In recent weeks, the Pentagon has urged several NATO allies, among them Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, to tone down their public warnings about the threat from Russia, four people familiar with the matter told Reuters. Pentagon officials argued that some European statements undermined Europe's security, the sources said. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby recently advised a Baltic official against any "poking" of the Russians, one of the people said.

Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine is in its fifth year, and Moscow has spread a deniable arson and sabotage campaign across Europe. As Washington offers Moscow sanctions relief and presses Kyiv to stop hitting Russian energy, the restraint it seeks appears to fall on those Russia threatens, first Ukraine and now NATO's eastern flank.

An Estonian delegation was told to be "measured"

As an example of unhelpful rhetoric, Colby cited Europeans' public suggestions that Russia was "cornered like a rat," the person said. Reuters could not determine whose words he meant. In late September, Estonia said Russia had ordered the arson at Milrem Robotics, a Tallinn company supplying ground robots to Ukraine, and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal likened Putin to a "rat in the corner." Michal said Putin was stepping up activity in Europe to erode the West's backing for Kyiv, and that the surest deterrent was to "back Ukraine."

At another meeting, Pentagon officials asked an Estonian delegation to keep its communications "measured," a person briefed on the encounter said. Another European official described the Pentagon's private messaging this way:

"We are helping you. The Americans are there… Just don't be loud. Don't make noise."

One European official called the advice cordial but baffling, since the Baltic states' own intelligence services have repeatedly judged it unlikely in recent months that Russia would test NATO's mutual defense provisions.

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The Pentagon refused to discuss "private conversations among allies," and the Baltic defense ministries did not reply.

One messenger is a key figure in the review of US troops in Europe

Colby is a key figure in the Pentagon's ongoing review of US force posture in Europe, which could lead to a sharp troop drawdown. In September, the Pentagon was weighing pulling up to 40,000 troops from Europe.

Russia has lately stepped up its deniable attacks on NATO members, Western intelligence officials say. Its suspected arson campaign against Starlink sites serving Ukraine has reached Lithuania, and on 28 October German prosecutors announced the arrest of two Belarusians suspected of plotting arson near Nuremberg. Russia denies running a sabotage campaign. Meanwhile, US officials have discussed business deals with Russia, which many European officials oppose.

O ateliê de vestidos de noiva My Vintage Dress, localizado na capital paulista, decretou o fim de suas atividades em nota alegando agravamento da situação financeira da empresa, alvo de protestos de clientes que denunciaram estelionato após não receberem suas encomendas, no início de setembro.

A loja diz que os impactos da decisão e suas pendências estão sendo avaliadas por profissionais, e orienta as clientes lesadas a entrarem em contato diretamente com o advogado de defesa.

Como motivo do fechamento definitivo, a My Vintage Dress aponta limitações concretas de estrutura e capacidade financeira. Anteriormente a empresa tinha declarado apenas a interrupção da produção.

Relembre o caso

No dia primeiro de setembro deste ano, um grupo de noivas protestaram em frente ao ateliê, localizado na rua Fradique Coutinho, em Pinheiros, zona Oeste da capital paulista. As clientes relataram que não receberam encomendas de vestidos de noiva e não tinham resposta sobre a situação.

Segundo testemunhas ouvidas pela CNN Brasil, a empresa desmarcava pedidos das clientes para verem os seus vestidos, não dava atualizações sobre o processo de produção e não entregavam a encomenda na data marcada sem qualquer esclarecimento.

A SSP (Secretaria de Segurança Pública) informou na época que ocorrências relativas ao caso estavam sendo registradas como estelionato e as autoridades policiais avaliavam cada situação para adotar as medidas cabíveis. A reportagem solicitou uma atualização sobre o caso para a polícia, mas ainda não houve retorno.

No dia 3 de setembro, foi protocolada uma ação de despejo contra a loja na 2ª Vara Cível do Foro Regional de Pinheiros por falta de pagamento de IPTU por parte do ateliê.

Em depoimento sobre o caso de estelionato no dia 4 de setembro, a proprietária Camila Rossi alegou que teria sofrido um golpe no valor de R$ 1 milhão e por isso teria interrompido a produção e enfrentava dificuldades.

Justiça do Rio de Janeiro decreta falência da Oi | CNN MERCADO

O que diz a defesa

O advogado de defesa da My Vintage Dress esclareceu a CNN Brasil que teve que deixar o imóvel por dívidas e tentou retomar a produção na casa dos funcionários. Porém, alegou que clientes seguiam ameaçando os trabalhadores no local, que temiam agressões.

Além disso, ele disse que a empresa tentou formas de retomar a produção, como venda da marca e atração de investidores para injetar recursos financeiros, mas que todas as controvérsias e problemas afastaram as negociações.

O ateliê se encontra em estado de insolvência e declarou que a qualquer momento a falência deve ser decretada.

Cerca de 300 clientes tem pedido de vestidos de noiva em aberto, sendo 112 com pedido de cancelamento em aberto até essa terça-feira (27), e pouco menos de 200 casos com entrega programada até 2028 e que não chegaram a ser produzidos segundo a defesa.

A CNN Brasil pediu atualização para a SSP (Secretaria de Segurança Pública) sobre os casos investigados, mas até a última atualização desta matéria não teve retorno.

Brasil registra 1 estelionato a cada 16 segundos, diz levantamento

*Sob supervisão de Carolina Figueiredo

Click to see the full-size image

Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

Security tensions between Japan and China are escalating while the former strengthens its long-range strike capabilities with American support.

Washington and Tokyo’s latest moves to reinforce their military presence along the so-called first island chain also mark another step in the broader US-China strategic rivalry across the Indo-Pacific region.

Originally conceived as a Cold War US defensive perimeter (stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines), the first island chain is increasingly becoming the centerpiece of an elaborate American-led military architecture designed to constrain Beijing’s growing maritime power.

The recent agreement between Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to implement an “effective denial defense” along that chain illustrates the shift. They also pledged continued cooperation on ammunition production for a potentially prolonged conflict.

During the Keen Sword 2027 exercises now underway, US and Japanese forces plan to deploy mobile missile systems, including American system NMESIS, on Yonaguni Island near Taiwan. Tokyo has already deployed domestically developed long-range (anti-ship) missiles capable of reaching China’s coastal areas.

The wider context is hard to miss. In November 2025 Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi  made a statement linking a Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own survival, which triggered sharp Chinese protests and a cascade of diplomatic, economic, and maritime frictions.

Beijing then restricted dual-use exports to Japan, while coast guard vessels and radar incidents added to the pressure.

As commentator Oliver Griffin puts it, Beijing views Japan’s buildup as a drift toward neo-militarism.

From Tokyo’s perspective, China’s expanding naval reach makes these steps necessary. This is therefore a classic security dilemma. Measures one side takes to feel “safer” make the other feel less secure, prompting further responses.

The first island chain is both a barrier and a gateway. As expert Simone Chiusa  notes, Chinese vessels seeking access to the open Western Pacific must navigate strategic chokepoints through its straits.

The strategic importance of these chokepoints illustrates Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic sea-power theory: control over key maritime routes and positions remains central to great-power rivalry.

American and Japanese planners see distributed missiles and interdiction systems as deterrence by denial. Beijing sees preparations to restrict its access.

The paradox is clear enough: the more Washington and Tokyo seek to reinforce deterrence, the more Beijing may perceive “encirclement” and accelerate its own capabilities.

Japan’s southwestern islands are thereby becoming an operational frontier of sorts rather than a mere defensive perimeter. An alliance designed primarily to protect Japanese territory then gradually becomes an instrument for projecting power into a Taiwan-related contingency.

As I wrote in May 2026, regarding US missile deployments in the Philippines, Washington’s actions near Taiwan fuel Chinese fears of a containment architecture involving Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The pattern continues.

China’s maritime-industrial growth has become central to allied planning. As I’ve noted elsewhere, Chinese shipbuilding capacity (measured by gross tonnage) exceeds that of the United States – by a factor of over 200, according to a 2023 US naval intelligence estimate.

Joint Sino-Russian submarine patrols further signal a new maritime era of coordination that certainly complicates American assumptions of uncontested sea control.

Yet the contest is no longer confined to the first island chain. A Japanese Self-Defense Force colonel has proposed a second-island-chain air bridge linking Japan and Australia (with US participation) for logistics and reinforcement – the reasoning being that China’s lengthening maritime strike reach now threatens operations farther into the Pacific.

Some American analysts warn that “pulling back to the second chain” would be strategic folly, while advocates of strategic restraint see a forward approach as intensifying insecurity.

For Japan, the predicament is particularly delicate. Tokyo is becoming more indispensable to Washington’s regional planning at the very moment when Japanese strategists worry about possible US-China accommodation under President Trump’s “transactional” approach.

The alliance security dilemma is real enough: fear of “abandonment” coexists with fear of entrapment in a Taiwan conflict. Japanese policymakers are of course not passive instruments. They act on their own threat perceptions while navigating uncertainty about long-term American commitments.

Gray-zone pressures add another layer. Coast guard patrols and incremental assertions of jurisdiction challenge the utility of high-end missile deployments – designed mainly for conventional scenarios.

Ultimately, efforts to preserve the existing “balance” in the Indo-Pacific may contribute to the very competition that makes that balance harder to sustain.

The American response to China’s rise has largely been to reinforce military alliances and expand forward deployments, risking an increasingly self-perpetuating cycle of militarization rather than fostering regional stability.

Washington is transforming Japan into a more central component of its forward maritime architecture – even as Beijing’s growing capabilities render that very architecture more contested. The risk here is that the cycle of reinforcement and reaction leaves all parties less secure than before.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Japan Faces Massive Energy Issues Due To US Wars, But Still Sends Troops Near Taiwan
• Cracks In The Coalition: Europe Picks Up The Phone To Moscow
• Iran Unveils Underground Arash Drone Arsenal (Videos)

The post Japan’s Militarization: Washington Fueling Chinese-Japanese Crisis appeared first on South Front.

The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.

The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.

American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.

The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.

The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.

The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.

The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.

The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation

Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.

He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.

His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.

Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.

The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.

If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.

Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.

One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.

There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.

But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.

Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.

Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.

The Problem with Reassuring Moscow

The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.

The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.

Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.

European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.

German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.

These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.

The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.

There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.

Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.

A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.

For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.

Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.

That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.

Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience

The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.

It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.

NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.

They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.

Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.

Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.

The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.

What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.

The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.

Pentagon officials have in recent weeks asked several NATO countries to tone down their rhetoric regarding the threat posed by Russia, arguing that some statements by European leaders and officials have undermined continental security, four people familiar with the matter said.

Among the nations that have received messages urging them to keep public statements in check are Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity. It was not clear if the messages, which were delivered in bilateral meetings, were conveyed to other European governments.

The US requests come as the Trump administration restarts an effort to press for a negotiated end to the full-scale war in Ukraine, now well into its fifth year. The latest push has blended incentives for Russia – including sanctions relief – with pressure on Ukraine to halt its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

Asked for comment, a Pentagon official said: “Private conversations among allies are just that, so we will not comment on these allegations.”

Among the comments that have drawn US officials’ attention are suggestions by European leaders that Russia is cornered and resorting to increasingly desperate measures as its invasion of Ukraine slows to a crawl, one of the people said.

Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a key figure in an ongoing review of US troop levels in Europe, was one of the US officials delivering the message, the people said. Reuters could not determine what other officials were involved.

None of the people, who include three European officials and a US official, suggested the advice was communicated in a confrontational manner.

US urges allies not to provoke Moscow

The US messages reflect a debate within NATO regarding how to publicly address the threat of an increasingly assertive Russia.

Some Western officials have argued that emphasizing the threat posed by Moscow could play into the hands of the Kremlin, which they say seeks to sow fear and undermine support for Ukraine.

Others argue European governments must be transparent to show their electorates that sacrifice and resources are needed to keep Moscow at bay. That is especially true as Russia appears to accelerate a covert campaign of sabotage throughout the continent.

Russia has denied that it is pursuing such a campaign.

Baltic states face pressure over public warnings

One of the people familiar told Reuters that Colby told a Baltic official recently that there should be no “poking” directed at the Russians.

The person said Colby pointed to Europeans publicly suggesting that Russia was “cornered like a rat” as an example of unhelpful rhetoric.

It was not clear what specific statement Colby was referring to. However, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal referred to Putin as a “rat in a corner” in late September, suggesting the Russian leader was resorting to sabotage efforts in Europe as Russia had become increasingly bogged down in Ukraine.

“We are helping you. The Americans are there,” said a separate European official, describing the Pentagon’s recent private messaging. “Just don’t be loud. Don’t make noise.”

In a separate recent meeting, the Pentagon urged an Estonian delegation to be “measured” in its communications, according to a person briefed on the encounter, though the person did not say Pentagon officials complained about any specific statement.

The defense ministries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not respond to requests for comment, while NATO declined to comment.

Russian sabotage fears divide NATO allies

One of the European officials said that the Pentagon’s advice, while cordial, was baffling, given that intelligence services in the Baltic states have in recent months consistently played down the probability of Russia testing NATO’s mutual defense provisions.

Other NATO intelligence services, by contrast, have publicly warned that Russia could dramatically ramp up its sabotage campaign in the near future.

The Pentagon messages to NATO officials come at a fraught time for European security.

Moscow has recently intensified its campaign of deniable attacks on NATO countries, Western intelligence officials have said.

On Wednesday, German prosecutors said two Belarusians were arrested for allegedly planning to set ​fire to a building or critical infrastructure facility ⁠in the Nuremberg area. In September, the German government blamed Russia for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, allegations Moscow has denied.

At the same time, US officials have been discussing potential business deals with Russia as part of the Trump administration’s push for peace in Ukraine. Those efforts have drawn mixed reactions from European officials, many of whom are pushing for the Kremlin’s continued economic isolation.

US reviews military presence in Europe

Pentagon planners, meanwhile, are reviewing Washington’s force posture in Europe, a process that could see a sharp drawdown in America’s troop presence on the continent.

US officials have said European NATO members need to assume more responsibility for their own defense, particularly as the US focuses on threats in the Middle East, Latin America and East Asia.

Santiago de Chile, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El Campeonato Nacional de Fútbol de primera división de Chile arranca hoy su etapa decisiva, cuando faltan cinco jornadas para el cierre y el líder Colo Colo carece aún de la ventaja necesaria que le otorgaría la corona.

The post Torneo de fútbol de Chile entra a su fase decisiva first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.

VTM

Cerca de 60 expositores e feirantes participaram na segunda edição da Feira Berço D’Ouro, em Santa Marta de Penaguião. Os dados são da autarquia e apenas das inscrições a dois dias da iniciativa.

Entre os participantes esteve António Gonçalves, agricultor da região, que levou cebolas, nabiças e feijão, produtos cultivados na sua própria horta. Foi a primeira vez que participou numa feira deste género e a expectativa era conseguir algum rendimento adicional. “Aproveitamos para ganhar aqui mais alguma coisinha”, explicou à VTM, num contexto em que, segundo referiu, a venda das uvas também não tem compensado como desejava.

Amélia Prior, residente no concelho, apresentou produtos caseiros, como marmelada e bolos, enquanto a sua prima disponibilizou roupa em segunda mão e trabalhos de Natal. Para a participante, a feira é uma oportunidade para quem produz em pequena escala e para os consumidores que procuram preços mais acessíveis. “É bom para todos, para o concelho e para nós, que fazemos as coisas”, considerou, defendendo a continuidade da iniciativa.

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The post Feira Berço D’Ouro reuniu cerca de 60 expositores appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

Three maritime drones struck a container ship sailing in the Black Sea off the coast of Bulgaria on Wednesday, the country's defense minister said, the latest in a string of such incidents on NATO's eastern flank

The post Drone Attack Hits Container Ship Off Bulgaria’s Black Sea Coast appeared first on Breitbart.

Confronto vivace a Battitori liberi, su Radio Cusano, tra il leader di Futuro Nazionale, Roberto Vannacci, e Savino Balzano, conduttore della trasmissione insieme a Gianluca Fabi. A far scattare il battibecco è la posizione dell’ex generale sull’Unione europea e sull’euro: a Balzano che lo incalza sulle sue dichiarazioni contestandogli una posizione poco incisiva rispetto alle aspettative del suo elettorato, Vannacci replica con tono piccato, respingendo la ricostruzione del saggista (“Sbagliato, è una falsificazione”) e chiarendo che l’uscita dall’Ue e dalla moneta unica resta una possibilità, anche se non figura tra gli obiettivi programmatici del suo partito.

Il politico invita Balzano a leggere il programma di Futuro Nazionale: “Né nel programma né nelle nostre intenzioni c’è quella di mettere in piano un’uscita dall’Ue e dall’euro come punto programmatico del partito. Abbiamo sempre avuto un approccio critico nei confronti di questa Unione europea e di questa Unione monetaria, che vogliamo cambiare”. L’obiettivo, spiega, è “andare a ridiscutere i trattati principali dell’Unione europea”. E cita AfD in Germania, Rassemblement National in Francia, Vox in Spagna e altre forze politiche europee che, a suo giudizio, possono favorire una revisione degli accordi di Maastricht. Poi precisa: “Non escludiamo tuttavia, nel caso di impossibilità di cambiare questa Unione dall’interno, la possibilità anche di uscire“.

Una risposta che non convince Balzano: “Mi sembra una posizione un po’ vaga”.
Vannacci replica: “Non è vaga. È una questione di tempi, di fattibilità e di possibilità di intervenire”.
Ma il conduttore torna alla carica: “Io parlo da cittadino. Mi sembra una posizione vaga. Alla fine questa Unione europea non piace a nessuno, non piaceva neanche al Pd. Pure il Pd vuole cambiare l’Unione europea. Uno da lei si aspetterebbe una posizione più tranchant”.
Il leader di Futuro Nazionale rivendica allora la differenza tra il proprio progetto politico e quello dei democratici: “Il mio partito non si chiama Italexit, quindi già uno se ne dovrebbe essere accorto prima. Il Pd vuole cambiare questa Unione europea nel senso di una maggiore integrazione. Noi invece vogliamo l’Europa delle patrie, delle nazioni e dei popoli sovrani, che è una cosa ben diversa”.

Per Vannacci, tentare di modificare l’Unione dall’interno è una strada più praticabile rispetto all’uscita immediata attraverso l’articolo 50 dei trattati europei. “L’uscita dall’Unione europea è una cosa che gli sprovveduti tirano fuori così, tanto per prendere qualche voto. Chi ha seguito almeno il percorso della Brexit sa che è una cosa tutt’altro che facile e sa che molti in Inghilterra oggi se ne stanno pentendo. Vedasi la Scozia, che sta cercando un percorso alternativo. Quindi bisogna pensarci bene”.
Il discorso si estende anche all’Alleanza Atlantica. “Non escludiamo la possibile uscita anche dalla Nato – afferma Vannacci, che indica come priorità il rafforzamento del peso dell’Italia nelle organizzazioni internazionali – Vogliamo rafforzare la posizione nazionale all’interno di queste organizzazioni e non più subirle da succubi. Vogliamo diventarne attori che riescono a perorare l’interesse nazionale”. E contesta le direttive e i regolamenti che, a suo dire, la Commissione europea impone agli Stati membri.

Balzano, però, torna a punzecchiarlo e chiude con una battuta: “Faccia attenzione a non cascare nel ‘ma anche’ di Veltroni, però. Glielo do come consiglio da cittadino”.
Vannacci non lascia cadere la provocazione: “Veltroni fa un altro lavoro rispetto al mio. Io quello che dico lo mantengo e l’ho sempre fatto nella mia vita”. E ribadisce che la linea del partito è sempre la stessa: “Chiunque abbia letto il programma di Futuro Nazionale sa che questa è stata la posizione sin dall’inizio”.

L'articolo Botta e risposta tra Vannacci e Balzano. “Non escludiamo di uscire da Ue e Nato”. “Posizione vaga” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Click to see the full-size image

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

A proposed trilateral meeting among Russian President Vladimir Putin, United States President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to address the concessions Ukraine will need to make to end the conflict, according to retired German Bundeswehr general Roland Kather. In an interview with a German television channel, Kather said the logical conclusion of the fighting is a diplomatic settlement reached through negotiations, and that Trump is dissatisfied with the unresolved situation and intends to push for an agreement.

The German general stressed that the summit will not be a casual discussion or merely an opportunity to “have coffee” and that they must prepare specific decisions in advance. He suggested that the three leaders will examine three core issues related to Ukraine: territorial problems that can be settled only at the heads-of-state level, Ukraine’s permanent neutral status, and the future size of its armed forces.

Kather expressed doubt that Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky is prepared to offer meaningful concessions. At the same time, he said Putin has no reason to retreat because Moscow still has the advantage.

Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov has already said that preparations for a Putin-Trump-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the upcoming APEC summit in China are underway. Trump has said the summit is needed mainly to discuss nuclear disarmament, though the Ukraine question is widely expected to feature.

The three leaders are discussing this issue among themselves, as Ukraine has nothing substantial left to offer Russia at the negotiating table. Moscow has also been clear about its ultimatum – demands met through a negotiated deal in which Ukraine cedes territory and accepts neutrality, or the military operation continues until Russia achieves its objectives on the battlefield. Since Trump has accepted that Ukraine no longer brings anything of value to negotiations but is still encouraged to fight by Brussels, he will directly negotiate with Putin and Xi to end the war.

Earlier this month, Putin signaled Russia’s readiness to resume trilateral talks on a Ukraine settlement focused on security guarantees and the future architecture of European security. Ushakov said such talks could resume after the US midterm elections on November 3.

Meanwhile, the EU is facing the consequences of years of confrontational policy. The newspaper La Verità noted that the EU’s intransigent stance toward Russia has left Brussels scrambling to secure a seat at the table with other powers, saying negotiation is a fundamental tool of political power and that when one actor stops talking to another, it lets others set the terms of peace. The Italian daily described this as the humiliating lesson the EU appears to have learned.

Since 2022, the EU has tightened economic sanctions, pursued Russia’s political isolation, and provided military support to Ukraine. Brussels is now considering appointing a senior representative to establish a direct channel with Moscow as it urgently seeks to restore dialogue with a government it had vowed never to normalize relations with. The main challenge is finding someone who can speak for the EU without being seen in Moscow as merely voicing hostility. Neither European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen nor the majority of EU members are considered suitable, given their repeated criticisms of Russia.

European leaders continue to insist that no agreement on European security be reached without EU involvement. However, the EU’s influence has diminished because it long refused to keep channels open. Brussels has reportedly considered five possible mediators to contact Russia on a Ukraine peace deal: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

Putin said former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder would be his preferred negotiator, adding that the Europeans should choose someone they trust who has not made harsh statements against Moscow.

The Russian military and political advantage narrows Ukraine’s chances of the Kremlin making concessions, a reality the EU stubbornly refuses to accept. At the same time, the EU’s scramble to find an acceptable negotiator highlights the economic and political damage that self-imposed isolation from Russia has caused. Without open communication channels and the ability to shift the balance of power, both Kiev and Brussels face an agreement largely shaped by Trump, Putin, and Xi.

Preparations for the trilateral summit within the APEC context, along with Russia’s stated readiness to resume talks after the US midterm elections, suggest that Kiev’s window to negotiate on a realistic basis and secure a better deal is closing. The capacity for the three Great Powers to set the agenda without Ukrainian participation further underlines how far the balance has shifted in Russia’s favor since the conflict began, despite Western sanctions.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Russian Army Advances Towards Konka River in Zaporozhye
• Russia and Ukraine Exchange Strikes: Railway Infrastructure, Energy, Metallurgy, and Chemical Industry Targets Hit
• Russia Tests Optical Navigation System to Help Drones Defeat Jamming

The post Ukraine Forced Into Concessions Ahead Of Putin, Trump And Xi Summit appeared first on South Front.

• NATO has provided new details about its AI model for predicting Russian drone strikes on the front lines.
• Called Initiative 13 or Model 13, it works for about 31 miles behind the line of contact.
• The AI gives commanders a map showing the next day's expected Russian drone activity.

A new NATO artificial intelligence model gives Ukraine's forces a frontline map of where Russian drone activity is expected the next day, per the alliance's innovation center.

The system, called Initiative 13 or Model 13, "turns an array of disparate data into a clear map of expected activity" for commanders to plan their next day of operations, a spokesperson for NATO's Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center, or JATEC, told Business Insider.

Business Insider reported on Ukraine's announcement of the program earlier this month, but JATEC is now providing new details on how it works.

Initiative 13 covers areas 5 to 50 km, or roughly 3 to 31 miles, of Ukrainian territory behind the line of contact, and divides that space into geographical cells, per JATEC.

"For each cell, the system determines the expected intensity of strike and reconnaissance activity of UAVs, the level of threat, the trend of its change, and the range of possible values," its spokesperson said.

The map shows a forecast for the next day, helping commanders to highlight risk areas so they can better deploy their forces and equipment, they said.

They added that the AI model is trained on battlefield data and considers previous Russian drone activity, what types of drones were used, when and how they were deployed, weather conditions, terrain, and distance to the line of contact.

"Initiative 13 does not replace data from the current situation and commander's decisions," the JATEC spokesperson added. JATEC is NATO's joint organization with Ukraine, based in Poland, that aims to glean lessons and innovations from the war.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in mid-October that Initiative 13, which it called Model 13, was "ready for integration into the Armed Forces of Ukraine's situational awareness systems."

The AI model, it said, could predict Russia's drone strikes with "high probability."

Kyiv's forces use a battlespace management system called Delta, which feeds data from the front lines onto an interactive map that commanders can access via laptop, phone, or tablet.

The drone-predicting AI was developed by Ukraine's forces and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, with support from JATEC.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in its initial announcement that another AI model, dubbed No. 32, for planning artillery deployments was also in the works but is still in prototype stages.

Artificial intelligence has increasingly been making its way into Ukraine's war, from helping mid-range attack drones identify and strike targets to sending uncrewed ground vehicles to autonomously complete supply runs.

Washington has selected Poland to host a European servicing centre for PAC-3 interceptors, strengthening the country’s role in NATO’s air defence infrastructure. The investment comes as wars in Ukraine and the Middle East expose the difficulties of sustaining missile stocks during prolonged conflicts.

Poland has been selected to host a major European maintenance centre for Patriot air defence interceptors, marking a further expansion of the country’s role in NATO’s military infrastructure and the transatlantic defence industry.

The decision, announced on 27 October by the United States government and American defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, will establish a dedicated facility for PAC-3 missiles used in Patriot air and missile defence systems.

The investment is estimated at approximately one billion zlotys, equivalent to around €227 million.

Poland secured the project following competition with Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.

The facility is intended to provide maintenance, repair, refurbishment and technical recertification services to European operators of PAC-3 interceptors.

Its importance extends beyond the immediate economic benefits for Poland.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed pressure on the availability of advanced air defence missiles, raising questions about Europe’s ability to sustain military operations when demand for interceptors exceeds existing supply.

A new role for Poland’s defence industry

Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka announced the selection of Poland as the location for the maintenance centre.

According to Lockheed Martin’s official announcement, the facility will support NATO allies operating PAC-3 interceptors through repairs, lifecycle maintenance, refurbishment and recertification.

The centre will also provide testing capabilities intended to improve operational readiness and reduce the time required to return missiles to service.

The exact location and final implementation arrangements remain subject to further negotiations.

Polish officials have indicated that the centre could become operational in approximately a year, although the schedule will depend on the conclusion of agreements and construction or adaptation of the necessary facilities.

The project is expected to create specialised employment and increase opportunities for Polish defence suppliers.

It also reinforces Poland’s position as a manufacturing and logistics centre on NATO’s eastern flank.

Maintenance is not missile production

An important distinction concerns the facility’s actual purpose.

The Polish centre will maintain and service PAC-3 missiles. It is not being presented as a new production line capable of manufacturing large quantities of additional interceptors.

Modern air defence missiles contain complex guidance systems, propulsion components and other equipment requiring specialised inspection and maintenance.

Their operational availability depends not only on the number produced but also on the ability to store, test, maintain and recertify existing stocks.

When these services are concentrated outside Europe, operators may face lengthy transport and servicing arrangements.

Locating maintenance capacity closer to European users should reduce some of those delays.

However, the facility will not independently resolve shortages caused by the consumption of missiles during military operations.

Additional manufacturing capacity, access to components and long-term procurement agreements remain necessary to increase overall inventories.

Ukraine and the Middle East increase demand

Patriot systems have become particularly important because of their role in defending military facilities, population centres and critical infrastructure against aircraft and missiles.

Ukraine has repeatedly requested additional Patriot interceptors to protect cities and energy installations from Russian attacks.

At the same time, the conflict in the Middle East has increased demand for advanced air defence capabilities.

Both theatres place pressure on supply chains whose production capacity cannot be expanded immediately.

Manufacturing sophisticated interceptors involves specialised components, qualified suppliers, extensive testing and demanding certification procedures.

The result is a gap between the speed at which missiles can be expended during sustained operations and the time required to replace them.

The United States has undertaken efforts to accelerate PAC-3 production.

Lockheed Martin announced that it had received a major US government contract in 2026 to support further expansion of PAC-3 MSE manufacturing.

The planned maintenance centre in Poland represents a complementary investment, intended to improve the availability of missiles already held by European forces.

A transatlantic industrial project

Although Poland will host the facility, the project has a wider European dimension.

Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are expected to participate in important elements of supply-chain integration.

These countries were among the original participants in the industrial cooperation arrangements alongside Poland and the United States.

The structure reflects NATO’s increasing emphasis on dispersing critical maintenance and logistical capabilities across allied territory.

A geographically distributed system can reduce dependence on individual sites and make it easier to sustain equipment during periods of disruption.

It can also help European defence companies develop technical expertise through cooperation with American manufacturers.

However, the arrangement will remain part of a transatlantic supply chain, with significant industrial and technological responsibilities retained by the United States.

The project therefore illustrates both Europe’s expanding defence-industrial role and its continuing dependence on American missile technology.

Poland’s expanding air defence network

The decision complements Poland’s broader investment in integrated air and missile defence.

Under the Wisła programme, Warsaw has been acquiring Patriot systems and associated interceptors as part of a wider modernisation of its armed forces.

Two Patriot batteries reached operational readiness in December 2025, according to Euronews’ reporting on the project.

Poland has also ordered additional batteries and substantial quantities of PAC-3 MSE missiles, with deliveries continuing through the remainder of the decade.

These investments are intended to improve protection against aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missile threats.

The maintenance centre should complement those acquisitions by strengthening technical support for the interceptors.

Readiness depends on more than procurement

The Polish investment demonstrates how NATO’s air defence priorities are changing.

For many years, procurement discussions concentrated primarily on purchasing new weapons systems.

The experience of prolonged conflicts has placed greater emphasis on ammunition availability, repair facilities, spare parts, storage and industrial capacity.

Those supporting capabilities determine how long military forces can sustain operations.

The new centre will not eliminate the need for additional missiles, but it could reduce servicing delays and improve the readiness of European stocks.

Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the scale of operations, access to components and the speed with which maintenance services can be delivered.

For Poland, hosting the facility strengthens its position within NATO’s defence-industrial network.

For the Alliance, it represents an attempt to address one of the practical weaknesses exposed by recent conflicts: acquiring advanced weapons is only part of the challenge; keeping them available for use is equally important.

Romanian intelligence services say a Russian-directed network was responsible for a fire near an arms manufacturing facility in Brașov. Investigations involving Germany and Poland have exposed what authorities describe as a wider operation targeting military and industrial defence infrastructure across Europe.

Romania has accused Russia of coordinating a cross-border sabotage network responsible for an industrial fire near an arms manufacturing facility, prompting a diplomatic confrontation with Moscow and investigations involving several European countries.

Romanian intelligence and prosecutors announced on 26th October that they had identified three foreign nationals allegedly involved in the operation, which caused a fire on an industrial site in Brașov on 14th September.

The suspects, two Belarusian nationals and one Ukrainian, are alleged to have participated in a network directed by individuals operating from Russia.

Two suspects have been detained in Germany, while a third has been located in Poland.

Romania is seeking their extradition as investigators examine possible connections to other attempted attacks against military and industrial installations.

Russia has rejected the allegations.

The case has drawn attention to the security of European defence production facilities at a time when NATO governments are seeking to increase military manufacturing capacity and sustain assistance to Ukraine.

Fire near a Romanian arms manufacturer

The investigation concerns an industrial complex in Brașov, a city with an established defence manufacturing sector.

The fire occurred on 14th September at premises situated close to CARFIL SA, a subsidiary of Romania’s state-owned defence company ROMARM.

According to the Romanian Intelligence Service, the incident was caused by individuals belonging to a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation.

The fire damaged premises occupied by several commercial businesses.

Although the industrial site is associated with the CARFIL complex, authorities have not established publicly that the arms manufacturing facility itself sustained damage.

That geographical distinction is important when assessing the consequences of the operation.

CARFIL manufactures military equipment and ammunition and has pursued partnerships involving drones, explosives and other defence technologies.

Its proximity to the incident has heightened concerns about the security of industrial facilities supporting Romania’s armed forces.

Suspects identified in three countries

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism, known as DIICOT, says the evidence connects three individuals to the incident.

According to Romanian national news agency AGERPRES, the Bucharest Court of Appeal issued European arrest warrants following the investigation.

Two suspects were detained in Germany while allegedly preparing similar operations.

The third was located in Poland, where authorities received a further European arrest warrant issued on 26 October.

Romanian prosecutors are pursuing extradition procedures.

The nationalities of the suspects do not establish responsibility on the part of Belarus or Ukraine. Romanian authorities attribute the alleged coordination to individuals based in Russia.

The investigation also indicates that the Brașov incident may not have been an isolated operation.

Romanian intelligence claims the network’s potential targets included government-owned and private arms manufacturers, military-related facilities and other strategic industrial sites in several European countries.

Those claims remain subject to ongoing criminal investigation.

Bucharest summons Russian ambassador

The Romanian government escalated the matter diplomatically on 27th October.

Foreign Minister Dan Neculăescu summoned Russia’s ambassador, Vladimir Lipaev, to deliver a formal protest concerning the alleged operation.

According to the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s account reported by AGERPRES, Bucharest stated that evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated Russian responsibility.

The ministry described the operation as part of a broader pattern of hostile activity affecting European states.

President Nicușor Dan also condemned the alleged sabotage, linking it to attempts to undermine European security and solidarity.

Moscow rejected the accusations.

The Russian Embassy maintained that the allegations were unfounded and disputed Romania’s account of the evidence presented during the diplomatic meeting.

The conflicting positions mean the attribution remains contested, notwithstanding the conclusions announced by Romania’s intelligence authorities.

A recruitment model designed for deniability

The Romanian Intelligence Service has provided details about how it believes the wider network recruits and directs participants.

According to its statement, recruitment can begin through social media with offers of payment for apparently minor activities, such as photographing or observing particular locations.

Subsequent assignments may become more serious, involving property destruction, arson or other acts of violence.

Individuals may be targeted because of financial difficulties or other personal vulnerabilities.

The service also identified methods allegedly used to conceal movements, payments and communications.

These include encrypted messaging applications, telephone numbers registered outside the country of operation and accommodation or transport arrangements booked under other identities.

Such methods can complicate investigations because the individuals physically carrying out an operation may have limited knowledge of the organisers.

Romanian authorities emphasised that individual indicators should be assessed in context and do not themselves prove involvement in sabotage.

Defence factories become a security concern

The case has implications beyond Romania.

European governments are investing in ammunition production, air defence systems and military technologies, partly in response to the continuing war in Ukraine.

The resulting expansion of manufacturing capacity creates additional infrastructure requiring protection.

Industrial sites may be vulnerable not only to direct attacks but also to disruption affecting nearby businesses, transport networks, power supplies and specialist contractors.

The Brașov investigation illustrates how an incident outside a defence factory’s perimeter can nevertheless raise questions about the security of the wider industrial complex.

It also demonstrates the importance of cooperation between European intelligence services and criminal investigators.

The detention of suspects in Germany and the identification of another in Poland show that investigations into alleged sabotage may cross several jurisdictions.

The wider European response

Romania’s allegations come amid growing concern over hostile activities involving cyberattacks, disinformation, surveillance and physical sabotage.

Attributing such incidents to a foreign government requires intelligence assessments, criminal evidence and international cooperation.

The public allegations against Russia do not replace the judicial process concerning the three suspects.

However, the investigation has already prompted a diplomatic response and additional scrutiny of industrial security.

For European governments seeking to expand their defence industries, the immediate challenge is protecting production facilities and associated infrastructure without allowing relatively small-scale disruptive operations to undermine wider manufacturing programmes.

The outcome of Romania’s criminal proceedings will be important in establishing the responsibility of those accused and clarifying how the alleged network operated across national borders.

Main Image: By MAPN – http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20051020_expomil?page=1, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14997305

O Timão venceu as seis finais que disputou na história: 2017 (em parceria com o Audax), 2019, 2021, 2023, 2024 e 2025. Em 2020, as alvinegras caíram para o América de Cali (Colômbia) nas semifinais. Dois anos depois, foram surpreendidas pelo Boca Juniors (Argentina) nas quartas de final.

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⚫⚪ As atuais campeãs... 𝑵𝑨 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑳 𝑴𝑨𝑰𝑺 𝑼𝑴𝑨 𝑽𝑬𝒁! ✔️ @asbrabas https://t.co/fA1SdBnGOz

— CONMEBOL Libertadores Femenina (@LibertadoresFEM) October 28, 2026

O Santa Fe saiu na frente. Aos 28 minutos, a atacante Manuela González lançou a bola desde o campo de defesa e acabou encontrando Daniela Garavito em velocidade, nas costas da marcação. A meia invadiu a área e chutou na saída da goleira Lelê. Anulado inicialmente por um suposto impedimento, o gol foi validado após intervenção da arbitragem de vídeo (VAR).

A resposta corintiana veio aos 36. Na sobra de uma bola afastada por Cristina Motta, após lançamento da também zagueira Thais Ferreira, a meia Letícia Monteiro bateu de primeira, da entrada da área, acertando o cantinho esquerdo da goleira Jimena Ospina.

Na etapa final, o Timão chegou ao gol da virada no melhor momento das adversárias. Aos 30 minutos, Letícia Monteiro acionou a volante Duda Sampaio, que tentou o passe de calcanhar, de primeira, na entrada da área. Motta tentou afastar, mas pegou mal e a bola sobrou livre com a lateral Gi Fernandes, que mandou para as redes, decretando o triunfo alvinegro.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Segue nostro Telegram.

E’ stato sufficiente che l’edizione di giovedi del giornale Politico.eu scrivesse qualche riga per mettere in moto una valanga, rivelando che l’Unione Europea ritiene di trovarsi di fronte all’escalation delle operazioni ibride russe e che si sta preparando all’eventualità che, prima o poi, queste azioni provochino delle vittime in Paesi Ue o Nato. Insomma quasi un auspicio che da qualche parte ci scappi il morto da poter strumentalizzare ai fini della propaganda di guerra, sia sul fronte esterno che sul fronte interno.

Si tratta di uno scenario che in Italia abbiamo purtroppo visto e subìto spesso: dalla strage di Piazza Fontana in poi. Su questo, nostro malgrado, potremmo tenere delle lectio magistralis a tutti gli altri paesi europei che non hanno sperimentato tragedie e orrori analoghi

Il giornale Politico.eu riferisce di una riunione di diplomatici della Ue a porte chiuse, senza telefonini e senza assistenti ha valutato il rischio di attacchi gravi, “capaci di provocare vittime su larga scala”. Due fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato a Politico che una riunione degli ambasciatori presso l’Ue, svoltasi mercoledì scorso, ha riguardato proprio questo tipo di scenario.

Per una fonte diplomatica citata dal sito, “data la portata e la vastità dell’azione russa, è inevitabile che prima o poi vi siano delle vittime. È pura fortuna che non ce ne siano ancora state”.

“È abbastanza ovvio che, quando la Russia utilizza strumenti sempre più letali per mettere alla prova la nostra preparazione e la nostra volontà di adottare contromisure, a un certo punto ci saranno delle vittime”, ha dichiarato a Politico la finlandese Teija Tiilikainen, direttore del Centro europeo di eccellenza per il contrasto alle minacce ibride. “Prima o poi, intenzionalmente o meno, questo è ciò che accade”.

Se diversi cittadini di Paesi membri dell’UE o della NATO venissero uccisi in quello che sembra essere un attacco, la pressione ad agire sarebbe enorme per entrambe le istituzioni. “Temiamo fortemente che a un certo punto venga tolta la vita a un nostro alleato”, ha affermato un diplomatico della NATO, il che renderebbe la pressione ad agire “molto alta”, riporta ancora Politico.eu.

Ma l’isteria ormai è talmente dilagante che alcuni Paesi membri della Ue, ritengono che debba essere la Nato e non l’Unione Europea la sede opportuna per trattare di questi argomenti e delle possibili soluzioni, soprattutto perché le riunioni della Ue sarebbero troppo “porose” per la fuga di notizie o di informazioni sensibili.

A rendere il tutto ancora più strumentalizzabile ai fini della mera propaganda di guerra esterna ed interna in Europa, vi è anche il tentativo di leggere le proteste giovanili e popolari in Francia come eterodirette o articolazioni di progetti di destabilizzazione. E in questo gioco sporco tutto fa brodo, dalla guerra ibrida della Russia alle ambizioni dell’islam politico.

“Quello che sta accadendo in Francia non è altro che immigrazione di massa fuori controllo“, ha scritto Donald Trump il 6 ottobre sul suo social Truth riferendosi agli scontri e alle manifestazioni che stanno attraversando la Francia. Per il presidente americano “non si tratta delle scuole”, ma dell’”Islam che vuole prendere il controllo di un Paese un tempo grande“.

A fargli eco è subito arrivato l’eurodeputato lepenista Fabrice Leggeri, esponente del gruppo della destra dei Patrioti al Parlamento di Strasburgo, secondo il quale “sulle proteste in Francia Trump non ha del tutto torto”. Perché, ha affermato durante un punto stampa al Parlamento Europeo, “le rivolte in corso, le rivolte dei cosiddetti studenti o presunti studenti, sono di fatto strumentalizzate dall’estrema sinistra e, come sappiamo, l’estrema sinistra è infiltrata da elementi islamisti”.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Se al posto degli ebrei mettiamo gli islamici, sono esattamente gli stessi nemici messi all’indice in Europa dai nazifascisti negli anni Trenta.

Articolo originale:  contropiano.org

The European Commission has opened talks with oil producers, refiners and NATO over the future of Europe’s fuel industry, exposing growing tensions between decarbonisation, industrial competitiveness and the demands of military preparedness.

The European Union is reconsidering the strategic importance of its oil-refining industry as disruptions to international energy supplies and growing defence requirements force Brussels to examine whether Europe can afford further reductions in domestic fuel production.

On 28 October, the European Commission convened its first high-level dialogue with the European refining industry, bringing together energy companies, technology providers and representatives of NATO.

The meeting was chaired jointly by Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen and Defence and Space Commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

Its significance extends beyond the immediate increase in fuel prices associated with the conflict in the Middle East.

Brussels is confronting a longer-term problem: Europe intends to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, but its transport networks, industrial infrastructure and military forces remain substantially dependent on petroleum products.

The question is no longer simply how quickly the European economy can decarbonise. It is also how much refining capacity must be retained to guarantee essential fuel supplies during a geopolitical crisis.

A strategic industry under pressure

Europe’s refining industry occupies an important position in the continent’s energy system.

According to figures published by the European Commission, EU refineries supply approximately 70 per cent of the jet fuel and 85 per cent of the diesel consumed in Europe.

These products are essential not only for civilian transport and logistics but also for military aviation, armoured vehicles and the movement of equipment.

Maintaining adequate production capacity therefore has implications for both economic activity and defence readiness.

Yet European refineries have faced difficult commercial conditions for years.

High energy costs, international competition and declining expectations for long-term fossil-fuel demand have complicated investment decisions.

Refineries require substantial capital expenditure to remain competitive, meet environmental requirements and adapt production processes.

Companies considering whether to modernise facilities must consequently assess the profitability of assets that may be expected to operate in a progressively decarbonising economy.

The resulting uncertainty creates a problem for governments seeking to retain strategically important industrial capabilities.

The Middle East conflict changes the calculation

The immediate catalyst for the Commission’s initiative is the disruption to energy markets caused by the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Interruptions to supply chains and uncertainty over maritime transport have increased concerns about the availability and cost of refined petroleum products.

Importing crude oil and importing finished fuels are not equivalent from a strategic perspective.

A country with domestic refining capacity can process available crude into the particular products required by its economy.

An economy heavily dependent on imported refined products is additionally exposed to processing capacity, transport availability and commercial decisions outside its jurisdiction.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when governments must guarantee supplies of diesel and aviation fuel during an emergency.

European policymakers are therefore examining ways to improve output from existing facilities and strengthen the resilience of fuel supply chains.

However, the Commission has not announced a binding production target or a programme to reopen closed refineries.

The 28 October meeting represents the beginning of a policy discussion rather than the adoption of a new industrial strategy.

NATO introduces a different perspective

The participation of NATO gives the initiative a wider security dimension.

Military preparedness requires dependable access to energy products, including during periods when normal commercial supply chains are disrupted.

Aircraft, naval vessels, military logistics and ground operations cannot be reorganised around alternative energy sources at the same pace as some civilian activities.

Furthermore, the ability to sustain prolonged operations depends on reliable industrial production, storage, distribution and transport.

A refinery’s strategic importance may therefore exceed its immediate commercial profitability.

That raises difficult policy questions.

Governments may consider whether critical production facilities require targeted support, whether strategic stockpiles are sufficient and how supply arrangements should function during emergencies.

Any intervention would have to address competition rules, public financing and the risk of subsidising facilities that become commercially unviable.

Decarbonisation remains part of the policy

Brussels has not abandoned its climate objectives.

The Commission has explicitly linked its refining discussions to the development of sustainable biofuels and synthetic fuels, commonly known as e-fuels.

These technologies offer potential alternatives for sectors where direct electrification remains technically difficult, including aviation.

However, their commercial development requires investment, suitable feedstocks, reliable energy supplies and sufficient demand.

Traditional refineries may be able to participate in this transition, although the technical requirements and economic viability vary between facilities.

Jørgensen said the Commission intended to work with industry on a roadmap that would reconcile domestic fuel production with Europe’s longer-term climate ambitions.

The challenge will be translating those objectives into investment decisions.

Europe’s industrial strategy faces a practical test

The initiative illustrates a wider adjustment in European economic policy.

In recent years, the EU has increasingly described industrial capacity as an element of economic security, rather than treating production solely as a commercial activity.

Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and defence equipment have all attracted attention because of vulnerabilities in international supply chains.

Oil refining is now entering the same discussion.

The Commission must determine how to preserve sufficient capacity for essential civilian and military requirements while continuing to encourage cleaner technologies.

Those objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but they operate over different timescales and involve different commercial incentives.

For European refiners, the central question is whether governments can provide enough regulatory and investment certainty to support modernisation.

For Brussels, it is whether the energy transition can proceed without creating new strategic dependencies.

The outcome of the dialogue will indicate how the EU intends to balance its climate commitments with the industrial demands of a less predictable security environment.