Filming a drone strike and posting it online may be quietly teaching Russia’s drones to aim better. Russia is collecting footage of its Geran attack drones striking Ukraine, probably to check how its optical target-recognition and guidance algorithms perform in combat, presidential defense-technology adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov says.

Russia has fitted its jet-powered Geran drones with machine vision that lets them recognize and track targets on their own in the final seconds of flight, a capability Ukraine’s electronic warfare cannot easily defeat. Now, Moscow is paying people inside Ukraine to film where those drones land, which Flash says is no coincidence after four years of not asking.

“Across many Telegram channels, the enemy is asking traitors to film videos of ‘Geran’ impacts and transmit information for a reward. For four years they didn’t ask, and suddenly it has become so crucial,” Beskrestnov notes.

The reason, he believes, lies in those optical guidance systems. Russian forces need impact footage to see how its algorithms are performing in real combat conditions, according to the expert.

The warning Flash is pressing on civilians

His takeaway for them is blunt: stop posting the videos of Russian assaults. He stresses the serious danger of publishing footage of impact sites and urges people not to film or share it.

“This serves as a signal to everyone: do not film and do not publish videos of ‘Shahed’ hits. You see how vital and necessary this is to Russia,” Beskrestnov adds.

Earlier, Ukrenergo board chairman Vitaly Zaichenko said that a Russian drone severed a unique power transmission tower at the Dnipro River crossing in Kyiv, and it cannot be restored. He added that the company was developing new technical solutions "on the fly, and very fast."

It would start the procedures for those solutions from 15 October. Russia’s use of drones able to sever metal towers is a new and serious challenge for Ukraine’s power engineers.

The U.S. Army turned the Merops interceptor drone into a formal program in just 142 days, an acquisition milestone that highlights efforts to speed the service’s response to emerging threats and get combat-proven capabilities into the hands of troops and allies. The Merops won accolades for its role in defending against Iranian barrages of Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions in the Middle East.

Speaking at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention in Washington, D.C., where TWZ is in attendance, Col. Christopher Hill, director of the Army’s Global Tactical Edge Acquisition Directorate (G-TEAD), described the Merops effort as “an example of how we can move fast when we need to.”

The Merops is a small, relatively low-cost counter-UAS system designed to rapidly intercept long-range, one-way attack drones in flight. It was originally developed by Perennial Autonomy. The system uses Surveyor drones as airborne interceptors, with onboard sensors to track targets and the ability to operate autonomously or under remote control. The interceptors can destroy enemy unmanned aircraft through direct impact or a proximity-detonated explosive warhead.

The interceptor was initially brought to the Army’s attention after drone incursions involving two NATO partners prompted a senior commander to demand an urgent response. The system was not part of the commander’s original acquisition plan, Hill explained, but its demonstrated performance in Ukraine made it a compelling candidate.

“He said, ‘I want this capability in the hands of our partners within 14 days,’” Hill recalled. “Everyone looked around the room, and he looked over at me, and I nodded my head like, ‘We’ll figure it out.’”

The Army did not quite meet that deadline. Hill said acquisition personnel and soldiers went into the theater to evaluate the capability, ultimately getting it into the hands of NATO partners within approximately 21 or 22 days.

That initial effort has since expanded. Hill said the Army procured additional Merops systems in partnership with the Joint Interagency Task Force, which procured 13,000 of the interceptors. The effort also progressed from providing the capability to NATO partners to supplying mobile Merops firing teams to a second theater — presumably U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

In CENTCOM, the U.S. military has been confronting the threat posed by Iran’s Shahed-136 and other one-way attack drones, which have been used in barrages against American and allied forces and installations in the Middle East. Former Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll had previously highlighted Merops as a particularly attractive option for countering such threats because of its relatively low cost and the speed with which it can be acquired.

You can watch Driscoll’s testimony on Merops at the 36-minute mark of the video below:

During congressional testimony, Driscoll said the Army was able to purchase 13,000 Merops interceptors within approximately eight days after the conflict with Iran began. He put the cost at about $15,000 per interceptor, with the potential for that figure to fall below $10,000 as production scales. In a separate interview with Bloomberg, he suggested larger orders could eventually push the price down to between $3,000 and $5,000.

Shahed drones have been estimated to cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece, while traditional air defense interceptors are far more expensive. Using comparatively inexpensive drones to defeat them can improve the economics of air defense while preserving more sophisticated interceptors for threats that require them.

Ukraine has employed Merops alongside domestically produced interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed/Geran one-way attack drones. The system’s battlefield use has helped demonstrate the potential of a new class of air defense weapons designed to defeat these kinds of drones without relying exclusively on costly surface-to-air missiles.

However, Hill cautioned that success in Ukraine does not automatically mean a system will perform equally well in every operational environment.

“On the Merops, it absolutely was influenced by [Ukraine]. I mean, that’s where it came from. That’s where we saw the capability,” he said. “But that’s one of the things where the employment of the system really matters.”

Hill noted that the system’s effectiveness will vary depending on where it is used, including differences between desert environments and the urban areas where it has operated in Ukraine. The objective, he said, is to get the capability into the Army’s inventory so commanders can make informed decisions about how and where to use it.

“Once we get it into our hands, now we can make a decision in Europe. Where does it go? Do I even need it?” Hill said. “It’s getting it in our hands. So that was the key for the Merops. The speed of getting it, then we can make the decision of how we employ it.”

That approach reflects a broader change in how the Army wants to manage emerging technology. Rapid fielding is important, but the service also wants to avoid acquiring a capability for an urgent operational need only to leave it without a clear path toward long-term funding, production, and support.

Hill said G-TEAD’s process is designed to involve the organizations that will eventually take responsibility for a capability from the outset. Program acquisition executives, or PAEs, are involved early, while the Army’s test and evaluation community and soldiers provide feedback as the system is assessed. The goal is to identify a transition partner upfront rather than wait until after an initial fielding effort to determine who will take ownership.

“We want to make sure that we’re giving commanders capability that we know works,” Hill said.

He described the directorate’s standard process as a 180-day effort, with the objective of reaching a decision on whether a capability should become an Army program within that period. The Merops effort, at 142 days, moved faster than that target.

The process is also intended to address what acquisition officials often call the ‘valley of death’: the gap between getting an emerging capability into the hands of operational units and the point at which a program office takes over and provides the funding and contracting structure needed to scale it.

“We will work to fill that valley of death gap between the time that we put capability into the hands of units and the time that the PM picks it up and actually [provides funding],” Hill said. “There’s a gap there. So we can do that intermediate scaling portion before it fully transitions.”

The effort builds on the Army’s wider push to streamline acquisition, an issue Driscoll has also emphasized. The Army secretary previously described an old process involving 16 decision-making steps, each with the ability to veto a proposal and send it back through the system. That structure could leave the service waiting two to seven years to purchase a capability.

The Merops experience suggests that some of those delays can be reduced when acquisition professionals work directly with operational units and the organizations responsible for evaluating and sustaining new equipment.

But rapidly acquiring an interceptor is only part of the challenge. The Army must still determine where it offers the greatest value, how it fits into existing air defense architectures, and how to produce and sustain enough systems to meet operational demand.

Low-cost interceptors are also not a replacement for every layer of air defense. They are, however, an increasingly important option against large numbers of relatively inexpensive attack drones, particularly when the alternative is expending missiles worth hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars to defeat each target.

For the Army, Merops is therefore serving two purposes: providing an additional tool against the growing one-way attack drone threat and demonstrating a faster route from an emerging battlefield capability to a formally supported military program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Army Explains How Merops Interceptor Drone Became Program Of Record In Just 142 Days appeared first on TWZ.

Russia has found a way to cut Ukraine’s power lines that no repair crew can undo. A unique power transmission tower that a Russian drone cut down at the Dnipro River crossing in Kyiv cannot be restored,  Ukrenergo board chairman Vitaliy Zaichenko says, as the grid operator rushes to build alternative ways to keep electricity flowing, Interfax reports.

Russia has spent the war trying to switch off Ukraine’s lights. Now, it is widening the campaign before winter with a new tactic: drones that slice through the steel towers carrying high-voltage lines.

“Everyone has seen the video showing the destruction of one of the unique power transmission towers at the crossing over the Dnipro in Kyiv. It was severed, and it is impossible to restore it,” Zaichenko continues.

He adds that now the company is developing new technical solutions "on the fly, and very fast." It will start the procedures for those solutions from 15 October, he notes. Russia’s use of drones able to sever metal towers is a new and serious challenge for Ukraine’s power engineers.

Zaichenko did not say when the tower was hit. On 30 September, Russia first used a jet-powered drone carrying a 40-kilogram charge built to cut steel towers, and that evening an eyewitness filmed one striking a power line tower in Kyiv, which cut electricity in parts of three districts, Informator reported.

When the spare parts are as scarce as the targets are plentiful

Rebuilding is colliding with a global shortage. Ukrenergo faces serious difficulties getting backup equipment, Zaichenko explains, because the whole world’s energy system is expanding at once and everyone needs the same hardware.

“There is a real problem with equipment. The global power system is expanding, and everyone needs energy equipment. There is a tough queue,” Zaichenko says.

Ukraine has faced such challenges since August 2026, when Russia began launching its jet-powered drones. Kyiv still has no effective solution against them and relies more on a mix of air defenses, such as automated turrets and interceptor drones.

Kyiv has also engaged over 100 private air defense system brigades to protect its enterprises in the ranks of the Ukrainian Air Forces.

Russia hit central Ukraine’s Kirovohrad Oblast with its largest attack since the full-scale invasion, killing residents of the oblast capital, Kropyvnytskyi, the oblast’s head said. Russian strikes hit more than a dozen oblasts, and Ukraine’s president said Moscow escalated deliberately after sanctions relief.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine continues on the front line and behind it, where its drones, missiles, and glide bombs strike towns daily. Kyiv is drafting winter crisis plans as Russia targets the biggest cities, and logistics is hit too: Russia struck one retailer’s warehouse hub 10 times in a day.

Three dead in Kropyvnytskyi

Oblast head Andrii Raikovych counted almost 360 Russian drones over Kirovohrad Oblast and hits on 26 locations, mostly in Kropyvnytskyi. In his words, “the enemy deliberately struck critical infrastructure, transport enterprises, logistics facilities, and residential buildings.” In a post after midnight, he reported a third death and six injured, five of them in hospital.

Air-raid alerts around the city ran from 15:20 on 14 October to 05:33, and Suspilne correspondents heard more than 20 explosions in Kropyvnytskyi, the public broadcaster reported. The national emergency service counted 25 struck locations, and rescuers were still putting out fires in the morning, the service’s spokesperson in the oblast said.

A wave Kyiv ties to sanctions relief

Nationwide, Russia launched 580 drones and two Kh-59 guided missiles from 18:00 on 14 October, and air defenses downed or suppressed 536 drones by 08:00, the Air Force reported. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia killed three people in Kropyvnytskyi and three in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha reported two dead.

Zelenskyy counted more than 850 Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones between the start of 14 October and 09:00 the next day, “precisely at the time of an artificial speed limitation for our defensive capabilities.” Overnight into 14 October, SpaceX capped speeds on its military Starshield satellite service, disrupting Ukrainian missions. He added that Russia escalated “deliberately, having received a relaxation of sanctions and seeing attempts to pressure Ukraine.” Last week, Washington cleared Russian diesel trade after a call between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin.

Strikes from Kyiv to Odesa Oblast

In Kyiv, a drone fell into a residential yard, Mayor Vitali Klitschko wrote, later putting the injured at six. Drones hit two industrial enterprises in Poltava Oblast, its head Vitalii Diakivnych wrote, and a later strike on Poltava injured three people, rescuers said in a preliminary count. Ukraine’s state gas company Naftogaz said a drone set one of its gas production facilities in the oblast on fire, halting its work.

Russian guided aerial bombs injured two women and a man in Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, on 15 October, according to preliminary data from oblast head Oleh Syniehubov, who had counted nine injured in the oblast over the previous day. Over that day, Russian attacks killed three people in Donetsk Oblast, the oblast police said, and one in Kherson Oblast, where oblast head Oleksandr Prokudin reported five more injured. In Kherson city, a drone injured a man, the oblast administration said. In Sumy Oblast, a drone hit a house and left two people in acute stress, its administration said.

In Odesa Oblast, strikes damaged two apartment blocks, a company, and a bank office without casualties, oblast head Oleh Kiper said. Later, a jet-powered Shahed hit a store in the oblast, Zelenskyy wrote, and Kiper counted four injured in a preliminary tally. Drones also hit an enterprise in Ternopil Oblast, and five people sought medical help, rescuers said, while drones damaged two homes in Rivne, oblast head Oleksandr Koval said.

Drone strikes against merchant vessels off Bulgaria have brought Russia’s war into waters bordering NATO and the European Union. With grain exports threatened, shipping costs rising and Sofia seeking allied protection, Moscow’s campaign against maritime trade risks becoming another instrument of economic and political pressure.

Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.

On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.

The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.

Russia’s Campaign Against Maritime Trade

The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.

The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.

Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.

This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.

The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.

Radev Confronts the Consequences of Moscow’s War

The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.

Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.

Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.

After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.

According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.

This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.

Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.

Food Security Becomes Another Instrument of Pressure

The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.

Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.

Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.

The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.

The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.

For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.

Europe’s Black Sea Security Strategy Faces a Practical Test

The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.

Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.

The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.

The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.

Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.

The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.

Russia’s drone and missile attacks on Ukraine’s population and infrastructure continue to dominate coverage of the conflict. But on the ground, Ukraine has been making significant, if still limited, gains. In mid-September, Ukraine formally announced the existence of Operation Vivaldi, which has retaken territory near Lyman and disrupted a Russian advance toward the fortified cities […]

The post Operation Vivaldi: Ukrainian gain on a drone-filled battlefield appeared first on Asia Times.

The head of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) was initially skeptical about the utility of high-altitude balloons, but now sees them as a “game-changing” capability. Lt. Gen. John Rafferty’s comments follow a separate disclosure that the Army axed plans for a balloon swarm test in the Pacific last year and instead sent those systems to support real operations in the Middle East. TWZ has been closely tracking the expanding use of high-altitude balloons and other lighter-than-air systems globally for intelligence gathering, as platforms for launching drones, and in support of other missions, for years now.

Lt. Gen. Rafferty was asked about high-altitude balloons during a media roundtable today, at which TWZ was in attendance, on the sidelines of the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention. Army Col. Joseph Mroszczyk, head of SMDC’s Transformation Integration Directorate for Space Superiority (TID-Space Superiority), also discussed the service’s use of balloons during the roundtable. Breaking Defense first reported on the shift of balloon-based capabilities from the Pacific to the Middle East on Monday.

“I’ll just give a little personal history on high-altitude balloons. I started in the Army Futures Command in the Long Range Fires-Cross Functional Team. There was this talk of high-altitude balloons. I think it was the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] task force was talking about it,” Rafferty said. “It just sounded crazy to me that we were considering this.”

“Then, a few years later, when the Sergeant Major [SMDC Command Sgt. Maj. Rickey Jackson] and I were together in the multi-domain community in Europe, I went with the 2nd MDTF [Multi-Domain Task Force] to Morocco for training and experimentation,” he continued. “[I] saw the high-altitude balloons in action, and I was immediately convinced after I understood better how they worked and how their ability to station-keep, and their ability to sense and even deliver effects from high altitude. It was game-changing for me.”

Broadly speaking, the main benefit that modern high-altitude balloons offer is their ability to be deployed persistently for days, weeks, or even months at a time. Designs available on the market today can hold their position, in spite of prevailing winds, and moderate their altitudes to keep on station, after precisely navigating to an assigned operating area.

On top of their persistence, the altitudes at which these balloons operate provide excellent fields of view for radars, cameras, and other sensors in all directions and across very broad areas. From a perch of 60,000 feet or more, they also offer a way to peer into certain denied areas while still soaring in international airspace and keeping further away from potential threats.

The video below from high-altitude balloon maker Aerostar offers a good general overview of the kind of capabilities on the market today.

As Lt. Gen. Rafferty noted today, ISR is not the only use case for high-altitude balloons, either. They can serve as communications relay nodes, as well as launch platforms for swarms of drones and other expendable payloads. These are all capabilities the Army has explicitly talked about as part of broader plans for balloons in the past. Other countries, especially China, are already actively employing high-altitude balloons for ISR and other missions, as we will come back to later on.

“In my former role as an MDTF commander, we experimented a lot in the Pacific with those [balloon-based] capabilities. We have leveraged different size platforms,” Col. Mroszczyk added today. “In this [TID-Space Superiority] role, as a proponent, what I’m pushing for is a family of stratospheric systems that really covers smaller size all the way up to larger size types of platforms in terms of balloons.”

“What that enables us to provide is space-like capabilities, really exploiting a transition point between what is normally considered the aerial layer and the space domain,” he continued. “Really, where you go from about 60,000 feet to 100,000 feet is what we focus on in the stratosphere. That operational space allows some persistence and broad coverage in an area where you can deliver space-like capabilities in terms of payloads, but then also take advantage of the deep access that you get from a stratospheric balloon.”

“So, being able to go, take advantage of winds that are pushing you where you want to go already to be able to get either launched effects or other types of payloads for sensing and communications and extension of your launched effects portfolio,” he added. “That is a way that we can help exploit the stratosphere, and we’re looking to do that throughout multiple experiments over the course of the coming year.”

“Launched effects,” is a catch-all term the U.S. military now routinely uses to talk collectively about uncrewed aerial systems designed to be launched from other platforms in the air, on the ground, and/or at sea. This encompasses drones configured for a wide variety of missions, including surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, signal relay, and even kinetic attack.

Col. Mroszczyk talked about plans to further demonstrate how high-altitude balloons will be commanded and controlled, as well as networked together with other Army capabilities, when asked to elaborate on what the forthcoming experimentation would entail.

As mentioned, the Army had also planned to demonstrate the ability of balloons to operate in swarms with a high degree of autonomy in the Pacific region last year before those assets were redirected to the Middle East. When exactly that deployment occurred and how long it lasted are unclear.

“We were asked to pivot and do some experimentation in combination with operations, and we pivoted and supported operations in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command],” Andrew Evans, Director of Strategy and Transformation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, or G-2, told Breaking Defense, per the story that outlet published on Monday.

“They were effective for the mission that they were assigned,” he also said, but declined to elaborate further, according to Breaking Defense. “Balloons can be a little finicky in terms of temperature, and you have to contend with environmental characteristics.”

“We had a lot of help from vendors in this space, but as you think about employing your systems and going from something like a Pacific [theater] to something like a CENTCOM [theater], you learn where those friction points might exist between what the military might need to inherently own, and … what a vendor could help provide in terms of the service,” Evans added. Furthermore, “balloons can be a little finicky in terms of temperature, and you have to contend with environmental characteristics.”

The remarks today from Lt. Gen. Rafferty and Col. Mroszczyk underscore the Army’s commitment to fielding new high-altitude balloon-based capabilities and the immense benefits the service sees in them. However, the continued emphasis on testing and experimentation highlights a discrepancy with the state of the service’s current efforts, and even more so in light of global trends.

The Army has been openly talking about balloons as part of its vision for a new multi-layered persistent sensor architecture, and how they could also be used to launch drones and other ‘effects,’ for at least six years now. In that same time, China has very actively shown off its ability to gather intelligence and conduct other missions using balloons and other lighter-than-air craft on a broad operational level across the Pacific. TWZ had been reporting on this reality for years before it was thrust fully into the public consciousness after a Chinese spy balloon passed over parts of the United States and Canada back in 2023.

Other countries, including U.S. allies and partners, are increasingly fielding balloon-based and other lighter-than-air systems, too. Forces in Ukraine have notably been using balloons to conduct kinetic attacks and launch drones in the course of the ongoing conflict with Russia. On the other side of that conflict, Russian forces have used balloons as decoys to confuse and misdirect air defenses.

American-made Hornet middle-range strike UAV being tested with balloon-assisted launch system.

Such resolution allows to drastically increase its original range (approx. 100km).

Hornet OWA-UAVs are actively employed by Ukrainian forces for strikes on Russian logistics and other… pic.twitter.com/S1bHqLNhPY

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) May 20, 2026

The Middle East deployment does show new efforts on the Army’s part to operationalize high-altitude balloons on a more widespread basis, but also that it is still relying on largely experimental capabilities to do so. Earlier this year, the service called attention to the establishment of a new schoolhouse for high-altitude balloon training to help further lay this groundwork, further underscoring how all of this is still very much in its infancy.

The remarks today from Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, especially, show there is substantial support within the Army for pushing ahead with high-altitude balloon programs. At the same time, there is clearly much work to be done if they are to have a truly game-changing impact, while the gap with China and others only continues to grow.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post High Altitude Balloons Are A “Game-Changing” Capability: Army Space Command Boss appeared first on TWZ.

Sikorsky has unveiled a concept for a containerized deployment package for its Nomad 100 vertical takeoff and landing uncrewed aircraft system (VTOL UAS), combining four aircraft and their support equipment inside a single 20-foot shipping container. The company is pitching the Nomad 100 Fast Pack as a way to rapidly establish autonomous air capabilities at locations without runways or other conventional support infrastructure.

The concept was unveiled on October 12 at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention in Washington, D.C., where TWZ is in attendance. It comes as the U.S. military seeks to expand its inventory of uncrewed systems and distribute capabilities across more dispersed operating locations, particularly in preparation for a potential large-scale conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific.

“Military commanders are asking for capability that enables them to deploy worldwide into austere environments,” said Ramsey Bentley, director of Sikorsky Advanced Concepts, speaking at AUSA. They want greater situational awareness, the ability to conduct targeting and deliver effects at range, and the capacity to control multiple assets simultaneously, he added.

The Nomad 100 Fast Pack is built around a standard 20-foot ISO container housing four aircraft, mission-command equipment, communications, power systems, and sustainment supplies. The aim is to deliver a self-contained package that can be transported to a forward location, brought into operation, and moved again quickly. A promotional video shows the Fast Pack being transported into a combat theater by one of the company’s Black Hawk helicopters as a slung load.

Sikorsky says two Nomad 100s can be prepared for flight “out of the box” in less than 15 minutes and that the other two aircraft — stored on the upper shelf of the container — can be made available within four to six hours.

The package is designed to support runway-independent operations from locations including naval vessels, tactical vehicle staging areas, and improvised landing zones.

“We no longer require a ground control station,” explained Sikorsky Vice President and General Manager Rich Benton. “We no longer require a large group of soldiers or operators.”

Beyond the containerized package, Bentley said Nomad can be transported by truck or trailer, or potentially self-deploy in a smaller package. Sikorsky is also developing containerized deployment concepts for larger members of the Nomad family.

As we have discussed in the past, the Nomad 100 combines vertical takeoff and landing with the ability to transition to fixed-wing flight, bringing airplane-like range and endurance to a compact, runway-independent package that can operate from confined locations.

“What is very unique about this aircraft is it’s able to roll over on its wing and also fly like an airplane,” Bentley said. “So you’re getting the vertical takeoff and landing capability, along with the endurance, range, and speed of a fixed-wing aircraft.”

Sikorsky cites an endurance of 10 to 14 hours, depending on payload, a range exceeding 800 nautical miles, and a cruising speed of 70 miles per hour, with a dash speed of 90 miles per hour.

Its hybrid-electric drivetrain uses combustion engines to drive a generator that supplies power to the aircraft’s rotors and mission systems. Nomad is designed to operate on multiple fuels, including JP-8, JP-4, and Jet A.

“Ten gallons of fuel provides over 10 plus hours of operation, so it’s a very efficient system,” Bentley said. He added that the hybrid-electric design reduces maintenance requirements, emphasizing line-replaceable units over more extensive traditional aviation maintenance.

The aircraft can carry a 60-pound mission payload, including supplies such as medical equipment. Bentley said its modular center fuselage can be configured as a cargo bay or adapted for other mission equipment.

Sikorsky says the Fast Pack can support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR-T), light attack, and contested logistics missions, depending on customer configuration.

On display at AUSA is a Nomad configured with a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor turret with laser designation capability and four small Northrop Grumman Hatchet glide munitions.

Other potential payloads include electro-optical and infrared sensors, synthetic aperture radar, launched effects, and electronic warfare systems for jamming.

The combination of a small logistical footprint and long-range flight could be particularly useful for supporting expeditionary forces. The aircraft could deliver supplies without relying on a runway or crewed helicopter, while sensor-equipped variants could provide reconnaissance and target designation. Other configurations could carry weapons or deploy additional uncrewed systems.

The Fast Pack also relies on Sikorsky’s MATRIX autonomy technology to reduce operator workload. Rather than continuously piloting each aircraft, an operator can assign a mission through a tablet-based interface and let the aircraft execute it autonomously.

“Now, Matrix autonomy is a very mature autonomy capability. We’ve had over 1,000 flight hours on Matrix,” Bentley said.

An operator selects a mission, designates a location on a map, and initiates the flight. MATRIX then manages engine start, preflight checks, launch, navigation, and mission execution.

“For the operator, very simply, he pulls up the display. He selects a mission, say reconnaissance, and then the operator would select a point on the map where he wants that reconnaissance to occur, and then he hits start,” Bentley explained. “The aircraft Matrix autonomy takes care of everything else along the flight.”

Bentley said the system can adapt to changing environmental and tactical conditions, using onboard sensors to navigate and avoid obstacles, including hazards around landing areas.

“Our whole approach here with the advanced Matrix autonomy is: How do we take the workload off the operator?” he said. “This is not remotely piloted, although you could do that. Our approach here is that this is fully autonomous.”

Communications are designed to be network-agnostic. Bentley identified Starlink or Starshield for beyond-line-of-sight connectivity in the current configuration, alongside tactical mobile ad-hoc networking (MANET) equipment for line-of-sight communications.

MATRIX is also used in other Sikorsky autonomy efforts, including the fully uncrewed U-Hawk drone, seen in the video below, and the company’s optionally piloted Black Hawk concept. A common tablet interface could help operators manage different autonomous aircraft without needing a separate control system for each.

Nomad 100 originated under DARPA’s EVADE program, which sought to develop a vertical-lift uncrewed aircraft capability. Bentley said two customers associated with the program had placed initial orders, with additional interest from domestic and international customers.

Sikorsky has a contract for three Nomad 100s under EVADE. The company announced in July that the first had been delivered to the customer, while a second was entering flight testing at the time of the interview. The U.S. Marine Corps is also buying two Nomad 100s, Bentley told Army Times.

Sikorsky is developing the larger Nomad 500, which will offer greater payload capacity, longer range, and increased power output. One Nomad 500 can fit in a 20-foot container, while three can be transported in a 40-foot container, according to Bentley. The largest member of the family, the Nomad 1000, requires a 40-foot container for a single aircraft.

The Fast Pack concept reflects a broader effort to make autonomous aircraft easier to deploy and sustain as military forces disperse across larger operating areas. Its appeal lies not just in the Nomad 100’s combination of vertical takeoff and long-range flight, but in packaging multiple aircraft and their supporting equipment into a single, relocatable system. That could be especially valuable in the Indo-Pacific, where long distances, limited infrastructure, and the vulnerability of fixed operating bases pose major challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Sikorsky’s Nomad 100 VTOL Drone Is Now Quad-Packed In A Container For Rapid Deployment appeared first on TWZ.

AEVEX Corp. has publicly shown its Specter jet-powered drone for the first time at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) annual meeting in Washington, D.C., where TWZ is in attendance. The aircraft is the latest development from a company that has played a significant role in the U.S. military’s one-way attack drone efforts. Most notably, it built the secretive Phoenix Ghost family that was rushed to Ukraine in 2022.

AEVEX announced Specter in September, describing it as a high-speed, low-cost, jet-powered autonomous platform designed for high-risk operational environments. The aircraft is being developed around a modular architecture, with ground-launched and air-launched variants planned. Its interchangeable nose section is intended to accommodate different payloads, including kinetic warheads, electronic warfare equipment, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and other future capabilities.

That flexibility is central to how AEVEX is pitching the aircraft. The company is aiming for an adaptable system that can be configured for different operational needs while remaining affordable enough to be used basically as a cruise missile in combat applications.

The aircraft’s external configuration features a prominent V-shaped lower fuselage, high-mounted, unswept trapezoidal wings, a v-tail and rear-mounted conformal engine intakes. Clearly, low observability was one design driver for Specter, with the goal of balancing survivability with low-cost likely factored in heavily. AEVEX has not publicly discussed Specter’s low-observable characteristics.

The company has also not disclosed key performance and technical details, including the aircraft’s range, payload capacity, communications architecture, terminal targeting methods or the extent of its autonomous capabilities.

“We’re really excited to kind of really up our stats on range and speed,” Craig Anders, an AEVEX representative, told TWZ at AUSA, describing Specter’s turbine engine. The aircraft is being designed to reach speeds in the sub-Mach range, he said.

Anders also elaborated on how Specter is intended to carry more than a conventional warhead. “This thing is going to have the ability to carry cameras and different types of non-kinetic effect payloads,” he said, describing it as a “multi-mission, multi-domain fighter.”

Despite that broader mission set, attrition remains a core part of the concept. Anders said the idea was for the aircraft to be attritable, with a relatively low price tag allowing commanders to send it farther into dangerous areas without putting more expensive capabilities at risk.

The distinction is important. Specter is not being presented simply as a disposable munition, nor as a high-end unmanned combat aircraft. Instead, AEVEX appears to be pursuing a middle ground: a jet-powered platform that can perform one-way attack missions but also support reconnaissance and provide other effects in high-threat areas, depending on its configuration. It is also meant to be built economically at scale.

AEVEX is developing Specter with Divergent, an engineering and manufacturing company known for its digital production processes and metal additive manufacturing. The partnership is intended to help make the aircraft easier to manufacture at scale while supporting changes to its design and configuration.

Anders said Divergent works with AEVEX engineers on the aircraft’s digital design and produces its fuselage. AEVEX is responsible for the internal systems, mission integration, flight characteristics and navigation science, he explained.

The manufacturing approach is a significant part of the program’s affordability ambitions. AEVEX says Divergent’s Digital Manufacturing and Production System (DAPS) is being used to support scalable production and manufacturability. However, the companies have not disclosed Specter’s projected unit cost or demonstrated that it can yet be produced at the volumes and prices the concept ultimately requires.

AEVEX is also drawing on its CompassX autonomy architecture and experience delivering thousands of autonomous systems. The company says Specter’s open interfaces and software-defined capabilities are intended to allow the platform to evolve as operational requirements change, rather than being optimized around one fixed mission.

Specter remains in development, with its first flight planned for December 2026. Anders said the initial flight would be a basic test, with early test aircraft fitted with landing gear so they can be recovered and reused for work on flight characteristics and handling. It isn’t clear if a truly reusable gear-equipped operational version is eyed for the future. Regardless, further testing could include tuning the aircraft’s dive profile.

The planned initial configuration uses a ground launch assisted by a rocket, or rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO), system. An air-launched version is also on the roadmap, Anders said, with that capability expected to follow in the relatively near term.

AEVEX is pursuing several potential military applications. Anders identified the U.S. Army’s Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) effort as a primary focus, while noting that the service has its own high-speed requirements. He also said the company is looking at opportunities associated with Rapid Dragon and other programs.

In FY 2027, the US Air Force is requesting $55 Million in discretionary and $300 Million in mandatory (reconciliation) funds for the Family of Affordable Mass Missile (FAMM) to procure 1,000 All Up Rounds covering both the Palletized (FAMM-P) and Lugged (FAMM-L) variants. The… pic.twitter.com/EgVaefmJgY

— Air-Power | NatSec Ledger (@NatSecLedger) April 22, 2026

Those comments indicate the range of applications AEVEX hopes Specter could address, not that the aircraft has been selected for any of them. Its performance, cost and ability to meet specific requirements will need to be demonstrated as development and testing progress.

Specter’s intended combination of jet propulsion, attritability and modular payloads could offer an enticing balance. It is not being presented as a higher-end ‘exquisite’ cruise missile, but neither is it limited to carrying a single payload type. The challenge for AEVEX will be delivering enough speed, range and mission flexibility to make the aircraft useful across multiple roles without pushing its price beyond what operators can justify for procuring it in large numbers.

A stealthy weapon that is jet-powered like Specter, one that can be configured for various types of one-way missions, could bridge the gap between far more advanced and costly autonomous aircraft and cruise missiles and lower-end one-way attack drones. There have been other concepts that are similar to Specter, we are living in a low-cost cruise missile explosion of sorts, but the company’s unique pedigree of innovation and fast fielding in the one-way attack munition space could give Specter additional credence.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Specter Jet-Powered Drone Aims At Low Cost, Multi-Mission, Single Use appeared first on TWZ.

Posição das forças xiitas que controlam o Iémen foi transmitida pelo porta-voz militar Yahya Sarea, num comunicado em que se referiu ao uso de "um grande número de mísseis balísticos e de drones".

© YAHYA ARHAB/EPA

A week after two cargo ships were struck by drones off the Bulgarian coast, the attack was repeated even closer to our territorial waters with a similar outcome: one vessel was sunk, and another was abandoned by its crew, resulting in injuries and likely numerous fatalities. This is already having tangible consequences for Bulgaria. “Attacks […]

For more than a year, U.S. Army forces in Europe have been experimenting with new counter-drone capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them, under the umbrella of what is dubbed Project Flytrap. In doing so, the service has also been gaining valuable new insights into how uncrewed systems can help shape the battlefield for friendly forces. It is particularly interesting to hear how the Army envisions using uncrewed platforms to open up new avenues for deceiving opponents.

Army Col. Timothy Price, head of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, discussed the use of uncrewed platforms for deception and other operational concepts that have emerged in the course of Project Flytrap during a talk yesterday. Price’s remarks came at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Germany, is a brigade-sized mechanized formation equipped primarily with variants of the Stryker 8×8 light armored vehicle.

Price, by way of introduction, described modern battlefields full of uncrewed platforms in the air and on the ground as presenting new twists on long-standing problem sets. More specifically, he started by describing the typical approach to getting past a minefield or similar obstacle using an established framework called SOSRA, which stands for Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, Assault.

“If we were going to breach a mined wire obstacle, the first step of SOSRA – suppress – would be the utilization of indirect fires, to get the enemy’s head down, and direct fire systems, so they would not maneuver on you, fix them in place, and you can make a decision about how you’re going to approach the problem,” the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander explained. “The next step would be to obscure it. In the historical sense, obscurations used is [sic] smoke, to mask your movement to the point of breach, so the enemy doesn’t know what you’re doing. And then, of course, secure would be to establish frontside security, [and] allow your engineers to come up within this local security bubble. They’ll utilize some kind of line charge to open the breach, reduce it – that’s the ‘R’ – and then bring on a follow-on force of assault through.”

“We were brought up around the old traditional mined wire obstacles that we had to physically breach. This is no different,” he added. “It’s just a multi-domain environment. So it’s built up of a combination of electronic warfare, kinetic UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] threats, and then counter-UAS threats, and then the network that holds [that all] together that forms the obstacle, which a unit has to maneuver through in order to maintain the offensive.”

Within this environment, Col. Price described the suppression step of SOSRA as having a different kind of probing dimension, particularly to feel out an enemy’s uncrewed capabilities, as well as those in the electromagnetic spectrum. He also noted that brigade-sized formations like this no longer necessarily have all the required tools organizationally to ‘service’ that aspect of the mission. This is in part because what has to be suppressed, including ground control stations for enemy drones, might now be miles behind the front line.

So, “what we have to do is allow the enemy to turn on their systems. How do I suppress them to allow division, or higher, to put an effect on them for suppression? It probably looks like flying small, attritable UAS [sic] into their security area” in the rear, he said. This, in turn, “cause[s] the enemy to do one of two things, either … go from passive to active with their EW [electronic warfare] systems, or to turn on radars to actually figure out what they’re seeing, which then forms the signature which higher headquarters can use to target.”

Though Col. Price did not describe it as such, there is already something of a deception aspect to this step in fooling enemy emitters to switch on and expose themselves. This, as a general tactic, is also hardly new. Stimulating air defenses, in particular, is a key part of operations to gather intelligence on those capabilities, as well as to suppress and destroy them. Once you have categorized and geolocated an emitter, it is a logical step to then target it. The ultimate goal, with data being passed along a more deeply networked kill chain, is for the time it takes for fires to be brought to bear to be almost instantaneous.

Regardless, deception comes far more into play in the obscure step, according to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander.

“Obscuration is different, as well. So instead of trying to hide behind smoke as we maneuver through it, what is the deception plan, right? How am I trying to show the enemy a signature that says I’m going to breach over here when I’m actually going to breach here, right?” he asked rhetorically. “So, that’s probably the implementation of UGVs [uncrewed ground vehicles] with some kind of decoy emitter on top of them to pull the enemy’s eyes, resources, and time to a point that allows me to focus my assets and resources on the point of breach.”

The use of uncrewed platforms as decoys is also not new, and even more complex concepts have emerged within the U.S. military in the past. Uncrewed systems have also been developed for military and other purposes over the years that are designed to mimic something else entirely, including for purposes of deception. This includes masquerading as birds and other animals.

Back in 2019, TWZ was the first to report in detail on a Navy effort to develop and field an entire networked, cooperative electronic warfare ecosystem, at that time referred to as the Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS. This was also a drone-heavy cross-domain concept intended to make many types of sensors over vast areas believe they were ‘seeing’ the same false fleets of aircraft and/or ships, and deceive and confuse the enemy on a grand scale. This, in turn, represented a massive leap in electronic warfare capabilities.

There is also overlap here with reported sightings of what are now commonly called unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and that used to be called unidentified flying objects (UFO). As we have reported on repeatedly over the years, while some UAP sightings remain unexplained, many more have turned out to be drones. Adversaries have been using uncrewed capabilities for intelligence gathering and deception purposes against American interests at home and abroad, likely in part by exploiting UAP stigma for cover. We have talked in the past about how drones will be used in more and more exotic ways to confuse opponents.

I don’t know what this is, or if it’s legit BUT remember we are in a new age of misdirection, decoy and guile. Specifically using low end drone technology. There are more ways to stimulate an enemy air defense system, distract a populous, assess the flow of public info from a… https://t.co/wW7YVlbayB

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 21, 2026

When it comes to UGVs, specifically, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, as well as units elsewhere across the U.S. Army, have been experimenting with various designs in recent years. The service has been trying for years to expand its operational use of UGVs, in general, but has faced repeated setbacks.

“It’s also spectral camouflage. So how are we controlling our heat and thermal signatures on our vehicles and our people?” Price continued. “It’s basic soldier discipline issues. It’s how we use our radios. It’s where we’re talking, where we’re not. But that’s what obscuration looks like.”

As a reminder, Project Flytrap’s primary focus has been on counter-drone capabilities, which come into play heavily during the secure stage.

“There’s multi-layered assets on top of that to allow that convergence for our success at the point of breach. I’m going to focus on our corner, our part of the battle, right?” he said. “So, I’m looking at active and passive electronic warfare systems – that can either, one, find [threats], let me know that I’ve got some kind of system flying or operating against me and, then, if it’s an active system, take some kind of effect to maybe cut a downlink and disrupt that system – all the way down to the individual soldier with a shotgun.”

As mentioned, the ‘obstacle’ to be ‘reduced’ at the end of this is not necessarily something as simple as a minefield surrounded by barbed wire anymore. Now it could be enemy one-way-attack drone capabilities preventing holding up an advance. Col. Price, in turn, described friendly kamikaze drones as part of the equation for breaching past those threats. Decoys and deception have a continued role to play in this phase.

“This is where, at the brigade level, we introduce one-way attack munitions to try to destroy the C2 [command and control] network that the enemy is using to operate this reconnaissance/strike complex” that is standing in the way, he explained. “There’s layers to it, right? Like they’ve got a close side to this that’s the local part of this reconnaissance/strike complex. They’ve probably got a theater level that the Corps [the U.S. Army’s command echelon above divisions] and higher is trying to target as we are forcing people to turn on systems to communicate. But at the regiment level, I’m looking at one-way attack munitions, focused on C2 nodes, headquarters, and ground control stations that [sic] I can disrupt their ability to put lethal effects on me as we begin to open the breach.”

The U.S. Army is in the process of fielding a variety of weaponized drones, including loitering munitions and designs capable of releasing grenades and other small bomblets.

During a question-and-answer session that followed his remarks, Col. Price was asked about whether lessons learned and other observations from Ukraine, and specifically that country’s recent Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive, had contributed to this evolving framework.

“In terms of Vivaldi, I’m not an expert, so I’m not going to make any kind of estimations on how that worked or why,” he said in response. “But I will say, if you look at the focus of that operation, you can probably make the assumption that there was convergence of efforts across the different headquarters to enable success. So that’s how I would relate to the two.”

“In order to be successful for a multi-domain breach, the tactical level requires my higher headquarters to be part of that solution to enable me with resources and capabilities that I don’t have in here at the brigade level,” he continued. “I would imagine it’s very similar in the other operational comparisons.”

Though certainly true, in broad strokes, this response in some ways underscores how the U.S. Army continues to lag behind global trends in the use of uncrewed systems, as now typified by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Army leaders have been open about this continued reality in the past, despite efforts to try to reverse it.

“We’re behind. I’ll just be candid. I think we know we’re behind,” Army Lt. Gen. Charles Costanza said during a panel discussion at AUSA last year, in response to a direct question at the panel from our Howard Altman. Costanza was talking about both the employment of drones and counter-drone capabilities, and highlighted work being done then under Project Flytrap, as you can read more about here.

Costanza was head of V Corps, a key component of the U.S. Army presence in Europe, at the time. He was removed from that post abruptly in August for reasons that remain unclear, but were reportedly tied to disputes between top Army leadership and Secretary Pete Hegseth. Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll resigned last month, amid reports of months of friction with Hegseth about various policies.

The Pentagon under Hegseth has launched a number of initiatives to accelerate the fielding of new uncrewed capabilities across the U.S. military, especially within smaller ground units. This now includes plans for a new Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM) unveiled last month.

For units like the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, new drone-centric concepts of operations are already taking shape. Beyond using them for surveillance and as one-way-attack munitions, there is also a clear focus emerging on employing expanding uncrewed capabilities to deceive opponents and prevent them from making the best use of their own resources.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Drones Are Creating New Opportunities For The U.S. Army To Deceive Its Enemies appeared first on TWZ.

By Lucia Kassai Oct 9, 2026 (Bloomberg) –When hurricanes sweep through the Gulf of Mexico, oil companies can lose millions of dollars waiting for the all-clear to restart production. Shell Plc...

On October 4, the US pulled its 12 B-1 strategic bombers out of Fairford, UK and returned them to the United States. Reports say the planes returned to Ellsworth Air Force Base in Rapid City, South Dakota. The bombers were pulled out when intelligence reported that an attack by armed drones against Fairford was imminent. […]

The post Moving B-1 bombers from UK to US is no drone warfare solution appeared first on Asia Times.

Shield AI says it is on track to roll out the first prototypes of its X-BAT jet-powered stealth ‘fighter’ drone by the end of this month. Flight testing of this uncrewed aircraft, which is designed to take off and land vertically from a tail-sitting position, is still scheduled to kick off before the end of the year. X-BAT’s core concept was already highly ambitious, but an extremely aggressive timeline to reach some degree of operational capability through the U.S. Navy’s Runway Independent Maritime Expeditionary Strike (RIMES) program has now been disclosed.

TWZ got an update on X-BAT, which we were first to report on in-depth last year, in an interview yesterday with Shield AI’s Armor Harris, Senior Vice President and General Manager of the company’s aircraft division. This came ahead of today’s announcement that the company has received an additional $150 million in funding from the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment through its Defense Exportability Features program via the Navy. This is on top of the $50 million investment the Navy, in cooperation with the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit, made in X-BAT’s development earlier this year as part of the RIMES effort. Shield AI has committed an equivalent amount of internal funding, for a combined total of $400 million.

“In broad strokes, the last year has been a bunch of collaborative risk reduction with the Navy. So, wind tunnel testing, engine testing, thermal testing, all kinds of stuff to basically take the major risks in the program, [and] burn them down, so we can move confidently into the production design,” Shield AI’s Harris told us. “The last culmination of the risk reduction is the flight testing of the two full-scale prototypes. The first one of those will be done at the end of October.”

“That’s a full-scale vehicle,” he continued. “It’s got the outer mold line, it’s got the F110 engine, the full propulsion path, everything in it.”

To date, Shield AI has only shown models of the X-BAT publicly. A new one displayed at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition in April revealed major changes to the core design. This included a complete reworking of the planform from a ‘cranked kite’ type arrangement to one with a distinctly different arrowhead-shaped profile featuring a straight leading edge with a more dramatic sweep.

The video below includes clips showing the original X-BAT design and the current one.

The aforementioned “propulsion path,” testing of which has already been conducted on the ground, primarily consists of the General Electric F110 paired with an Axisymmetric Vectoring Exhaust Nozzle (AVEN). The nozzle was originally developed in the 1990s for an experimental thrust-vectoring F-16 fighter. Shield AI is using the original AVEN, which had been in storage for decades, to support development of X-BAT. The nozzle will provide pitch and yaw control, with roll control for the drone coming from bleed air routed through thrusters in the drone’s wings.

No runway, no problem.

Shield AI and @GE_Aerospace just cleared a critical path to vertical flight, completing engine light-off testing of the Axisymmetric Vectoring Exhaust Nozzle (AVEN) for X-BAT.

Engineers from both companies integrated the AVEN into GE Aerospace's… pic.twitter.com/OxV3y3sRKB

— Shield AI (@shieldaitech) July 20, 2026

Shield AI has previously said that the roughly fighter-sized X-BAT will have a maximum range of 2,000 nautical miles and a service ceiling of around 50,000 feet. The company has also said in the past it is targeting an effective combat radius roughly twice that of the F-35, or around 1,340 nautical miles, but also that it could be closer to 1,000 nautical miles. Space has been made within the X-BAT design for a potential in-flight refueling capability, but there is no active work yet to integrate that feature.

In terms of payload, X-BAT’s design includes internal weapons bays roughly the same size as those on the F-35, as well as two external hardpoints under the wings. Those hardpoints are plumbed, meaning that range-extending drop tanks, or even buddy refueling stores to allow the drone to act as a tanker, could be carried. Baked-in modularity and open-architecture mission systems are intended to make it easier to fit various sensors, data links, and other capabilities down the line.

“X-BAT’s really designed to be a multi-role capability, and, if you look out at the 10-20 year time horizon, it’s hard to predict what the future fight is going to look like,” Shield AI’s Harris noted. “We fundamentally believe that multi-role capabilities are critically important. And, so, X-BAT, the reason why it’s sized to where it is is [sic] to be able to carry serious strike weapons internally and externally, in addition to being able to do air-to-air [combat], electronic warfare, and other mission sets.

“You could think of it as like X-35 versus F-35,” he also said yesterday when asked about any expectations now for further changes between the initial pair of prototypes and the final production design.

Lockheed Martin’s X-35 demonstrators are, in very broad strokes, similar to, but distinct from any of the resulting variants of the Joint Strike Fighter. Shield AI has notably already talked in the past about integrating more low-observable (stealthy) attributes to the exhaust end of the design down the line.

“Then we’ll get into flight testing around the end of this year,” Harris added. “We’ll be doing vertical takeoff and landing testing with that [the initial prototypes] to actually prove out and develop the VTOL [vertical takeoff and landing] technology for X-BAT.”

Shield AI’s X-Forge 2 facility at the Newton City-County Airport in Kansas is set to be the main flight testing hub for X-BAT, as well as the focal point for sustainment of the drones. A production facility, X-Forge 3, is also being built in Des Moines, Washington. The company’s original site, X-Forge 1, is in Frisco, Texas.

In terms of the actual flight test campaign, “you remember the X-BAT system has the air vehicle and the launch and recovery vehicle, which is the trailer that it launches and lands from,” Harris said. “Basically, the way the testing works is, we start with the vehicle horizontal, sitting on that launch and recovery vehicle, running the engine. Then we bring it up vertical, run the engine vertically, run the vehicle vertically.”

“Then we have one of the biggest cranes in the world that’s getting set up at our test site in Kansas right now, and we hang the vehicle suspended from that crane and do a bunch of testing while it’s hanging from the crane in free flight,” he continued. “Then we take the crane away, and then we do the actual untethered flights.”

Shield AI’s goal is to fly a fully missionized X-BAT in 2028 and start series production the following year.

On top of that, “the way that the [RIMES] program has been structured is getting to an early operational capability in 2029 is the end goal,” Shield AI’s Harris said.

When asked if this meant that RIMES is aiming “to eventually arrive at not just a demonstration of capability, but a real operationalized capability,” he said that was “correct.”

We will come back to this more later on, but suffice it to say up front, the prospect of X-BAT reaching an operational level of maturity within three years is extraordinarily ambitious, to say the least.

In the meantime, Shield AI has already been testing the mechanisms to “latch and unlatch” X-BAT to the launch and recovery system using an unpowered “battleship” test article, according to Harris. The design of the launch and recovery system has also evolved, and it is now self-propelled, at least to a degree, rather than just being a towed trailer.

“The launch and recovery vehicle is actually critical to the operation of the X-BAT weapon system because it enables survivability on the ground. So when you’re operating in a land-based environment, it enables basically shoot-and-scoot tactics,” Harris also noted. “Enemy transporter-erector-launchers [for missiles] are like pretty hard to find because they’re constantly moving around. Just like X-BAT, when it’s mated onto the launch and recovery vehicle, [it] is always moving around, makes it hard to track, hard to find, hard to destroy.”

The plan now is to “build the one-to-one launch and recovery vehicles to air vehicles. So the air vehicle is always on the trailer. It never comes off of it,” he continued. “Even maintenance to the air vehicle is done while it’s sitting on that launch and recovery vehicle.”

“In fact, we’re actually planning on building more than one-to-one of the launch and recovery vehicles, so that way you can preposition them around different islands, different places in the theater, and have multiple places the aircraft can lily pad from,” he added. “But you’re never putting multiple aircraft onto one launcher and launching them or something like that.”

“When you typically operate a jet, there’s a whole bunch of ground carts and stuff that you bring, like the ground power cart, the ground cooling cart, the air start cart, etc,” Harris further elaborated. “So we’ve moved a lot of those systems onto [the] launch and recovery vehicles, so you don’t have all these separate carts, which is pretty critical when you’re trying to do expeditionary operations.”

“The model for land-based operations is kind of a hub-and-spoke type model. So the squadrons are based at air bases. All the fuel and the weapons are generally based at the air bases, as well. But then you can distribute the aircraft all over the airfield,” he continued. “So, you think about what the enemy’s doing, they’re targeting the runways, they’re targeting the tarmacs, but you can disperse the aircraft around the perimeter of the airfield. You can launch them from the golf course. You can launch them from empty space in the taxiway, etc.”

Harris said that another “spoke” could be X-BATs operating from forward arming and refueling points (FARP). All of this is part of larger concepts of operations for the drone that Shield has been envisioning, and that are not at all limited to deployments at locations on land. Harris noted during the interview that the self-propelled nature of the current launch and recovery system would also help with moving the drones around on virtually any ship with sufficient deck space. This is where the RIMES program, which is separate and distinct from the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone ambitions, really comes in.

“I’ll say the fundamental value proposition of RIMES is that if you have a carrier-based CCA, you’re fundamentally constrained by the square footage of the deck of the aircraft carrier,” Harris explained. “So if you are taking an F-18 or an F-35 off, you better be replacing it with better capability per square foot of deck space than the thing that you’re taking off.”

“So, F/A-XX [the Navy’s sixth-generation carrier-based fighter, now to be built by Boeing] is a huge leap in capability, right? Which is why that program makes a lot of sense,” he continued. “The challenge with CCA is: Does it really make sense to take a manned aircraft off of an aircraft carrier and replace it with an unmanned aircraft?”

Shield AI’s argument here is that X-BAT disrupts this core equation by opening the door to a CCA-like capability, or even something more capable, that can be employed in a ship-based mode without sacrificing any crewed aircraft capacity on an aircraft carrier. Shield AI envisions dozens of X-BATs being employed from amphibious assault ships, as well as other kinds of amphibious warfare ships, including expeditionary sea base type vessels, as seen at the top of this story.

“So when you think about the number of carrier air wings that the Navy has to deploy, deploying X-BAT across all these other ships basically significantly increases the number of carrier air wings,” Harris said.

As already mentioned, the current structure of the RIMES includes a target for an early operational capability in 2029, according to Harris. “We have a program defined to get there, and there’s basically milestone-based payments along the way, so as Shield performs and hits milestones, then the Navy kicks in additional funding,” he added.

“I don’t want to get ahead of the Navy, and give you a specific number, but like hundreds to low thousands,” he also said when asked if there was even a very rough planning figure for the eventual size of the RIMES drone fleet.

Many questions remain about X-BAT, which still has to demonstrate the viability of its vertical takeoff and landing capability, which underpins everything else. As we noted in our original in-depth report on this design, the core concept here is not new, and there have been many unsuccessful attempts to operationalize it in the past. There has been skepticism that Shield AI’s effort will succeed where others have failed. The company is of the view that groundwork has now been more firmly laid, including through its own work with its much smaller internal combustion-engine-powered V-BAT tail-sitting VTOL drone, to truly realize a design of this kind.

The performance and capabilities that Shield AI expects from X-BAT once it is flying at all are also ambitious. A high degree of autonomy is also part of the full planned package, which will leverage the company’s already extensive work in this domain with its Hivemind software.

There are also questions about the Navy’s exact plans for RIMES, as well as its broader future drone fleets. Just this year, the service has issued several contracting notices pointing to rapidly evolving views about future carrier-based strike drones and other uncrewed aircraft. New requirements that Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) released in August ostensibly for future CCA-type drones notably pointed more toward something that sounded very much like an advanced uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), as you can read more about here.

Whether the 2029 operational timeframe the Navy is said to be aiming for under RIMES is firm, or even realistic in any way, remains to be seen. The actual definition of what constitutes an “early operational capability” could be very flexible, as well. It is also worth noting here that Shield AI is not the only company currently conducting work under RIMES. Whether the Navy might be planning to acquire more than one design through this program is unclear. We have reached out to the service for more information.

Other services could be interested in any operational capability produced through the RIMES effort, too. TWZ regularly highlights how runway-independent drones would be particularly well-suited to the U.S. Marine Corps’ new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations. That service is already in the process of acquiring MQ-58B Valkyrie drones from Kratos that will be able to operate from conventional runways. They will also be capable of runway-independent launches, though they will still have to land conventionally. The baseline Valkyrie design lands via parachute.

Aviation Week has reported separately today that Shield AI is looking to pitch the X-BAT to the U.S. Army as a successor to that service’s fleet of MQ-1C Gray Eagle armed drones.

In general, runway independence is of growing interest elsewhere across the U.S. military as threats to large, established bases continue to expand in scale and scope. The proliferation of various tiers of weaponized drones is a particularly significant factor in this, as TWZ just examined in detail this week in the context of the recent withdrawal of B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom. Ever more capable cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles are also part of the full threat picture.

The conflict with Iran has also underscored the limits of what can be gained survivability-wise by dispersing traditional fixed-wing aircraft, especially within an existing airbase. As highlighted earlier, X-BAT could be dispersed very differently to nearly anywhere within a facility that can handle the thrust from the F110 engine in hover.

As it stands now, we are set to get our first view of a full-sized X-BAT prototype within the next few weeks as Shield AI continues to gear up for the start of actual flight testing before the end of the year.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Navy Doubles Down On X-BAT VTOL ‘Fighter’ Drone Development appeared first on TWZ.

South Korea's presidential office on Wednesday dismissed a Ukrainian report that Russia has imported petroleum products from South Korean ports, calling the accusation inappropriate.

Multiple reports now say that U.S. Air Force B-1 Lancers left the United Kingdom over the weekend due to the threat of an Iranian-directed near-field drone attack broadly akin to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb that decimated Russian bombers. Though many specific details are still unconfirmed, this is an entirely plausible mode of attack that TWZ has been warning about for many years now.

Short- and long-range drone threats against parked aircraft have now morphed fully from theory to reality, as also demonstrated by losses in the course of the conflict with Iran, and even non-state actors are increasingly brandishing these capabilities. Despite the increasing dangers posed to planes out on open flightlines, the Pentagon continues to drag its feet on building hardened aircraft shelters and other fortified air base infrastructure.

Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday, B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July. The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.

Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details, all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.

Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb last year involved simultaneous covert near-field attacks using explosive-laden quadcopter-type drones on airbases across Russia. At least 10 Russian bombers, as well as a variety of other aircraft, all parked on open flightlines, were destroyed.

“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford. “There were some threats.”

“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.

“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”

It’s also worth noting here that British authorities had arrested five men on suspicion of driving bomb-laden vans toward the base back on September 27. Those individuals were released on bail after no explosives were found in the vehicles. U.S. and British officials have also raised the possibility of an Iranian link to that incident.

“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday. “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”

“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.

Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.

Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion, but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure, as well as American naval vessels operating offshore. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.

This all extends overseas, as well. In November 2024, there was a rash of drone sightings over and around several airbases in the United Kingdom, including RAF Fairford. This has been an issue more broadly in Europe in recent years, as well. This was only further underscored by an attempted drone attack on a Ukrainian An-124 at an airport in Germany in August, which authorities in that country have blamed on Russia.

New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.

According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised… https://t.co/eCZaLfz9yx pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv

— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026

A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by. Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.

The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors. The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth. It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.

Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) January 25, 2024

Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves. Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home.

As we wrote all the way back in 2017:

“Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating:

‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’

Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.”

With all this in mind, a heated debate has emerged in the past few years in and around the U.S. military about the value of investing in new hardened aircraft shelters, as well as other fortified infrastructure.

To date, the U.S. Air Force, in particular, has put virtually all emphasis on surface-to-air missiles and other active defenses, as well as the dispersal of aircraft, over physical hardening. The conflict with Iran, in which a number of American military aircraft have been damaged or destroyed on the ground by drone and missile attacks, has underscored the limits of these strategies.

Second angle. pic.twitter.com/NUupdRkdm9

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 29, 2026

“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”

Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.

“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”

“I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”

It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.

That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.

When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets. Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.

A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.

Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks. There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.

Active defenses, especially surface-to-air missile batteries and interceptors to go with them, have historically been very expensive. Lower-end counter-drone-focused interceptors and directed energy weapons are helping to bring these costs down in some regards. Even so, those capabilities come at a significant cost.

There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran, which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can read more about in our separate reporting here.

Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones. U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.

How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway?

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 5, 2026

On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel. Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.

More recently, there have been signs of changing mindsets on the matter of hardening across the U.S. military. In January, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), a focal point for counter-drone efforts the Pentagon established last year, issued explicit guidance regarding the use of netting, cables, and other kinds of passive physical defenses around bases and other critical infrastructure. A contracting notice in March also called attention to plans for new hardened underground facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”

“It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”

In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.

This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.

“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”

We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.

Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Glaring Lack Of Investment In Aircraft Shelters Highlighted By B-1B’s Sudden Retreat From U.K. Airbase appeared first on TWZ.

The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.

The world is becoming more dangerous.

We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7

— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026

Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw

— James Cartlidge MP (@jcartlidgemp) October 6, 2026

The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.

Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.

For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.

While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.

Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.

Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.

Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.

The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.

The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.

Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.

2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.

— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026

Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.

Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.

That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.

The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.

That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.

Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK

— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025

For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.

The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.

A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.

Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.

The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.

There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.

Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.

That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.

The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.

The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.

With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.

The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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