Fighting intensified across Yemen over the past week, as the Houthis (Ansar Allah) escalated their missile and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia.
On October 16, two missiles hit Aden International Airport’s perimeter. The Houthis said they targeted a nearby military facility housing a Saudi-led coalition command center and weapons depot. No casualties were reported.
Two days later, October 18, the Houthis shot down a Saudi AH-6i light attack helicopter near Najran. Footage released by the group’s military media showed a missile striking the helicopter before it fell. The crash killed both crew members. The Houthis also downed a Turkish-made Karayel combat drone in Yemen.
On October 19, a ballistic missile hit the Al-Alam training camp in Shabwa province as recruits assembled. The strike killed 73 people and wounded more than 200. The dead were all new recruits. The Houthis claimed the attack. A missile strike also targeted Marib.
The next day, October 20, Houthi military media released footage of an operation on Jabal Han, a mountain overlooking Taiz’s western approaches, and said the group’s forces had stormed the summit and ridgeline, driving out Saudi-backed forces. Fighting also continued around Al-Dhabab, the Old Airport and Madarat, while clashes south of the city extended into Al-Misrakh and Sabr al-Madawim. The mountain overlooks the Al-Dhabab road, a key supply route into Taiz.
On October 21, the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at the Saudi-led coalition’s operations room at Badr Camp in Aden. An explosion was heard and smoke reported near the airport. Three drones also targeted Al-Rayyan Airport in Mukalla.
In addition, the group’s military media released footage from operations east of Raghwan in Marib showing wreckage of Turkish-made STM Kargu loitering munitions. The footage showed at least two of the systems. This was evidence of growing involvement by Ankara in the war.
The same day, Saudi authorities said debris from a drone intercepted over the Shaybah oilfield killed two foreign workers, one Filipino and one Nepali, and injured two others, a Pakistani and an Indian. A separate attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam killed two people and injured eight; the second death was announced the following day. The airport sustained material damage, prompting flight diversions.
All in all, the Houthis maintain the upper hand on the battlefield, in Taiz, near Bab al-Mandab and on other fronts. The group’s air defenses also remain a credible threat. Meanwhile, strikes on Saudi-backed forces and the kingdom itself are becoming more lethal. Despite all of these factors, Riyadh appears to be determined to go on with the war, with reports indicating it is close to securing more support not just from Turkey, but also from Egypt and Syria.
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RT | October 22, 2026
The US-Israeli war on Iran has caused an “unprecedented” shock to global energy markets, removing some 3 billion barrels of oil supply, Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser has warned.
The war launched in February effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial oil and LNG artery, sending crude prices up roughly 50%. Despite Gulf exports recovering to a reported 80% of pre-war levels, renewed attacks on vessels have kept markets on edge, with Brent hitting a five-month high above $112 this week. Houthi attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and shipping have compounded the crisis, threatening another vital trade chokepoint, the Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
In an interview with Al Arabiya Business aired on Thursday, Nasser said the nearly eight-month crisis had deprived global markets of an estimated 3 billion barrels of oil.
“The impact of this crisis on energy markets is unprecedented,” he said. “We have lost around 3 billion barrels since it began. And bear in mind that the Gulf accounts for roughly 20% of global oil demand.”
The figure is equivalent to nearly a month of global oil consumption and reflects cumulative supply losses caused by disrupted shipping, reduced production and logistical bottlenecks.
With global oil inventories already below their five-year average when the war erupted, prices could have soared past $200 a barrel, Nasser warned. He credited emergency reserve releases, China’s sharp cut in seaborne oil imports and Saudi Aramco’s East-West pipeline, which bypasses Hormuz, with averting an even more severe price shock.
Nasser warned, however, that even an end to the crisis could bring fresh pressure on oil markets, as recovering consumption and a rush to replenish depleted reserves will likely fuel another demand surge.
“Once things return to normal, we expect additional demand of around 3 million barrels per day – about 2 million from consumption growth and another 1 million just to replenish the reserves countries have drawn down during the crisis,” he said, noting that the added demand could keep markets under strain long after shipping routes reopen.
Fresh escalation fears
Meanwhile, fears of another escalation are growing as US-Iran talks remain deadlocked. Reports on Wednesday claimed Washington was quietly pulling troops from bases in Jordan, Qatar and Kuwait, evacuating some diplomats and their families from Saudi Arabia and preparing similar withdrawals elsewhere. Similar precautions were taken ahead of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28.
The moves follow US President Donald Trump’s rejection last month of Tehran’s proposal to reopen Hormuz in exchange for lifting the US blockade of Iranian ports, easing oil export restrictions, unfreezing Iranian assets and ending regional hostilities, including Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon.
Washington and Israel have since reportedly discussed another major offensive, potentially soon after the November 3 US midterms. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also openly threatened fresh strikes on Iran, even without US backing.
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | October 22, 2026
Earlier this month, Aramco’s chief executive, Amin Nasser, assured the markets that “our system is intact” and that Saudi Arabia could restore its full 12 million barrels a day of capacity within days. It is a comforting message, and Washington, European capitals and oil traders have every reason to want to believe it. It is not true.
Karl Miller has just completed a 37-slide operating assessment of Saudi Arabia’s energy system, covering everything from the oil fields to the fuel depots, as of October 20. I have read it closely. It is the most careful accounting of this damage I have seen, and it is careful in a way that should worry anyone counting on Saudi oil this winter. Miller does not count Houthi boasts, social-media videos or plumes of smoke as damage. He separates confirmed hits from claims, and he refuses to add up the design capacity of every facility that was struck as if it were all offline at once. Even with all of that discipline, the picture is grim.
A quarter of Saudi production is gone
Start with the headline number. In February, before the war, Saudi Arabia produced about 10.88 million barrels of crude a day. In September it was still producing 2.51 million barrels a day less, a drop of 23 percent. In August the shortfall was 4.64 million barrels a day, when output sank to about 6.24 million. From March through September, the Kingdom produced more than 800 million fewer barrels than it would have at its February rate. That is roughly eight days of total world oil consumption that never came out of the ground.
Aramco’s own books say the same thing. In the company’s reported figures, its liquids production fell from 10.56 million barrels a day in the first quarter to 7.57 million in the second, a 28 percent collapse in a single quarter. Natural gas and ethane fell nearly 6 percent. A company whose system was intact does not report numbers like that.
Exports followed production down. In one consistent tracking series, Saudi crude exports fell from 7.27 million barrels a day in February to 3.70 million in August, a 49 percent drop. They recovered to 5.62 million in September, but that is still 23 percent below the pre-war level.
The damage runs through the whole chain
The reason the recovery keeps stalling is that the damage is not in one place. It runs from the wellhead to the gas station.
At the front end, the Abqaiq complex, the plant that conditions most of Saudi Arabia’s light crude before it can be shipped or refined, sustained physical damage in July. In March, some 2 to 2.5 million barrels a day were curtailed across the offshore Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf and Abu Safa fields. In April, Khurais and Manifa each lost 300,000 barrels a day.
In the middle, five of the Kingdom’s major refineries have been damaged or shut down. Ras Tanura, at 550,000 barrels a day the largest domestic refinery, burned and was shut in March. SATORP in Jubail lost three units in April, restarted at half capacity and was still running at only about 70 percent in May. SAMREF in Yanbu was hit in March. The Riyadh refinery caught fire on October 3. Jazan, a 400,000-barrel-a-day plant designed to turn out 250,000 barrels a day of ultra-low-sulfur diesel, shut down on July 27 after its power plant and tank farm were hit, and Ansar Allah attacks in August and September disrupted every attempt to restart it. Satellite imagery now shows tank damage at Petro Rabigh as well. The Juaymah gas-liquids plant, which feeds Saudi Arabia’s LPG exports, has suffered fires.
At the back end, the system for storing and moving fuel is being picked apart. Imagery of the Abha bulk plant from September 13 shows six tanks apparently destroyed and eight more damaged. A depot near Riyadh’s airport burned on September 19. Jazan’s tank clusters have been hit repeatedly.
And the East-West Pipeline, Saudi Arabia’s only way to move crude to the Red Sea and around a closed Strait of Hormuz, has been hit again and again. In April, 700,000 barrels a day of pumping capacity was knocked out. In September, repeated attacks took out three pumping stations and halted the line until a low-rate restart on September 22. On October 4 and 5, another pumping station near Khurais was reported badly damaged. The energy minister now says the line is running at 5.8 million barrels a day, against a rated 7 million. Even Miller notes that no one outside Aramco is metering the actual flow.
Why repairs don’t stick
Miller’s most important insight is that this is a system, and systems fail at their weakest link. Jazan is the clearest example. Fixing the crude units does no good if the gasification and power plant that run the refinery is still damaged, and fixing the power plant does no good if there are no tanks to put the diesel in. A refinery can be “restarted” on paper and still produce nothing useful. The same logic runs upstream. An oil field with every well intact still has to shut in if the processing plant or pumping station downstream of it is broken.
Every time Aramco gets one link repaired, another one gets hit. That is why restart announcements keep failing to show up in the production numbers.
Saudi Arabia is running out of fuel to sell
The most alarming numbers in Miller’s report are about refined products. By July, the latest month with complete data, Saudi refinery output was down 534,000 barrels a day from February, nearly 18 percent. Diesel output fell 21 percent. Diesel exports fell 47 percent, from 848,000 barrels a day to 446,000. Gasoline exports fell 40 percent.
The Saudis have been covering the gap by draining their tanks. Diesel stocks fell from 25.6 million barrels in February to 16.6 million in July, down 35 percent. Gasoline stocks fell by the same proportion. The world’s largest oil exporter more than doubled its imports of fuel oil, and it is burning more than twice as much crude directly in its power plants as it did in February. Some of that is the summer air-conditioning load, but it is not the behavior of a country with fuel to spare.
Lower stocks mean less cushion for the next attack. And there will be a next attack.
The trap Riyadh is in
Miller’s report spells out one more danger that I have not seen discussed anywhere else. If Saudi Arabia’s export outlets close, its oil has nowhere to go but its own refineries, its own power plants and its storage tanks. In July, domestic refineries and direct burning absorbed about 3.04 million barrels a day. Once the storage is full, that is roughly the ceiling on what Saudi Arabia could keep producing. Close Ras Tanura and Yanbu at the same time, and the Kingdom would have to shut in most of its oil fields. That is exactly the scenario Ansar Allah’s campaign against the pipeline, the Red Sea and the Gulf terminals is built to produce.
Why this matters to everyone else
The rest of the world is already living with the consequences. Saudi diesel exports are down by about 400,000 barrels a day, at the same moment Hormuz is restricted and Russian refineries are under drone attack. The International Energy Agency says the global diesel shortage will last well into 2027. Brent is above $100. Europe, which depends on imported diesel, is already rioting over the cost of living, and winter has not started.
Miller makes no claim that every barrel of lost output was blown up by a Houthi missile, and he is careful to say so. Some of the decline reflects shipping, security and commercial decisions. But the point is that it doesn’t matter to a trucker in Lyon or a farmer in Lombardy whether a barrel was lost to a missile, a closed sea lane or a refinery that has no power. It is gone either way.
So when Aramco says its system is intact, ask what the production figures, the export figures and the fuel stocks say. They say Saudi Arabia is producing a quarter less oil than it did in February, exporting half as much diesel, and drawing down its reserves to keep the lights on. Any new American or Israeli campaign against Iran will land on a Saudi energy system that has no slack left to absorb it.
© Afzal Khan/Alamy
© Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images
Riad vuelve a tender la mano a las fuerzas religiosas cuya influencia MbS se pasó años frenando.
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En unas imágenes difundidas desde Dhubab, al oeste de Adén, un vehículo blindado atropella a unos hombres identificados como combatientes capturados de las fuerzas de Saná. Las imágenes, relacionadas con las movilizaciones de las Brigadas Salafistas de los Gigantes y difundidas por medios afines a Arabia Saudí, han despertado en Yemen el temor a una vuelta a los métodos de los grupos takfiri, que tachan a otros musulmanes de infieles. Reuters verificó las imágenes de vehículos arrollando a combatientes, entre ellos hombres desarmados, e informó de que las Brigadas de los Gigantes habían abierto una investigación.
Las imágenes se producen mientras las formaciones respaldadas por Arabia Saudí pierden terreno ante una ofensiva lanzada por Saná bajo el lema coránico «Y Alá es más poderoso y más severo en el castigo».
La toma de los distritos costeros occidentales por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas Yemeníes (FAY), alineadas con Ansarallah, seguida de avances a través de la provincia de Taiz, ha puesto de manifiesto las divisiones militares de la coalición. Las FAY calculan que su control territorial ronda el 95 % del territorio de la provincia. La respuesta de Riad ha recurrido cada vez más a un instrumento habitual de su guerra en Yemen: la movilización de la hostilidad sectaria contra Ansarallah.
Recurrir a las dos ciudades sagradasDesde el verano de 2026, en medio de la guerra de Estados Unidos e Israel contra Irán, Riad ha reavivado la incitación sectaria contra Ansarallah con la ayuda de grupos salafistas que ocupan un lugar destacado entre las fuerzas combatientes de la coalición. Tras pasar del patrocinio emiratí al saudí, estas formaciones ofrecen al reino una base de apoyo cuya hostilidad doctrinal hacia los zaidíes puede canalizarse hacia el campo de batalla.
Arabia Saudí se ha mostrado cada vez más decidida a dotar a sus políticas de legitimidad religiosa. Su versión de un ataque con drones cerca de La Meca el 15 de septiembre de 2026, seguida de afirmaciones de que se interceptó un misil de crucero en la región de Medina el 15 de octubre, proporcionó material para campañas que invocaban la defensa de las ciudades sagradas del islam. Las fuerzas yemeníes negaron haber atacado los lugares sagrados y rechazaron la acusación sobre Medina calificándola de invención. Los yemeníes también celebraron una manifestación masiva en Saná «en defensa de La Meca y los lugares sagrados».
Los medios de comunicación saudíes promovieron las acusaciones, y los medios del Golfo y yemeníes alineados con la coalición se hicieron eco de ellas. Las campañas resultantes buscaban desacreditar a Ansarallah, cuya popularidad había aumentado gracias a su campaña militar en apoyo de Gaza, y replantear el enfrentamiento como una defensa de los lugares sagrados musulmanes frente a un enemigo sectario.
Fatwas a la carta
Paralelamente a estas acusaciones, Arabia Saudí movilizó a sus predicadores contra Ansarallah mediante fatwas emitidas «a la carta». Esta renovada coordinación une a las instituciones religiosas y políticas del reino después de que el príncipe heredero Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) pasara años debilitando las estructuras clericales que habían sustentado su alianza.
El gran muftí Saleh al-Fawzan, que asumió el cargo en octubre de 2025, emitió un comunicado en el que condenaba directamente a Ansarallah y otorgaba autoridad religiosa a la campaña en su contra. Su intervención situó al máximo cargo religioso del reino del lado de las fuerzas que se enfrentan a Saná, presentando su misión como la defensa de los lugares sagrados musulmanes y la obediencia a los gobernantes legítimos.
La declaración de Fawzan también asoció a Ansarallah con Satanás y presentó la resistencia a su dominio como un deber sancionado por Dios.
El muftí fue nombrado por recomendación de MbS y tiene un historial de posturas hostiles hacia los Hermanos Musulmanes y los chiitas. En abril de 2026, los medios árabes informaron de que ya no se podía acceder a su página web ni a su archivo de fatwas, lo que suscitó especulaciones sobre la eliminación o revisión del material acumulado a lo largo de décadas. Su última intervención contra Ansarallah otorga a esa autoridad religiosa un papel destacado en el renovado esfuerzo bélico de Riad.
El 25 de septiembre, el clérigo saudí afirmó: «El grupo hutí se fundó sobre la corrupción en el credo y la corrupción en el enfoque, por lo que se rebeló contra sus gobernantes y dividió al país y a su pueblo». Lo describió como «una secta descarriada y un grupo desviado que declara infieles a los Compañeros, considera lícito derramar sangre musulmana y permite la demolición y destrucción de sus mezquitas». Restablecer la seguridad en Yemen bajo su liderazgo reconocido, declaró, era «uno de los deberes más imperativos».
Predicación para el frente
La alineación entre los predicadores salafistas de Yemen y el discurso wahabí saudí es evidente en el uso de dictámenes religiosos para legitimar la guerra contra Ansarallah. Ahmed bin Hassan al-Muallim, presidente de la Asociación de Eruditos Yemeníes, hizo un llamamiento a la movilización como deber religioso y nacional. El diputado de Islah y portavoz de la asociación, Mohammed Nasser al-Hazmi al-Idrisi, también desempeñó un papel en la incitación a la lucha contra Ansarallah al adoptar una retórica religiosa que legitima enfrentarse a ellos y apoya la búsqueda de ayuda de Arabia Saudí.
A medida que las fuerzas de Saná avanzan por Taiz, fuentes de alto nivel vinculadas a sus negociaciones con tribus y formaciones armadas informan a The Cradle de que Arabia Saudí está trabajando intensamente para explotar las divisiones sectarias en la provincia. Dichas negociaciones tienen como objetivo evitar enfrentamientos y derramamiento de sangre, mientras que Riad busca movilizar a las fuerzas que se resisten al avance de Saná.
Las fuentes describen una escalada de la incitación en el interior de las mezquitas por parte del partido Islah, afiliado a los Hermanos Musulmanes, y de grupos salafistas, que utilizan una retórica sectaria para fomentar la lucha contra Ansarallah. En este contexto, Ali al-Imad, miembro del buró político de Ansarallah, advirtió de que Arabia Saudí estaba movilizando a grupos takfiri bajo designaciones militares.
Múltiples fuentes locales informan a The Cradle de que una retórica similar se ha extendido por las mezquitas y las escuelas religiosas de las provincias del sur. En Lahj, los anuncios de reclutamiento obtenidos por The Cradle convocan a una brigada salafista para apoyar la guerra del reino contra las fuerzas de Saná.
Uno de ellos exige a los solicitantes que sigan un «enfoque salafista» y describe el reclutamiento para una «Brigada Tawhid» contra la «marea hutí rafidí», utilizando un término despectivo para referirse a los chiitas. Las fuentes locales califican la formación propuesta de takfiri y inspirada en el ISIS.
La compra del frente sur
Arabia Saudí también ha proporcionado apoyo financiero a comandantes militares salafistas leales en el sur de Yemen, con el objetivo de reforzar sus formaciones y ampliar su papel en el campo de batalla. Según fuentes locales, estas formaciones incluyen a miembros de organizaciones takfiri a quienes Riad ha enviado a los frentes tras la extensión del control de Saná a lo largo de la costa occidental hasta Bab al-Mandab.
Entre los beneficiarios señalados se encuentran el general de división Hamdi Hassan Mohammed Shukri, comandante de la Cuarta Región Militar, de la Segunda División de las Brigadas Gigantes y de la Séptima Brigada de Infantería; el general de división Abdulrahman Saleh Hassan al-Lahji, jefe de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas del Escudo de la Nación y comandante de la Cuarta Brigada de Infantería; y Rashad al-Dhalei y Qusai al-Damani.
Abyan Today, citando fuentes políticas, informó de que estos comandantes y otros recibieron alrededor de 600 millones de riales saudíes del «Comité Especial» saudí. Según la misma información, el Eje de Taiz, afiliado a Islah, quedó excluido, lo que pone de manifiesto las divisiones dentro del bando respaldado por Arabia Saudí y las recriminaciones por las retiradas y la rendición.
El esfuerzo por comprar lealtades militares va acompañado de una expansión de las redes religiosas que pueden ayudar a sostener las formaciones sobre el terreno. Además de reforzar las Brigadas Gigantes bajo el mando de Abdulrahman al-Muharrami, conocido como Abu Zara, el activista yemení Adel al-Hasani afirma que Riad estableció 62 centros religiosos durante la tregua, que se extienden desde Bab al-Mandab hasta Mahra.
Otro informe sobre sus acusaciones señala al oficial saudí Falah al-Shahrani y al embajador Mohammed al-Jaber como responsables de supervisar la red. Según se informa, muchos de ellos están dirigidos por seguidores del predicador salafista Yahya al-Hajuri y se basan en autoridades religiosas como Rabee al-Madkhali.
Desde que el enfrentamiento entre Arabia Saudí y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos se intensificó a finales de 2025, Riad ha acelerado sus esfuerzos por reorganizar las formaciones armadas del sur y ganarse a sus comandantes, aprovechando el declive de la influencia militar emiratí tras la derrota, en enero de 2026, de las fuerzas respaldadas por Abu Dabi.
En febrero se informó de que el reino había destinado casi 3.000 millones de dólares al pago de los salarios de militares y civiles yemeníes, incluidos aproximadamente 1.000 millones de dólares para los combatientes del sur a los que antes pagaban los Emiratos Árabes Unidos.
Un bando salafista dividido
Los reveses sufridos por las formaciones respaldadas por Arabia Saudí reflejan un liderazgo fragmentado y objetivos políticos contradictorios, además de las pérdidas en el campo de batalla. Dentro del movimiento salafista yemení, algunos líderes han rechazado el intento de Riad de avivar las divisiones internas.
Personalidades del norte, entre ellas el jeque Mohammed al-Imam, han considerado la guerra contra Ansarallah como un conflicto entre musulmanes y han firmado acuerdos de coexistencia y distensión en zonas como Saada, Dhamar y Mabar.
Esos acuerdos contribuyeron a mantener a grupos de combatientes al margen de los combates. Su negativa a considerar el enfrentamiento como una obligación religiosa ha complicado el rumbo que Riad pretendía imponer a otras formaciones salafistas, financiándolas y armándolas antes de empujarlas al combate.
Las divisiones atraviesan las redes religiosas de las que depende el reino, así como las formaciones militares que ha puesto bajo su patrocinio. Para aquellos líderes salafistas que firmaron acuerdos locales, la coexistencia con Ansarallah ha supuesto una forma de mantener a sus comunidades al margen de los combates, lo que entra en conflicto directo con la movilización que Riad está fomentando en otros lugares.
Entre las fuerzas alineadas con Abu Dabi, voces vinculadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur (STC, en inglés) también han advertido de que la renovada dependencia de Riad respecto a los combatientes del sur refleja sus dificultades militares más que un cambio en su postura política.
Temen ser utilizados hasta que la amenaza inmediata remita, para luego volver a ser marginados. En su opinión, los llamamientos saudíes a las fuerzas del sur no ofrecen ninguna garantía de que el reino vaya a atender sus demandas políticas una vez que esos combatientes hayan cumplido su propósito militar inmediato.
Saná ha ampliado sus contactos tribales y ha aprovechado las divisiones entre sus oponentes, en paralelo a su campaña militar. Los informes sugieren que estas negociaciones, las infiltraciones de seguridad y los ataques contra depósitos de armas han contribuido a debilitar a las formaciones enemigas y a preparar el terreno para nuevos avances.
El investigador y analista político Ahmed al-Hasani describe el sectarismo como una de las principales herramientas de movilización de Arabia Saudí en Yemen. Sin embargo, distingue entre las escuelas salafistas vinculadas a Riad, otras ligadas a Abu Dabi y aquellas que conservan cierta independencia.
La escuela del imán de Dhamar considera la guerra como un conflicto interno, explica, mientras que Arabia Saudí sigue cortejando a figuras de la escuela Fuyush de Adén sin haberlas involucrado aún en la batalla, a pesar de las fatwas de los clérigos saudíes —incluida la de Fawzan—.
Hasani afirma a The Cradle que la predicación incendiaria se ha extendido por las mezquitas, mientras que los grupos takfiri más cercanos al ISIS operan al margen de las estructuras tradicionales de las mezquitas y las escuelas religiosas. Se concentran en zonas rurales y en torno a las líneas del frente, combatiendo en frentes como los de Bayda y Marib.
Las Fuerzas del Escudo de la Nación siguen desplegadas a lo largo de las líneas de contacto en Marib, Jawf, Shabwa, Bayhan y Abyan, en alerta frente a Ansarallah, pero sin que actualmente se estén llevando a cabo ofensivas de gran envergadura en esos sectores.
Reclutamiento más allá de Yemen
A medida que sus formaciones aliadas pierden posiciones estratégicas, Riad ha buscado refuerzos en el extranjero. Axios informó de conversaciones entre Arabia Saudí y Siria sobre el envío de tropas a Yemen, en medio de informes independientes sobre esfuerzos para reclutar combatientes takfiri que lucharon en Siria.
Estas medidas coincidieron con la activación del Acuerdo de Defensa Conjunta de La Meca entre Arabia Saudí, Turquía y Pakistán. A pesar de los informes sobre la concentración de soldados pakistaníes cerca de la frontera con Yemen, Islamabad afirmó que sus fuerzas no cruzarían a Yemen y que su misión se limitaba a defender el territorio saudí.
La movilización religiosa también se ha extendido más allá de Yemen. Páginas sirias y relatos procedentes de Damasco, Idlib y Hama han seguido de cerca los combates, mientras que fuentes yemeníes declararon a Al-Akhbar que se estaba trasladando a combatientes desde Siria a través de territorio saudí, con la ayuda de Turquía para que algunos llegaran a los frentes de Marib, Jawf, Adén y Hadramaut.
El exministro del Interior iraquí Baqir Jabr al-Zubaidi afirmó que se había organizado un puente aéreo para trasladar a combatientes sirios a Yemen tras el fracaso de las campañas militares del Golfo.
La Asociación de Eruditos Musulmanes de Irak, una organización clerical suní, emitió un comunicado en el que pedía apoyo político, mediático, ideológico y en el campo de batalla para los combatientes contrarios a Ansarallah. También condenó la matanza de hombres que habían depuesto las armas, describiendo el incidente como una grave violación religiosa y exigiendo medidas correctivas contra los responsables.
Hadi Qubaisi, director del Centro Ufeed de Investigación y Estudios e investigador especializado en asuntos políticos e islam político, sostiene que:
«La apuesta por traer combatientes de Siria a Yemen se basa principalmente en aprovechar el número, más que en reactivar un proyecto yihadista capaz de atraer a grandes masas. Si se tratara de una auténtica movilización yihadista, sus ecos habrían llegado hasta Trípoli y los campos palestinos. Pero el atractivo de este discurso ha disminuido, sobre todo tras la guerra de Gaza y la brecha que esta puso de manifiesto entre las consignas y las posturas prácticas».
Arabia Saudí ha perdido parte de su capacidad de movilización religiosa, añade Qubaisi a The Cradle, mientras que las autoridades sirias controlan el discurso religioso y están reformando los planes de estudios. Por lo tanto, enviar un número limitado de combatientes difiere de lanzar una amplia campaña de reclutamiento.
En Yemen, Islah y sus aliados también han utilizado la retórica religiosa y takfiri en su enfrentamiento con Ansarallah. Su capacidad para traducir esa predicación en un reclutamiento generalizado ha seguido siendo limitada, a pesar de los esfuerzos por presentar la participación en los combates como un deber religioso.
Qubaisi considera que el traslado de combatientes a Yemen se enfrenta a obstáculos sustanciales, desde el escaso atractivo del campo de batalla y la ausencia de incentivos económicos que se ofrecen en otros lugares hasta las divisiones y las luchas internas entre las fuerzas armadas del sur.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
In “The Muqaddimah”, the 14th-century historian Ibn Khaldun wrote that “great dynasties often decline after three generations because they fail to produce capable successors.” Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia now asks this question precisely: Has he weakened the very dynasty he was meant to strengthen and secure? The kingdom is under mounting […]
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The Cradle – October 20, 2026
US special envoy Tom Barrack conceded that a “ground kinetic” battle in Yemen by the US “seems fruitless” during a talk at the Global Security Forum in Qatar on 20 October.
“I think the president’s been clear that he supports Saudi Arabia and the backing that they need logistically he will supply. But America getting involved in a ground kinetic battle somewhere else seems fruitless.”
Barrack is Washington’s ambassador to Turkiye and special presidential envoy for Syria and Iraq.
He admitted that military force has failed in Yemen and that Riyadh is in a “very difficult position.”
“These kinetic reactions have never worked. It doesn’t work. It’s probably not likely that it’s going to work,” he said.
Barrack questioned whether US meddling across West Asia has helped or harmed the region, arguing that Ansarallah in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the resistance factions in Iraq would lose their reason to exist only once states took responsibility themselves.
He pressed for talks between Riyadh, Sanaa, and regional mediators, urging regional capitals to build their own alliances instead of leaning on Washington.
He went further, admitting that the US has had a hand in 23 regime changes across the region, none of which achieved their aims.
He declined to say whether the US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February was a mistake, while conceding that it had unleashed unintended consequences across the region.
The admission comes as the Saudi-led coalition presses on with airstrikes on Yemen, drawing retaliatory missile and drone strikes by the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) on the kingdom.
Riyadh has turned to its defense partners under the Mecca pact, including Pakistan and Turkiye, after Washington declined its requests for direct US intervention against Yemen.
Barrack’s remarks follow Washington’s failed bid to subdue Yemen by military force, with more than 1,000 US airstrikes between March 2024 and April 2025 unable to halt Yemeni naval operations waged in support of Gaza, forcing the US into an Omani-brokered ceasefire with Sanaa in May 2025.
The campaign cost Washington $1 billion in its first three weeks alone, as Yemeni forces downed 17 MQ-9 Reaper drones and the US lost two F-18 fighter jets.
Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi said in November 2024 that the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier had retreated hundreds of miles after coming under Yemeni fire, while then US Under Secretary of Defense Bill LaPlante admitted he was “just shocked” by what Yemen’s missiles could do.
Europe fared no better, with Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, commander of the EU’s Operation Aspides, telling Bloomberg in June 2024 that his Red Sea fleet needed to more than double in size and that US–UK strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” after France withdrew one of his frigates citing the threat level.
On January 5, 2025, Saudi Arabia’s then ambassador to Bangladesh, Essa Youssef Essa Al Duhailan, delivered a stark reminder of a lost opportunity. Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom’s state-owned oil giant, had sent high-level delegations to Bangladesh three times between 2016 and 2018 to explore investment opportunities, including an oil refinery. Yet, according to the ambassador, […]
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Mohammed bin Salman is learning a lot about being a leader, although it is the Houthis who are giving him the lessons.
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Mohammed bin Salman is learning a lot about being a leader, although it is the Houthis who are giving him the lessons. The first one is that in the Arab world all promises of military support from neighbours are worthless. The second: only Iran has the power to stop the war in Yemen.
It’s hard to define Donald Trump’s legacy in the Middle East when, since the end of February this year, everything seems to point to him and the U.S. being a huge loser in a war against Iran. But one decision he did make more recently can be considered quite smart: not to hit the Houthis.
This group in Yemen has cultivated the model of how to stay in power even in the face of airstrikes from the U.S. They remain in mountainous regions, scattered as much as possible, and are the toughest fighters in the entire region. Trump’s decision in March 2025 to halt his own bombing campaign against them was probably the smartest thing the Donald has done in the region. He knew that they were just too tough, too resilient, and the price of U.S. shipping being hit in the Red Sea was just too great.
Tough times now for Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who can’t be sleeping very well at night – if he is getting any sleep at all. His own decision back in 2015 to launch a bombing campaign against civilians mainly in Sanaa (and often wedding ceremonies) might be one he is regretting now. The Crown Prince’s own air force is still bombing the Houthis, but this time along the coastline in a bid to break their stranglehold on the Bab el-Mandeb straits. But the response by the Houthis – to bomb the living daylights out of Saudi Arabia’s main airport in Riyadh – has not only shocked leaders of the entire region but underlines a point that media based in Dubai, too used to writing flattering copy about the Crown Prince, might not make: the fate of this young country, with its young leader, is balancing on the edge of a knife. Many experts point out why the Crown Prince is so paranoid about security and the threat of a coup d’état by pointing out that it is only a matter of time before one of these Saudi pilots drops his payload on the Crown Prince’s palace instead – which would be the tinderbox moment for a regime to fall, for a leader to slip away in the dead of night and arrive perhaps somewhere in London, Tangiers or even California. While MbS is fretting about the state of the war with the Houthis, which is not going at all well, his main worry is not that this group enters KSA and does anything politically to destabilise the country. It is rather that the lack of confidence within the royal family – by enough princes – reaches a tipping point and he is either assassinated or given the opportunity to flee at a moment’s notice. The attack on the airport was really such a tipping point, as it showed not only how MbS’s leadership and the poor decisions he makes are evident (the airport should have been closed months ago, but it would look like a defeatist move) but also how vulnerable the entire country is to any attack by the Yemeni group. Such a vulnerability is the issue, given that it was the young Crown Prince himself who upped the ante with the conflict with the Houthis – and he has hundreds of princes whom he locked up in a five-star hotel and held hostage while extracting huge amounts of money from, as one of his first policy initiatives as leader, who all hold mock reverence to him as the country’s leader. But for how long?
“This could turn out to be existential for Bin Salman,” argues London-based MENA commentator Sami Hamdi. “UAE and Houthis are hammering him in Yemen, Trump has taken his money and turned his back on him, Netanyahu is violating him by insisting on an official invite for help (normalisation), his best friend Turki Al Sheikh continues to fleece him with unprofitable boxing matches and never-ending raves, and his international allies refuse to fight for him and are pushing him towards a deal that will be interpreted by all as a humiliation for him.”
Solitude seems to come with the job of being MbS in Saudi Arabia – a country always appearing to be on the cusp of being great and significant but never quite managing it. Recently MbS carved out the reputation of being a dynamic regional leader who allowed pop concerts with scantily clad Western performers, while his own mega-projects in the desert quietly get wound down, barely leaving the drawing board.
The real lesson of the Houthis for MbS is that they are simply too tough – and even Turkey and Pakistan, who presented themselves as allies for Riyadh militarily, are remarkably quiet. Some would even go as far as to call it a betrayal of the Arabs.
“Why does Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ‘rightfully’ live in a state of disappointment and betrayal from his Arab and American allies?” asks the legendary Egyptian journalist and geopolitical hack Abdel Bariatwan. “Where is Turkey and Pakistan, and where is the Mecca alliance? Isn’t it a disgrace that Iran is the only one volunteering to mediate to stop the war?” he asks.
Saudi Arabia executed two Bangladeshis on October 14 but Dhaka’s response was conspicuously restrained. Its consulate in Jeddah reportedly sought formal confirmation and the foreign ministry requested details. Officials then reassured Riyadh that bilateral relations would remain unaffected. Public sentiment, reflected in a flood of angry and frustrated social media posts, stands in sharp contrast […]
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Al Mayadeen| October 19, 2026
Egypt’s Civil Democratic Movement rejected any involvement of the Egyptian armed forces in a regional war on behalf of any side, insisting that Cairo make its decisions independently of foreign influence.
The movement said Monday that no outside party should dictate Egypt’s position, arguing that the country’s most important role lies in pursuing “wise mediation to establish peace.”
Turning to domestic affairs, the movement called on civilian opposition groups, its own members included, to begin preparing for the presidential election scheduled for 2030. The call follows President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s recent statement that his presidency will end in 2030 and that the matter of constitutional changes to alter that timeline is “completely settled.”
Parliament postpones debate on troop deployment
The statement comes as Egypt’s parliament has yet to take up a proposal to authorize the president to send troops abroad. Lawmakers adjourned an emergency session devoted to discussing support for Saudi Arabia, and deliberations were due to resume on Monday. The debate was postponed again on Monday, this time until October 26.
The session was convened at el-Sisi’s request after he said Cairo would take any action Saudi Arabia asks of it to defend its security and sovereignty.
Yemen’s Sanaa-based Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali al-Ra’i had urged Egypt’s parliament on Saturday not to let the country be drawn into the Saudi escalation, saying such a step would contradict Egypt’s historical role in defending Arab causes.
Yemeni scholars welcome Al-Azhar initiative
Separately, Al-Azhar urged the urgent formation of a mediation committee bringing together respected figures from across the Muslim world. It said the committee should start work immediately to end conflicts and wars in the Arab region, defuse crises, and bridge differences between the parties involved.
The Association of Yemeni Scholars, in turn, reaffirmed its commitment to engaging constructively and in good faith with the invitation extended by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, expressing appreciation for the Islamic values and principles it conveyed.
The association also declared Sanaa’s readiness to host the committee proposed by the Grand Imam, comprising respected and wise figures from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Press TV – October 18, 2026
Yemen has condemned the international community’s silence on Saudi Arabia’s ongoing aggression and blockade, saying it emboldens Riyadh to continue its atrocities.
The Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, in a statement released on Saturday, said the Saudi military continues to target ordinary people and civilian infrastructure, as it has done over the past years.
The ministry denounced Saudi strikes on civilians and non-military installations as a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977.
In the latest attack, a series of Saudi airstrikes targeted a residential neighborhood in the Maqbanah district of Yemen’s southwestern Ta’izz province, killing nine civilians, including a woman and a girl, and injuring 16 others.
The statement also censured the deafening silence of the international community, which claims to uphold human rights while lecturing others about them.
It noted that such an approach would offer Saudi officials the carte blanche to keep on their brutalities, and would make the international community complicit in Riyadh’s crimes and aggression.
The Yemeni foreign ministry then called on the international community, particularly the UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as human rights organizations, to abandon double standards, condemn the heinous crimes committed against Yemeni people, and pressure Saudi Arabia to honor its obligations under international humanitarian law.
The ministry finally emphasized that Saudi atrocities would not go unpunished, and that the House of Saud, “whose hands are stained with blood and whose fingers with guilt,” would be held accountable.
On July 20, the Sana’a government announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia in response to “an unjust and oppressive siege” on Yemen for almost 12 years.
Subsequently, the Yemeni armed forces have reported a series of successful missions that have targeted vessels associated with Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea.
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its allies imposed a blockade on Yemen, initiating a comprehensive military offensive that received support in terms of military, political, and logistical assistance from the United States and several Western countries.
Tens of thousands of Yemenis have lost their lives; however, Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve its primary goal of reestablishing a puppet government that served its interests.
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