The U.S. Army wants to infuse new autonomous capabilities into its current and future fleets of amphibious landing ships and other watercraft. The service is also aiming to acquire up to 100 new purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV). The maritime assets the service has now, often referred to as ‘the Army’s Navy,’ are obscure and generally underappreciated. However, the small force offers an important additional set of naval logistics capabilities, especially for any future fight in the Pacific, which could be further bolstered with optionally-crewed or entirely uncrewed platforms.
Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Crist, head of 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), issued plans for future autonomous watercraft capabilities during a talk last week during a talk at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium. 8th TSC, which has its main headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is one of the top formations tasked with managing U.S. military logistics across the Pacific.
“In order to be able to increase theater distribution, we have the two composite watercraft companies, at end state there, west of the IDL [International Date Line],” Crist explained, referring to the Army’s future planned maritime force posture in the Pacific. “We continue partnering with industry to be able to move into autonomous watercraft systems to be able to conduct other means of maritime distribution.”
To take a step back quickly, as part of its broader regional role, 8th TSC also has forward-deployed elements in Japan. This includes the 5th Transportation Company, which is currently organized as what the Army calls a composite watercraft company. As of 2024, the unit had a pair of General Frank S. Besson class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), as well as 10 smaller Landing Craft Utility (LCU) type vessels and four small tugs, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
The Army has eight LSVs, in total, and these are by far its largest and most capable ships. The two youngest LSVs, which were acquired in the mid-2000s, also form a distinct subclass, and their design is optimized for long-distance open-ocean operations, as you can read more about here. It’s not immediately clear which LSVs are currently assigned to the 5th Transportation Company. The unit is also set to receive new Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) landing craft.
Until very recently, the 10th Support Group (Regional), headquartered in Okinawa, was more directly responsible for overseeing forward-deployed Army logistics units in Japan. Earlier this month, the Army performed a so-called ‘reflagging’ of that formation, a largely administrative process that transformed it into the 45th Sustainment Brigade.
As part of the reflagging of the 10th Support Group into the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the Army has also been pushing ahead with plans for “the standup of a second composite watercraft company in Yokohama North Dock,” in the port city of the same name on the Japanese home island of Honshu, Maj. Gen. Crist explained last week. “That end state will have two composite water[craft] companies west of the IDL [International Date Line] under the command and control of the 45th Sustainment Brigade.”
When it comes to the watercraft assigned to these units, “we’re also moving into the autonomous lane,” Crist added. “Just in August, USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] had an opportunity to conduct an experiment by retrofitting an existing commercial vessel, the HOS Resolute [sic; HOS Resolution], with a kit to provide autonomous navigation.”
Maritime autonomy firm Sea Machines was able to integrate its SM300 software package on the HOS Resolution in just nine days for this demonstration. The ship is a 257-foot-long offshore support vessel more typically used to support oil and gas rigs. However, it features a stern ramp and four jack-up legs that also make it well suited to loading and unloading cargo at remote beaches.
For years now, the U.S. Marine Corps has also been experimenting with the HOS Resolution and other similar ships more generally. That service has been using the vessels to help refine its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are themselves heavily centered on future conflict scenarios in the Pacific. The Marines have brought those capabilities to Army demonstration exercises in the past, as well.
The Army sees the August experiment as a potential stepping stone to integrating increasing degrees into its existing watercraft fleets.
“You could increase the fleet of autonomous vessels by tapping into the existing manned fleet,” Maj. Gen. Crist said. “Put on retrofitting kits to be able to conduct navigation, and then eventually propulsion and engine room activities, and eventually get to a fully autonomous system.”
Even just adding in autonomous navigation capabilities could help reduce the workload for the human crews on Army vessels and provide added margins of safety. Blending autonomy with “propulsion and engine room activities” could improve reliability and reduce maintenance demands. Being able to operate those ships in a fully uncrewed mode, if desired, would open up additional operational possibilities, including just for repositioning ships across the broad expanses of the Pacific.
Reduced manning requirements could be especially attractive for the Army’s ‘Navy,’ which is already a very small part of the service’s overall force structure. Last week, Maj. Gen. Crist also talked about further leveraging traditional crewed vessels owned and/or operated by contractors.
“It’s going to be a broad portfolio of systems of systems,” he said of the overall watercraft vision for the Pacific. “Army watercraft with Army Mariners will be, of course, one aspect of it. We also look for the opportunity to be able to leverage USTRANSCOM’s (U.S. Transportation Command) contracting capability to leverage operational support vessels that are commercially owned and commercially operated. We’re considering ways of being able to have commercial vessels that become manned by Army mariners.”
It is also interesting to note here how extremely similar this all sounds to the modifications the U.S. Navy made to the Spearhead class Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Apalachicola ahead of its commissioning in 2023. However, despite tens of millions of dollars spent and successful demonstration of autonomous capabilities, the Navy curiously decided to put the Apalachicola into service without any plan to make use of these features operationally. There does not appear to have been any effort to integrate these capabilities more broadly within the Spearhead class since then, either.
Last year, the Navy struck the four oldest Spearhead class ships from its rolls entirely and has put several others on reduced operating status, ostensibly as a cost-saving measure. The service is still acquiring new Expeditionary Fast Transports, including members of the Expeditionary Medical Ship subclass that feature expanded medical facilities. The Spearhead class was born out of a program specifically to meet Army and Marine Corps requirements, and the ships are regularly used to support those services in the Pacific and elsewhere globally.
The Army also wants to expand its fleets of purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV) for use in the Pacific, as well as elsewhere globally. Just earlier this year, Army Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, who preceded Maj. Gen. Crist as head of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said he wanted to rapidly acquire as many as 100 drone boats. His vision included larger USVs capable of carrying eight to 10 standardized shipping containers.
“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner told reporters at a roundtable in June, according to Military Times. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”
“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner added at that time.
One of the inherent benefits of the Army watercraft fleets, and its LSVs in particular, is their ability to help alleviate the need for the U.S. Navy to meet more localized littoral logistics needs, if they are even available to help in the first place. Navy amphibious and military sealift ships would already be heavily strained by high demand during any major conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere globally. This could easily be further exacerbated by threats to those supply lines. All of this has already been underscored this year by pressure on maritime logistics chains in the context of the war with Iran. The Army’s ‘Navy’ also offers valuable additional capabilities and capacity in non-combat contingencies, such as responding to natural disasters.
More generally, the Army has been working to expand its use of smaller USVs, including speedboat-like designs, in various roles. The service has clearly been paying close attention to Ukraine’s very successful use of drone boats in one-way kamikaze attacks, as well as ones armed with guns and rockets and examples configured as launch platforms for surface-to-air missiles and weaponized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).
The 7th Infantry Division, one of the Army’s main maneuver combat formations in the Pacific, just recently experimented with a Ukrainian-developed Magura-series USV during an exercise in Michigan. That particular USV was configured to launch a quadcopter-type drone. Another member of the Magura family was observed being used in a one-way-attack configuration by U.S. Army Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines earlier this year.
The Army has also been experimenting with American-designed USVs. The aforementioned recent exercise in Michigan also featured a Saronic Corsair, the same type of USV that the Navy used to rescue the crew of an Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that went down in the Gulf of Oman in June. Explosive-laden Corsairs were also used to carry out the first known U.S. kamikaze USV attack, which was launched against a coastal target in Iran in July.
During another separate exercise in the Philippines this year, Salaknib 2026, Army forces used unarmed Rampage USVs from U.S. firm Havoc, as seen below. As part of that exercise, the USVs escorted a crewed General Frank S. Besson class LSV to its destination, heading out in front to help spot potential hazards.
“There’s all the work that the Department’s already doing with autonomy and autonomous systems that we look to take advantage of in the [Pacific] theater, as well,” Maj. Gen. Crist said at AUSA.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have both been working to grow their operational fleets of smaller USVs, as well as larger ones, in recent years. At the same time, the Navy has suffered years of setbacks and shakeups in its efforts to operationalize bigger and more capable designs. The service awarded contracts for a total of 30 new medium-sized USVs last month in its latest attempt to reverse that trend.
In September, Secretary Pete Hegseth also announced several new initiatives aimed at further expanding use of uncrewed platforms and advanced autonomous capabilities across the U.S. military and all domains. The Pentagon is presently laying the groundwork for the establishment of an all-new top-level Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), which it hopes to see come to fruition next year.
What is clear now is that the Army’s vision for future watercraft operations, especially in the Pacific, is increasingly autonomous.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post How The U.S. Army’s ‘Navy’ Aims To Go More Autonomous With Its Vessels In The Pacific appeared first on TWZ.
The U.S. Air Force says any decision on whether or not to acquire new production F-16 Viper fighters is likely a year or more away. The service’s top officer in charge of force structure planning has also now raised the prospect of using a “spectrum of capability” to eventually supplant aging older-model F-16s. All of this comes as the Air Force has laid out a new vision to have 1,509 combat-coded fighters in inventory, hundreds more than it has now, by 2035, amid questions about whether industry and budgets can keep up.
Inside Defense and Air & Space Forces Magazine were among the first to report on the Air Force’s latest long-term fighter force structure plan late yesterday. This followed a roundtable with Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the service’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. At the time of writing, an unclassified copy of the report, which was submitted to Congress last week, has not been released publicly. TWZ has reached out for more information.
Tabor said yesterday that the target fleet of 1,509 combat-coded fighters by 2035 would be approximately 40 percent F-35s, 40 percent F-15s (inclusive of F-15E Strike Eagles and F-15EX Eagle IIs) and F-16s, and 20 percent F-22 Raptors and F-47s, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. As an aside, the final expected F-47 fleet size remains unclear, though the Air Force continues to say it plans to acquire at least enough of those jets to replace its 185 F-22s on a one-for-one basis.
The current breakdown of the service’s fighter force structure is 45 percent F-16s, 30 percent F-35s, 15 percent F-15s, and 10 percent F-22s. Last year’s long-term fighter force structure report said the service was aiming for an eventual inventory of 1,558 combat-coded fighters and hoped to hit a milestone of 1,369 aircraft by Fiscal Year 2030. As of the start of Fiscal Year 2026, the Air Force had 1,168 combat-coded fighters, not including 103 A-10 Warthog ground attack jets, which have been part of this force structure planning in the past. The plan now is for the last of the A-10s to be retired by 2030. The new 2035 figure also does not include the hundreds of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones the service wants to have acquired by that time, something we will come back to later on.
Currently, the Air Force expects fighter fleet expansion to be driven by the acquisition of new F-35As, F-15EXs, and F-47s. This was also the case when last year’s fighter force structure report was released. The possibility of the Air Force also acquiring new-production F-16s has come up several times in recent years. Most recently, there were several reports last month that prime contractor Lockheed Martin had made a new pitch to the service for a version of the latest Block 70 version of the fighter, tentatively dubbed the F-16G. New Block 70 and Block 72 F-16s, which differ in what engine they use, are being actively produced at Lockheed Martin’s plant in Greenville, South Carolina. At that time, TWZ did a deep dive into the benefits that this could offer the Air Force.
“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” Lt. Gen. Tabor said amid a discussion about the prospect of acquiring new Vipers at the roundtable yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”
“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately,” Tabor added, while acknowledging that “we are very conscious” that older-model F-16s are set to begin reaching the end of their lifespans in the 2030s. He also said any such planning was unlikely to be part of the process of developing the service’s Fiscal Year 2028 budget proposal, which will be released sometime early next year.
The Air Force is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program,” a spokesperson for the service had told us last month without specifically mentioning any particular type of aircraft. “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”
When it comes to the current F-16 fleet, the Air Force had 774 Vipers in inventory at the start of Fiscal Year 2026 and expected that number to drop to 768, according to past budget documents. This includes a mixture of subvariants, and not all of them are assigned combat-coded units. The Air Force has been substantially upgrading at least a portion of its existing F-16s, including with the addition of new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and electronic warfare suites, to ensure their operational relevance for years to come.
The Air Force has also already been taking newer F-16s from squadrons transitioning to the F-35 and using them to replace older Vipers in other units. Last year’s fighter force structure report explicitly highlighted plans to supplant Block 30 F-16s in five Air National Guard formations – three combat-coded squadrons and two training units – with Block 40 and 50 types in this way.
“A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.”
“Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.”
…
“The new [F-16G] proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.”
“The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.”
You can read our full prior deep analysis on this topic here.
Lt. Gen. Tabor acknowledged many of these exact same points at the roundtable yesterday. He notably described acquiring new F-16s as “maybe the lazy” option, but also one that would benefit from “practically a ready-made aircraft” that is in production now, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” he also said, speaking more generally. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”
In the context of acquiring new F-16s, especially, it is important to note here that Lockheed Martin order books are very full already as a result of demand for these fighters from U.S. allies and partners. The company’s capacity, at least at present, to add a substantial new Air Force acquisition program on top of that is a real question. This, in some ways, mirrors questions that surround Boeing efforts to meet surging Air Force demand for F-15EXs.
On top of all this, the Air Force’s still-evolving CCA plans remain something of a wildcard in these discussions. The Air Force has ordered General Atomics FQ-42 Vengeance and Anduril’s FQ-44 Fury CCAs into production, and is now aiming to have a combined fleet of at least 500 of these drones in inventory by 2032. The service is also still expecting to acquire additional CCAs, which could be of entirely different types, through a second iterative development cycle, or Increment 2, under this program. This is influencing the service’s crewed fighter force structure plans, but the full scale and scope of those impacts remain to be seen.
“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”
The Air Force’s F-22s are currently set to be its first ‘aerial quarterbacks’ for CCAs, with F-35s and F-47s expected to follow. At the same time, TWZ has highlighted previously how CCA could offer particular value when paired with fourth-generation fighters like the F-16. This, in turn, could actually bolster the case for new Viper acquisitions as a more affordable force multiplier.
The Air Force’s ability to secure necessary funding and other factors will play in all this, too. 2035 is a long way off from a budgetary perspective. It also stretches across multiple election cycles, including the one that will decide the next presidential administration, all of which could lead to major changes in defense spending priorities. Congress can and routinely does demand that the U.S. military alter major procurement plans. Just in the past two years or so, legislators have intervened to force the Air Force to move ahead with the acquisition of new E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control planes and to save the U.S. Navy F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter program.
In the meantime, the Air Force clearly faces many continued questions about how to balance the need to modernize its fighter fleets while ensuring it retains enough tactical airpower to meet current and future operational demands. Even so, the service says it sees no need to rush to make a decision about whether to choose the “lazy” route of just buying new F-16s.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Any Decision To Buy New-Build F-16s Not An “Urgent” Priority: USAF appeared first on TWZ.
One of the KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tankers the U.S. Air Force retired some two years ago has left the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. This aircraft is one of a set of KC-10As sold to private aerial refueling contractor Omega Air. At least one other potential operator, a still mysterious end user somewhere in North Africa, could also be in line to pick up several ex-Air Force Extenders.
Maxim Loshak, who goes by the handle @az_aviator on X and Instagram, caught the KC-10A leaving Davis-Monthan earlier today. The aircraft currently carries U.S. civil registration number N82247, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records confirm that Omega Air is the new owner. Online flight tracking data also shows the aircraft subsequently flew to San Antonio International Airport, which is Omega’s main base of operations.
Omega's first KC-10A, N82247 (formerly 86-0034), has departed Davis-Monthan en route to San Antonio International Airport. pic.twitter.com/kALlgeuLGy
— KIWA Spotter (@KiwaSpotter) October 20, 2026
The KC-10A in question previously carried the Air Force registration number 86-0034 and had been in the boneyard since May 12, 2023, per the service’s records. The Air Force acquired a total of 60 Extender tankers between 1979 and 1987, and lost one in an accident in 1987. The very last of the remaining 59 KC-10As was retired in September 2024. The Extender was derived from the three-engine DC-10 airliner and was designed to refuel aircraft using either the boom or the probe-and-drogue method.
As seen in the picture at the top of this story, N82247 notably lacks the KC-10A’s trademark boom under the rear fuselage. This is actually not entirely unexpected. The Air Force had put 10 Extenders up for auction last year in a non-flyable state. Each of the planes was missing a single engine, taken from under one of their wings, for reasons that are still not entirely clear. These particular aircraft were also among the first KC-10As to be retired, and their booms had been stripped to be used as spares for other examples that had remained in service until the type’s final retirement in 2024.
In addition to sourcing the requisite engines, “in order to make them flyable, the winning bidder will need to work with Boeing to obtain a fly-away kit to seal up the area where the boom systems was,” an Air Force spokesperson told us last year while the 10 KC-10As were still up for auction.
Omega Air could fit new booms to this KC-10A, as well as other ex-USAF Extenders it is in the process of acquiring. The company could also leave some of them configured as probe-and-drogue-only tankers. Omega already flies two ex-Dutch KDC-10 tankers, which are broadly similar to the KC-10, as well as another DC-10 converted into a probe-and-drogue-only tanker. The company has several Boeing 707-based tankers, as well.
There is a possibility that some of the KC-10As that Omega is acquiring could be operated in non-tanker roles. Carrying cargo was also a major role for Extender while in Air Force service. Still, this seems unlikely given that aerial refueling is Omega’s primary business. Some of the ex-Air Force Extenders might also be used as sources of spare parts. TWZ has reached out for more information about Omega’s overall plans for its new acquisitions.
Regardless, even in a boomless configuration, ex-USAF KC-10As will be a significant addition to Omega Air’s fleet. Demand for private aerial refueling services, in general, has been ramping up in the United States and elsewhere globally in recent years.
For the U.S. military, private contractors offer a valuable way to reduce demand for and strain on organic tanker fleets to meet non-combat-related aerial refueling needs. This, in turn, helps free up government-owned tankers for combat missions and other higher-priority taskings. Those tankers may also simply not need to fly as much with private companies helping to shift the burden. The ability of the Air Force’s existing tanker fleets, in particular, to meet even peacetime demands has been a growing point of concern for years now. This has been further exacerbated by persistent technical and other issues with replacement KC-46 tankers.
With all this in mind, the Air Force’s decision to retire the KC-10A fleet entirely was and still is controversial. Though the Extenders were certainly aging, they were also highly flexible tankers able to carry greater loads of fuel than the KC-46s that supplanted them.
Omega Air clearly still sees value in the KC-10A. As mentioned, at least one other operator in North Africa is at least interested in potentially acquiring Extenders. Others may yet emerge.
If nothing else, after just over two years, an ex-USAF KC-10A has returned to the skies for a second career in the private sector.
Special thanks again to Maxim Loshak for sharing his picture of N82247 with us.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Retired KC-10 Extender Tanker Has Risen From Boneyard To Fly Again appeared first on TWZ.
Ukraine continues to struggle with throttling of the speeds at which weapons using the vital satellite communications services provided by the SpaceX Starlink system can operate, and one weapons manufacturer tells us it is rethinking whether to rely on it in the future. As we have previously reported, heavy use of Starlink on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, including as a means of guiding one-way attackers in the air and at sea, has underscored potential risks of exclusive reliance on Elon Musk’s orbital communications networks in critical tactical tasks.
At issue are complaints by Ukrainian officials that “in various sectors of the front, the equipment ceases to function at speeds of 130–161 kilometers per hour.”
A limit on how fast Starlink terminals on vehicles can travel before the feed is cut off in certain areas impacts a slew of weapons and campaigns, especially strikes on Russian logistics behind enemy lines and in the sea of Asov, as well as the control of defensive interceptor drones critical for taking down Russian long-range one-way attack drones, like the notorious Shahed-136.
The following video shows one such Shahed interception.
Spectacular footage of a Ukrainian interceptor striking a Russian Shahed kamikaze drone, followed by its fall to the ground. pic.twitter.com/8DrJyS22Fn
— Special Kherson Cat
The limiting of Starlink/Starshield occurred amid deteriorating relations between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The latest chill between Washington and Kyiv was sparked by the American leader’s claims that Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure have reduced the supply of diesel fuel to the U.S. and other nations more than the conflict in the Middle East. Trump was upset Ukraine kept hitting these targets despite his demanding they stop.
Q: Do you think Ukraine should stop attacks on Russian oil refineries? Have you told Zelenskyy that?
— Furkan Gözükara (@FurkanGozukara) October 5, 2026
TRUMP: We've talked about it, we have, and I think they're slowing it down, but they are causing a lot of problems. The lack of refineries is the problem. pic.twitter.com/ffpFnRqFlk
Exacerbating this issue, Trump on Oct. 9 announced via his Truth Social platform that he had made a deal to purchase diesel from Russia, pivoting away from a years-old Western policy that placed massive economic pressure on Moscow.
Trump: "I have just concluded a highly successful discussion with President Vladimir Putin, of Russia, wherein it was agreed that Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace, another 500,000 Tons during the month of… pic.twitter.com/zH0I6HA941
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 9, 2026
Who gave the order to limit the speeds at which Ukrainian weapons using the Starlink/Starshield system operate is unclear.
“The order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House,” Reuters reported last week, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official briefed on the matter. “The officials said leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.”
“No such request was ever made by the president,” a U.S. official told us on Monday.
“There has been no change to Department of War policy regarding intelligence sharing or any capabilities we are enabling Europeans to provide to Ukraine,” a senior Pentagon official responded to our questions about whether the Pentagon imposed the limits and, if so, why.
When we pushed for a more specific response to the Starlink/Starshield concerns, the Pentagon declined comment. However, Tuesday afternoon, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the Pentagon did not order any changes and that Ukraine violated Starlink’s terms of services.
Hegseth suggests Ukrainians haven't abided by Starlink's "terms of service" pic.twitter.com/Z8MJyQ4Nvq
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 20, 2026
We reached out to SpaceX as well, but the company did not immediately respond. Last week, SpaceX’s founder and CEO, Elon Musk, said that “any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately” Trump. Musk had previously refused Ukrainian requests to use Starlink against targets inside Russia.
The prohibition against using Starlink inside Russia has drastically limited Ukraine’s ability to strike dynamic targets like mobile ballistic missile launchers and hunt for drone launch sites. However, Ukraine has not had to rely on Starlink in its campaign against oil infrastructure or other fixed targets deep inside Russia which upset Trump in the first place.
Tuesday morning, Zelensky spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and again brought up Starlink/Starshield in addition to other major concerns.
“…the situation with Starlink/Starshield… needs to be restored,” Zelensky urged.
I spoke with Marco Rubio @SecRubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of…
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 20, 2026
Rubio denied that any assistance was being withheld from Ukraine. Noting that Starlink “is a private company,” the secretary told reporters that Trump is “frustrated…because he doesn’t like to be blamed for things that aren’t true, including accusations that somehow he had ordered intelligence sharing to be cut off. And that’s not true; he’s said that repeatedly.”
SECRETARY RUBIO: There's nothing being deliberately denied to Ukraine. It's simply a balance between our obligations to other partners, and frankly, our own standards and requirements for our own facilities as well. pic.twitter.com/x9NWbIufBa
— Department of State (@StateDept) October 20, 2026
This most recent flap isn’t the first time SpaceX and Musk have faced particularly significant criticism over limiting some Ukrainian use of the network. Actions SpaceX took earlier this year to block unregistered Starlink terminals also had major consequences for Russian forces, which were sent scrambling to find alternatives to fill the massive resulting communications gap.
Given the tenuous nature of Ukraine’s ability to use Starlink/Starshield, the Wild Hornets company is reevaluating whether to use the SpaceX system in future endeavors even though, so far, it has experienced few problems with it. Wild Hornets is a major Ukrainian combat drone maker. Among other weapons, it makes the Sting interceptors, designed to defend against Russian Shahed kamikaze drones.
The Starlink/Starshield issue isn’t affecting current operations, a Wild Hornets spokesman told us Tuesday morning. “Our own communications system provides the basic connection to our interceptors,” he said. “Plus, our technology for remote control of the interceptors can use various sources of internet connectivity. True, the military often uses Starlink for this, but in our case, the terminal doesn’t need to be moved at high speeds (it simply provides a connection between the command center and the ground station to which the interceptor is connected—it’s somewhat similar to cell towers).”
Concerns about the reduction in speeds at which Starlink terminals can operate has Wild Hornets thinking about ditching a future project, the spokesman told us.
“But we understand that there are other types of interceptors,” added the spokesman. “For example, some drones carry a terminal on board and need to fly at high speed with it. In such cases, Starlink’s limitations make their operation impossible. From this point of view, it also makes us rethink some of the projects we’re currently working on. For example, launching interceptors from aerial platforms.”
“We’re keeping an eye on the situation,” the spokesman continued. “For our current operations (connections with ground stations), we can use any source of stable internet connectivity. Therefore, various solutions are possible in different locations. However, for these needs, everything is operating normally with Starlink at the moment. As for our plans with new projects, we don’t have a clear decision yet, but we will be testing alternatives.”
The spokesman declined to provide further details about what “alternatives” could look like.
There are a number of ways the lack of Starlink for extended-range drone operations could be mitigated to a degree, but the persistent, reliable, high-bandwidth and compact capability SpaceX provides has no direct alternative at this time. The use of drones that work as line-of-sight relays, which can be daisy chained together electronically with other airborne relays, with a connection spanning dozens or even hundreds of miles to a ground entry point is possible. You can read about this concept here. The use of swarms of balloons to create an active network over a battlespace and using Starlink on those slower moving platforms to relay line-of-sight connections to multiple drones below is another possibility. You can read more about this concept here. But we must stress again, nothing can fully replace Starlink/Starshield and its seamless beyond line-of-sight communications architecture at this time.
“I believe, in any case, depending on a single solution is very risky,” the Wild Hornets spokesman proffered. “Especially if you don’t have full control over it. Especially when it comes to something as critical on the battlefield as communications. That’s exactly why our ecosystem is built around our own communications technology and basically is open to various solutions when it comes to internet connectivity.”
The No. 1 interceptor: STING by Wild Hornets has destroyed over 15,000 Shaheds and Gerberas in one year
— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) October 13, 2026
Confirmed data shows that STING has topped the interceptor rankings for 12 consecutive months. In September this year, Ukraine’s Defense Forces downed around 1,600 Shaheds,… pic.twitter.com/4v1aeOxPiy
As far as military units are concerned, the commander of the Georgian Legion told us that his forces have been affected by issues with Starlink/Starshield even though the main concerns have been about the speeds at which weapons can travel and still have connectivity. The Georgian Legion is fighting in the heavily contested Kramatorsk region of eastern Ukraine.
“We use Starlink a lot because, in this war, reliable communication is essential,” Mamuka Mamulashvili told us. “It helps us stay connected when everything around us is changing. Of course, we’ve learned not to rely on just one system. There are alternatives, like mobile internet, fiber-optic connections, radio and other satellite systems such as OneWeb. But honestly, none of them can fully replace Starlink in Ukraine right now.”
“The problems were not limited to the speed restriction of approximately 160 km/h,” the Georgian Legion commander pointed out. “Starlink connectivity itself was also intermittent, repeatedly switching on and off. This caused communication disruptions across various drone systems, not just those operating at speeds exceeding 160 km/h. As a result, the impact was broader than the restriction on high-speed interceptor drones. Intermittent connectivity created problems for drone control and communications across multiple systems, affecting their reliability and the ability to carry out missions as intended.”
“We had serious communication problems,” Mamulashvili explained. “At one point, our drone operators were struggling to maintain a reliable connection with the drone systems, which disrupted coordination and made it difficult to carry out missions as planned. When you lose the connection between the operator and the drone, you can lose control of the situation in seconds. We managed to adapt, but it definitely affected our work.”
“We have to adapt and find solutions, as we always do,” the commander said. “This war teaches you one thing every day. You can’t depend on a single technology or expect someone else to solve all your problems. You have to be ready for anything and keep moving forward.”
Russian sources, meanwhile, are gloating over the speed limits placed on weapons using Starlink/Starshield, particularly how it is affecting Ukraine’s mid-range drone attacks that have crippled Russian logistics. As we explained in a previous report, Ukrainian units have relied on the SpaceX system to help extend the range of their drones to reach as far as 150 miles into Russian-occupied territory. The SpaceX system is not used to hit targets inside Russia proper.
The following video shows some of these mid-range attacks.
Russian rail logistics are now also the target of Midstrike drones, with lines to Crimea being particularly affected. pic.twitter.com/K1BFd0QVov
— Sergio
“Disabling or slowing down Starlink has significantly reduced the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range drone strikes along the ‘Novorossiya’ highway,” influential Russian milblogger Vladimir Romanov reported. The highway, also known as the R-280, is a key link between cities in occupied southern Ukraine and the occupied Crimean peninsula. The road has been a frequent target of Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign.
“The success of these strikes depends on the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ access to American satellite communication,” Romanov noted. “For the past six months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been attacking civilian transport – trucks, cars, and buses – exclusively through the use of ‘Starshield.’ This means that, for the past six months, American military satellite infrastructure has been used to carry out terrorist acts against Russian civilians, and so on. In other words, the United States is still directly involved in the war with Russia!”
America's gifts to Russia never end, with Russian military bloggers now confirming that Washington's operation to cut Ukraine's Starlink has halted Ukraine's ability to strike Russian logistics routes in Ukraine.
— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) October 20, 2026
An operation likely written in the Kremlin, executed by… pic.twitter.com/iXcIAu5Rr3
As for how widespread worries among Ukrainian weapons manufacturers are, the Wild Hornets spokesman suggested that his company is not alone. He said he has spoken with other companies relying much more heavily on Starlink/Starshield who have expressed concerns. He pointed to growing interest in the European Eutelsat satellite constellation as an example of companies seeking options, but noted that “of course, creating something like Starlink won’t be easy.”
We’ve reached out to the Ukrainian Brave1 defense technology incubator and the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI) for additional insights into how this issue is affecting Ukraine’s defense manufacturing base.
It will be interesting to see if other Ukrainian weapons companies also consider scrapping plans to rely on Starlink in the future and what architectures will emerge at least as a backstop to it.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Major Ukrainian Arms Maker Rethinking Future Reliance On Starlink appeared first on TWZ.
NATO member Finland is preparing to reintroduce anti-personnel landmines into its military arsenal, with a contract for around one million examples due to be signed soon, following the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention that aims to eliminate these weapons. The move comes as Helsinki looks to strengthen its territorial defenses against a longstanding Russian threat and the prospect of a larger Russian military presence along its eastern border in the years ahead.
Finland’s withdrawal from the treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, took effect on January 10 of this year. Reflecting growing concern among NATO’s eastern-flank members about Russia’s military posture and the lessons of the war in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also moved to leave the convention.
Mines have, for many centuries, been used to complicate an attacker’s movement, slow operations, and force troops to devote time and resources to clearing obstacles. Anti-personnel mines, in particular, have long been employed in defensive campaigns, but they come with significant humanitarian risks. They can kill or maim civilians long after hostilities end, which has seen them fall foul of international humanitarian law in many countries — at least when those nations don’t see a realistic risk of invasion.
It is a measure of how badly the European security environment has deteriorated that anti-personnel mines are back on the agenda.
The Finnish Defense Forces previously said that discussions with the domestic defense industry and preparations to train military personnel would begin early this year. It has now announced that the project seeks two different types of anti-personnel mines, of Finnish manufacture.
The two weapons will comprise a modern tube mine activated by a tripwire trigger, and a pressure-activated step mine. In the future, more technically advanced mines may also be procured, including cluster-type mines of the kind deployed by Russia in Ukraine. In general, anti-personnel mines have been very widely used by both sides in that conflict, with Kyiv notably receiving them as part of U.S. air packages, as you can read about here. Neither the United States nor Russia are signatories of the Ottawa Convention.
“The aim is for production of the new anti-personnel mines to begin in Finland in 2028,” said Col. Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineers for the Finnish Army Command.
“We have a materials procurement project underway, which is currently in the preparatory and market review phase. At the same time, we are drawing up the technical specifications for the mines,” Mikkonen added. “We will soon move on to the stage where we issue requests for tenders, so that we can eventually proceed to a competitive tendering process and conclude contracts.”
At this point, no contracts have been signed. However, once the procurement effort is underway, the Finnish Defense Forces are set to return their anti-personnel mine stockpile to what it was before acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.
The first new mines and associated training equipment are expected to become available during 2027. Ultimately, all conscripts will be trained to employ anti-personnel mines. The total cost of the project is around $110 million, with the last of the mines scheduled to be delivered in the 2030s.
Helsinki has stressed that it does not intend to lay anti-personnel mines during peacetime. Mikkonen said the weapons would be used only under emergency conditions.
Finland’s decision reflects a national defense philosophy that has long been shaped by direct experience with Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, beginning the Winter War, and fought another conflict with the country from 1941 to 1944. Finland lost territory but preserved its independence, subsequently maintaining conscription, a large trained reserve, and a defense strategy built around making any invasion costly.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced Finnish concerns that major conventional warfare in Europe remained a realistic possibility. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, and the country shares a little over 800 miles of border with Russia.
Finland’s defensive approach traditionally emphasizes rapid mobilization to defend national territory and delay a much larger attacking force until reinforcements can arrive. The role of anti-personnel mines in that scenario is clear, being sown to slow down infantry movements and hamper advances through vulnerable areas. Their disproportionate effect, at least in theory, is especially relevant for a country with a relatively tiny population compared to the length of its border.
At the same time, anti-personnel mines would form only one part of a much broader defensive system incorporating artillery, airstrikes, engineering obstacles, fortifications, and reserve forces. It should be noted that Finland also has a considerable armory of anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines, most of which are of local manufacture.
In general, Moscow has been restructuring its military command arrangements and starting to establish the foundations for a larger conventional presence across northern Europe.
In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District, an apparent response to Finland’s and Sweden’s subsequent entry into NATO.
The Leningrad Military District is responsible for a strategically important region that covers the approaches to St. Petersburg, areas bordering Finland, and territory extending toward the Arctic. Its reestablishment gives Russia a dedicated command structure for managing forces facing NATO across this northern sector.
While significant, the creation of a military district does not necessarily generate additional combat power.
Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drain resources in terms of personnel, equipment, logistics, and more.
Nevertheless, Moscow’s longer-term plans point toward a substantial expansion of its ground forces and military infrastructure in areas facing Finland and the wider NATO alliance.
A central element of Russia’s reorganization is the formation of the 44th Army Corps in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland’s eastern border. The corps was established in 2024 as part of the wider effort to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the northwest.
Russia’s wider military development also encompasses the Kola Peninsula and approaches to the Arctic, where facilities support the Northern Fleet and its strategic nuclear submarine force.
Satellite imagery last year showed construction at the Lupche-Savino garrison near Kandalaksha, including facilities intended to accommodate an artillery brigade and at least part of an engineering brigade. The location is approximately 70 miles east of Finland’s border.
Earlier this year, a separate report by the Finnish Yle media outlet found that the Russian military was expanding a base in the town of Novaya Vilga to hold as many as 6,000 Russian troops. It is located about 100 miles from the Finnish border.
Breaking News: Where exactly is Russia building its massive new military garrison?
— Mika Mäkeläinen (@Mikareport) June 10, 2026
For the first time, a completely new base is going up behind Finland's eastern border, set to hold up to 6,000 soldiers. Take a look at the first satellite data: https://t.co/IuZerZRyeQ #russia pic.twitter.com/2UvQXheaAP
For Finland, the situation could change dramatically if the war in Ukraine winds down, and the Russian military assembles in greater strength closer to its borders.
Finland’s Military Intelligence Review 2026 assesses that Russia’s military reforms have not yet significantly increased its capabilities in its immediate vicinity. But it still anticipates a substantial increase in Russian military capabilities as circumstances permit and identifies Finland as a major direction for future force development after the war.
A ceasefire or settlement in Ukraine would not automatically enable Russia to launch a major offensive against Finland. A ceasefire could ease the immediate military pressure on Russia while still creating a serious economic and political challenge for the Kremlin. Russia’s wartime spending has sustained defense-sector production and employment, but winding that spending down risks exposing structural weaknesses.
With a ceasefire or settlement, Moscow would still need to rebuild units, replace equipment, replenish personnel, and establish the logistical capacity to sustain large-scale operations. However, there are indications that this is already happening, at least to a degree.
Recent imagery analysis indicates, for example, a significant buildup of newly delivered Russian armor, including new T-90M tanks, at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base, located around 450 miles from the Finnish border.
Mind you, the 22nd with T-90Ms, BTR-82As and BMP-3ms (and maybe BREMs) is just the latest storage depot beign refilled. There's also the 80th mainly with 2S19s and the 374th near the Finnish border with 2S43s and 2S44s since 2025…
— Jompy (@Jonpy99) October 15, 2026
Finland’s planned acquisition of anti-personnel mines fits into a broader effort to prepare for a potential future conflict. Prominent in the minds of Finnish — and other Nordic — defense planners is the fact that Russia is rebuilding the command structures and infrastructure needed to support a larger military presence near NATO’s northern frontier, even as the war in Ukraine limits its immediate ability to do so.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Finland To Build A Million Landmines As Russian Threat Looms appeared first on TWZ.
The U.S. military has successfully demonstrated a new lower-cost receiver that could form part of a future over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. The testing also raises the question of whether the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) research site in Alaska, which the U.S. Air Force transferred away more than a decade ago, could be repurposed for operational use in this role. A new radar of this kind would help the United States plug critical gaps in surveillance coverage over the ever-more strategic Arctic region. Canada is notably already pursuing a multi-billion-dollar OTH radar project in cooperation with Australia for this exact purpose.
The U.S. military put out a press release yesterday regarding the testing of the newly developed receiver array, which occurred between September 7 and September 11. This was the culmination of a series of “Arctic air domain awareness” experiments conducted cooperatively by U.S. and Canadian authorities over the past three years.
The final round of experimentation last month “examined whether an existing high-frequency transmitter [HAARP], paired with a newly developed, low-cost [16-element high-frequency] receiver array, could detect aircraft beyond the coverage of current long-range radar sites,” according to the release. “The effort focused on improving awareness across a region where vast distances, harsh weather and limited infrastructure present challenges for air surveillance.”
“Researchers used the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program [HAARP] facility and a receiver array in Cold Bay developed by MITRE to collect data on participating aircraft over the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea,” the release added. “MITRE also supported the effort throughout the three-year experiment series and designed and executed the field experiment in partnership with government, scientific, and operational participants.”
The remote HAARP site was built in the 1990s as part of a joint U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy effort. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also involved. The central component of the 33-acre facility is an array of 180 crossed-dipole antennas, which can transmit up to 3.6 megawatts of radio frequency energy, according to the Air Force.
The primary purpose of HAARP was to provide U.S. government and independent researchers with a state-of-the-art facility to explore ionospheric phenomena. On the U.S. military side, work was focused on improving long-range surveillance and communications capabilities, including ways to communicate with submerged submarines. Over the years, HAARP has also been the subject of several entirely unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.
In 2014, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would shutter the HAARP site and dismantle it. However, the following year, the decision was instead made to transfer it to the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which has continued to operate it as a civilian research facility.
“During an experimental air domain awareness initiative, HAARP served as a high-power illuminator, transmitting signals toward the ionosphere to support the detection of airborne targets over Alaska’s maritime approaches,” according to the captions of several pictures that accompanied the release yesterday. “The experiment evaluated bistatic over-the-horizon detection methods to explore potential improvements in long-range surveillance and air domain awareness across Alaska’s maritime approaches.”
The most common types of OTH radars are so-called ‘skywave’ or ‘backscatter’ designs. They usually consist of two large and geographically separated arrays of antennas. The ‘illuminator’ array pumps out signals that are bounced off the ionosphere, the ionized layer of Earth’s upper atmosphere, at a specific angle so that they return to the ‘receiver’ array. Objects of interest (in the air and/or on the surface depending on the specific configuration) are detected in the process. As TWZ has previously written:
“Commonly, radars are limited by line of sight due to the curvature of the Earth in relation to the altitude they are operating at. OTHRs overcome this critical limitation, but with some major drawbacks.”
…
“While they offer much lower fidelity than many of their line-of-sight counterparts in most cases, they make up for it in huge range, hundreds of miles to thousands of miles (1,500 miles is common, for instance, for powerful military sky wave/backscatter OTHR systems) and a large coverage area. The sky wave type of OTHRs achieve this by bouncing their radio waves off the ionosphere to a coverage area where they hit targets and return the same way to the receiving station. The angle at which the radio waves hit the ionosphere dictates the range, and that angle is limited to a specific envelope or the waves won’t properly bounce back toward Earth. As such, placing the radar in the right place in relation to the targeted surveillance area or areas, to begin with, is key.”
In the testing last month, Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes, HC-130J Combat King II rescue aircraft, and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers “served as cooperative targets, providing known positions against which researchers could compare the experimental data,” according to the official release. “The team successfully completed testing, meeting or exceeding its test execution objectives. Initial results show the system was successfully able to achieve full skywave (beyond line of sight) detections of aircraft and correlation to truth flights. Thorough data analysis is ongoing.”
The release also says that the tests “explored how existing infrastructure and emerging technology could complement current surveillance capabilities.” This raises the possibility that the HAARP site, specifically, might be utilized as part of a new OTH radar. Whether or not this is actually under consideration is still unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information.
Regardless, OTH radars have been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years in the United States and elsewhere globally. Separate reports just in the past day or so have highlighted what appears to be significant progress on at least one part of a long-planned OTH radar in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave.
Outside of Alaska, the U.S. military has been working to establish a Tactical Mobile Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) site in the South Pacific archipelago nation of Palau. The originally stated goal had been to finish work on this facility in 2026, but the project has faced legal challenges.
As already mentioned, OTH radars have also been part of U.S. plans to improve surveillance coverage in the Arctic. Like the recent testing in Alaska, there has been significant cooperation with Canada in this regard over the years, including through the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
Today, NORAD relies heavily on a network of ground-based radars called the North Warning System (NWS) to provide aerial surveillance coverage in the High North. The radars that make up the NWS are also all pointed northward, and none of them provide the kind of wide-area long-range coverage that an OTH design would offer.
The NWS reflects a long-standing focus on monitoring for aerial threats heading across the North Pole toward North America, especially possible nuclear strikes from Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). However, new avenues for geostrategic competition in the Arctic with Russia, as well as China, over natural resources, from oil and natural gas to fish and other sealife, as well as trade routes have emerged in recent years amid receding ice and other impacts of global climate change. This, in turn, has only prompted growing demand for surveillance coverage.
“We need a layered sensing grid, from [the] seafloor to the space layer. And we have no choice. It has to be layered and deep, a defense in depth, from a sensing point of view,” Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna, head of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, also said during a panel discussion at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in 2025, at which TWZ was in attendance. “And I will say I suffer from an insufficiency of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the Arctic on a daily basis. And I am fighting for information.”
McKenna was responding at the time to a direct question about gaps in so-called “domain awareness” in and around the Arctic and how to address them.
“I think there’s an importance here of not just air domain, but also space domain, and having a sufficiency of ISR in the Arctic to actually build you the [domain awareness] picture,” he added. “I haven’t really touched on over-the-horizon radar, but I certainly can get into it. I think that’s a really important capability given the austerity of the Arctic and the need for it to cue other things.”
For its part, Canada is now building its own new Arctic Over The Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), at an estimated cost of more than $4 billion. In an announcement last year that caught many off guard, the Canadian government announced that it would be leveraging technology originally developed for Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support this development. It is also important to note here that relations between Canadian authorities and the Trump administration have been and continue to be heavily strained over a variety of issues, which has prompted broad concerns about future defense and security cooperation.
Back in the United States, OTH radar plans are also now tied in with the broader Golden Dome air and missile defense initiative. Golden Dome is seeking to establish new layers of defense around the U.S. homeland against a wide array of threat types, and puts major emphasis on new space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Expanded defensive architectures within the Earth’s atmosphere are also part of this plan.
“Adversaries are developing and building advanced nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, Vice Commander of the U.S. element of NORAD and Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in August. This includes “cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missiles, as well as fractional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, to threaten not only Alaska and Hawaii, but the entire continent of the United States.”
Chinese hypersonic and other developments, in particular, enable new modes of attack that “can approach North America from the south, rather than the traditional northerly vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed,” Jarrard continued. “The Chinese have also been building a conventionally-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles that can range [sic] targets throughout Alaska, providing Chinese leaders strike options against our homeland below the nuclear threshold.”
“Russia’s advanced missiles, like the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, are designed to circumvent the ground-based radars used by NORAD and NORTHCOM to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge the ability to provide threat warning and attack assessment,” he added.
New OTH radars positioned in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific will not be able to address all of these threat developments alone. At the same time, the recent testing leveraging the HAARP site is another step toward meeting demands for sorely needed expanded long-range radar coverage in the Arctic.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Alaska’s HAARP Site Now Being Used To Test New Air Force Over-The-Horizon Radar Tech appeared first on TWZ.
A Russian satellite, Kosmos 2612, may have passed within approximately 85 feet (26 meters) of a U.S.-registered satellite belonging to commercial imagery provider ICEYE. This would be an extraordinarily close and potentially dangerous pass-by for two objects in space traveling at thousands of miles per hour. For weeks beforehand, ICEYE-X36, which would be of special interest to Russia, had already found itself in increasingly close orbital alignment with its pursuer. The two satellites now look to be drifting further and further apart, but the episode has been a clear sign of what is to come as the potential for conflict in space only continues to grow.
Publicly available space tracking data from the satellitemap.space and orbitalradar.com websites show that Kosmos 2612 (also written sometimes Cosmos 2612 and abbreviated K2612) and ICEYE X36 had their especially close encounter at approximately 16:07 UTC today. Private space services company LeoLabs also told TWZ today that it could not “confirm or contradict what other data sources have stated publicly,” but that it has “high-confidence that the objects came within approximately [emphasis in the original] 500 meters [1,640 feet] of each other.” Kosmos 2612 had been making progressively closer passes by ICEYE X36 in recent days.
Short time-lapse of part of this morning’s first pass of ICEYE-X36 (59103) and COSMOS 2612 (68762) over South America under partly cloudy skies. pic.twitter.com/t8RhwmKcV4
— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) October 18, 2026
6/x
— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026
Note that while ICEYE-X36 was Finnish built, it is (like other ICEYE sats who's ownership transferred) no longer Finnish. It is registered in the US but might be Ukranian owned/leased now.
“COSMOS 2612 closed from hundreds of kilometers away to extreme proximity to ICEYE-X36. It then maneuvered around ICEYE-X36, remained nearby for an extended period, and then began moving away,” LeoLabs also stated in a report assessing the situation, which was updated today and provided to TWZ. “The latest observations show the spacecraft strongly diverging and confirm that the close-proximity activity had ended.”
LeoLabs’ broader assessment here is supported by data from other publicly available sources, as seen below.
UPDATE: Cosmos 2612 appears to have maneuvered following a close approach with the ICEYE satellite.
— Adam Cohen (@AdamCohen8) October 18, 2026
The latest TLEs show 2612 in a larger orbit that will drift away with no further maneuvers.
In this animation, I fit an impulsive burn to bridge 2612’s previous TLE to its most… https://t.co/owzTZiijka pic.twitter.com/RBqGDvVH9H
None of the distances stated earlier may seem especially close, let alone worrisome, by terrestrial standards. However, this is absolutely abnormal for operations in space that are not being directly coordinated by the parties involved. As a point of reference, in 2020, another Russian satellite, Kosmos 2542, came within 150 to 300 kilometers (93 to 186 miles) of USA 245, a KH-11 spy satellite, and became a major international news story.
“We are aware of the situation and tracking it closely,” a spokesperson for ICEYE’s U.S.-based division told TWZ this morning. “Our constellation architecture is designed for continuity and resilience.”
ICEYE was founded in Finland, but now has offices globally. The company specializes in providing imagery via synthetic aperture radar (SAR) from satellites like ICEYE X36, which was launched in 2024.
SAR has the benefit of being able to capture images day or night, and regardless of bad weather or other obscurants like heavy smoke. There are trade-offs in terms of the kinds of details typically visible via SAR compared to what is seen in visual spectrum imagery. Ukrainian authorities have been utilizing ICEYE imagery for years now, including for targeting purposes, as part of the ongoing conflict with Russia. There have been reports in the past that ICEYE X36 has been operating more directly under the control of the Ukrainian government, but this has not been confirmed.
Kosmos 2612 is one of six satellites (Cosmos 2609 through Cosmos 2614) the Russian military launched via a single Soyuz-2.1b rocket on April 17. The exact purpose and configuration of these satellites are unconfirmed. However, they appear to be so-called inspector types capable of rendezvousing and maneuvering close to other objects in space. We will come back to this later on.
What is clear is that Kosmos 2612 has spent the past three weeks deliberately maneuvering to extremely closely shadow ICEYE X36.
“Over two weeks beginning on September 30, 2026, Cosmos 2612 executed a series of new maneuvers that brought it back into coplanar alignment and placed it at nearly the same altitude as the commercial satellite,” Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington, D.C., along with Research Assistant Chantal Li, wrote in an analysis of the situation just last Thursday.
“According to current orbital elements, the Russian #KOSMOS 2612 satellite is now within 1-2 km [0.6 miles to 1.2 miles] of #ICEYE-X36,” Dr. Marco Langbroek, currently a lecturer on Space Situational Awareness at the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering of Delft Technical University in the Netherlands, wrote in a thread on X on Saturday. “Based on current elements, it might come within meters of the latter within a few hours from now. This is an #RPO [rendezvous and proximity operation] without consent.”
2/x
— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026
Initially I was skeptic whether #ICEYEX36 really was an intentional target: but a series of manoeuvers by #Kosmos2612 starting on Sept 30, were clearly designed to bring the two objects very close and synchronise their orbital periods, orbital altitude and eccentricity: pic.twitter.com/BhIoi8Rtbe
“New TLEs [two-line elements] show that K2612 made a manuever [sic] on Oct 16 and is now stationkeeping within 5 km [3.1 miles] or less of ICEYE X36,” Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist and astronomer, who previously worked for the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and has long been tracking objects of interest in orbit, also wrote in a series of posts on X on Saturday. “To my knowledge this is the first LEO [low Earth orbit] rendezvous of two active satellites where the owner of one of the sats did not give approval.”
McDowell later clarified that “close passes” of objects in orbit had certainly occurred previously, “but not I think rendezvous [sic] (matching velocity vector).”
“This is the most advanced and potentially dangerous uncooperative RPO we’ve observed,” Adam Marsh, LeoLabs vice president for technical solutions, separately told Breaking Defense.
As underscored by the previous interaction of Kosmos 2542 and USA 245, close shadowing of satellites in orbit is certainly nothing new. The U.S. government, as well as Russia and others, have been observed engaging in this kind of activity in the past. At the same time, just how close Kosmos 2612 got to ICEYE X36, and how long they spent in close alignment, are, at the very least, highly unusual.
“It’s important to note that ‘red’ on ‘blue’ engagements, such as this, are relatively uncommon in Low Earth Orbit (LEO),” LeoLabs’ report points out. At the same time, “this was not a routine conjunction or ‘fly by.’ The sequence included a controlled approach, changes in relative position, close-proximity loitering, additional small maneuvers, and a controlled departure. The behavior is consistent with sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO).”
On top of this, there are other signs that what just happened between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 may follow a Russian playbook of sorts that could also be used in a prelude to an on-orbit anti-satellite attack.
Within weeks of their launch in April, Kosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614 had all moved orbital planes shared by multiple ICEYE satellites. Three of them subsequently made close passes by ICEYE X36, specifically, but none of them initially kept station with it. ICEYE CEO Rafal Modrzewski did say “the company later moved its satellite, prompting further Russian manoeuvres [sic],” according to a story Reuters published last week.
— COMSPOC_OPS (@COMSPOC_OPS) July 15, 2026
Tracking data via @LeoLabs_Space . Analysis via COMSPOC SSA.
On April 16, Russia launched six maneuverable satellites (Cosmos 2609-2614) from Plesetsk. Five of them — Cosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614… pic.twitter.com/ISoToOptnp
To take a step even further back, before Kosmos 2542 was caught shadowing USA 245 in 2020, there were reports that the U.S. spy satellite had shifted its orbit. This was possibly prompted by the movements of another Russian ‘inspector,’ Kosmos 2543. This does not appear to have ever been confirmed.
While in space, Kosmos 2542 had deployed Kosmos 2543 in November 2019. Then, on July 23, 2020, the U.S. military said that it had detected Kosmos 2543 itself launching a smaller object in what it described as a test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon. In a subsequent interview with Time, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, U.S. Space Force’s top uniformed officer, disclosed that American forces had first observed Russian “nesting doll” satellites – a reference to traditional Russian matryoshka dolls – similarly demonstrating the “characteristics of a weapon system” in 2017.
U.S. officials have been warning for years that Russia’s growing array of inspector-type satellites, ostensibly designed to examine other assets the country has in orbit if they break down or otherwise malfunction, are inherently dual-purpose in nature. Beyond launching projectiles, a host of other modes of attack, kinetic and non-kinetic, are enabled by the underlying ability of a spacecraft to maneuver very close to other objects in orbit and hold that position. This includes the use of grappling arms to cause damage or just tow a satellite out of orbit, spraying aerosols to harm or impair optics and solar panels, and electronic warfare jamming. A satellite could turn out to be the weapon itself, becoming a kinetic interceptor that smashes into its target on command.
One satellite shadowing another closely in orbit allows various kinds of intelligence gathering, as well. Collection of imagery and signal emissions can offer valuable details about a target’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as how it is being used in a particular context.
“As observed by LeoLabs Global Radar Network and analyzed by our team, COSMOS 2612 demonstrated a sequence of capabilities that could be used to inspect, characterize, shadow, or potentially interfere with another spacecraft,” according to LeoLabs’ report. “These actions require planning, maneuverability, precise navigation, and significant fuel. They may also indicate the use of onboard sensors capable of measuring the relative position of another spacecraft.”
What has just transpired between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 highlights how just a viable threat of attack can be disruptive in its own right. Simply forcing an imagery-gathering satellite out of position could prevent it from collecting over an intended area, or at least doing so in the most effective manner.
Furthermore, satellites only have a limited amount of fuel with which to maneuver in any way after reaching orbit. Harassment in space that forces them to burn off that finite resource at a higher-than-expected rate could reduce their total operational life expectancy, as well as further limit their effectiveness and make them more vulnerable to attacks or accidents. Debris in space is a steadily growing hazard that satellites increasingly need to dodge.
The United States, among others, has been actively pursuing on-orbit refueling capabilities to help address these issues. Last month, American officials also made the bombshell admission that there are unspecified U.S. weapon systems in orbit now, ostensibly for defensive purposes amid growing threats from Russia, as well as China. Both of those countries, among others, have been actively developing and fielding various anti-satellite capabilities inside and out of the Earth’s atmosphere.
“We can only speculate about the operation’s goal, but it could have been anything from simply intimidation to outright destruction or sabotage of a U.S.-registered satellite,” CSIS’ Clayton Swope told TWZ directly today in light of the new developments regarding Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36. “Perhaps the operation is on hold. There are, however, several other satellites that shadowed ICEYE X36 back in May that could be brought in[to] action too.”
It is important to point out that space, as a domain, inherently creates complications when it comes to attributing any form of attack, should one occur. Satellites do suffer mishaps, sometimes with catastrophic results, the causes of which are not always clear.
Just in January, a Russian inspector satellite launched in 2014 appeared to break up unexpectedly. Sometime around the end of July, the Chinese reconnaissance satellite Yaogan 50-02, which had only been launched some four months earlier, also broke up in orbit. On Sept. 13, a similar fate befell the U.S. Cold War-era Farrah III spy satellite, also known as USA 32. At the time of writing, no firm evidence has emerged to indicate any of these incidents were the result of hostile action rather than accidents of some kind.
Update: Debris from active PRC satellite Yaogan 50-02.@S4S_SDA has now cataloged 62 pieces of debris originating from the PRC's active Yaogan 50-02 satellite (68196 / 2026-051A) on around 20 July 2026 (ref my initial analysis on Substack, link in thread).
— Space Domain Awareness (@shell_jim) October 12, 2026
In spite of the… pic.twitter.com/1ecF68W8VQ
Some recordings of USA 32 (#19460), whose fragmentation in LEO on 13 Sep 2026 at approximately 2113 UTC was confirmed by U.S. Space Forces–Space (S4S). By the time of the recordings, a large number of fragments had already dispersed over a wide section of the track. pic.twitter.com/gjRxCTPz2o
— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) September 16, 2026
“While the intention behind COSMOS 2612’s behavior remains uncertain, the deliberate nature of the activity, the fuel required to conduct this activity, and the proximity to a Western commercial imaging satellite make the event strategically important,” LeoLab’s report notes. “This event, and the capabilities demonstrated, do not establish hostile intent. It does, however, demonstrate capabilities that could support intelligence collection, on-orbit inspection, coercive signaling, interference, or preparation for future counterspace operations.”
It is very possible, if not highly probable, that Kosmos 2612’s recent activities will be indicative of a trend going forward. Aggressive and potentially dangerous maneuvering by armed forces in close proximity to each other is not uncommon within the atmosphere, especially in the air and at sea. Extending a variation of those tactics into the space domain would make sense, especially given the central role that capabilities in orbit increasingly play in modern military operations globally. Those roles extend to early warning, general intelligence gathering, weapons guidance, near-real-time communications, and beyond.
American officials have already said in the past that American assets in space are routinely the target of “reversible attacks,” meaning ones that do not cause permanent damage. That also speaks to the difficulty of attribution if there is no lasting effect or impact to draw attention to.
The U.S. government’s long-time monopoly on the space domain has also been steadily eroding in recent years, especially in light of China’s massive expansion of its intelligence-gathering and other satellite constellations. The scale and scope of what commercial satellite imagery and other space services providers, like ICEYE, offer today have led to a further democratization of space-based capabilities to countries like Ukraine that do not possess significant, if any, constellations of their own.
All of this, in turn, has increasingly driven the U.S. military, specifically, to plan for more proactive operations and potential direct conflict in orbit to ensure it retains its edge going forward. The aforementioned disclosure of U.S. on-orbit weapons is indicative of those developments and an accompanying shift in U.S. policy to be more open about counter-space capabilities.
More details may yet emerge about Kosmos 2612 and its recent rendezvous in orbit with ICEYE X36, but it already points to how space has become an increasingly likely potential zone for direct conflict going forward.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Russian Satellite’s Unprecedented Shadowing Of A Very Particular Radar Imaging Satellite Is A Big Deal appeared first on TWZ.
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