The New Statesman has published a letter signed by the great and good defending Sally Rooney's right to support Palestine Action. Prof James Alexander wonders why so many writers couldn't write a decent letter.

The post A Reply to Slavoj Žižek, Jonathon Porritt, Peter Singer, Shami Chakrabarty, Priyamvada Gopal, Tariq Ali, Jeremy Corbyn and All appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft.

However, the agreement’s execution remains subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes that multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to make upfront investments in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

Besides, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants of the fighter.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will allow Lockheed Martin to enter into long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, thereby stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post The $7 Billion Bet Inside Lockheed’s F-35 Framework: Why Pentagon Wants to Lock Production for a Decade appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

• I've never been skiing.
• But if I ever decide to learn, I'll do it at the Four Seasons in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
• My 550-square-foot room felt like a luxury cabin on the slopes.

When I arrived at the Four Seasons Jackson Hole on a muggy day in early September, I imagined it covered in snow. This was in 2024, when I visited Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for the first time.

I spent one night at the five-star ski-in, ski-out resort. If I ever take a ski trip, I imagine that my room at this Four Seasons would be a peaceful place to rest after an active day of gliding through powder.

Step inside the 550-square-foot room with a starting rate of nearly $1,000 a night during the winter ski season.

Welcome to the Four Seasons Jackson Hole, a five-star, slopeside ski resort.

The 65-year-old hotel chain has a luxurious reputation and over 130 locations worldwide, each designed to reflect its destination.

Kim Cole, the director of public relations for the Four Seasons, told Business Insider that the company describes the Jackson Hole location's aesthetic as "modern mountain chic," catering to hikers, bicyclists, and skiers in the winter.

After checking in, I explored the room with the typical peak-season guest in mind.

The hotel has 106 guest rooms and 18 suites. The starting rate is $525 in the offseason and $995 in the peak winter season. Business Insider received a media rate for a one-night stay.

There are also 31 Resort Residences on-site, built to serve large groups. These residences have kitchens and up to five bedrooms. Starting prices range from $4,200 to $11,000, depending on the season.

Cole told Business Insider that in the winter, guest rooms are typically booked with active guests who participate in winter sports, so I imagined how the room would feel as a skier.

I thought my 550-square-foot room blended traditional cabin nostalgia with midcentury modern luxury.

My room had a king-sized bed, a full bathroom, and a private balcony.

Renovated by Wimberly Interiors in 2022, the guest rooms were designed to bring the outside in, with metal accents, stone finishings, and a soft, earth-toned color palette. This nature-inspired trend, known as biophilic design, gained traction in 2024.

The bed was plush with warm, fluffy bedding and dense pillows.

The king-sized bed sat between mixed-material nightstands with edgy lamps that contrasted with classic wooden shutters.

With one king-sized bed, the room sleeps up to three adults (or two adults and one kid). The room can also be arranged with two double beds, increasing the maximum occupancy to four adults (or two adults and two kids).

The nature-inspired headboard was a mesmerizing statement piece.

The headboard was the standout piece in the room. A cherry-wood frame juxtaposed with a bright-white image gave it a midcentury modern look.

The image was a textured carving of trees that I could feel when I brushed my fingers over the branches. A light bar glowed beneath the board, making it easier to see the details of the monochrome image.

The bed was so comfy that I didn't want to get up — and with smart controls on the in-room tablet, I didn't have to.

The tablet on the nightstand served as the room's control center, commanding everything from the TV to room service. This amenity was added in the 2022 remodel.

The tablet would be especially handy after an exhausting day on the slopes.

The other nightstand held an eclectic shelf of books with a warm white color palette.

Few things are more relaxing on a snow day than cozying up with a good book.

Luckily, my room had a small selection of biographies, historical literature, and novels, ranging from realistic fiction to young adult fantasy.

Publishing dates for these books ranged from 2003 to 2020, but I thought they looked much older. They were all sleeveless with a white or off-white binding.

Across from the bed, a large TV was mounted above a stone fireplace.

Rustic drawers were to the left of the fireplace, while a modern sitting area was on the right.

I noticed all the seating in my room was soft and cushy, which seemed ideal for sore bodies after an active day.

The room also had a private bar with gold trimmings.

The bar had an espresso machine, neutral-toned ceramic mugs, and Four Seasons-branded water.

Beneath the bar, a cabinet hid the mini-fridge. It was stocked with alcohol and snacks like peanut M&Ms and gummy bears, which were available for an extra cost.

In the marble bathroom, the oversize tub had a bendy shower head that made me feel like I was in a spa.

The bathroom had complimentary Le Labo toiletries.

The bathroom felt spacious, with a double-sink vanity, a sizable shower, and a separate toilet room.

The mirrors and vanities were replaced by Wimberly Interiors in 2022.

Across from the bathroom, a walk-in closet held bathrobes, a safe, and some classic, upscale amenities I've only seen in ultra-luxury hotels.

I spotted old-school amenities like a shoehorn and a shine brush, which I've seen more often in high-end European accommodations than in the US.

The ample size of the bathroom and closet made the room suitable for up to four guests.

The private balcony seated one in a comfortable lounge chair.

I spent some time on the deck, but since I imagined it would be less enjoyable in the cold, I appreciated the sliding glass doors that let me enjoy the view without the cold.

Out there, I had a view of the ski lifts traveling up and down Rendezvous Mountain.

From the balcony, I spotted the downhill trails towering over the resort's courtyard. Looking down, I pictured the green courtyard blanketed in snow.

In the winter, I imagine the biggest luxury of this $1,000-a-night room is hitting the slopes just outside. If I ever visit Jackson Hole during peak season, I'll only splurge on a Four Seasons stay if I'm taking a ski trip.

On eBay Live, livestreaming is for the entrepreneurial everyman. It is a no-frills, decentralized QVC for the modern age.

The interface is clunky, the sellers are unpolished, and the viewer numbers are low. The site is more like a digital garage sale than a Sotheby's auction, but it's just as thrilling to watch a bidder win a rare baseball card as to watch one win a Rothko.

Items for sale include Rolex watches, Funko Pop toys, commemorative coins, and Michael Kors backpacks, which sellers hawk to audiences of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 other souls. These online auctioneers set countdown clocks, sometimes as short as 10 seconds. Bids start as low as $1.

Tuning into a sub-100-viewer eBay Live auction is strangely intimate. Sellers, often in makeshift home sets or nondescript warehouse backrooms, fill the time between auctions with banter and often play music on their own speakers. Sellers also respond to the audience, affectionately referred to as "chat."

One bidding frenzy drew me in. Ten seconds and a flurry of clicks later, I became the proud owner of a $3.81 Dragonite Pokémon card. I know nothing about Pokémon, yet I felt a surge of joy hearing my username declared the winner. There is a simple pleasure in buying and selling real things in a digital auction house.

The post Review: eBay Live Is QVC for the Modern Age appeared first on Reason Magazine.

When both Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base were closed as active American military facilities in the early 1990s, the Philippines was said to be the sick man of US alliances. The same Philippines now seems to have emerged as America’s pivot in the Indo-Pacific.

General Ronald Clark, Commander of US Army Pacific, made it clear in an October 18 interview with the Financial Times that the Philippines, alongside Japan and South Korea, is central to US deterrence against hostile forces (implying China) in the Indo-Pacific.

The commander of US Army Pacific, a component of Indo-Pacific Command, said he wanted to demonstrate more “exquisite” military capabilities to help “show the adversary some things that they should be concerned about.”

As part of that push, US Army Pacific has expanded its role, including by temporarily deploying weapons in the Philippines, Japan, and other parts of the region that would play a critical role in a war with China, including over Taiwan, according to General Clark.

He revealed how Typhon, a mobile missile launch system that fires SM-6 missiles at ships, and Tomahawks that could strike parts of coastal China from the Philippines, have been used in recent joint exercises with the Philippines.

The US Army has also been using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in ways designed to send a clear message to China about the joint military capabilities of America and its allies, Clark said.

Mentioning an exercise earlier this year in which the army moved long-range precision weapons from the US to the Philippines and brought ammunition from South Korea for a live-fire mission, Gen. Clark stressed that it was important for deterrence.

“It causes them to go: ‘Hey, this is something that we have to think about,’” he said,  adding, “You can see it operate and we can do it at scale at a time and place of our choosing. So, you reveal capability in order to give your adversary pause.”

Incidentally, in an earlier conversation with the Wall Street Journal, Gen. Clark, who commands 107,000 soldiers, talked about the “tyranny of distance” that made it impossible to fight China with just air and naval power.

He argued that China’s vast geographic expanse and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities make it impossible or too risky to rely solely on air and naval power.

Here, Gen. Clark argues that the Philippines’ geography is a major advantage. The country’s 7,641 islands sit near vital maritime routes, the South China Sea, and the Luzon Strait/Taiwan Strait, making it an irreplaceable staging ground for US surveillance, logistics, and coastal defense.

From Batanes in northern Luzon—100 miles from Taiwan—to Palawan facing the Spratlys in the south, the archipelago locks the two hottest flashpoints: the north controls the Taiwan Strait, and the south controls the South China Sea.

For the US  military, it is the only territory that can monitor both the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea simultaneously. The archipelago can thus complicate the movement of Chinese naval forces from their coastal waters into the wider Pacific.

Incidentally, America is rebuilding its military presence in the Philippines after its 1992 withdrawal.

China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America?

The return to Subic Bay and the expansion of US military cooperation across the Philippines mark a major strategic reversal. Washington is once again developing access to facilities that can support its operations in the western Pacific.

The US has access to nine Philippine military sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and is investing more than $300 million to upgrade infrastructure.

However, all 9 (nine) bases are owned by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but the US has been granted rotational access. The first 5 (five) were agreed in 2014, with 4 (four being added later in 2023 by President Marcos Jr. to deal with threats from the South China Sea.

The nine sites are being turned into A2/AD nodes that complicate any Chinese movement through the First Island Chain.

Notably, rather than building massive permanent bases, the US and the Philippines are building a flexible, distributed network that complicates targeting by China and raises the costs of a potential conflict (“deterrence by denial”).

Viewed thus, it is understandable why the US has introduced, as seen in Gen. Clark’s  FT interview,  advanced mobile-strike and missile systems such as the Typhon mid-range missile system into the Philippines, capable of reaching targets in the South China Sea and southern China.

One could further argue that Gen. Clark’s interview was not about the Philippines alone. It was about a new American way of fighting a war in the Indo-Pacific that is distributed, land-based, visible, and anchored on three democracies of  Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. That is why he put the Philippines in the same sentence as Japan and Korea.

One can thus surmise that, in a future contingency arising from Chinese actions, Japan will provide airfields, South Korea ammunition, and the Philippines firing positions.

This aligns with the US 2026 National Defense Strategy that EurAsian Times explained earlier. The idea is to build “a strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain.

In this scheme of things, Japan is the northern anchor — with long-range missiles, US-Japan command integration, and bases. South Korea is the arsenal and logistics hub — Clark himself cited a live-fire exercise in the Philippines using ammunition brought from South Korea, showing how Korean stockpiles now sustain Philippine operations.

The Philippines is the southern anchor and now a vital Indo-Pacific center for the US. The 12th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, held in Manila on February 16, 2026, officially reaffirmed both allies’ commitment to maintaining a vigilant posture, strengthening deterrence across the First Island Chain, and keeping critical sea lanes open.

Apparently, Washington is not only institutionalizing this triangle, the US, Japan, and the Philippines, but also widening its scope by involving Australia and forming the “Squad.”

The Squad’s core focus is to counter maritime pressure and escalation in the South China Sea and East China Sea and reinforce freedom of navigation.

Accordingly, defense officials and defense chiefs from the four nations have increasingly aligned through mini-lateral dialogues, joint exercises (such as Balikatan), and security assistance packages (including transfers of Japanese warships and patrol aircraft to the Philippine Navy).

The developments above make it clear that the Philippines has become the centerpiece of Washington’s strategy to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. As Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said this year, Manila is Washington’s “model ally”.

In his words, “When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong. And that is exactly what we have here in Manila, under the leadership of President Marcos, Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, and other key leaders. We see and respect a resolute and proud nation that is determined to strengthen its own capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. A model ally.”

The Philippines now strengthens America’s network of strategic positions running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Both are developing capabilities intended to make Chinese military operations more difficult, costly, and uncertain.

But as explained above, that is in a manner that affords more operational flexibility for America through access to ports, airfields, and other facilities that can help US forces disperse, sustain operations, and respond more quickly during a crisis, without depending on a small number of major bases.

In other words, thirty-four years after losing its sovereign bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US military has returned with comparable power, but by shifting its status from a base owner to a rotational guest.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Three Decades After Subic Bay Withdrawal, U.S. Military Returns to the Philippines With a New Model to Check China appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come, by Charles Kupchan, Yale University Press, 328 pages, $32.50

In popular rendering, international politics since 1945 has been shaped by the so-called "liberal order." Led by the United States, a bundle of international institutions, rules, and norms intended to limit interstate competition and facilitate cooperation were widely embraced, contributing (per this narrative) to a peaceful and prosperous world. Today, that system seems to be breaking down, leaving policymakers, pundits, and scholars grappling with what a future order should entail and how this system should be orchestrated.

Rivers of ink have already flowed in service of this foundational question. To the mix we can now add Charles Kupchan's Bringing Order to Anarchy. Kupchan, a professor of government at Georgetown University and a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, is interested in both how the present crisis of order arrived and what should be done about it—as he puts it, "How did we get here?" and "What do we do now?" In his telling, we arrived at this moment because of the diffusion of power abroad, combined with shifts in domestic priorities among key members of the post-1945 order (especially the United States). The post-1945 order, he concludes, is thus irredeemably broken.

Going forward in what he sees as an increasingly multipolar world, Kupchan advocates a "global system of concerts" modeled on the Concert of Europe—the international order established after the Napoleonic wars. His proposed system would prioritize relations among the great powers, creating "informal and flexible steering groups" that would emphasize "building consensus, establishing lateral lines of authority across power centers, and providing top down governance." In practice, influence and authority would devolve to different regions, within which local great powers would play leading roles in shaping regional affairs. Meanwhile, the great powers would meet as part of a global concert, sitting atop regional orders as a kind of deconfliction and organizing body.

The most welcome contribution here is Kupchan's call to accept the end of the post-1945 order and to work within the constraints of a new distribution of power. For all that policymakers and analysts recognize that change is needed, the debate over the future of international order tends to focus on preserving whatever elements of the existing order we can. It also tends to attribute the need for change to shifts in U.S. domestic politics. Kupchan, on the other hand, helpfully reminds us that order depends first and foremost on the distribution of power. States, after all, are the building blocks of any international system, just as relative power affects both what they want and their options for pursuing their interests. The creation and maintenance of an order therefore hinges on whether it broadly reflects the distribution of power, allowing states to get some of what they want, through means most can accept.

It follows that pronounced shifts in the distribution of power require adjustments in the larger system. The greater the shift, the greater the change. And since the power shift underway today is foundational—with China emerging as a peer competitor to the United States, American power in relative decline, and power diffusing away from the West (broadly conceived)—it would be extremely foolhardy to try to preserve an order created at a very different historical moment. With a new distribution of power, Kupchan recognizes, a new system is required. Hard stop.

Still, Kupchan's call for creating a concert to replace the extant order is not entirely convincing. Two problems stand out.

First, the very same power shifts that require change to the current system leave the efficacy of the concert approach open to question. If great powers are to play the leading role in a concert system, it matters both which states constitute the great powers and how their relative power compares to one another. But amid a power shift, these are the very issues that are likely to be intensely contested, if not fundamentally uncertain. It's inauspicious for the envisioned concert, for instance, that scholars of international politics cannot agree whether the world today is unipolar, multipolar, bipolar, or something else altogether. Absent some baseline understanding of the distribution of power, it is difficult to see how a concert would form, gain buy-in, and operate successfully. 

Kupchan's invocation of the Concert of Europe itself alludes to the problem. It is no accident that the Concert formed only after 25 years of warfare clarified the European distribution of power, and waned as power shifted (due heavily to the emergence of Germany). Nevertheless, Kupchan doesn't seriously engage with this core requirement for a concert model when he makes the case for a concert today. The result is a tension between the book's underlying logic and its top-line policy prescription.

Second, and relatedly, it is not completely clear what the concert's remit would actually entail. On one hand, Kupchan argues that the "Global Concert would be a consultative body, not a decision-making one"; it would "tee up decisions that could be taken and implemented" by other ordering bodies. Yet Kupchan also notes that a key virtue of concerts writ large is their ability to "lower the bar to reaching and abiding by agreements"; similarly, he calls for concert diplomacy that would set up "bespoke steering groups to tackle specific challenges," particularly in security affairs. This suggests something grander than a consultative body. "Reaching and abiding by agreements" and setting up ad hoc fora to tackle specific challenges are decisions. Indeed, even "teeing up" ideas and decisions that could be tackled by subordinate international institutions and structures is a kind of decision. 

One gets the sense that Kupchan is not totally comfortable with the implications of his own reasoning. If new great powers are emerging and are poised to dominate international politics, and if these states are to coordinate with one another in small group settings, it seems likely that the concert would be a decision-making body. Alternatively, if the concert is to truly function as a consultative body, it is unclear why new great powers eager to assert influence over the international agenda would sign up and give credence to this exercise.

Beyond the logic of the concert system itself, no review of Bringing Order to Anarchy would be complete without some reflection on the volume's discussion of U.S. politics. The book contains a lengthy list of proposed domestic changes, including calls to encourage civility, forge bipartisan consensus, put the U.S. fiscal house in order, and avoid ideological excesses at home. No doubt many readers would agree with these recommendations. Still, it is not really clear what these proposals do to advance Kupchan's core arguments. Rather than directly affecting the creation or operation of a concert order, the domestic challenges he wants to remedy act as constraints on U.S. power: They impede the translation of U.S. material capabilities into international influence. Accordingly, a concert system could operate even with a domestically dazed and confused United States—the U.S. would simply be a less effective participant. Changing the domestic status quo may be a good thing, but it is not central to the mission of explaining what a future international order entails. The book's domestic discussion ends up being an odd discursion.

Still, this is an important book. In calling for casting the former order aside, Kupchan brings needed clarity to a meandering discussion. By the same token, it is very useful to bring insights from the Concert of Europe into the policy conversation. Whatever gaps there might be in its ideas about the logic and operation of a concert system—or the relationship of domestic politics to a concert—the book raises a new set of options, and that in itself is a valuable contribution to the discussion.

The post After the International 'Liberal Order' appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Amid global demand for Patriot interceptors, Lockheed Martin recently unveiled its most advanced interceptor, the PAC-3 Edge, which could offer improved performance against ballistic missiles and hypersonic threats.

EurAsian Times takes a deep dive into the evolution of Patriot Air Defense Systems, but before that, let’s start with the news.

PAC-3 EDGE

The new interceptor missile builds on the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE technology, which has proven its worth in multiple conflicts, including Ukraine and the Middle East.

The new PAC-3 Edge incorporates a new seeker, an upgraded control system, and a more advanced solid rocket motor developed with Northrop Grumman.

These new features will improve the missile interceptor’s range, altitude, speed, and precision.

It is part of the US Army’s Future Interceptor program, which is currently in competition.

“The Army’s decision to progress Lockheed Martin into the next stage of development affirms its confidence in Lockheed Martin’s proven Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) experience and the company’s ability to deliver an advanced, layered defense,” the company said in a statement.

Lockheed Martin will advance development and begin testing PAC-3 Edge in 2027 to prepare for rapid deployment by 2031, it added.

“Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge interceptor leverages the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE, delivering even greater maneuverability, power and velocity to ensure the Army’s layered defensive architecture remains the most advanced in the world,” said Tim Cahill, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control president.

PAC-3 interceptors come in three variants: the lower-cost PAC-3 ACE, legacy PAC-3 CRI, and the prestigious PAC-3 MSE.

The company said it invested US$250 million in the Strigo Product Center to fund new, industry-leading seeker technology that increases precision and maneuverability against evolving threats.

PAC-3 Edge is designed to be integrated with existing and future Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, including the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), the M903 launcher, containerized launchers, and HIMARS Flex.

The US Army’s selection of Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge program highlights the service’s efforts to improve its existing layered air defense systems to address evolving aerial threats.

While the company did not provide technical details of the new seeker technology, analysts believe that it could be a dual-mode or multimode configuration that integrates multiple sensors to better detect, track, and intercept evolving threats such as hypersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), maneuvering ballistic missiles, and the ability to distinguish real threats from decoys.

In the war in Ukraine, while the PAC-3 MSE interceptors have proved highly effective in countering ballistic missiles and aircraft, they have struggled to intercept Russia’s hypersonic missiles, such as Oreshnik, Zircon, and Kinzhal.

Furthermore, while PAC-3 MSE interceptors were highly effective against ballistic threats in the initial phase, their performance gradually declined as Russia adapted its missiles to perform increasingly complex terminal maneuvers.

According to a Financial Times report based on Ukrainian Air Force data compiled by the Center for Information Resilience, Patriot interceptors’ ballistic interception rate reached 37% in August 2025 but fell to a low of 6% in September.

This decline was linked to Russian tactical improvements, such as missiles changing trajectory and missiles capable of performing terminal maneuvers.

However, despite this drop in interception rates, Patriot batteries remain Ukraine’s only defense against Russian ballistic threats.

The new PAC-3 Edge interceptors will provide increased protection against such maneuvering missile threats and hypersonic missiles.

Notably, the unveiling of new PAC-3 Edge interceptors comes as global demand for PAC-3 interceptors has increased, and Lockheed Martin is establishing new facilities to raise its interceptor production rate.

Lockheed produced nearly 620 interceptors in 2025; however, it plans to triple Patriot interceptor production to 2000 by 2030.

Patriot PAC-3 interceptors are also included in the Pentagon’s Munitions Acceleration Council (MAC), which is targeting 12 legacy and two “emerging” munitions as part of its ambitious plan to ramp up production and ink a series of agreements with key vendors to ensure cost efficiency while maintaining production stability, according to fiscal 2027 budget documents.

Rising global demand for PAC-3 interceptors, requests from multiple countries to establish Patriot interceptor production facilities, and the unveiling of the advanced PAC-3 Edge interceptors underscore the Patriot air and missile defense system’s continued relevance more than four decades after it first became operational.

The Evolution Of Patriot Air Defense Systems

The MIM-104 Patriot is the US Army’s primary air-and-missile defense system.

Although it was initially designed as an anti-aircraft system, newer Patriot variants can engage ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and aircraft.

A typical Patriot battery includes a radar set, an engagement control station, power generation, other support vehicles, and several launch stations.

The US Army Missile Command first developed the Patriot concept in 1961 as the Army Air Defense System for the 1970s (AADS-70s).

The AD system was meant to be mobile and replace the static HAWK and Nike Hercules emplacements.

In 1964, the US Army renamed it Surface-to-Air Missile, Development (SAM-D).

Three years later, in 1967, the Department of Defense selected Raytheon as the prime contractor. SAM-D’s first flight test took place in November 1969.

Although Raytheon won the prime SAM-D contract in 1967, it did not build everything alone. Martin Marietta joined early as a major subcontractor to handle missile assembly, launcher vehicles, and canister production.

In 1974, the Department of Defense reoriented the SAM-D program to support a Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance system and a simplified concept of operations.

The revised and re-engineered system was renamed PATRIOT (Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target) in 1976.

Patriot entered full-rate production in September 1980, and the US Army activated its first Patriot missile battalion in May 1982.

The Army added significant upgrades to the Patriot system throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

In 1985, the Department of Defense (DoD) started efforts to add a ballistic missile defense capability to the system.

In 1986, the Army upgraded Patriot to the Patriot Advanced Capability-1 (PAC-1) standard, which included software changes that allowed it to engage tactical ballistic missiles.

The PAC-1 was deployed by 1988.

Soon, the US Army began efforts towards the PAC-2 standard, which involved modifications to the missile fuze, warhead, and guidance to engage more capable ballistic missiles like the Soviet OTR-23.

The Patriot system first saw combat service during the 1991 Gulf War, defending critical assets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. The PAC-2 missiles were used to intercept Iraq’s Scud missiles.

Martin Marietta built the PAC-2 interceptors.

In 1993, the US Army added remote launch capability to Patriot systems, allowing missile launchers to be deployed over 10 km from the radar. This also more than tripled the system’s defended area.

Later, the US Army also developed the PAC-3 standard.

The most significant PAC-3 upgrade was a new interceptor with hit-to-kill technology, developed by Lockheed, which defeats targets by striking them directly rather than using a blast-fragmentation warhead.

Lockheed achieved the first-ever hit-to-kill intercept in 1984 with the Homing Overlay Experiment, using impact force alone to destroy a mock warhead outside Earth’s atmosphere. Further development and testing produced today’s PAC-3 missile, which won a 1993 competition to become the US government’s first hit-to-kill interceptor.

In 1995, Lockheed Corp merged with Martin Marietta to create one of the US’s largest defense aerospace companies, combining two key components of the Patriot program: Martin Marietta’s established Patriot infrastructure and production facilities and Lockheed’s cutting-edge hit-to-kill technology.

This newly formed mega-contractor rolled out the PAC-3 missile interceptor.

The PAC-3 standard itself included three distinct configurations, Configuration 1, 2, and 3, which improved its radar, seeker, and range.

The US declared PAC-3 Configuration 3 combat-ready in August 2002.

PAC-3 Configuration 3 had its first combat test in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In 2010, the US Army successfully tested an upgraded PAC-3 interceptor, the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).

According to CSIS’s Missile Threat, the PAC-3 MSE features an enlarged motor and other enhancements to nearly double the PAC-3’s range. It achieved initial operational capability in late 2016.

The PAC-3 also features an active Ka-band radar seeker for endgame guidance. With its lighter weight and newer propulsion system, the PAC-3 can reportedly defend an area seven times greater than the PAC-2.

Patriot currently employs a single AN/MPQ-53, AN/MPQ-65, or AN/MPQ-65A radar set to detect and engage targets. Unlike other air defense systems, the Patriot radar combines surveillance, tracking, and engagement in a single unit.

The AN/MPQ-53 was the world’s first phased-array air defense radar and was employed with legacy PAC-2 systems.

The AN/MPQ-65A is the most advanced Patriot radar; however, the US Army is currently transitioning to use the new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radar, which offers 360-degree coverage and significantly greater detection range.

Furthermore, while the AN/MPQ-53 and -65-series radars are passively scanned arrays, LTAMDS is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) that uses gallium nitride (GaN) power amplifiers, offering greater jamming resistance, beam agility, and power efficiency than previous systems.

360-degree coverage is essential to counter Russia’s evolving “wolf-pack tactics,” which involve launching dozens of aerial targets simultaneously, including drones and ballistic and cruise missiles, that approach from different directions and strike at once.

Only the US and Poland are procuring the LTAMDS at present. In September, the US awarded a US$1.7 billion contract to produce nine radars for the two users.

Currently, 18 countries operate the Patriot AD system. These include the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Taiwan, Greece, Spain, South Korea, the UAE, Ukraine, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, Poland, and Bahrain.

In 2023, the US allowed countries to transfer Patriot batteries to Ukraine, where they have repeatedly intercepted Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

For instance, on May 16, 2023, the Ukrainian Air Force claimed it used Patriot to intercept a salvo of six Kinzhal missiles over Kyiv.

However, rising global demand for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and Russia’s adaptive missile technology, which involves terminal-phase maneuvers, have necessitated a two-pronged strategy: boosting PAC-3 interceptor production and developing more advanced interceptors.

The PAC-3 Edge will keep the Patriot AD system relevant amid evolving aerial threats.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post New U.S. Missile Aims To Outmaneuver Russia’s Maneuvering Missiles: Here’s Patriot’s Evolution to PAC-3 Edge appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

There is now a growing debate over what constitutes war and whether it should include strikes on data centers. They represent a new front in warfare, in which facilities powering the technology behind many critical industries have become targets.

As it is, the definition of a military attack seems to be changing over time.

Conventionally, it was understood to occur when tanks or fighter planes crossed a border. Then it was expanded to include the use of missiles that were fired without crossing the border but hitting a city and causing physical destruction of “vital infrastructure and death”.

Such attacks justified a country retaliating under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which legitimizes a war under “Right to Self Defense” if an “armed attack occurs.”

Now there is a growing school of thought that “vital infrastructure” must include any disruptive attack on data centers, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, amounting to significant loss of function. It should be treated as a use of force and trigger the affected country’s right to self-defense under Article 51, the argument goes.

Apparently, vulnerabilities in modern digital infrastructure have turned data centers into primary targets in contemporary warfare. As society becomes deeply integrated with cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and automated logistics, data centers have evolved into the nervous system of modern statecraft.

Attacks on digital infrastructure are no longer limited to cyberattacks (non-kinetic) that cause banking collapses and disrupt vital systems like power grids and hospitals by cutting off Internet access; they now include kinetic strikes on data hubs that affect nations’ military capabilities and expose financial vulnerabilities.

After all, modern defense systems rely heavily on cloud-based logistics. Data centers process satellite imagery, coordinate drone operations, run predictive maintenance algorithms for fighter jets, and host classified communication networks. Thus, taking down these nodes effectively blinds an adversary’s command structure.

This has been noticed in the recent conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. For instance, on September 23, Russian Geran-5 jet drones hit the Inkom Business Center in Kyiv,  housing Datagroup’s data center. Four people died, and internet service for 100,000 households was down for hours.

On September 27, Kyivstar — Ukraine’s central mobile operator — and Vodafone Ukraine’s data centers were hit. Russia’s Defense Ministry  justified this by saying that “Data centers were being used for the benefit of the Ukrainian military.”

Two weeks later, Ukraine returned the favor. It launched highly targeted long-range drone strikes hitting major data hubs across Russia, inflicting significant disruption on the country’s digital economy.

Between October 8 and October 14, 2026, Ukrainian forces carried out a series of “symmetrical responses” to counter earlier Russian attacks on Ukrainian internet and telecommunications assets. The strikes specifically crippled infrastructure belonging to Yandex (often called “Russia’s Google”) and Sberbank, Russia’s largest banking and technology conglomerate.

Similarly, in February-March 2026, during US-Israeli strikes on Iran, the latter hit back not only at oil but at data centers — Google, Microsoft, and Oracle cloud infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly those located in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Apparently, when Amazon Web Services’ Bahrain facility suffered “physical damage to cooling infrastructure from debris”, it became the first known case of an AWS data center damaged in an interstate war.

Iranian missiles near Al Udeid Air Base damaged an Oracle Cloud data center in Doha. Microsoft also confirmed “connectivity issues” in the Qatar Central region.

The same happened to the Google data center in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, which hosts Aramco cloud.

G42 [UAE AI company backed by Microsoft] data center in Abu Dhabi was also affected, forcing it into blackout mode.

In other words, from Kyiv to Bahrain, a pattern is clearly apparent  — belligerents no longer distinguish between cloud and command. Data centers that host banks and brigades are treated as brigades. They have officially transitioned from commercial tech infrastructures to critical national security assets.

As Omar Sultan Al Olama, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, Digital Economy, and Remote Work Applications, said the other day,  “Unfortunately, they’re more important than bridges. They’re more important than roads. They’re more important than tunnels because our whole lives are on these devices that we’re using”.

Incidentally, the UAE is revising plans for a 5-gigawatt AI data center project following the Iranian strikes. The original plan envisioned a 10-square-mile campus in Abu Dhabi, to be built in partnership with American tech companies like Oracle, Nvidia, and Cisco. Now the data centers will likely be spread out across the UAE. Sultan Al Olama said, “ The UAE will change its data centre rules and stop promoting where they are”.

According to Kirk Cameron, founding director of the Institute for Advanced Computing at Virginia Tech, “Data centers are now on the critical path for modern digital infrastructure. The loss of key data centers could collapse economies, disrupt public and private transportation with loss of GPS, and affect government essential services for health, emergency dispatch, and power grids.”

Many agree with him when he argues that  “Data centers are competitive advantages in warfare. Knocking out capabilities means potentially crippling combat operations for an adversary. It’s also a form of economic warfare and could lead to longer-term competitive challenges for the target.”

All this brings the question of whether bombing a data center constitutes an act of war.  Does the definition of war need to change?

The main challenge to this question lies in what is called the “Gray Zone” of conflict, particularly in non-kinetic attacks. Unlike a missile launch, which leaves clear radar signatures and identifiable points of origin, cyber operations offer plausible deniability.

Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, attacking a dual-use target is governed by the principles of distinction and proportionality.  Here, attacking a dual-use target is legal only if the military advantage gained outweighs the civilian collateral damage.

If an attack on a data center shuts down military communications but also disables the life-support monitoring systems of dozens of regional hospitals, the strike violates proportionality. Such an operation can be classified as a war crime, reinforcing the argument that major cyber infrastructure operations carry the same legal weight and consequences as traditional warfare.

But any clear distinction in such cases is neither easy nor free from contention. For instance, when Russia attacked data centers in Ukraine, it claimed that these were being used by Ukrainian intelligence and military. However, Ukraine denied the charge.

As  Kasia Klonowska, an authority on international law, says, “Due to a lack of a definition of the treaty- terms weapons, means or methods of warfare, it is unclear whether non-weaponized AI decision-support systems should be subjected to a legal review prescribed by Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I. It remains a challenge to determine exactly what should be subjected to review beyond weapons.

“You have very limited situations in which they would actually qualify as lawful targets when they’re used by the military, and even then, it’s very difficult for the attacker to know whether that’s happening or not. If they are purely processing military data, they could be legitimate targets. But many, if not most, are dual-use.”

To address the legal ambiguity surrounding digital warfare, Prof. Ben Hines has proposed what he calls a “Substantive Necessity” framework, reinterpreting international law under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Under this framework, a non-kinetic cyber attack amounts to an armed attack when the victim state, based on clear and convincing evidence, apprehends a hostile act that has fundamentally compromised, or is imminently poised to compromise, the functioning or security of infrastructure crucial to the state’s ability to function.

The framework argues that traditional international legal thresholds for “force” and “gravity” do not inherently require physical destruction or kinetic weaponry. Under this test, taking down a country’s primary data center cluster that hosts banking, health, emergency dispatch, GPS — even without an explosion — is an armed attack. Because effects equal or exceed kinetic.

Viewed thus, it is not surprising that Western nations like the US, the Netherlands, and France are clearly asserting that a disruptive attack on data centers that causes significant loss of function will be treated as a use of force and may trigger the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In sum, as the line between the physical and digital worlds disappears, international law is adapting to treat high-consequence infrastructure attacks as equivalent to an armed attack.

Data centers are now firmly on the front lines of global conflict, where a single breach can serve as the definitive catalyst for war. The lines between civilian infrastructure and military assets are dangerously blurring.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Iran Hit Amazon. Russia Struck Kyiv’s Data Centers. Ukraine Hit Yandex. Can Such Attacks Trigger Article 51? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.