Prime minister says room for manoeuvre was limited by geopolitical crises and Labour’s 2024 manifesto

Andy Burnham has admitted his first budget as prime minister was not as radical as he would have liked because of the economic uncertainty facing the country.

He said he would have liked to have gone further with this week’s announcement – including with higher energy support payments – but felt hemmed in by external events such as the war in Iran, which has pushed up borrowing costs.

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© Photograph: Darren Staples/PA

© Photograph: Darren Staples/PA

© Photograph: Darren Staples/PA

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Cross-party committee says ‘moonshot’ vow to end obesity epidemic in a decade will fail without personal leadership from PM

The UK government’s promise to reverse rising obesity rates in the next decade is “doomed to fail” without a major rethink and a new plan led directly by the prime minister, a cross-party committee of MPs has concluded.

The health and social care select committee said in a report that there are no signs the so-called “moonshot ambition on obesity”, set out in the 10-year health plan for England, will achieve anything significant.

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© Photograph: Rawpixel/Getty Images

© Photograph: Rawpixel/Getty Images

Andy Burnham must tread cautiously, but Brexit was a very grave act of self-harm – and he is right to address it

Andy Burnham’s opening debate on whether Britain should rejoin the EU is divisive, painful and politically risky. That is why it should be welcomed. To jeopardise his popularity so soon after coming to office might seem reckless, but the issue is urgent and not going away. Brexit is continuing to damage the nation’s economy. The prime minister’s job is to challenge, if not reform it.

The Brexit decade has evoked a bizarre sense of guilt among Britons. Opinion polls show nearly 60% regard it as a mistake, with just a third still in favour. Almost a quarter of those who voted for Brexit now regret it. While early forecasts of economic disaster were proved wrong, the accumulated cost of cutting links with Britain’s biggest trading partner is estimated at 6-8% of GDP.

Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist

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© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/SOPA Images/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/SOPA Images/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/SOPA Images/Shutterstock

Report calls for an effort to tackle harms in similar way to obesity and smoking, and stresses need to ‘offer boys something better’

The manosphere and online misogyny should be treated by the government as a public health issue, in the same way as obesity or smoking, experts have said.

Writing in the Lancet, the authors of a new report argue that a coordinated response is needed, involving governments, schools, health services and community organisations, similar to the public-health response to tobacco use and ultra-processed food.

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© Photograph: miniseries/Getty Images

© Photograph: miniseries/Getty Images

© Photograph: miniseries/Getty Images

The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.

American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.

According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.

The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.

Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.

Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.

The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.

Military Preparations and Political Timing

The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.

The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.

During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.

The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.

The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.

Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.

However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.

American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.

The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.

Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible

Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.

That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.

The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.

The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.

Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.

Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.

Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.

The Conflict Has Already Spread

The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.

Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.

These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.

The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.

However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.

Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.

None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.

Europe Faces Another Energy Risk

For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.

The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.

An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.

The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.

European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.

The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.

A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.

Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.

The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments

European governments must balance several interests.

They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.

At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.

A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.

European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.

The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.

With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.

Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.

Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).

Experts round on chancellor over ‘scattergun’ budget, saying he ducked big tax and spending decisions

John Healey has backed away from cutting the cost of welfare this parliament, amid dire warnings his first budget could lead to brutal spending cuts because of a £28bn shortfall in public finances.

Experts rounded on Healey’s steady-as-she-goes budget on Thursday, with the Institute for Fiscal Studies saying he had left himself a mountain to climb by ducking big tax and spending decisions.

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© Photograph: Wiktor Szymanowicz/Future Publishing/Getty Images

© Photograph: Wiktor Szymanowicz/Future Publishing/Getty Images

US vice-president writes to top Iranian security official in sign Washington has not abandoned diplomacy

Hopes of averting a major new conflagration between Iran and the US soon after Tuesday’s midterm elections could rest on Iran’s response to a personal letter from the US vice-president, JD Vance, offering to restart diplomacy.

The letter, written after predominantly Qatari mediation, was sent to the secretary of Iran’s supreme national security council, Mohsen Rezaei on Sunday. It requires Tehran to agree to make commitments on its nuclear programme at the start of a process that would lead to the opening of the strait of Hormuz within seven days in return for US sanctions relief.

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© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP

© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP

© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will let pharmacies produce and sell treatments involving six peptides that aren't specifically approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The move is meant to provide a "controlled alternative" to buying peptides from possibly sketchy foreign pharmacies, HHS said.

Under the new HHS policy, the agency will not "take enforcement action against a State-licensed pharmacy, Federal facility, or licensed physician compounding a drug product" using one of six named "peptide bulk drug substance[s]."

This is a major win for peptide proponents, compounding pharmacies, and health freedom—and hints that HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. may be feeling frustration with the slow pace of things at the FDA.

The six peptides in question—BPC-157, Epitalon, KPV, MOTS-c, Semax, and TB-500—were the subject of a summer meeting of the FDA's Pharmacy Compounding Advisory Committee (PCAC).

Up for debate was whether these six "bulk drug substances" and another, Emideltide, should be put on the FDA's Section 503A Bulks List. That list governs which substances licensed physicians and specialty pharmacies can compound into drug products without them being a component of an already FDA-approved drug or having "an applicable United States Pharmacopeia (USP) or National Formulary (NF) monograph."

In July, the panel voted to put six of the seven peptide-related substances under consideration (all except Emideltide) on the bulks list. But the panel's vote is not binding.

It's ultimately up to FDA authorities to decide whether they accept the advisory committee's recommendations. So far, no decision has been released.

But yesterday, HHS unveiled an "Enforcement Discretion Policy Regarding 503A Compounding Using Certain Peptide Bulk Drug Substances." And it effectively puts the committee's recommendations into practice by proxy.

Kennedy can't ensure FDA approval, of course. But he can—and will—stop HHS from taking action against physicians or pharmacies that compound and distribute these substances under his prescribed rules.

In an explainer about the new policy, HHS notes that "compounded drugs are not FDA-approved, which means FDA does not review their safety, effectiveness, or quality before they are marketed." Nonetheless, "compounded drugs can serve an important medical need for certain patients" and "there is significant interest in the use of these peptides in compounding," it says.

Opponents of allowing more peptide-based treatments to be compounded by licensed U.S. pharmacies often focus on the fact that these products don't have FDA approval and may not have the extensive experimental backing required of FDA-approved treatments.

But people are already taking BPC-157, MOTS-c, and other peptides anyway, buying them from companies selling them under "for research use only" labels or obtaining them from foreign distributors. Peptides can even be found on discount everything-marketplaces like the China-based AliExpress.

Allowing licensed physicians and pharmacies in the U.S. to compound these substances without fear of being punished gives people access to safer options than they might otherwise have.

Pharmacies compounding peptide-based products under the rules set forth by federal law still have to be licensed in the states where they operate and follow certain rules, including a requirement that active ingredients used for compounding must be "accompanied by valid certificates of analysis" and "be compounded based on the receipt of a valid patient-specific prescription." Per the new HHS policy, they must also follow several other rules regarding the packaging and labeling of these peptides.

"The Secretary of HHS has determined that this limited enforcement-discretion policy will discourage the continued, widespread use of certain research-use-only peptides supplied by foreign manufacturers that pose a safety risk to US patients," notes the HHS explainer. "By allowing limited compounding of the substances addressed in this guidance under appropriate safeguards, the policy provides patients with a more controlled alternative."

It's an astoundingly reality-based policy for government health officials, who often act as if matters like this come down to a binary between perfect health and safety on one hand and certain danger on the other.

Rather than relegating peptides to gray or black markets until they (may be) pronounced all clear by the FDA, RFK Jr.'s HHS has chosen to balance safety with "patient choice and freedom," as the HHS states.

The post RFK Jr. Institutes Backdoor Approval of 6 Peptides appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The prime minister’s ambitions might be ambiguous, but unlike the Conservative leader, he is following voters and the facts

British politics is still polarised around Brexit, although 10 years on from the referendum, the terms of debate are very different. Or they should be. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has moved discussions of European solidarity from the realm of abstraction to a matter of urgent defence partnership. Donald Trump’s presidency in the US, marked by scorn for European democracies and indulgence of Vladimir Putin, has undermined confidence that Britain can rely on any “special relationship” with Washington.

Under these circumstances, it would be absurd to deny that a reappraisal of Brexit is in order. The prime minister acknowledged this in his speech at the Labour party conference last month, calling for a national conversation about the future relationship with every option, including rejoining, on the table. The Eurosceptic opposition are having none of it. The Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, accuses the government of stirring division by raising the European question. She told MPs this week that Labour should thank the Tories for the Brexit deal they negotiated.

Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.

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© Photograph: House of Commons/PA

© Photograph: House of Commons/PA

© Photograph: House of Commons/PA

Christine Lagarde’s unexpected decision to leave the European Central Bank nine months ahead of schedule has triggered a politically sensitive succession process at a time when renewed inflation, rising borrowing costs and economic uncertainty are testing the eurozone’s monetary institutions.

Christine Lagarde will step down as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) on 7th February 2027, bringing her tenure to an early conclusion and opening negotiations among European Union governments over one of the continent’s most influential economic appointments.

The announcement, made by the ECB on 29th October, came on the same day that its Governing Council decided to leave interest rates unchanged, despite renewed inflationary pressure linked to rising energy prices.

Lagarde, who has led the institution since November 2019, was originally expected to remain in office until October 2027. Her departure will therefore bring forward a succession contest that had already attracted considerable attention in European financial and political circles.

Speaking after the announcement, Lagarde explained that she wanted greater freedom to address matters beyond monetary policy, arguing that the restrictions associated with central bank leadership prevented her from contributing publicly to wider debates.

Her explanation leaves open questions about the political consequences of her departure, particularly as EU governments prepare for difficult negotiations over the institution’s future leadership.

A Succession Shaped by European Politics

Under Article 283 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the ECB president is appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority following consultations with the European Parliament and the ECB’s Governing Council.

Although the process is formally governed by treaty provisions, appointments to the ECB’s Executive Board have historically involved negotiations among the eurozone’s largest economies.

Two former national central bank governors have emerged as prominent potential successors: Klaas Knot of the Netherlands and Pablo Hernández de Cos of Spain.

Both have substantial experience in monetary policy, although their possible candidacies remain subject to the political calculations of EU governments.

The timing is especially significant for France, which faces a presidential election in April 2027 against a background of domestic political instability and mounting concerns about public finances.

An appointment concluded before that election would be negotiated by the existing European leadership, potentially affecting the balance of influence over one of the eurozone’s principal institutions.

However, Lagarde has not publicly identified the French election as the reason for her departure.

The succession process will also coincide with other changes to the ECB’s Executive Board, increasing the importance of negotiations over the geographical and institutional balance of its leadership.

Inflation Returns to the Foreground

The leadership announcement coincided with a difficult monetary policy decision. On 29th October, the ECB maintained its deposit facility rate at 2.5 per cent, leaving the main refinancing and marginal lending rates at 2.65 and 2.90 per cent respectively.

Eurozone inflation reached 3.8 per cent in September, substantially above the ECB’s medium-term target of 2 per cent. Rising energy prices have complicated the institution’s position. Higher gas and oil costs threaten to increase consumer prices while simultaneously weakening industrial output and household purchasing power.

The ECB acknowledged that the energy shock could produce further inflationary pressures and reduce growth.

At the same time, tighter financial conditions across the eurozone have increased the risks associated with additional monetary tightening.

This leaves policymakers confronting a familiar but difficult problem: raising interest rates may restrain inflation, but it can also deepen economic weakness and increase borrowing costs for governments, businesses and households.

The next president will inherit these competing pressures rather than a settled monetary environment.

France Adds Another Complication

Financial developments in France have added urgency to the debate.

French government bond yields have risen sharply, with ten-year borrowing costs reaching levels not seen since 2002.

This reflects market concerns about the country’s fiscal position and political uncertainty, while raising wider questions about financial stability within the eurozone.

For the ECB, the challenge is particularly delicate.

Its mandate requires monetary policy to be directed towards price stability across the currency union. However, the economic consequences of higher interest rates differ considerably between member states.

Countries with elevated public debt face greater pressure from rising financing costs, while economies exposed to higher energy prices may experience weaker investment and industrial production.

The ECB possesses instruments intended to address disorderly financial-market conditions, but these do not eliminate the underlying fiscal and political differences between eurozone members.

The appointment of Lagarde’s successor will therefore take place against a backdrop of renewed debate about the relationship between monetary independence and national economic interests.

An Institution Facing a Different Europe

Lagarde’s presidency began before the pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent European energy crisis.

During her tenure, the ECB navigated emergency monetary interventions, unusually high inflation and substantial changes in interest rates.

Her successor will confront a different combination of challenges: renewed geopolitical disruption, economic competition with the United States and China, and growing demands for European investment in defence and industrial development.

These priorities are primarily the responsibility of governments, but they influence the economic conditions in which the central bank operates.

The immediate question is who will replace Lagarde. The more consequential question is how the next ECB president will manage monetary policy in a eurozone whose economic and political divisions are becoming increasingly difficult to separate.

For EU leaders, the succession is an opportunity to determine the institution’s leadership. For the ECB, it will be another test of its ability to maintain monetary independence while managing the consequences of Europe’s changing political economy.

The ECB faces an ugly choice as eurozone inflation hits 3.8pc

Musician wrote a ‘love letter’ to Canada with a new album – and some pointed commentary about the US president

Lake Ontario, the vast body of water that straddles the US-Canada border, has gone by many names over the centuries: Lac Saint-Louis, Lacus Ontarius, Skaniadorio, Cataraqui Lake. But one thing it will never be called, says the Canadian rock star Bryan Adams, is Lake America.

In his new song Lake Ontario, Adams takes aim at the US president, Donald Trump, accusing him of “breaking the peace” between the people who live on the lake’s shores.

The ‘lake of shining waters’ is what the Iroquois called her

It’s a First Nations name – not an executive order.

But things weren’t going his way in Iran

So like a baby tossing the toys from the pram

You can push us to the brink

But where the open road divides

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© Photograph: Christopher Polk/Billboard/Getty Images

© Photograph: Christopher Polk/Billboard/Getty Images

John Healey aced the morning-after media round because his Martin Lewis measures left nothing to challenge him on

Maybe it had been one of the greatest acts of political genius after all. The day after the budget is usually the moment when things start to fall apart. When clued-up journalists and economists have had a chance to go through all the fine points the chancellor would rather everyone had missed. The forecasts that suggest everything is predicated on a wing and a prayer. The hidden unfunded tax cuts. The greater-than-expected spending commitments.

But on Thursday morning Andy Burnham and John Healey could afford themselves a sigh of relief. All had gone about as well as they could have hoped. It turns out that when you don’t make any massive tax or spending commitments, there isn’t a great deal to unravel. All there had been was a raft of small-scale interventions designed to help people with their personal finances. Call it the Martin Lewis budget. In fact, Healey and Lewis now seem unable to get through the day without spending some time with each other. They certainly can’t stop talking about one another. It’s becoming unhealthily co-dependent. The gods of small things.

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© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images

© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images

© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images

The Hill is thrilled to present the third annual “Bang for Your Buck: Get the Most from Your 2027 Medicare Benefits.” This year’s event is expanded in scope beyond prescription drug plans to address the most common questions about Medicare during open enrollment, which runs from Oct. 15 to Dec. 7. Healthcare costs and affordability…

The Hill is thrilled to present the third annual “Bang for Your Buck: Get the Most from Your 2027 Medicare Benefits.” This year’s event is expanded in scope beyond prescription drug plans to address the most common questions about Medicare during open enrollment, which runs from Oct. 15 to Dec. 7. Healthcare costs and affordability…

Prime minister wrote to ministers saying he did not want them to ‘advocate for specific options or opine on the likely outcome of the process’

Selling nicotine-free vapes to children under the age of 18 has become illegal from today, the government has said.

Children were already banned from buying vapes containing nicotine. But, under the Tobacco and Vapes Act, shops across the UK will now be banned from selling nicotine-free vapes, and nicotine pouches, to children.

Vaping can be a way to help established adult smokers who are already addicted to nicotine from tobacco to swap to a less dangerous product. Vaping is considered safer than smoking, but that is a low bar. Vapes should therefore never be used by children or non-smokers.

Some children have already come to harm from bad reactions to vapes. The long-term health harms of vaping in today’s children will only become clear over time. They are however unlikely to be good; inhaling multiple, often heated, chemicals into the lungs may well do irreversible harm.

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© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

Despite supposed potential plans to build something other than a data center on the land, the possibility of a massive AI data center coming to San Diego is ruffling a lot of feathers.

Despite supposed potential plans to build something other than a data center on the land, the possibility of a massive AI data center coming to San Diego is ruffling a lot of feathers.

Thinktank says chancellor has given himself a mountain to climb after ducking big decisions in low-key speech

John Healey has paved the way for a “brutal” spending review next year after his budget failed to cover a £28bn shortfall in the public finances needed to avoid a return to austerity, according to Britain’s leading tax and spending experts.

A day after his address to the Commons, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) said the chancellor had left himself a mountain to climb by ducking several big decisions in his debut tax and spending statement.

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© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images

© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images

© Photograph: WPA/Getty Images