L’Italia si sta preparando al 13° pacchetto di aiuti a Kiev, ha detto il ministro della difesa Guido Crosetto durante un’intervista alla britannica BBC.
“Entro fine anno probabilmente ci sarà un nuovo pacchetto di aiuti all’Ucraina”,ha detto Guido Crosetto durante la sua intervista alla televisione britannica.
Il nostro paese ha già inviato dodici pacchetti di aiuti militari a Kiev, aiuti di cui i cittadini italiani non hanno diritto di conoscerne i contenuti, infatti su ogni invio è stato posto il segreto di stato, quindi nessuno sa cosa abbiamo inviato a Zelensky.
Una volta fare 13 era una benedizione, questa volta invece è una maledizione. Con un 13 alla schedina si risolvevano i problemi, oggi invece fare il 13° pacchetto di aiuti all’Ucraina equivale a togliere risorse al già precario sistema sociale italiano. La schedina pare l’abbiano vinta Zelensky e i suoi soci, non noi.
Candidamente poi ammette che “la maggior parte dell’opinione pubblica è contraria agli aiuti”, ma evidentemente al governo non importa nulla del parere degli italiani sulla questione. Ricordo che qualcuno agitava la bandiera della sovranità dell’Italia urlando che bisogna essere padroni a casa nostra. Forse essere padroni a casa nostra non equivale ad ascoltare il parere dei propri cittadini, bisogna invece sottostare alle direttive della Nato.
Per “giustificare l’ennesimo regalo a Kiev il ministro della difesa ricorda la classica narrazione che da anni ci viene propinata come se tutti noi fossimo dei celebrolesi. Ha detto che “Putin non si ferma all’Ucraina. E Nato e Unione Europea si preparano. Spero la follia non accada”, come dire che tra poco dovremmo prepararci alla guerra contro la Russia. Vedremo se i suoi figli saranno i primi a partire.
Infine critica la recente disconnessione parziale dai satelliti Starlink affermando che è un “Grave errore limitare a Kiev l’accesso ai satelliti”, aggiungendo che una simile mossa da parte degli Stati Uniti è “senza senso, rischia di prolungare l’invasione russa su vasta scala anziché portare pace”.
Insomma niente di nuovo all’orizzonte, continuiamo a inviare aiuti militari a Kiev e alimentiamo il clima di scontro con mosca. Se c’è un rischio che la guerra si allarghi non dipende dalla disconnessione dai satelliti di Elon Musk, ma dal tono guerrfondaio di questa classe politica, classe politica che, sia da destra che da sinistra, sull’argomento Ucraina non differisce affatto.
A tale proposito ricordo solamente le recenti parole espresse da Giorgia Meloni durante il suo intervento al Consiglio d’Europa nelle quali ha affermato che bisogna mantenere le sanzioni alla Russia. Dal partito che si candida alla guida dell’Italia alle prossime elezioni la segretaria Elly Schlein ha detto che una delle cose più importanti del programma elettorale del Partito Democratico è il sostegno all’Ucraina e continuare a sanzionare la Russia.
Quindi chiunque vinca alle prossime elezioni la politica verso l’Ucraina non cambia, soldi a palate in direzione di Kiev, Poi poco importa se per fare un ecografia ti danno l’appuntamento dopo due mesi, se va bene …
Intanto l’ íultima decisione di Donald Trump nelle relazioni con l’ucraina riguarda la sospensione di alcune sanzioni emesse, poche settimane fa, contro la Russia. Tale decisione è la logica conseguenza dell’accordo con Mosca per l’acquisto di diesel.
Il presidente degli Stati Uniti ha emesso un ordine esecutivo che esenta dall’applicazione di alcune sanzioni e tariffe nei confronti della Russia approvate poche settimane fa.
“Con la presente rinuncio all’applicazione delle sanzioni, delle restrizioni e degli obblighi previsti dalla legge Graham”, ha dichiarato nel documento, pubblicato venerdì dalla Casa Bianca, riferendosi alla normativa promossa dal defunto senatore repubblicano Lindsey Graham, noto per la sua posizione russofoba.
Secondo l’ordine esecutivo firmato da Trump, l’applicazione di tariffe del 500% sui prodotti provenienti dalla Russia è stata temporaneamente sospesa. Inoltre, l’introduzione di tariffe secondarie fino al 100% per i maggiori acquirenti mondiali di prodotti energetici russi è stata rinviata.
Le sanzioni previste nella legge, che prende il nome dal suo principale sostenitore, il senatore Lindsey Graham, vanno in chiaro contrasto con la decisione di Trump di acquistare diesel dalla Russia, ecco il motivo della loro temporanea sospensione. Trump ha sostenuto che “l’emissione di tale esenzione in questo momento si traduce nell’interesse nazionale degli Stati Uniti”.
Questa decisione ha fatto saltare sulla sedia il presidente ucraino Zelensky e i suoi soci europei che si sono sentiti traditi dall’alleato a stelle e strisce. Ma le tensioni con Kiev non si fermano qui. Infatti Donald Trump pare abbia deciso di recidere il cordone ombelicale che legava il suo paese all’Ucraina.
Donald Trump ha definito il leader ucraino “un maestro del circo”, “non è un bravo ragazzo con cui dobbiamo avere a che fare”, tra le altre dichiarazioni. Relativamente agli attacchi alle raffinerie russe ha affermato che Zelensky “Non sta facendo un buon servizio al mondo”
Sabato scorso, Trump ha nuovamente accusato Zelensky di aver attaccato le raffinerie russe, che le forze ucraine hanno continuato a portare avanti nonostante i suoi avvertimenti. “Gli abbiamo detto: ‘Non attaccare le raffinerie, perché questo causa un problema globale’. Ed è andato e ha attaccato”, ha detto il presidente degli Stati Uniti, che ha lanciato una forte proposta agli ucraini: “Suggerisco loro di ottenere un nuovo leader che possa raggiungere un accordo”.
Insomma, questa volta, la rottura tra il presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump e il capo del regime di Kiev Vladimir Zelensky sembra essere reale, ma sarà davvero così o è una semplice mossa pre elettorale?
Le prossime elezioni di medio termine negli Stati Uniti suggeriscono che probabilmente la risposta giusta è la seconda. Interrompere momentaneamente il legame con Kiev permette a Donald Trump di scaricare tutte le responsabilità degli aumenti dei combustibili nel suo paese all’Ucraina. Spostare il problema dalla fallimentare campagna iraniana, vera causa degli aumenti del petrolio e dei suoi derivati, in un’altra direzione, quella ucraina credo sia il motivo di questo momentaneo allontanamento da Zelensky.
Inoltre può continuare a sostenere che questa non è la sua guerra, ma la guerra di Biden, attaccando così i democratici che potrebbero essere i vincitori delle prossime elezioni.
Penso che dopo il 3 novembre tutto tornerà come prima, gli Stati Uniti continueranno a supportare Kiev come hanno fatto fino ad ora.
Articolo originale: farodiroma.it
Sputnik – 25.10.2026
Even as the US diesel deal with Russia that was brokered by Donald Trump could help bring the price of oil down, the Democrats’ Russophobia “is leading them to try to sabotage the deal,” Dr. Jeremy Kuzmarov, managing editor of CovertAction Magazine, tells Sputnik.
“Trump may be making some steps at the beginning to try to end the conflict in Ukraine, whereas the Democrats, I think, want to escalate that conflict. And they are totally irrational,” he adds.
Only a small number of Democrats opposed the anti-Russian sanctions bill, arguing that it is “totally irrational and is going to have a very negative effect on the US economy.”
“This is a case in point where this hysteria about Russia and Russophobia reaches the extent that the government is actually advocating for positions that are very harmful to the American economy and to American workers or farmers — even though the Democrats purport that they are more for the working people.”
American farmers complain that they cannot stay in business due to the cost of fuel, the soaring cost of living does a number on the budgets of working Americans, and many businesses in the US are struggling.
“Some of that also has to do with the war spending of the government and all the money they put into warfare, including Ukraine. That is the thing that Democrats are so hypocritical about. Because they just want to spend more and more billions on Ukraine,” notes Kuzmarov.
“That is what has been ruining the American economy and American society over decades now — the excessive military spending. The Democrats undercut their claim to be for the working people or for farmers if they are trying to sabotage an economic arrangement that would actually work to bring the cost of fuel down.”
Meanwhile, more and more Americans may start seeing the numerous opportunities for economic deals with Russia, potentially leading them to “put more and more pressure on the government to ease relations, restore regular diplomatic relations, end the war in Ukraine, stop the sanctions, and restore ties for the benefit of both countries.”
The Europeans are also “increasingly protesting their governments’ policies and the position they have taken against Russia,” seeing how purchasing more Russian oil and gas would have been beneficial to the European economies.
American people ended up being the losers in their government’s scheme to weaken Russia through the Ukrainian conflict, with billions of dollars that are “needed here in the United States” being lost in the process.
“Ukraine has sacrificed generations of its youth now, its economy has been devastated, and it has become more of an autocratic country under Volodymyr Zelensky,” Kuzmarov says, noting that US Democrats support the “destruction of Ukraine” rather than Ukraine itself.
“That has been destructive for everybody except the weapon contractors and maybe the Wall Street financial firms that own those weapon contractors.”
On October 22, The Washington Post reported that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had asked companies involved in Russian diesel imports to preserve relevant documents as Democrats prepared for a possible probe.
A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.
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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry
Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.
The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.
The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?
The math of fifty thousand
Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.
And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?
Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.
European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.
Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.
Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.
And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.
Creative accounting for oil
There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.
Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.
Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.
In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.
From apotheosis to casus belli?
Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.
Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.
Florida A&M shooting near Bragg Memorial Stadium leaves 11 people shot, including six minors, as Tallahassee police investigate after homecoming.
Related: United States Escalated Hostility Toward Cuba Throughout 2026
The Florida A&M shooting left 11 people with gunshot wounds and one additional person injured on Saturday, October 24, near Florida A&M University’s Bragg Memorial Stadium in Tallahassee.
The shooting occurred shortly before 8:00 p.m. near the intersection of Perry and Manatee streets, just hours after the university’s homecoming football game.
Tallahassee Police Chief Lawrence Revell said 12 people were injured in total. Eleven were shot, while the 12th person was injured while fleeing the scene.
The victims included six adults and six minors. The youngest was an 11-year-old child.
Police said at least three victims suffered serious injuries. One of them, a minor, remained in critical condition as of Sunday morning.
The other eight shooting victims were reported in stable condition. By Sunday morning, five victims had been released from the hospital, while six remained hospitalized.
Police said one of the injured was a student at Florida A&M University. The university confirmed that it was aware of the incident near campus.
The 12th victim was identified by Revell as the grandmother of one of the shooting victims. She was injured while trying to escape the area during the panic.
The shooting took place during homecoming weekend, when thousands of students, alumni and visitors had gathered in Tallahassee for celebrations and the football game.
Florida A&M University issued a safety alert urging people to avoid the area around Bragg Stadium and Perry Street while police investigated.
The university said its campus remained safe but asked community members to allow law enforcement to carry out its work.
🚨At least 12 people are injured, including six children, in a shooting near a football stadium in Tallahassee on homecoming weekend for #Florida A&M University. #Tallahassee Police Chief Lawrence Revell told reporters that no arrests had been made yet following the Saturday… pic.twitter.com/G0MSaiSAkF
— ⚡️🌎 Sarwar 🌐⚡️ (@ferozwala) October 25, 2026
Tallahassee Police Department | Florida A&M University
The Florida A&M shooting occurred after the university’s homecoming football game at Bragg Memorial Stadium.
Florida A&M’s Rattlers lost 31-28 to the Arkansas-Pine Bluff Golden Lions in the homecoming game earlier that day.
Police said preliminary information indicates that a physical altercation between two or three people preceded the shooting.
Chief Revell said investigators believe one shooter was involved. However, no arrests had been made and no suspect had been identified as of Sunday morning.
The Tallahassee Police Department’s Violent Crimes Unit is leading the investigation.
Officers, detectives, sergeants and forensic personnel remained at the scene, collecting evidence and reviewing information from witnesses.
Revell said police were still working to determine exactly what happened and to identify those responsible.
The police chief described the incident as an isolated event and said there was no indication that it was a random attack against the university.
He also said that about two dozen officers were already in the area when the altercation broke out, given the large crowds present for homecoming.
The shooting occurred in a crowded area near the stadium, where families, students and visitors had gathered after the game.
The presence of children among the victims has intensified concern about gun violence affecting young people in the United States.
Police have asked anyone with information about the shooting to contact the Tallahassee Police Department or Crime Stoppers.
Authorities have not released the identities of the victims or confirmed a motive.
The investigation remains active and officials have warned that preliminary details could change as evidence is reviewed.
As of 11:30 p.m., the Tallahassee Police Department is continuing its active investigation into a shooting that occurred just before 8 p.m. Saturday, Oct. 24, near the intersection of Perry and Manatee streets. Read the full news release: https://t.co/wNqNznTLyb
— Tallahassee Police (@TallyPD) October 25, 2026
Everytown for Gun Safety | Gun Violence Archive
The Florida A&M shooting is the latest in a series of mass shootings that continue to affect communities across the United States.
The incident occurred near one of the country’s historically Black colleges and universities, known as HBCUs.
Florida A&M University was founded in 1887 and has played a central role in expanding access to higher education for Black students in the United States.
The university is a symbol of the struggle of Black communities against racial segregation and structural racism in American education.
Homecoming is one of the most important cultural events at HBCUs. It brings together students, alumni, families and local residents in celebrations that strengthen community ties.
The shooting has cast a shadow over those celebrations and raised questions about public safety around large public events.
Gun violence remains a persistent crisis in the United States. Mass shootings occur regularly in schools, universities, public spaces, workplaces and residential areas.
The country continues to face political divisions over gun control, background checks, access to firearms and community-based violence prevention.
Advocacy groups have called for stronger measures to reduce access to weapons by people at risk of committing violence.
They have also urged investment in youth programs, mental health services and community intervention initiatives.
The Tallahassee shooting highlights the impact of gun violence beyond those directly targeted. Bystanders, families and entire communities can be affected by a single act of violence.
The injury of a grandmother fleeing the scene illustrates how panic and fear can harm people who were not involved in the original dispute.
The Florida A&M shooting has implications beyond Tallahassee because it reflects the broader crisis of gun violence in the United States.
Gun violence affects public health, education, economic activity and social cohesion across the country.
Mass shootings near universities and sporting events undermine confidence in public spaces and create fear among students and families.
The incident is particularly significant because it occurred at an HBCU during homecoming, a moment of cultural pride and community gathering.
HBCUs have historically played a vital role in advancing educational opportunity and civil rights in the United States.
Violence near these institutions adds to concerns about the safety of Black students and communities, particularly in a country still marked by racial inequality.
The shooting may also intensify national debate over gun legislation, policing and the protection of young people.
Federal, state and local authorities face growing pressure to address both the availability of firearms and the social conditions that contribute to violence.
For Tallahassee, the incident represents a major test for public safety institutions and community leaders.
The university has asked for calm and cooperation while police continue their investigation.
The immediate priority is to identify those responsible and support the victims and their families.
The Florida A&M shooting is a reminder that gun violence remains one of the most urgent social and political challenges facing the United States.
Social and political groups in the Dominican Republic are protesting a government decision to scrap tariff protections for domestically produced rice, warning that the move could expose local farmers to increased import competition.
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The Broad Front (Frente Amplio) and the Jesús Adón Popular Bloc (Bloque Popular Jesús Adón) have called for a march in Nagua on Sunday, Oct. 25, demanding stronger government measures to protect domestic rice production. The demonstration is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. at the town’s main park, on the road toward San Francisco de Macorís. Organizers have urged farmers, agricultural workers, traders and social organizations across the northeastern region to take part.
The protest centers on Decree 635-26, issued by President Luis Abinader on Sept. 9, 2026, which repealed Decree 693-24. The previous measure established a tariff system intended to shield locally produced rice from international competition.
#DOMINICANA | Tras intensas presiones de Estados Unidos, el Gobierno dominicano derogó la medida arancelaria que protegía la producción nacional de arroz. Organizaciones sociales y productores denuncian que la eliminación de estas salvaguardas bajo el tratado DR-CAFTA vulnera la… pic.twitter.com/ZCVO0Om8iz
— teleSUR TV (@teleSURtv) October 23, 2026
Text Reads: Following intense pressure from the United States, the Dominican Government repealed the tariff measure that protected the national rice production. Social organizations and producers denounce that the elimination of these safeguards under the DR-CAFTA treaty violates the country’s food sovereignty.
Under the former rules, certain imports within the tariff-rate quota faced a 20% tariff, while imports exceeding the quota were subject to a 99% rate. The system allowed 23,300 metric tons of rice from the United States to enter the Dominican market duty-free, with imports above that volume subject to the higher tariff.
María Teresa Cabrera, president of the Broad Front, said the decision to remove the protections stemmed from external commercial pressure linked to bilateral negotiations with the United States over access to the Dominican agricultural market.
Cabrera warned that weakening tariffs could undermine a sector encompassing more than 30,000 producers and supporting tens of thousands of direct and indirect jobs. Rice production also sustains related economic activities, including transportation, supply and marketing.
“Rice is not just another commodity: it is an essential food for the Dominican people and the livelihood of thousands of farming and working families. Weakening domestic production to favor imports could have economic and social consequences extending far beyond the countryside. Food security is also a matter of national sovereignty,” Cabrera said.
The decision has also raised concerns among agricultural organizations, which are seeking clarity on the safeguards and competitiveness measures the government intends to introduce to protect domestic production.
The Dominican government has said it is pursuing diplomatic and commercial negotiations with international counterparts to renegotiate the terms while maintaining controls on rice imports.
The planned march comes as agricultural groups press the government for assurances that domestic rice producers will remain protected under any revised trade arrangements.
At least 11 people were wounded in a shooting near Florida A&M University in Tallahassee on October 24, including three who suffered serious injuries, police said. One victim is in critical condition.
RELATED: US Supreme Rejects Trump’s Bid to End Gender-Affirming Care for Trans Inmates
Tallahassee Police Chief Lawrence Revell said eight other victims were in stable condition. A university student was among those injured.
Preliminary information indicates that the shooting followed a dispute involving several people, according to authorities. Police believe the incident was isolated rather than a random attack targeting the university.
No arrests have been made, and the investigation remains ongoing. Local authorities have urged members of the public to provide information that could help identify those responsible.
At least 12 people were injured in a shooting near Florida A&M University’s Bragg Memorial Stadium in Tallahassee, Florida, local police and the university sayhttps://t.co/3ik4danrqj
— TRT World (@trtworld) October 25, 2026
The shooting also left a family member injured as people fled the scene. A grandmother of one of the victims was hurt while trying to escape, bringing the reported number of people injured in the incident to 12 when non-gunshot injuries are included.
Reports from local media indicated that six adults and six minors were among those affected, including an 11-year-old child. The reports did not clarify how those figures corresponded to the 11 people shot and the additional person injured while fleeing.
Florida A&M University, founded in 1887, is a historically Black institution based in Tallahassee. The shooting occurred near its facilities, although police have said preliminary findings do not indicate that the university itself was the target.
RT | October 24, 2026
The Pentagon has designated cultural programs linked to China’s Confucius Institute as a national security threat, according to US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. He claims that the centers, which largely offer Chinese language courses on American college and university campuses, serve as a front for Beijing’s “propaganda” campaign – an allegation Chinese officials have previously denied.
In a video posted on Facebook on Friday, Hegseth said that while the US Congress had previously “banned” the Confucius Institutes from American educational institutions, they “came back disguised in new forms” and under new names.
Hegseth was apparently referring to several measures passed by Congress in recent years that stripped universities that hosted Confucius Institutes of federal funding. The pressure from the lawmakers has led to the closure of multiple centers on US soil.
According to Hegseth, over the past two months, the Department of War has “systematically dismantled” 80 new Chinese-backed cultural centers across 30 universities, adding “these sleeper organizations to our list of institutions that threaten our national security.”
The official alleged that the targeted entities had sought to “steal intellectual property and to infiltrate the minds of American students,” but stopped short of providing any concrete evidence.
Back in 2020, the US Department of State designated Confucius Institutes as a “foreign mission of the People’s Republic of China,” requiring the institutions to regularly provide information regarding their Chinese personnel, recruitment, funding, and operations to the US government. The US Department of State characterized the China-funded cultural centers as “part of Beijing’s multifaceted propaganda efforts.”
Later that year, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo alleged that the centers were working to recruit “spies and collaborators” at US colleges, and expressed hope that “we will get them all closed out.”
China’s Foreign Ministry at the time accused Pompeo of deliberately undermining cultural and educational exchanges “by discrediting Confucius Institutes… [out of] ideological bias and political expediency.”
Beijing urged Washington to “abandon the Cold War zero-sum mentality… [and to] stop interfering with normal people-to-people and cultural exchanges.”
Confucius Institutes have similarly come under government pressure in several other Western countries in recent years.
Last year, Australian media reported that six local universities had shut down Beijing-backed cultural centers amid government scrutiny, reducing the number of such entities in the country by half.
In 2020, several media outlets, including The Times, claimed that Sweden had become the first European nation to close all Confucius Institutes and related classrooms.
Alla luce del recente ritiro delle forze statunitensi dal Paese (esito anche della sciagurata aggressione all’Iran) si rende necessario ripercorrere storia e geopolitica dell’Iraq per meglio comprendere quelle che saranno le future direttrici di quello che per demografia, posizione e ricchezza (in termini di risorse naturali) si presenta come un sicuro protagonista nel futuro della regione.
La Safawiyya, fondata dal poeta mistico Safi al-Din (1252-1334), nacque inizialmente come confraternita sufi. Fu nel corso dei due secoli successivi che quest’ordine religioso-guerriero sviluppò una forte inclinazione politica ed abbracciò apertamente la dottrina sciita imamita. Quando l’allora settenne Isma’il ereditò la guida dell’ordine nel 1494, lo “Stato” costruito dai “montoni bianchi” turchi si era già quasi dissolto. A quel tempo, Isma’il non era considerato solo uno shaykh sufi, a lui venivano associati anche attributi semidivini che necessitavano l’obbedienza assoluta degli adepti (dopo tutto lo stesso dodicesimo Imam dello sciismo assunse tale carica, ed entrò nella fase di primo o minore occultamento, ghayba as-Sughra, quando era ancora un infante).
Ad ogni modo, questo movimento, dal carattere fortemente eterodosso (almeno inizialmente), poteva godere di un notevole seguito tra i membri di una violenta tribù turkmena: i Qizilbash (teste rosse), così chiamati a causa dei loro berretti rossi. Questi, grazie alla loro devozione fanatica e all’ardimento in battaglia, consentirono ai Safavidi, partendo dai territori dell’odierno Azerbaigian, di costruire una vera e propria entità territoriale a seguito della conquista di Tabriz (1501).
Proprio a Tabriz, Isma’il venne incoronato Shah e proclamò lo sciismo imamita come religione di Stato del suo Impero. Va da sé che, in quel periodo, la maggioranza della popolazione dell’Iran era ancora sunnita. Dunque, lo sciismo venne imposto in modo più o meno forzato. Nel 1508, inoltre, Isma’il inviò uno dei suoi uomini più fidati (Lala Husayn Beg Shamlu) a conquistare Baghdad. Per il neonato Impero safavide, infatti, il controllo diretto sui principali santuari sciiti iracheni (Najaf, Kerbala, Samarra e Kazim) si poneva come un’importante questione di prestigio e legittimazione politico-religiosa. Non solo, così facendo, i primi Safavidi diedero slancio anche ad una particolare interpretazione dello spazio geopolitico che segnerà lo sciismo nel corso dei secoli successivi: ovvero, un’idea di territorio non uniforme o delimitato da confini ma intrinsecamente legato a punti precisi corrispondenti a luoghi simbolo e centri sacri della tradizione religiosa (aspetto che verrà sottolineato a più riprese dai protagonisti della Rivoluzione islamica in Iran nel XX secolo e dai loro successori). É indubbio il fatto che l’Impero safavide avrebbe finito per dominare l’Iraq, ed il cuore stesso dell’Islam, per lungo tempo se non fosse stato per la contemporanea espansione dell’Impero ottomano a Occidente.
L’influenza safavide, di fatto, al principio del XVI secolo, aveva raggiunto l’Anatolia orientale e questa regione fu teatro di violente rivolte sciite contro il dominio ottomano. Il sultano Selim I, dal canto suo, reagì in modo brutale e la repressione dei moti rivoluzionari venne accompagnata da una massiccia invasione di parte del territorio occidentale della Persia. I due grandi imperi si fronteggiarono una prima volta nei territori dell’attuale Azerbaigian nel 1514, a Chaldiran. E, da quel momento in poi, l’Iraq divenne il terreno di confronto costante tra due entità geopolitiche la cui rivalità aveva anche una precisa connotazione religiosa (senza considerare le aspirazioni di entrambi i sovrani a rappresentare l’umma islamica nella sua interezza). Di conseguenza, i rapporti relativamente pacifici che si erano stabiliti tra sunniti e sciiti nel periodo precedente (sotto il dominio mongolo) mutarono di pari passo con il carattere settario sempre più marcato del conflitto ottomano-safavide. Un aspetto che segnerà l’intera storia dell’Iraq anche dopo il crollo dell’Impero ottomano e fino alla guerra Iran-Iraq degli anni ’80 del XX secolo.
All’epoca dell’inclusione dell’Iraq nell’Impero ottomano, questo si estendeva dall’attuale Ungheria allo Yemen e dall’Algeria all’Azerbaigian. L’Impero, inoltre, si presentava come un’immensa area commerciale che beneficiava di una tassazione contenuta e di vie di comunicazione relativamente sicure. Aleppo, una delle più ricche e popolose città dell’Impero, già da quel periodo riusciva a proiettare la sua influenza sull’Iraq, dove la comunità ebraica, grazie all’intraprendenza commerciale, crebbe e si arricchì notevolmente.
Questo merita l’apertura di una breve parentesi. Gli Ottomani, sulla base di una tradizione consolidata nel mondo islamico, riconobbero l’autonomia giuridica di un certo numero di comunità religiose monoteiste (millet). Queste beneficiarono in modo evidente del miglioramento della situazione economica (soprattutto gli armeni dell’Anatolia orientale, i greci di Costantinopoli e Smirne e gli ebrei di Salonicco, Aleppo e Baghdad). Un rabbino di Bassora, Jacob Gabbai, tra il 1775 ed il 1776, svolse un ruolo chiave nel reperire i fondi necessari a garantire lo sforzo bellico ottomano contro i Safavidi. Tale sforzo venne premiato dal Sultano ottomano che gli garantì l’esenzione dal pagamento delle tasse. Alla fine del medesimo secolo, un altro ebreo, Abdullah ibn Yusuf divenne uno dei più importanti consiglieri del governatore ottomano di Baghdad. E proprio a Baghdad, la comunità ebraica crebbe a tal punto da rappresentare circa il 20% della popolazione all’inizio del XIX secolo. Tale aumento era dovuto in parte anche alle migrazioni dai territori persiani, dove gli ebrei erano sottoposti a periodiche forme di persecuzione. Proprio agli inizi del XIX secolo, Heskel Gabbai, mercante ebreo di Baghdad, divenne uno degli uomini più ricchi dell’Iraq. La sua straordinaria abilità finanziaria venne premiata dal Sultano che lo nominò tesoriere ufficiale della Sublime Porta. Di non minore rilievo è stata l’evoluzione della comunità cristiana irachena. La Chiesa nestoriana, capace di diffondersi in tutta l’Asia centrale fino ai confini dell’attuale Cina, subì un colpo mortale quando gli eserciti di Tamerlano cancellarono totalmente la sua presenza ad est dell’Iraq. Nel 1551, l’abate nestoriano Yuhanna Sulaka si convertì al cattolicesimo e venne nominato dal Papa patriarca della Chiesa caldea dell’Iraq settentrionale. Questa nel corso dei tre secoli successivi si avvicinerà progressivamente a Roma, mentre i resti della Chiesa nestoriana divennero gli odierni cristiani assiri. Minore fortuna ebbero gli yazidi. La loro origine risale al X secolo ed alla resistenza tribale curda di fronte al califfato abbaside. Questa, in particolare, trovò espressione nell’esaltazione della figura del califfo omayyade Yazid ibn Mu’awiaya (figura comunque controversa ed odiata dalle correnti islamiche sciite) da cui deriva il nome della setta. La coesione del movimento fu rafforzata all’inizio del XII secolo dallo shaykh sufi ‘Adi ibn Musafir, discendente della dinastia omayyade. Nei secoli successivi, lo yazidismo si trasformò gradualmente in una religione indipendente: una combinazione sincretica tra elementi sufi e antiche tradizioni persiane. Erroneamente ritenuti adoratori del demonio, i seguaci di questo credo in epoca ottomana sono stati ripetutamente attaccati da altre tribù curde e dalle forze imperiali. Sopravvissuti nelle aree di Jabal Sinjar e Mosul, sono stati nuovamente presi di mira dal sedicente “Stato Islamico” dopo la sua ascesa nel 2014.
Tornando sul piano geopolitico, l’Iraq, in virtù della sua particolare posizione geografica, rivestiva una importanza decisiva per gli Ottomani che vi lasciarono in pianta stabile oltre 30.000 soldati. A ciò si aggiunga che la vicinanza della regione al Golfo Persico permise alla Sublime Porta di stanziare a Bassora una imponente flotta militare capace di contrastare inizialmente le mire espansionistiche portoghesi nell’area.
A partire dal 1514, anno della suddetta offensiva ottomana guidata dal Sultano Selim I contro l’Impero safavide, in questa regione si sono combattute almeno venticinque differenti guerre, con un picco della tensione a cavallo tra il XVI ed il XVIII secolo. Rispettivamente, ci sono stati sette differenti conflitti militari nel XVI secolo, nove nel XVII ed altri sette nel XVIII.
Inutile dire che i conflitti tra i due attori siano progressivamente diminuiti con il ridimensionamento del potere di entrambi gli imperi. Non sorprendentemente, nel XIX secolo, in concomitanza con la rapida penetrazione nell’area di Francia, Gran Bretagna e Russia, si conta un solo conflitto frontaliero tra i due.
Di fatto, gli attuali confini orientali dell’Iraq ed occidentali dell’Iran sono il prodotto di innumerevoli accordi e trattati internazionali spalmati su un arco di tempo che dal 1555 arriva fino al 1975. Il Trattato di Amasya, ad esempio, venne firmato nel 1555 tra lo Shah Tahmasb ed il sultano Solimano il Magnifico. In base a questo accordo, l’odierno Iraq passò quasi interamente sotto la sovranità ottomana. Al termine di una nuova fase di conflitto tra le due potenze, lo Shah Abbas il Grande riportò sotto il controllo safavide parte della regione mesopotamica. Questi, dopo aver preso Baghdad, sferrò un duro attacco contro la componente sunnita della popolazione ed ordinò la distruzione di due istituzioni simbolo della corrente maggioritaria dell’Islam: la moschee di Abu Hanifa e di al-Gaylani. Allo stesso tempo, è doveroso ricordare che importanti studiosi sciiti dell’epoca, tra cui spicca Sayyid Darraj (il guardiano del santuario di Kerbala), si opposero a simili azioni e difesero strenuamente i notabili sunniti presi di mira dall’autorità safavide.
Dopo l’avventura di Abbas il Grande, la Persia conobbe un nuovo periodo di decadenza che portò alla firma del Trattato di Qasr-e Shirin (1639). Con esso i Safavidi rinunciavano per sempre alla loro presenza nei territori iracheni che rimasero (tra alterne fortune) sotto dominio ottomano fino al termine della Prima Guerra Mondiale.
Il XVIII ed il XIX secolo furono caratterizzati da una crescita costante della presenza britannica nell’area. Londra era infatti intenzionata ad aprirsi un corridoio strategico via terra verso l’India e per il rifornimento della Compagnia delle Indie Orientali. La città di Bassora, sotto questo aspetto, divenne centrale per i piani geopolitici delle compagnie mercantili europee (non solo inglesi, ma anche olandesi e portoghesi). Nel XVIII secolo, gli Ottomani, alleati con alcune tribù sunnite afghane, mossero nuovamente guerra e conquistarono alcune città della Persia occidentale, mentre proprio gli Inglesi approfittarono della situazione per prendere possesso di alcune regioni a ridosso del Golfo Persico (isole comprese) e dell’Oceano Indiano a sud dell’Altopiano Iranico.
Con l’ascesa al potere di Nadir Shah e della dinastia afsharide (1736-1796), gli Ottomani, costretti sulla difensiva, cercarono di allearsi con i Britannici in chiave antipersiana. I ripetuti scontri tra Afsharidi e Ottomani portarono alla firma del Trattato di Gardan con il quale le parti riconoscevano, di fatto, i confini previsti dal precedente Trattato di Qasr-e Shirin.
Nel 1821, probabilmente su istigazione russa (Mosca era interessata ad uno scontro che indebolisse entrambe le parti per facilitare la sua penetrazione nel Caucaso), i due imperi entrarono nuovamente in conflitto. I Persiani, questa volta governati dalla nuova dinastia dei Qajar, riuscirono ad occupare alcune città dell’Anatolia orientale ma, successivamente, con il primo Trattato di Erzurum (mediato da Russia e Gran Bretagna) riconobbero nuovamente la linea di frontiera stabilita ai tempi di Nadir Shah.
Tutti questi Trattati avevano comunque il difetto di non delineare dei confini chiari tra le due entità geopolitiche. Essi, più generalmente, ne indicavano solo alcuni punti. Sulla base di questa incertezza, mentre i Persiani erano impegnati ad Herat in una sanguinosa battaglia contro le tribù afghane, gli Ottomani, sostenuti dagli inglesi, occuparono il fondamentale centro urbano di Khorramshahr, nell’area sud-occidentale dell’Altopiano. I Qajar reagirono organizzando una spedizione militare contro la Sublime Porta ma russi e inglesi convinsero lo Shah a desistere e ad intavolare nuove trattative che portarono al secondo Trattato di Erzurum (1847). Questo Trattato, per la prima volta nella storia, indicava in modo preciso quello che sarebbe dovuto essere il confine tra lo Stato dei Qajar e l’Impero Ottomano. In particolare, stabiliva che: “il governo persiano accetta che i territori a ovest di Zahab appartengono al governo ottomano, così come quest’ultimo riconosce la sovranità persiana sui territori a est di Zahab e della valle di Karand. Il governo persiano rinuncia a qualsiasi pretesa per quello che riguarda la città e la provincia di Suleimanyah, non interferendo negli affari della medesima, così come il governo ottomano riconosce la sovranità persiana sulle città a ovest del fiume Arvand (Shatt al-Arab) e riconosce la sovranità persiana su Khorramshahr e Abadan. Inoltre, le navi persiane sono libere di navigare nel fiume Arvand, dal punto in cui il corso d’acqua sfocia nel mare sino al punto in cui è stabilito il confine tra le parti”.
Proprio attorno a questo corso d’acqua strategico (il fiume Arvand o Shatt al-Arab) si concentreranno le rivendicazioni reciproche che portarono al conflitto tra l’Iraq ba’athista e la neonata Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran.
Un nuovo accordo venne preso nel 1935 a seguito di un rinnovato periodo di tensione questa volta tra l’Iraq sottoposto a mandato britannico e la Persia di Reza Khan. Già in quel periodo, ad onor del vero, si palesò la volontà irachena di occupare alcune città del Khuzestan. Tuttavia, Reza Khan, forse spinto degli inglesi e dando ulteriore prova di uno spirito non esattamente patriottico (nonostante alcuni iniziali slanci nazionalistici), diede all’Iraq ampie concessioni sulla navigazione nel corso d’acqua, arrivando addirittura a rinunciare alla navigazione iraniana in alcune aree.
La situazione si complicò ulteriormente quando nel 1958, a seguito del colpo di Stato militare di Kassem in Iraq ed all’uscita di questo dal Patto di Baghdad, le controversie assunsero una dimensione “globale” andando a legarsi allo scontro tra Stati Uniti ed Unione Sovietica. Ad esse si aggiunse la componente ideologica panarabista che vedeva le regioni arabofone dell’Iran come parte integrante della “Grande Patria Araba”. Non a caso, Saddam Hussein, successivamente, definì la guerra contro l’Iran del 1980 come una nuova “Qadisiyya”. Ma questi aspetti verranno analizzati nel dettaglio in seguito.
Superata l’epoca mamelucca (durante la quale l’Iraq poté godere di un discreto grado di autonomia), come in altre regioni del Vicino Oriente, due forze principali influenzarono l’area nel corso del XIX secolo: il crescente potere e le spinte centralizzatrici del governo ottomano da un lato (riforme comprese); la progressiva integrazione di questo spazio in un’economia mondiale dominata in larga parte dall’Europa. Ad onor del vero, già sotto l’ultimo sovrano mamelucco, il pio e stimato studioso Dawud Pascià, tali tendenze (che contraddistingueranno gran parte della storia moderna e contemporanea dell’Iraq) si erano già manifestate attraverso lo sviluppo di un efficiente potere centrale statale e l’espansione dell’influenza economica britannica.
Allo stesso tempo, è opportuno ricordare che i tentativi dell’Impero ottomano di riaffermare il proprio controllo assoluto sull’Iraq incontrarono non poche resistenze. Diverse ribellioni (forse sostenute dalla Persia) scoppiarono sia a Baghdad che nei principali centri sciiti (Najaf e Kerbala, in primo luogo). Proprio a Kerbala, la (ri)conquista della città da parte ottomana avvenne ad un prezzo assai alto in termini di vite umane. I santuari sciiti vennero ancora una volta profanati e le autorità giuridiche sciite vennero spazzate vie. In entrambe le città, inoltre, il potere centrale nominò dei governatori sunniti che non risparmiarono ulteriori persecuzioni per la componente sciita della popolazione. Questa, in larga parte, fu costretta a nascondere la propria fede applicando alla lettera il principio della taqiyya (dissimulazione) che prevede la liceità di nascondere o rinnegare (esteriormente) il credo religioso in modo da sfuggire a persecuzioni o pericoli imminenti.
Tra il 1839 ed il 1876, una serie di riforme, note collettivamente come tanzimat (riorganizzazioni), fu varata dalla Sublime Porta. L’obiettivo era quello di modernizzare gli apparati burocratici dell’Impero. Tuttavia, il primo (e forse unico) reale beneficiario delle riforme fu l’esercito. Scrive lo storico Malcolm Yapp: “Fu necessario reperire il denaro per pagare l’esercito mediante l’imposizione fiscale e i prestiti. Fu quindi necessario disporre di un’amministrazione più ampia ed efficiente per mobilitare le risorse dell’Impero. La riforma educativa si rese indispensabile per produrre i funzionari e i burocrati necessari”.
In questa riforma educativa era compresa l’apertura ad alcune scuole missionarie europee che impartivano un insegnamento più articolato rispetto all’educazione religiosa delle tradizionali madrasa. Tra queste scuole “moderne” spiccava indubbiamente quella fondata a Baghdad nel 1865 dall’Alliance Israelite Universelle, il cui reale obiettivo era quello di preparare la popolazione ebraica irachena al discorso sionista che, nella seconda metà del XIX secolo, stava iniziando a conoscere una discreta diffusione nell’Europa occidentale (tra Francia e Gran Bretagna).
Ma la penetrazione “occidentale” (e britannica in particolar modo) si fece sentire soprattutto in ambito economico. Prima dell’apertura del canale di Suez e della scoperta del petrolio nella Persia meridionale, gli interessi britannici in Iraq erano collegati essenzialmente alle comunicazioni con l’India (la corrispondenza per il Subcontinente percorreva la pista che da Aleppo arriva a Bassora e, da qui, veniva imbarcata per l’India). Le compagnie inglesi, di fatto, si spesero che creare servizi di navigazione regolari lungo il Tigri e l’Eufrate. Negli anni ’30 del XIX secolo, ad esempio, vide la luce la Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company; mentre nel 1862 venne istituito un collegamento navale tra Bassora e Bombay e, successivamente, un collegamento telegrafico diretto. Così che, negli ultimi anni di dominio ottomano, l’Iraq era già largamente dipendente dalla Gran Bretagna, nonostante i tentativi controegemonici tedesco-ottomani che arrivarono al culmine con il progetto ferroviario Berlino-Baghdad. Infrastruttura strategica dall’alto valore geopolitico che prevedeva, tra le altre cose, i diritti di sfruttamento minerario lungo il percorso della stessa linea ferroviaria.
Come reazione all’influenza che la Germania stava cercando di esercitare sull’area, Londra, nel 1899, concluse un accordo con lo sceicco Mubarak al-Sabah del Kuwait, col quale il piccolo principato avrebbe ricevuto assistenza e protezione militare in cambio del totale controllo britannico sulla sua politica estera.
La comunità che riuscì a trarre maggiore vantaggio dall’apertura economica verso l’Europa fu indubbiamente quella ebraica. Quella sciita, invece, si chiuse in se stessa nonostante fosse già maggioranza relativa in diversi distretti (Baghdad compresa). Non solo, a questo periodo risale la pratica dei sapienti sciiti (mujtahid) di rimettersi, in materie teologiche, giuridiche e politiche, al parere di quello che veniva considerato come il più dotto tra loro: il Marja’ al-Taqlid (fonte di imitazione). Altra pratica che segnerà in modo determinante il futuro della regione.
Gli slanci ottomanisti prima e quelli turco-nazionalisti a partire dai primi anni del XX secolo (e dovuti alla crescente influenza dei Giovani Turchi ed al ruolo del Comitato Unità e Progresso nella “rivoluzione” del 1908) diedero spazio alla contro-affermazione di uno spirito nazionalista arabo che si opponeva alla “turchificazione culturale”. Diverse associazioni segrete vennero create in questi anni. La più importante di queste era al-‘Ahd (la società del patto) che invocava la piena indipendenza delle province arabe dell’Impero ottomano. Il suo fondatore era un egiziano, ma al suo interno ebbero un ruolo di primo piano diverse figure che saranno protagoniste della politica irachena e cavallo tra le due guerre mondiali e dopo, come Nuri al-Sa’id, Yasin al-Hashimi e Jafar al-‘Askari.
Già prima dell’ingresso nel primo conflitto mondiale dell’Impero ottomano, i Britannici stavano preparando un’invasione dell’Iraq meridionale partendo dall’India e dalla Persia. Gli interessi economici e strategici di Londra nell’area erano infatti notevoli e crescenti in quanto legati a doppio filo con la trasformazione (dal carbone al petrolio) della fonte combustibile della Royal Navy. Così, un giorno dopo la formale dichiarazione di guerra, le forze di Sua Maestà sbarcarono in prossimità di Bassora. Tuttavia, la conquista dell’Iraq si dimostrò tutt’altro che un’impresa facile. Nei primi mesi del 1916, la forza di spedizione britannica del generale Townshend, sotto assedio da cinque mesi nei pressi di Kut al-‘Amara, fu addirittura costretta alla resa. Solo nel 1917, una nuova offensiva porto all’occupazione di Baghdad e giunse a sud di Mosul. Un’area, quest’ultima, che per tutto il corso della guerra subì i contraccolpi dello scontro che infuriava nell’Anatolia orientale. Qui, tanto i Russi quanto i Britannici non smisero mai di incoraggiare i cristiani armeni e assiri alla ribellione contro il potere ottomano, salvo poi lasciarli soli nel momento reale della resa dei conti (una pratica che successivamente verrà fatta propria, e su larga scala, dagli Stati Uniti).
Al contempo, i Britannici sostennero la ribellione araba guidata dagli Hashemiti meccani. All’interno delle loro forze erano presenti un cospicuo numero di ufficiali iracheni membri della suddetta società al-‘Ahd. La ribellione riuscì a distrarre le forze ottomane da altri fronti e nel 1918 portò Faysal, figlio dello sceriffo della Mecca Husayn, a Damasco. Qui, le sue speranze di dare vita ad un grande regno arabo indipendente si scontrarono con la realtà degli accordi segreti Sykes-Picot con i quali Francia e Gran Bretagna avevano deciso di spartirsi il Vicino Oriente assai prima della fine della guerra.
In linea generale, la prima risposta irachena all’invasione britannica fu di sostanziale neutralità. Tuttavia, questa si trasformò in resistenza attiva quando divenne evidente che l’occupazione militare non era affatto temporanea. Le reazioni variarono a seconda della regione. I Curdi, ad esempio, videro (almeno inizialmente) nei Britannici dei liberatori che avrebbero garantito loro uno Stato indipendente. Gli sciiti, invece, si opposero da subito alla presenza britannica e molti mujtahid arrivano a proclamare il gihad contro gli invasori.
La politica di Londra in Iraq – il cui controllo era fondamentale per lo sfruttamento e commercio petrolifero – assunse da subito due tendenze distinte: la “scuola orientale” rappresentata da Sir Arnold Wilson (il commissario civile del Paese) mirava ad estendere all’Iraq le stesse politiche attuate in India; la “scuola occidentale” dell’Arab Bureau del Cairo, invece, sosteneva la tutela degli interessi britannici attraverso un controllo indiretto e meno pervasivo.
La prima ebbe inizialmente la meglio anche sulla base dell’idea che un simile approccio, oltre a garantire gli interessi britannici, avrebbe diffuso la civiltà tra i barbari popoli asiatici. Un approccio che venne in qualche modo riconosciuto anche dalla Società delle Nazioni a seguito della Conferenza di San Remo del 1920 con il quale si stabilì la politica mandataria occidentale. Questa veniva giustificata così: “Alcune comunità che appartenevano prima all’Impero turco hanno raggiunto un grado di sviluppo tale che la loro esistenza come nazioni indipendenti può essere provvisoriamente riconosciuta, salvo il consiglio e l’assistenza amministrativa di una Potenza mandataria, finché non saranno in grado di reggersi da sé. I desideri di queste comunità dovranno essere principalmente tenuti in conto dalla Potenza mandataria”.
Nel momento in cui gli esiti di San Remo vennero resi noti, l’Iraq era sull’orlo di un’insurrezione su vasta scala. Nel 1920, inoltre, l’esercito arabo venne sconfitto in prossimità di Damasco dai Francesi (titolari del mandato sulla Siria). Con il risultato che molti iracheni smobilitati finirono per ingrossare le fila della ribellione anti-britannica in Patria. Il centro della “Grande Rivolta” del 1920 fu ancora volta Kerbala. Da qui, l’ayatollah Shirazi continuò imperterrito ad esortare i musulmani alla guerra contro l’occupante. Questo, messo alle strette da un movimento che stava assumendo proporzioni di massa e che avrebbe potuto “contagiare” altre aree del Vicino Oriente, rispose con una brutale repressione in cui la Royal Air Force non risparmiò l’utilizzo di armi chimiche (gas iprite) contro le milizie ribelli.
Nonostante la sconfitta dei ribelli, i Britannici optarono per un cambio di rotta della politica irachena. Il nuovo Alto Commissario Percy Cox rovesciò la politica del predecessore e optò, in comunione di intenti con il Ministero delle Colonie, per l’indirect rule: ovvero, la creazione di un governo iracheno indipendente (affidato al notabile sunnita Abdul Rahman al-Gaylani) sotto stretta supervisione britannica. Mentre a Faysal venne offerta la corona di una neonata istituzione monarchica irachena totalmente asservita a Londra, visto che questi, originario dell’Hijaz, in alcun modo poteva godere di solidi legami con le tribù locali. Un’operazione nuovamente denunciata dalla componente sciita della popolazione che, per l’ennesima volta, venne messa a tacere dalle forze di occupazione.
Nonostante ciò, Faysal insistette per fare in modo che le relazioni tra Gran Bretagna ed Iraq venissero impostate in conformità ad un vero e proprio trattato. Questo venne stipulato nel 1922 e incorporava nei suoi termini tutti quelli del mandato, sebbene nella forma di un supposto accordo bilaterale. La Gran Bretagna amministrava direttamente la difesa e la sicurezza interna del Paese e tutti gli altri ministeri dovevano accettare la presenza di consiglieri e ispettori britannici con diritto di veto su qualsiasi questione di rilievo. Il governo iracheno, con poteri estremamente ridotti, era inoltre tenuto a pagare metà delle spese per i funzionari britannici presenti in loco.
Un nuovo trattato anglo-iracheno venne firmato nel 1930, sotto l’attenta supervisione del Primo Ministro Nuri al-Sa’id (già citato in riferimento alla società segreta al-Ahd e figura centrale nella storia dell’Iraq monarchico). Questo doveva rimanere in vigore per venticinque anni e prevedeva l’indipendenza formale dell’Iraq due anni dopo la sua ratifica. Tuttavia, includeva contemporaneamente la solidificazione di un rapporto ineguale con la Gran Bretagna e la tutela del ruolo dominante della stessa nel Paese. Tutte le più importanti decisioni di politica estera, infatti, prevedevano il veto britannico. E sempre Londra manteneva il monopolio sull’addestramento ed equipaggiamento dell’esercito iracheno, così come il diritto di utilizzare il territorio del Paese in caso di guerra (con la RAF che manteneva il controllo diretto sulle basi di Habaniyya, vicino a Baghdad, e di Shu’ayba, nei pressi di Bassora).
Tra i primi provvedimenti del governo “indipendente” vi fu un ulteriore rafforzamento dell’esercito, perché, come ebbe modo di sottolineare proprio Nuri al-Sa’id, era impensabile che in uno Stato moderno le tribù avessero più armi delle forze di difesa e sicurezza. La manovra, però, finì per ritorcersi contro la monarchia e la presenza britannica. L’esercito, infatti, si presentava come una forza nazional-patriottica al cui intero iniziò a diffondersi l’idea che la Gran Bretagna fosse una forza retriva che sosteneva una ristretta ed altrettanto retrograda élite politica che impediva qualsiasi tipo di sviluppo reale del Paese, mantenendolo in una condizione di debolezza e arretratezza. Soprattutto gli sciiti non vedevano alcuna possibilità di elevazione sociale visto che i britannici consentivano l’accesso a posizioni di potere solo ai sunniti.
Strategic Culture Foundation | October 23, 2026
Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.
If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.
Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.
Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.
Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.
But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.
Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.
The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.
Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.
Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.
The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.
Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.
On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.
Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?
As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.
What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.
In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.
When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.
The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.
Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.
One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.
The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.
For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.
By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.
Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.
There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.
So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.
By Patrick LAWRENCE | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 24, 2026
Given the gush of vitriol and condemnation since Oct. 9, when Donald Trump announced his deal to import 5 million metric tons of Russian diesel, roughly 37 million barrels, one would think the president had surrendered the United States’ sovereignty to the Kremlin, or handed over the Ukrainians to the Russian army, or rankly betrayed the Europeans or altogether renounced what we picturesquely call Western civilization.
This is, indeed, what we read daily in the corporate press these days and what we are supposed to think. It is 2016 redux, it seems. Another round of Russiagate may not be far off, given 16 House Democrats have introduced a Prohibit Corrupt Russia Oil Deals Act and 12 senators now attack the diesel accord as “a gift to our adversary.”
If there is one thing essential to recall about those dreary years it is that the wobbly-from-the-first Russiagate edifice, the whole of it, was made of mis– and disinformation, hyperbole, innuendo, extravagant abuses of office and propaganda incessantly disseminated in corporate media.
It was, in short, the Deep State’s attempt to scuttle any effort to advance beyond the poisonous Russophobia it had spent a decade cultivating (taking my date from Vladimir Putin’s era-defining speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007).
It is the same again as Trump tries once more to end the war in Ukraine and refashion East–West relations, a project the old “MICIMATT”— the military-industrial, congressional, intelligence, media, academic and think tank blob — simply cannot abide.
Let us listen to this new round of rubbish with the recent past in mind.
“Donald Trump, meet Neville Chamberlain.” That is Tom Friedman, writing in The New York Times last week under the headline, “Trump’s Democracy–for–Diesel Deal Shames Us All.”
“When future students search online for ‘sellout,’ ‘appeaser’ or ‘traitor to his country’s core values,’” Friedman elaborates, “their two pictures will come up first, side by side.” There is no matching our Tom when it comes to overdrawn historical reference dressed up as intellectual gravitas.
Harold Meyerson, writing in The American Prospect Tuesday under the headline, “Why Putin Is Now Our Ally,” is unhappy that Americans are not angrier and more contemptuous than they appear to be in response to Trump’s latest démarche to Russia.
“We’ve grown so inured to Trump’s outrages,” he writes, “that his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime hasn’t yet stoked the level of horror and rage it deserves.”
Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime. We’re back to this, are we?
We’re also back to the good old Trump–Putin “bromance” bit, it seems, as in “Trump’s man-crush on the Russian dictator has been well documented and need not be recounted in all its unctuous detail.”
This bizarre suggestion of homophilia repeats a tiresome trope from the Russiagate years — never in the slightest documented, for the record — and this time comes from Tom Nichols, a neoliberal hack of long standing. Writing Oct. 18 in The Atlantic, Nichols wants us to see matters this way:
“Donald Trump has now abandoned pretense and is openly aiding the Kremlin in its war against a friend and partner of the U.S. The American commander in chief has abandoned the Western order, the most successful — and powerful — security arrangement in human history.”
Are we clear on all this? The corrupt, Nazi-infested regime in Kiev is America’s friend and partner, simple as that.
The Western order as we have it is the finest thing humanity has ever managed, and Donald J. Trump has forsaken this finest-ever order.
All because the Trumpster signed an agreement whereby the United States will purchase, all in, about two weeks’ worth of Russian diesel fuel.
Paranoia strikes deep, as should be plain to all as the imperium proceeds into its self-inflicted decline. Into the pages of The Atlantic it will creep whenever the topic is “Putin’s Russia” (as against “Russia”).
Trump’s ‘Simple’ Decision
How to account for this outpouring of nitwittery from all these pseuds? Why so suddenly does the world seem to be coming to an end? These are our questions.
Trump II has proven disastrously worse than Trump I, to state the obvious. He had a few good ideas the first time around: end the wars of adventure, bring the soldiers home, decommission NATO, a new détente with Moscow.
This time — and you have to credit the Trumpster for this, strange as it is to credit him with anything — he has only one. He still wants to restore relations with Russia to a working order of some kind, and this must begin with ending the war the Biden regime provoked very quickly after Trump was voted out of office.
Trump is a Manhattan property man for whom everything is transactional, we have to remember. Exploring “deals” does not figure at the higher end of statecraft — certainly not given all that is at issue between Russia and the West — but this is a question of method, not purpose. Let us not get lost in the former while losing sight of the latter.
Peaceful, constructive relations with Russia, based on an enduring settlement of benefit to all sides, are a good thing altogether to be welcomed, however often Americans and West Europeans are told any such eventuality would amount to the horror of horrors.
As everyone thinking about this has remarked, Trump’s immediate intent in striking his diesel deal is to get prices down as best he can before the midterm elections and to pretend the price crisis has causes other than the U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran.
I’m for setting the politics aside. A few days’ worth of diesel — all that can possibly arrive from Russian refineries before Nov. 3 — won’t make any difference, and Trump cannot but know this.
My mind goes to a remark Trump made on Truth Social, his digital bullhorn, at the beginning of this week in response to all the shrieking and shouting that followed his Oct. 9 announcement:
“My decision on Russia is a very simple one. I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don’t want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”
It is important to read this together with other things the Trump regime has got up to lately. While the United States is in plausible-denial mode, Kiev reports that it has disrupted some of the early-warning satellite intelligence vital to Ukraine’s defenses.
Elon Musk, apparently after consultation with the White House, has restricted Ukraine’s use of Starshield, the military-grade version of the Starlink communications system.
These are day-to-day lifelines. So is the Prioritized Ukraine Requirement List, the arrangement whereby the United States sells arms to the Europeans, who send them on to Ukraine. To date the volume of shipments through the P.U.R.L. channel has come to $7 billion. Trump is reportedly threatening to end the program.
Atop all this he has suspended implementation of a sanctions bill he signed into law only a month ago. Concurrently, the Witkoff–Kushner duo presented Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian dictator, with a new settlement proposal that reads to me like a condensed version of the very creditable 28–point plan they presented a year ago next month.
Something is afoot, it seems to me. I see a thought-through strategy in all this. I see renewed determination on Trump’s part.
Trump is out of the closet at last — and perfectly accurate — as he asserts that Zelensky is the principal impediment to a settlement accord and, so, should be either removed from office or forced to accept defeat and recognize Russia’s legitimate interests.
Trump’s new push to bring the Ukraine crisis to a close, to be clear on this point, is not a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. It is just the opposite.
There are a lot of reasons to question how far Trump will get either in ending the war or restoring relations with Russia to a livable détente. But if he maintains the present momentum, we may be watching the beginning of the endgame in Ukraine.
This is a “may,” conditional verb required. But it is this prospect that has all the warmongers in the MICIMATT complex in a dither.
Strange it will be if a president so wrong about so much manages to achieve the peace he is after. But maybe the Tom Friedmans and the Tom Nichols and the rest of their kind are useful as a mirror.
Maybe the extent of their panic is a measure of the Trumpster’s chances of success this time around.
RT | October 24, 2026
Billionaire Elon Musk has accused US politicians of putting Kiev’s interests ahead of their own country’s, alleging that American taxpayer money sent to Ukraine is being laundered back into political campaigns.
Writing on X on Friday, the SpaceX founder suggested that financial interests could explain why some American lawmakers remain staunch supporters of Kiev in its conflict with Russia.
“Some of that US taxpayer money comes back through multiple laundry machines to fund political campaigns in America, which is why you see some politicians caring more about Ukraine than America!” Musk wrote, without identifying the beneficiaries.
In March, US outlet Just the News cited a declassified intelligence summary describing a plan to divert hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid earmarked for clean-energy projects in Ukraine into then-President Joe Biden’s 2024 reelection campaign.
Trump shared the report on Truth Social, while then-US intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard reportedly asked officials at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to investigate whether the alleged scheme had been carried out.
Musk also accused Ukrainian elites of profiting from Western assistance while ordinary Ukrainians bear the human cost.
“The former have grown very rich off the hundreds of billions flowing to Ukraine, while the latter’s children are conscripted to die in trenches,” he wrote.
Kiev’s increasingly coercive mobilization campaign has been marked by numerous documented cases of forced detentions and violent confrontations involving recruitment officers. Corruption investigations have also exposed schemes allowing wealthier Ukrainians to evade military service.
Ukraine has been rocked by major corruption scandals involving figures close to Vladimir Zelensky. One centered on his longtime associate Timur Mindich and an alleged $100 million bribery and money-laundering operation at state nuclear energy company Energoatom. The scandal forced senior officials from office, including former presidential chief of staff Andrey Yermak, while Mindich fled Ukraine.
Ukrainian investigators have also uncovered what they say is fraud to the tune of $5.6 million involving military drones purchased at prices up to 90% above market rates.
Even Kiev’s staunchest European backers have criticized its failure to deliver promised anti-corruption reforms, warning that billions of euros in assistance could be withheld.
Zelensky is seeking at least €70 billion ($81 billion) in additional foreign assistance for 2027, estimating Ukraine’s total conflict-related spending needs for next year at €155 billion.
European Council President Antonio Costa said on Friday that the EU expects to cover roughly two-thirds of the additional funding, or around €46.7 billion, with a decision potentially coming in November. That sum would come on top of the €45 billion already earmarked for Kiev next year.
By Lewis Kamb | U.S. Right to Know | October 15, 2026
On a Sunday morning in October 2019, the chief of the virus ecology unit at the National Institutes of Health’s Rocky Mountain Laboratories emailed a postdoctoral scientist in his lab with an idea.
Vincent Munster and his postdoc, Michael Letko, had spent that year building a system to rapidly test whether dozens of SARS-related bat coronaviruses could infect human cells.
That week, Munster read a new preprint from prominent virologists Vineet Menachery and Ralph Baric’s lab groups showing that the protease trypsin could unlock entry for certain coronaviruses that otherwise would not infect human cells.
Letko had forwarded him the paper two days earlier with the note, “Seems like more groups will be converging on this idea soon.”
“You should be able to make S with a more broader cleavage signature (like furin-like) to enhance infectivity,” Munster wrote back on Oct. 6, 2019. “You can include a motif like this R-X-[K/R]-R↓ Might be cool to get some synthesized.”
In virology parlance, “S” is the coronavirus spike protein, which allows the virus to latch onto the cells it infects, and R-X-[K/R]-R is a furin cleavage site motif, which can make viruses better able to infect cells and spread.
Munster was suggesting that his postdoc engineer a furin site into a coronavirus spike protein to make it more infectious.
Eleven weeks later, a coronavirus carrying a similar furin cleavage site emerged in Wuhan, China, spawning the COVID-19 pandemic. It remains the only known sarbecovirus, the SARS-related group of coronaviruses that Munster and Letko were then screening, to have one.
The email exchange has never been made public before. It appears in a 270-page batch of records recently released by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to U.S. Right to Know in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act.
The request sought specific correspondence from Munster’s lab in Hamilton, Montana, from March 2019 through Jan. 22, 2020, the date when his group published one of the first papers showing that the new coronavirus used a human cell receptor called ACE2 as a doorway into cells.
Two new threads run through the records: Weeks before the pandemic began, a senior NIH virologist proposed in writing to build into a SARS-like spike protein the feature that would become the central argument for COVID-19’s laboratory origin: a furin cleavage site.
And, through the same year, his lab was asking virus hunters for unpublished bat coronavirus spike sequences, and getting them, including from researchers in the U.S.-funded consortium called PREDICT, whose New York-based lead partner, EcoHealth Alliance, had a long-standing collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) to collect and study SARS-related viruses.
Each goes to a different key point in the origins debate. The furin cleavage site is the single genetic feature most cited in the arguments that SARS-CoV-2 did not arise entirely in nature.
Unpublished sequences are the other: because the pandemic virus matches nothing in the published scientific literature, most laboratory-origin scenarios depend on some lab having held a virus the rest of the world had never seen.
Nothing in the records shows that Letko followed through on Munster’s suggestion to insert a furin cleavage site in a SARS spike protein, however. In fact, the furin cleavage site found in SARS-CoV-2 differs from the motif, or short sequence of amino acids, that Munster suggested.
Nor do the documents indicate that Rocky Mountain Labs possessed SARS-CoV-2 or a close relative, or that either Munster or Letko directly communicated with researchers in Wuhan while working on their project.
Their research also used synthetic gene fragments, not live viruses, employing particles that cannot replicate or spread. Such work generally poses lower biosafety risks.
The two then-unpublished bat virus spike sequences obtained from PREDICT, one from Malaysia and one from Uganda and Rwanda, are also too distantly related to SARS-CoV-2 to have given rise to it.
Letko, who is now an associate professor at Washington State University, declined to comment for this story, saying in an email “(y)ou will write what you write, regardless of the truth or what I have to say.”
Munster did not respond to requests for comment. He was indicted earlier this year for bringing mpox specimens into the U.S. without proper documentation and giving false statements to law enforcement officials as part of unrelated NIH research. He has pleaded not guilty.
The NIH press office also declined to answer questions about why the agency had not previously told the public that its scientists had solicited and obtained unpublished SARS-like coronavirus spike sequences, or proposed inserting a furin cleavage site into a SARS-like spike, before the pandemic.
Converging on the idea
Munster’s suggestion to add a furin cleavage site is the second known instance of scientists proposing to insert this distinguishing feature into a SARS or SARS-like spike within roughly two years before COVID-19 emerged.
In 2018, EcoHealth Alliance, Baric’s lab and researchers at the WIV had proposed the same kind of modification to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in work that would have used live, replicating viruses. Their application, known as the DEFUSE proposal, was denied.
The concept is notable because the furin cleavage site that helped the virus cause the pandemic has become central to the debate over the pandemic’s origins.
Some proponents of a laboratory origin view DEFUSE as a blueprint for creating SARS-CoV-2, while prominent supporters of a natural origin have argued that deliberately engineering such a feature would have been unlikely and unnecessarily cumbersome. Munster’s email gives the lab-origin supporters another example of such a furin site proposal.
The revelation about Munster’s lab seeking unpublished sequences speaks to a different issue in the COVID-19 origins debate.
Because SARS-CoV-2 descends from no virus previously described in the scientific literature, any scenario in which it was engineered requires assuming that some laboratory held SARS-related sequences that had never been made public.
In a 2021 review of SARS-CoV-2 in Cell by 21 scientists called that implausible. “There is no rational experimental reason why a new genetic system would be developed using an unknown and unpublished virus,” they wrote.
But the records show a U.S. government laboratory doing just that two years earlier.
Letko’s platform was a new genetic system, and he sought unpublished sequences precisely because they were unpublished. Sharing them, he wrote in April 2019, “will surely increase the impact of our story by providing a proof of principle with unpublished sequences.”
Researchers in the U.S.-funded virus hunting program supplied two within eight weeks. One of the researchers, Simon Anthony, was also an author of the Cell review.
Alina Chan, a molecular biologist who has advocated for a thorough investigation of laboratory origin scenarios, recently reviewed the Munster-Letko email records at the request of U.S. Right To Know.
“What this shows is that different groups of virologists were converging on the idea of inserting cleavage sites in the spikes of potentially dangerous coronaviruses,” she said.
“Assuming a lab origin of COVID-19, if a lab in Wuhan hadn’t caused the pandemic, it’s plausible that a lab in the U.S. would’ve eventually followed the same path.”
Soliciting sequences
Munster’s emailed proposal didn’t come out of the blue. He and Letko were in the middle of a yearlong research project that the newly released records document from its start.
Seven months earlier, in March 2019, Munster and Letko set out to answer a question: of the hundreds of SARS-related coronaviruses in research databases worldwide, which ones could infect people?
Letko built a workaround that he and Munster described as a “rapid and scalable platform,” according to the records.
Rather than build each virus individually, they took only the receptor-binding domain — the fragment of the spike that grips onto the host cell’s receptor — and spliced it into a SARS-CoV spike backbone.
They then loaded these chimeric spikes onto harmless reporter particles and used them to infect cells expressing hACE2, the receptor SARS-CoV uses to enter the human airway.
A glow from the bioluminescent enzyme luciferase indicated successful cell entry. With Letko’s method, what typically had taken months to test now took about three weeks.
The limiting ingredient to test their method was the spike sequences. Letko had exhausted the SARS-like sequences already published. So, he and Munster started looking for others that hadn’t been, the records show.
On March 8, 2019, Munster emailed EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak, Vice President Kevin Olival and Columbia University virologist Simon Anthony, attaching a confidential abstract with a chart and figures illustrating their project.
“While we have now tested all of the variation(sic) currently published for lineage B beta-coronaviruses for their ability to enter primate cells, we are seeking additional, unpublished lineage B beta coronavirus sequences to test in our platform,” Munster wrote.
He asked them not to circulate the attachment, because the work was “still unpublished and quite competitive.”
Of the three recipients, only Anthony, then one of the core leaders on PREDICT, appears in the released correspondence. He replied later that evening: “Hey! Looks super cool.”
Two months of negotiation followed, the emails show. On April 5, Letko thanked Anthony “for agreeing to share betacoronavirus lineage B spike sequences with us,” adding that unpublished material “will surely increase the impact of our story.”
On May 2, Anthony reported back from a PREDICT meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia. His team had detected “around 5 or 6 novel 2b viruses,” he wrote, but had “only managed to get spikes for 2 of them so far.”
Because neither had been published, Letko’s paper “would be the first report of these viruses in the literature,” so long as he credited PREDICT and its partners as co-authors, Anthony said.
Letko agreed. Two days later, Anthony sent the sequences. He identified them as PREDICT_CoV-51, isolate PDF-0663, from Malaysia (which Anthony described as “SUPER divergent. Could be really interesting,”) and PREDICT_CoV-43, from Uganda and Rwanda.
“Absolutely stellar!” Munster replied. “Will keep you posted on the results!”
Anthony was generally correct. A small fragment of the Malaysian virus had been deposited in GenBank, the NIH’s public sequence database, in 2016, and referenced the following year in a survey paper Anthony co-authored with Daszak and others. But neither its full spike sequence nor its complete genome was public.
Nothing at all was public about the African virus. In neither case could anyone outside PREDICT obtain the spike sequence, the part that determines whether a virus can enter human cells and the only part Letko’s platform could use.
A step further
Five months later, after reading the new preprint about trypsin, Munster proposed taking Letko’s project a step further.
For a coronavirus to infect a host cell, binding the receptor is only the first step. The spike must then be cut open by one of the host’s own enzymes before the virus can fuse with the cell and get inside. These enzymes that cut protein apart are called proteases, and each one targets different spots.
The protease a spike is built for largely determines what tissues it can infect. SARS-CoV depends on proteases that are not available everywhere in the body. Furin, however, is expressed in the cells of most tissues.
The Menachery-Baric preprint that sparked Munster’s idea had shown that adding trypsin from the outside could unlock entry into human cells for coronaviruses that otherwise couldn’t infect them.
Trypsin is a far less selective protease, cutting a protein after common amino acids rather than requiring a particular short sequence, or motif. What Munster proposed to Letko — engineering a furin site into the spike itself — would let the virus cut itself open.
Instead of waiting for an outside enzyme to do the job, a furin site could clear the hurdle in one step to “enhance infectivity,” as Munster wrote.
The idea had been proposed before.
EcoHealth Alliance submitted the DEFUSE proposal to DARPA, under a program called PREventing EMerging Pathogenic Threats, or PREEMPT. Its key partners included Baric’s laboratory at the University of North Carolina (UNC) and Zhengli Shi, the leading coronavirologist at the Wuhan lab.
The proposal aimed to introduce human-specific proteolytic cleavage sites, including furin sites, into SARS-related bat coronavirus spikes to evaluate and enhance their ability to infect human cells. DARPA declined to fund it, faulting the proposal over the risks of “gain-of-function” research.
Munster was not named on the proposal submitted to DARPA. But according to official congressional correspondence, he had been part of the DEFUSE team two months earlier.
In April 2024, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), then ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, wrote to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and DARPA saying he had obtained documents showing that “Vincent Munster of NIAID’s [National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases] Rocky Mountain Laboratory was listed as a partner in the DEFUSE proposal presented at the PREEMPT Proposers Day,” a January 2018 DARPA event at which Daszak pitched the project to representatives of at least 15 federal agencies.
Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Paul wrote, “was at one point listed as a partner” alongside the WIV, UNC, Columbia University’s Lipkin Lab and Duke-NUS, a disclosure Paul said appeared to contradict former National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases director Anthony Fauci’s testimony to Congress that NIH knew nothing of DEFUSE.
By the time the proposal reached DARPA that March, Munster and his lab were off it; the final list of partners included EcoHealth, the WIV, UNC, Duke-NUS, the USGS National Wildlife Health Center and Palo Alto Research Center.
Paul demanded from HHS records of “all communications between Vincent Munster and any individual from EcoHealth Alliance, WIV, University of North Carolina, Columbia University, or Duke-NUS.” Paul has not released his underlying documents, and neither HHS nor DARPA has publicly answered his requests.
The newly released NIH records show that about a year after DEFUSE was submitted, Munster asked EcoHealth for unpublished sarbecovirus sequences; that he received them from a virologist at Columbia’s Center for Infection and Immunity, the center Ian Lipkin directs; and that in October 2019 he proposed building a spike with a furin-like cleavage site to enhance infectivity.
Steven E. Massey, a professor of bioinformatics at the University of Puerto Rico and a researcher with DRASTIC, the independent group that first published the DEFUSE proposal, called Munster’s suggestion “significant,” saying it “shows the [furin site] idea was circulating outside the EHA-WIV-UNC group,” a reference to EcoHealth Alliance, the WIV and UNC.
Munster’s email does not mention DEFUSE. His idea appears instead as a reaction to the Menachery-Baric preprint, framed as a potential next experiment for his and Letko’s work.
And the motif he proposed is not the one found in the pandemic virus that emerged less than three months later. SARS-CoV-2’s site has alanine where Munster’s pattern called for lysine or arginine.
A suboptimal site
That difference is key. The furin site in SARS-CoV-2 substantially improves the virus’s ability to enter human airway cells and is widely regarded as a major contributor to its transmissibility. Its absence from every other sarbecovirus found in nature is also one of the observations lab-origin proponents cite most often.
The 2021 review in Cell also directly addressed whether the site could have been engineered. Its authors, including Kristian Andersen, Robert Garry and Simon, argued that the site’s own sequence weighs against a lab design.
SARS-CoV-2’s motif, RRAR, “does not match its canonical form (R-X-R/K-R),” they wrote, and is “suboptimal” compared with those of other human coronaviruses.
“There is no logical reason why an engineered virus would utilize such a suboptimal furin cleavage site, which would entail such an unusual and needlessly complex feat of genetic engineering,” the paper stated.
The only prior work inserting a furin site at that position in a SARS-CoV spike, they noted, had used an optimal sequence in a pseudotype system.
Massey disputes that framing. He said excessively efficient cleavage can destabilize the spike and reduce the virus’s ability to enter cells, so a site that looks suboptimal on paper may not be suboptimal for the virus.
The newly released records show Munster reasoning along the Cell authors’ lines nearly two years before their review appeared. The motif he proposed matches the canonical form they describe, not the one the pandemic virus carries, and his lab ran a pseudotype system of the kind they cite.
Read one way, the email corroborates their logic: that a scientist contemplating a furin-like site reached for the textbook motif, and SARS-CoV-2 does not have it.
Read another way, it establishes something the review did not address: by October 2019 the idea of adding such a furin cleavage site to a SARS-related spike to enhance infectivity was circulating not only in an unfunded DARPA proposal but also inside an NIH laboratory.
What was published
When Chinese scientists ultimately posted the genetic sequence of the novel coronavirus spreading in Wuhan on Jan. 10, 2020, Letko and Munster had everything they needed to test it in their system.
The platform did not require a live virus, only the sequence of the small piece of the spike that latches onto a human cell. Within hours of the sequence going up, Neeltje van Doremalen, another scientist in Munster’s lab, pasted it into an email to Letko and Munster.
Letko expected results by Jan. 26 or 27. They came back ahead of schedule. On Jan. 21, Munster decided where to send the final manuscript showing their research. “Nature it is,” he wrote to Letko. “Lets(sic) do 2 authors and speed this up.”
The paper went out that afternoon, to Nature and to the preprint server bioRxiv. Only 12 days had passed since the sequence appeared online.
The lab made the new method’s speed its selling point. Their method “reduces the time from the sequence being published to having real in vitro data to under 12 days,” the cover letter told Nature’s editors, “allowing the scientific community to gain critical information on virus tropism in almost real-time with the outbreak.”
The work drew notice at the top of NIAID.
“First data from my lab confirming ACE2 as the receptor for 2019-NCoV,” Munster emailed an NIAID coronavirus response list that afternoon.
Greg Folkers, then chief of staff to then-NIAID Director Anthony Fauci, replied: “When this hits bioRxiv might be worth a tweet.”
The paper that was submitted gives no sign that Letko took up Munster’s suggestion to engineer a cleavage site into a spike. But it does show that the scientists used the protease trypsin rather than the furin Munster had proposed.
The paper’s second figure is titled, “Trypsin enhances lineage B entry in various cell lines.” It reports that bat coronavirus spikes that could not get into human, primate or pig cells on their own did get in once the particles were bathed in the enzyme.
The trypsin experiments appear nowhere in the project before Munster and Letko’s October exchange about the Menachery-Baric preprint. They are also absent from the abstract that Munster previously circulated in the spring. The published paper cites the Menachery-Baric preprint that sparked their exchange conversation.
Neither of the sequences that Anthony sent in May 2019 appears in the paper, and neither he nor PREDICT are acknowledged. The only trace of PREDICT in the 18-page manuscript is a footnote citation.
The panel of viruses the paper did report testing consisted of 29 receptor-binding domains obtained from a public database administered by the NIH.
One of the two viruses resurfaced a year later, when Columbia’s Center for Infection and Immunity deposited its complete genome in GenBank on July 6, 2020, five and a half months after the preprint that was to have carried it.
In February 2021, the bat coronavirus from Uganda and Rwanda also appeared in the journal Virus Evolution, in a study of how SARS-related viruses acquired the ability to use the human ACE2 receptor.
Letko was second author, Munster was listed near the end, Anthony was the senior author and the Ugandan and Rwandan field scientists and PREDICT leadership were included as co-authors, as Anthony had said in 2019 would be required. Run through Letko’s platform, the virus could not enter human cells through ACE2 at all.
The Malaysian virus, which Anthony had called the more interesting of the two, has never appeared in a published study. Nothing in the records says why. Anthony, now a professor at the University of California, Davis, did not respond to requests for comment.
On May 24, 2021, two years after he emailed the virus’s spike sequence to the Montana lab, Columbia deposited its complete genome in GenBank on behalf of the PREDICT consortium, crediting Malaysia’s Sabah Wildlife Department and EcoHealth Alliance.
Lewis Kamb is an investigative reporter who specializes in using freedom of information laws and public records to uncover wrongdoing and hold the powerful accountable.
Given the vitriol gushing out of corporate media over the purchase of about two weeks’ worth of Russian diesel fuel, we just might be watching the beginning of the endgame in Ukraine.
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By Patrick LAWRENCE
Given the gush of vitriol and condemnation since Oct. 9, when Donald Trump announced his deal to import 5 million metric tons of Russian diesel, roughly 37 million barrels, one would think the president had surrendered the United States’ sovereignty to the Kremlin, or handed over the Ukrainians to the Russian army, or rankly betrayed the Europeans or altogether renounced what we picturesquely call Western civilization.
This is, indeed, what we read daily in the corporate press these days and what we are supposed to think. It is 2016 redux, it seems. Another round of Russiagate may not be far off, given 16 House Democrats have introduced a Prohibit Corrupt Russia Oil Deals Act and 12 senators now attack the diesel accord as “a gift to our adversary.”
If there is one thing essential to recall about those dreary years it is that the wobbly-from-the-first Russiagate edifice, the whole of it, was made of mis– and disinformation, hyperbole, innuendo, extravagant abuses of office and propaganda incessantly disseminated in corporate media.
It was, in short, the Deep State’s attempt to scuttle any effort to advance beyond the poisonous Russophobia it had spent a decade cultivating (taking my date from Vladimir Putin’s era-defining speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007).
It is the same again as Trump tries once more to end the war in Ukraine and refashion East–West relations, a project the old “MICIMATT”— the military-industrial, congressional, intelligence, media, academic and think tank blob — simply cannot abide.
Let us listen to this new round of rubbish with the recent past in mind.
“Donald Trump, meet Neville Chamberlain.” That is Tom Friedman, writing in The New York Times last week under the headline, “Trump’s Democracy–for–Diesel Deal Shames Us All.”
“When future students search online for ‘sellout,’ ‘appeaser’ or ‘traitor to his country’s core values,’” Friedman elaborates, “their two pictures will come up first, side by side.” There is no matching our Tom when it comes to overdrawn historical reference dressed up as intellectual gravitas.
Harold Meyerson, writing in The American Prospect Tuesday under the headline, “Why Putin Is Now Our Ally,” is unhappy that Americans are not angrier and more contemptuous than they appear to be in response to Trump’s latest démarche to Russia.
“We’ve grown so inured to Trump’s outrages,” he writes, “that his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime hasn’t yet stoked the level of horror and rage it deserves.”
Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime. We’re back to this, are we?
We’re also back to the good old Trump–Putin “bromance” bit, it seems, as in “Trump’s man-crush on the Russian dictator has been well documented and need not be recounted in all its unctuous detail.”
This bizarre suggestion of homophilia repeats a tiresome trope from the Russiagate years — never in the slightest documented, for the record — and this time comes from Tom Nichols, a neoliberal hack of long standing. Writing Oct. 18 in The Atlantic, Nichols wants us to see matters this way:
“Donald Trump has now abandoned pretense and is openly aiding the Kremlin in its war against a friend and partner of the U.S. The American commander in chief has abandoned the Western order, the most successful — and powerful — security arrangement in human history.”
Are we clear on all this? The corrupt, Nazi-infested regime in Kiev is America’s friend and partner, simple as that.
The Western order as we have it is the finest thing humanity has ever managed, and Donald J. Trump has forsaken this finest-ever order.
All because the Trumpster signed an agreement whereby the United States will purchase, all in, about two weeks’ worth of Russian diesel fuel.
Paranoia strikes deep, as should be plain to all as the imperium proceeds into its self-inflicted decline. Into the pages of The Atlantic it will creep whenever the topic is “Putin’s Russia” (as against “Russia”).
Trump’s ‘Simple’ Decision
How to account for this outpouring of nitwittery from all these pseuds? Why so suddenly does the world seem to be coming to an end? These are our questions.
Trump II has proven disastrously worse than Trump I, to state the obvious. He had a few good ideas the first time around: end the wars of adventure, bring the soldiers home, decommission NATO, a new détente with Moscow.
This time — and you have to credit the Trumpster for this, strange as it is to credit him with anything — he has only one. He still wants to restore relations with Russia to a working order of some kind, and this must begin with ending the war the Biden regime provoked very quickly after Trump was voted out of office.
Trump is a Manhattan property man for whom everything is transactional, we have to remember. Exploring “deals” does not figure at the higher end of statecraft — certainly not given all that is at issue between Russia and the West — but this is a question of method, not purpose. Let us not get lost in the former while losing sight of the latter.
Peaceful, constructive relations with Russia, based on an enduring settlement of benefit to all sides, are a good thing altogether to be welcomed, however often Americans and West Europeans are told any such eventuality would amount to the horror of horrors.
As everyone thinking about this has remarked, Trump’s immediate intent in striking his diesel deal is to get prices down as best he can before the midterm elections and to pretend the price crisis has causes other than the U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran.
I’m for setting the politics aside. A few days’ worth of diesel — all that can possibly arrive from Russian refineries before Nov. 3 — won’t make any difference, and Trump cannot but know this.
My mind goes to a remark Trump made on Truth Social, his digital bullhorn, at the beginning of this week in response to all the shrieking and shouting that followed his Oct. 9 announcement:
“My decision on Russia is a very simple one. I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don’t want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”
It is important to read this together with other things the Trump regime has got up to lately. While the United States is in plausible-denial mode, Kiev reports that it has disrupted some of the early-warning satellite intelligence vital to Ukraine’s defenses.
Elon Musk, apparently after consultation with the White House, has restricted Ukraine’s use of Starshield, the military-grade version of the Starlink communications system.
These are day-to-day lifelines. So is the Prioritized Ukraine Requirement List, the arrangement whereby the United States sells arms to the Europeans, who send them on to Ukraine. To date the volume of shipments through the P.U.R.L. channel has come to $7 billion. Trump is reportedly threatening to end the program.
Atop all this he has suspended implementation of a sanctions bill he signed into law only a month ago. Concurrently, the Witkoff–Kushner duo presented Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian dictator, with a new settlement proposal that reads to me like a condensed version of the very creditable 28–point plan they presented a year ago next month.
Something is afoot, it seems to me. I see a thought-through strategy in all this. I see renewed determination on Trump’s part.
Trump is out of the closet at last — and perfectly accurate — as he asserts that Zelensky is the principal impediment to a settlement accord and, so, should be either removed from office or forced to accept defeat and recognize Russia’s legitimate interests.
Trump’s new push to bring the Ukraine crisis to a close, to be clear on this point, is not a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. It is just the opposite.
There are a lot of reasons to question how far Trump will get either in ending the war or restoring relations with Russia to a livable détente. But if he maintains the present momentum, we may be watching the beginning of the endgame in Ukraine.
This is a “may,” conditional verb required. But it is this prospect that has all the warmongers in the MICIMATT complex in a dither.
Strange it will be if a president so wrong about so much manages to achieve the peace he is after. But maybe the Tom Friedmans and the Tom Nichols and the rest of their kind are useful as a mirror.
Maybe the extent of their panic is a measure of the Trumpster’s chances of success this time around.
Trump Jr.’s apparent opposition to his father’s foreign policy moves reflects wider divisions within the MAGA movement.
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In a peek behind the curtain of the White House, it has been revealed that Donald Trump Jr. has privately opposed his father’s war with Iran from the very start, even personally confronting President Donald Trump with his objections, according to The Atlantic.
The president’s eldest son has continually expressed his reservations to the off-again, on-again nearly eight-month conflict behind closed doors, despite going to extra lengths to avoid any public criticism of his father.
Two anonymous sources who reportedly spoke directly with Trump Jr. said the MAGA leader has repeatedly questioned the military campaign, a position in line with his longstanding opposition to U.S. involvement in foreign wars.
The father-son fallout reportedly dates back to the beginning of the war, when Trump Jr. vocalized his objections directly to the president.
“Don has kept his views on the subject private, as he would never publicly break with his dad on an issue like this, but I can’t imagine anyone who knows Don would be surprised by his personal views on the subject,” a person supposedly close to Trump Jr. told the progressive magazine.
Trump Jr. has continuously propped up his father as a leader who would keep America out of costly foreign entanglements, particularly in the Middle East.
Trump Jr.’s apparent opposition to his father’s foreign policy moves also reflects wider divisions within the MAGA movement, where prominent conservative voices have questioned whether the conflict is consistent with the president’s states campaign pledges.
Meanwhile, the war has become an increasingly vexing political issue for Republicans ahead of November’s midterm elections.
Exploding gasoline prices and mounting economic pressures have fueled public frustration, while a Pew Research Center poll found that 65% of Americans disapprove of the administration’s handling of the conflict.
A spokesman for Trump Jr. refused to comment on the report.
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