A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.
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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry
Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.
The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.
The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?
The math of fifty thousand
Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.
And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?
Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.
European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.
Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.
Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.
And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.
Creative accounting for oil
There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.
Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.
Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.
In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.
From apotheosis to casus belli?
Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.
Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.
Public security, rejection of the woke agenda, and the defense of traditional values help explain the Brazilian right’s electoral strength.
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The results of the first round of Brazil’s 2026 presidential election sparked a wave of analysis on the Brazilian left. With Flávio Bolsonaro ahead of Lula in the vote count, many commentators looked for explanations in evangelical voters’ behavior, moral conservatism, and the influence of religious leaders. These factors matter, but they do not explain everything. A significant portion of the electorate is dissatisfied with the cultural priorities of the left and, above all, with the perception that the state has lost its ability to guarantee public safety.
Public security occupies a central place in this debate. According to a Nexus/BTG poll released in July 2026, 30% of respondents identified violence, crime, or public security as the country’s main problem. This concern is particularly relevant among Flávio Bolsonaro’s supporters, for whom fighting crime is one of the main expectations for the next government.
The situation in Rio de Janeiro illustrates the scale of the problem. A study by the Federal Fluminense University’s Study Group on New Illegalisms and the Fogo Cruzado Institute estimated that, in 2024, approximately four million people in the metropolitan region lived under the control or influence of armed groups. This represented 34.9% of the region’s population. Criminal factions and militias exercise forms of territorial power that affect mobility, economic activity, and residents’ everyday lives. Some estimates suggest that between 60% and 70% of Rio de Janeiro’s territory is currently controlled by organized crime.
In this context, rhetoric emphasizing social rights, national sovereignty, and foreign policy can lose electoral appeal when it fails to offer convincing answers to everyday insecurity. Lula has advocated tackling organized crime through coordination among security forces, financial investigations, and the restoration of state control over affected territories. Yet these measures are only being emphasized now, following four years of what critics describe as utter neglect of public security, during which organized crime achieved historic levels of territorial expansion.
Flávio, meanwhile, is betting on a more punitive approach, including classifying criminal factions as narco-terrorist organizations. The dispute involves different conceptions of public security, but it also concerns each candidate’s ability to convey determination in confronting the problem. Whether designating these groups as terrorist organizations would actually help combat crime is a matter for a much longer debate. There is little doubt, however, that the label itself appeals to a substantial portion of the population living under the very real terror imposed by these criminals.
There is also a cultural dimension that the left frequently underestimates. Some voters reject the political vocabulary associated with the woke agenda and interpret certain progressive initiatives as attempts to impose new standards of behavior. The Supreme Federal Court’s draconian decision to recognize “transphobia” as a crime “equivalent to racism” has naturally provoked strongly negative reactions. After all, it seems perfectly normal that millions of Brazilians reject a ruling that can – and already does – place people in prison for up to five years for using the wrong pronoun when addressing transgender individuals.
Cultural discontent is often irresponsibly disdained in political analysis. Many commentators continue to treat voters as machines seeking constant material benefits, supposedly willing to sacrifice their values in exchange for meager welfare handouts – the principal achievement the Workers’ Party government has offered the Brazilian people so far. This analysis is mistaken. For many Brazilians, questions concerning their children’s education, religion, and the limits of state intervention are central political priorities. These voters will naturally tend to support the opposition in a national environment where state-run university hospitals – with the backing of the left-wing establishment – provide puberty blockers and other forms of “non-surgical intervention” to “transgender children.”
Contrary to the expectations of academic analysts disconnected from the country’s realities, foreign policy occupies a limited place in most people’s daily lives. Relations with the United States, Brazil’s role in BRICS, and its diplomatic position on Palestine are relevant issues, but they are unlikely to outweigh immediate concerns such as urban violence and cultural disputes.
Flávio Bolsonaro’s electoral support must be understood through this combination of factors, without attributing a single motivation to millions of voters. Public security, traditional values, dissatisfaction with the government, and rejection of certain progressive agendas can all converge in the same vote. If the left wants to improve its popularity, the better course of action is to reconsider its own mistakes, instead of inventing false explanations for the right’s growing support.
Kimi Antonelli conquistou a pole-position para o GP dos Estados Unidos, 18ª etapa da temporada 2026 da Fórmula 1, neste sábado (24), no Circuito das Américas, em Austin. O jovem piloto da Mercedes registou 1:34,035s no Q3 e superou Max Verstappen e Isack Hadjar formando o trio mais rápido.
Na tabela classificativa seguiram-se Leclerc, Hamilton da Ferrari, na fente do segundo Mercedes de George Russell.
Pela McLaren, Oscar Piastri terminou em sétimo, enquanto Lando Norris ficou em oitavo após ter a sua melhor volta anulada por exceder os limites da pista. Arvid Lindblad e Liam Lawson completaram o top- ten.
Após três sessões de treinos livres, em que a Ferrari se mostrava mais forte, eis que na hora da verdade, quando se discutia quem iria partir na frente, eis que a Mercedes decidia posicionar-se na liderança, através de Kimi Antonelli e alcançava a pole-position para o GP dos Estados Unidos.
Na sessão Q1, com 18 minutos de duração, Lando Norris, depois de nas sessões livres ter ficado de certa forma meio discreto, apareceu nesta sessão na liderança, averbando o tempo de 1:35,029, na frente de Leclerc (+0,171s) e de Verstappen (+0,186s). Isack Hadjar e Lewis Hamilton completavam o top-five. Gabriel Bortoleto fazia o 7.º tempo.
Os eliminados foram: Ocon, Stroll, Sainz, Albon, Perez e Bottas.
Só iriam passar para o Q3 os 10 mais rápidos. E logo de início Bortoleto surgia em pista a dar vácuo para o seu companheiro de equipa (o brasileiro sabe que nada adianta alcançar nesta sessão uma boa posição, porque tem que cumprir a sua penalização partindo da cauda do pelotão) então ajudar Hülkenberg era a missão do dia.
Verstappen surgia nesta sessão com grande determinação e saltava para o topo da tabela (1:34,471s), seguido por Norris e Antonelli. Mas de seguida, quando faltavam 5 minutos para o final da sessão, todos regressavam à pista, agora com pneus macios novos, e Leclerc voava para a liderança com o crono 1:34,198s, secundado por Antonelli (+0,080s) e com Russell no terceiro lugar (+0,107s). Verstappen e Norris desciam para as quarta e quinta posições.
Hülkenberg ficava no limite, em 11º e não conseguia qualificar-se.
Os eliminados eram: Gasly, Hulkenberg, Bearman, Bortoleto, Colapinto e Alonso.
Depois de alguns bons registos, nomeadamente de Russel, Verstappen e Hadjar, o piloto da Mercedes Kimi Antonelli saltava para o topo da classificação com 1:34,035s.
A cerca de cinco minutos do final da sessão, praticamente todos os pilotos regressavam à pista para uma tentativa final de obterem o melhor registo, mas o crono do italiano não era superado.
Verstappen ficava na segunda posição (+0,179s) e Hadjar em terceiro (+0,215s), relegando os dois Ferrari para as posições imediatas – 4.º Leclerc (+0,232s) e 5.º Hamilton a fechar o top-five (+0,276s).
Entretanto o tempo de Norris que era era neutralizado (por ultrapassar os limites da pista) e descia para oitava posição.
Eis como ficou a grelha de partida para o GP dos Estados Unidos:
1) Kimi Antonelli (Mercedes) 1’34.035
2) Max Verstappen (Red Bull/Red Bull Ford) 1’34.214
3) Isack Hadjar (Red Bull/Red Bull Ford) 1’34.250
4) Charles Leclerc (Ferrari) 1’34.267
5) Lewis Hamilton (Ferrari) 1’34.311
6) George Russell (Mercedes) 1’34.476
7) Oscar Piastri (McLaren/Mercedes) 1’34.803
8) Lando Norris (McLaren/Mercedes) 1’35.049
9) Arvid Lindblad (Racing Bulls/Red Bull Ford) 1’36.049
10) Liam Lawson (Racing Bulls/Red Bull Ford) –
11) Pierre Gasly (Alpine/Mercedes) 1’35.080
12) Nico Hülkenberg (Audi) 1’35.158
13) Fernando Alonso (Aston Martin/Honda) 1’35.818
14) Oliver Bearman (Haas/Ferrari) 1’36.031
15) Esteban Ocon (Haas/Ferrari) 1’36.531
16) Lance Stroll (Aston Martin/Honda) 1’36.677
17) Carlos Sainz (Williams/Mercedes) 1’36.770
18) Alexander Albon (Williams/Mercedes) 1’36.967
19) Sergio Pérez (Cadillac/Ferrari) 1’37.433
20) Valtteri Bottas (Cadillac/Ferrari) 1’37.523
21) Franco Colapinto (Alpine/Mercedes) 1’35.722
22) Gabriel Bortoleto (Audi) 1’35.691
Colaboração F1Mania
Brazil, Israel, Serbia and the US are holding elections within the space of 10 days. Will the authoritarian right cement its global gains, or can pro-democracy forces make a comeback?
Four elections on four continents within 10 days could profoundly reshape global politics, propelling the world further along its current authoritarian trajectory or marking a limited comeback for democratic norms.
In all four contests, basic democratic norms are at stake at a time when autocracy is advancing worldwide at an alarming rate. According to the Sweden-based V-Dem Institute, which uses multivariable assessment tools, the democratic freedoms enjoyed by the average global citizen are down to levels last seen in 1978 – long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Europe.
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© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?
The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.
In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.
In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.
Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.
Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.
Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.
Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.
In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”
Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.
According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.
Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.
“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.
This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.
But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.
Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.
Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.
However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all. It is an industrial MoU.
But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.
By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.
Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.
The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.
Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.
In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.
However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent” on military dialogue.
“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.
Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.
The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.
On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).
On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.
The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.
Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.
Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.
For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.
Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.
Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.
Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.
Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400 from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.
However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.
After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.
Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.
Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.
It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.
So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.
However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.
The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
File image.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly instructed Israeli diplomats to support Argentina’s call for negotiations with Britain over the Falkland Islands, a move that could further strain relations between Israel and the United Kingdom
The Telegraph reported on October 24, citing unnamed sources, that Netanyahu had approved a shift toward recognizing Argentina’s historical connection to the South Atlantic archipelago and calling for direct negotiations between Buenos Aires and London.
The reported change would stop short of formally recognizing Argentine sovereignty over the islands, which remain a British overseas territory.
The report follows remarks by Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, who said last week that Israel recognized the importance of the issue to the Argentine public and called for progress that considered its historical, legal and human dimensions.
The British representative to the UN, Kate Foster, reiterated that Britain had no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, adding that negotiations over sovereignty could not proceed without the consent of the islanders.
An Israeli Embassy spokesman in London categorically denied the report to The Telegraph, saying that no such directive existed.
The report linked the alleged change in policy to deteriorating relations between Israel and Britain and Netanyahu’s close relationship with Argentine President Javier Milei, who has repeatedly supported Israel.
Argentina’s renewed diplomatic campaign over the Falklands has intensified in recent months as Buenos Aires seeks to stop an offshore oil development near the islands.
Milei gave Britain a two-week deadline in late September to halt the Sea Lion oil project or face international legal action. Argentina subsequently initiated arbitration proceedings under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, arguing that the development violates its sovereign rights.
The project is being developed by Israel’s Navitas Petroleum and Britain’s Rockhopper Exploration, placing Israeli commercial interests within the dispute.
Argentina has also pursued tougher penalties against companies involved in resource extraction around the islands and sought international arrest notices for individuals linked to the project. Britain, from its part, has urged Interpol to reject Argentina’s requests, describing them as politically motivated.
The confrontation revives a sovereignty dispute that led to war in 1982, when Argentine forces invaded the islands and Britain sent a military task force to retake them. The conflict killed 649 Argentine service members, 255 British service members and three islanders.
Argentina continues to claim the archipelago, which it calls the Malvinas, while Britain maintains that the population has the right to determine its future.
Relations between Israel and Britain have deteriorated over separate disagreements, including Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza, Britain’s recognition of a Palestinian state in 2025 and London’s increasingly critical position on Israeli settlement activity in the occupied West Bank.
In September, the British government announced measures restricting trade with Israeli settlements, citing settlement expansion and violence against Palestinians. Israel condemned the measures.
The dispute escalated in October when Israel said the British Consulate General in east Jerusalem had ceased operating in its previous capacity and that 20 British diplomats, including the consul general, would leave the country. Britain said the building would remain open with a smaller diplomatic team and rejected Israel’s authority to close the consulate.
Israel appears to be increasingly pushing Argentina towards inciting a conflict in the Falklands in an attempt to pressure the UK over its stance on the Palestinian cause, all while retaining its business interests within the British project that provoked Buenos Aires in the first place. Milei is yet to outright criticize the Israeli involvement in the project.
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SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence
NOW hosted at southfront.press
Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.
The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation
Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com
The post Netanyahu Draws Argentina Into Falklands Showdown to Turn Up Pressure on Britain appeared first on South Front.
Trump Jr.’s apparent opposition to his father’s foreign policy moves reflects wider divisions within the MAGA movement.
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In a peek behind the curtain of the White House, it has been revealed that Donald Trump Jr. has privately opposed his father’s war with Iran from the very start, even personally confronting President Donald Trump with his objections, according to The Atlantic.
The president’s eldest son has continually expressed his reservations to the off-again, on-again nearly eight-month conflict behind closed doors, despite going to extra lengths to avoid any public criticism of his father.
Two anonymous sources who reportedly spoke directly with Trump Jr. said the MAGA leader has repeatedly questioned the military campaign, a position in line with his longstanding opposition to U.S. involvement in foreign wars.
The father-son fallout reportedly dates back to the beginning of the war, when Trump Jr. vocalized his objections directly to the president.
“Don has kept his views on the subject private, as he would never publicly break with his dad on an issue like this, but I can’t imagine anyone who knows Don would be surprised by his personal views on the subject,” a person supposedly close to Trump Jr. told the progressive magazine.
Trump Jr. has continuously propped up his father as a leader who would keep America out of costly foreign entanglements, particularly in the Middle East.
Trump Jr.’s apparent opposition to his father’s foreign policy moves also reflects wider divisions within the MAGA movement, where prominent conservative voices have questioned whether the conflict is consistent with the president’s states campaign pledges.
Meanwhile, the war has become an increasingly vexing political issue for Republicans ahead of November’s midterm elections.
Exploding gasoline prices and mounting economic pressures have fueled public frustration, while a Pew Research Center poll found that 65% of Americans disapprove of the administration’s handling of the conflict.
A spokesman for Trump Jr. refused to comment on the report.
In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.
Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.
The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.
The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.
It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft. However, the agreement’s execution still depends on Congressional authorization and appropriations.
The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.
The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.
The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.
“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.
“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”
The Pentagon believes multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to invest upfront in expanding production facilities.
Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.
Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.
Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?
The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.
If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.
In addition, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants.
The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.
To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.
Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.
“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.
“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”
Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.
The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.
Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.
According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.
China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America?
While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.
Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).
Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.
Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.
Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will let Lockheed Martin enter long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.
It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.
Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.
It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.
Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.
Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.
If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.
“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.
Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.
Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.
If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.
Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.
Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.
A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.
The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.
The post F-35 Stealth Fighter: Why Pentagon is Locking Production For a Decade—and Lockheed’s $7B Counter-Bet to Make It Work appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.
Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.
The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.
The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.
It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft.
However, the agreement’s execution remains subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations.
The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.
The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.
The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.
“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.
“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”
The Pentagon believes that multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to make upfront investments in expanding production facilities.
Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.
Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.
The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.
If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.
Besides, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants of the fighter.
The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.
To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.
Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.
“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.
“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”
Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.
The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.
Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.
According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.
While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.
Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).
Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.
Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.
Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will allow Lockheed Martin to enter into long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, thereby stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.
It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.
Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.
It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.
Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.
Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.
If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.
“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.
Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.
Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.
If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.
Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.
Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.
A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.
The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.
The post The $7 Billion Bet Inside Lockheed’s F-35 Framework: Why Pentagon Wants to Lock Production for a Decade appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
An incident that took place in Italy deserves careful consideration, because it demonstrates the close relationship between Israel and the political institutions of European countries.
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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The unexpected
An incident that took place in Italy deserves careful consideration, because it demonstrates the close relationship between Israel and the political institutions of European countries—in a Europe that is becoming a destination for many Israeli citizens seeking to recreate their communities in small territorial enclaves on the Old Continent. Why is it worth discussing this? Because this is an example of a pattern that is beginning to repeat itself in various parts of Europe, and this will have significant geopolitical consequences sooner than we expect.
Here’s what happened. On October 5, 2026, Fanpage.it published an investigative report by Michelangelo Mecchia that had a rare impact in Italian journalism: in less than a week, it reached the Chamber of Deputies, the European Parliament, and the Veneto Regional Council. At the center of the story is an association based in Albignasego, in the Padua area, called Christians for Israel Italy. It is the Italian branch of Christians for Israel International (C4I), a network founded in the Netherlands in 1979 and now present in over forty countries. According to the investigative report, for more than twenty years this network has been raising money for Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.
So far, this would be a story of transnational religious and political activism—the kind that exists in every democracy. The point is another. Between 2023 and 2024, the Veneto Region allocated 16,000 euros in public funds to the association. And the same association, according to the documentation, has over the years built up privileged access to the leadership of the parties currently governing the country and the region. The question that arises does not concern anyone’s beliefs. It concerns the way in which an Italian public institution chooses its partners, and whether it does so knowing—or wanting to know—who it is funding.
The method used was undercover investigation. Journalists approached the Italian chapter posing as potential donors and asked whether it was possible to support projects in the occupied territories. The answer was yes: all they had to do was indicate “Judea and Samaria” in the transfer description. The term is not neutral. It is the biblical designation that Israeli authorities use for the West Bank and that the settler movement employs precisely to deny that it is occupied territory. According to the investigation, the Italian office also clarified that it works in direct contact with Israeli political authorities.
The main operational channel is Christian Friends of Israeli Communities (CFOIC), a partner organization based in the settlements themselves. According to Fanpage, it is through CFOIC that most of the money destined for the settlements passes, used to purchase drones, cameras, surveillance systems, and jeeps for patrolling the territory. This is therefore not generic humanitarian aid, but equipment for controlling the area around the outposts: the very same security infrastructure that, in the day-to-day reality of the West Bank, serves to demarcate land, monitor Palestinian villages, and facilitate the expansion of the settlements.
Two factors add weight to this picture. The first is the scale. After October 7, 2023, the international network launched an extraordinary campaign that, according to its own 2023 financial report, raised 3.6 million. The second concerns an incident that came to light in the Netherlands, where the investigative journalism platform Investico investigated the Dutch branch of the network: in an interview with reporters, a settler, Nati Rom, proposed using donations to buy guns for settlement residents. The Dutch section subsequently suspended that collaboration. Investico also traced the funding for prefabricated housing units for new settlement residents. It should be noted precisely that the proposal regarding weapons has not been attributed to CFOIC or the Italian section. But it speaks volumes about the environment from which that money comes—and about the fact that the network itself felt it had to distance itself from it.
Then there is the public discourse. Marco Alexander, a tour guide, has spoken several times in the movement’s webinars, suggesting that the best solution would be to relocate the population of Gaza elsewhere, followed by a process of “de-Palestinization.” In a video, the association’s president, Edda Fogarollo, a history professor, attacked Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, for wearing a keffiyeh, calling for the Pope to intervene. The attack came after Israeli police had prevented the patriarch from reaching the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. That an association calling itself Christian would choose to take aim at the shepherd of the Christians of the Holy Land—rather than at those who barred him from entering Christianity’s holiest site—is a political fact even before it is a theological one.
International law as a matter of opinion
The press release in which the Green and Left Alliance brought the case before the Regional Council refers to a “ruling” from 2024. The technical term is different, and the distinction deserves clarification because those who defend the settlements often exploit precisely these inaccuracies. On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, on the legal consequences of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. An advisory opinion is not a judgment between parties, but it represents the most authoritative interpretation of current international law that exists. And its conclusions are clear: Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Territory is illegal; Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity and evacuate the settlers; and all States have an obligation not to recognize the situation as legal and not to render aid or assistance in its maintenance.
This last point is decisive for the Veneto case. The obligation not to provide assistance does not apply only to governments in their diplomatic relations: it extends to the entire state apparatus, including local authorities, to the extent that they use public resources. On September 18, 2024, the General Assembly adopted the opinion through Resolution ES-10/24, approved by 124 votes in favor, 14 against, and 43 abstentions, and called on Israel to end the occupation within twelve months. Italy abstained. That abstention was a political choice by the government, not a suspension of the legal obligations identified in the advisory opinion. The twelve-month deadline expired over a year ago. Meanwhile, the settlements have expanded.
Regarding the term “genocide,” used in the regional communiqué, legal prudence requires a distinction to be made. The case brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice is still pending on the merits, and Israel rejects the accusation. In January 2024, however, the Court deemed some of the claims invoked by South Africa to be plausible and ordered provisional measures; in September 2025, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that acts of genocide were committed in Gaza. The final judgment rests with the Court. But a ruling class that uses public funds to finance those who publicly advocate for the forced transfer of the population of Gaza cannot claim to be unaware of the legal and moral climate in which it operates.
Public funds for israeli interests
We must be precise here as well, because the issue is serious and does not need to be exaggerated. The 16,000 euros were allocated via two decrees, in 2023 and 2024, under the call for proposals established by Regional Law No. 5 of February 3, 2020, which supports initiatives for Holocaust Remembrance Day, education about the Holocaust, the fight against antisemitism, and the promotion of Jewish culture. The funds went to two events: 9,500 euros for an “Exhibition of Degenerate Art” and 6,500 euros for an initiative dedicated to Eugenio Gentili Tedeschi.
This, however, does not settle the matter; it merely shifts it. Money is fungible: every public euro that covers an association’s cultural expenses frees up a private euro for other purposes, including campaigns for “Judea and Samaria.” But there is a plan even more significant than the flow of funds, and that is the plan of legitimization. A regional grant—especially one based on a law dedicated to the memory of the Holocaust—conferrs upon its recipient a badge of institutional respectability. It is symbolic capital that can then be spent anywhere: in the halls of the Senate, in relations with schools, and in fundraising. And during the Venice exhibition financed with that money, former Member of the European Parliament Magdi Cristiano Allam denied the very existence of a Palestinian national identity. Public sponsorship, in other words, provided a platform for a thesis that denies a people under occupation the right to exist as a political entity.
Finally, there is an aspect concerning the memory of the Holocaust itself. Using a law designed to educate young people about the extermination of Europe’s Jews as a funding channel for entities committed to supporting a military occupation that has been declared illegal amounts to co-opting that memory for a contingent political purpose. This also harms the Jewish communities of Veneto—the primary beneficiaries of the law—who bear no responsibility for the choices made by a Christian-Zionist association and yet find themselves sharing the same budget line with it.
The situation in Veneto is not an isolated administrative incident. Between 2011 and 2025, the Italian branch of C4I organized conferences with Israeli diplomats and members of the ruling party, several of which took place in the Senate chambers. On October 13, 2021, for example, the association hosted a “Jerusalem Prayer Breakfast” at the Senate, with the then-Israeli ambassador Dror Eydar, Giorgia Meloni (who was in the opposition at the time), Matteo Salvini, Lucio Malan, Paolo Formentini, and Simone Pillon announced as attendees. On that occasion, Salvini described the transfer of the capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as a moral, civic, religious, and political commitment.
President Fogarollo ran in the 2015 Veneto regional elections with Fratelli d’Italia and in the 2022 Padua municipal elections on a center-right ticket; in September 2026, she was on the Pontida lawn with an Israeli flag alongside League deputy Formentini. On January 30, 2024, League Senator Massimiliano Romeo introduced a bill against antisemitism that incorporates the IHRA definition, which was later approved by the Senate; in September 2026, Maurizio Gasparri defended it in a public debate with Fogarollo herself. There is nothing illegal about lobbying, and an association has every right to support a bill. But the IHRA definition is contested by a large part of the legal and academic community precisely because, in its examples of application, it risks equating political criticism of the State of Israel with antisemitism. When it is promoted most zealously by circles that deny Palestinian identity, the suspicion that the aim is to silence dissent regarding the occupation becomes legitimate.
Viewed through a geopolitical lens, the case illustrates a broader dynamic. Christian Zionism, which originated in the Anglo-Saxon evangelical world, has for decades been one of the most effective vehicles for Western support of the West Bank colonization project: it provides money, volunteers, informal diplomatic networks, and above all, a theological framework that removes the issue from the realm of international law and places it in the realm of prophecy. In Italy, where Catholicism has a very different tradition and where the Holy See has recognized the State of Palestine since 2015, this influence has found a foothold not in the Churches but in a segment of the political right, which uses it as a marker of allegiance to the Atlantic camp. The result is paradoxical: an association that calls itself Christian attacks the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, while Palestinian Christian communities in the West Bank—from Taybeh to Bethlehem—have been denouncing settler violence for years.
What the Venetians expect from their institutions
On October 12, regional councilors Carlo Cunegato and Elena Ostanel of the Green and Left Alliance submitted a question requiring an immediate response to the Regional Executive Committee led by Alberto Stefani. Democratic Party councilors Monica Sambo, Alessandro Del Bianco, Chiara Luisetto, and Gianpaolo Trevisi asked Culture Councilor Valeria Mantovan to report to the committee on procedures and oversight. At the national level, Stefania Ascari, a member of the Chamber of Deputies from the Five Star Movement, questioned the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Economy, and the Interior; in Strasbourg, Members of the European Parliament Brando Benifei and Cecilia Strada addressed the European Commission. To date, as far as is known, neither the Region nor the association has provided a public response on the matter.
There are four requests to be made to the Regional Executive, and none of them is radical. The first is full transparency: publish the decrees, financial reports, and expense receipts for the two grants, so that every euro is traceable. The second concerns the present. The 2026 call for proposals under Law 5/2020, approved on August 19 by Resolution No. 886, makes available 55,000 euros, and the rankings have not yet been published. Before awarding the funds, the Regional Executive must verify that no beneficiary supports, either directly or through networks of which they are a part, activities in the settlements. The third is structural: to introduce an explicit clause in regional calls for proposals that excludes from grants and funding any entity that finances activities in territories that international law considers illegally occupied, in accordance with the Court’s opinion. The fourth is political: a clarification as to why an association with these characteristics was able to access funds intended for Holocaust remembrance.
Throughout its history, Veneto has experienced life as a land of emigration and a border region; it knows what it means to have its territory determined by others, and it has also experienced what it means to be invaded, plundered, and culturally and politically violated. It needs no lessons to understand why a people would refuse to have its name erased.
The resources paid for by Venetian citizens through their taxes must be used for public health care, for nursing homes with fees that are becoming increasingly unaffordable, for schools, and for true culture. They must not—not even indirectly, nor through the veneer of respectability that public funding provides—contribute to legitimizing those who support the colonization of another people’s land. International law has already made clear which side to take. It is up to the Region to demonstrate that it understands this.
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