© Jack Guez/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
A comissão da ONU (Organização das Nações Unidas) afirmou, em um relatório publicado nesta segunda-feira (26) que Israel continuou cometendo genocídio em Gaza após o cessar-fogo mediado pelos Estados Unidos, em outubro do ano passado.
O relatório da Comissão Internacional Independente de Inquérito da ONU sobre o Território Palestino Ocupado, incluindo Jerusalém Oriental, e Israel examinou as violações contra crianças palestinas do início da guerra entre Israel e o Hamas, em 7 de outubro de 2023, até setembro deste ano.
O relatório afirma que as autoridades israelenses continuaram cometendo “atos genocidas com a intenção genocida de destruir, no todo ou em parte, os palestinos em Gaza”, e que a situação também continuou se deteriorando na Cisjordânia ocupada.
Outro relatório da comissão, divulgado em setembro do ano passado, concluiu que Israel havia cometido genocídio em Gaza e que autoridades israelenses de alto escalão, incluindo o primeiro-ministro, Benjamin Netanyahu, incitaram esses atos — acusações que Israel considerou escandalosas.
A missão israelense em Genebra afirmou que o último relatório faz parte de uma campanha de desinformação para demonizar o Estado de Israel.
“A tentativa de destruir o Estado judeu… continua até hoje por meio de esforços de atores como a Comissão de Inquérito da ONU para minar a legitimidade de Israel e negar seu direito fundamental de existir e se defender”, afirmou o embaixador Daniel Meron em comunicado.
A comissão constatou que as forças israelenses continuaram usando munições pesadas, drones, quadricópteros, artilharia e tiros de atiradores em áreas densamente povoadas durante o cessar-fogo em Gaza.
Segundo a comissão, a “Linha Amarela” — apresentada como uma demarcação temporária do cessar-fogo — está se estendendo cada vez mais para dentro de Gaza, tornando-se uma fronteira de fato, o que, segundo o relatório, reflete a expansão do controle territorial de Israel sobre Gaza.
Autoridades palestinas afirmam que mais de 74 mil pessoas foram mortas nos ataques de Israel a Gaza, iniciado após combatentes liderados pelo Hamas matarem cerca de 1.200 pessoas no sul de Israel em 7 de outubro de 2023.
Em seu relatório ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU, a comissão afirmou que a situação na Cisjordânia também se deteriorou drasticamente, com o número de palestinos mortos em ataques aéreos aumentando de seis entre 2008 e 6 de outubro de 2023 para 254 entre 7 de outubro de 2023 e 30 de setembro de 2026.
O presidente da comissão, Srinivasan Muralidhar, afirmou que o assassinato intencional de civis palestinos e a destruição de residências na Cisjordânia fazem parte de uma estratégia mais ampla para exterminar e deslocar os palestinos.
Operações militares desde janeiro de 2025 levaram ao maior deslocamento de palestinos na Cisjordânia desde 1967, com 34.176 palestinos ainda deslocados em agosto de 2026, segundo o relatório.
A comissão também criticou a Autoridade Palestina, afirmando que ela havia perseguido palestinos que expressavam opiniões divergentes e que jornalistas e defensores dos direitos humanos haviam sido mortos e feridos.
Comissão da ONU aponta genocídio em Gaza com ataques de Israel a crianças
Donald Trump framed Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power as a condition for finishing the offensive against Iran. “We have to finish the job we started,” he wrote on his social media, aiming the appeal squarely at Israeli voters three days before the legislative elections.
The U.S. President returned to an October 18 letter in which he called Netanyahu an “exceptional Prime Minister warrior” and praised their joint record in military operations.
RELATED: UN Commission Accuses Israel of War Crimes and Genocide in West Bank and Gaza
As everyone knows, including the enemy, Bibi and I have had a great relationship to win together,” Trump stated, holding up Operation Epic Fury as proof of their cooperation.
Trump asserted that Iran had lost its navy and its air force and that its economy had fallen into a “state of chaos.” He placed inflation at 301% and claimed a naval blockade had stopped oil exports. Two tiers of Iranian leadership, military and civilian, had been eliminated, he added.
‘Netanyahu has done a VERY GOOD JOB as prime minister under very trying conditions’ — Trump pic.twitter.com/4VQJ2fR3mJ
— RT Intl (@RT_on_X) October 26, 2026
In the October 18 letter, Trump described the Israeli leader as a “Great Warrior Prime Minister” and an “even greater partner for peace.” His latest post closed with an open call for Netanyahu’s reelection in the middle of the Iran offensive.
The appeal marks another attempt by the White House to steer another nation’s vote. It also arrives as Washington and Tel Aviv face sustained protests over the war on the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s conduct has been denounced as a policy of extermination.
Netanyahu and Trump met in Washington amid protests against the genocide in Gaza, and Trump has framed their alliance as a shared military project. Trump’s latest intervention draws Washington deeper into a vote that will decide not only Israel’s leadership but also the regional balance.
BREAKING: President Trump issues a second statement endorsing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
— The Kobeissi Letter (@KobeissiLetter) October 25, 2026
This marks the first time a US President has publicly endorsed a candidate in the Israeli elections. pic.twitter.com/t4l0qtj3hi
The endorsement lands days before more than seven million voters renew the 120 seats of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. Surveys project a fragmented legislature in which no bloc secures the 61 seats required to form a government. The threshold has rarely yielded a stable majority in recent cycles, and this campaign has only deepened the fragmentation.
That arithmetic has lifted the leverage of Israel’s Arab parties and pulled tens of thousands of expatriates back home to cast ballots. It has also sharpened a parallel demand for accountability.
On Saturday, tens of thousands of people marched in Tel Aviv to demand an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023 Israeli attack. Organizers stressed that the gathering was civic in nature and did not endorse any party or candidacy.
The opposition bloc led by former army chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot is pressing for that independent commission. Netanyahu opposes the measure, while his supporters highlight his record on national security and regional operations. Neither camp has stopped to examine Israel’s conduct and its policy of extermination against the Gaza Strip.
Tuesday’s vote will determine whether Netanyahu secures the mandate Trump is urging. With no bloc near a majority, coalition negotiations are expected to follow, and the outcome will shape both Israel’s next government and the course of the Iran campaign.
© Saher Alghorra for The New York Times
Ahead of Israel’s Oct. 27 national vote, President Donald Trump issued a sweeping endorsement of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s re-election bid, calling him a "great warrior," an "even greater partner for peace" and an ally in the confrontation with Iran.
The backing could give Israel’s longest-serving prime minister a boost ahead of the country’s first national vote since the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, massacre. The election is widely viewed in Israel as a referendum on whether to grant Netanyahu another term to pursue his war objectives, including disarming Hamas and Hezbollah and countering the nuclear threat from the Islamic Republic.
In response, Netanyahu thanked Trump for his "extraordinary endorsement." "Together we will never let Iran’s regime get nuclear weapons," he said.
Addressing the endorsement, Doron Spielman, international spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, told Fox News Digital that no personal or professional bond in the history of U.S.-Israel relations compares with the current partnership.
"Israel and the U.S. have stood together as the two countries bearing the torch for the West, and that is a direct result of the incredible relationship between President Trump and Netanyahu," he said.
He reiterated Netanyahu’s long-standing foreign-policy priority and central campaign promise: ensuring that Iran does not acquire atomic bombs under his watch.
"Israel prefers to do this with the U.S., which has been our greatest ally and friend, and who has already entered the front with us twice. But already at the time of Operation Rising Lion, Israel showed that it was willing to act alone. Israel acted for over a week before the U.S. joined," he said, in reference to the June 2025 military mission against Iran.
Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, with roughly 20 years in office, Netanyahu began his diplomatic career in 1982 as deputy chief of mission at Israel’s embassy in Washington, D.C. He served as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 to 1988 before entering politics with Likud. He became the party’s chairman in 1993 and was first elected premier in 1996.
After losing the 1999 election, Netanyahu returned to government in 2002 as foreign minister and later served as finance minister. He returned to the premiership in 2009, serving until 2021 and again from late 2022. He is widely credited with liberalizing Israel’s economy and helping transform the country into a global high-tech hub.
FORMER ISRAELI ARMY CHIEF GADI EISENKOT EMERGES AS NETANYAHU’S LEADING ELECTION CHALLENGER
Netanyahu’s current political allies include Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism-Zehut, and the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. The newcomer Amcha Yisrael, led by Ofer Winter, could also join the bloc, although Winter is currently feuding with Likud over concerns that his party, which is hovering near the electoral threshold, could split the right-wing vote and potentially "waste" tens of thousands of ballots.
According to most Hebrew-language media polls, neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the opposition led by Gadi Eisenkot currently has a clear path to securing the 61 Knesset seats needed to form a government.
If no candidate can assemble a governing coalition, Israel could head to another election, repeating the cycle of political instability that saw the country hold four national votes between April 2019 and March 2021.
Dan Diker, president of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, told Fox News Digital that any incoming government will face the same formidable security challenges as the current one, with few prospects for quick victories.
"The major challenge in this election will be what Netanyahu discussed in terms of adjusting the national security concept to prioritize prevention. That means taking very serious, assertive and aggressive military counterterrorism and nonmilitary actions against our enemies," Diker said.
The Israeli left, center and even far-right believe Netanyahu has failed to meet the expectations associated with his image as "Mr. Security," according to professor Tamar Hermann, a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute.
ISRAEL DRILLS FOR SURPRISE ATTACK WITH MASSIVE MILITARY EXERCISE AS EXPERT INVOKES 1973 WAR
"He promised to topple the Iranian regime, he promised to dismantle Hamas, he promised to crush Hezbollah. None of it was achieved," Hermann told Fox News Digital. "He gave a green light to not punishing vigilantes in the settlements who act against Palestinians. He also gave too much to the ultra-Orthodox parties, giving up on the idea of universal conscription."
Hermann said that Netanyahu’s current term has been his least successful, beginning with the judicial reform push, which triggered mass protests in 2023, and followed by the Palestinian terror attacks on Oct. 7. Netanyahu subsequently faced public anger over his handling of the hostage crisis, although, in coordination with Trump and his envoys, he ultimately secured the return of all the captives.
"In the eyes of some, his legacy will be that he inflicted a huge disaster upon Israel in terms of what happened to civilians on Oct. 7 and the deterioration of Israel’s international image," she said.
Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, framed the upcoming election in terms of legacy and how Netanyahu will be remembered 50 years from now.
"There are two types of leaders: leaders in history and leaders of history," he told Fox News Digital. "There are leaders who go into office and perform as best they can, and there are leaders who go into office and see themselves as transformative, as having a historical role like Abraham Lincoln, Roosevelt or Churchill. Benjamin Netanyahu belongs to this category."
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Oren said Netanyahu sees his mission as saving Israel from existential threats, foremost among them Iran, a goal he has yet to achieve.
"He is willing to endure virtually limitless criticism and condemnation around the world, as well as mass demonstrations against him, to fulfill this one role," he said. "To understand that is to understand Benjamin Netanyahu: He is a leader of history."
In 1996, Israel’s then-Prime Minister Simon Peres appeared to be on his way to victory in parliamentary elections that would keep him and his center-left Labor Party in power. On the key issue of peace, he had pledged to provide West Bank and Gaza Strip territory to the Palestinians for a sovereign state. The “land […]
The post Netanyahu hopes voters forget October 7, 2023 appeared first on Asia Times.
RT | October 26, 2026
The EU faces a growing budget squeeze after borrowing hundreds of billions for pandemic recovery and Ukraine. Rising repayment costs threaten future spending and rushed payouts raise fraud risks, its chief auditor has warned. Brussels is nevertheless seeking billions more for Kiev.
Speaking to Rapporteur, Tony Murphy, president of the European Court of Auditors, described the budget situation as a “pressure cooker,” with EU debt potentially reaching €1 trillion (1.12 trillion) by the end of 2027. The bloc’s debt stood at €739 billion (825 billion) in 2025, up from €601 billion ($671 billion) a year earlier.
“You have to pay it back at some time. It’s not free money,” Murphy said. He emphasized that “it’s real money that has to be paid back.”
However, concerns have repeatedly been raised about the EU getting back any of the billions it has spent on Ukraine, including its recent €90 billion ($100 billion) loan, which Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico recently slammed as “gifts” that Ukraine will “never pay back.”
Kiev is required to repay the loan only after receiving Russian reparations – something Moscow has vehemently ruled out. Ukraine’s own former Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov has also acknowledged that such scenarios are “just fairy tales” and that Brussels will never get its money back, which is being actively embezzled by Kiev.
The EU, however, must still repay the money it borrowed. According to Murphy, servicing pandemic debt alone would consume 8% of the bloc’s proposed 2028–2034 budget and governments have yet to agree on new revenue to cover the repayments, leaving Brussels with less money for other priorities.
The squeeze comes as households and businesses continue to face high energy costs following Europe’s break with Russian supplies, compounded by the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Murphy also warned about how quickly money is being spent. He called the requirement to process €90 billion in remaining pandemic recovery payments by December “crazy,” describing the impending payouts as a “tsunami.”
Pressure to meet deadlines could also encourage weaker checks and more abuse, he said, as European prosecutors are already investigating hundreds of suspected fraud cases involving recovery funds.
Despite the crisis, Brussels is again looking for more money for Kiev after Vladimir Zelensky requested another €70 billion ($78 billion) for 2027, beyond existing commitments. European Council President Antonio Costa said Friday that the EU expects to cover roughly two-thirds, with a decision potentially coming in November.
Princes and Thieves, a new book by investigative journalist Matthew Cole, may open a rabbit hole into financial connections between Middle Eastern dictators and President Donald Trump's family. Cole accuses Emirati monarch Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) of sending billions of dollars to various mercenaries and political operators, including Jared Kushner, son-in-law to President Donald Trump. Cole's reporting combines well-documented connections with secondhand accounts from anonymous sources.
On Thursday, Vanity Fair published an excerpt from the book, reporting that Dutch military intelligence hacked into Kushner's phone in 2018 and discovered hundreds of millions of dollars in bank transfers connected to MBZ. Also on Thursday, Kushner published a letter from his lawyers to Cole categorically denying the "incredible and false" allegations in the book. "Mr. Kushner never accessed foreign accounts and always followed all rules and regulations and only pursued goals that were in the best interest of the United States as directed by the President of the United States," they wrote.
Cole had originally written on his blog that the book was scheduled for release on October 27, but the publication date was pushed forward over the weekend.
The book purports to tie Kushner to a vast web of Emirati influence operations around the world. In Cole's telling, which matches other journalists' accounts, MBZ wants to reshape the Middle East and eastern Africa into an alliance of U.S.-backed dictatorships, where "tolerance" is enforced through high-tech surveillance and "democracy" is a synonym for terrorism. MBZ's use of mercenaries in pursuit of these goals is well-documented. So is Kushner's personal affinity with the Emirati monarch and his business ties with the Arab monarchies.
Soon after Trump won the 2016 election, MBZ held a widely reported meeting with Kushner. According to the book—and according to much of that earlier reporting—the monarch complained about the Obama administration's failure to back Arab regimes against popular revolutions, its decision to end the Iraq War, and its diplomacy with Iran.
Going much further than past reporting, Cole now claims Kushner was personally involved in MBZ's mercenary operations. MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman put a collective $2 billion into Emirati and Israeli bank accounts which were managed (but not technically owned) by Kushner, according to Cole's sources. Those same sources claim that parts of this secret "slush fund" went to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, American military contractor Erik Prince, and Cuban hitman Felipe Vidal.
Haftar, a former CIA asset, became a general in Libya's 2011 revolution and then attempted to overthrow the new government with Emirati backing in 2014. Despite a 2020 ceasefire, his forces continue to control much of Libya. Prince, founder of the military contractor formerly known as Blackwater, moved to the UAE and helped build a secret army of Colombian mercenaries. He sued Cole for defamation after Cole reported on Prince's role in helping Haftar, but a judge threw out the case. Cole's sources claimed that Vidal, a self-described "hit man," helped the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fake an Iranian attack on oil tankers in May 2019, meant to provoke Trump into war.
Kushner's lawyers have denied any relationship with any of those three men, apart from a single meeting with Prince after the 2016 election. (According to Cole, both Vidal and Prince refused to comment for the book.) The position of the U.S. government is that the May 2019 incident was a genuine Iranian attack, not an Emirati false flag.
After the Vanity Fair article was published last week, Israeli negotiator Gershon Baskin pointed out in The Jerusalem Post that the Central Bank of Israel "does not offer private banking services to individuals," which would make it impossible for Kushner's money to be deposited in the Central Bank of Israel, as Cole claimed. The book addresses that argument, claiming that the money was deposited "in what would appear to be a government account," with Kushner and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu jointly authorizing transactions.
The Abraham Accords, which include an alliance between Israel and the UAE, have often been touted as a way for the U.S. to "spend less time and less resources in the Middle East," in the words of Vice President J.D. Vance. But Cole argues that the UAE actually used its alliance to entangle American interests in a future conflict. The book states that Kushner set up "a rainy-day defense fund" for war with Iran, using Emirati money deposited in a separate Central Bank of Israel account.
Cole also claims to have evidence that Kushner was on the take from the UAE's regional frenemy Qatar. In 2017, the UAE and Saudi Arabia issued an ultimatum for Qatar to rein in its foreign policy and blockaded the small nation. The Intercept later reported that Kushner's father had sought a Qatari bailout for the family real estate business just before the crisis, and the Qatari-linked company Brookfield ended up providing the needed investment in August 2018, leading to a congressional investigation into the deal.
Democrats are still digging for information on Kushner's business ties to Qatar, but three sources told Cole that the Qatari royal family authorized and paid for the Brookfield deal. The Qatari government "asked the White House how to resolve the blockade. And the Kushners kept saying, 'We have this great property that needs investment.' Eventually, the Qataris realized the only way to settle the blockade was to buy the building," a former U.S. intelligence officer said.
Kushner's lawyers write that they have "no evidence that Qatar impacted the investment decision. Any suggestion of his involvement in the transaction or any allegation of quid pro quo with the Qatari government is false and defamatory."
Other parts of the book are better-documented. Cole obtained a draft of Prince's autobiography, text messages from one of Prince's colleagues, and emails from Emirati government adviser George Nader, who was convicted of fraudulently funneling money into Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign. If nothing else, the book is a comprehensive account of the UAE's unofficial empire and its American ties. But the most explosive claims about Kushner's involvement in those activities rest on anonymous sources, making it a matter of Cole's word against Kushner's.
"I considered the responses from Kushner's attorneys carefully and consulted multiple sources about them. During the five years I have spent working on this book, I have tried to keep an open mind, and I am confident that my reporting is accurate. Kushner's lawyers' responses did not change that conclusion," Cole writes in the book's epilogue.
The post New Book Says Jared Kushner Funneled Money to Middle East Mercenaries. Kushner Denies It. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
By Arman Shariati | Press TV | October 26, 2026
Israeli regime’s airspace – the airspace over the occupied territories – is widely regarded as among the most heavily defended in the world.
Yet the scale of its protection cannot be explained by Israeli military technology alone. Russia, China and even the United States do not benefit from an equivalent network of allied support dedicated to intercepting threats before they reach their territory.
Israel’s own defenses are indeed formidable. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, while Arrow 2 targets ballistic missile threats within it. David’s Sling is built to counter medium-range threats, and Iron Dome intercepts rockets and other short-range projectiles.
These systems are backed by fighter jets and an extensive radar network, creating multiple layers of protection against incoming attacks.
But Israel’s air defense shield extends well beyond its own arsenal. From October 2023 through Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone operations in 2024, 2025 and 2026, a group of allied states has played an active role in protecting the regime.
They have provided interceptors, radar capabilities, fighter aircraft, military bases and personnel, helping the Tel Aviv regime detect, track and counter incoming threats.
What emerges is not simply a domestic air-defense network, but a wider umbrella sustained by the resources and involvement of powerful allies – from the US to Europe to Arab countries.
This ironclad commitment of regional and extra-regional countries to Israel’s protection has come at a considerable cost.
The price goes well beyond dollars and shekels. It includes depleted weapons stockpiles that could take years to replenish, damaged radars and military bases, soldiers killed or wounded, and governments facing domestic political backlash for a costly partnership that much of their own public fiercely opposes and protests against.
The burden, however, is not shared equally. The United States has shouldered the largest financial and military inventory costs. The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan have faced intense operational demands and direct security risks. European states have incurred more limited but still significant costs, particularly in munitions and the political fallout from a war that has driven up energy prices and compounded the cost-of-living pressures facing their populations.
The Israeli bill
The Israeli regime’s direct costs are the easiest to track because they fall on its own treasury. In April 2024, after Iran launched a large number of drones and missiles at the occupied territories, Brig. Gen. Reem Aminoach, an economic adviser to a former Israeli military chief of staff, estimated in an interview with Ynet that defending against the attack that night had cost 4-5 billion shekels, or roughly $1.1–$1.35 billion at the exchange rate at the time.
Haaretz later put the total cost of defending against the same retaliatory attack at around $1.5 billion. That was just one night. Many more retaliatory strikes have hit the occupied territories since then.
The cost structure follows a clear logic. Iran uses inexpensive drones and mass-produced missiles, while Israel relies on some of the world’s most expensive interceptors to defend against them.
This disparity lies at the heart of the war’s financial burden. Israel’s broader budget picture adds another dimension. Sustained, high-intensity defensive operations have forced the regime to spend far more than it did previously.
With a net budget of about 60 billion shekels in 2023, the Israeli military could not sustain repeated nights of interceptions without substantial increases in funding and continued US support.
Israel has been able to sustain this costly imbalance largely because of extensive financial backing from American taxpayers. Much of its interceptor production is funded or co-developed through US programs, and the Arrow missile defense system is produced with American participation.
US Congress has also repeatedly approved emergency supplemental funding for Israeli missile defense. These ties mean that Israel’s financial burden and America’s are deeply interconnected and difficult to separate, which explains the public anger in the US.
The American inventory crisis
No country has spent more on Israel’s defense than the United States, and no factor is more consequential than the state of its interceptor stockpiles. Washington may be willing to spend the tens of billions of dollars required to protect their genocidal ally, but willingness alone cannot resolve the US military’s primary challenge: replenishing its dwindling missile interceptors.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank, has published some of the most widely cited public estimates of US missile interceptor inventories.
Its analysis, updated following the 40-day war against Iran, found that American Patriot and THAAD inventories had declined dramatically.
According to CSIS estimates, the US inventory of Patriot interceptors fell from approximately 2,330 before the war began on February 27, 2026, to between 759 and 827 by July 27, 2026, marking a decline of roughly two-thirds.
The THAAD inventory also dropped sharply, falling from an estimated 452 interceptors before the war to between 239 and 257 by July 27, representing a decline of approximately 43 to 47 percent.
Many military experts believe CSIS’s estimates are overly optimistic. Some, for instance, argue that the United States may have fired as many as 290 of its roughly 360 THAAD interceptors during the early phase of the war. That would amount to more than 80 percent of its pre-war stockpile.
Whatever the exact figures, Washington’s decision to prioritize Israel’s defense has left the US military dangerously underprepared and more vulnerable to another round of war if it breaks out.
The cost of replenishing stockpiles
The US Army’s FY2027 figures put the unit cost of a PAC-3 MSE interceptor at roughly $5 million and that of a THAAD interceptor at nearly $12 million.
Based on these figures, replacing the Patriot and THAAD interceptors expended would cost an estimated $10 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has offered a higher estimate, putting the cost of replacing the depleted interceptors at approximately $13.1 billion.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in recent remarks noted that the US spent about $11 billion on missile defense for Israel over three years. In a post on X, quoting a tweet of a former Obama administration official, he said US forces had fired 609 interceptors in defense of the Israeli regime between October 2023 and June 2026, including SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Patriot, and THAAD missiles.
The naval picture
The US Navy’s missile interceptor inventories are also under severe strain. The SM-3 and SM-6 are among the principal naval weapons used to counter ballistic missiles and other high-speed threats.
Public estimates vary widely, with some reports placing combined naval inventories in the low hundreds. A figure of 150–200 for the two interceptor types combined is plausible as a rough order of magnitude, but no precise public count is available.
The broader concern is that naval interceptors are expensive and slow to manufacture, while the Navy must preserve sufficient stocks to address other potential threats, including those posed by China and Russia. Every interceptor expended in the defense of Israel is therefore one fewer available for other contingencies until it can be replaced.
Not all US and allied defenses against Iran relied on ground-based or naval interceptors. Fighter jets also engaged Iranian drones using air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-9X and AIM-120. The AIM-9X reportedly costs several hundred thousand dollars per missile, while the AIM-120 AMRAAM costs more than $1 million.
Using such expensive weapons to destroy drones that cost only thousands of dollars compounds the economic imbalance, even when the immediate tactical objective is achieved.
The trade-off
By the final phase of the 40-day imposed war, following the initial ceasefire, it had become clear that US commanders were holding back dedicated SM-3 and THAAD interceptors rather than expending them to protect American bases in Jordan and elsewhere.
Footage of nighttime defensive missile launches appeared to show almost exclusively Patriot interceptors, with only one exception. The implication was stark: stocks had dwindled to the point where US commanders could no longer afford to use these missiles freely.
The apparent logic was to preserve the remaining interceptors for a larger war, prioritizing the future defense of Israel over the immediate protection of American service members.
That decision carried its own cost. Aircraft on the ground were hit, and US personnel were killed in some of the retaliatory attacks. This matters because it illustrates the full price of managing depleted stockpiles. A shortage of interceptors weakened the US military’s defensive capacity across multiple theaters, leaving American personnel exposed to attacks that more robust defenses might have helped repel – all in the effort to protect the Israeli regime.
Cost, however, is only part of the problem. Production capacity is the more consequential constraint in a prolonged campaign.
Patriot and THAAD interceptors are manufactured in limited quantities, and expanding output takes time.
CSIS estimates that restoring Patriot and THAAD inventories to their pre-war levels will take at least three years. Interceptors ordered in fiscal year 2027 are not expected to arrive until 2029, leaving a prolonged gap between expenditure and replenishment.
The China and Asia-Pacific dimension
The most serious long-term cost to the United States may emerge far from the West Asia region. As US interceptor stocks are depleted in the region, the Pacific is left more exposed.
The Indo-Pacific is where Washington faces its most formidable strategic competitor. Taiwan’s defense depends in part on US air and missile defenses, while Pentagon war plans for a potential war with China assume that American forces can withstand and respond to large-scale missile attacks.
If SM-3, SM-6, and Patriot inventories fall to a fraction of their previous levels, the margin for absorbing such an attack narrows considerably. A few hundred interceptors would be insufficient to sustain even several days of high-intensity combat in East Asia.
The extent to which US military capabilities in the South China Sea and across East Asia have been weakened cannot yet be quantified.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern is widely recognized among defense analysts: a shortage of interceptors in one theater affects the military’s ability to respond in every theater, and the Pacific is particularly difficult to reinforce quickly.
Persian Gulf states and early-warning network
The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan contributed to Israel’s defense in a different but equally consequential way.
Their role was not primarily to supply interceptors, but to provide sensors, airspace access, military bases, and the political authorization needed to put these assets to use.
Missile defense depends on early warning. A THAAD battery cannot intercept a missile it has not detected, and detection depends on radars capable of identifying and tracking threats at sufficient range and speed. The AN/TPY-2 radar used by THAAD is a large, transportable system. The US Missile Defense Agency’s 2025 budget puts the cost of each unit at approximately half a billion dollars.
In March 2026, during the first days of the 40-day imposed war of aggression, the American THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan was struck and destroyed. Imagery showed craters around the site, suggesting that multiple strikes may have been involved.
Buildings housing similar radar systems were also hit at two locations in the United Arab Emirates. Another THAAD radar, at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, was destroyed as well.
Iran also targeted and struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, which was used to track Iranian missile launches.
Taken together, these incidents point to a broader pattern of Iranian retaliatory attacks on US-aligned early-warning radars and THAAD sites across the region.
This interpretation is consistent with the available satellite imagery, which indicates that the campaign extended beyond individual military installations to the sensor network underpinning regional missile defense that has been at the service of the US and the Israeli regime.
Such radars are expensive and exceptionally difficult to replace. Their value lies not only in the hardware itself, but also in their integration with interceptor batteries and the data links connecting them to other sensors.
Destroying a single radar can compromise an entire interceptor network’s ability to detect and track threats approaching from a particular direction. Replacing these systems can take months or even years, and rebuilding them does not necessarily restore the coverage they previously provided.
Radar losses therefore carry a strategic cost as well as a financial one. Once a radar is destroyed, the states that depend on it must decide whether to rebuild it at an exposed location, relocate it, or accept a gap in their defensive coverage.
By providing Israel and the United States with tracking data on Iranian projectiles, Arab monarchies exposed themselves to Iranian retaliation and risked becoming direct targets in a war they had helped shape.
These losses also raised questions about Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability as the wider regional confrontation extended to other fronts.
Yemen is a prominent example. Damage to radar and air defense assets across the Persian Gulf may have further complicated Saudi Arabia’s position in its prolonged war against Yemen.
Although the Ansarullah-led Yemeni military possesses independent capabilities, and Saudi Arabia’s difficulties in Yemen stem from numerous military, political, and strategic factors, the decision to contribute to Israel’s defense added another layer of risk for the Persian Gulf monarchies.
Their involvement exposed critical military infrastructure to retaliation and potentially weakened their ability to respond to threats beyond the immediate confrontation with Iran.
Jordan’s exposed position
Jordan’s case is perhaps the most striking because of its small military and fragile economy. The country hosts US occupation forces, including a THAAD battery at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, and lies along the flight paths of missiles and drones traveling between Iran and the Israeli-occupied territories.
During Iran’s 2024 retaliatory strikes, Jordan’s air force was reported to have intercepted many of Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace. The Jordanian government defended these actions as necessary to protect its territory and citizens – a lame justification.
For a country with limited military resources, however, the cost was significant: every interceptor fired and every fighter jet scrambled placed additional demands on an already constrained defense budget.
The political cost was even greater. Jordan has a large population of Palestinian origin, and public opinion is strongly sympathetic to Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank as well as the Axis of Resistance.
Jordan’s decision to intercept Iranian projectiles launched in retaliation for Israeli strikes proved controversial domestically, with Jordanians slamming their government for helping protect the Israeli regime.
Jordan made this choice despite facing its own concerns about Israel’s regional ambitions. Members of Israel’s ruling regime have openly advocated annexing the occupied West Bank, while some have promoted proposals that would displace Palestinians into Jordan.
This context makes Amman’s involvement in regional missile defense particularly sensitive. The country faces the dual risk of Iranian retaliation against US military assets on its soil and growing domestic anger over its role in protecting Israel.
Jordan’s economic vulnerabilities compound these pressures. Public debt, energy costs, and the burden of hosting refugees already strain its finances. Against this backdrop, even a relatively modest additional military expenditure can have significant consequences.
Jordan’s experience illustrates how participation in regional missile defense can impose not only military and financial costs, but also serious domestic political risks.
Europe’s price
European states paid in a different currency. Most did not expend large numbers of interceptors against Iranian drones, but their involvement carried costs across three main areas: munitions, military operations, and the economic shock of the war imposed on Iran.
France deployed air assets to the region to intercept drones and missiles over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Some reports suggested that French stocks of air-to-air missiles, including the MICA, came under strain.
Such shortages would be significant, given France’s other military commitments. Its air force and weapons inventories are already stretched across support for Ukraine, operations in the Sahel, and the maintenance of its own strategic deterrent. Each additional deployment reduces the resources available for other missions.
Britain used its bases in Cyprus, including RAF Akrotiri, as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf, to support operations against Iran. Reports indicated that RAF aircraft intercepted drones and missiles. The British armed forces are considerably smaller than they were at the height of the country’s military power, and sustained operations of this kind consume substantial flying hours, spare parts, and personnel capacity.
Europe’s greatest burden, however, has been economic and political. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the collapse of Persian Gulf energy exports drove up oil, gas, and diesel prices.
Europe’s dependence on imported energy meant that the shock quickly fed into household bills, transport costs, and food prices. Many European governments were already grappling with public dissatisfaction over the cost of living before the 40-day war. The war intensified those pressures as is evident now with protests raging across European countries.
European governments that committed military resources to Israel’s defense and offensive operations now face a difficult question: will their own citizens view that commitment as a principled security measure or as complicity in policies that have contributed to worsening economic conditions?
There is no straightforward answer, but the issue has become part of Europe’s domestic political debate. The costs of defending Israel have reached far beyond the battlefield, affecting budgets, energy security, and public confidence in government policy.
Defending the indefensible
The costs of protecting Israel have been substantial, although they have fallen unevenly across the countries involved.
The United States has spent billions of dollars and depleted significant portions of its advanced interceptor stockpiles, with replenishment expected to take years. The Persian Gulf states and Jordan have suffered damage to radar and air defense assets while assuming additional security risks.
European countries have borne the costs of munitions and military operations, alongside an energy shock that has intensified public anger over the cost of living.
Yet the financial figures tell only part of the story. The more fundamental question is whether the policies driving these expenditures serve the interests of the governments and populations bearing the costs.
The costs are real and continue to mount: public expenditure, depleted interceptor stockpiles, damaged radars and military bases, and the heightened risk of retaliation against countries drawn into a war beyond their borders. Meanwhile, rising fuel, food, and housing costs have placed additional pressure on ordinary households, deepening public frustration with government decisions.
Israel’s regional military campaign has drawn its partners further into a confrontation whose consequences extend well beyond the immediate battlefield. For these governments, the challenge is no longer simply how to sustain their support for Israel, but how to justify its mounting costs to their own populations.
The question is how much more they are willing to spend, how much additional risk they are prepared to accept, and how long their citizens will continue to support a policy whose burdens are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
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