I had to be dismissed by the Trump administration in 2025 before I truly understood how fragile the fabric of our society in the United States had become. Values we had long regarded as universal — such as ending world hunger, HIV, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases — suddenly became political bargaining chips. I never imagined the day would come when my country would abruptly and recklessly cut off supplies of medical equipment, emergency food, and rape kits destined for some of the world’s poorest people, with a death toll that is hard to calculate.
A ceasefire around Russian-occupied Oleshky in Kherson Oblast took effect at 03:00 on 27 October Kyiv time, and both sides were complying with the agreements, Ukraine’s human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported that its forces had stopped firing on the Kherson axis at 04:00 Moscow time, at the same moment.
Russia has kept Oleshky cut off for months. In June, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented worsening shortages of food, medicine, and medical care there and in neighboring Hola Prystan. As of 8 October, Lubinets’ office still saw no practical breakthrough toward an organized evacuation, with 358 residents verified as needing help to leave. The ceasefire is the first step that has to hold before aid can go in and residents can leave, an operation Marc Beckman, the first lady’s chief adviser, expects to take five to seven days.
By 09:00 on 27 October, Russian forces were still observing the ceasefire, according to Pavlo Drohal, spokesperson for Ukraine’s 30th Marine Corps. Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office, announced that the mission had begun and that Lubinets had gone to the site to coordinate it.
The White House announced on 23 October that First Lady Melania Trump had secured a localized ceasefire, set to begin on 29 October. The same evening, Russia’s chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov announced a ceasefire on the Kherson axis from 27 October, with engineering reconnaissance and a secured route for a humanitarian convoy. Ukraine’s General Staff followed, introducing a ceasefire in a designated area from the same hour.
Beckman told Ukrinform on 26 October that Russia had moved the ceasefire two days earlier and extended it beyond Oleshky into Kherson Oblast. Lubinets said on 23 October that the mission should effectively begin on 29 October, after demining, adding that the date was not a matter of principle for either side.
People in Oleshky wait for food supplies. Photo: BBC
A day after the announcement, Lubinets and his Russian counterpart Yana Lantratova, who lead the two negotiating groups, confirmed the timing in an online meeting, he said. According to Lubinets, the agreement covers demining the road to Oleshky, delivering food, water, medicine, and hospital equipment, and safe movement for civilians.
Newsmax to document the operation
Meanwhile, Melania Trump said she had secured an “impartial American media organization” to accompany the Russian and Ukrainian teams. Beckman named it as Newsmax. He said he had worked directly with the channel’s owner, and that its journalists would record testimony as what he called neutral American observers.
Residents could leave for Ukraine or Russia, or stay, Beckman said. He added that Russia had assured Kyiv and Washington it would respect their choice of destination. Both governments asked him not to disclose what guarantees Russia gave or how violations would be handled, he said. He expects the operation to take five to seven days after 29 October, with an extension possible if both sides agree.
Diplomat doubts the truce will move peace talks
At the same time, Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Ukraine’s ambassador to the EU in 2010–2015, told Radio NV the truce became possible only through the personal involvement of Donald and Melania Trump. The US president, he said, sees it as a way to show Americans he is bringing peace closer. He said he expects Russia to attempt provocations aimed at pushing residents toward the Russian side.
Yelisieiev said he does not share the optimism of those who think Oleshky could push the wider peace process forward. He compared it to the Black Sea grain corridor, a one-off arrangement that no longer works. He warned of a “diplomatic smokescreen”: Russia imitates negotiations while it keeps fighting, hoping Ukraine and its partners weaken over time.
Ukrainian drone delivering aid to occupied Oleshky on the night of 4 October. Screenshot from video: Ivan Vyhivskyi / Facebook
A town under blockade
Oleshky lies on the left bank of the Dnipro, about 4 km from Kherson, and has been occupied since February 2022, Radio Svoboda reported. The White House says it had about 24,000 residents before the war and estimates 1,700 to 2,000 remain, mostly elderly, including about 50 children. Russian troops have also seized food dropped by Ukrainian drones, a local official said.
The European Union has approved the mobilisation of approximately €4.9 billion under the European Peace Facility (EPF), implementing a significant part of an earlier agreement intended to resolve disagreements over military assistance to Ukraine.
The eight decisions, adopted by the Council on 26th October, allocate €4.7 billion towards partial reimbursement of military equipment already supplied by member states and €230 million towards the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine.
Although the announcement represents an important step in restoring the operation of an established financing mechanism, most of the money does not correspond to fresh deliveries of military equipment.
That distinction is important as European governments attempt to reconcile continued support for Kyiv with growing pressure on national defence budgets and the need to replenish their own military inventories.
From political agreement to financial implementation
The decisions implement part of the €6.6 billion agreement reached by EU governments on 25th September, which ended a prolonged dispute over the allocation of European Peace Facility resources.
Under the original arrangement, €4.7 billion was earmarked for reimbursements, €1 billion for new joint procurement and approximately €900 million for training-related expenditure.
Monday’s decisions authorise most of the reimbursement component alongside a further allocation for training. They do not, by themselves, demonstrate that the separately planned €1 billion in new military equipment has been purchased or delivered.
The distinction reflects the unusual structure of the European Peace Facility.
Established in March 2021, the EPF operates outside the EU’s regular budget and finances security and defence assistance, including military equipment supplied by member states to partner countries.
Governments can provide weapons from their national stocks and subsequently seek partial reimbursement. This enables the EU to share some of the costs, although actual deliveries remain dependent on national decisions, industrial capacity and available equipment.
Reimbursements therefore strengthen the financial position of contributing governments without necessarily increasing Ukraine’s immediate stock of weapons.
Nevertheless, by reducing the financial burden of earlier donations, the mechanism can help governments preserve the capacity to make further contributions.
Military training becomes a longer-term commitment
The additional €230 million for the EU Military Assistance Mission also reflects the increasingly institutional character of European military support.
Established in November 2022, EUMAM Ukraine provides training for Ukrainian personnel through facilities and instructors made available by participating countries.
The EU has agreed to extend the mission for another two years, moving military training beyond a series of short-term emergency measures.
Training programmes can be adapted to battlefield requirements, including the operation of Western equipment, command procedures, engineering and specialised military functions.
However, the usefulness of training also depends on the availability of appropriate weapons, ammunition and replacement equipment once personnel return to Ukraine.
The Council says the latest decisions bring overall support under the European Peace Facility to approximately €10.8 billion, comprising €9.9 billion associated with military assistance reimbursements and €950 million for training.
Frozen Russian assets and the defence industry
A separate financing mechanism is increasingly relevant to European support for Ukraine.
The Council reports that €3.5 billion in extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets has already been channelled through the EPF to finance ammunition, air defence and drones.
More than €1.5 billion of the resulting procurement has been directed towards Ukraine’s own defence industry.
This creates a different relationship between European financing and Ukrainian military production.
Rather than relying exclusively on weapons taken from European stockpiles, the arrangement allows part of the support to be translated into orders for equipment manufactured inside Ukraine.
The approach may also reduce certain transport and procurement constraints, although production remains vulnerable to Russian attacks, component shortages and interruptions to electricity supplies.
The legal and political questions surrounding Russian-asset revenues remain significant. As EU Today previously examined, disputes over how European institutions approve funding measures have generated legal challenges.
The next test for European governments
At their 15–16 October summit, EU leaders welcomed the EPF agreement and continuing disbursements under the separate €90 billion Ukraine support loan covering 2026 and 2027.
The two instruments serve different purposes. The loan supports wider Ukrainian financial and defence requirements, while the EPF provides a mechanism for sharing the costs of military assistance.
For Kyiv, the central question is how rapidly European financial commitments can be converted into deliverable military capabilities.
For EU governments, the challenge is whether reimbursement mechanisms, national procurement and Ukrainian industrial production can operate together on a predictable basis.
The release of €4.9 billion resolves an important financing issue. It does not eliminate the continuing requirement for new equipment, ammunition and sustained production.
At least one person has been killed and 15 injured in successive Russian attacks on the Ukrainian capital. Strikes damaged a university campus, residential buildings and the Southern Bridge, disrupting metro services, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Ukraine’s allies of delaying critical air defence supplies.
Russian forces launched successive attacks on Kyiv between Monday evening, 26th October, and Tuesday morning, striking a university campus, residential neighbourhoods and a major bridge across the Dnipro River, causing casualties and disrupting transport across the Ukrainian capital.
At least one person was killed and 15 injured, according to updated reports on Tuesday. The attacks damaged university buildings and student accommodation in eastern Kyiv, while a subsequent strike hit the Pivdennyi, or Southern, Bridge, interrupting road and underground railway services between the two banks of the city.
The first wave began shortly before 10pm on Monday, when Russian ballistic missiles struck the Desnianskyi district, near Lisova metro station and Kyoto Park.
Buildings belonging to the State University of Trade and Economics were damaged, including student dormitories. Residential properties, medical facilities and vehicles were also affected.
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko initially reported ten injured, most of them students. Nine required hospital treatment, including three in serious condition.
In the neighbouring Dniprovskyi district, emergency workers recovered a body from a severely damaged building. Two ambulance workers responding to an emergency call were also injured.
Southern Bridge struck in renewed attack
A second wave of Russian attacks followed in the early hours of Tuesday.
The Southern Bridge was struck again, damaging infrastructure used by Kyiv’s underground railway system and forcing authorities to restrict traffic across the Dnipro.
Metro operations were disrupted on two lines. On the green line, trains operated only between Syrets and Vydubychi on the western bank and between Osokorky and Chervonyi Khutir on the eastern bank. Services across the bridge were suspended.
On the red line, Chernihivska and Lisova stations were temporarily closed, with trains operating between Akademmistechko and Darnytsia.
The bridge is one of Kyiv’s principal transport connections between its eastern and western districts, carrying both road traffic and part of the metro network.
Repeated damage to transport crossings has complicated movement across the capital, particularly for residents travelling between the densely populated eastern districts and workplaces in central and western Kyiv.
Zelenskyy: Delays in air defence help Russian attacks
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded to Monday’s strikes by accusing Russia of targeting crowded civilian areas and warning that delays in Western air defence deliveries were increasing Ukraine’s vulnerability.
In a statement published on Telegram, he said Russian ballistic missiles had struck university grounds, Kyoto Park, areas near a metro station and residential buildings.
The president said there were no military installations near the affected sites and warned that further attacks remained possible.
He linked the casualties directly to Ukraine’s continuing difficulties obtaining sufficient air defence equipment.
“Artificial delays in providing air defence to Ukraine help terror,” Zelenskyy said.
He urged Western governments to ensure that political agreements on military assistance were implemented without administrative delays.
Zelenskyy also argued that Ukraine required weapons capable of destroying Russian ballistic missile launchers before missiles could be fired, rather than relying entirely on interception.
Such capabilities, he said, would offer a more effective means of protecting civilian lives.
Washington faces questions over interceptor deliveries
His criticism came hours after he publicly disclosed that Ukraine had been waiting almost a month for US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth to approve deliveries of missiles for Patriot and NASAMS air defence systems.
“In particular, we have been waiting for nearly a month for Mr Hegseth to sign off on missiles for Patriots and NASAMS,” Zelenskyy said on 26th October.
He instructed Ukrainian officials to raise the matter again with Washington.
Some of these weapons are purchased through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, or PURL, which allows allied governments to finance American military equipment destined for Ukraine.
However, US-made weapons may remain subject to American export and transfer authorisations even when European governments have agreed to finance their procurement.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that a shipment of air-defence missiles may have been delayed, but said the delay was not politically motivated. Ukraine has said it is waiting for US approval for missiles for its Patriot and NASAMS systems, as its forces face shortages of the ammunition needed to intercept incoming attacks.
The precise effect of the outstanding approvals on Kyiv’s ability to defend itself during the latest strikes has not been established. The delay adds to the pressure on a country already trying to protect its cities and critical infrastructure with limited air-defence stocks.
Kyiv’s continuing ballistic missile vulnerability
Ballistic missiles present particular challenges for Ukrainian air defences because of their high speeds and the limited time available to detect, track and intercept incoming weapons.
Patriot systems equipped with appropriate interceptors are among Ukraine’s principal defences against such attacks. Their effectiveness depends not only on the availability of launchers and radar systems but also on adequate stocks of interceptor missiles.
Russia’s repeated attacks on the Southern Bridge also demonstrate the wider consequences of damage to urban infrastructure. Even when a transport crossing remains structurally intact, damage to railway equipment or nearby installations can interrupt services for thousands of passengers.
The latest bombardment followed another substantial Russian attack on Kyiv on 21st–22nd October, which killed one person and injured more than 20.
For Ukraine, the attacks have reinforced two immediate requirements: protecting essential infrastructure against further strikes and securing a reliable supply of interceptor missiles.
Whether Washington can accelerate the outstanding approvals, and whether European partners can provide additional ammunition from their own stocks, will be central to Ukraine’s air defence preparations as winter approaches.
Many of the people left in Oleshky, where bombardment is constant, have run out of food. A truce that began Tuesday is supposed to allow aid in and civilians out.
Net-covered streets on Wednesday in Kherson, Ukraine, during a temporary cease-fire to allow for an upcoming evacuation of civilians from the neighboring town of Oleshky.
Many people left in Oleshky, where bombardment is constant, have run out of food. A truce set to begin early Tuesday is supposed to allow aid in and civilians out.
Many people left in Oleshky, where bombardment is constant, have run out of food. A truce set to begin early Tuesday is supposed to allow aid in and civilians out.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Iryna Simakina was in Enerhodar, a city in southern Ukraine, home to Europe's largest nuclear power plant.
As Russian forces advanced on the city, staying became increasingly dangerous. Simakina, who uses a wheelchair because of a disability, eventually left
A review of “Crossing the Red Line: Biden, His Advisors, and Israel’s War in Gaza.” The President deferred again and again to Israel’s narrative and sold weapons that were used in war crimes.
The prime minister also told Israelis to 'prepare yourselves' for U.S. aid to end, saying that 'the United States has changed. It's over, and it will come to an end. It's only a matter of time'
Calculations from the Center for Global Development say spending next year is likely to be £410m less than anticipated
The UK is on course to miss its target of spending 0.3% of national income on international aid by an estimated £400m by the end of next year.
Calculations from the Center for Global Development (CGD) found the UK was on course for a large shortfall in promised official development assistance at the end of 2027.
If Democrats win the House, and possibly the Senate, a result nonpartisan analysts call plausible, they would gain the power to bring new Ukraine aid to a vote and to push back on President Donald Trump’s deals easing pressure on Russia, Reuters reports in an analysis of how US foreign policy could shift.
The stakes are concrete. Trump has largely halted direct US aid to Ukraine, which lawmakers of both parties had backed, and its current supplies run from packages passed under his predecessor.
Weeks ago, he also waived the sanctions on Russian energy that Congress had written into law and struck a deal to bring Russian diesel back to the market, angering Republicans and Democrats alike.
What a Democratic Congress could do for Ukraine
With both chambers, Democrats could put new Ukraine aid on the floor, and given the bipartisan support such aid has drawn, it could pass with the two-thirds majorities needed to override a Trump veto.
Other steps could be taken, too. Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, in line to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee if his party wins control, has already introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump’s plan to return Russian diesel to the global market.
Democrats are also readier than Trump’s Republicans to rein in military spending. They blocked his request for an unprecedented 67% rise in the military budget, to $1.5 trillion, in the Senate, and many say they will try to restore the foreign aid he has withheld or canceled.
The limits of a slice of power
The leverage has limits. Even with both chambers, Democrats would still face a president who can veto, and overriding him would require two-thirds of each chamber. The pattern has already been visible in Iran: Trump launched that war on 28 February without congressional approval, and when a War Powers resolution passed with a handful of Republican votes, his administration ignored it.
On a Sunday morning in October 2019, the chief of the virus ecology unit at the National Institutes of Health’s Rocky Mountain Laboratories emailed a postdoctoral scientist in his lab with an idea.
Vincent Munster and his postdoc, Michael Letko, had spent that year building a system to rapidly test whether dozens of SARS-related bat coronaviruses could infect human cells.
That week, Munster read a new preprint from prominent virologists Vineet Menachery and Ralph Baric’s lab groups showing that the protease trypsin could unlock entry for certain coronaviruses that otherwise would not infect human cells.
Letko had forwarded him the paper two days earlier with the note, “Seems like more groups will be converging on this idea soon.”
“You should be able to make S with a more broader cleavage signature (like furin-like) to enhance infectivity,” Munster wrote back on Oct. 6, 2019. “You can include a motif like this R-X-[K/R]-R↓ Might be cool to get some synthesized.”
In virology parlance, “S” is the coronavirus spike protein, which allows the virus to latch onto the cells it infects, and R-X-[K/R]-R is a furin cleavage site motif, which can make viruses better able to infect cells and spread.
Munster was suggesting that his postdoc engineer a furin site into a coronavirus spike protein to make it more infectious.
Eleven weeks later, a coronavirus carrying a similar furin cleavage site emerged in Wuhan, China, spawning the COVID-19 pandemic. It remains the only known sarbecovirus, the SARS-related group of coronaviruses that Munster and Letko were then screening, to have one.
The email exchange has never been made public before. It appears in a 270-page batch of records recently released by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to U.S. Right to Know in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act.
The request sought specific correspondence from Munster’s lab in Hamilton, Montana, from March 2019 through Jan. 22, 2020, the date when his group published one of the first papers showing that the new coronavirus used a human cell receptor called ACE2 as a doorway into cells.
Two new threads run through the records: Weeks before the pandemic began, a senior NIH virologist proposed in writing to build into a SARS-like spike protein the feature that would become the central argument for COVID-19’s laboratory origin: a furin cleavage site.
And, through the same year, his lab was asking virus hunters for unpublished bat coronavirus spike sequences, and getting them, including from researchers in the U.S.-funded consortium called PREDICT, whose New York-based lead partner, EcoHealth Alliance, had a long-standing collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) to collect and study SARS-related viruses.
Each goes to a different key point in the origins debate. The furin cleavage site is the single genetic feature most cited in the arguments that SARS-CoV-2 did not arise entirely in nature.
Unpublished sequences are the other: because the pandemic virus matches nothing in the published scientific literature, most laboratory-origin scenarios depend on some lab having held a virus the rest of the world had never seen.
Nothing in the records shows that Letko followed through on Munster’s suggestion to insert a furin cleavage site in a SARS spike protein, however. In fact, the furin cleavage site found in SARS-CoV-2 differs from the motif, or short sequence of amino acids, that Munster suggested.
Nor do the documents indicate that Rocky Mountain Labs possessed SARS-CoV-2 or a close relative, or that either Munster or Letko directly communicated with researchers in Wuhan while working on their project.
Their research also used synthetic gene fragments, not live viruses, employing particles that cannot replicate or spread. Such work generally poses lower biosafety risks.
The two then-unpublished bat virus spike sequences obtained from PREDICT, one from Malaysia and one from Uganda and Rwanda, are also too distantly related to SARS-CoV-2 to have given rise to it.
Letko, who is now an associate professor at Washington State University, declined to comment for this story, saying in an email “(y)ou will write what you write, regardless of the truth or what I have to say.”
Munster did not respond to requests for comment. He was indicted earlier this year for bringing mpox specimens into the U.S. without proper documentation and giving false statements to law enforcement officials as part of unrelated NIH research. He has pleaded not guilty.
The NIH press office also declined to answer questions about why the agency had not previously told the public that its scientists had solicited and obtained unpublished SARS-like coronavirus spike sequences, or proposed inserting a furin cleavage site into a SARS-like spike, before the pandemic.
Converging on the idea
Munster’s suggestion to add a furin cleavage site is the second known instance of scientists proposing to insert this distinguishing feature into a SARS or SARS-like spike within roughly two years before COVID-19 emerged.
In 2018, EcoHealth Alliance, Baric’s lab and researchers at the WIV had proposed the same kind of modification to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in work that would have used live, replicating viruses. Their application, known as the DEFUSE proposal, was denied.
The concept is notable because the furin cleavage site that helped the virus cause the pandemic has become central to the debate over the pandemic’s origins.
Some proponents of a laboratory origin view DEFUSE as a blueprint for creating SARS-CoV-2, while prominent supporters of a natural origin have argued that deliberately engineering such a feature would have been unlikely and unnecessarily cumbersome. Munster’s email gives the lab-origin supporters another example of such a furin site proposal.
The revelation about Munster’s lab seeking unpublished sequences speaks to a different issue in the COVID-19 origins debate.
Because SARS-CoV-2 descends from no virus previously described in the scientific literature, any scenario in which it was engineered requires assuming that some laboratory held SARS-related sequences that had never been made public.
In a 2021 review of SARS-CoV-2 in Cell by 21scientists called that implausible. “There is no rational experimental reason why a new genetic system would be developed using an unknown and unpublished virus,” they wrote.
But the records show a U.S. government laboratory doing just that two years earlier.
Letko’s platform was a new genetic system, and he sought unpublished sequences precisely because they were unpublished. Sharing them, he wrote in April 2019, “will surely increase the impact of our story by providing a proof of principle with unpublished sequences.”
Researchers in the U.S.-funded virus hunting program supplied two within eight weeks. One of the researchers, Simon Anthony, was also an author of the Cell review.
Alina Chan, a molecular biologist who has advocated for a thorough investigation of laboratory origin scenarios, recently reviewed the Munster-Letko email records at the request of U.S. Right To Know.
“What this shows is that different groups of virologists were converging on the idea of inserting cleavage sites in the spikes of potentially dangerous coronaviruses,” she said.
“Assuming a lab origin of COVID-19, if a lab in Wuhan hadn’t caused the pandemic, it’s plausible that a lab in the U.S. would’ve eventually followed the same path.”
Soliciting sequences
Munster’s emailed proposal didn’t come out of the blue. He and Letko were in the middle of a yearlong research project that the newly released records document from its start.
Seven months earlier, in March 2019, Munster and Letko set out to answer a question: of the hundreds of SARS-related coronaviruses in research databases worldwide, which ones could infect people?
Letko built a workaround that he and Munster described as a “rapid and scalable platform,” according to the records.
Rather than build each virus individually, they took only the receptor-binding domain — the fragment of the spike that grips onto the host cell’s receptor — and spliced it into a SARS-CoV spike backbone.
They then loaded these chimeric spikes onto harmless reporter particles and used them to infect cells expressing hACE2, the receptor SARS-CoV uses to enter the human airway.
A glow from the bioluminescent enzyme luciferase indicated successful cell entry. With Letko’s method, what typically had taken months to test now took about three weeks.
The limiting ingredient to test their method was the spike sequences. Letko had exhausted the SARS-like sequences already published. So, he and Munster started looking for others that hadn’t been, the records show.
On March 8, 2019, Munster emailed EcoHealth Alliance President Peter Daszak, Vice President Kevin Olival and Columbia University virologist Simon Anthony, attaching a confidential abstract with a chart and figures illustrating their project.
“While we have now tested all of the variation(sic) currently published for lineage B beta-coronaviruses for their ability to enter primate cells, we are seeking additional, unpublished lineage B beta coronavirus sequences to test in our platform,” Munster wrote.
He asked them not to circulate the attachment, because the work was “still unpublished and quite competitive.”
Of the three recipients, only Anthony, then one of the core leaders on PREDICT, appears in the released correspondence. He replied later that evening: “Hey! Looks super cool.”
Two months of negotiation followed, the emails show. On April 5, Letko thanked Anthony “for agreeing to share betacoronavirus lineage B spike sequences with us,” adding that unpublished material “will surely increase the impact of our story.”
On May 2, Anthony reported back from a PREDICT meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia. His team had detected “around 5 or 6 novel 2b viruses,” he wrote, but had “only managed to get spikes for 2 of them so far.”
Because neither had been published, Letko’s paper “would be the first report of these viruses in the literature,” so long as he credited PREDICT and its partners as co-authors, Anthony said.
Letko agreed. Two days later, Anthony sent the sequences. He identified them as PREDICT_CoV-51, isolate PDF-0663, from Malaysia (which Anthony described as “SUPER divergent. Could be really interesting,”) and PREDICT_CoV-43, from Uganda and Rwanda.
“Absolutely stellar!” Munster replied. “Will keep you posted on the results!”
Anthony was generally correct. A small fragment of the Malaysian virus had been deposited in GenBank, the NIH’s public sequence database, in 2016, and referenced the following year in a survey paper Anthony co-authored with Daszak and others. But neither its full spike sequence nor its complete genome was public.
Nothing at all was public about the African virus. In neither case could anyone outside PREDICT obtain the spike sequence, the part that determines whether a virus can enter human cells and the only part Letko’s platform could use.
A step further
Five months later, after reading the new preprint about trypsin, Munster proposed taking Letko’s project a step further.
For a coronavirus to infect a host cell, binding the receptor is only the first step. The spike must then be cut open by one of the host’s own enzymes before the virus can fuse with the cell and get inside. These enzymes that cut protein apart are called proteases, and each one targets different spots.
The protease a spike is built for largely determines what tissues it can infect. SARS-CoV depends on proteases that are not available everywhere in the body. Furin, however, is expressed in the cells of most tissues.
The Menachery-Baric preprint that sparked Munster’s idea had shown that adding trypsin from the outside could unlock entry into human cells for coronaviruses that otherwise couldn’t infect them.
Trypsin is a far less selective protease, cutting a protein after common amino acids rather than requiring a particular short sequence, or motif. What Munster proposed to Letko — engineering a furin site into the spike itself — would let the virus cut itself open.
Instead of waiting for an outside enzyme to do the job, a furin site could clear the hurdle in one step to “enhance infectivity,” as Munster wrote.
The idea had been proposed before.
EcoHealth Alliance submitted the DEFUSE proposal to DARPA, under a program called PREventing EMerging Pathogenic Threats, or PREEMPT. Its key partners included Baric’s laboratory at the University of North Carolina (UNC) and Zhengli Shi, the leading coronavirologist at the Wuhan lab.
The proposal aimed to introduce human-specific proteolytic cleavage sites, including furin sites, into SARS-related bat coronavirus spikes to evaluate and enhance their ability to infect human cells. DARPA declined to fund it, faulting the proposal over the risks of “gain-of-function” research.
Munster was not named on the proposal submitted to DARPA. But according to official congressional correspondence, he had been part of the DEFUSE team two months earlier.
In April 2024, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), then ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, wrote to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and DARPA saying he had obtained documents showing that “Vincent Munster of NIAID’s [National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases] Rocky Mountain Laboratory was listed as a partner in the DEFUSE proposal presented at the PREEMPT Proposers Day,” a January 2018 DARPA event at which Daszak pitched the project to representatives of at least 15 federal agencies.
Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Paul wrote, “was at one point listed as a partner” alongside the WIV, UNC, Columbia University’s Lipkin Lab and Duke-NUS, a disclosure Paul said appeared to contradict former National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases director Anthony Fauci’s testimony to Congress that NIH knew nothing of DEFUSE.
By the time the proposal reached DARPA that March, Munster and his lab were off it; the final list of partners included EcoHealth, the WIV, UNC, Duke-NUS, the USGS National Wildlife Health Center and Palo Alto Research Center.
Paul demanded from HHS records of “all communications between Vincent Munster and any individual from EcoHealth Alliance, WIV, University of North Carolina, Columbia University, or Duke-NUS.” Paul has not released his underlying documents, and neither HHS nor DARPA has publicly answered his requests.
The newly released NIH records show that about a year after DEFUSE was submitted, Munster asked EcoHealth for unpublished sarbecovirus sequences; that he received them from a virologist at Columbia’s Center for Infection and Immunity, the center Ian Lipkin directs; and that in October 2019 he proposed building a spike with a furin-like cleavage site to enhance infectivity.
Steven E. Massey, a professor of bioinformatics at the University of Puerto Rico and a researcher with DRASTIC, the independent group that first published the DEFUSE proposal, called Munster’s suggestion “significant,” saying it “shows the [furin site] idea was circulating outside the EHA-WIV-UNC group,” a reference to EcoHealth Alliance, the WIV and UNC.
Munster’s email does not mention DEFUSE. His idea appears instead as a reaction to the Menachery-Baric preprint, framed as a potential next experiment for his and Letko’s work.
And the motif he proposed is not the one found in the pandemic virus that emerged less than three months later. SARS-CoV-2’s site has alanine where Munster’s pattern called for lysine or arginine.
A suboptimal site
That difference is key. The furin site in SARS-CoV-2 substantially improves the virus’s ability to enter human airway cells and is widely regarded as a major contributor to its transmissibility. Its absence from every other sarbecovirus found in nature is also one of the observations lab-origin proponents cite most often.
The 2021 review in Cell also directly addressed whether the site could have been engineered. Its authors, including Kristian Andersen, Robert Garry and Simon, argued that the site’s own sequence weighs against a lab design.
SARS-CoV-2’s motif, RRAR, “does not match its canonical form (R-X-R/K-R),” they wrote, and is “suboptimal” compared with those of other human coronaviruses.
“There is no logical reason why an engineered virus would utilize such a suboptimal furin cleavage site, which would entail such an unusual and needlessly complex feat of genetic engineering,” the paper stated.
The only prior work inserting a furin site at that position in a SARS-CoV spike, they noted, had used an optimal sequence in a pseudotype system.
Massey disputes that framing. He said excessively efficient cleavage can destabilize the spike and reduce the virus’s ability to enter cells, so a site that looks suboptimal on paper may not be suboptimal for the virus.
The newly released records show Munster reasoning along the Cell authors’ lines nearly two years before their review appeared. The motif he proposed matches the canonical form they describe, not the one the pandemic virus carries, and his lab ran a pseudotype system of the kind they cite.
Read one way, the email corroborates their logic: that a scientist contemplating a furin-like site reached for the textbook motif, and SARS-CoV-2 does not have it.
Read another way, it establishes something the review did not address: by October 2019 the idea of adding such a furin cleavage site to a SARS-related spike to enhance infectivity was circulating not only in an unfunded DARPA proposal but also inside an NIH laboratory.
What was published
When Chinese scientists ultimately posted the genetic sequence of the novel coronavirus spreading in Wuhan on Jan. 10, 2020, Letko and Munster had everything they needed to test it in their system.
The platform did not require a live virus, only the sequence of the small piece of the spike that latches onto a human cell. Within hours of the sequence going up, Neeltje van Doremalen, another scientist in Munster’s lab, pasted it into an email to Letko and Munster.
Letko expected results by Jan. 26 or 27. They came back ahead of schedule. On Jan. 21, Munster decided where to send the final manuscript showing their research. “Nature it is,” he wrote to Letko. “Lets(sic) do 2 authors and speed this up.”
The paper went out that afternoon, to Nature and to the preprint serverbioRxiv. Only 12 days had passed since the sequence appeared online.
The lab made the new method’s speed its selling point. Their method “reduces the time from the sequence being published to having real in vitro data to under 12 days,” the cover letter told Nature’s editors, “allowing the scientific community to gain critical information on virus tropism in almost real-time with the outbreak.”
The work drew notice at the top of NIAID.
“First data from my lab confirming ACE2 as the receptor for 2019-NCoV,” Munster emailed an NIAID coronavirus response list that afternoon.
Greg Folkers, then chief of staff to then-NIAID Director Anthony Fauci, replied: “When this hits bioRxiv might be worth a tweet.”
The paper that was submitted gives no sign that Letko took up Munster’s suggestion to engineer a cleavage site into a spike. But it does show that the scientists used the protease trypsin rather than the furin Munster had proposed.
The paper’s second figure is titled, “Trypsin enhances lineage B entry in various cell lines.” It reports that bat coronavirus spikes that could not get into human, primate or pig cells on their own did get in once the particles were bathed in the enzyme.
The trypsin experiments appear nowhere in the project before Munster and Letko’s October exchange about the Menachery-Baric preprint. They are also absent from the abstract that Munster previously circulated in the spring. The published paper cites the Menachery-Baric preprint that sparked their exchange conversation.
Neither of the sequences that Anthony sent in May 2019 appears in the paper, and neither he nor PREDICT are acknowledged. The only trace of PREDICT in the 18-page manuscript is a footnote citation.
The panel of viruses the paper did report testing consisted of 29 receptor-binding domains obtained from a public database administered by the NIH.
One of the two viruses resurfaced a year later, when Columbia’s Center for Infection and Immunity deposited its complete genome in GenBank on July 6, 2020, five and a half months after the preprint that was to have carried it.
In February 2021, the bat coronavirus from Uganda and Rwanda also appeared in the journal Virus Evolution, in a study of how SARS-related viruses acquired the ability to use the human ACE2 receptor.
Letko was second author, Munster was listed near the end, Anthony was the senior author and the Ugandan and Rwandan field scientists and PREDICT leadership were included as co-authors, as Anthony had said in 2019 would be required. Run through Letko’s platform, the virus could not enter human cells through ACE2 at all.
The Malaysian virus, which Anthony had called the more interesting of the two, has never appeared in a published study. Nothing in the records says why. Anthony, now a professor at the University of California, Davis, did not respond to requests for comment.
On May 24, 2021, two years after he emailed the virus’s spike sequence to the Montana lab, Columbia deposited its complete genome in GenBank on behalf of the PREDICT consortium, crediting Malaysia’s Sabah Wildlife Department and EcoHealth Alliance.
Lewis Kamb is an investigative reporter who specializes in using freedom of information laws and public records to uncover wrongdoing and hold the powerful accountable.
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Ukraine has received more than 50,000 rounds of 20-mm ammunition from Denmark for the onboard cannons of its F-16 fighter jets, with Ukrainian pilots already using the rounds to intercept Russian jet-powered Geran attack drones, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry said.
The accelerated delivery addresses a key need in Ukraine’s air defense as Russia increasingly deploys faster jet-powered drones that challenge conventional interceptors. Ukraine has also relied on F-16 cannons when stocks of air-to-air missiles are limited, making ammunition supplies important to keeping the aircraft effective against incoming aerial threats.
Denmark responds to ammunition request
The Defense Ministry thanked Denmark for responding quickly to Ukraine’s request for additional ammunition, saying the delivery directly strengthens the country’s air defenses and helps protect civilians from Russian aerial attacks.
The delivery follows a broader effort by Ukraine’s European partners to replenish F-16 cannon ammunition. On October 2, it was reported that Spain, Belgium, and Poland were also sending 20-mm rounds for Ukrainian F-16s to counter Russia’s jet-powered drones.
Belgium is also expanding its support for Ukraine’s F-16 fleet. On 16 October, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever pledged to deliver 10 F-16s by the end of 2026, up from three previously planned, and discussed supplying additional ammunition, including 20-mm rounds produced by Belgian defense company FN Herstal.
Jet-powered drones pose a growing challenge
Russia’s faster attack drones are harder to intercept than older, propeller-driven Shahed-type models. Their speed gives air defenders less time to respond and makes them more difficult for many interceptor drones and conventional short-range weapons to catch.
Ukraine’s air-to-air missile shortages have also increased the importance of F-16 cannon ammunition. Ukrainian pilots have sometimes relied on their aircraft’s built-in 20-mm cannon when air-to-air missiles are scarce.
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The threat from jet-powered drones is growing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in late September that Ukraine was intercepting about 55% of Russia’s jet-powered drones, compared with more than 90% of older models.
Denmark’s ammunition delivery gives Ukrainian F-16 pilots more rounds to engage these faster targets, as Ukraine works to strengthen its defenses against Russia’s expanding drone campaign.
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