Late October in Turkey is often marketed as a seamless extension of summer, but this year, the transition has been marked by a stark atmospheric shift. Persistent thunderstorms and heavy rains have swept across the country, reaching from the streets of Istanbul down to the popular shores of the Antalya coast, prompting travelers to question whether the window for a Mediterranean escape has slammed shut. The reality of the weather, however, varies significantly by geography. While eyewitnesses in areas near Alanya reported relentless rain and wind, independent expert Adem Çiçek notes that the most severe precipitation concentrated around the Sea of Marmara and specific Mediterranean pockets like Demre and Fethiye. In contrast, the primary hubs of Belek, Kemer, and Alanya have remained relatively stable. This distinction is critical for those deciding between a late-season flight and a cancellation: the "bad weather" is not a uniform blanket, but a series of localized disruptions. The Trade-off: Leisure vs. Logistics The primary tension for the late-October traveler is the risk of an early seasonal shutdown. There are frequent rumors that low occupancy and rain lead hotels to shutter their doors prematurely. In reality, the closing dates follow a predictable geographic gradient. Most seasonal establishments on the Aegean coast and in Fethiye wind down by November 1, with Kemer following a similar timeline. Those seeking a longer stay will find more stability in Antalya and Alanya, where the infrastructure typically remains operational until mid-November, and in some cases, until the end of the month.

French senators have approved legislation that could expose participants in violent demonstrations to compensation claims of up to €10,000, including individuals who did not personally damage property. The proposal has reopened a dispute over public order, collective responsibility and the right to protest.

France’s Senate has approved controversial legislation designed to recover the costs of damage caused during violent demonstrations, extending potential financial liability beyond those who personally committed acts of vandalism.

The bill, adopted in the early hours of 28 October by 229 votes to 105, would allow the authorities to pursue compensation from certain participants in gatherings where destruction or violence occurred.

Its provisions include a potential liability of up to €10,000 per person and mechanisms for recovering compensation through deductions from certain social benefits.

The legislation, widely described in France as the casseurs-payeurs bill, reflects growing political pressure to respond to property destruction accompanying demonstrations and public gatherings.

However, it also raises legal questions about the circumstances in which individuals may be held financially responsible for damage they did not personally cause.

The bill must still be considered by the National Assembly before it can become law.

From individual responsibility to collective liability

Under existing arrangements, the French state can be required to compensate victims for certain damage resulting from gatherings or public disorder.

Authorities may subsequently seek reimbursement from individuals legally responsible for that damage.

The proposed legislation would expand the circumstances in which compensation could be recovered.

According to the French Senate’s official explanation, liability could extend to people who participated in a violent group or remained in a gathering despite police orders to disperse, when they could not reasonably have been unaware that violence or destruction was taking place.

An individual would not necessarily have to be identified as the person who broke a window, damaged a vehicle or destroyed public property.

Instead, participation in a gathering meeting the relevant legal conditions could provide a basis for civil liability.

The distinction is central to the controversy.

The proposed €10,000 ceiling concerns financial compensation rather than a new criminal fine imposed automatically on demonstrators.

Nevertheless, opponents argue that expanding civil responsibility beyond direct perpetrators could undermine the principle that liability should reflect an individual’s own conduct.

A response to repeated unrest

The government introduced the legislation in September against a background of public disorder associated with demonstrations and sporting celebrations.

Violence following Paris Saint-Germain’s Champions League victory in May contributed to demands for stronger mechanisms to recover the costs of destruction.

Subsequent disturbances during demonstrations on 17 October added urgency to the debate.

The Senate’s conservative and centrist majority supported the bill, while left-wing lawmakers opposed important elements of the proposed system.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez defended the principle that those involved in destruction should contribute to the cost of repairs.

Supporters maintain that criminal penalties alone do not adequately compensate shopkeepers, residents and public authorities faced with substantial financial losses.

They also argue that taxpayers should not automatically bear the costs of damage attributable to individuals involved in violent gatherings.

The disagreement therefore extends beyond criminal punishment to the distribution of financial responsibility after public disorder.

Social benefits become part of the debate

One of the most disputed provisions concerns the recovery of compensation from people with insufficient resources to pay.

As approved by the Senate, the legislation would permit deductions from certain social benefits, including housing assistance and family allowances.

Senators also extended the proposed mechanism to the revenu de solidarité active, or RSA, the minimum-income benefit available to eligible low-income individuals.

Supporters of the measure argue that financial responsibility should not disappear simply because an individual lacks conventional assets or income.

The proposed arrangements would nevertheless have to leave recipients with a minimum amount for living expenses.

Opposition lawmakers have questioned whether deductions from family-related benefits could impose financial consequences on relatives who had no involvement in the original incident.

This is particularly relevant where parents’ social payments could be affected by damage attributed to their children.

The debate therefore concerns both the enforceability of compensation claims and the possibility that recovery measures could affect entire households.

The constitutional question

France’s legal framework recognises freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate, subject to restrictions established by law.

It also permits the authorities to impose obligations and penalties on individuals involved in unlawful conduct.

The issue raised by the proposed legislation is where the boundary between these principles should be drawn.

A system requiring direct evidence of property destruction presents different legal questions from one imposing liability based on participation in a wider gathering.

The latter arrangement would require careful assessment of the individual’s conduct, awareness of violence and opportunity to leave.

Opponents fear that demonstrators could face substantial financial exposure even without personally committing vandalism.

Supporters respond that the legislation is directed at participation in violent disorder, rather than peaceful protest itself.

Any final legislation could face scrutiny over proportionality, equality before the law and the protection of constitutional freedoms.

An uncertain passage through parliament

The Senate vote represents an important stage, but not the completion of the legislative process.

The National Assembly remains politically divided, making the final form of the proposal uncertain.

Deputies could amend the conditions for civil liability, the compensation ceiling or the provisions concerning social benefits.

The government’s ability to secure sufficient parliamentary support will determine whether the measures survive intact.

The legislation illustrates an increasingly difficult issue in French politics: how to ensure compensation for victims of public disorder without extending legal liability so broadly that participation in demonstrations becomes a substantial financial risk.

The answer will depend on the precise safeguards contained in the final text and how courts would be required to apply them.

My home government, the UK, last week somewhat belatedly joined the growing list of EU and European nations advising its citizens to stockpile essential supplies for a minimum of three days, in case of unforeseen (or initially unsolvable) crises.

In doing so, London helped bring into the mainstream what until around a decade ago had been the preserve of nutty survivalist US “preppers” (colloquial abbreviation for the conspiracy loons in woodshacks in backwoods America, preparing for the return of Jesus Christ or a ‘commie invasion’).

Instead, the topic has now become a nervously jokey staple of middle-class dinner parties.

As the conversation wanders from what horrible disaster might befall society, from freak flooding, to nuclear war, to an internet blackout or poisoned water supplies, the talk rapidly becomes one of ‘so what’s in your box’?

The UK list was a ‘success’ in that – unlike the early days of Covid – it didn’t result in mass panic buying, and empty shelves. But the mass panic is a point we’ll come back to.

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The European Parliament’s employment committee has highlighted the need for regulating automated control of workers after visiting Amazon warehouses in Germany and Poland this week.

Seven of the committee MEPs visited Amazon warehouses employing some 5,000 workers on Monday and Tuesday (26-27 October) ahead of the Commission’s Quality Jobs Act proposal expected in December.

The trip follows the committee’s hearing on working conditions in Amazon in January, where workers raised concerns about efficiency goals, safety, and surveillance using AI tools, which may be regulated more rigorously as a part of the upcoming act.

According to a 2023 survey by UNI Europa, a labour union federation, about a half of Amazon’s employees said their work had a negative impact on their mental and physical health.

Workers’ progress throughout the day is usually watched through security cameras, but also the work badges scanned in check points in various locations in the warehouse, and scanning devices used to identify products. 

In the city of Sosnowiec, home to one of Amazon’s Polish warehouses, employees are overworked by “constant pressure of being judged, which is very hard to cope with mentally,” Agata Wypiór, recently-named vice secretary of Amazon’s European Works Council and Solidarność union leader told EUobserver.

Leaving worker management and performance monitoring to algorithms means “these processes become almost invisible,” Li Andersson, head of the delegation, told EUobserver.

“The way the workers describe it, it sounds like a digital panopticon: when you work faster you have to work even faster.“ 

Workers themselves often do not know what data is collected on them and how it is being used to set productivity targets, Anderssen highlighted. 

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Lula vence com ajuda do STF e promete transferência de renda. Flávio contesta, Senado bolsonarista pode fazer impeachment. Convulsão social à vista.

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Em 2002, Lula ganhou pela primeira vez a eleição com o slogan “A esperança venceu o medo”. Seus adversários alegavam que Lula seria uma espécie de Che Guevara no poder e faria os investimentos correrem – nada mais distante da realidade, pois o presidente é amado pelos banqueiros. De todo modo, não há contraste maior do que aquele entre a primeira e a última vitória de Lula. Nesta, as magras e pouco convincentes propostas de Lula logo deram lugar a uma campanha do medo. Flávio ia acabar com o Bolsa Família, cortar as aposentadorias e até tirar de Nossa Senhora Aparecida o título de Padroeira do Brasil – coisa que só o Papa tem poder para fazer.

Essa é a versão popularesca da campanha do medo, e é a mais racional. A versão de classe média alegava que os gays iam ser impedidos de existir; as mulheres, de abortar; e a democracia acabaria. Democracia, no caso em tela, é um conceito esotérico de difícil apreensão. Se a maioria do povo brasileiro é contra o aborto – que, em tese, já é proibido no Brasil –, então a coisa democrática é justamente impedir as mulheres de usarem o aborto como método contraceptivo. A vermos o surto histérico de parte da classe média brasileira, fica-se com a impressão de que uma Era de Aquário do Mal poderia começar caso Flávio vencesse as eleições.

As coisas iam muito bem para Flávio até as 13h22 do dia 25 de outubro. Flávio venceu o primeiro turno com uma vantagem de 2.224.965 votos sobre Lula, e tinha esperanças de herdar boa parte dos votos dos quatro candidatos terceira via, que é majoritariamente antipetista. Os três candidatos antipetistas somados tiveram 5.607.483 votos. O escritor de autoajuda Augusto Cury teve 3.448.569 votos, e os institutos de pesquisa indicavam que os votos dele seriam divididos entre Flávio e Lula no segundo turno. Assim, seria razoável esperar que Flávio ganhasse uns 7 milhões de votos no segundo turno. Lula, por outro lado, contava com a redução da abstenção para reverter o quadro. Expectativa pouco ou nada realista.

Até o início da campanha, Lula nada tinha para oferecer ao povo além de um dia extra de descanso para trabalhadores de carteira assinada, a revogação de um imposto que ele mesmo criou e o fim das apostas que ele mesmo regulamentou. Durante a campanha, ele deu o primeiro aumento em três anos ao Bolsa Família, o programa neoliberal de transferência de renda que o transformou num símbolo da esquerda brasileira, e, perguntado sobre o porquê da demora, disse que não sabia que não houve aumento, e quando descobriu, aumentou. O aumento sequer estava previsto no orçamento. Além disso, prometeu um depósito de 5 mil reais para pequenos empreendedores e uma mesada de 400 reais para estudantes universitários – sendo que o país já está com dívida pública alta e juros de 13,75% ao ano.

O estilo lulista de fazer política foi explicitado mais uma vez no último debate presidencial: tudo o que ele promete é transferência de renda, e toda a sua retórica se baseia em divisão social. Lula chegou ao ponto de dizer que só um presidente nascido no Nordeste poderia cuidar da região, pois as pessoas do Sul e do Sudeste desdenham o Nordeste. Toda crítica a um governo que passou quase 20 anos no poder é interpretada como ódio aos pobres. Lula se coloca como um pobre apenas porque nasceu nessa condição, mas é o único pobre do mundo a ganhar de um banqueiro um uísque Macallan de meio milhão de reais (80 mil euros). Perguntado por Flávio se ele gostaria de pedir desculpas aos brasileiros endividados, Lula afirmou que quem tem que pedir desculpas é a elite.

Diante dessa estagnação incontornável e deliberada, o fato político mais relevante da campanha de Flávio talvez tenha sido a adesão de Roberto Mangabeira Unger e de Aldo Rebelo, dois ex-ministros de Lula. Aldo Rebelo, em virtude da questão ambiental, já havia se aproximado muito do bolsonarismo, então sua adesão em 2026 não é uma surpresa. Mangabeira Unger, porém, é um professor de Harvard que sempre foi próximo do PDT, m partido de esquerda que recentemente se tornou satélite do lulismo, mas que até pouco tempo atrás era desenvolvimentista. Para que as figuras políticas de esquerda campeãs do desenvolvimentismo se aliem todas ao bolsonarismo, falta apenas Ciro Gomes, e foi o assessor dele, Gustavo Castañon, que organizou o encontro entre Flávio, Aldo e Mangabeira, tendo este último pegado um avião nos Estados Unidos para este fim.

Às 13h22 do dia 25, porém, o otimismo da campanha de Flávio começou a fazer água porque o PT pediu ao Tribunal Eleitoral que a votação em algumas cidades da Bahia fosse prorrogada até as 19 horas. As eleições no Brasil vão das 8 às 17h do horário de Brasília, e uma rápida apuração das urnas eletrônicas se segue. A razão do pedido era o suposto complô de prefeitos apoiadores de Flávio para tirar os ônibus da rua e impedir os eleitores de votar. No entanto, os ônibus atrasaram em Salvador porque sindicalistas petistas fizeram um “adesivaço”: quando os ônibus ainda estavam na garagem, colaram adesivos do PT, e se os ônibus circulassem assim, isso configuraria crime eleitoral. Como a circulação de ônibus é assunto da prefeitura, foi a prefeitura que reteve os ônibus para tirar os adesivos, mas até as 10h30 o trânsito já havia sido normalizado (fora que as seções eleitorais ficam a uma curta distância do endereço do eleitor na hora do cadastro do título, e pode ser mudada depois caso o eleitor queira).

Salvador é uma área que dá muitos votos ao PT. Assim, a campanha de Flávio também pediu que as chuvas em cidades de direita fossem pretextos para retardar a eleição naqueles locais. Depois o PT foi direto ao Supremo Tribunal Federal pedir que as eleições fossem prorrogadas em todo o país. O sistema inauditável do STF sorteou o ministro Zanin, ex-adovado pessoal de Lula, que concedeu a prorrogação às 17h05, depois de muitas urnas já terem sido fechadas e desligadas – sendo vedada a sua abertura.

Por fim, veio a apuração, que aconteceu numa ordem diversa da habitual (os votos do Nordeste costumam entrar por último, por exemplo, então numa eleição brasileira normal a direita começa bem e vai derretendo no final da apuração). Para espanto generalizado, Lula melhorou de desempenho em todas as regiões do país. Flávio ganhou apenas 3.721.538 novos votos (o razoável era esperar uns 7 milhões da terceira via), e Lula conseguiu ganhar inacreditáveis 10.376.694 novos votos.

Flávio anunciou que vai pedir a anulação do segundo turno, mas é pouco provável que consiga algo, já que o grande problema do Brasil no presente momento é justamente a confiabilidade do Judiciário – que trata questionamentos às urnas como atentado à democracia.

Justamente pelo fato de que o STF é percebido por grande parte da população brasileira como o maior problema do país, Flávio se empenhou em eleger senadores para poder votar impeachment de ministros do Supremo. E conseguiu: ano que vem, o Senado terá 45 senadores bolsonaristas, o que é mais da metade. Dada a insatisfação da população com o Supremo, não é implausível que eles consigam totalizar 54 votos (dois terços do senado) para tirar no mínimo um ministro.

Lula já governa com o apoio do Supremo para ignorar as casas legislativas e censurar a população. Quando a crise econômica vindoura se somar à política (imagine o leitor que a partir do ano que vem as empresas vão pagar o imposto tão logo recebam seus pagamentos da clientela), o Brasil deve passar por uma convulsão social e enfrentar uma onda repressiva. Não será fácil o fim da Nova República. No presente momento, uma criança já pagou com a sua saúde: numa favela carioca dominada pelo tráfico, as vítimas da sociedade comemoraram a vitória de Lula com fogos e tiros, dos quais um atingiu uma menina.

Muitos antissionistas exigem que o Brasil vote em Lula por causa das crianças da Palestina. Pelo jeito, só as crianças palestinas importam; as brasileiras, jamais.

The midnight sky was clear, the waves gentle, and the full moon lit the way for our inflatable rescue boat to reach the dinghy in distress.

The southward winds of the central Mediterranean had abated for a brief détente in the early hours of Tuesday (27 October), after days of wondering how any small vessel could ever safely make their way out of African waters.

The lethal conditions of one of the region’s stormiest months of the year, were confirmed by the sight of an empty blow-up raft wandering adrift the previous evening.

“Bridge, bridge, bravo, we have a visual on a small rubber boat,” the search-and-rescue lead from the German NGO SOS Humanity said over the radio, while leading the search from the bow of an inflatable boat. 

The makeshift dinghy floated less than 200 meters from the charity’s Humanity 1, 43 nautical miles (90 km) from Libyan shores.

The passengers had been on the water for 24 hours.

Their proximity to a country notorious for its mistreatment and trafficking of migrants kept the rescue team tentative in their advance, as some aboard the distressed floater could believe they are being approached by the EU-funded militias masking as the Libyan coast guard – or by European border forces ready to push them back south of Italian waters. 

Yet at first contact, everyone aboard the distressed vessel lit up in celebration. 

The small raft burst with excitement, as the dozens aboard revived their hopes of escaping the perils of the open air cemetery that is for so many the Mediterranean sea.

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Increase will add strain on healthcare system already struggling amid cuts by Trump administration, experts say

The number of people with dementia in the United States is projected to increase dramatically over the next 25 years, which will place increasing strain on a healthcare system already struggling to help them amid cuts by the Trump administration, experts say.

According to a new study in Jama Neurology, the annual incidence of new dementia cases globally will more than double, from 11.4m in 2023 to 24.7m in 2050. In the United States, the number of adults diagnosed with dementia each year will increase from 514,000 in 2020 to 1m by 2060, according to a Jama study published in 2024.

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© Photograph: Yaraslau Saulevich/Getty Images

© Photograph: Yaraslau Saulevich/Getty Images

© Photograph: Yaraslau Saulevich/Getty Images

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps.

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An increasingly tense situation

On October 24, in the center of Milan, several stores on the shopping streets covered their windows with wooden panels, and some large international chains closed their stores, urging customers to shop at outlying locations. A picture is worth a thousand words. Merchandise is barricaded away, the citizen-consumer is sent to the suburbs, and the “showcase city” discovers it is afraid of the real city. In Turin, at the head of the march, a banner read: “We won’t pay for the war.” The march was stopped by several police charges.

Seven days earlier, on October 17, the Milan demonstration against the high cost of living had ended in clashes all the way to Piazza Duomo, with fifty people detained, half of whom were minors; tensions also flared in Turin and Bologna. The mobilization calendar already has two dates marked: the general strike by the grassroots unions on October 30 and the CGIL strike on November 20, which will be joined by the European student strike.

The government’s official narrative is well known: public order, infiltrators, and violent elements to be isolated. This article offers an alternative interpretation – that of scientific socialism. It asks who is paying for the crisis, who is profiting from it, and what role the state and its foreign policy play in distributing the burden. The answer, I’ll say in advance, does not flatter Palazzo Chigi.

Let’s start with the numbers, which have the merit of not aligning with any political party – at least for now. In September, Italian inflation rose to 4.2% year-over-year, up from 3.3% in August, driven by energy prices, which rose by 22.3%. Frequently purchased items – those bought every week – rose by 5.3%; unprocessed food by 5.5%. This is the highest figure in three years.

So much for the statistics. The political dimension comes into play when we break down the average. In the third quarter, the harmonized index rose by 4.4% for households with low spending levels and by 2.9% for those with the highest spending levels. A difference of one and a half percentage points, which Istat attributes to the different composition of consumption: those with low incomes spend almost everything on utility bills, gas, and groceries – exactly the items that are becoming more expensive. In short, inflation isn’t a rain that wets everyone equally. It’s an umbrella for some and a bucket for others. Marx would have called it by its name: a redistribution of value shifting from wages to profit and rent without needing to alter the contract, because all it takes is adjusting the price.

The National Consumers’ Union has translated the 4.2% into hard cash: an additional 1,108 euros per year for the average family, 1,516 for a couple with two children. On the same day, Istat recorded a plunge in consumer confidence, from 94.5 to 91.2. The October protests are the political expression of that 91.2.

The wage picture brings things full circle. According to the Istat Annual Report, Italian contractual wages have lost 8.6% of their purchasing power since 2019. In the second quarter of 2026, after ten quarters of modest recovery, wages once again began to rise at a slower rate than prices. The OECD forecasts a further 0.9% loss for Italy in 2026 and calculates that, compared to 2021, Italian workers have effectively worked 20 days a year for free. The government flaunts record employment figures like a trophy. It’s right to flaunt them: they’re the trophy of a capitalism that has learned to make people work more while paying them less. More people employed, lower wages. It’s not a paradox – it’s the formula.

The “Leopard” fiscal maneuver

Faced with this scenario, what has the Meloni government done? It has done what it does best: it has shifted cents from one pocket to another of the same citizen, calling it relief.

Take diesel, the fuel for trucks, tractors, fishing boats, and sixteen million cars. With the budget law for 2026, the government had accelerated the alignment of excise taxes between gasoline and diesel, raising the tax on diesel by 4.05 cents starting January 1. Then came the energy crisis of 2026, and, starting in March, a series of stopgap decrees offering temporary discounts. By the end of September, the discount on diesel had been cut in half, from about 12 to 6 cents, and the average price reached nearly 2.36 euros per liter – the highest level since records began. On October 5, the discount expired, replaced by “variable excise taxes”: the government promises to return tomorrow, in the form of a reduced excise tax, the additional VAT revenue it collects today due to the price increase. On October 21, self-service diesel still cost 2.259 euros per liter. The CGIA estimates a total increase of 13.6 billion in fuel spending by households and businesses in 2026 compared to 2025. Meanwhile, Germany – which no one accuses of lax accounting – has cut the tax on gasoline and diesel by 14 cents per liter from October 1 through the end of the year. In Rome, the tax authorities have a long memory when it comes to collecting revenue and a short one when it comes to refunding it.

Then there’s the 2027 budget law, the last of this legislative term, the one that’s supposed to see the government through to the next election. The total budget announced is 23.4 billion. But upon closer inspection, the pie shrinks: according to calculations reported by la Repubblica, about 9.5 billion remains for the government’s “identity-based” measures, while 14.3 billion is absorbed by energy and defense spending financed through the flexibility requested from Brussels. Parliament voted for a deviation of 29 billion “for energy and defense” – two words that, in the government’s lexicon, are now uttered in the same breath.

The mechanism allocates up to 0.3% of GDP per year for defense and the same amount for energy security in 2027 and 2028. According to the Budget Policy Document, approximately 2.4 billion is allocated to healthcare.

The government claims the contribution requested from banks and insurance companies – just over five billion in 2027 and about 10.7 billion over the three-year period. “Fine,” one might say. But the proportions tell the story better than the press releases: the financial sector is making a temporary and decreasing contribution (0.21% of GDP in 2027, 0.10% in 2029) after having reaped inflated margins for years – driven precisely by high interest rates and inflation – while workers bear the burden structurally. Starting in 2027, with the phasing out of “Quota 103” and the “Women’s Option,” the automatic adjustment based on life expectancy takes effect: old-age retirement at 67 years and one month, with early retirement available at 42 years and 11 months of contributions for men. The government that had promised to abolish the Fornero reform has become its most diligent enforcer. For the bank, a one-time payment; for the worker, one more month of life on the factory floor, on a permanent contract.

The European Commission, for its part, warns that incentives for consumption would further fuel the cost-of-living crisis. This is the core of the doctrine: if energy prices rise, demand is to blame; if demand falls, it’s because wages are too rigid. In both cases, the bill falls on those who live on wages. Where, however, is the fiscal leeway? In the clause that grants it for tanks. Butter must wait; the cannon has the fast lane.

Kalecki at Palazzo Chigi: Italian-style military Keynesianism

Here we arrive at the crux of the matter that the mainstream press carefully avoids. So-called European rearmament is not merely a strategic choice. It is also an economic policy, and as such must be judged.

Italy has decided to tap into the European SAFE program, requesting 14.9 billion in defense loans, repayable over 45 years. Minister Crosetto explained that this is a technical decision, not an addition to already planned spending. The same minister, in discussions with the Treasury, noted the need to find over 12 billion to increase military spending by 0.5% of GDP by 2028, in accordance with NATO commitments. Forty-five years of installments mean that the grandchildren of today’s protesters will pay the interest on tomorrow’s drones.

Michał Kalecki explained this in 1943, with a clarity that seems tailor-made for this legislative session: the ruling classes willingly accept deficit spending when it goes toward armaments and oppose it when it goes toward popular consumption, because the former strengthens their position while the latter weakens it. Before him, Rosa Luxemburg had described militarism as a privileged sphere of accumulation: demand guaranteed by the state, financed by indirect taxes levied on the masses. Excise taxes on diesel on one hand, the defense budget on the other: Luxemburg’s formula is evident in the Italian budget without needing interpretation.

The German case helps illustrate where this path leads. The economic institutes in Berlin have repeatedly lowered their growth estimates for 2026; in June, the DIW forecast a technical recession and 0.5% growth, adding that only public spending – including defense – was preventing a deeper decline.

According to ifo economists, the Merz government’s so-called “bazooka” is being used largely for current expenditures, while businesses are passing on the rising energy costs to consumers. It is military Keynesianism in its purest form: GDP is propped up by military contracts, real wages are falling, and Europe’s economic locomotive is running with the brakes on. Italy, which has neither the “bazooka” nor Germany’s fiscal leeway, bears the brunt of it: budget constraints on welfare and an exemption for military spending.

All of Europe takes to the streets, because the crisis has no passport

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps. On the weekend of October 17 and 18, hundreds of thousands of people protested in various European countries, including France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Albania.

France, as is often the case, served as a testing ground. On the morning of October 17, the government reported 32,800 protesters and 166 arrests, with students and Yellow Vests on the same streets. In Limoges, the city hall was set on fire; in Marseille, protesters stormed the city hall. Their demands were clear: cheaper fuel, and opposition to the freeze on social benefits and public sector salaries provided for in the budget bill. Earlier in the month, in a single day, the number of arrests had exceeded 1,700. On October 24, the “Yellow Vests” called for their “second act.”

The parallel with Italy is instructive for two reasons. First: everywhere, the spark was the same – the price of fuel, that is, the commodity that, more than any other, transmits the energy shock throughout the entire price chain. Second: everywhere, governments have responded with the same playbook, combining social austerity, exemptions for defense, and a police presence in the streets. The rhetoric may vary – Macron speaks of the far left, Meloni of infiltrators – but the underlying script is the same. This comes as no surprise. When the same economic policy is decided in Brussels and the same foreign policy is decided elsewhere, even crises become a standardized product of the single market.

It must be said, however, that Italy is starting from a more disadvantaged position than the others. With real wages stagnant for thirty years and GDP growth projected at 0.8% in 2027 (0.6% without the budget), and with debt set to peak at 138.5%, the country has no safety net. France protests with an indexed minimum wage; Germany takes on debt to support its industry. Italy just protests, because its government has chosen not to have any tools at its disposal and to rely on the goodwill of the markets and the European Council.

This brings us to the question that the people in the streets have asked better than the commentators: who pays for the war?

It’s important to start from a firm foundation. The energy shock of 2026 stems primarily from the war in the Middle East and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz; Istat itself, in its Annual Report, linked the risk of inflation once again outpacing wages to the prolonged blockade of the Strait. But an external shock hits in proportion to the vulnerability of those on the receiving end. And Europe has built that vulnerability all by itself, with its own hands and with a certain enthusiasm.

Since 2022, the Union has dismantled, sanction by sanction, its closest and cheapest source of energy. Before the conflict in Ukraine, it imported approximately 180 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year; by January 2026, it was importing 1.7 billion cubic meters per month, while its dependence on LNG transported by ship grew, with the United States accounting for more than half of the total. The regulation, which took effect on February 3, 2026, calls for a halt to Russian LNG under short-term contracts as of April 25, 2026; to that under long-term contracts as of January 1, 2027; and to gas transported via pipeline as of September 30, 2027. According to the IEEFA, the share of U.S. gas could rise from 27% in 2025 to about 40% by 2030. Dependence on a single supplier via pipeline has been replaced by dependence on suppliers via sea – which are more expensive, farther away, and, as the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates, vulnerable to any crisis along the routes. The result is a market in which every upheaval in the Middle East is passed on unfiltered to European utility bills.

The saga also has a second act. In the first nine months of 2026, Europe spent approximately 7.88 billion euros on Russian LNG from the Arctic. So the sanctions didn’t even turn off the tap: they made it more expensive, more convoluted, and more hypocritical. Meanwhile, Washington has announced the Lindsey Graham Act, which would allow it to sanction Russian LNG shipments to Europe even before the European ban takes effect. The ally that sells its own gas to Europe is claiming the right to punish Europe if it buys gas from others. Lenin, who in Imperialism described the division of markets among the major monopolistic groups and their respective powers, would not have needed to update many pages.

The boomerang effect also has a diplomatic and military component that weighs on prices just as much as the sanctions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued in Berlin that Russia might be capable of attacking Europe within 5 years. On October 12, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Grynkewich, promised that NATO forces would destroy anything involved in a potential attack, while Moscow, the previous month, had warned that it would use nuclear weapons if the Alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad. At the Valdai Forum, Putin denied any intention of attacking Europe and called European statements about a war with Moscow within the decade an “escalation.” Everyone will interpret Moscow’s words as they see fit. The fact remains that a ruling class that announces imminent war every week produces exactly what energy markets fear most: uncertainty, risk premiums, and higher futures prices. Fear is a commodity, and we pay for it at the pump.

Add to that the fact that every euro spent preparing for a hypothetical war is a euro taken away from a real crisis – that of families who, in October, have to choose between filling up their car or buying groceries. The rhetoric of the “Russian threat” thus serves a dual purpose. Externally, it justifies rearmament and sanctions. Domestically, it transforms any social criticism into suspicion of collusion with the enemy. Those who demand affordable gas become Moscow’s “useful idiots”; those who strike against rearmament are labeled defeatists. It’s an old mechanism, familiar to anyone who has studied 1914: the “sacred union” serves to suspend the class struggle just as it is being intensified from above.

Who pays for rearmament? A rhetorical – and hypocritical – question

Let’s return, then, to the banner in Turin. “We won’t pay for the war” is a slogan, and like all slogans, it simplifies. But it simplifies in the right direction. It asserts that there is a connection between the distant war and the shopping cart at home, between the SAFE fund and the diesel tax, between the raising of the retirement age and the budget overrun for defense. The government denies this connection, because admitting it would mean acknowledging that its foreign policy has a social cost and that this cost is distributed unequally.

Marxism has never viewed crises as mere hiccups along the way. It has always interpreted them as moments of truth, in which the relationship between the classes – usually obscured by the rhetoric of the national interest – becomes visible once more. The fall of 2026 is one such moment. Low-income families facing 4.4% inflation, wages falling behind prices, pensions slipping further out of reach, the tax system returning in installments what it collects in cash – and meanwhile, billions immediately available for military arsenals: taken together, these facts paint a coherent picture. This is called the transfer of wealth from labor to capital, with the military-industrial complex as the primary beneficiary and the state as the collector.

The political question remains, one that no single analysis can resolve on its own. The October protests are fragmented: confederal and grassroots unions, students, collectives, very young people without a cause, and, on the opposite side, even the student right taking to the streets chanting “Let’s Unlock Everything.” Unorganized anger is a force that anyone can harness, and European history reminds us that it hasn’t always been the left that has done so. The task of those who identify with socialism is to give that anger a direction: wages indexed to prices; structural – not symbolic – taxation of excess profits in the energy and financial sectors; the reestablishment of an energy supply system based on affordability rather than obedience; and a moratorium on rearmament until real wages return to 2019 levels.

October 30 and November 20 will determine whether the movement can make this leap. Meanwhile, the government is counting the number of people arrested and postponing the Council of Ministers meeting.

Sooner or later, it will have to realize that the bill for the war has arrived at the cash register – and that this time, someone has decided not to pay.

Le proteste contro il diesel in Italia mettono in luce le contraddizioni di classe: una piccola borghesia produttiva schiacciata dai costi e un sottoproletariato metropolitano che esplode di rabbia.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il gasolio come rivelatore della lotta di classe

Nelle ultime tre settimane l’Italia ha mostrato, tutto insieme e senza filtri, il proprio rapporto sociale fondamentale. Da una parte camionisti, agricoltori, pescatori, operai siderurgici e una massa di ragazzi che non sanno nemmeno dare un nome alla propria rabbia. Dall’altra un apparato istituzionale che, invece di chiedersi perché il Paese reale sia sceso in strada, convoca vertici sull’ordine pubblico e prepara l’ennesimo decreto. Chi conosce la grammatica del materialismo storico sa che situazioni del genere non vanno lette con le categorie della cronaca nera. Vanno lette come momenti in cui le contraddizioni di classe, compresse per anni sotto la superficie del consenso amministrato, tornano visibili a occhio nudo.

Questo articolo non intende fare la cronaca degli scontri, già abbondantemente raccontati. Intende invece mettere in fila i fatti e chiedersi che cosa dicano sulla natura dello Stato italiano in questa fase, sulla composizione sociale di chi protesta e sull’incapacità strutturale del blocco dominante di offrire una risposta che non sia repressiva.

Tutto comincia, come spesso accade, da una voce di bilancio. Il decreto-legge 17 settembre 2026, n. 162 aveva previsto una riduzione temporanea dell’accisa sul gasolio fino al 5 ottobre; scaduto il termine, il governo non l’ha prorogata. Il prezzo medio è tornato a sfiorare i 2,50 euro al litro. Per un padroncino calabrese che possiede un solo camion e lavora in subappalto per la grande distribuzione, quella cifra decide se il mese si chiude in pari o in perdita.

Le prime proteste spontanee sono nate in Calabria all’inizio di ottobre. Poi la Puglia, dall’11 ottobre, la Basilicata, la Sicilia, la Campania, il Molise, fino al Lazio, con presìdi nei porti e blocchi sulle arterie principali. Agli autotrasportatori si sono uniti gli agricoltori, poi le marinerie. Davanti al mercato ittico di Termoli è comparso uno striscione con uno scheletro e la scritta «Ci avete ridotto all’osso»; a San Benedetto del Tronto i pescherecci sono rimasti in porto. Nei supermercati di Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania e Calabria gli scaffali si sono svuotati, e la gente è corsa a fare scorte come non accadeva dal Covid.

Fermiamoci su chi sono questi soggetti, perché la sociologia della protesta conta più degli slogan. Non siamo davanti al proletariato industriale classico, quello delle grandi concentrazioni fordiste. Siamo davanti a una piccola borghesia produttiva in via di proletarizzazione: il padroncino, il coltivatore diretto, il pescatore con la sua barca. Marx aveva descritto – nel Cap. 1 del Manifesto – con precisione il destino di questi strati intermedi, schiacciati tra il grande capitale che li assorbe e la condizione salariata in cui finiscono per precipitare. Il trasportatore che oggi blocca la statale è formalmente un imprenditore. Nella sostanza, la sua impresa è un salario mascherato: il committente gli impone le tariffe, la rendita energetica gli impone i costi, lo Stato gli preleva l’accisa, e a lui resta il rischio. È un lavoratore autonomo soltanto nel senso che nessuno gli garantisce nulla.

Il gasolio, in questo senso, è qualcosa di più di un carburante. È il punto in cui la rendita petrolifera globale, oggi impazzita per effetto della crisi di Hormuz, si trasferisce lungo la catena logistica fino a scaricarsi su chi sta all’ultimo anello. Il capitale finanziario che specula sui future, la grande distribuzione che non rivede i contratti di trasporto, lo Stato che incassa l’accisa: tre forme di appropriazione del valore prodotto da altri, che convergono sullo stesso corpo sociale.

La seconda piazza: il sottoproletariato metropolitano

Il 17 ottobre la protesta ha cambiato natura e geografia. Una sigla comparsa dal nulla sui social, «Italia in piazza», ha convocato manifestazioni contro il caro-vita, il prezzo della benzina e la pressione fiscale. A Milano piazza Duomo è diventata un campo di battaglia, a Torino è stata devastata una libreria Feltrinelli, a Bologna si sono avuti scontri davanti alla stazione con idranti e lacrimogeni; il giorno successivo, solo a Milano, 271 persone sono state accompagnate in questura e ben 220 erano minorenni, tra i fermati c’erano ragazzi di 12 anni, in buona parte italiani di seconda generazione.

Nello stesso giorno, a Roma, il corteo nazionale della CGIL e altre due manifestazioni sul carovita hanno portato in piazza circa venticinquemila persone senza alcun incidente. Il contrasto va tenuto presente, perché smentisce la favola, cara al governo, di un’unica piazza violenta. Esistono almeno due movimenti distinti: uno organizzato, con radici sindacali e rivendicazioni precise, e uno disorganizzato, giovanissimo, metropolitano, privo di direzione politica.

Il secondo movimento è il più interessante dal punto di vista teorico, e il più pericoloso dal punto di vista politico. Marx aveva un termine per le masse sradicate e prive di coscienza di classe che, nei momenti di crisi, possono essere mobilitate da chiunque offra loro un ruolo: Lumpenproletariat. Usare oggi quella parola non significa insultare quei ragazzi. Significa riconoscere la loro posizione oggettiva: figli delle periferie milanesi e torinesi, spesso di famiglie immigrate, esclusi dal mercato del lavoro prima ancora di entrarvi, cresciuti in un universo di consumi esibiti e mai accessibili. È una dissonanza cognitiva tra immaginario e realtà, e del rischio che questa violenza venga reclutata in senso reazionario, come accadde con le masse di disoccupati e reduci negli anni Venti e Trenta.

La lezione del Diciotto brumaio vale anche in senso inverso. Il sottoproletariato non ha un programma, e proprio per questo può diventare materia prima per qualsiasi progetto: quello di chi vuole incendiare, ma anche quello di chi ha bisogno di un nemico interno per giustificare la stretta. Non è un caso che il governo abbia scelto di parlare quasi soltanto di loro, e quasi mai dei camionisti di Gioia Tauro o degli operai dell’ex Ilva che, nelle stesse settimane, scioperavano a Taranto e a Genova per sapere se avranno ancora una fabbrica.

Lo Stato come comitato d’affari

Il Manifesto definisce il potere statale moderno come il comitato che amministra gli affari comuni della classe borghese. La formula è stata spesso liquidata come schematica. Le ultime due settimane ne offrono una verifica quasi didattica.

Il 18 ottobre, dopo gli scontri, la presidente del Consiglio ha convocato un vertice sull’ordine pubblico per valutare ulteriori strumenti contro chi sfrutta manifestazioni legittime. Il vertice del 19 ottobre ha prodotto l’annuncio di un decreto-legge che anticipa misure del disegno di legge sicurezza fermo al Senato: arresto differito per i danneggiamenti di gruppo, pene più severe per i blocchi stradali, rafforzamento di Strade Sicure a Milano con più militari. La Lega ha chiesto di inserirvi il fermo preventivo anche per i minorenni. Si tratterebbe dell’ottavo pacchetto sicurezza in quattro anni.

Si osservi la sequenza. Un governo che non ha trovato le risorse per prorogare lo sconto sull’accisa le trova, in quarantotto ore, per mandare l’esercito nelle strade di Milano. Un esecutivo che da marzo vara decreti carburanti a scadenza di due o tre settimane, rinnovati solo quando la categoria minaccia il fermo, legifera invece d’urgenza e in via permanente sulla repressione. Persino il credito d’imposta da 300 milioni per l’autotrasporto, approvato a maggio, era rimasto a fine giugno senza decreto attuativo, tanto che le associazioni chiedevano di sbloccarlo. Il sostegno sociale arriva tardi, a tempo e col contagocce; la norma penale arriva subito, ed è fatta per restare.

Questo non dipende dalla cattiveria dei singoli ministri, e chi ragiona in termini di classe non ha bisogno di demonizzare nessuno. Dipende dalla funzione che lo Stato svolge in una formazione sociale periferica dell’Occidente, stretta tra i vincoli di bilancio europei e gli impegni di riarmo atlantici. Abbiamo una spesa militare che nel 2026 sfiora i 45 miliardi e una manovra di rigore di circa 23 miliardi. Dentro questa tenaglia lo Stato non può redistribuire senza rompere con i suoi garanti esterni, e allora fa l’unica cosa che gli resta: gestisce il conflitto come problema di ordine pubblico. Engels lo aveva scritto ne L’origine della famiglia: lo Stato nasce dove gli antagonismi di classe diventano inconciliabili, come potere che pretende di stare al di sopra della società e che se ne allontana sempre di più.

Il teatrino delle contraddizioni

Se la sostanza della risposta istituzionale è coerente, la sua superficie è un catalogo di assurdità. Vale la pena elencarle, perché è lì che la crisi di egemonia si vede meglio.

La prima riguarda la diagnosi. Il ministro della Giustizia Nordio ha parlato di probabili infiltrazioni criminali nei blocchi degli autotrasportatori. Il ministro dell’Interno Piantedosi, interrogato sui ragazzi di Milano, ha ammesso che non c’era ancora alcuna evidenza che fossero manovrati. Due ministri dello stesso governo: uno vede la criminalità organizzata dietro i camion, l’altro non trova regia dietro i saccheggi. Ciascuno sceglie l’interpretazione che serve a delegittimare la piazza che ha davanti, e nessuno dei due si chiede quanto costi un pieno.

La seconda riguarda il palleggio delle responsabilità. Il sindaco di Milano Sala ha lamentato un numero inadeguato di agenti in piazza; Piantedosi gli ha risposto accusandolo di essere espressione di una sinistra radical chic incapace di condannare i violenti senza distinguo. Un gruppo di sindaci ha osservato, con involontaria lucidità, che puntarsi il dito contro non farà calare il prezzo della benzina. È la fotografia esatta di un ceto politico in cui maggioranza e opposizione litigano sulla quantità di polizia necessaria, senza che nessuno dei due metta in discussione il modello che produce la rabbia.

La terza riguarda il linguaggio. Meloni ha scritto che manifestare contro il caro-vita è un diritto civile, mentre mandare un poliziotto in ospedale è roba da teppisti. Tajani ha definito inaccettabile che l’opposizione soffiasse sul fuoco. Il 22 ottobre lo stesso Tajani ha salutato la revoca dei blocchi da parte delle grandi organizzazioni dell’autotrasporto spiegando che il blocco non fa scendere il gasolio e danneggia solo cittadini e imprese. Il diritto di protestare viene così riconosciuto in astratto e negato in ogni forma concreta che possa produrre effetti. Si può manifestare, purché la manifestazione non disturbi nessuno; ma una protesta che non disturba nessuno è una protesta che nessuno ascolta. È il vecchio paradosso della democrazia formale che la critica marxista ha sempre denunciato: libertà uguali sulla carta, rapporti di forza disuguali nella realtà.

La quarta contraddizione è la più grave. Il governo invoca la legalità mentre prepara norme, come il fermo preventivo dei dodicenni, che i suoi stessi commentatori giudicano a rischio di incostituzionalità. Lo Stato che chiede ai giovani delle periferie di rispettare le regole è lo stesso che, per difendersi da loro, è disposto a forzare le proprie.

La crisi è organica

Gramsci, nei Quaderni, ha lasciato la definizione più citata della crisi: il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere, e in questo interregno si verificano i fenomeni morbosi più svariati (chi vuole legga Quaderni, Q. 3, 34). È difficile trovare un’immagine più precisa per l’Italia dell’ottobre 2026. Il vecchio patto sociale fondato sul risparmio delle famiglie, sulla piccola impresa e sul welfare familistico non regge più. Un nuovo blocco storico non c’è. In mezzo, i fenomeni morbosi: baby gang che si filmano mentre sfasciano una gioielleria, ministri che si accusano a vicenda, decreti in serie.

Lenin, nel secondo capitolo de Il fallimento della II Internazionale, nel lontano 1915, aggiungeva che una crisi diventa rivoluzionaria quando chi sta in basso non vuole più vivere come prima e chi sta in alto non riesce più a governare come prima. La prima condizione, in Italia, comincia a manifestarsi. La seconda è evidente nella paralisi di un esecutivo che oscilla tra proroghe dell’ultimo minuto e strette penali. Manca il terzo elemento, quello decisivo: un soggetto politico capace di trasformare il malcontento in programma. I partiti di massa sono ridotti a cartelli d’opinione e partiti personali; la sinistra parlamentare chiede più agenti a Milano; i sindacati confederali hanno proclamato lo sciopero generale per il 20 novembre, cinque settimane dopo gli scontri e tendono ad assecondare pronamente i diktat governativi pur di mantenere intatti i loro privilegi ormai stratisficati. Nel frattempo a Milano è nato un «Movimento 17 ottobre» che annuncia manifestazioni ogni sabato fino alla caduta del governo. Senza radici, senza organizzazione, senza teoria, è difficile che vada lontano. Ma la sua stessa nascita dice quanto sia largo lo spazio lasciato vuoto.

Qui sta il nodo. Ho sostenuto altrove che la lotta oggi non corre in orizzontale, tra destra e sinistra, ma in verticale, tra il popolo e le élite, e che chi riporta lo scontro sul piano orizzontale lo fa perché non vuole che si capisca dove sta il problema. Le giornate di ottobre lo confermano. Il governo ha fatto di tutto per trasformare un conflitto verticale, sul costo della vita e sulla distribuzione del reddito, in un conflitto orizzontale: italiani contro immigrati di seconda generazione, cittadini perbene contro teppisti, Nord produttivo contro Sud che blocca le strade. Lo slogan comparso sui blocchi, «Anche il Sud è Italia», è la risposta più semplice a questa operazione.

Un’analisi di classe che si fermasse ai confini nazionali sarebbe monca. Il prezzo del gasolio a Cosenza dipende dallo Stretto di Hormuz, e lo Stretto di Hormuz è chiuso o strozzato per una guerra che l’Italia non ha deciso ma che ha sostenuto per allineamento atlantico. Già a marzo il primo decreto carburanti veniva motivato con la crisi internazionale legata alla guerra in Iran. Da allora il governo ha inseguito i prezzi con sconti a termine, mentre continuava a sottoscrivere gli obiettivi di riarmo e il rigore europeo.

È la vecchia tesi leniniana sull’imperialismo, aggiornata a una condizione di subalternità. Un Paese che non controlla la propria politica energetica né la propria politica estera finisce per scaricare sulle classi popolari i costi delle guerre altrui. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già moltiplicato le bollette; la guerra nel Golfo moltiplica ora il prezzo del carburante. Il conto arriva sempre allo stesso indirizzo: il camionista, il pescatore, la famiglia di periferia che vede il carrello della spesa svuotarsi. Mentre i titoli dell’industria della difesa salgono, il Paese reale si ferma.

Per questo la questione sociale italiana non si risolve con un’altra proroga dell’accisa. Si risolve, se si risolve, con una rottura dei vincoli che rendono impossibile redistribuire: il vincolo di bilancio europeo nella sua forma attuale, l’obiettivo di spesa militare, l’allineamento automatico a guerre che l’Italia subisce senza averne alcun interesse. Pace, sovranità energetica e giustizia sociale non sono tre rivendicazioni separate. Sono la stessa rivendicazione vista da tre lati.

Chi chiede pietà e a chi

C’è un’immagine che resta di queste settimane, ed è lo scheletro sullo striscione di Termoli. Non è un’immagine di rivolta. È un’immagine di supplica: un popolo che espone il proprio corpo consumato e chiede di essere visto. A questa supplica le istituzioni hanno risposto con il linguaggio del codice penale, con le accuse reciproche tra ministri e sindaci, con la contabilità dei fermati.

Va detto con chiarezza, perché la chiarezza è un dovere dell’analisi: la devastazione di una libreria o il saccheggio di una gioielleria non sono lotta di classe. Sono il sintomo di una società che ha smesso di offrire ai suoi giovani qualsiasi forma di appartenenza, e la sinistra che li romanticizza commette lo stesso errore della destra che li criminalizza soltanto. Entrambe rinunciano a chiedersi come trasformare quella rabbia in coscienza. Ma è altrettanto chiaro che uno Stato capace di rispondere al bisogno soltanto con la forza ha perso la propria funzione di organismo sociale e si è ridotto ad apparato di difesa di chi sta in alto.

La storia italiana conosce bene questi passaggi. Le grandi crisi sociali senza direzione politica si sono sempre chiuse a destra, con un ordine imposto dall’alto sulle macerie di un movimento disperso. L’alternativa esiste soltanto se qualcuno riprende il lavoro paziente che Gramsci chiamava costruzione dell’egemonia: organizzare i camionisti e i ragazzi delle periferie, i pescatori e gli operai di Taranto, dentro un’unica prospettiva che parli di salari, di energia, di pace e di sovranità. Non è un compito per i talk show né per i decreti.

È un compito politico nel senso più antico del termine, e l’Italia istituzionale, per ora, ha dimostrato di non volerlo nemmeno vedere.

Exclusive: Health secretary to extend role of watchdog, which backers say helps hold service in England to account

Yvette Cooper has abandoned plans to abolish the NHS’s independent patient champion after an outcry from MPs across the political spectrum.

The health secretary has decided to keep and extend the role of Healthwatch England, which was due to be axed as part of the government’s reorganisation of the health service in England.

axe the Health Services Safety Investigations Body.

end councils’ automatic representation on the boards of ICBs.

remove the requirement for a nurse on every NHS foundation trust board.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: SolStock/Getty Images

© Photograph: SolStock/Getty Images

© Photograph: SolStock/Getty Images

Dear readers,

We are back with a new issue of the Secrecy Tracker – your regular update on what the EU institutions prefer to keep under wraps. 

I am Alexander Fanta, a journalist with Follow the Money, who has struggled for years to gain access to EU documents. I wrote this newsletter with the help of EUobserver’s Nikolaj Nielsen and Pascal Hansens from Investigate Europe.

Media outlets, journalist associations and press freedom organisations have penned an open letter to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to voice their frustration about the recent deterioration in the EU’s freedom of information.

The letter, which was co-signed by the publishers of this newsletter – Follow the Money, EUobserver and Investigate Europe – urges the commission to end the silent crisis that has hampered journalists finding the documents they need to scrutinise matters of public importance – such as how the member states (mis-)spent billions of euros in post-Covid recovery funds, or how the commission hides its arms research cooperation with Israel.

The signatories of the letter include press lobby groups such as the International Federation of Journalists, but also some of the weightiest voices in investigative journalism – the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.

The letter asks the commission to address the excessive redactions and long delays journalists face when asking for documents under the EU’s freedom of information law, Regulation 1049/2001, as well as the Commission’s failure to keep crucial documents – think von der Leyen’s texts with Pfizer chief Albert Bourla. 

Moreover, the commission should reverse a controversial change to its internal rules of procedure in 2024 which made access requests more difficult by limiting the definition of what is considered “a document”, and putting entire areas of the commission’s work – such as enforcement of its Big Tech laws – out of bounds from access requests.

The leading figure behind the letter, the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Tom Gibson, has asked von der Leyen’s cabinet for a meeting to discuss these issues, and seek improvements.

“The European Commission purports to uphold press freedom in Europe as well as through its external policy”, Gibson said. “Yet, in Brussels, we see that the European Commission is seeking to actually put obstacles in the way of creating an enabling environment for journalists who report on the institutions – in order, seemingly, to maintain an ability to control the official narrative.”

“This has to change otherwise the European Commission can be accused of double standards”, according to Gibson.

EUobserver’s Gaza complaint

Last week, the European Ombudswoman, an administrative watchdog, launched a probe into EUobserver’s complaint against the European Commission. The Brussels-executive had refused to release 17 documents it has on how the EU spent money on bricks-and-mortar projects in Gaza.

We had first asked in February as part of an investigation that sought to get an idea to what extent the Israelis destroyed EU-funded infrastructure in the Strip. We were stonewalled, amid arguments there is no overriding public interest even though tens of thousands of people have been killed, triggering massive Europe-wide protests and flotillas. Our appeal went unanswered.

Now EU ombudswoman Teresa Anjinho is demanding, as a first step, a commission response to our appeal by November 4 latest. If the commission still fails to deliver, she will review the documents herself.

Aarhus Convention vs data-centre secrecy

The secrecy surrounding data centres’ environmental footprint is coming under increasing scrutiny. In April, Investigate Europe broke the news, and reported in this newsletter, that a provision in a delegated act to the energy efficiency directive, which keeps key information of data centres environmental impact secret, likely violates transparency obligations under the Aarhus convention.

Now, Lighthouse Reports has published a story that they are formally challenging the law. Frustrated by facing repeated refusals from more than a dozen EU member states and the European Commission to access data on energy consumption by data centres across Europe, collected under the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED).

Lighthouse Reports decided last September to turn to the Aarhus Convention – a binding treaty aims to protect access to environmental information and is often used as a last resort solution – and its compliance committee to seek disclosure. Lighthouse Reports may face a long wait for a ruling though, as the process can take years.

When EU’s top court challenges transparency watchdog’s authority

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) has challenged the European Ombudsman’s authority to investigate its refusal to disclose past financial declarations of interests of its judges and advocates general, according to a decision published today by the EU’s transparency watchdog.

The dispute began after Investigate Europe reporters, while investigating judges’ currently declared financial interests, discovered that older declarations were no longer publicly available. The Court initially refused, arguing that those documents were judicial and not administrative ones, and therefore fell outside the rules on public access to documents.

Following our complaint to the ombudswoman and its subsequent decision to open an inquiry, the court eventually agreed to release the requested former declarations, but only upon request. So Teresa Anjinho closed the case, as she considered that the court remedied the problematic situation.

The ombudswoman firmly rejected the court’s interpretation: handling public access requests is an administrative activity, regardless of the nature of the documents concerned. She also called for greater clarity on how the court distinguished between judicial and administrative documents. 

So a small victory for transparency, but a broader question remains: should the EU’s top court have such discretion over which of its own internal documents face public scrutiny? 

How to get access across Europe

A new guide promises to give journalists (and anyone else) an easy introduction into making freedom of information requests in 39 European countries and with the EU.

The first-of-its-kind compendium, curated and co-written by yours truly with the help of 45 journalists, academics and FOI advocates from around the continent and published by Arena for Journalism, answers practical questions such as “how can I appeal” and provides contacts who can help in each country. 

Find the guide – free to use and share – under this link.

Oozing panache and bagging awards already, La Bola Negra is an eye-popping war and prejudice epic starring Penélope Cruz in a blond wig and Glenn Close speaking Spanish. We meet the ex-lovers who dreamed it up

When Javier Ambrossi and Javier Calvo – the directing duo known in their native Spain as “Los Javis” – began writing their queer epic La Bola Negra, they weren’t thinking about whether it would be stylish (which it is) or win numerous awards (which it has) or capture what they refer to as “the anti-fascist zeitgeist” (which it does). Instead, they thought only of scale. “I’m done with LGBTQ+ movies being niche,” says Ambrossi. “I was like, ‘Let’s make the biggest, gayest war movie ever.’” Job done.

At Cannes this year, the best director prize was awarded jointly to them and to Paweł Pawlikowski, who made the Thomas Mann road trip film Fatherland. La Bola Negra is now an Oscars frontrunner, with best picture and best director nominations all but guaranteed. Brimming with panache, the movie darts back and forth between three stories set in Spain: in 1932, a young man applying for membership of an exclusive casino is rejected on the grounds of his suspected homosexuality; in 1937, a callow nationalist soldier develops tender feelings for the injured republican prisoner under his watch; and in 2017, a queer historian inherits an unfinished story by Federico García Lorca. That story lends the movie its title and provides the thread that sews its strands together.

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© Photograph: Everett Collection Inc/Alamy

© Photograph: Everett Collection Inc/Alamy

© Photograph: Everett Collection Inc/Alamy

For travelers arriving in Ras Al Khaimah, the promised turquoise waters of the Persian Gulf have recently been replaced by an oily sheen and a concerning dermatological aftermath. Reports from tourists in the northern emirate describe a recurring pattern: after swimming, skin first develops red patches that eventually transition into clusters of small white eruptions. While guests note that the rash does not itch and overall health remains stable, the consistency of these symptoms across different groups of travelers points to a single environmental cause. The Geography of the Spill The skin irritations are a direct consequence of a significant oil spill that has contaminated a large stretch of the coastline. In Ras Al Khaimah, the oil slick has extended approximately 40 kilometers along the shore and continues to expand. This has forced local authorities to close beaches entirely until further notice. The environmental impact has also reached neighboring emirates, where swimming bans have been implemented in specific areas where oil traces were detected. The disruption is localized; the primary tourist hubs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi remain unaffected, with their beaches operating normally. However, for those who booked high-end stays in the north-where weekly family packages can exceed 300,000 rubles-the luxury experience has been compromised by a paralyzed beachfront infrastructure.

Ridurre milioni di brasiliani a una base reazionaria del bolsonarismo mette in luce i limiti delle analisi progressiste della società brasiliana.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Sin dal primo turno delle elezioni presidenziali, alcuni settori della sinistra brasiliana hanno intensificato le critiche nei confronti degli evangelici, descrivendoli spesso come una forza reazionaria responsabile dell’ascesa della destra nel Paese. Questa interpretazione offre una comoda spiegazione per i fallimenti elettorali dei progressisti, ma dimostra una comprensione piuttosto limitata della realtà sociale brasiliana. Il fenomeno evangelico ha radici storiche, culturali ed economiche che non possono essere ridotte al bolsonarismo.

Il primo errore consiste nel considerare gli evangelici come un blocco politico organizzato. Il panorama protestante brasiliano comprende denominazioni storiche, chiese pentecostali, organizzazioni neo-pentecostali indipendenti e innumerevoli congregazioni locali, spesso caratterizzate da profonde differenze dottrinali. Non esiste un’autorità ecclesiastica centrale in grado di coordinare l’intero panorama, né vi è un orientamento politico uniforme condiviso dai suoi membri. Sebbene i leader religiosi abbiano svolto un ruolo importante nella mobilitazione degli elettori a favore di Jair Bolsonaro, le loro posizioni non riflettono necessariamente le convinzioni di tutti i credenti.

Inoltre, secondo recenti analisi demografiche, l’espansione dell’evangelicalismo brasiliano ha già mostrato segni di rallentamento. Ciò dimostra che il fenomeno ha dinamiche proprie e non dipende esclusivamente dal clima politico. Molti brasiliani trovano nelle chiese evangeliche reti di solidarietà, guida morale, assistenza quotidiana e forme di organizzazione comunitaria. Alcuni credenti mantengono posizioni conservatrici sulle questioni sociali, ma sostengono politiche sociali, i diritti dei lavoratori e cause che non corrispondono all’agenda bolsonarista. Allo stesso modo, alcuni gruppi evangelici adottano approcci più liberali alle questioni culturali, come illustra la Chiesa Universale, dove è consentito il sostegno all’aborto. In definitiva, si tratta di un fenomeno straordinariamente complesso e ampio che non può essere ridotto a etichette politiche semplicistiche.

Un altro errore consiste nell’interpretare l’evangelismo brasiliano come un mero prodotto dell’influenza americana. Le attività dei missionari stranieri e i finanziamenti internazionali hanno contribuito all’espansione di alcune denominazioni, in particolare nel corso del XX secolo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza brasiliana ha sviluppato caratteristiche distintive proprie. Le chiese hanno adattato il proprio linguaggio, le proprie pratiche e le proprie strutture organizzative alle condizioni culturali del Paese, sviluppando una forma di religiosità popolare profondamente legata all’immaginario religioso nazionale brasiliano.

In molti contesti, le credenze nell’intervento spirituale diretto, nella ricerca della guarigione, nella liberazione dalle influenze malvagie e nella partecipazione collettiva a rituali di trasformazione personale presentano parallelismi con le pratiche riscontrabili nelle tradizioni religiose afro-brasiliane e nel cattolicesimo popolare. Ciò non significa che queste religioni siano equivalenti. Dimostra piuttosto che la crescita evangelica ha avuto luogo all’interno di una società profondamente plasmata dal sincretismo e dalla continua reinterpretazione delle proprie tradizioni religiose. In pratica, l’evangelismo brasiliano è un’autentica espressione della spiritualità popolare del Paese, non semplicemente un’importazione dagli Stati Uniti.

Occorre inoltre considerare la dimensione urbana di questo processo. Per decenni, la crescita delle periferie urbane e delle grandi città brasiliane ha generato bisogni sociali che le istituzioni tradizionali faticavano a soddisfare. Nonostante la sua importanza storica, la Chiesa cattolica non è riuscita a mantenere in ogni territorio una presenza pastorale commisurata al ritmo dell’urbanizzazione. Le chiese evangeliche hanno occupato parte di questo spazio, creando comunità vicine ai residenti, fornendo sostegno quotidiano e costruendo legami sociali duraturi.

Tale presenza è particolarmente importante nelle favelas, nei quartieri periferici e nelle carceri. Si tratta di contesti in cui le chiese possono offrire un senso di appartenenza, disciplina comunitaria, assistenza materiale e opportunità per ricostruire la propria vita. Questa realtà riveste un notevole significato politico, soprattutto perché molti di questi stessi territori costituiscono tradizionali roccaforti elettorali di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e del Partito dei Lavoratori (PT).Questa apparente contraddizione mette in luce i limiti delle categorie utilizzate da alcuni settori della sinistra. Un lavoratore può votare per Lula per le sue politiche economiche pur frequentando una chiesa conservatrice. Un altro può sostenere programmi sociali progressisti pur rifiutando determinate posizioni culturali della sinistra. Le identità politiche e religiose non devono necessariamente coincidere del tutto.

Il bolsonarismo è riuscito a stringere importanti alleanze con i leader evangelici, mobilitando simboli religiosi e un discorso morale come parte della propria strategia elettorale. Ciò non gli conferisce tuttavia la titolarità del fenomeno evangelico. Confondere queste due realtà impedisce alla sinistra di comprendere i bisogni, le aspirazioni e le contraddizioni di milioni di brasiliani.

Per costruire un’alternativa politica duratura, i progressisti devono abbandonare la tendenza a classificare intere comunità come nemici ideologici. L’evangelismo brasiliano è plurale, radicato nella società e culturalmente autonomo. Ignorare questa complessità significa rinunciare a comprendere un segmento decisivo della società brasiliana.

Three-quarters of all responses were machine-generated in failed attempt to stop bill from passing into law, research finds

AI bots flooded a government consultation with tens of thousands of fake responses in a failed attempt to stop the UK’s ban on disposable vapes.

Three-quarters of all the responses to the 2023 consultation on the tobacco and vapes bill were machine-generated, in what is thought to be the first coordinated attempt to use AI to derail health policymaking in the UK.

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© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

A Russian tourist's two-week vacation in Bali ended not with souvenir photos, but with an admission to an infectious disease hospital after returning home. The woman began feeling unwell upon her arrival in Russia, where her temperature spiked to 38°C (100.4°F), accompanied by severe chills and a fine rash. Subsequent testing confirmed she had contracted the Zika virus, a tropical infection that does not circulate naturally in the Russian climate but is endemic to regions like Indonesia. The case highlights a specific failure point in international travel: the invisible carrier. Zika is primarily transmitted by *Aedes* mosquitoes, species that thrive in tropical environments and are absent from Russia's natural ecosystem. Because the virus does not have a natural reservoir in Europe, every confirmed case in the region is import-based, meaning the risk is introduced by the traveler themselves rather than the local community. In this instance, the medical outcome was manageable; the patient received inpatient treatment, began recovering, and was discharged without critical complications. However, the incident underscores that while the disease may resolve relatively quickly for many, the diagnostic clarity only comes after the symptoms have already manifested back home. Managing the Invisible Risk For travelers heading to tropical destinations where Zika transmission is active, the absence of a specific vaccine or antiviral treatment shifts the burden of safety entirely to prevention. The core of the risk is simple: proximity to the mosquito vector. Unlike a foodborne illness, which can be mitigated by dietary caution, or a waterborne disease, which can be avoided by drinking bottled water, Zika exposure requires a barrier against a biological agent that is ubiquitous in its habitat.

In the village of Dubki, a routine walk to the local grocery store happens at an altitude of 860 meters, where Soviet-era panel apartment blocks stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the edge of the Sulak Canyon. This is not a purpose-built resort, but a residential settlement founded in 1965 to house workers for the Chirkoy Hydroelectric Power Station. Today, around 5,400 residents live across 106 multi-story buildings, creating a surreal urban plateau that overlooks one of the deepest gorges on Earth. The primary draw for visitors is the sheer scale of the geography. In certain sections, the Sulak Canyon reaches depths of 1,920 meters, surpassing the depth of the Grand Canyon in the United States. While most natural wonders require extensive trekking or expensive permits, Dubki offers a strange, accessible luxury: the most dramatic viewpoints are often within walking distance of residential courtyards. This allows travelers to witness the striking contrast of turquoise waters and sheer cliffs without the need for organized transport or entry tickets. The Trade-off of Living on the Edge However, the transition from a worker's settlement to a tourist magnet has created a tangible friction between the brochure image and the reported reality. The infrastructure, designed for a stable population of hydroelectric workers, now struggles under the weight of seasonal crowds. The most pressing issue is water; the local piping network often fails during peak evening hours, forcing many residents to install storage tanks to maintain a basic supply.

In the first nine months of 2026, Denpasar's search and rescue agency (BASARNAS) identified five Bali beaches where incidents involving foreign tourists occurred most frequently: Cemongkak, Padang-Padang, Nyang-Nyang, Tembleng, and Kelingking. According to the agency, the primary hazards at these sites are high tides, strong ocean currents, and difficult terrain, particularly rocky cliffs that limit safe access and egress. The specific mechanics of danger on these beaches are illustrated by recent rescue operations. At Cemongkak and Padang-Padang, rising tides cut off four Russian nationals from the shore. The situation at Cemongkak proved the most critical, requiring a helicopter evacuation for two tourists trapped beneath a rock face. In the Pecatu region, where all three of these beaches are located, rescuers conducted four operations involving foreigners over the nine-month period. Terrain Complicates Recovery The risks extend beyond the waterline to the land itself. At Cape Mbulu, a Russian citizen was found dead beneath a cliff. BASARNAS reported that rescuers had to wait for the tide to recede before they could begin the recovery. The steep slope and rocky terrain further complicated the operation, highlighting how topography can delay critical response efforts.

A spill of oily residue has forced authorities in the United Arab Emirates to close public beaches in three emirates, disrupting coastal activities for travelers in the region. The UAE Ministry of Climate Change and Environment officially confirmed the incident on October 23, with local authorities in Ras Al Khaimah subsequently ordering the closure of all public beaches on October 24 until further notice. Similar restrictions have been applied to the Al Hamria beach in Sharjah and all coastal areas in Umm Al Quwain. Hotel-by-hotel variability The impact on accommodation is not uniform. While some properties have shut down their beach zones, others continue to operate them based on specific assessments of their shoreline. At the Mövenpick Resort Al Marjan Island in Ras Al Khaimah, management notified guests that the beach area is temporarily closed after oily substances were observed on the sea surface and partially reached the shore. Swimming and marine activities are suspended pending further instructions, though the hotel's on-site pools remain available to guests. Reports from travel agents and guests indicate that restrictions have also been implemented at the Hampton by Hilton Marjan Island, Rove Al Marjan Island, and Al Hamra Residence Hotel. Conversely, other properties, such as The Cove Rotana Resort and Rixos Al Mairid Ras Al Khaimah, have reportedly kept their beaches open, reflecting a dynamic situation where each hotel's management makes individual decisions regarding access.

Russia and Algeria are set to re-establish direct air connectivity in early 2027, a move that would significantly reshape the logistics of travel between the two nations. Alexei Solomatine, the Russian ambassador to Algeria, confirmed the current status of the negotiations, noting that the Russian side is prepared to assist with the organizational matters necessary for Air Algérie to return to the Russian market. The core of the current delay lies not in political hesitation but in bureaucratic procedure. The primary task at hand is finalizing the processes required for the Algerian airline to operate its representatives in Moscow. Once these approvals are secured, Air Algérie can resume flights between the capitals, closing a transportation gap that has persisted since early 2024. The practical shift for travelers For those accustomed to the current state of travel between Moscow and Algiers, the difference is stark. Presently, the journey requires connections, extending travel time to anywhere between 10 and 12 hours. A direct flight would compress this duration to approximately five hours, transforming a day-consuming transit experience into a standard intercontinental hop.