The Horn of Africa is where strategic maritime corridors, fragile states, and regional ambitions converge - and it is emerging as a new front in Middle Eastern geopolitical competition.
Israel’s 26 December 2025 recognition of Somaliland’s independence added new dimensions to these tensions, intersecting with Turkey’s expanding military, economic, and diplomatic footprint in Somalia and broader partnerships across the Horn of Africa.
From Turkey’s perspective, Israel’s Somaliland move and its broader regional engagement challenge Ankara’s strategic interests. Tel Aviv, for its part, views Somaliland as a potential gateway to projecting influence near Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and along one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
Somaliland’s longstanding quest for international recognition risks becoming further entangled in the rivalries of Middle Eastern powers, transforming a local sovereignty dispute into a wider contest over the future of Red Sea security.
As Turkey and Israel deepen their engagement, and other external actors pursue their own agendas, the Horn of Africa might end up an increasingly crowded arena of geopolitical competition. The implications for regional stability could be serious.
Israel's Somaliland gambit and the rivalry with Turkey
Situated alongside busy maritime routes, the Horn of Africa links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, occupying a position of much geostrategic importance.
Egypt, Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) increasingly view the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the surrounding territories as a single security environment. Instability in one part of this interconnected region can disrupt commercial shipping, threaten energy security, and intensify rivalries among states far beyond its shores.
Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland’s independence and to invest in deeper ties with the self-declared breakaway republic is very much about securing a strong position in a territory situated in close proximity to Yemen.
This land can provide Tel Aviv with the means to closely monitor Houthi activity, improve intelligence collection, and strengthen surveillance of maritime routes that have become increasingly vulnerable to disruption.
“Israel’s interest in the Horn of Africa is not new but has sped up amid regional shake-up in the aftermath of [7 October 2023],” Dr Burcu Ozcelik, Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security at the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told The New Arab.
“Israel sees Somaliland mainly through a defence cooperation lens, and as a possible staging ground for future offensive military activity against the Houthis. The strategic value of access near Yemen for Israel spans intelligence, surveillance, and potentially military operations,” she added.
Ankara and Tel Aviv’s rivalry and maritime security interests are “mutually reinforcing” motivations, argued Cameron Hudson, an independent analyst with expertise on African peace, security, and governance, who previously worked on Africa at the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and the US National Security Council.
“They are two sides of the same coin and cannot be disaggregated,” he told The New Arab.
However, Omar S. Mahmood, a Senior Analyst for Somalia and the Horn of Africa at International Crisis Group, offers a more qualified interpretation. He suggests that the immediate motivation for Tel Aviv is mostly related to security, while competition with Ankara is a secondary consequence, not necessarily the driving force.
“I don’t think Israel’s relationship with Somaliland is driven by a broader rivalry with Turkey per se. But there are local ramifications as Somaliland itself is seeking external allies as it is uncomfortable with growing Turkish military support to Somalia, viewing it as a potential future threat,” explained Mahmood in an interview with The New Arab.
“So, in this sense the middle powers can get drawn into supporting opposite sides in local rivalries, even if that was not the primary factor driving their engagement in the first place,” he added.
Turkey's foothold in Somalia
Turkey’s presence in Somalia is a product of many years of sustained investment and political commitment.
In 2011, Somalia faced a devastating famine which claimed approximately 250,000 lives (half of them children) amid an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. At that time, Mogadishu did not have many reliable partners around the world.
That was when Ankara’s engagement with the country gained momentum, beginning with humanitarian assistance and reconstruction before developing into a much wider relationship across multiple domains, from investment to military training and security cooperation to state-building.
Central to Turkey’s military partnership with Somalia has been its TURKSOM facility in Mogadishu. This training establishment has been at the heart of Turkish efforts to help build up the Somali government’s ability to fight al-Shabaab.
Ankara and Mogadishu signed a 10-year defence agreement in 2024, extending their cooperation into naval development and the protection of Somalia's coastline, alongside growing Turkish interests in maritime security and offshore oil and gas exploration, underscoring Turkey’s stakes in Somalia achieving greater stability.
Bilateral ties also strengthened when Somalia sought international support following Ethiopia's agreement with Somaliland concerning access to the sea in exchange for recognition - a deal which infuriated officials in Mogadishu.
Ankara subsequently helped mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia, illustrating how Turkey’s influence has gone beyond military and economic cooperation and entailed effective regional diplomacy.
In late 2025, Turkey joined many other countries around the world in strongly denouncing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Ankara feared that recognition of the breakaway republic gravely threatened Somalia’s territorial dignity.
Turkey also has concerns about the potential creation of openings for external actors to establish a presence for themselves in territories situated near maritime routes where Ankara has vested interests.
Rather than reacting with an immediate escalation of its military presence, Ankara seems to find its most effective response to be based on reinforcing its relationships and institutions that serve to underpin Turkish influence in Somalia. This measured approach appears to be aimed at protecting the investments which Turkey has made in the country without setting Ankara up for any overt confrontation with the Israelis in Somalia.
However, Ankara’s efforts to preserve its position in Somalia could have unintended consequences. Somaliland may interpret deeper Turkish-Somali security cooperation as a threat to its political ambitions, prompting Hargeisa to seek stronger external backing and, in the process, potentially deepening regional tensions.
The Emirati factor
No analysis of Turkish-Israeli competition in the Horn of Africa is complete without taking stock of the UAE’s role. Abu Dhabi’s support for Somaliland, even if short of formal recognition, places the UAE broadly on the same side of this sovereign dispute as Tel Aviv.
The UAE has vast strategic and commercial interests across the Red Sea, giving Abu Dhabi high stakes in the Horn of Africa’s evolving security order, while its normalised relationship with Israel continues to be an important feature of the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape more than six years after the Abraham Accords’ signing.
On the other side, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and other regional actors have expressed support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, a position that connects their interests in the Horn of Africa to their wider security cooperation in the Middle East.
Hudson sees the UAE and Israel as a “powerful and mutually reinforcing duo in the Red Sea” which are both willing to challenge established power structures and intervene in disputes in the Horn of Africa to further their national interests at the region’s expense.
“They are happy to pick winners and losers, unsettle established power dynamics, and actively intervene in regional politics and conflicts in ways that benefit them even if that means unsettling regional dynamics,” he told The New Arab.
Hudson contrasts this with “Turkish or Saudi efforts to stabilise and reinforce established power dynamics as a way of limiting destabilising outside influences.”
Clearly, Abu Dhabi’s role is important not only due to Emirati ambitions but also because external backing can make local leaders less willing to compromise by reducing the perceived costs associated with confrontation.
The local stakes of a wider geopolitical contest
Despite the growing involvement of Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa, and the risks of this region becoming more of an arena for external competition, it is necessary to note that Somalia and Somaliland are not passive actors victimised by a giant game of geopolitical chess.
Both have agency and are actively seeking non-African partners to strengthen their positions and advance their political objectives.
For the government in Mogadishu, Turkey's military, economic, and diplomatic support is critical to strengthening state institutions, improving security, and protecting Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Meanwhile, Somaliland has long sought international recognition and has strong incentives to cultivate relationships with countries such as Israel and the UAE, which might advance that goal or at least provide greater protection against perceived threats.
In this sense, “you have a layer of local rivalries that now intersect with regional rivalries, creating a potentially dangerous situation,” explained Mahmood, who emphasised that this permits “Horn of Africa actors to take on more maximalist, aggressive and less compromising positions, knowing that [they] have…external support to fall back on.”
Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, Israel, and maritime targets have done much to help explain why regional powers see the Horn of Africa as increasingly important to their foreign policy calculations.
As Houthi-Saudi hostilities escalate, Riyadh is focused on growing stronger security partnerships with regional actors, while governments in the Horn of Africa are likely to view closer cooperation with the Kingdom as a way to secure higher levels of assistance and bolster their own military capabilities. Meanwhile, the conflict in Sudan adds new layers of complication as it draws regional actors into overlapping security and political calculations.
Yet a greater military presence does not necessarily translate into greater stability. While competing powers expand their security footholds with the aim of countering one another, mistrust can deepen, territorial disputes can intensify, and local actors will probably pursue greater support from external powers.
Therefore, the Horn of Africa is increasingly likely to become exposed to conflicts in and around the Red Sea even if not directly involved in their initial escalation. Within this context, heightened insecurity means that further militarisation of the Red Sea risks undermining, rather than enhancing, security.
An evolving security arrangement around the Red Sea
On 7 August, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement - a trilateral alliance which is defensive in nature and aimed at containing the chaotic instability unleashed by the war centred on Iran.
This security configuration has potentially significant implications for the balance of power around the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. It was hardly surprising that the leadership in Mogadishu hailed the pact in the immediate aftermath of its announcement, especially given Somalia’s close ties with the three signatories and shared threat perceptions of Israeli aggression.
For Somalia, the pact’s significance extends beyond its endorsement and raises important questions about regional realignments and Ankara’s position in the Horn of Africa within the wider context of an emerging security architecture.
Escalating Houthi-Saudi hostilities prompt a broader recalibration of regional security alignments, bringing Turkey and Pakistan closer to Saudi Arabia through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. For Ankara, this partnership offers an opportunity to connect its longstanding presence in Somalia with a wider strategic role in Gulf and Red Sea security.
Dr Ozcelik told The New Arab that the hostilities have “crossed red lines that were deemed unthinkable not long ago,” setting in motion a realignment among Riyadh’s allies. Ankara’s growing institutional engagement with the Kingdom therefore extends beyond diplomatic rhetoric, highlighting a more formal commitment to regional defence and security cooperation.
There are implications of this emerging Turkish-Saudi alignment for the rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv. As Dr Ozcelik stressed, Ankara is “institutionalising its partnership with Saudi Arabia beyond rhetoric and through defence commitments, minilateralism, and regional diplomacy.”
This closer Turkish-Saudi relationship will not escape Israeli strategists’ attention, particularly as Ankara expands its regional security role while Riyadh remains firm in its support for Palestinian statehood.
In Dr Ozcelik’s assessment, these parallel developments risk “fuelling a greater gulf between Israel and Turkey,” further complicating an already tense relationship that has significantly deteriorated since 7 October 2023.
While commentators sometimes toss Somalia around as a possible Mecca Joint Defence Agreement candidate, Hudson considers formal Somalia membership in the pact unlikely in the near term. He noted that Somalia remains a recipient of security assistance rather than a country capable of contributing meaningfully to a mutual defence arrangement.
“Given the high level of instability still emanating from Somalia, external countries would be foolish at this point to enter into a mutual security agreement with them now. Somalia can’t provide for its own security, let alone contribute to the security of others,” Hudson told The New Arab.
Similarly, Mahmood does not expect Somalia to formally join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. But he does think Mogadishu is likely to deepen security relations with the pact’s three signatories, noting that this is a development already underway. “Somalia prefers to align with this bloc of countries and sees them as a future source of support as it continues to build up its military capabilities,” he observed.
The risks of an expanding geopolitical contest
The internationalisation of the Horn of Africa’s political disputes and security crises entered a new chapter after Israel became the first UN member-state to officially recognise Somaliland ten months ago.
What started as a dispute over Somaliland’s recognition and Somalia’s territorial integrity has transformed into a larger contest over maritime security, military access, and regional influence.
A dangerous risk is an exacerbating security dilemma in which competing alliances deepen mistrust, undermine compromise, and expose the Horn of Africa to conflicts originating elsewhere.
Preventing further escalation will require Middle Eastern powers and their regional partners to exercise restraint while recognising that lasting stability depends on addressing the disputes that drive Somalia and Somaliland to seek competing external allies.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero
Edited by Charlie Hoyle