Years ago, when people asked Geoffrey Hinton why he worked on artificial intelligence, he would repeat a line from J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the creators of the atomic bomb: “When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it.”
© Ramón de la Rocha (EFE)
© Reuters
“Sì, credo che sia una buona idea”. Elon Musk rimanda il giudizio finale agli azionisti ma per lui non c’è motivo di discussione. La potenziale fusione tra SpaceX e Tesla è uno scenario che stimolerebbe chiunque, figurarsi il suo proprietario. Musk detiene la maggioranza nell’azienda aerospaziale, mentre in quella automobilistica circa il 20%. Basta solo la notizia a far schizzare in Borsa le azioni delle due società: +10% SpaceX, +2,5% Tesla. Messi insieme, i due colossi – parliamo della settima e undicesima azienda più ricca al mondo – avrebbero una capitalizzazione di 3.500 miliardi di dollari, superando le Big Tech rivali. La nuova creatura entrerebbe di fatto nella top 5, insieme a Nvidia, Apple, Alphabet e Microsoft. “Unirle presenta molti vantaggi, poiché ci troviamo davanti alla superintelligenza”, aggiunge Musk chiamando l’intelligenza artificiale con il nome coniato da Donald Trump. “C’è molto da guadagnare dalla cooperazione nello sviluppo di software”.
L’istituzione di due comitati speciali, chiamati a studiare la fattibilità dell’operazione, è solamente il primo passo. Se la loro valutazione dovesse essere positiva, bisognerà capire cosa ne pensino gli azionisti. Niente di semplice. Per l’approvazione finale è richiesta infatti una maggioranza favorevole di tutti i detentori delle azioni, non solo di quelli che hanno votato. Va da sé che raggiungerla è tutt’altro che una passeggiata. Per cui, frena Musk che non può prender parte alle discussioni per un evidente conflitto di interessi, “non credo che dovremmo dare una fusione per scontata. Alcuni lo fanno, ma penso sia un’esagerazione”. Lui ovviamente spera che alla fine la barca entri in porto. L’azienda ipotetica vanterebbe 155.000 lavoratori e genererebbe un fatturato complessivo di 153 miliardi di dollari.
Ci sono diverse ragioni per cui Musk sogna di vedere una sintesi tra le due società che ha fondato. Da una parte SpaceX, con il suo enorme know-how in materia spaziale, tra missili e connessioni satellitari; dall’altra Tesla, con le sue conoscenze dell’automotive. La prima collaborazione tra le due società ha prodotto la macchina volante Roadster, presentata la scorsa settimana. L’auto, marchiata Tesla, è dotata di razzi riutilizzabili Falcon di SpaceX, gli stessi che portano in orbita i satelliti di Starlink.
In futuro la partnership continuerà a prescindere dall’esito di una fusione. SpaceX ha infatti già acquistato le batterie Megapack e Cybertruck di Tesla per 1 miliardo di dollari. Viceversa, l’azienda automobilistica ha comprato delle azioni di quella aerospaziale nel momento in cui xAI si è fusa con SpaceX. E poi c’è Terafab. la joint venture tra le due aziende. Musk ha svelato a marzo il mega impianto di produzione di chip in Texas (costo stimato: 119 miliardi di dollari) che dovrebbe alimentare tutti gli altri progetti delle aziende. E non intende di certo abbandonarlo.
Una cosa però è collaborare, un’altra è unire le proprie forze. I dubbi su una effettiva fusione sono tanti e leciti. Le due aziende dovranno essere abili nel presentare l’operazione come un successo win-win, senza che qualcuno possa insinuare che una delle due venga sfavorita. Bisognerà anche capire come l’unione verrebbe recepita al di fuori dagli Stati Uniti. Non soltanto in Europa, che sta diventando un territorio ostile agli occhi delle aziende americane. “Sarebbe troppo pericoloso per noi”, confida un funzionario al Financial Times. L’ostacolo principale è rappresentato dalla Cina e dalle sue stringenti regole sulla sicurezza nazionale. Tesla vanta già una presenza consolidata, con un fatturato di 21 miliardi registrato lo scorso anno. Pechino però guarda con grande sospetto a SpaceX, primo competitor nella guerra spaziale. E non è un dettaglio di poco conto.
Elon Musk has contributed more than $276 million since July to Republican political causes ahead of the United States midterm elections on 3 November. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said decisions over Ukraine’s access to SpaceX satellite communications rest with the company rather than the White House. Both developments demonstrate how private technological and financial resources can influence decisions traditionally associated with government.
For journalist Gil Durán, author of The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy, published by Avid Reader Press in August 2026, the issue extends beyond campaign donations. In a recent interview, he argued that a group of Silicon Valley investors is using its financial influence and control of technology to challenge the authority of elected governments.
“We’re at a decisive stage of that race,” Durán said when asked about the contest between technology and democracy described by venture capitalist Peter Thiel. His argument is that wealth alone no longer satisfies some of the industry’s most influential figures; they also want a direct role in determining how societies are governed.
Durán places Thiel at the centre of this movement. In a 2009 essay, The Education of a Libertarian, the PayPal co-founder wrote that he no longer believed freedom and democracy were compatible. He argued that technological innovation could allow individuals to escape the constraints of conventional politics.
Thiel subsequently clarified that he was not advocating disenfranchisement. His stated position was that majority rule often frustrated individual liberty. Durán, however, interprets the essay and Thiel’s subsequent political investments as evidence of a sustained interest in diminishing democratic constraints on private power.
The book also examines The Sovereign Individual, a 1997 work by James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg that anticipated how digital currencies and technological change might weaken the power of nation states. Durán sees its influence in later arguments for privately organised alternatives to traditional government.
One example is The Network State, developed by entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan. It proposes that online communities could acquire territory and eventually obtain diplomatic recognition. Advocates describe a voluntary model of political organisation; Durán regards the prospect of corporate-financed jurisdictions as a challenge to public accountability.
The relationship between Thiel and Vice-President JD Vance illustrates how venture capital can translate into political influence. Thiel supported Vance’s early investment career and contributed $15 million to a super PAC backing his successful 2022 Senate bid. Durán attributes much of Vance’s political ascent to that support, although voters, party endorsements and Vance’s own campaigning also shaped the result.
Musk’s latest contributions offer a more immediate example. His donations since July include $158 million to the Senate Leadership Fund and more than $76 million to America PAC. Such spending is lawful under the rules governing independent political committees, which cannot coordinate their expenditure with candidates.
Durán contends that similar pressures affect Democrats, arguing that wealthy donors can exercise influence across party lines. His criticism therefore concerns the political system’s dependence on private funding as much as any particular administration.
The consequences extend beyond elections. Ukraine’s dependence on satellite communications has exposed how a privately owned service can become essential to military operations. Restrictions affecting Starlink-related services have prompted competing accounts from US officials and SpaceX over responsibility for the decision. Rubio’s latest remarks point towards commercial control, while earlier reporting attributed the decision to Washington.
Artificial intelligence raises comparable questions of ownership and oversight. Durán argues that investors promoting transformative AI may also seek regulatory conditions that protect their substantial financial commitments. His prediction of a possible investment bubble remains a judgement, not an established outcome.
In Europe, the debate has immediate regulatory consequences. The EU’s Digital Services Act requires major online platforms to assess risks to elections and civic debate, while enforcement of important provisions of the AI Act began in August 2026. These measures address the influence of companies whose platforms and systems operate across borders.
Durán’s interpretation of Silicon Valley as a coherent anti-democratic movement remains contested. The entrepreneurs he discusses have differing interests, and their political influence does not itself establish a common plan to dismantle democratic government.
Their influence is nevertheless measurable in campaign finances, government contracts and control over infrastructure essential to national security. None of these forms of power requires holding elected office.
Ukrainian drone maker Wild Hornets is rethinking projects it is currently working on, including launching interceptors from aerial platforms, because of limits on SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet. Spokesman Mike Orliuk told The War Zone (TWZ) this on 20 October. The company builds Sting interceptors, which it says destroyed over 15,000 Shaheds and Gerberas, a cheaper Shahed lookalike, in a year. Orliuk said Sting’s current operations are unaffected.
The stakes rise as Russia shifts to faster drones. Ukrainian defense technology adviser Serhii Beskrestnov counted more than 2,500 jet-powered Gerans, Russia’s version of the Shahed, in August. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 16 October that these drones fly faster than 400 km/h. He added that some Ukrainian interceptors chasing them work through Starlink. When the link was slowed, Ukraine could not intercept some of them, he said.
“Our own communications system provides the basic connection to our interceptors,” Orliuk said. The company’s remote-control technology can draw on various internet sources, he added, though the military often uses Starlink. Even then, the terminal does not need to move at high speed. It only links the command center to a ground station, which Orliuk compared to a cell tower.
“For these needs, everything is operating normally with Starlink at the moment,” he said.
“Some drones carry a terminal on board and need to fly at high speed with it,” Orliuk said. “In such cases, Starlink’s limitations make their operation impossible.”
That is why the company is rethinking the air-launch project. Wild Hornets has made no clear decision yet but will test alternatives, Orliuk said. He declined to describe them.
“I believe, in any case, depending on a single solution is very risky,” he said.
Orliuk said he has spoken with other companies that rely far more on Starlink and have expressed concerns. He pointed to growing interest in Europe’s Eutelsat network, though “creating something like Starlink won’t be easy.”
Who ordered the slowdown remains unclear. The order to slow Ukraine’s Starshield service came from inside the White House, two US officials and a Western official said. A US official told TWZ the president never made such a request. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 17 October that the slowdown had “nothing to do with the White House” and called “a report on that” “categorically false,” without saying which report he meant.
Elon Musk ordered the speed cap on Starshield, the military version of SpaceX’s Starlink network that Ukraine’s drones rely on, The Wall Street Journal reported on 20 October. Earlier, Musk said that such limits are decided by the US military and “ultimately POTUS.” Speaking to reporters in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, on 20 October, according to WSJ, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said, “We haven’t made any directives or anything like that,” CBS News reported.
For a week, no one with a hand on the system said the decision was theirs. Musk pointed to the US military and the president, and Trump said he did not know who it was. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials said the cap has hampered the drones they use to intercept Russian Shaheds and to strike Russian forces in occupied territory. Kyiv says the cap remains in place, and at about 160 km/h it makes intercepting jet-powered drones and missiles that fly about twice as fast virtually impossible.
Musk capped the speeds at which Ukrainian hardware could stay connected to the network, people familiar with the matter told WSJ. The slowdown, which began on 14 October, left some of Ukraine’s strike and interceptor drones virtually useless, WSJ said.
WSJ’s sources differ on Trump’s role. Some US officials said Musk acted on his own and that Trump did not specifically order any retribution against Ukraine. One person said Musk spoke with several senior administration officials, Trump among them, before imposing the cap. Two people said Musk and Trump discussed the decision by phone soon after the slowdown became public.
During the uproar, SpaceX representatives called White House counterparts. They asked for a shared message that the company and the administration had coordinated before Musk’s directive, the people said. The White House ran an informal inquiry into who ordered the slowdown, WSJ said.
Musk held several conversations with administration officials before the order to understand the president’s thinking, CBS reported, citing sources. He dislikes his company being seen as profiting from the war, and it is unclear how his order was carried out, CBS said.
Hegseth said the US had not pulled anything back. He said Starlink “has the option” to make decisions under its terms of service, and that from the Pentagon’s view nothing had changed, CBS reported.
Speaking to reporters as he left the White House on 16 October, Trump said he did not think either he or Musk was responsible, The Telegraph reported. On 19 October, he said, “I don’t know who it was, but I’d like to find out.”
Last week, a bipartisan group of senators asked the Pentagon’s inspector general to investigate whether officials “directed” or “authorized” changes to Starlink and Starshield services and intelligence sharing affecting Ukraine.
On 15 October, Reuters reported that the order came from inside the White House. The officials said Pentagon leaders received a message that the Starshield service for Ukraine’s military needed to be slowed, but did not say who made the decision or who carried it out. A senior US official said “No such request was ever made by the president.”
On 16 October, The Telegraph reported, citing four sources, that Musk approached Trump with the idea of the speed limits. One of the sources said Trump agreed.
Michael Kofman, a war analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, said, according to WSJ, that Ukrainian strike and interceptor drones remain limited to 160 km/h. He said actual connections run below 130 km/h, which still hampers strikes and air defense.
On 20 October, Ukraine’s top diplomat in Washington, Denys Sienik, said Kyiv was still waiting for answers from the Pentagon and SpaceX, WSJ reported.
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