U.S. President Donald Trump urged Israeli voters to reelect Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to press the military campaign against Iran until it is complete.
Donald Trump framed Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power as a condition for finishing the offensive against Iran. “We have to finish the job we started,” he wrote on his social media, aiming the appeal squarely at Israeli voters three days before the legislative elections.
The U.S. President returned to an October 18 letter in which he called Netanyahu an “exceptional Prime Minister warrior” and praised their joint record in military operations.
As everyone knows, including the enemy, Bibi and I have had a great relationship to win together,” Trump stated, holding up Operation Epic Fury as proof of their cooperation.
Trump asserted that Iran had lost its navy and its air force and that its economy had fallen into a “state of chaos.” He placed inflation at 301% and claimed a naval blockade had stopped oil exports. Two tiers of Iranian leadership, military and civilian, had been eliminated, he added.
‘Netanyahu has done a VERY GOOD JOB as prime minister under very trying conditions’ — Trump pic.twitter.com/4VQJ2fR3mJ
In the October 18 letter, Trump described the Israeli leader as a “Great Warrior Prime Minister” and an “even greater partner for peace.” His latest post closed with an open call for Netanyahu’s reelection in the middle of the Iran offensive.
The appeal marks another attempt by the White House to steer another nation’s vote. It also arrives as Washington and Tel Aviv face sustained protests over the war on the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s conduct has been denounced as a policy of extermination.
Netanyahu and Trump met in Washington amid protests against the genocide in Gaza, and Trump has framed their alliance as a shared military project. Trump’s latest intervention draws Washington deeper into a vote that will decide not only Israel’s leadership but also the regional balance.
BREAKING: President Trump issues a second statement endorsing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
This marks the first time a US President has publicly endorsed a candidate in the Israeli elections. pic.twitter.com/t4l0qtj3hi
The endorsement lands days before more than seven million voters renew the 120 seats of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. Surveys project a fragmented legislature in which no bloc secures the 61 seats required to form a government. The threshold has rarely yielded a stable majority in recent cycles, and this campaign has only deepened the fragmentation.
That arithmetic has lifted the leverage of Israel’s Arab parties and pulled tens of thousands of expatriates back home to cast ballots. It has also sharpened a parallel demand for accountability.
On Saturday, tens of thousands of people marched in Tel Aviv to demand an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023 Israeli attack. Organizers stressed that the gathering was civic in nature and did not endorse any party or candidacy.
The opposition bloc led by former army chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot is pressing for that independent commission. Netanyahu opposes the measure, while his supporters highlight his record on national security and regional operations. Neither camp has stopped to examine Israel’s conduct and its policy of extermination against the Gaza Strip.
Tuesday’s vote will determine whether Netanyahu secures the mandate Trump is urging. With no bloc near a majority, coalition negotiations are expected to follow, and the outcome will shape both Israel’s next government and the course of the Iran campaign.
More than 800 Palestinians lost their homes after a fire gutted a displacement camp in the Shujaiya neighborhood of eastern Gaza City, in an attack the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing blamed on Israeli military drones.
The blaze consumed the camp’s tents and nearly everything inside them, according to the Gazan Ministry, which said quadcopter drones operated by Israeli forces ignited the fire on October 26.
The fire affected more than 200 families, made up mostly of women, children, the elderly and people with vulnerable health conditions, the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing detailed. The flames caused panic among residents, who have no housing alternatives.
The Shujaiya camp sheltered families who had already fled their homes in other parts of the territory. Many had moved more than once since the war began, carrying whatever they could salvage each time.
💢🇵🇸 Over 800 Palestinians have been forced to displace yet again from Shujaiya, an eastern neighborhood in Gaza City, after Israeli forces set fire to a displacement camp, according to Al Jazeera.
Israeli quadcopter drones set the camp ablaze at around 8 p.m. local time on… https://t.co/9nyw5g9DGe
Palestinian authorities called the fire a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. They framed it as part of a deliberate policy of forced displacement designed to push people out of the territory.
The Ministry of Public Works and Housing demanded urgent action from the international community, the UN Security Council, and the United Nations, and it asked those bodies to halt the attacks on civilians without further delay. It also pressed humanitarian agencies to deliver tents, temporary shelters, and essential supplies immediately to families left without roofs or belongings.
Local spokespeople linked the persistence of military operations to the tense electoral climate inside Israel, where security politics have hardened. Security operations have long featured in Israeli campaigns, and commanders face domestic pressure to show results even as international criticism mounts.
A ceasefire agreement announced on October 10, 2025, never produced calm on the ground. Israeli forces have maintained recurrent bombings, shootings, and demolition work across different parts of the Gaza Strip. Official records show the zionist offensive launched in October 2023 has now surpassed 74,000 deaths and left 175,000 people wounded.
Human rights organizations renewed their demands for a halt to hostilities and for safe, unobstructed access for humanitarian assistance. The widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure has made recovery more difficult for communities worn down by repeated strikes. Hospitals, schools, and homes lie in ruins across the territory.
Aid agencies describe the situation as catastrophic. Clean water, medicine, and fuel remain scarce, and the latest fire has multiplied the need for emergency shelter in a place where almost every building is damaged.
Palestinian officials say the fire is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader campaign against civilian life, insisting the international response so far has fallen short of the scale of the crisis.
Israel has committed the crime against humanity of "extermination" in the West Bank, while continuing to commit "genocide" against Palestinians in Gaza, United Nations-mandated investigators have said.
Israel has committed the crime against humanity of "extermination" in the West Bank, while continuing to commit "genocide" against Palestinians in Gaza, United Nations-mandated investigators have said.
In 1996, Israel’s then-Prime Minister Simon Peres appeared to be on his way to victory in parliamentary elections that would keep him and his center-left Labor Party in power. On the key issue of peace, he had pledged to provide West Bank and Gaza Strip territory to the Palestinians for a sovereign state. The “land […]
Two in three Israelis consider the Nova massacre central to their voting decision as the country goes to the polls for the first time since the 2023 attacks
Princes and Thieves, a new book by investigative journalist Matthew Cole, may open a rabbit hole into financial connections between Middle Eastern dictators and President Donald Trump's family. Cole accuses Emirati monarch Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) of sending billions of dollars to various mercenaries and political operators, including Jared Kushner, son-in-law to President Donald Trump. Cole's reporting combines well-documented connections with secondhand accounts from anonymous sources.
On Thursday, Vanity Fairpublished an excerpt from the book, reporting that Dutch military intelligence hacked into Kushner's phone in 2018 and discovered hundreds of millions of dollars in bank transfers connected to MBZ. Also on Thursday, Kushner published a letter from his lawyers to Cole categorically denying the "incredible and false" allegations in the book. "Mr. Kushner never accessed foreign accounts and always followed all rules and regulations and only pursued goals that were in the best interest of the United States as directed by the President of the United States," they wrote.
Cole had originally written on his blog that the book was scheduled for release on October 27, but the publication date was pushed forward over the weekend.
The book purports to tie Kushner to a vast web of Emirati influence operations around the world. In Cole's telling, which matches other journalists' accounts, MBZ wants to reshape the Middle East and eastern Africa into an alliance of U.S.-backed dictatorships, where "tolerance" is enforced through high-tech surveillance and "democracy" is a synonym for terrorism. MBZ's use of mercenaries in pursuit of these goals is well-documented. So is Kushner's personal affinity with the Emirati monarch and his business ties with the Arab monarchies.
Soon after Trump won the 2016 election, MBZ held a widely reported meeting with Kushner. According to the book—and according to much of that earlier reporting—the monarch complained about the Obama administration's failure to back Arab regimes against popular revolutions, its decision to end the Iraq War, and its diplomacy with Iran.
Going much further than past reporting, Cole now claims Kushner was personally involved in MBZ's mercenary operations. MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman put a collective $2 billion into Emirati and Israeli bank accounts which were managed (but not technically owned) by Kushner, according to Cole's sources. Those same sources claim that parts of this secret "slush fund" went to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, American military contractor Erik Prince, and Cuban hitman Felipe Vidal.
Haftar, a former CIA asset, became a general in Libya's 2011 revolution and then attempted to overthrow the new government with Emirati backing in 2014. Despite a 2020 ceasefire, his forces continue to control much of Libya. Prince, founder of the military contractor formerly known as Blackwater, moved to the UAE and helped build a secret army of Colombian mercenaries. He sued Cole for defamation after Cole reported on Prince's role in helping Haftar, but a judge threw out the case. Cole's sources claimed that Vidal, a self-described "hit man," helped the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fake an Iranian attack on oil tankers in May 2019, meant to provoke Trump into war.
Kushner's lawyers have denied any relationship with any of those three men, apart from a single meeting with Prince after the 2016 election. (According to Cole, both Vidal and Prince refused to comment for the book.) The position of the U.S. government is that the May 2019 incident was a genuine Iranian attack, not an Emirati false flag.
After the Vanity Fair article was published last week, Israeli negotiator Gershon Baskin pointed out in The Jerusalem Post that the Central Bank of Israel "does not offer private banking services to individuals," which would make it impossible for Kushner's money to be deposited in the Central Bank of Israel, as Cole claimed. The book addresses that argument, claiming that the money was deposited "in what would appear to be a government account," with Kushner and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu jointly authorizing transactions.
The Abraham Accords, which include an alliance between Israel and the UAE, have often been touted as a way for the U.S. to "spend less time and less resources in the Middle East," in the words of Vice President J.D. Vance. But Cole argues that the UAE actually used its alliance to entangle American interests in a future conflict. The book states that Kushner set up "a rainy-day defense fund" for war with Iran, using Emirati money deposited in a separate Central Bank of Israel account.
Cole also claims to have evidence that Kushner was on the take from the UAE's regional frenemy Qatar. In 2017, the UAE and Saudi Arabia issued an ultimatum for Qatar to rein in its foreign policy and blockaded the small nation. The Intercept later reported that Kushner's father had sought a Qatari bailout for the family real estate business just before the crisis, and the Qatari-linked company Brookfield ended up providing the needed investment in August 2018, leading to a congressional investigation into the deal.
Democrats are still digging for information on Kushner's business ties to Qatar, but three sources told Cole that the Qatari royal family authorized and paid for the Brookfield deal. The Qatari government "asked the White House how to resolve the blockade. And the Kushners kept saying, 'We have this great property that needs investment.' Eventually, the Qataris realized the only way to settle the blockade was to buy the building," a former U.S. intelligence officer said.
Kushner's lawyers write that they have "no evidence that Qatar impacted the investment decision. Any suggestion of his involvement in the transaction or any allegation of quid pro quo with the Qatari government is false and defamatory."
Other parts of the book are better-documented. Cole obtained a draft of Prince's autobiography, text messages from one of Prince's colleagues, and emails from Emirati government adviser George Nader, who was convicted of fraudulently funneling money into Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign. If nothing else, the book is a comprehensive account of the UAE's unofficial empire and its American ties. But the most explosive claims about Kushner's involvement in those activities rest on anonymous sources, making it a matter of Cole's word against Kushner's.
"I considered the responses from Kushner's attorneys carefully and consulted multiple sources about them. During the five years I have spent working on this book, I have tried to keep an open mind, and I am confident that my reporting is accurate. Kushner's lawyers' responses did not change that conclusion," Cole writes in the book's epilogue.
Israeli regime’s airspace – the airspace over the occupied territories – is widely regarded as among the most heavily defended in the world.
Yet the scale of its protection cannot be explained by Israeli military technology alone. Russia, China and even the United States do not benefit from an equivalent network of allied support dedicated to intercepting threats before they reach their territory.
Israel’s own defenses are indeed formidable. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, while Arrow 2 targets ballistic missile threats within it. David’s Sling is built to counter medium-range threats, and Iron Dome intercepts rockets and other short-range projectiles.
These systems are backed by fighter jets and an extensive radar network, creating multiple layers of protection against incoming attacks.
But Israel’s air defense shield extends well beyond its own arsenal. From October 2023 through Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone operations in 2024, 2025 and 2026, a group of allied states has played an active role in protecting the regime.
They have provided interceptors, radar capabilities, fighter aircraft, military bases and personnel, helping the Tel Aviv regime detect, track and counter incoming threats.
What emerges is not simply a domestic air-defense network, but a wider umbrella sustained by the resources and involvement of powerful allies – from the US to Europe to Arab countries.
This ironclad commitment of regional and extra-regional countries to Israel’s protection has come at a considerable cost.
The price goes well beyond dollars and shekels. It includes depleted weapons stockpiles that could take years to replenish, damaged radars and military bases, soldiers killed or wounded, and governments facing domestic political backlash for a costly partnership that much of their own public fiercely opposes and protests against.
The burden, however, is not shared equally. The United States has shouldered the largest financial and military inventory costs. The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan have faced intense operational demands and direct security risks. European states have incurred more limited but still significant costs, particularly in munitions and the political fallout from a war that has driven up energy prices and compounded the cost-of-living pressures facing their populations.
The Israeli bill
The Israeli regime’s direct costs are the easiest to track because they fall on its own treasury. In April 2024, after Iran launched a large number of drones and missiles at the occupied territories, Brig. Gen. Reem Aminoach, an economic adviser to a former Israeli military chief of staff, estimated in an interview with Ynet that defending against the attack that night had cost 4-5 billion shekels, or roughly $1.1–$1.35 billion at the exchange rate at the time.
Haaretz later put the total cost of defending against the same retaliatory attack at around $1.5 billion. That was just one night. Many more retaliatory strikes have hit the occupied territories since then.
The cost structure follows a clear logic. Iran uses inexpensive drones and mass-produced missiles, while Israel relies on some of the world’s most expensive interceptors to defend against them.
This disparity lies at the heart of the war’s financial burden. Israel’s broader budget picture adds another dimension. Sustained, high-intensity defensive operations have forced the regime to spend far more than it did previously.
With a net budget of about 60 billion shekels in 2023, the Israeli military could not sustain repeated nights of interceptions without substantial increases in funding and continued US support.
Israel has been able to sustain this costly imbalance largely because of extensive financial backing from American taxpayers. Much of its interceptor production is funded or co-developed through US programs, and the Arrow missile defense system is produced with American participation.
US Congress has also repeatedly approved emergency supplemental funding for Israeli missile defense. These ties mean that Israel’s financial burden and America’s are deeply interconnected and difficult to separate, which explains the public anger in the US.
The American inventory crisis
No country has spent more on Israel’s defense than the United States, and no factor is more consequential than the state of its interceptor stockpiles. Washington may be willing to spend the tens of billions of dollars required to protect their genocidal ally, but willingness alone cannot resolve the US military’s primary challenge: replenishing its dwindling missile interceptors.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank, has published some of the most widely cited public estimates of US missile interceptor inventories.
Its analysis, updated following the 40-day war against Iran, found that American Patriot and THAAD inventories had declined dramatically.
According to CSIS estimates, the US inventory of Patriot interceptors fell from approximately 2,330 before the war began on February 27, 2026, to between 759 and 827 by July 27, 2026, marking a decline of roughly two-thirds.
The THAAD inventory also dropped sharply, falling from an estimated 452 interceptors before the war to between 239 and 257 by July 27, representing a decline of approximately 43 to 47 percent.
Estimates of remaining American Interceptor inventory (Source: CSIS)
Many military experts believe CSIS’s estimates are overly optimistic. Some, for instance, argue that the United States may have fired as many as 290 of its roughly 360 THAAD interceptors during the early phase of the war. That would amount to more than 80 percent of its pre-war stockpile.
Whatever the exact figures, Washington’s decision to prioritize Israel’s defense has left the US military dangerously underprepared and more vulnerable to another round of war if it breaks out.
The cost of replenishing stockpiles
The US Army’s FY2027 figures put the unit cost of a PAC-3 MSE interceptor at roughly $5 million and that of a THAAD interceptor at nearly $12 million.
Based on these figures, replacing the Patriot and THAAD interceptors expended would cost an estimated $10 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has offered a higher estimate, putting the cost of replacing the depleted interceptors at approximately $13.1 billion.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in recent remarks noted that the US spent about $11 billion on missile defense for Israel over three years. In a post on X, quoting a tweet of a former Obama administration official, he said US forces had fired 609 interceptors in defense of the Israeli regime between October 2023 and June 2026, including SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Patriot, and THAAD missiles.
The naval picture
The US Navy’s missile interceptor inventories are also under severe strain. The SM-3 and SM-6 are among the principal naval weapons used to counter ballistic missiles and other high-speed threats.
Public estimates vary widely, with some reports placing combined naval inventories in the low hundreds. A figure of 150–200 for the two interceptor types combined is plausible as a rough order of magnitude, but no precise public count is available.
The broader concern is that naval interceptors are expensive and slow to manufacture, while the Navy must preserve sufficient stocks to address other potential threats, including those posed by China and Russia. Every interceptor expended in the defense of Israel is therefore one fewer available for other contingencies until it can be replaced.
Not all US and allied defenses against Iran relied on ground-based or naval interceptors. Fighter jets also engaged Iranian drones using air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-9X and AIM-120. The AIM-9X reportedly costs several hundred thousand dollars per missile, while the AIM-120 AMRAAM costs more than $1 million.
Using such expensive weapons to destroy drones that cost only thousands of dollars compounds the economic imbalance, even when the immediate tactical objective is achieved.
The trade-off
By the final phase of the 40-day imposed war, following the initial ceasefire, it had become clear that US commanders were holding back dedicated SM-3 and THAAD interceptors rather than expending them to protect American bases in Jordan and elsewhere.
Footage of nighttime defensive missile launches appeared to show almost exclusively Patriot interceptors, with only one exception. The implication was stark: stocks had dwindled to the point where US commanders could no longer afford to use these missiles freely.
The apparent logic was to preserve the remaining interceptors for a larger war, prioritizing the future defense of Israel over the immediate protection of American service members.
That decision carried its own cost. Aircraft on the ground were hit, and US personnel were killed in some of the retaliatory attacks. This matters because it illustrates the full price of managing depleted stockpiles. A shortage of interceptors weakened the US military’s defensive capacity across multiple theaters, leaving American personnel exposed to attacks that more robust defenses might have helped repel – all in the effort to protect the Israeli regime.
Cost, however, is only part of the problem. Production capacity is the more consequential constraint in a prolonged campaign.
Patriot and THAAD interceptors are manufactured in limited quantities, and expanding output takes time.
CSIS estimates that restoring Patriot and THAAD inventories to their pre-war levels will take at least three years. Interceptors ordered in fiscal year 2027 are not expected to arrive until 2029, leaving a prolonged gap between expenditure and replenishment.
The China and Asia-Pacific dimension
The most serious long-term cost to the United States may emerge far from the West Asia region. As US interceptor stocks are depleted in the region, the Pacific is left more exposed.
The Indo-Pacific is where Washington faces its most formidable strategic competitor. Taiwan’s defense depends in part on US air and missile defenses, while Pentagon war plans for a potential war with China assume that American forces can withstand and respond to large-scale missile attacks.
If SM-3, SM-6, and Patriot inventories fall to a fraction of their previous levels, the margin for absorbing such an attack narrows considerably. A few hundred interceptors would be insufficient to sustain even several days of high-intensity combat in East Asia.
The extent to which US military capabilities in the South China Sea and across East Asia have been weakened cannot yet be quantified.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern is widely recognized among defense analysts: a shortage of interceptors in one theater affects the military’s ability to respond in every theater, and the Pacific is particularly difficult to reinforce quickly.
Persian Gulf states and early-warning network
The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan contributed to Israel’s defense in a different but equally consequential way.
Their role was not primarily to supply interceptors, but to provide sensors, airspace access, military bases, and the political authorization needed to put these assets to use.
Missile defense depends on early warning. A THAAD battery cannot intercept a missile it has not detected, and detection depends on radars capable of identifying and tracking threats at sufficient range and speed. The AN/TPY-2 radar used by THAAD is a large, transportable system. The US Missile Defense Agency’s 2025 budget puts the cost of each unit at approximately half a billion dollars.
In March 2026, during the first days of the 40-day imposed war of aggression, the American THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan was struck and destroyed. Imagery showed craters around the site, suggesting that multiple strikes may have been involved.
Buildings housing similar radar systems were also hit at two locations in the United Arab Emirates. Another THAAD radar, at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, was destroyed as well.
Iran also targeted and struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, which was used to track Iranian missile launches.
Taken together, these incidents point to a broader pattern of Iranian retaliatory attacks on US-aligned early-warning radars and THAAD sites across the region.
This interpretation is consistent with the available satellite imagery, which indicates that the campaign extended beyond individual military installations to the sensor network underpinning regional missile defense that has been at the service of the US and the Israeli regime.
Such radars are expensive and exceptionally difficult to replace. Their value lies not only in the hardware itself, but also in their integration with interceptor batteries and the data links connecting them to other sensors.
Destroying a single radar can compromise an entire interceptor network’s ability to detect and track threats approaching from a particular direction. Replacing these systems can take months or even years, and rebuilding them does not necessarily restore the coverage they previously provided.
Radar losses therefore carry a strategic cost as well as a financial one. Once a radar is destroyed, the states that depend on it must decide whether to rebuild it at an exposed location, relocate it, or accept a gap in their defensive coverage.
By providing Israel and the United States with tracking data on Iranian projectiles, Arab monarchies exposed themselves to Iranian retaliation and risked becoming direct targets in a war they had helped shape.
These losses also raised questions about Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability as the wider regional confrontation extended to other fronts.
Yemen is a prominent example. Damage to radar and air defense assets across the Persian Gulf may have further complicated Saudi Arabia’s position in its prolonged war against Yemen.
Although the Ansarullah-led Yemeni military possesses independent capabilities, and Saudi Arabia’s difficulties in Yemen stem from numerous military, political, and strategic factors, the decision to contribute to Israel’s defense added another layer of risk for the Persian Gulf monarchies.
Their involvement exposed critical military infrastructure to retaliation and potentially weakened their ability to respond to threats beyond the immediate confrontation with Iran.
Jordan’s exposed position
Jordan’s case is perhaps the most striking because of its small military and fragile economy. The country hosts US occupation forces, including a THAAD battery at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, and lies along the flight paths of missiles and drones traveling between Iran and the Israeli-occupied territories.
During Iran’s 2024 retaliatory strikes, Jordan’s air force was reported to have intercepted many of Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace. The Jordanian government defended these actions as necessary to protect its territory and citizens – a lame justification.
For a country with limited military resources, however, the cost was significant: every interceptor fired and every fighter jet scrambled placed additional demands on an already constrained defense budget.
The political cost was even greater. Jordan has a large population of Palestinian origin, and public opinion is strongly sympathetic to Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank as well as the Axis of Resistance.
Jordan’s decision to intercept Iranian projectiles launched in retaliation for Israeli strikes proved controversial domestically, with Jordanians slamming their government for helping protect the Israeli regime.
Jordan made this choice despite facing its own concerns about Israel’s regional ambitions. Members of Israel’s ruling regime have openly advocated annexing the occupied West Bank, while some have promoted proposals that would displace Palestinians into Jordan.
This context makes Amman’s involvement in regional missile defense particularly sensitive. The country faces the dual risk of Iranian retaliation against US military assets on its soil and growing domestic anger over its role in protecting Israel.
Jordan’s economic vulnerabilities compound these pressures. Public debt, energy costs, and the burden of hosting refugees already strain its finances. Against this backdrop, even a relatively modest additional military expenditure can have significant consequences.
Jordan’s experience illustrates how participation in regional missile defense can impose not only military and financial costs, but also serious domestic political risks.
Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16s were used numerous times to intercept drones launched at Israel
Europe’s price
European states paid in a different currency. Most did not expend large numbers of interceptors against Iranian drones, but their involvement carried costs across three main areas: munitions, military operations, and the economic shock of the war imposed on Iran.
France deployed air assets to the region to intercept drones and missiles over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Some reports suggested that French stocks of air-to-air missiles, including the MICA, came under strain.
Such shortages would be significant, given France’s other military commitments. Its air force and weapons inventories are already stretched across support for Ukraine, operations in the Sahel, and the maintenance of its own strategic deterrent. Each additional deployment reduces the resources available for other missions.
Britain used its bases in Cyprus, including RAF Akrotiri, as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf, to support operations against Iran. Reports indicated that RAF aircraft intercepted drones and missiles. The British armed forces are considerably smaller than they were at the height of the country’s military power, and sustained operations of this kind consume substantial flying hours, spare parts, and personnel capacity.
Europe’s greatest burden, however, has been economic and political. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the collapse of Persian Gulf energy exports drove up oil, gas, and diesel prices.
Europe’s dependence on imported energy meant that the shock quickly fed into household bills, transport costs, and food prices. Many European governments were already grappling with public dissatisfaction over the cost of living before the 40-day war. The war intensified those pressures as is evident now with protests raging across European countries.
European governments that committed military resources to Israel’s defense and offensive operations now face a difficult question: will their own citizens view that commitment as a principled security measure or as complicity in policies that have contributed to worsening economic conditions?
There is no straightforward answer, but the issue has become part of Europe’s domestic political debate. The costs of defending Israel have reached far beyond the battlefield, affecting budgets, energy security, and public confidence in government policy.
Defending the indefensible
The costs of protecting Israel have been substantial, although they have fallen unevenly across the countries involved.
The United States has spent billions of dollars and depleted significant portions of its advanced interceptor stockpiles, with replenishment expected to take years. The Persian Gulf states and Jordan have suffered damage to radar and air defense assets while assuming additional security risks.
European countries have borne the costs of munitions and military operations, alongside an energy shock that has intensified public anger over the cost of living.
Yet the financial figures tell only part of the story. The more fundamental question is whether the policies driving these expenditures serve the interests of the governments and populations bearing the costs.
The costs are real and continue to mount: public expenditure, depleted interceptor stockpiles, damaged radars and military bases, and the heightened risk of retaliation against countries drawn into a war beyond their borders. Meanwhile, rising fuel, food, and housing costs have placed additional pressure on ordinary households, deepening public frustration with government decisions.
Israel’s regional military campaign has drawn its partners further into a confrontation whose consequences extend well beyond the immediate battlefield. For these governments, the challenge is no longer simply how to sustain their support for Israel, but how to justify its mounting costs to their own populations.
The question is how much more they are willing to spend, how much additional risk they are prepared to accept, and how long their citizens will continue to support a policy whose burdens are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
A Nuova Delhi i BRICS hanno scritto che la riforma è dovuta. A New York il Sud Globale ha detto di essere pronto a pretenderla. Resta da vedere se saprà anche organizzarsi per ottenerla, cioè trasformare una maggioranza aritmetica in un soggetto politico
In prima fila davanti alle crisi, in ultima fila quando si decide
Il 22 settembre 2026, a margine dell’ottantunesima sessione dell’Assemblea generale, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ha riunito a New York i ministri di quello che la diplomazia indiana chiama il gruppo dei Paesi del Sud Globale «di orientamento affine e amici». Il tema scelto aveva il tono di un programma: Navigating Together Towards a Brighter Future – the Compelling Case for an Empowered Global South. Nel discorso d’apertura il ministro ha consegnato l’immagine che resterà di questa sessione. Il Sud Globale siede in prima fila davanti alle crisi del mondo e nelle ultime file quando si tratta di decidere come affrontarle, perché le istituzioni costruite per un’altra epoca continuano a riflettere i rapporti di forza di quell’epoca.
Dieci giorni prima, a Nuova Delhi, Narendra Modi aveva aperto il diciottesimo vertice BRICS con una formula più dura. La governance globale, nella sua descrizione, ha la forma di una «piramide del privilegio», e la riforma del Consiglio di Sicurezza non può più essere rinviata, servono scadenze fisse e risultati verificabili. Interpellato sul punto, il portavoce del Segretario generale Stéphane Dujarric ha ammesso che la rappresentanza dei Paesi in via di sviluppo nelle sedi in cui si scrivono le regole globali è insufficiente, e che quelle sedi, dal Consiglio alle istituzioni finanziarie, dovrebbero riflettere il 2026 e non più il 1945.
Tre momenti in meno di due settimane non spostano di un millimetro l’architettura della Carta. Bastano però a formulare la tesi di queste pagine. La riforma delle Nazioni Unite è diventata una questione di legittimità prima che di efficienza, e la legittimità di un’organizzazione fondata sull’«eguaglianza sovrana di tutti i suoi Membri» (art. 2, par. 1 della Carta) dipende ormai dalla maggioranza che quell’organizzazione la abita. Il protagonismo del Sud Globale è necessario in senso stretto: senza di esso la riforma non ha un soggetto che la porti né un criterio che la giustifichi. Con esso, come si vedrà, non ha ancora uno strumento che la imponga.
L’aritmetica del 1945
Nel 1945 i membri fondatori erano 51; oggi sono 193. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza è stato allargato una sola volta, con la risoluzione 1991 A (XVIII) del 1963, entrata in vigore nel 1965, che portò i seggi da undici a quindici aggiungendo soltanto membri eletti. I cinque seggi permanenti, e con essi il potere di veto previsto dall’art. 27, par. 3, sono rimasti quelli delle potenze vincitrici della Seconda guerra mondiale. Il risultato non richiede interpretazione. L’Africa, con 54 Stati membri e una parte cospicua delle operazioni di pace sul proprio territorio, non dispone di alcun seggio permanente. L’America Latina e i Caraibi nemmeno. L’Asia, che ospita più della metà dell’umanità, vi è rappresentata dalla sola Cina.
Il meccanismo di revisione è costruito per proteggere questa fotografia. L’art. 108 richiede il voto favorevole dei due terzi dell’Assemblea e la ratifica dei due terzi dei membri, «compresi tutti i Membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza»: a ciascuno dei cinque spetta dunque, oltre al veto politico, un veto costituzionale. Dal 2009 la discussione è incanalata nei Negoziati intergovernativi (IGN) avviati con la decisione 62/557 dell’Assemblea, che da allora si chiudono ogni anno con una decisione di rinnovo. Il presidente keniano William Ruto lo ha ricordato dal podio dell’Assemblea pochi giorni fa, con una constatazione che vale più di molte analisi: diciassette anni dopo, si sta ancora negoziando.
Quando l’ONU si è riformata davvero, lo ha fatto lasciando intatta la distribuzione del potere. Il pacchetto lanciato da António Guterres nel 2017, esaminato dal servizio di ricerca del Parlamento europeo, si articolava su sviluppo, gestione, pace e sicurezza, e rispondeva alle critiche di scarsa responsabilità, trasparenza ed efficacia; il briefing annotava anche che il termine stesso di «riforma» si era rivelato problematico per gli Stati membri, proprio per l’assenza di un’intesa sul suo significato. Nulla, in quel disegno, toccava la composizione degli organi decisionali. L’iniziativa UN80, avviata nel marzo 2025, ha seguito la stessa grammatica in condizioni peggiori: tagli al bilancio della Segreteria, revisione dei mandati, fusioni di uffici, dentro una crisi di liquidità generata dai contributi non versati. La riforma amministrativa si fa perché non redistribuisce nulla. Quella politica resta bloccata per la ragione opposta.
Genealogia di una rivendicazione
Il Sud Globale non scopre oggi le Nazioni Unite come terreno di lotta. Dena Freeman ha mostrato che i Paesi del Sud si sono pensati come soggetto collocato globalmente fin dagli anni Sessanta, molto prima che la categoria entrasse nel lessico accademico, e che il Gruppo dei 77 ha costantemente ricondotto i propri problemi all’ingiustizia dell’ordine internazionale, cercando di correggerla con il diritto internazionale e i processi politici multilaterali. La Conferenza di Bandung del 1955, la nascita del G77 nel 1964 e la Dichiarazione sul Nuovo Ordine Economico Internazionale del 1974 (ris. 3201 S-VI) tracciano una linea continua. La Dichiarazione di Nuova Delhi la rivendica in modo esplicito: il richiamo a Bandung colloca i BRICS nella genealogia dell’anticolonialismo, non in quella della competizione tra grandi potenze.
Che cosa è cambiato, allora, rispetto agli anni del NIEO? Due cose, e nessuna delle due appartiene alla retorica. La prima è il peso materiale. Secondo l’Institute of South Asian Studies di Singapore, il formato allargato dei BRICS rappresenta circa il 37 per cento del prodotto mondiale e il 54 per cento della popolazione. Il G77 degli anni Settanta aveva i numeri in Assemblea e poco altro; il Sud del 2026 dispone anche di capacità industriale, riserve e tecnologie a basso costo. La seconda novità discende dalla prima: l’esistenza di alternative istituzionali, dalla Nuova Banca di Sviluppo ai circuiti di pagamento in valute nazionali ai fori regionali. Il NIEO chiedeva al Nord di cambiare le regole. Il Sud di oggi può anche scriverne altre, e questa possibilità cambia il valore della sua domanda di riforma. Chi può uscire negozia in modo diverso da chi non ha scelta.
Uno studio diffuso all’inizio del 2026 sul rapporto tra ascesa del Sud e riforma dell’ONU offre un controllo utile. I casi di adattamento multilaterale riusciti, come l’Accordo di Parigi, condividevano un problema che richiedeva partecipazione universale, una conduzione procedurale inclusiva, la mobilitazione della società civile a Nord come a Sud e una base scientifica comune. Nessuna di queste condizioni si ritrova nel dossier del Consiglio di Sicurezza, dove il problema è la distribuzione di un bene scarso, il potere di decidere sulla guerra e sulla pace, e dove ogni guadagno di un attore è una perdita per un altro. È per questo che lì il protagonismo del Sud deve assumere una forma diversa dalla semplice partecipazione.
Nuova Delhi: che cosa dice la Dichiarazione, e che cosa tace
Adottata per consenso il 12 settembre 2026, al termine della sessione plenaria ristretta, la Dichiarazione di Nuova Delhi conta 140 paragrafi. Sulla riforma delle Nazioni Unite compie tre operazioni. Riafferma l’impegno per una riforma complessiva dell’organizzazione, compreso l’allargamento della rappresentanza dei Paesi in via di sviluppo nel Consiglio di Sicurezza. Riconosce le aspirazioni africane espresse nel Consenso di Ezulwini e nella Dichiarazione di Sirte. Registra, infine, il sostegno di Cina e Russia a un ruolo maggiore di Brasile e India nel sistema ONU, «incluso il Consiglio di Sicurezza». Letti insieme, i paragrafi dedicati alla governance compongono una strategia coerente: restare dentro il sistema multilaterale e riscriverne la gerarchia interna.
Il lessico va però letto con la lente, perché è lì che si misura la distanza tra dichiarazione e impegno. Un «ruolo maggiore» non è un seggio permanente. La formula riprende quella delle dichiarazioni precedenti, e il fatto che un vertice presieduto dall’India non sia andato oltre dice molto sul limite del consenso interno: Pechino sostiene l’aspirazione indiana a contare di più, non quella di sedere accanto a sé con gli stessi poteri. Il Consenso di Ezulwini, dal canto suo, chiede per l’Africa almeno due seggi permanenti con tutte le prerogative dei membri attuali, veto compreso, e cinque seggi non permanenti. Nessuno dei due membri permanenti del club BRICS ha mai sottoscritto questa posizione nei suoi termini; la Dichiarazione ne «riconosce» le aspirazioni, che è cosa diversa.
Conta anche ciò che il testo non nomina. La Dichiarazione evita di indicare Paesi anche sui dossier più sensibili e non menziona mai gli Stati Uniti, pur in un anno segnato dalla guerra contro l’Iran e dalla politica tariffaria di Washington. È una scelta di metodo imposta dalla composizione del blocco, che tiene insieme Iran, Arabia Saudita ed Emirati: la riunione dei ministri degli esteri di maggio si era chiusa senza dichiarazione congiunta proprio per le divergenze sull’Asia occidentale. La riforma delle istituzioni diventa così, per sottrazione, il terreno su cui il consenso regge. Ne fa un collante e al tempo stesso ne limita l’ambizione, perché su ciò che unisce in quanto rimane vago non si costruisce una proposta negoziabile.
Da qui il peso della proposta procedurale avanzata da Modi: che i membri elaborino dieci proposte comuni su rappresentanza, reattività e produzione delle regole, da consolidare in una «Roadmap BRICS per la riforma» entro il prossimo vertice. Se realizzata, sarebbe la prima volta che il blocco passa dalla formula alla bozza. È l’indicatore più concreto uscito da Nuova Delhi, ed è anche quello che più facilmente potrebbe essere lasciato cadere.
New York, settembre 2026: il Sud come coalizione
Il comunicato del Ministero degli esteri indiano sulla riunione del 22 settembre elenca le preoccupazioni condivise dai partecipanti: conflitti che colpiscono la sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, volatilità dei flussi commerciali e d’investimento, la condizione dei marittimi nelle aree di guerra, eventi climatici estremi, ritardi sugli Obiettivi di sviluppo sostenibile. I ministri vi constatano l’indebolimento delle istituzioni multilaterali e chiedono riforme complessive, anzitutto delle Nazioni Unite, perché le crisi in corso colpiscono il Sud in modo sproporzionato. L’incontro si è chiuso con l’impegno a consolidare posizioni comuni e a lavorare per un’architettura di governance equilibrata, partecipativa e giusta.
Tre dettagli della stessa settimana dicono più del comunicato. Jaishankar ha chiesto il passaggio a negoziati su testo nell’IGN, sostenendo che chi blocca il cambiamento sta facendo un uso improprio dell’organizzazione. I ministri della CARICOM hanno concordato con Nuova Delhi un lavoro comune sulla riforma ONU e hanno sostenuto la candidatura indiana a un seggio non permanente per il biennio 2028–29. Ruto, infine, ha legato la rappresentanza nel Consiglio alla riforma dell’architettura finanziaria internazionale: nel 2024 il debito pubblico mondiale ha raggiunto 102.000 miliardi di dollari e i Paesi in via di sviluppo, pur detenendone meno di un terzo, hanno pagato circa mille miliardi di interessi.
Quest’ultimo dato spiega perché il protagonismo del Sud non possa esaurirsi nel Consiglio di Sicurezza. Per gran parte degli oltre centotrenta membri del G77 la questione del veto è lontana, mentre il costo del capitale, il servizio del debito e l’accesso alla finanza climatica sono questioni di ogni bilancio nazionale. Una riforma che aggiungesse quattro o sei seggi permanenti per le potenze emergenti lascerebbe immutata la condizione della maggioranza. Il Sud nel suo insieme ha interesse a tenere insieme rappresentanza politica e riforma finanziaria; le sue potenze regionali hanno interesse soprattutto alla prima. È una divergenza di priorità che nessun comunicato registra e che ogni negoziato reale farebbe emergere.
Tre nodi
Il primo nodo è la rappresentanza del Sud al proprio interno. Il Sud Globale è una maggioranza, non un soggetto unitario. Sul Consiglio si confrontano almeno tre schieramenti. Il G4 (Brasile, Germania, India, Giappone) chiede nuovi seggi permanenti. Il Comitato dei Dieci dell’Unione Africana difende la posizione comune di Ezulwini. Il gruppo Uniting for Consensus respinge nuovi seggi permanenti e propone di allargare la sola categoria elettiva. Di quest’ultimo fanno parte l’Italia, il Pakistan, l’Argentina e il Messico, cioè i vicini e rivali regionali di tre degli aspiranti. Ogni candidatura del Sud genera un’opposizione del Sud. Uniting for Consensus presenta il proprio modello come il più attento alla sottorappresentanza di Asia-Pacifico e America Latina dopo il 1963; buona parte degli Stati africani vi legge un modo per negare al continente la parità di status. Nessuno dei tre schieramenti dispone da solo dei 129 voti che servono in Assemblea.
Il secondo nodo è il veto. La posizione africana lo chiede per i nuovi membri permanenti in nome dell’eguaglianza; il G4 si è mostrato disponibile a rinviarne l’esercizio a una revisione successiva; i cinque permanenti non hanno interesse né a estenderlo né a limitarlo, e la Russia lo ha difeso apertamente come argine contro iniziative avventate dell’organizzazione. Qui l’interesse dei membri BRICS diverge in modo strutturale. Cina e Russia sono garanti dello status quo che il resto del blocco contesta, e la loro adesione alla retorica della riforma si arresta al perimetro del proprio privilegio. Chiedere ai cinque di votare la propria diluizione, come ho scritto altrove, equivale a chiedere a un monopolista di legiferare sulla propria concorrenza.
Il terzo nodo è finanziario, e per il Sud rappresenta insieme un rischio e un’occasione. Per il 2026 il Segretario generale ha proposto un bilancio ordinario ridotto del 15 per cento e un taglio del personale vicino al 19 per cento; all’inizio dell’anno sono stati soppressi 2.900 posti. Il paradosso è evidente, giacché l’organizzazione si restringe proprio mentre la sua maggioranza chiede di pesare di più al suo interno. Ma chi finanzia un’istituzione acquista titolo a ridisegnarla. Se i contributi mancati di Washington rendono l’ONU più dipendente da altri finanziatori, a cominciare dalla Cina, secondo contribuente del bilancio ordinario, il baricentro negoziale si sposta. Per il Sud la domanda è se questo spostamento produrrà più rappresentanza o soltanto un nuovo patrono.
Tre vie: dentro, sopra, di lato
La prima via è quella negoziale, dentro l’IGN. Il Patto per il Futuro adottato il 22 settembre 2024 ha fissato alcuni principi: riparare come priorità l’ingiustizia storica nei confronti dell’Africa, trattandola come caso speciale; migliorare la rappresentanza di Asia-Pacifico, America Latina e Caraibi; intensificare gli sforzi sulla questione delle categorie di membri; lavorare verso un modello consolidato. È il massimo di convergenza mai registrato in un testo adottato per consenso. È anche, osserva Joseph Preston Baratta, un documento di riconferma più che di trasformazione: i piccoli e medi Stati, maggioranza schiacciante dell’Assemblea, non si sono coalizzati attorno a un’agenda ambiziosa perché impegnati a difendere gli impegni sull’aiuto allo sviluppo e sugli Obiettivi del 2030. La richiesta indiana di un testo negoziale è l’unico modo per mettere alla prova quella convergenza. Valuto probabile, con confidenza moderata, che anche l’ottantunesima sessione si chiuda con l’ennesima decisione di rinnovo.
La seconda via passa sopra il negoziato ordinario. L’art. 109 della Carta prevede una Conferenza generale degli Stati membri per la revisione della Carta, convocabile con il voto dei due terzi dell’Assemblea e di nove membri qualsiasi del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Per la convocazione, dunque, il veto non opera. Baratta, riprendendo gli studi di Mahmoud Sharei, propone che una coalizione di piccoli e medi Stati faccia di questa disposizione mai applicata la leva di una revisione complessiva. Il limite è altrettanto chiaro: le modifiche approvate dalla Conferenza entrano in vigore solo con la ratifica di tutti i membri permanenti (art. 109, par. 2). L’art. 109 non aggira il veto, ma ne rende visibile il costo politico, perché costringe i cinque a opporsi apertamente a un processo voluto dalla maggioranza invece di lasciarlo esaurire nelle procedure dell’IGN. Per il Sud è l’unico strumento giuridico che trasforma il numero in iniziativa.
La terza via corre di lato. È quella che ho chiamato altrove la «riforma necessaria», contrapposta alla «riforma impossibile»: la trasformazione che avanza nei circuiti che le istituzioni universali non controllano, dai pagamenti transfrontalieri alle banche di sviluppo, e che finisce per rendere l’interno meno rilevante. Questa via non chiede il permesso a nessuno. Ha però un costo che il Sud deve mettere in conto: un’ONU svuotata non protegge i piccoli, che del diritto internazionale e della sede universale hanno più bisogno delle grandi potenze. Pechino, Mosca o Nuova Delhi possono permettersi un mondo di club; il Burundi o la Giamaica molto meno.
Le tre vie non si escludono. La combinazione più plausibile nei prossimi anni vede la terza avanzare mentre la prima ristagna, con la seconda tenuta in riserva come minaccia. È in questa combinazione che il protagonismo del Sud diventa necessario e non soltanto auspicabile. Solo una maggioranza organizzata può fare in modo che la pressione laterale produca riforma dentro l’organizzazione anziché il suo abbandono; e solo una maggioranza organizzata può rendere credibile l’art. 109 come alternativa allo stallo.
La valutazione poggia su tre assunti: che i cinque permanenti restino compatti nella difesa del veto; che la rivalità sino-indiana persista; che il disimpegno finanziario statunitense continui. Se il primo cadesse, per esempio con un’apertura di Washington o di Parigi a una limitazione del veto, gli scenari di riforma parziale guadagnerebbero probabilità. Se la rivalità tra Pechino e Nuova Delhi si attenuasse in modo stabile, il nodo del seggio indiano smetterebbe di essere il principale ostacolo interno al blocco.
Un ulteriore banco di prova è ormai imminente. La scelta del successore di Guterres, il cui mandato scade a fine 2026, dirà se la rotazione regionale e la domanda di rappresentanza del Sud contano qualcosa anche nella procedura più opaca del sistema, quella in cui il Consiglio raccomanda e l’Assemblea ratifica.
Una maggioranza che deve diventare soggetto
La Carta si apre con le parole «Noi, popoli delle Nazioni Unite». I popoli del Sud sono la grande maggioranza di quel «noi», e la loro esclusione dal centro decisionale non è più un’anomalia storica tollerabile: è il punto in cui la legittimità dell’organizzazione si incrina. Per questo il protagonismo del Sud Globale è necessario. Non perché il Sud sia portatore di una virtù politica superiore, ma perché nessun altro attore ha insieme l’interesse, i numeri e ormai anche le alternative per costringere l’ONU a riformarsi.
Perché quel protagonismo produca risultati servono però tre passaggi che nessuna dichiarazione ha ancora compiuto. Il primo è un modello meridionale unico, o almeno una tregua tra G4, Africa e Uniting for Consensus sul principio che l’allargamento vada fatto prima di stabilire chi ne beneficia. Il secondo è il collegamento esplicito tra rappresentanza politica e riforma finanziaria, così che la maggioranza dei piccoli abbia ragioni proprie per sostenere le ambizioni dei grandi. Il terzo è l’uso delle istituzioni alternative come leva negoziale e non come uscita di sicurezza.
A Nuova Delhi i BRICS hanno scritto che la riforma è dovuta. A New York il Sud Globale ha detto di essere pronto a pretenderla. Resta da vedere se saprà anche organizzarsi per ottenerla, cioè trasformare una maggioranza aritmetica in un soggetto politico. Le Nazioni Unite sono nate per impedire il ritorno del 1939; il Sud chiede che smettano di somigliare al 1945. Tra le due richieste non c’è contraddizione. C’è soltanto chi, dentro il Consiglio, ha interesse a far credere che ci sia.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan made a rare joint visit to Tehran amid reports that the U.S. and Israel were drawing up plans to renew their attacks on Iran.
Mohsen Rezaei, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in July. He will meet with a delegation from countries in the Mecca Pact to discuss conflict in the region, according to an Iranian official.
Egypt’s armed support for the Sudanese military junta under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan took on a new and decidedly ugly dimension earlier this month with the killing of at least 114 people working an artisanal goldmine in northeastern Sudan.
The attack took place on October 10th. Survivors describe an aircraft circling before attacking the workings at Jabal al-Uqaydat. One injured miner, Ali Mohamed Hamza, said workers were preparing tea at about eight in the morning when it appeared overhead, making three circuits before striking on its fourth pass. Other accounts describe five strikes. The number of weapons and attack runs remains unverified, as does the final death toll.
The New York Times placed the mine in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian frontier. Its reporting identified apparent Egyptian munitions in footage from the site. Subsequent accounts of that investigation described an unexploded Egyptian NASR 400 bomb, identified by Trevor Ball, a former American army explosive-ordnance specialist. This is significant physical evidence, although the identification requires further corroboration and manufacture alone cannot establish the operator.
On October 12th Egypt’s armed forces announced a third phase of a military and police campaign against illegal gold mining in the Eastern Desert. Warning leaflets had been dropped, it said, and operations were intended to protect national resources and enforce sovereignty. Cairo did not admit bombing the Sudanese mine or acknowledge casualties or crossing the frontier. Instead, its statement carefully described operations within Egyptian borders.
But taken together, the munition evidence, eyewitness accounts and Egypt’s own announcement mean Cairo can’t brush this off. Nor can they brush this off as an operation against the Rapid Support Forces. What it does suggest is that Egypt will use armed force indiscriminately against civilians wherever their Sudanese allies either won’t or can’t do it.
This is all part of the wider story of Egypt’s involvement in Sudan. Reuters reported in February that satellite imagery showed Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci combat drones at East Oweinat, an Egyptian airfield near Sudan. Egyptian officials acknowledged equipping two southern airports for border protection and military strikes. A separate Times investigation reported that drones operating from Egypt had attacked the RSF inside Sudan.
All this goes well beyond diplomatic sympathy. Cairo provides political backing and, as its security officials have acknowledged privately to Reuters, logistical and technical assistance to General al-Burhan’s forces. Egypt simultaneously occupies a seat in the Quad mediation group alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It therefore possesses leverage both over the battlefield and over negotiations intended to end the war.
The contradiction is sharp. The Quad’s September 2025 statement called for an independent, civilian-led government and a transition not controlled by either belligerent. But under Burhan’s leadership that’s not happening any time soon, which means that Egypt, for all its talk about supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan, will go its own way as it sees fit—even if that includes desperate miners trying to scratch a living from the soil of their own economically devastated country.
Burhan’s response to the miners’ deaths was pusillanimous, tepid at best. On October 12th, he ordered a fact-finding inquiry involving prosecutors, judicial officials and security representatives. His administration said Sudanese and Egyptian authorities were communicating. But there was no condemnation of Cairo or any public demand that Egypt explain what had happened. Preserving the patron’s goodwill appears to be more important to Burhan than demanding answers about the deaths of his own countrymen.
These miners were neither an invading army nor a rival government. They were people digging for survival on ground reported to be their own country’s soil. Their killing demands accountability, not diplomatic discretion. The junta’s tepid response suggests a grim hierarchy of obligations: the survival of its relationship with Cairo first; the lives of Sudanese citizens a distant second.
As for Cairo’s behaviour, this looks decidedly like a war crime. If further investigation were to corroborate eyewitness accounts of the plane making several passes over the area before commencing its attack, then clearly they were having a good look at the facts on the ground. And they dropped their bombs anyway. Hello…? Is that The Hague?
The ‘Grand Design’ to “maintain [western civilisation’s] place at the head of the world” (as U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it) requires the tools for ensuring compliance are two-fold: The creating of destructive revolutionary fervour from below (now termed ‘regime change’); and secondly, the use of what Theodore Herzl in a now famous phrase termed “the terrible power of the purse to exert irresistible pressure on international politics” in order to co-opt the ruling strata into a power network that would advance the Grand Design ‘project’.
This is what we are observing with Trump’s war on Iran. The June 2025 Israeli-American attack was primarily a decapitation attack designed to disable both Iran’s political and military leadership, whilst armed Mossad trained elements, the MEK and Baluchi separatists inter alia would be inserted into Iran to foment revolution from the street below. At that time, the former Shah’s son – implausibly – was being presented to the western media as the incoming leader of Iran.
It did not work. And now Netanyahu is touting that Israel has ‘fresh evidence’ that Iran is moving towards producing a weapon component to its nuclear programme. He is telling Trump that he needs now to finish the job of destroying Iran. And to motivate Trump further, leadingIsraeli daily Ma’arivreports that Israel stove-piped Likud polling directly into the White House to the effect that Netanyahu might win the Israeli elections on 27 October. According to the report, this Likud information (that runs counter to most other Israeli polls) prompted Trump’s full-hearted election endorsement of Netanyahu.
At the same time, the pro-Zionist billionaire donors are wielding the ‘terrible power of the purse’ at Trump: ‘We will not accept anything less than the defeat of Iran. If you continue to seek a deal we will pull our financial support from you’.
Senior current and former security officials in Israel however, refute the need for an imminent attack on Iran and Netanyahu’s claim of new evidence of Iran moving toward a nuclear weapon –
IDF Chief of Staff Zamir told Israel’s Channel 13: “We don’t see a need to attack Iran before the elections”;
Leading Israeli military strategist Udi Evental has cautioned:
“A war to thwart the elections and democracy, not to thwart Iran’s nuclear programme. Netanyahu, who is suspected of being up to his neck in extraneous political and personal considerations, is unfit to make such a decision. He must not be allowed to”.
Whether or not there is such evidence really does not matter. Likely it doesn’t exist. The claim simply forms the peg on which the U.S. is beingtold to take action to ‘finish the job’ on Iran.
As ever, Netanyahu said in the last days:
“Iran is once again trying to develop its weapons of death … There is only one way to remove this threat once and for all – to topple the regime in Iran, and that is my directive to the IDF, the Mossad and the security agencies.”
A senior Iranian official told Drop Site that Tehran’s current internal intelligence assessment indicates a high likelihood that large-scale bombing may begin – even before Tuesday’s Israeli elections.
The point here is that Iran does not care who wins in the midterms, nor who will win the U.S. Presidency in 2028. For the Iranian leadership it is all the same. They well understand the concept of the ‘Grand Design’ (how could they not?).
It is well understood in Iran that they are engaged in a long war confronting the entire Atlanticist bloc – Israel, its intelligence services, its arsenals, its satellites, its military industry, and its media machine. It does not matter whether it is a Republican or a Democrat in the White House. Senior Iranian officials see both parties to have been bought by the Zionist terrible power of the purse.
Understanding the ‘Design’ is to understand that the Zionist donor class will never be satisfied by some ‘deal or trade-off’. They claim it to be certain that Iran ultimately would renege on any mooted acquiescence to U.S. demands. Israelis and their donor class auxiliaries simply do not believe (and repeat incessantly) that Iran would ever accept compliance to Israel, or to accept U.S. political and cultural dominance.
They may be right. Why?
Simply because Iran has a deep civilisation, stretching back to a specifically Persian-Iranian complex of beliefs and practices of the second millennium BCE – Mazdaism, a cosmology of divine drama, represented by the continuing struggle between Light and Darkness.
The renown scholar, Professor Henri Corbin, has argued that “Iran was situated at a centre … it being not only a nation or an empire, but a spiritual universe”. He understood Iran therefore, as a mediating force, both geographically and metaphysically.
For millenia, Iranians have experienced the world as having a clear metaphysical dimension – and history. It is therefore unlikely that they would be attracted to a western nihilistic material posture. Civilisational states, whether Iran or Russia, that embrace contrarian values would never succumb to the ‘Grand Design’. Hence, they must be destroyed.
What does this metaphysical history mean? It means that Iran is preparing for war, not for a ‘deal’. Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and personal representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, stated that,
“If the question is whether Iran still has the ability to continue missile and drone operations [in the event of an attack], the answer is ‘yes’ … The United States has valuable assets in the region. In the event of war, cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities could also come within range. If the conflict begins again, we will have a broader plan”.
“Everyone must understand that action against Iran carries a cost”.
Senior Iranian officials believe that war is coming. Iran has extensive plans (in the event of an attack) that encompasses Saudi Arabia and its leadership, too, a senior Iranian hinted. Karl Miller (from the field) states that in this respect, already a quarter of Saudi oil production has been destroyed and that the damage as a result of AnsarAllah’s retaliatory attacks runs through the whole Saudi production chain – ‘from wellhead to the gas station’ – and that Saudi Arabia has been covering the gap by draining their tanks.
Miller’s report, quoted by Larry Johnson, warns that,
“if Saudi Arabia’s export outlets close, its oil has nowhere to go but to its own refineries, its own power plants and its storage tanks. Once the storage is full, that is roughly the ceiling on what Saudi Arabia could keep producing. Close Ras Tanura and Yanbu at the same time, and the Kingdom would have to shut in most of its oil fields. That is exactly the scenario Ansar Allah’s campaign against the pipeline, the Red Sea and the Gulf terminals, is built to produce”.
“Any new American or Israeli campaign against Iran will land on a Saudi energy system that has no slack left to absorb it”, Larry Johnson observes.
Any new attack on Iran, by extension, will mean the end to the Gulf as we know it, an end to the petrodollar, and an end to the Gulf as the primary supplier of hard cash to Wall Street and the Tech world.
Nonetheless, Trump reportedly has said that the U.S. is not currently negotiating with Iran, and something will happen “fairly soon”.
Maybe. (But with Trump everything distils into speculation). But if he is bluffing, it won’t work, and his humiliation will be all the deeper.
One man who knows Trump better than most (having authored four books on him), Michael Wolff, opines that if the Democrats win in the 3 November midterms –
“They will be trying to impress upon the world that it is ‘a new day’. Trump, for his part, will be trying to impress upon the world that he still controls the stage. There will be a series of these kinds of things (such as a putative invasion of Cuba, for example) greater than anything we may have imagined. He will not be humbled. The idea of humility does not exist in Donald Trump’s soul. Therefore he will do – the opposite”.
L’Iran e la Russia, entrambi sottoposti a sanzioni che li stanno portando alla rovina, sono davvero più allineati che mai e coordinano ogni cosa su un fronte comune.
Washington, sul fronte ucraino, potrebbe passare alla modalità “salvare la faccia” a tutti i costi. Dopotutto, la portata della sconfitta strategica subita dall’Impero e dall’Occidente allo sbando nel Paese 404 è sbalorditiva. A ciò si aggiunga la sconfitta strategica in Iran, oltre allo Yemen che martella senza tregua la Casa dei Saud. Il Gran Maestro Lavrov l’ha definita così: «L’Occidente non sarà mai più l’attore principale, a dettare le condizioni».La tentazione potrebbe essere forte di individuare un percorso più diretto verso un ordine mondiale multinodale e policentrico – sulla scia di tutte quelle concessioni sfrenate e senza precedenti di Trump a Mosca. Ma poi le vere nuvole nere continuano ad addensarsi.Il culto della morte nell’Asia occidentale e il «Sindacato di Epstein» nel suo complesso sono riusciti a sopraffare l’intera massa dei neoconservatori russofobi sparsi in tutto il MICIMATT (complesso militare/industriale/congressuale/di intelligence/mediatico/accademico/dei think tank, secondo la memorabile definizione di Ray McGovern) e a ricostituire l’Iran come l’indiscutibile e unica emergenza di sicurezza nazionale.Il piano in 7 punti o nienteIl viaggio affrettato e organizzato all’ultimo minuto del feldmaresciallo Asim Munir da Islamabad a Teheran all’inizio di questa settimana, alla fine, non ha potuto mediare nulla.Munir ha incontrato tutte le figure di rilievo. Ha chiesto senza mezzi termini al presidente del Parlamento Ghalibaf: cosa occorre per trovare una soluzione all’impasse tra Iran e Stati Uniti? Ghalibaf è stato schietto – e lo ha ribadito almeno otto volte nel corso del loro incontro: Washington deve attuare le condizioni in sette punti dell’Iran, che costituiscono essenzialmente una sintesi del memorandum d’intesa (MoU) ripetutamente fallito, che Trump aveva firmato per poi distruggerlo.I sette punti erano stati proposti per la prima volta a Tweedledum e Tweedledee – Witkoff e Kushner – tramite i qatarioti in un precedente ciclo di negoziati indiretti tra Iran e Stati Uniti.Il presidente Pezeshkian e il segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC) Mohsen Rezaee, nei loro incontri, hanno sottolineato esattamente la stessa cosa. Questo è il messaggio che Munir dovrebbe trasmettere al «sociopatico in capo».Le fonti ufficiali iraniane non lo confermeranno; solo la versione americana, pesantemente manipolata. Ma Munir potrebbe aver portato un ultimatum finale degli Stati Uniti a Rezaee, Pezeshkian e Ghalibaf: abbandonate il vostro programma nucleare, oppure andrete incontro a massicci attacchi, mirati principalmente a Pickaxe Mountain.Oltre ai 7 punti, Mohsen Rezaee ha infatti comunicato nuovamente a Munir – e quindi alla Casa Bianca – che nemmeno un granello di polvere nucleare lascerà l’Iran. Si torna così all’unica possibilità di un ritorno ai negoziati: Washington deve accettare i 7 punti.Il ministro degli Esteri Araghchi continua a ribadire l’essenziale: «Gli Stati Uniti non sono riusciti a raggiungere nessuno dei loro obiettivi di guerra». La catena di nessi è quindi ineludibile: nessuna vittoria militare (e nessun cambio di regime); costi economici insostenibili; situazione politica insostenibile; pertanto l’unica via d’uscita sono i 7 punti.E, come se non bastasse, Teheran fa scorrere il tempo.Parallelamente, nel contesto dell’operazione «Yemeni Storm», anche Sana’a tiene il tempo.Con Aramco, linfa vitale degli Stati Uniti, di Israele e dei sicari salafiti-jihadisti sul modello dell’ISIS, nonché fonte privilegiata di finanziamento per le «guerre infinite», ora nella linea di fuoco diretta di Ansarallah, l’obiettivo yemenita è quello di adoperarsi «per prosciugare le fonti del terrorismo».
Riad, tuttavia, sta raddoppiando la posta in gioco, minacciando di bombardare ogni raduno delle tribù yemenite. Se ciò dovesse accadere, oltre un milione di yemeniti in più si uniranno alle Forze Armate yemenite e marceranno verso il confine yemenito-saudita.
Dopotutto, le tribù, ben addestrate e dotate di armamenti all’avanguardia, stanno solo aspettando un ordine dal leader di Ansarallah, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, per riversarsi nell’Arabia «saudita» meridionale e recuperare le tre province – Najran, Jizan e Asir – che sono terre ancestrali yemenite sottratte dagli inglesi nel 1934.
Un prezzo che non potete permettervi di pagare
Potrebbe scatenarsi il finimondo: ora; a breve; o al più tardi entro la fine di novembre. Se dovesse accadere prima, prima delle elezioni israeliane, è certo che a guidare il tutto sarà il culto della morte. Il sociopatico in capo privilegia un attacco dopo le elezioni di medio termine.
Il «culto della morte» sta preparando un attacco su vasta scala contro centrali elettriche, infrastrutture petrolifere, obiettivi militari e impianti nucleari iraniani. Teheran ha ripetutamente avvertito che qualsiasi attacco, congiunto o separato, da parte degli Stati Uniti e di Israele, sarà considerato una «Totalen Krieg», una guerra totale, e la risposta supererà ogni limite o moderazione.
I servizi segreti interni iraniani sono interamente concentrati su uno scenario di bombardamenti su larga scala che si verificherà prima di martedì prossimo, giorno delle elezioni nel «culto della morte».
Qualunque cosa accada, la risposta di Teheran garantirà che il prezzo da pagare sia ben oltre ogni limite. Per quanto riguarda Israele, l’Iran sferrerà un contrattacco contro entrambe le raffinerie israeliane; i porti di Haifa e Ashdod; tutte le basi aeree; e Dimona sarà aggiunta solo se i siti nucleari iraniani dovessero essere colpiti.
In caso di attacco da parte degli Stati Uniti, qualsiasi monarchia petrolifera del Golfo che ospiti un punto di lancio diventerà immediatamente un bersaglio legittimo, comprese le reti elettriche, gli impianti di desalinizzazione, le raffinerie, i porti, i centri dati, i quartier generali e le installazioni delle aziende americane.
Lo Stretto di Hormuz verrebbe completamente chiuso. Il prezzo del barile di petrolio schizzerà alle stelle. L’economia globale entrerà in una Grande Depressione. Da un punto di vista imperiale, ciò sarebbe altrettanto desolante quanto il fatto che Washington lasci all’Iran la gestione dello Stretto di Ormuz e la riscossione dei diritti di transito: in realtà, la fine umiliante della talassocrazia unilaterale – con la Quinta Flotta degli Stati Uniti costretta a chiedere il permesso per entrare o uscire dalla propria base fatiscente in Bahrein.
Mohammad Mokhber, uno dei principali consiglieri della Guida Mojtaba Khamenei, ha sottolineato che «se gli Stati Uniti e Israele colpiranno le nostre infrastrutture petrolchimiche o le nostre centrali elettriche, l’Iran colpirà nove paesi».
Inoltre, l’agenzia di stampa Fars, molto vicina al Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Islamiche (IRGC), è venuta a conoscenza di una serie di nuove direttive: qualora gli attacchi comportassero l’assassinio di funzionari iraniani e l’uccisione di civili, la risposta iraniana includerà obiettivi politici associati agli Stati Uniti e a tutte le nazioni partecipanti alla guerra, oltre alle loro infrastrutture.
Lavrov e Araghchi rilanciano il RIC
In mezzo a tanto orrore, cerchiamo di sottolineare almeno una tendenza positiva. Durante la recente visita di Lavrov a Teheran, il ministro degli Esteri iraniano Araghchi è andato dritto al sodo:
«Mai nella nostra storia la Russia e l’Iran hanno collaborato così strettamente come ora».
Il concetto chiave è «mai nella nostra storia». Lavrov e Araghchi hanno discusso di «tutto, dall’Europa all’Asia occidentale». Ma in particolare di questi quattro temi: Libano, Palestina, Ucraina e Yemen. Per non parlare di tutto ciò che riguarda l’ampliamento della cooperazione economica e «nucleare».
Per cooperazione economica si intende in particolare l’INSTC – il Corridoio Internazionale di Trasporto Nord-Sud che collega tre partner dei BRICS e della SCO: Russia, Iran e India.
Si veda il mio documentario sull’INSTC girato in Iran lo scorso anno.
L’Impero del Caos fa affidamento su sanzioni, minacce e bombardamenti. L’integrazione eurasiatica si basa sulla costruzione di infrastrutture, sull’incremento degli scambi commerciali e sulla cooperazione sovrana. Pertanto, Lavrov e Araghchi hanno dovuto ancora una volta rilanciare il RIC: l’originario collegamento Russia/India/Cina, inizialmente concepito come «Triangolo di Primakov», ma ora con l’Iran al posto dell’India.
Lavrov ha proposto che il nuovo RIC istituisca una «struttura di sicurezza comune» nel Golfo Persico attraverso un vertice trilaterale. Ciò equivale a definire, nell’ambito del RIC, un quadro unificato per lo Stretto di Hormuz.
La risposta dell’Impero sarà un’ulteriore disorientazione. Poiché, ancora una volta, si tratta dell’«indivisibilità della sicurezza» – come quando la Russia l’ha proposta agli Stati Uniti e alla NATO nel dicembre 2021. Allora ciò fu accolto con una risposta che equivaleva a una mancata risposta.
Per quanto riguarda il Libano, la Palestina, l’Ucraina e lo Yemen, Lavrov e Araghchi erano in prima linea. Da un lato abbiamo l’Impero del Caos e i suoi alleati/vassalli, dall’altro la Russia e gli alleati dell’Iran.
È tutto interconnesso, naturalmente. Un arco imperiale di pressione militare si estende dall’Ucraina allo Yemen. La risposta ruota attorno a come coordinare la resistenza (corsivo mio) a tale pressione.
Per quanto riguarda la cooperazione economica, sia l’Iran che la Russia sono sottoposti a un vero e proprio tsunami di sanzioni. Le loro banche sono state espulse dal sistema SWIFT e le esportazioni di petrolio sono severamente limitate. Pertanto, il commercio tra i due Paesi deve aggirare il dollaro statunitense, l’intero sistema finanziario occidentale e la talassocrazia imposta dalla Marina degli Stati Uniti.
Il know-how necessario per aggirare le sanzioni è qualcosa che l’Iran e la Russia potrebbero condividere con l’intero Sud del mondo, attraverso pagamenti in valute locali, il baratto, i corridoi terrestri, l’INSTC e il commercio attraverso il Mar Caspio.
E questo ci riporta ancora una volta allo Stretto di Ormuz – che l’Iran controlla. Le petro-monarchie del Golfo stanno andando completamente nel panico. La Russia mantiene solidi canali di comunicazione sia con l’Iran che con il Golfo. Lavrov è in perfetta sintonia con tutti loro. Ha portato le preoccupazioni del Golfo a Teheran e, a sua volta, ha trasmesso le condizioni di Teheran al Golfo.
Lavrov ha sottolineato che il Memorandum d’intesa di Islamabad, più volte dichiarato «morto», è l’unica via da seguire. Esattamente ciò che Xi ha detto a Trump nello Studio Ovale. Esattamente ciò che la leadership iraniana ha detto ad Asim Munir a Teheran.
Ha inoltre sottolineato che le petro-monarchie del Golfo Persico devono darsi una regolata e avviare un serio dialogo sulla sicurezza con l’Iran e le nazioni arabe, compresi i paesi confinanti come l’Iraq e la Giordania, coinvolgendo la Lega Araba, l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione Islamica (OIC) e i membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite.
Ancora una volta: l’indivisibilità della sicurezza.
L’Iran e la Russia, entrambi sottoposti a sanzioni fino all’oblio, sono infatti in sintonia come mai prima d’ora, coordinando ogni cosa su un fronte comune – mentre il disperato «Sindacato di Epstein» rimane intrappolato nel proprio incubo di una «guerra eterna» da lui stesso architettato.
Three Palestinians, including a young girl, were killed today in an Israeli airstrike on a camp for displaced people in the southern Gaza Strip, medical sources and first responders said.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been forced to deny reports of a confrontation with the head of Israel's army over possible military action against Iran.
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