The Holy Synod on Tuesday confirmed the previously reported existence of a letter circulated to priests urging them to abandon the Church of Cyprus and found a new church.

Archimandrite Georgios Christodoulou, the Holy Synod’s chief secretary, told media that though the matter of the letter was not on the agenda during Tuesday’s special session of the Synod, it would be addressed at a later stage, “before it gets out of hand”.

According to Phileleftheros, the letter – which effectively advocates for a mutiny – is signed by five individuals. The missive has been circulated to all Paphos-based clerics, as well as to a number of priests in other districts.

The letter’s authors are thought to be proponents of what is known as ‘apoteichisis’ – from the Greek word literally meaning “walling off”. It is a practice in Eastern Orthodox Christian theology where a member or cleric of the Church ceases ecclesiastical communion and liturgical commemoration of their ruling bishop or patriarch.

The action is taken when church leaders are deemed by the adherents to be preaching heresy or straying from Orthodox dogma.

Proponents view it not as leaving the Church or forming a new schism, but as erecting a “protective wall” between themselves and a compromised clergyman to preserve the true faith.

Behind the move are thought to be supporters of former Paphos bishop Tychikos, deposed from his role in May 2025 after he was charged with various breaches of church protocol, including showcasing an icon of a saint not canonised by the church.

Tychikos subsequently appealed against his dismissal at the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, but was unsuccessful in his appeal.

Then in January this year, the Holy Synod voted to suspend him indefinitely from priestly duties following his decision to pursue legal action through the civil courts.

Tychikos had been summoned to Tuesday’s session of the Holy Synod, but did not show up. Instead, he sent a letter requesting a face-to-face meeting with the archbishop.

The archbishop accepted.

Previously, the Holy Synod had asked the rebel priest to sign a declaration of loyalty to the decisions of the Ecumenical Synod, to declare obedience to the decisions of the Holy Synod, and to renounce ‘apoteichisis’ and its adherents.

He complied with none of those requests.

In other business on Tuesday, the Holy Synod condemned the recent deadly attack at a Greek Orthodox church in Jordan, where gunmen fired on the crowd, killing nine people and injuring dozens more.

Turkey may raise as many objections as it wants, but Greece is determined to proceed with the submarine cables for the Crete-Cyprus electricity interconnector, known as the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) as scheduled. On Tuesday morning, the French-flagged offshore support vessel “Abeille Marengo” arrived at the port of Heraklion in Crete. From there it will […]

The post French-flagged vessel in Crete to start surveys for GSI power cables appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.