As eleições em Israel nesta semana terminaram sem que um bloco político conseguisse garantir clara maioria no Parlamento, o que deve gerar negociações delicadas para formação de um novo governo.
Benjamin Netanyahu permanecerá no cargo como primeiro-ministro interino, mas enfrenta um Parlamento com maioria da oposição que busca destituí-lo.
Aqui estão alguns cenários que podem acontecer nos próximos dias e meses.
Outra eleição
Após a divulgação dos resultados finais oficiais das eleições — o que deve ocorrer na próxima semana –, o presidente de Israel, Isaac Herzog, iniciará consultas com representantes dos partidos e, em seguida, indicará o candidato que considerar ter as melhores chances de formar um governo.
Se o candidato não conseguir formar um governo, outro poderá tentar e, caso esse também falhe, o Knesset poderá indicar outro. Há um prazo de cerca de 100 dias para esse processo.
Se ninguém tiver sucesso, será realizada outra eleição.
Herzog afirmou na quarta-feira (28) que tudo deve ser feito para evitar uma nova eleição e pediu aos partidos que participarem das consultas com ele com a mente aberta.
Governo de unidade
O partido Likud, de Netanyahu, que ainda deve conseguir a maior quantidade de assentos no Knesset, poderia formar uma coalizão com partidos de oposição de centro e de direita, como o Yashar, de Gadi Eisenkot — o segundo maior partido —, o “Israel, Nosso Lar”, de Avigdor Lieberman, e a facção “Juntos”, de Naftali Bennett.
Esse agrupamento garantiria 66 cadeiras, uma maioria no Parlamento de 120 cadeiras.
No entanto, essa opção parece remota neste momento, pois significaria que Netanyahu provavelmente teria que abandonar seus aliados políticos “naturais”: os partidos de ultradireita e os judeus ultraortodoxos.
Além disso, os partidos da oposição teriam que quebrar sua principal promessa aos eleitores, que era destituir Netanyahu.
Ainda assim, se nenhum dos lados conseguir formar um governo ao final de semanas de negociações prolongadas, um governo de unidade poderá surgir como última opção.
A retomada dos confrontos com o Irã, ou com outros atores, também poderia aproximar os lados.
Governo de minoria de Eisenkot
Se Herzog escolher Eisenkot primeiro, ele poderia tentar formar um governo com os aliados “naturais” do Yashar — Juntos, Os Democratas e Israel, Nosso Lar — apoiado pelos dois partidos árabes de Israel, mesmo que eles não sejam integrantes desse governo: Ra’am e a Lista Conjunta.
A coalizão de Eisenkot somaria 48 cadeiras, de acordo com a última apuração de votos, com os partidos árabes somando 19 cadeiras, o que, juntos, alcançaria uma maioria de 67 cadeiras.
Mas, mesmo que Eisenkot volte atrás em sua promessa de campanha de não incluir partidos árabes no governo e aceite o apoio deles, seria difícil convencer muitos israelenses, cujas atitudes em relação à minoria árabe de Israel se endureceram ainda mais desde o ataque do Hamas em 7 de outubro de 2023.
Netanyahu concentrou sua campanha em deslegitimar o apoio dos partidos árabes, que alcançaram níveis recordes nas eleições.
Por enquanto, apenas o partido “Os Democratas”, de centro-esquerda, se manifestou publicamente pedindo a inclusão desses partidos.
Ambos os partidos árabes sinalizaram que estão dispostos a cooperar com a chapa de Eisenkot.
O Ra’am integrou-se ao governo de Naftali Bennett em 2021, a primeira vez que um partido árabe independente entrou em uma coalizão israelense. Esse governo caiu após 18 meses.
Netanyahu com maioria para um governo de direita
A coalizão de Netanyahu deve sair das 64 cadeiras que detém no Parlamento para 53, de acordo com os últimos resultados eleitorais.
Mas o líder mais longevo de Israel é visto como um dos políticos mais habilidosos do país e poderia dividir a oposição ao atrair integrantes de seus partidos para o seu lado.
Ele já conseguiu fazer isso antes, inclusive como líder da oposição na corrida para as eleições de 2022, das quais saiu vitorioso. Mas a coalizão contra a qual ele lutava na época tinha uma vantagem muito menor e ele não precisou de muitos desertores para desestabilizar seus rivais políticos.
Il «Grande Progetto» volto a «mantenere [la civiltà occidentale] al vertice del mondo» (come ha affermato il Segretario di Stato statunitense Marco Rubio) richiede che gli strumenti per garantire l’obbedienza siano di due tipi: La creazione di un fervore rivoluzionario distruttivo dal basso (oggi definito «cambio di regime»); e, in secondo luogo, l’uso di ciò che Theodore Herzl, in una famosa frase, definì «il terribile potere del denaro di esercitare una pressione irresistibile sulla politica internazionale», al fine di cooptare gli strati dominanti in una rete di potere che promuovesse il «progetto» del Grande Disegno.Questo è ciò che stiamo osservando nella guerra di Trump contro l’Iran.
L’attacco israelo-americano del giugno 2025 era principalmente un attacco di decapitazione volto a neutralizzare sia la leadership politica che quella militare dell’Iran, mentre elementi armati addestrati dal Mossad, il MEK e i separatisti baluchi tra gli altri sarebbero stati infiltrati in Iran per fomentare la rivoluzione dalla base. A quel tempo, il figlio dell’ex Scià – in modo poco plausibile – veniva presentato ai media occidentali come il futuro leader dell’Iran.
Non ha funzionato. E ora Netanyahu sta sostenendo che Israele disponga di «nuove prove» del fatto che l’Iran si stia orientando verso la produzione di un componente bellico nell’ambito del proprio programma nucleare. Sta dicendo a Trump che ora deve portare a termine l’opera di distruzione dell’Iran. E per motivare ulteriormente Trump, il principale quotidiano israeliano Ma’ariv riporta che Israele ha trasmesso direttamente alla Casa Bianca i sondaggi del Likud, secondo cui Netanyahu potrebbe vincere le elezioni israeliane del 27 ottobre. Secondo l’articolo, queste informazioni del Likud (che contraddicono la maggior parte degli altri sondaggi israeliani) hanno spinto Trump a esprimere il proprio pieno sostegno elettorale a Netanyahu.
Allo stesso tempo, i miliardari filosionisti stanno esercitando il «terribile potere del denaro» su Trump: «Non accetteremo nulla di meno della sconfitta dell’Iran. Se continuerà a cercare un accordo, le ritireremo il nostro sostegno finanziario».
Alti funzionari della sicurezza israeliani, sia in carica che in pensione, confutano tuttavia la necessità di un attacco imminente all’Iran e l’affermazione di Netanyahu relativa a nuove prove che l’Iran si stia muovendo verso l’arma nucleare –il Capo di Stato Maggiore delle Forze di Difesa Israeliane (IDF) Zamir ha dichiarato al Canale 13 israeliano: «Non vediamo la necessità di attaccare l’Iran prima delle elezioni»; Il principale stratega militare israeliano Udi Evental ha messo in guardia: «Una guerra per ostacolare le elezioni e la democrazia, non per ostacolare il programma nucleare dell’Iran. Netanyahu, che si sospetta sia immerso fino al collo in considerazioni politiche e personali estranee alla questione, non è idoneo a prendere una decisione del genere. Non glielo si deve permettere».
Che esistano o meno prove del genere non ha davvero importanza. Probabilmente non esistono. L’affermazione costituisce semplicemente il pretesto con cui si sta esortando gli Stati Uniti ad agire per ‘portare a termine l’opera’ contro l’Iran. Come sempre, Netanyahu ha dichiarato negli ultimi giorni: «L’Iran sta ancora una volta cercando di sviluppare le sue armi di morte… C’è un solo modo per eliminare questa minaccia una volta per tutte: rovesciare il regime in Iran, e questa è la mia direttiva all’IDF, al Mossad e alle agenzie di sicurezza».Un alto funzionario iraniano ha dichiarato a Drop Site che l’attuale valutazione dei servizi segreti interni di Teheran indica un’elevata probabilità che possano iniziare bombardamenti su larga scala – anche prima delle elezioni israeliane di martedì.
Il punto è che all’Iran non interessa chi vincerà le elezioni di medio termine, né chi conquisterà la presidenza degli Stati Uniti nel 2028. Per la leadership iraniana è tutto uguale. Comprendono bene il concetto del «Grande Disegno» (come potrebbero non farlo?).In Iran è ben chiaro che il Paese è impegnato in una lunga guerra contro l’intero blocco atlantista: Israele, i suoi servizi di intelligence, i suoi arsenali, i suoi satelliti, la sua industria militare e la sua macchina mediatica. Non importa se alla Casa Bianca ci sia un repubblicano o un democratico. Gli alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che entrambi i partiti siano stati comprati dal terribile potere sionista del denaro.
Comprendere il «Progetto» significa comprendere che la classe dei finanziatori sionisti non si accontenterà mai di un «accordo o compromesso». Essi sostengono con certezza che l’Iran alla fine verrebbe meno a qualsiasi acconsentimento ipotizzato alle richieste statunitensi. Gli israeliani e i loro alleati della classe dei finanziatori semplicemente non credono (e lo ripetono incessantemente) che l’Iran accetterebbe mai di sottomettersi a Israele, né di accettare il dominio politico e culturale degli Stati Uniti. Potrebbero avere ragione. Perché? Semplicemente perché l’Iran possiede una civiltà profonda, che affonda le sue radici in un complesso di credenze e pratiche specificamente persiano-iraniane risalenti al secondo millennio a.C.: il mazdeismo, una cosmologia del dramma divino, rappresentata dalla lotta continua tra Luce e Oscurità.
Il rinomato studioso, il professor Henri Corbin, ha sostenuto che «l’Iran era situato in una posizione centrale… non essendo solo una nazione o un impero, ma un universo spirituale». Egli concepiva quindi l’Iran come una forza mediatrice, sia geograficamente che metafisicamente.
Per millenni, gli iraniani hanno percepito il mondo come dotato di una chiara dimensione metafisica – e di una storia. È quindi improbabile che possano essere attratti da un atteggiamento materialistico e nichilista di stampo occidentale. Gli Stati civilizzatori, siano essi l’Iran o la Russia, che abbracciano valori contrari non soccomberebbero mai al «Grande Disegno». Di conseguenza, devono essere distrutti.
Cosa significa questa storia metafisica? Significa che l’Iran si sta preparando alla guerra, non a un «accordo». Mohsen Rezaei, segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale iraniano e rappresentante personale della Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, ha affermato che, «Se la domanda è se l’Iran abbia ancora la capacità di proseguire le operazioni con missili e droni [in caso di attacco], la risposta è “sì” … Gli Stati Uniti dispongono di risorse preziose nella regione. In caso di guerra, anche cavi, centri dati e strutture di intelligenza artificiale potrebbero rientrare nel raggio d’azione. Se il conflitto dovesse riprendere, avremo un piano più ampio». «Tutti devono comprendere che un’azione contro l’Iran comporta un costo».
Alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che la guerra sia imminente. L’Iran dispone di piani di ampia portata (in caso di attacco) che coinvolgono anche l’Arabia Saudita e la sua leadership, ha lasciato intendere un alto funzionario iraniano. Karl Miller (dal campo) afferma che, a questo proposito, un quarto della produzione petrolifera saudita è già stato distrutto e che i danni causati dagli attacchi di rappresaglia di AnsarAllah interessano l’intera catena produttiva saudita – «dalla testa di pozzo alla stazione di servizio» – e che l’Arabia Saudita sta colmando il deficit attingendo alle proprie riserve.
Il rapporto di Miller, citato da Larry Johnson, avverte che,«se i canali di esportazione dell’Arabia Saudita dovessero chiudersi, il suo petrolio non avrebbe altra destinazione se non le proprie raffinerie, le proprie centrali elettriche e i propri serbatoi di stoccaggio. Una volta che lo stoccaggio fosse pieno, si raggiungerebbe all’incirca il limite massimo di produzione che l’Arabia Saudita potrebbe mantenere. Se Ras Tanura e Yanbu venissero chiusi contemporaneamente, il Regno sarebbe costretto a chiudere la maggior parte dei propri giacimenti petroliferi. Questo è esattamente lo scenario che la campagna di Ansar Allah contro l’oleodotto, il Mar Rosso e i terminali del Golfo è volta a provocare». «Qualsiasi nuova campagna americana o israeliana contro l’Iran si abbatterà su un sistema energetico saudita che non dispone più di margini per assorbirla», osserva Larry Johnson.
Qualsiasi nuovo attacco all’Iran, per estensione, significherà la fine del Golfo così come lo conosciamo, la fine del petrodollaro e la fine del Golfo come principale fornitore di liquidità per Wall Street e il mondo della tecnologia.
Ciononostante, secondo quanto riferito, Trump avrebbe affermato che gli Stati Uniti non stanno attualmente negoziando con l’Iran e che qualcosa accadrà «molto presto».
Forse. (Ma con Trump tutto si riduce a speculazioni). Se però sta bluffando, non funzionerà, e la sua umiliazione sarà ancora più profonda.
Un uomo che conosce Trump meglio di molti altri (avendo scritto quattro libri su di lui), Michael Wolff, sostiene che se i Democratici vinceranno nelle elezioni di medio termine del 3 novembre –
«Cercheranno di far capire al mondo che è “un nuovo giorno”. Trump, dal canto suo, cercherà di far capire al mondo che è ancora lui a controllare la scena. Ci sarà una serie di eventi di questo tipo (come una presunta invasione di Cuba, ad esempio) di portata superiore a qualsiasi cosa possiamo immaginare. Non si mostrerà umile. Il concetto di umiltà non esiste nell’animo di Donald Trump. Pertanto, farà esattamente il contrario».
The Iranian military on Thursday claimed that four tankers had struck mines in or near the Strait of Hormuz, as the UK’s Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that at least one tanker was attacked in the area. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy first said in a statement that three tankers traveling on an […]
Egg prices go up 2.1% on Sunday; flour is reportedly set to rise by as much as 14%, with bread, pasta and other staples likely to follow, in fresh blow to households stretched thin by cost-of-living crisis
El líder de Ansar Allah, Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, afirmó que Estados Unidos e Israel emplean consignas de liberación y derechos humanos para justificar la opresión, la agresión y el bloqueo impuesto al pueblo de Yemen.
The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.
American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.
According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.
The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.
Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.
Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.
The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.
Military Preparations and Political Timing
The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.
The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.
During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.
The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.
The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.
Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.
However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.
American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.
The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.
Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible
Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.
That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.
The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.
The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.
Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.
Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.
Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.
The Conflict Has Already Spread
The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.
Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.
These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.
The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.
However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.
Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.
None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.
Europe Faces Another Energy Risk
For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.
The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.
An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.
The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.
European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.
The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.
A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.
Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.
The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments
European governments must balance several interests.
They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.
At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.
A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.
European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.
The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.
With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.
Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.
Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).
La sospecha apunta al envío de fondos desde Qatar y otros dos países para alentar el voto árabe, mientras Eisenkot acusa a Netanyahu de querer deslegitimar los comicios Leer
La sospecha apunta al envío de fondos desde Qatar y otros dos países para alentar el voto árabe, mientras Eisenkot acusa a Netanyahu de querer deslegitimar los comicios
An Israeli drone strike hit a civilian car in central Gaza on Thursday, killing at least two Palestinians, medical sources told the Anadolu Agency, as the IDF continues its relentless attacks across the Strip. The car was bombed near the entrance of the al-Maghazi refugee camp, and at least one other person was wounded. Footage […]
Since invading Lebanon in early March, Israeli officials have tried to frame the war as primarily targeting Lebanon’s Shi’ite population. From early on, the war was about destroying Shi’ite villages, displacing Shi’ite locals, and at times threatening to annihilate the Lebanese Shi’ite community outright. And certainly, the Shi’ites have borne the brunt of the destruction […]
Jaffa, Israel — Outside of Ahva Elementary School in Ajami, a historic Palestinian neighborhood just south of central Tel Aviv, the mood was defiant on October 27, the day of Israel’s national elections. “We fear that if we do not get this government out of power, we will lose everything,” one Palestinian voter told me after casting her ballot.
It came as no surprise that she, like most of the Palestinian citizens of Israel I interviewed on Election Day, asked not to be named. Since October 7, 2023, more than 400 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been investigated by police for “incitement,” often over social media posts, according to the legal rights group Adalah.
During the 1948 war, which Palestinians call the Nakba, most of Jaffa’s nearly 100,000 Palestinian residents fled or were expelled. The fewer than 4,000 who remained were concentrated in Ajami, fenced in with barbed wire, where they lived under Israeli military rule until 1949.
Just weeks ago, it was not clear that the parties most Palestinian citizens of Israel vote for would even appear on the ballot. In September, Israel’s Central Elections Committee, a body of party representatives, voted to disqualify both Arab parties — which are led by and draw most of their votes from Palestinian citizens of Israel — from running in the election. The Joint List is an alliance of three parties running together to clear the 3.25 percent threshold needed to enter the Knesset.
Hadash, a left-wing party with roots in Israel’s Communist Party, is the only one of the three with both Jewish and Palestinian members. Ta’al’s platform has historically focused on the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Balad, a Palestinian nationalist party, calls for Israel to become a state of all its citizens, with equal rights for everyone.
The other party, running independently, is Ra’am, a conservative Islamist party led by Mansour Abbas, which in 2021 became the first Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition.
The two Arab parties were eventually reinstated and allowed to run in the Israeli election, but only after an appeal to Israel’s Supreme Court.
As Israelis vote to elect the country’s 26th parliament (Knesset), Palestinian voters in the Ajami neighborhood said Gaza was at the top of their minds. Just down the road is a public memorial displaying photos of some of the more than 20,000 children who have, according to a UN commission, been killed by the Israeli military in Gaza since October 7, 2023.
The memorial, at Hajj Kahil Square, has been torn down more than once. In May, according to Bokra, a Palestinian news site, two men, one of them carrying a rifle, ripped the photos from the walls. The next day, Jaffa residents put them back up and renamed the traffic circle the “Gaza Children’s Roundabout.” Police, who ultimately answer to Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s far right minister of national security, have also tried to stop protesters from displaying the images.
Whether or not to participate in Israel’s national elections has long been a fraught topic among Palestinian citizens of Israel.
Whether or not to participate in Israel’s national elections has long been a fraught topic among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Some fear that voting in the election would lend legitimacy to a state that expelled most of their families in 1948 and maintains a military occupation over Palestinians in the West Bank, and that human rights groups say has committed genocide in Gaza; but others view it as their only way to gather power in the Knesset, especially more than three years after October 7.
An unprecedented wave of homicides in the community has also pushed many to the polls. At least 184 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been killed this year, putting 2026 on pace to surpass last year’s record of 252, according to the Abraham Initiatives. Police filed indictments in just 12 percent of homicides in Palestinian communities by June 2026, compared with a historic rate of indictments in 65 percent of cases involving homicides committed against Jewish Israelis.
On Israel’s Election Day, a recorded voice message went out to more than 1 million Palestinian voters from Sousan Sultan, whose sister Susan was killed in April 2025, and whose husband, Ziad, was murdered last August. “My sister was murdered, and she cannot vote in the election,” Sultan said in the recording, asking voters to cast their ballots in her sister’s name.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his main challengers have all ruled out forming a coalition with the Arab parties, even as polls suggest the opposition may struggle to reach a majority without them. Throughout the campaign, Likud (Israel’s largest right-wing party) and its allies have made those parties a frequent target of their campaign ads, using Palestinian electoral power as a way to drum up turnout among anti-Palestinian blocs.
Some ads depict images of Palestinian political leaders, including Ahmad Tibi, who was an adviser to Yasser Arafat, alongside center-right politician Gadi Eisenkot, whose Yashar party leads the opposition, proclaiming the choice is “the right” or “Palestine.”
In the Negev, the desert region in Israel’s south that is home to most of the country’s roughly 300,000 Bedouin citizens, many of whom identify as Palestinians, voter turnout has historically been low. But in this election, that appears to have completely shifted. In the Bedouin village of al-Atawneh, turnout had reached 64 percent by noon on the day of the election, the highest in the country, according to Central Elections Committee data. In the last election, it was 41 percent for the entire day.
“We are seeing record-breaking voter turnout in the Naqab [the Arabic name for the Negev] today for the Knesset elections, reaching unprecedented levels,” Huda Abu Obaid, advocacy coordinator with the Negev Coexistence Forum, told Truthout on Election Day. “However, right-wing groups are intentionally delaying the voting process, forcing voters to wait in excessively long lines.”
Many of the Negev’s Bedouin citizens live in villages the state does not recognize, which lack connection to the national water and electricity grids and where homes face demolition for being built without permits. Israeli authorities demolished a record 5,187 buildings in Bedouin communities in the Negev in 2024 alone, up from 3,283 the year before, according to the Negev Coexistence Forum.
Far right parties sent their own observers to polling stations in Palestinian communities, and rights groups reported long delays in the Galilee, in the north, and the Negev, both home to large Palestinian populations. The Central Elections Committee said it had found no evidence of systematic tampering and that polling stations would stay open past 10:00 pm for anyone still in line.
On Election Day in 2015, Netanyahu warned in a video that Palestinian voters were heading to the polls “in droves,” a message widely credited with driving a late surge in support for Likud. This year, he did it again, warning his base of high Palestinian turnout and claiming, without evidence, that his opponents were trying to steal the election.
With about 84 percent of all votes counted by Wednesday afternoon, no party bloc was close to reaching the 61-seat threshold required to form a majority in the Knesset. Netanyahu’s bloc was the largest, at 54 seats, but it was still down from 68 he held in the outgoing Knesset. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc (composed of all non-Arab parties running to unseat Netanyahu) won 49 seats. The Arab parties won a combined total of 17 seats, the most they have ever won in history. Turnout among Palestinian citizens reached an estimated 80 percent, breaking a record set in 1999, and surpassing the turnout rate among Jewish Israeli voters for the first time ever.
Jafar Farah, director of the Mossawa Center, a Haifa-based advocacy group for Arab citizens of Israel, cautioned against reading too much into the numbers. Farah was elected to the No. 2 spot on Hadash’s slate in May but withdrew in September. He said the rise in Palestinian turnout does not necessarily mean Palestinian citizens have renewed faith in the Israeli state or its institutions, or believe the ballot can end the military occupation of the West Bank (a theme in some of the Joint List’s campaign ads), or change conditions in Gaza. Instead, Farah said, many voters see casting a ballot as a form of “damage control.”
At least 184 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been killed this year.
“The increase in turnout projected in the 2026 polls, if it materializes, cannot automatically be interpreted as a return of trust in the Israeli establishment or in the Arab parties,” Farah said. “It may also reflect a growing sense of the need for political protection in conditions marked by uncertainty.”
A May poll by Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center found that while more than 77 percent of Palestinian citizens of Israel want an Arab party in the next government, only 40 percent believe Jewish Israelis genuinely support a political partnership with them.
Netanyahu’s challengers offer little on the issues many Palestinian voters care about. Eisenkot’s party says it supports Jewish settlement wherever it is carried out legally and opposes a Palestinian state. Eisenkot himself has said anyone still thinking about a two-state solution after October 7 is “simply delusional.” Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who leads the B’Yachad list, has ruled out ceding any land to what he calls Israel’s enemies, an apparent reference to a Palestinian state.
As of today, the math appears simple: Without the Joint List or Ra’am joining the coalition, the opposition appears to have no way to form a majority in the Knesset. Yet Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman, two right-wing opposition leaders, are still ruling out any government that relies on Arab parties, and Eisenkot has not dropped conditions for coalition partners that most Palestinian lawmakers are unlikely to accept.
Palestinian citizens of Israel turned out in record numbers to get the Netanyahu government out of power, but it remains to be seen whether the other opposition parties will join in their efforts.
The article examines Gadi Eisenkot’s portrayal as a centrist political alternative to Benjamin Netanyahu, contrasting that image with his military record and role in developing Israel’s Obliteration Doctrine.
It has been reported that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun received assurances from the United States that Israel does not intend to carry out any new strikes beyond the yellow line assuming Hezbollah doesn’t attack. The report was followed with suggestions that Lebanon’s goal, then, was to convince Hezbollah to stop resisting. Israel, for its part, […]
Prime minister claims Arab Israeli parties used foreign backing to steal elections, in which his coalition lost its majority
Benjamin Netanyahu has been accused of using smear tactics to cling to power, after he claimed that Arab Israeli parties had used foreign backing to “steal” Tuesday’s election, in which the prime minister’s coalition lost its parliamentary majority.
Netanyahu and his allies called on the internal security service, Shin Bet, to investigate alleged vote buying and other irregularities in Palestinian communities in Israel, supposedly funded by foreign money.
À Gaza, des organisations arabes supplétives de l'armée israélienne sont de plus en plus actives. Financées par Tel-Aviv, elles constituent un défi militaire et politique pour le mouvement islamiste. L'Autorité palestinienne voit en elles un moyen de reprendre le contrôle d'un territoire dont elle a été chassée en 2007.
Le 1er septembre 2026, un raid lancé dans l'ouest de la ville de Gaza par une milice locale hostile au Hamas, appuyée par les forces israéliennes, a conduit à la capture du chef de la sécurité intérieure de ce mouvement, M. Moueïn Al-Arabid, recherché de longue date par Tel-Aviv. Quelques jours plus tard, un combattant du Djihad islamique, allié du Hamas, est enlevé puis abattu à Khan Younès, dans le sud de l'enclave, par un autre groupe gazaoui opérant aux côtés des troupes d'Israël. Constituées ou remises en selle à Gaza dès 2024 avec l'aide de Tel-Aviv, dans le contexte du vide sécuritaire créé par la guerre, les milices anti-Hamas n'en sont pas à leurs premiers coups de main armés contre le mouvement et ses alliés. Depuis le « cessez-le-feu » qu'il a conclu avec Israël en octobre 2025, leurs attaques se sont même multipliées, faisant près d'une centaine de victimes (1).
Issus, pour certains, de clans familiaux, comme les Forces de défense populaire (FDP) de M. Rami Hilles (originaire d'une grande famille de la ville de Gaza, mais désavoué par les siens), et le plus souvent proches du Fatah, le parti du président de l'Autorité palestinienne (AP) Mahmoud Abbas, ces groupes comprendraient au total plusieurs milliers d'hommes, contre près de vingt mille combattants et dix mille policiers du côté du Hamas. Outre les FDP, les plus importants sont les Forces populaires, fondées par l'ancien chef de gang Yasser Abou Shabab (tué fin 2025 et remplacé par M. Ghassan Al-Douhaini), l'Armée populaire - Forces du Nord de M. Ashraf Al-Mansi, la Force de frappe antiterroriste de M. Houssam Al-Astal et les Forces de la patrie libre du très redouté Shawki Abou Nassira (dit « le Crocodile »). Elles sont installées dans des camps fortifiés, à proximité de la quarantaine d'avant-postes militaires israéliens érigés le long du côté est de la « ligne jaune ». Tracée par Tel-Aviv lors du « cessez-le-feu » et déplacée plus à l'ouest au fil des mois, cette ligne de démarcation sépare désormais les deux tiers de l'enclave occupés par Israël (ou « zone verte ») de la portion territoriale encore administrée par le Hamas (« zone rouge »). D'après une enquête du journal Haaretz (2), les miliciens et leurs proches disposent notamment dans leurs camps de « modules préfabriqués dotés de climatiseurs », d'une « aire de jeux avec du gazon synthétique », mais aussi d'une « boutique de vêtements » et d'une « épicerie bien garnie » — un « luxe », alors que le reste de la bande de Gaza est frappé par les pénuries alimentaires, d'eau et d'électricité, en raison des restrictions israéliennes, et que la reconstruction reste bloquée…
Financées, équipées et entraînées par Israël, ces organisations supplétives sont devenues un instrument-clé de la stratégie suivie par Tel-Aviv à Gaza. Ainsi, selon le témoignage d'un officier recueilli par Haaretz, l'armée israélienne « envoie des miliciens dans des secteurs difficiles d'accès, situés au cœur du territoire contrôlé par le Hamas (3) », entre autres pour récupérer des drones ou accomplir des missions risquées que les soldats ne peuvent entreprendre eux-mêmes. Mais leurs activités ne se limitent pas aux actions contre le mouvement islamiste. Il les charge aussi d'agir contre leurs concitoyens en assurant le déplacement forcé de populations. En mai 2026, le groupe de M. Abou Nassira a ainsi violemment évacué des centaines de familles d'un quartier oriental de Deir Al-Balah (dans le centre de l'enclave) afin de faire place nette pour les troupes d'occupation (4). Un militaire israélien raconte avoir vu, lors d'une opération conjointe, des miliciens « tirer sur les gens » pour les déloger de chez eux, puis « incendier les maisons » après avoir « volé tout ce qu'ils pouvaient » (5). Les milices sont également accusées du pillage de convois d'aide humanitaire, de contrebande, d'extorsion, mais aussi d'assassinats de civils soupçonnés d'être proches du Hamas — d'après une commission d'enquête des Nations unies (6), celui-ci est l'auteur de nombreuses « exécutions sommaires et extrajudiciaires » de collaborateurs d'Israël et de militants du Fatah.
Reprendre pied à Gaza
En juin 2025, face aux critiques suscitées par les révélations sur le soutien apporté en secret par Tel-Aviv à ces milices, le chef du gouvernement, M. Benyamin Netanyahou, a reconnu avoir recours à des groupes supplétifs et à des clans locaux pour lutter contre le Hamas. « Où est le problème ?, a-t-il déclaré. C'est une bonne chose car cela permet d'épargner la vie de soldats (7). » De fait, la stratégie israélienne concernant ces groupes répond à un objectif précis poursuivi par M. Netanyahou : fragmenter la société gazaouie et empêcher l'émergence d'une entité politique unifiée dans la bande côtière (8). C'est pourquoi celui-ci martèle depuis le début de la guerre qu'Israël exclut toute possibilité de voir l'AP remplacer le Hamas dans l'enclave.
Ce faisant, M. Netanyahou passe sous silence le rôle joué par l'AP, sise à Ramallah (Cisjordanie), dans le « marigot milicien » de Gaza. Maintenue dans l'ombre, son implication auprès des groupes supplétifs, dont la plupart des chefs sont d'anciens employés des forces de sécurité de l'AP, est documentée par plusieurs médias — malgré les démentis officiels de Ramallah — et a été confirmée par Abou Shabab et M. Al-Astal eux-mêmes (9). Selon des sources sécuritaires palestiniennes, l'aide que leur fournit l'AP leur parvient sous l'égide de M. Bahaa Balousha, une figure du service de renseignement général de l'AP, natif de l'enclave et proche du président Abbas (10). Des membres de milices seraient ainsi rémunérés par l'AP, qui aurait même fait transférer — avec l'aval d'Israël — des combattants blessés dans des hôpitaux de Cisjordanie, où ils auraient été soignés sous une fausse identité (11).
En appuyant ces groupes armés, le régime de M. Abbas veut reprendre pied à Gaza, d'où le Hamas a chassé l'AP en 2007, et à affaiblir son rival islamiste. En outre, malgré l'opposition d'Israël, il entend s'imposer comme un interlocuteur incontournable de la « communauté internationale » dans le cadre de la reconstruction prévue par le « plan de paix » de M. Donald Trump.
« Pour nombre d'entre nous, remettre en question l'État juif, c'est remettre en question la judéité », déplore l'essayiste américain Peter Beinart, aujourd'hui militant pour un État binational en Israël-Palestine (1). Cette tension-là est en partie neutralisée par le renouveau de la pensée antisioniste dans la jeunesse juive américaine. Grâce à des groupes comme Jewish Voice for Peace (Voix juive pour la paix) ou des magazines comme Jewish Currents (Beinart participe à son comité de rédaction), une nouvelle voix critique progresse depuis plus d'une décennie outre-Atlantique, et connaît une accélération depuis les massacres du 7 octobre 2023 et la destruction de Gaza. Beinart, pratiquant, explique dans cet ouvrage pourquoi il croit que « la libération des Palestiniens passe aussi par celle des Juifs ».
Et si desserrer ce lien entre judéité et soutien à l'État israélien permettait aussi de se réapproprier les origines mêmes du sionisme ? C'est tout l'enjeu de 22 Mapesbury Road de Rachel Cockerell, dont le titre en français reprend l'adresse londonienne où son père est né, d'une famille d'origine juive russe arrivée en Angleterre à la veille de la première guerre mondiale (2). En découvrant le parcours de son arrière-grand-père, un certain David Jochelman (1869-1941), Cockerell s'est trouvée confrontée à l'un des chapitres les plus riches et confus de l'histoire contemporaine : la modernité juive du début du XXe siècle. Jochelman fut l'une des chevilles ouvrières de l'Organisation juive territorialiste (ITO), mouvement fondé en 1905 par l'écrivain anglais Israël Zangwill (1864-1926) après une scission avec l'Organisation sioniste mondiale (OSM), laquelle constituait un soutien obstiné à la création d'un État juif en Palestine. Pour les partisans de Zangwill, il valait mieux faire le « sionisme sans Sion », peut-être dans des colonies britanniques comme l'Ouganda ou l'Australie.
Ce qui intéresse le plus Cockerell est une autre hypothèse alors envisagée, encore moins connue aujourd'hui : le « plan de Galveston ». Son arrière-grand-père a participé à l'installation de presque dix mille Juifs, notamment de l'Empire russe, au centre des États-Unis, en passant par le port de Galveston, non loin de Houston. « Qu'on ne nous parle donc plus de la Palestine comme champ de notre émigration », proclame Zangwill en décembre 1907, au début de l'entreprise. « À moins que vous ne parliez de “Palestine, USA”. Car le Texas possède un endroit qu'on appelle Palestine, tout près de Galveston, avec deux familles juives et une synagogue à elles deux. Vers cette Palestine-là, nous conduirons l'émigration avec joie. »
Zangwill, la « personnalité juive la plus célèbre du monde anglophone au début du siècle », porte à la scène, aux États-Unis, avec The Melting Pot (1908), une ode à la créolisation, qui aura un grand succès. Or cette parenthèse semble se refermer pour la famille de Cockerell. Jochelman, de retour en Europe, finira en compagnon de route de Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), à la tête de la tendance la plus nationaliste au sein du sionisme. Mais elle ne se clôt pas entièrement. Car dans les années 1950, bien après son décès, on apprend que Jochelman avait un fils d'un premier mariage, né dans l'Empire russe et abandonné aux États-Unis. Cockerell le retrouve sous le nom de plume d'Emjo Basshe (1898-1939), dramaturge de l'avant-garde new-yorkaise, proche du Parti communiste.
De façon marquante, le récit, excepté la brève préface et la conclusion, est entièrement construit à partir de documents d'archives : fragments de lettres et de journaux personnels, extraits de discours et d'articles de presse, entretiens. Cette polyphonie des sources est à l'image d'une histoire de l'identité juive faite de perspectives et d'utopies plurielles, qui s'entrechoquent et se contredisent.
(1) Peter Beinart, Being Jewish After the Destruction of Gaza. A Reckoning, Atlantic Books, Londres, 2025, 172 pages, 18 livres sterling. Lire aussi Peter Beinart, « Les hantises du colon », Le Monde diplomatique, octobre 2025.
« Vous aviez raison. » Le 28 septembre dernier, lors de la conférence travailliste à Liverpool, le nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères bat sa coulpe auprès « des millions de personnes émues et indignées par le sort du peuple palestinien ». Interrogé le soir même par LBC, M. Edward (« Ed ») Miliband élude néanmoins sur les exportations d'armes vers Israël ou l'interdiction du réseau de désobéissance civile Palestine Action (1). Les travaillistes refusent toujours de prendre leurs responsabilités. Déjà, en juin 2025, quand le député indépendant Jeremy Corbyn avait proposé une enquête parlementaire sur l'implication du Royaume-Uni dans les massacres à Gaza, le gouvernement avait estimé que ce serait « inutile ». Pour établir la vérité sur les livraisons d'équipements britanniques à l'armée israélienne, ou l'appui que lui aurait apporté la Royal Air Force (RAF) basée à Chypre, l'élu a donc lancé une autre initiative : la convocation du tribunal citoyen pour Gaza, sur le modèle du tribunal Russell, présidé par Jean-Paul Sartre (2).
Avec ses deux coprésidents, les juristes Neve Gordon et Shahd Hammouri, M. Corbyn a récapitulé les deux jours d'audience à Londres, en septembre 2025, dans The Gaza Tribunal, publié en juillet dernier. Ils rapportent la parole des témoins, du journaliste palestinien Abubaker Abed, chassé de Gaza en 2025, à la rapporteuse spéciale des Nations unies Francesca Albanese. Les éléments recueillis confirment la production britannique de composants d'avions F-35 destinés à Tel-Aviv — malgré la suspension partielle des exportations d'armes en septembre 2024 —, comme la transmission à l'armée israélienne de renseignements recueillis par la RAF lors de vols au-dessus de Gaza, depuis la base chypriote d'Akrotiri (plus de six cents entre décembre 2023 et octobre 2025).
Verdict ? Le Royaume-Uni a bien pris part au génocide, en plus d'avoir réprimé ceux qui le dénonçaient. Notamment Sally Rooney, qui signe la postface de l'ouvrage (lire « Gaza, juger les complices »). Auteure de romans vendus à des millions d'exemplaires — dont Normal People (L'Olivier, 2021) —, l'Irlandaise avait annoncé en 2025 le reversement d'une partie de ses droits à Palestine Action, juste après que ce groupe avait été classé terroriste par Londres. Le 14 octobre dernier, son éditeur britannique Faber a suspendu la distribution de ses livres au Royaume-Uni par crainte d'une loi qui punit d'emprisonnement la fourniture d'argent ou d'autres biens « en sachant ou en ayant des raisons raisonnables de soupçonner qu'ils seront ou pourraient être utilisés à des fins terroristes ». Anne Carson, John Maxwell Coetzee, Arundathi Roy ou encore Colm Tóibín ont apporté leur soutien à la romancière. Pour sa part, Sally Rooney a déclaré qu'elle était entièrement prête à assumer les conséquences de ses choix politiques. Contrairement au gouvernement britannique.
The US military is reportedly sending an additional Patriot missile system to Israel as preparations continue for a potential US-Israeli attack on Iran, while Gulf Arab allies have been warned to prepare for a renewed bombing campaign.
As Netanyahu's hold on power hangs in the balance, there is a mixture of hope and skepticism among Palestinians. 'This is a time for caution, not celebration.' In the past, all Israeli leaders turned out to be essentially the same
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