American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.
According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.
The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.
Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.
Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.
The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.
The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.
The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.
During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.
The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.
The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.
Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.
However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.
American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.
The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.
Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.
That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.
The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.
The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.
Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.
Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.
Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.
The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.
Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.
These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.
The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.
However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.
Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.
None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.
For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.
The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.
An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.
The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.
European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.
The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.
A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.
Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.
European governments must balance several interests.
They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.
At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.
A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.
European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.
The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.
With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.
Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.
Italy has accused Germany of contributing to the latest surge in European natural gas prices by delaying the replenishment of its underground storage facilities, reopening a debate about national energy policies and their consequences for the EU’s single market.
The dispute emerged on 29 October after the European benchmark gas price briefly exceeded €100 per megawatt hour the previous day, its highest level since December 2022.
Germany’s gas storage facilities were just 61.7 per cent full, compared with almost 91 per cent in Italy and an EU average of approximately 75 per cent.
The difference has become politically sensitive because European countries purchase gas in an interconnected market, meaning decisions taken by one major consumer can influence prices paid elsewhere.
Speaking at the Montel Italian Energy Day conference in Milan, Alessandro Noce, director general for energy markets and infrastructure at Italy’s Energy Ministry, criticised Germany’s approach to preparing for winter.
According to Reuters, Noce argued that Italy had spent €300 million securing additional gas reserves, only to face higher market prices as Germany attempted to replenish its comparatively depleted stocks.
He also questioned whether Germany had delayed purchases because of preparations to privatise energy companies involved in the storage process.
Germany’s Economy Ministry did not immediately respond to the criticism.
The German government’s approach has attracted particular attention because of its role in the operations of Uniper and Securing Energy for Europe (SEFE).
Both companies became important components of Germany’s energy-security arrangements following the disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2022.
Plans concerning their future ownership have coincided with renewed questions about how Berlin balances commercial considerations against the need to maintain strategic reserves.
At the Milan conference, an energy analyst suggested that preparations for privatisation had contributed to delays in storage purchases.
That assessment has not been established as the definitive explanation for Germany’s comparatively low reserves.
Nevertheless, the resulting political dispute demonstrates the difficulties of managing energy security through a system in which national governments retain considerable discretion while their purchasing decisions affect a common market.
Europe’s latest price increase has several causes extending beyond German storage policies.
Disruptions to liquefied natural gas shipments associated with the conflict involving Iran have constrained supplies from the Middle East.
At the same time, European countries entered the summer storage-refilling period with unusually low reserves following the previous winter.
The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) reported that underground gas storage was only 28 per cent full at the end of winter 2025–26.
By 21 October, that figure had risen to 75 per cent, still below historical levels.
In its latest gas-market monitoring report, ACER estimated that disruption linked to the Middle East conflict had added between €18 billion and €33 billion to Europe’s gas-import bill.
The agency also found that American liquefied natural gas accounted for roughly 30 per cent of EU gas supplies, reflecting Europe’s growing reliance on transatlantic energy imports.
Although this diversification has reduced dependence on Russian pipeline gas, it has also increased Europe’s exposure to international competition for LNG cargoes.
European buyers must compete with customers in Asia, particularly when colder weather or geopolitical disruptions increase demand.
The disagreement has implications for the European Union’s gas-storage framework.
Following the 2022 energy crisis, the EU introduced mandatory storage requirements intended to reduce the risk of supply shortages during winter.
The arrangements were subsequently extended until the end of 2027.
Under the revised rules, member states retain a 90 per cent storage-filling target but have greater flexibility over when and how it is achieved.
Countries may reach the target between 1 October and 1 December, rather than being bound to the previous 1 November deadline.
Further flexibility is available in difficult market conditions.
These provisions were designed partly to prevent governments from creating artificial demand peaks by purchasing gas simultaneously to meet rigid deadlines.
However, the present dispute suggests that delayed purchases can create another problem if several major consumers need additional supplies as winter approaches.
Germany’s current storage level does not, by itself, establish a breach of EU requirements. The applicable deadlines and permitted exemptions must also be considered.
The Italian government has meanwhile been seeking permission from the European Commission to use public funds to reduce energy costs for households and businesses.
Rome’s concerns reflect the economic consequences of sustained high gas prices, particularly for industries dependent on energy-intensive manufacturing.
Italy faces a general election expected in 2027, adding a domestic political dimension to the debate over energy subsidies.
Noce warned that prices could rise to between €150 and €180 per megawatt hour if January brings particularly cold weather.
Such an outcome remains a scenario rather than a forecast.
Energy markets will also be influenced by developments in the Middle East, LNG deliveries, industrial demand and winter temperatures.
Europe has expanded its LNG import infrastructure and diversified energy sources substantially since 2022.
However, the latest price increases demonstrate that greater import capacity does not necessarily insulate consumers from global supply disruptions.
The German–Italian dispute also exposes the limits of national energy planning within an integrated European market.
Germany’s storage policies affect its neighbours, just as decisions taken elsewhere influence the price German consumers pay.
The central question for Brussels is whether existing coordination arrangements provide sufficient incentives for governments to safeguard their own winter supplies without transferring additional costs to other member states.
With the heating season approaching, that issue is becoming an immediate economic concern rather than a theoretical dispute about European energy solidarity.
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© Photograph: Graham Robinson
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© Photograph: Graham Robinson
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