Novaya Gazeta, the venerable Russian newspaper that sought to expose corruption and rights abuses and whose reporting staff included the slain Anna Politkovskaya and at least five others who were killed or died under suspicious circumstances, announced it was shutting down. "They killed us," the paper's top editors said in a Telegram post on October 30, a day after authorities began evicting the remaining staff from their Moscow editorial offices. The paper, which had mostly suspended work...

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

From this Sunday, the EU is imposing a new €2 charge on parcels coming from outside the bloc. It comes on top of the €3 charge on small parcels announced in June.

So why is the EU doing this, and what difference will it make? Let’s start with what’s changing.

From this Sunday, there will be a €2 tax on each product category contained in a parcel coming from outside the EU. This ads up to the €3 tax on small parcels introduced in June this year. So for a parcel of less than €150, you can already count a €5 charge, and that’s if your parcel contains just one category of item.

Say you order four different garments from the Chinese platform Shein. The total charge comes to €20.

Officially, it’s the sellers who are supposed to pay, not consumers. But in practice, they pass the cost on to customers one way or another.

So why this second charge? The €3 charge adopted in June was meant to tackle the flood of small parcels coming from companies like Temu and Shein.

Parcels of very low value, often just a few euros. And that’s not an exaggeration. According to Kristian Vanderwaeren, Belgium’s head of customs, the average value of a parcel before the charge was around €5. And that’s an average, so imagine the number of parcels worth less than €5 that literally come from the other side of the world.

Until now, parcels worth less than €150 were exempt from customs duties. That was a big hole in customs revenue. And at the same time, customs officers had more and more parcels to process. Hence the €3 levy.

Now the new charge is different. It applies to all parcels, not just the smallest ones. Its goal is to raise revenue to cover the cost of checks. Because if the EU wants to fight fraud and make sure products on the market are safe, customs controls have to increase. And that takes time, and therefore money.

We don’t know yet exactly how much the new tax will bring in revenues. What we know, even if the situation is not comparable, is what the €3 tax is starting to bring.

Between June and September, the €3 charge brought in €364mln for Belgian customs. In just three months.

Belgium is a major entry point for parcels bound for the EU, through the port of Antwerp and Liège airport. So we cannot duplicate that figure for other EU countries.

Still, over a full year, the two charges combined, on top of standard customs duties, should raise a significant amount. We can therefore imagine that countries outside the EU are not happy, especially China.

Beijing describes the measure as protectionist. It also argues that the cost will largely be passed on to European consumers, which means, in its view, that the EU is shooting itself in the foot.

But that is, to some extent, exactly what Europeans are hoping for. If Chinese products become more expensive, they become less attractive.

Business groups agree. Comeos, the Belgian federation for trade and services, welcomed the charge as a response to unfair competition.

Think about an everyday product worth less than €100. There is usually a big price gap between the Chinese version and the one made in Europe. When that gap is somewhere between €5 and €20, the charge can tip the balance. It may push you to buy local, or not to buy at all. In both case, this means less money getting out of the EU.

And there are already signs it’s working. Since the €3 charge came in in June, the volume of small parcels arriving at Liège airport has dropped by 60 percent.

The European consumer organisation BEUC has also welcomed the move, saying more border controls mean safer products.

Something that is not immediately visible for citizens, but which has its importance. 

The full investigation is likely to take at least weeks to conclude

Meanwhile, we are getting a line from Russian-occupied Oleshky confirming that evacuations are now under way, as part of a US-brokered localised ceasefire to provide humanitarian aid to the city’s residents.

527 people are expected to return to Ukraine-controlled territories, Ukraine’s prime minister Sergii Koretskyi said, quoted by Interfax.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Susana Vera/Reuters

© Photograph: Susana Vera/Reuters

© Photograph: Susana Vera/Reuters

Kentridge’s cine-musical creation, made to accompany Shostakovich’s 10th Symphony, is a marvel of puppetry, dance and humour, exploring humanity, grief and idealism

The Baku international arts festival in Azerbaijan is showcasing an amazing cine-musical creation, perhaps the most amazing animation I have ever seen. Oh to Believe in Another World is an hour-long collage animation with live-action choreography by the 71-year-old South African artist and film-maker William Kentridge. It is shown with the live orchestral accompaniment of Shostakovich’s 10th Symphony, and this event is partly in honour of the 120th anniversary of Shostakovich’s birth this year, and partly to honour Shostakovich’s reportedly unrequited love (and lifelong friendship) for his student, Azerbaijani pianist and composer Elmira Nazirova.

The 10th symphony was inspired by Stalin and premiered shortly after his death, so it seems probable that Shostakovich had been at work on it for some time before this, long enough beforehand for at least some of the composition to have been conceived without any sense of Stalin’s death. Could part of it perhaps have been originally intended as an obediently dramatic tribute to Stalin? Yet the music arguably combines fear, awe, revulsion, and a hysterical reaction to the mad energy of Stalin’s genocidal tyranny, a darkly ambiguous respect for the great dictator whose victory in 1945 was a mainstay of the postwar dispensation; perhaps there is also a feeling in the music’s swirl that a great and terrible era has passed away, and with it a kind of grief at all that had been sacrificed to it.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Pete Woodhead

© Photograph: Pete Woodhead

© Photograph: Pete Woodhead

Independent outlet, whose former editor won Nobel peace prize, says Russian authorities have forced it to shut

• Europe live – latest updates

The Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta has announced it is closing, citing pressure from authorities who recently searched the home of its senior editor and earlier this year detained one of its journalists.

“Novaya Gazeta is ceasing to exist,” the editor-in-chief, Sergei Sokolov, said in a video statement published on YouTube on Friday. “The Russian authorities – the Russian special services – have forced the editorial team to end its work.”

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Toms Kalniņš/EPA

© Photograph: Toms Kalniņš/EPA

© Photograph: Toms Kalniņš/EPA

I moved to Poland from London with my Polish husband, and we are raising our two-year-old  son here. My son will grow up and live his entire life within the digital infrastructure that the government is building today. The fact that I was not born in Poland does not mean I don’t care about its future, as a mother, I have an obligation to fight for my son’s rights as a Polish  citizen. 

Recently, I saw that the Polish Ministry of National Defence has signed a  Letter of Intent with the American analytics company Palantir Technologies.

Having lived  through what happened in the United Kingdom when our government signed similar agreements, I believe that Polish people deserve to know what happens when public systems are handed over to a foreign defence contractor.

Among the company’s founding investors was In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital arm. 

In London, I was part of a campaign group fighting against Palantir’s contract with our National Health Service (NHS).

Under that agreement, the US defence contractor gained deep access to NHS data systems, including mental health records, reproductive health data, and medication history.

Heavily redacted contracts

Over 100 pages of the contract remain heavily redacted and hidden from the public. Because Palantir is an American corporation, citizens cannot easily hold them to account or use basic data access requests in the way they could with an EU-based company.

In the UK, two parliamentary committees and the British Medical Association are calling on the government to exit the contract before the break clause in  2027. 

Poland is not the first European country Palantir has approached, but other allied nations  have already drawn the line.

In Switzerland, the Swiss armed forces rejected Palantir’s offers nine times. The military’s conclusion was that it was technically impossible to guarantee that  sensitive national data would not reach American intelligence services.

When a Swiss  investigative outlet reported on this, Palantir sued them and lost on 22 of 23 counts. In Germany, the Bundeswehr explicitly excluded Palantir from a military cloud procurement on  grounds of data sovereignty, with senior military officials stating that granting external  industry employees’ access to the national database was completely unacceptable. 

Poland is now preparing to deepen its cooperation with a company that the Swiss and German militaries both rejected on security and sovereignty grounds.

It is our children who  will have to face the long-term consequences of today’s decisions. I have seen what happens when people in the United Kingdom did not ask questions until it was too late, and I cannot stay silent and watch exactly the same thing happen in Poland.

If you care about data sovereignty, public transparency, and protecting the next generation,  join us at the public protest against Palantir’s contracts in Poland, organised by Nasze Dane, on 8 November at Plac Konstytucji in Warsaw at 3pm.

According to Rosneft, the Novokuibyshevsk refinery can process around 8.8 million tonnes of crude oil per year and is involved in the production of jet fuel.

Newspaper Novaya Gazeta, one of the last vestiges of independent journalism in Russia, announced Friday that it was closing down, citing pressure from authorities who recently searched the home of its senior editor and earlier this year detained one of its journalists.

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.

The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.

American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.

The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.

The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.

The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.

The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.

The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation

Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.

He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.

His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.

Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.

The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.

If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.

Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.

One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.

There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.

But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.

Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.

Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.

The Problem with Reassuring Moscow

The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.

The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.

Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.

European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.

German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.

These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.

The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.

There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.

Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.

A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.

For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.

Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.

That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.

Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience

The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.

It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.

NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.

They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.

Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.

Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.

The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.

What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.

The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.

Dancing and singing erupted at an Ebola treatment centre in DR Congo as the last patients were discharged. For the first time since May, the MSF-run facility has no confirmed cases under treatment, although the wider outbreak continues.

Hello, and happy Friday. My name is Angela Skujins. On today’s agenda: the horrors of a Russian-captured community, EU-Canada affairs throw up more questions than answers, and hefty fines for angry Albanian protesters. Let’s go.

The result means Israel is now set to face a lengthy and likely tricky period of negotiations as party leaders work to form a government.

A rare ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky enters its fourth day as aid is expected to arrive, after a Russian drone killed at least 14 at Dnipro's station. In Albania, protesters face fines up to €5,500. We also look at Israel's deadlock and the Ebola epidemic in Congo.

Russia said its forces struck energy infrastructure in and around Ukraine's capital on Friday as an aid ⁠convoy entered the beleaguered Russian-held city of Oleshky ​in southern Ukraine, carrying food and medical supplies as part of a localised ceasefire deal. Ukrainian officials said 527 people would be evacuated from the city to areas controlled by Kyiv. Follow our liveblog for the latest updates.

The EU-Canada summit in Montréal will expand cooperation across multiple areas, including trade, investment, supply chains, AI, climate, security and the Arctic, and advance Canada's integration into EU programmes.

Catch up with the most important stories from around Europe and beyond this October 30th, 2026 - latest news, breaking news, World, Business, Entertainment, Politics, Culture, Travel.

Two years after riding a wave of discontent to total control of Washington, Donald Trump and the Republicans face the same message of change that brought them to power. This time, it's aimed squarely at them.

The freezing of more than $2.38 billion in cryptocurrency following a suspected attack on Binance has exposed an uncomfortable contradiction at the heart of the digital currency revolution: supposedly decentralised money can still be controlled, immobilised and effectively confiscated by a handful of powerful private companies.

The cryptocurrency industry has spent years selling investors a vision of financial freedom. Digital currencies, we have been told, offer independence from traditional banks, government interference and the restrictions imposed by conventional financial institutions.

But the events surrounding the latest security crisis at Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, have exposed a rather different reality.

Following a suspected cyberattack on Binance, stablecoin issuers Tether and Circle moved to freeze more than $2.38 billion in digital assets associated with the incident. The intervention, reported by Reuters on October 29th, 2026, represents one of the most extraordinary demonstrations yet of the power concentrated within the cryptocurrency ecosystem. It also raises questions that extend far beyond the immediate financial losses.

According to Reuters, Tether froze approximately $1.57 billion in assets, while Circle immobilised more than $800 million. Cryptocurrency company Ripple also reportedly froze around $200 million.

Binance initially described the incident as a potential security issue, assuring customers that their funds remained safe. Its co-founder Changpeng Zhao, who no longer manages the company, subsequently suggested that the incident appeared to be a hack.

The scale of the intervention is remarkable. Within hours, companies responsible for issuing some of the world’s most widely used digital currencies had demonstrated that they could prevent substantial quantities of cryptocurrency from being transferred.

For investors who have regarded cryptocurrency as an escape from conventional financial controls, this is an uncomfortable development.

A $6.3 billion warning

Subsequent reporting has put the potential scale of the breach into even sharper perspective. Reuters reported that hackers stole approximately $6.3 billion from Binance, potentially making it the largest cryptocurrency theft on record.

According to blockchain intelligence companies TRM Labs and Chainalysis, the attackers targeted wallets across ten different blockchains and moved most of the funds within approximately 20 minutes. Both firms attributed the operation to North Korean hackers, although that attribution remains an assessment rather than an independently established judicial finding.

Binance said it had worked with industry partners to freeze approximately $3 billion in affected assets. The exchange also indicated that it would cover all hacking losses and that customer deposits had not been affected. Withdrawals were temporarily suspended while the investigation continued.

An initial investigation suggested that a compromised laptop belonging to an engineer might have provided the attackers with access to internal systems.

The financial markets reacted swiftly. Bitcoin fell by more than three per cent, while Ether and Binance’s BNB token also suffered significant declines. Shares in Coinbase, one of America’s largest cryptocurrency exchanges, came under pressure.

The incident is particularly damaging because Binance is not some obscure trading platform operating on the fringes of the financial system. It has more than 335 million registered users worldwide. Its reputation and security arrangements are therefore central to confidence in the wider cryptocurrency market.

The decentralisation contradiction

There is an important distinction that investors should understand. Bitcoin itself cannot simply be frozen by a private company. It operates on a decentralised blockchain without a central issuer possessing the power to block individual transactions.

Stablecoins such as Tether’s USDT and Circle’s USDC are different. They are issued by identifiable companies, which retain certain administrative powers, including the ability to blacklist wallet addresses and prevent transfers.

Stablecoins have become an essential component of cryptocurrency trading because they offer a relatively stable value, usually pegged to the US dollar, without requiring investors to move continually between digital assets and conventional currencies.

Yet the Binance incident demonstrates that the companies issuing these tokens can exercise considerable control over assets held in their networks.

There is an obvious argument in favour of this intervention: freezing stolen money can prevent criminals from converting it into spendable assets and potentially help victims recover their losses.

But there is also a legitimate question about accountability. Who decides when an account should be frozen? What evidence is required? What safeguards exist against mistakes or abuse? And what happens when a legitimate investor finds their holdings immobilised without warning?

Financial freedom cannot mean that private companies exercise arbitrary powers without transparency or effective avenues of appeal.

Europe’s regulatory challenge

The events also arrive at a particularly sensitive moment for European cryptocurrency regulation.

The EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, better known as MiCA, was intended to establish a common framework for digital assets, improve consumer protection and provide greater certainty for businesses.

However, the rapid expansion of stablecoins and the growing involvement of large financial institutions have created new regulatory challenges.

The European Central Bank has been pressing for stronger oversight, including greater supervision of crypto companies and additional safeguards surrounding stablecoins. Meanwhile, ESMA has been seeking to ensure that trading platforms comply with MiCA’s requirements, including restrictions on unauthorised stablecoins.

For Brussels, the question is no longer simply whether cryptocurrency should be regulated. It is whether existing regulatory arrangements are sufficiently robust to deal with an international industry in which billions of dollars can disappear within minutes.

There is also a geopolitical dimension. The attribution of the Binance attack to North Korean-linked hackers reinforces concerns that cryptocurrency theft has become an important source of illicit revenue for hostile states and organised criminal networks. Governments cannot afford to regard these incidents as merely private commercial disputes.

Trust is the real currency

The cryptocurrency industry has repeatedly argued that its technology represents the future of finance. There is undoubtedly considerable potential in blockchain technology, digital payments and tokenised assets.

But technological innovation does not automatically create financial security. Indeed, the Binance incident illustrates how vulnerable even the largest platforms can be, while demonstrating that the supposed independence of digital money is sometimes more complicated than its advocates suggest.

Tether and Circle deserve credit for acting quickly to immobilise funds suspected of being stolen. Their intervention may ultimately prove essential in limiting the damage.

Nevertheless, the industry must confront the uncomfortable implications of what has happened. If cryptocurrency companies can freeze billions of dollars at the touch of a button, they must also accept corresponding responsibilities for transparency, accountability and due process.

Investors should not have to choose between the promise of financial independence and the basic protections expected of any modern financial system.

The technology may be revolutionary. But trust, once lost, remains exceptionally difficult to restore, and in the cryptocurrency business, trust is ultimately the most valuable asset of all.

The Crypto Mirage: What the Collapse of Key Coin Assets Says About Investment Fraud