The London-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) has filed a complaint with the European Ombudsman, accusing the EU Commission of maladministration over its handling of the bloc’s methane rules.
The complaint, filed on Thursday (29 October), targets two recent commission decisions.
The first is for a July recommendation that member states hold off on fining importers that are in breach of the rules until 2030.
The second is a proposal made earlier this month to delay the import rules by a year over supply worries — a decision that was made following heavy pressure from oil and gas companies, the White House and eventually by the summer, a majority of member states.
But the EIA argues that neither decision is backed up by evidence that the rules actually threaten Europe’s energy supply or push up prices.
By delaying a law already adopted in 2024, the group says, the commission is “undermining integrity of both the legislative process and the EU rule of law.”
“Rather than ensuring that the EU Methane Regulation is implemented as agreed, the commission has responded to pressure from the fossil-fuel industry by weakening enforcement and proposing further delays, without providing credible evidence to justify these decisions,” said Jack Corscadden, senior climate campaigner at EIA.
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EU member states remain deadlocked over whether to delay the bloc’s methane rules for oil and gas importers by one year or three, with neither side able to secure a majority.
Ambassadors were due to agree the EU Council’s negotiating position this week, after a first attempt failed last week.
But the Irish presidency has had to push the vote back to 6 November again as the two camps continue to disagree on the timeline.
On the one hand, France, Spain, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Portugal back the European commission’s proposal for a one-year delay.
The other group, including Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece and Slovenia, wants three years.
And then there is a third group of countries that haven’t decided yet, or could live with either scenario.
The undecideds and waverers
Belgium, for example, signed a call in June for a three-year delay, but could live with the commission’s timeline, though it would refuse a pause of more than three years, which parliament’s proposed 2029 review could open the door to.
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In 2003, Chinese president Hu Jintao worried about what became known among the country’s leadership as the ‘Malacca dilemma.’
Some 80 percent of China’s imported crude passed through the Malacca strait which Beijing’s naval forces could not control.
This gave rise to a wider security doctrine of supply-chain resilience which became the basis for China’s transformation into the clean tech powerhouse it is today.
When the US–Iran war disrupted Middle Eastern oil flows this year, Xi Jinping called China’s early bet on wind and solar “forward-looking” – as recounted in a new paper from the London School of Economics’ Grantham Research Institute published on Monday (26 October).
The paper identifies green growth as “the answer” to geopolitical uncertainty. Clean tech isn’t just clean, it’s also secure and not dependent on imports. Plus, it delivers a “more durable pathway” to “economic resilience.”
Some governments want to expand fossil-fuel imports, or drill more oil or gas wells, arguing that a more diversified supply chain improves resilience. But the paper dismissed that.
Oil and gas are priced on global markets, so even producers are exposed to price shocks. More North Sea drilling would save UK households between £16 and £82 (€19 to €98) a year, the paper finds, citing Oxford University research, compared with £105 to £441 on a renewables and electrification pathway.
It’s interesting comparing how the two political systems respond to (hypothetical) supply shocks. In China, the mere threat of losing control of one strait was enough to transform energy politics gradually over many years.
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France is facing one of its worst political, social and fiscal crises in years, and there is a sense things will get worse before they get better.
What started in September as high-school protests over teacher shortages and poor education standards in the Paris suburbs later grew into a much wider revolt over soaring fuel and living costs, a public sector pay freeze and a proposed austerity budget.
Last Saturday (17 October), public anger exploded into nationwide riots. More than half a million people took to the streets across France. Most marched peacefully. But violence broke out on the sidelines in several cities, with looting, arson and clashes with police.
When things finally calmed down, nearly 2,400 people had been arrested, interior minister Laurent Nuñez later said.
But even as protesters demand more teachers, smaller classes, higher wages and cheaper fuel, investors have been selling off French government bonds, worried that France cannot rein in its spending.
The gap between French and German 10-year borrowing costs, an important gauge of financial stability in the eurozone, reached almost 151 basis points on Tuesday, the widest since the eurozone debt crisis of 2011-2012.
But French politics is too divided to agree on the spending cuts bond traders want to see. And with presidential elections due in April, a quick resolution looks unlikely.
That leaves the central bank. The European Central Bank (ECB) could buy up French debt to bring borrowing costs down. It may even be forced to, if bond market panic spreads. But bailing out France is politically explosive, and depends on the judgement of the bank’s 27-member governing council.
For the time being, the ECB “is unlikely to say or do anything helpful,” Shahin Vallée, a senior associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), wrote in a recent blog post.
Vallée, who is now an advisor to institutional investors, previously worked for Herman Van Rompuy who was European Council president during the eurozone crisis. He then joined Emmanuel Macron, France’s economy minister at the time, as advisor.
That background means he can speak with authority on everything from macroeconomics and bond markets to French politics and fiscal woes. EUobserver reached out to him to see what comes next.
Last week you were in Bangkok, where the IMF urged rich and poor countries to cut deficits and get debt under control. Is that the right medicine for France?
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Earlier this week, EU officials said in unusually staunch terms that they would not buy Arctic oil and gas.
Even if someone (Norway) decided to drill new oil or gas wells in the Barents Sea, which is well above the Arctic Circle, the EU would not purchase it.
The goal is to dissuade investors. It costs many billions of euros to develop gas or oil at scale in the harsh conditions of the far north.
If there is no offtake market in continental Europe, no-one is going to take the risk.
The thing is, EU buyers already buy gas (and oil) from the Arctic. A lot of it.
Most of the gas, some 12 million tonnes so far this year, comes from Russia’s Yamal LNG plant, which sits on the shore of the biggest estuary you have never heard of, the Gulf of Ob (Obskaya Guba in Russian).
But that will end 10 weeks from now, when the EU ban on Russian LNG kicks in.
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The European Parliament on Thursday (22 October) backed a three-year delay to the EU’s methane rules for oil and gas importers, two years more than the European Commission proposed last week.
MEPs also voted to extend the delay to European oil and gas producers, which goes beyond the commission’s plans.
The text now forms parliament’s position for negotiations with member states, whose ambassadors failed to agree on Wednesday.
Under the amendments, tabled by the conservative European People’s Party (EPP), importers would only have to prove that their oil and gas meets EU monitoring standards from 2031, instead of 2027 under the current law.
Reporting on methane intensity would also be delayed from 2028 to 2031.
A separate amendment from a cross-party group of 36 Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs, which also passed, delays reporting obligations for EU operators by three years, to 2030.
MEPs also approved an amendment, tabled by Dutch Socialist MEP Mohammed Chahim, that the extra time should not apply to oil, gas and coal from countries under EU sanctions, which in practice means Russia.
A far-right Patriots for Europe proposal to suspend the regulation altogether was rejected, as was a push by the conservative ECR group to delay parts of the rules even longer.
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The EU “will not drill and will not buy” Arctic oil and gas, EU officials said on Tuesday (20 October), as the European Commission presented its new Arctic strategy.
“Our position on Arctic oil, gas and coal has not changed,” a senior EU official told reporters. “It’s fairly simple. We will not drill in the Arctic, and we will not buy hydrocarbons from the Arctic.”
The strategy follows months of heavy lobbying by Norway’s prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his cabinet.
Oslo used the energy supply disruption caused by the Iran war to push the EU to drop its 2021 support for a moratorium on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic, insisting that it was crucial for future energy security.
But EU officials made clear on Tuesday they did not buy that argument. “We do not need Arctic resources to keep our energy supply secure,” the official said.
What happened to the moratorium?
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France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.
The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.
That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.
Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies.
But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.
“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.
“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Made in Europe
The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November.
Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.
But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.
To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities.
From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.
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The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.
The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).
And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.
Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.
He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday.
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.
Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.
And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers.
“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.
The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.
The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.
And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.
It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before.
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.
Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.
And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.
“As we close the tap on Russian energy, we open the doors to a more diverse range of reliable suppliers,” EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote in an op-ed for EUobserver this week.
“And these suppliers know that we are reliable buyers.”
One of those ‘reliable’ suppliers is the US, which provided 57 percent of the EU’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) last year and is on course to supply two-thirds this year, according to IEEFA.
Four out of five overseas gas cargoes arriving in the EU will be American by 2028, the think tank estimates. These expensive cargoes have kept coming in. But how reliable is that supply likely to remain?
US officials have already shown their willingness to use their gas dominance for strategic gain. In March, US ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder threatened that Europe could lose its favourable access to American LNG if it tried to reopen the ‘Turnberry’ bilateral trade deal.
“In switching from Russia to the US, the EU has jumped from the frying pan into the fire,” Pascoe Sabido, a researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory, wrote in a comment under Jørgensen’s op-ed.
And recent developments prove his point.
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Centre-left MEPs are trying to convince the European Commission to withdraw its proposal to pause EU methane rules, if parliament or member states try to delay them for more than one year.
Last week, energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen announced that the commission would propose delaying the import rules, due to kick in on 1 January 2027, by a year, following months of pressure from member states, the White House, and oil and gas companies.
But in a letter sent on Monday (12 October) to commission president Ursula von der Leyen and three of her commissioners, five Socialists and Democrats (S&D) MEPs said any postponement must be “strictly limited to a single year.”
The letter, seen by EUobserver, was signed by S&D vice-president Mohammed Chahim, Tiemo Wölken, Jens Geier, Günther Sidl, and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin.
If parliament or member states try to push for a longer delay, the commission should “make full use of its right to withdraw the proposal,” they wrote, “as such changes would distort its purpose.”
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The European Commission has added 46 projects to its list of critical raw materials investments, but its own figures show little EU money has reached similar schemes it selected last year.
The new projects are to be spread across 16 EU countries and cover all but two of the EU’s list of 17 strategic raw materials, said the commission on Friday (9 October).
The priority is copper, used in power grids, which featured in 19 of the 46 new initiatives.
Battery materials also top the list: with 12 projects involving nickel, 10 cobalt, seven lithium, five manganese, and four graphite.
Only four of the new projects concern rare earths used in magnets, wind turbines, and electric motors, for which the EU relies almost entirely on imports, mainly from China.
The new projects suggest the commission sees recycling as a core pillar in its quest to reduce dependency on Chinese imports. Of the 46 new ones, 19 focus on recycling, 11 on processing and eight on extraction.
‘Very tangible‘
“The results are very tangible,” EU industry commissioner Stéphane Séjourné told reporters in Brussels on Friday, pointing to the impact of the first list of strategic investments, selected in March 2025.
He mentioned Keliber in Finland, which he said is now extracting and processing lithium, and the French company Carester’s plant in Lacq, which recycles magnets and separates heavy rare earths.
He said Carester could eventually account for around 15 percent of global production of dysprosium and terbium oxides, used in the powerful magnets in electric car motors and wind turbines, and that Greek company Metlen is already producing gallium, important for semiconductors and defence equipment.
He didn’t mention that all three projects were already well advanced before they received strategic status in March 2025.
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EU governments were allowed to water down targets in their post-Covid pandemic recovery plans after they had already asked Brussels for the money, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) said on Thursday (8 October).
Of 20 milestones and targets the auditors examined, 13 were amended after the member state had already submitted its payment request. In nine of those cases, the change itself was requested after the payment application had already been made.
The revised targets were “aligned with actual achieved outputs, which made the payment possible,” the auditors wrote in their annual report on the 2025 EU budget.
Rewriting measures
Ireland, for example, asked for a payment in December 2024. But in January 2025 it requested to cut the target for ICT graduates down from 12,450 to 10,900, citing a high administrative burden.
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Germany’s most promising industries are also among the most tightly connected to Chinese supply chains, found a new study published on Thursday (8 October).
The paper, Industry with a Future, by the Cologne-based ZOE Institute for Future-fit Economies, ranks 62 German industries according to their prospects for future value, links to green technologies, and contribution to the wider German economy.
Small electrical industries come out particularly well, including clean tech sectors, such as battery producers and manufacturers of electric motors, switchboards, and computer equipment.
These areas combine the kind of specialised know-how that is difficult to copy, which can protect high-wage economies, such as Germany, from cheap foreign competition into the future.
But many of those industries still depend on China for components, and in some cases also rely on Chinese buyers to sell their products to.
“China matters to these industries not only as a competitor, but also as a supplier and a buyer,” the ZOE Institute study’s co-author, Marla Schiefeling, told journalists at a briefing on Wednesday.
That leaves Germany with a difficult industrial policy problem: It needs to scale these sectors up while cutting its dependence on China, but the fastest way to scale is with cheap Chinese components.
To solve this predicament, the authors argue for diversifying suppliers and creating more demand in Germany and the EU.
Old giants, new tricks?
The driver of the troubles is that the German economic model itself isn’t working anymore.
Around 420,000 manufacturing jobs were lost between 2019 and 2025, and German exports to China fell 29 percent from their 2021 peak to 2025, the study notes.
“Production and employment in German industry have been falling for years. This is definitely not a cyclical dip. It is a structural problem,” said co-author Lukas Bertram.
Reliant as it is on exports, Germany’s big export industries, such as car makers or industrial machines, are losing competitiveness, mostly to China, while facing US tariffs abroad and high energy prices at home.
Yet the study argues these industries are also the country’s best hope, and are better placed to create new value than their current troubles suggest.
German carmakers, such as BMW, Mercedes, and Volkswagen, which are in the direct line of fire of China’s EV dominance, already have many of the industrial capabilities to make much of what is needed to build batteries, wind turbines or power grids, from electronics to specialised metal parts.
“From these capabilities, new leading roles can emerge, for instance in electric mobility,” the report’s authors note.
While still associated with fuel and combustion engines, carmaking ranks among the top three industries for eight of the 10 green supply chains the authors examined.
Machinery, metal products and parts of the chemicals industry also do well, which the authors initially found surprising.
“We briefly wondered whether something was off with the methodology. But once we dug deeper, we realised it makes complete sense,” said Schiefeling.
“There’s still a lot of potential and a huge amount of technological know-how there,” she added.
“The task is to translate that into sustainable production structures from which new value can emerge,” she said.
Other sectors, such as coal power, coke ovens, oil refining, and fertiliser production, by contrast, have little future in Germany, the study finds.
But rather than letting them collapse, the authors argue they should be wound down gradually, which they call “strategic de-scaling.”
‘Made in EU’
Meanwhile in Brussels, the debate about the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act is heating up.
The first version of the plan was circulated by the commission in March, but it is still being redrafted, with a new version presented on Wednesday.
At the heart of the plan is the ‘Made in EU’ clause. This would require governments to favour European-made (low-carbon) goods, starting with steel, cement, aluminium, cars, and clean technologies.
In a joint non-paper sent to the commission on Monday, German chancellor Friedrich Merz and French president Emmanuel Macron similarly called for a “European preference” in strategic sectors and to “derisk” from Chinese supply chains, notably in batteries and clean energy equipment.
But the ZOE Institute’s Bertram said that while ‘made in Europe’ criteria could help create demand for EU and Germany fledgeling industries, this might not help all sectors concerned.
For a German battery or switchboard maker that can only source its parts from China, such rules might “initially raise prices rather than genuinely create local production capacity,” he said.
French borrowing costs are surging and central bankers are starting to fret. Some of them, at least.
The head of the French central bank, Emmanuel Moulin, told the Financial Times that his country risks being “strangled by interest rates”.
The best solution, he made clear, was for the French government to cut costs and reduce the deficit, which, in an unchanged scenario, could reach upwards of six percent next year.
Last week, the French minority government proposed €43bn worth of cuts for 2027. But pushing them through parliament is a tall order in a divided country.
Meanwhile, investors are dumping French bonds, pushing up French government borrowing costs compared to German benchmark Bunds. This is already immensely costly to French society.
“In three weeks, we’ve lost the equivalent of €15bn a year in higher debt-servicing costs over a 10-year horizon, or almost €100bn cumulatively over 10 years!”, French economist Shahin Vallée said on social media last week.
The gap, or spread, between French and German bond yields, historically around 50 basis points (0.5 percentage points), was 109 basis points when he wrote it on Wednesday. It is now 30 points higher.
Spreads are a crucial marker for financial stability because they show how nervous investors are. The bigger the spread, the higher the perceived risk.
And France’s parabolic bond spread is already bringing back unwelcome memories of the eurozone crisis in November 2011, when the spread reached 200 basis points.
Bypass parliament?
The question is what to do about it, and who is best positioned to act. The French government could bypass a parliamentary vote or push through the budget by ordinance, under articles 49.3 and 47 of the constitution, respectively.
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