RT | October 29, 2026

The Financial Times has refused to correct an anonymously sourced article about a recent phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Norway and Finland, despite objections from both Nordic governments, according to media reports.

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Finnish President Alexander Stubb spoke with Putin earlier this week, drawing criticism from some of Europe’s more Russia-hawkish politicians.

The British newspaper claimed that Putin spent much of the conversation “lecturing” the Nordic leaders on “medieval Slavic history” and its relevance to the Ukraine conflict, rather than discussing ways to end the hostilities. Citing three anonymous sources described only as “familiar with the conversation,” the FT portrayed the Russian president as “fixated” on history.

Store’s government told Norwegian daily Verdens Gang (VG) that the characterization was inaccurate and that Finland had contacted the FT on behalf of both countries to challenge its account, the newspaper reported on Thursday. Finnish media also covered the joint objection, with the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat citing its own sources to dispute the British paper’s description of the call.

Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yury Ushakov said later in the day that the FT article is “some invented information, or rather disinformation” and that the Nordic leaders were correct to call out the publication.

The FT, however, rejected the request, telling VG that it stood by its reporting.

Its article, published on Tuesday, was written by three journalists.

One of them, American national Christopher Miller, previously worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US government-funded international broadcaster originally established with covert CIA funding to conduct anti-communist propaganda operations during the Cold War. Miller went to Ukraine in 2010 as a volunteer with the US Peace Corps.

His co-authors, Max Seddon and Henry Foy, head the FT’s bureaus in Moscow and Brussels, respectively.

Last week, the newspaper published a lengthy article by Seddon titled “The Putin whisperers,” recounting a dramatic but difficult-to-verify story of American and German nationals attempting to avert a “nuclear Armageddon” through backchannel diplomacy with Moscow.

Foy, meanwhile, broke a story in 2025 alleging that a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had experienced suspected Russian GPS jamming. The FT journalist was himself aboard the aircraft when it landed in Bulgaria, as he subsequently revealed on the newspaper’s podcast. His original report, citing anonymous officials, suggested Russia may have deliberately targeted the top EU executive with electronic interference.

Key elements of the story were challenged almost immediately by flight-tracking service Flightradar24. Bulgarian authorities subsequently debunked the core claims relayed by FT.

Despite the discrepancies, the FT insisted it stood by its reporting. Foy did not respond to requests for comment from fellow journalists who questioned the account.

Why Norway and Finland Were Right to Call Putin

By Glenn Diesen | October 29, 2026

The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.

How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap

Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.

The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.

Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.

The End of Debate

Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?

Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.

Weaponising Solidarity

The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.

Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.

This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.

Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?

A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.

The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.

By Uriel Araujo | October 29, 2026

President Volodymyr Zelensky recently signed Bill No.16119, a law expanding educational rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples. Ukraine is thereby selectively adjusting, rather than reversing, its post-2014 Ukrainization policies.

The measure was presented as progress on minority rights and a step that could help open further EU accession clusters. Romanian President Nicusor Dan welcomed the legislation, noting that mother-tongue education for ethnic Romanians is “no abstract matter” for families living in Ukraine.

The law expands the use of eligible minority languages in schools, recognizes special institutional status for minority-language schools, and strengthens continuity of education.

Crucially, the additional protections apply only to official languages of the European Union and to indigenous languages such as Crimean Tatar. Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian and Slovak qualify. Russian does not. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education clarified that the additional rights “do not apply to the Russian language.”

Russian remains widely spoken, with 28% or even more Ukrainians still using both Russian and Ukrainian at home despite years of Ukrainization and wartime restrictions.

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe flagged the problem years ago: in its 2017 opinion, it found the less favorable treatment of non-EU languages, particularly Russian, difficult to justify and raised discrimination concerns. Its 2023 opinion report on national minorities legislation reiterated that promoting Ukrainian as the state language does not justify withholding equivalent protections from Russian speakers.

Ukraine’s Constitutional Court took a different view in 2021, holding that preferential treatment for EU languages was permissible – the European advisory body’s criticism and Kyiv’s domestic position have never fully aligned.

The expanded guarantees for ethnic Hungarians and Romanians may reflect Budapest’s and Bucharest’s ability to block or delay Ukraine’s EU accession process.

It is no accident Roma inclusion follows a separate track: a national strategy running to 2030 addresses education, housing and discrimination. These measures concern the social integration of marginalized Gypsies communities, rather than reversing Ukrainization.

Similarly, Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, who cannot exercise comparable leverage inside the EU process, remain outside the new framework.

By comparison, although the ongoing war complicates it, Russia formally recognizes ethnic Ukrainians, while its Constitution and laws guarantee the preservation and study of minority languages.

In any case, Kyiv explicitly differentiates between Russian and EU minority languages, while Moscow formally has an inclusive framework.

Ukraine’s Russian minority-rights controversy predates the 2022 invasion: differential treatment has been a structural feature of post-Maidan policy, rather than just a temporary wartime measure.

After 2014, language, media and minority legislation steadily elevated Ukrainian while narrowing the public space for Russian. US political scientist Nicolai N. Petro, writing in Foreign Policy in late 2023, described policies that further relegated Russian speakers to a permanent second-class status – and warned that such approaches risk alienating a significant share of the population even once fighting ends.

Ukrainian officials have at times declared there is simply “no Russian minority”, a claim that sits uneasily with census data and everyday bilingual reality, to say the least.

Meanwhile, nationalist historical narratives persist: a Lviv’s museum dedicated to Nazi collaborator Roman Shukhevych was being rebuilt just weeks before the education law was signed. Shukhevych incited anti-Polish pogroms in 1930.

The continued public commemoration of such figures is hard to reconcile with any claim of comprehensive ideological retreat from post-Maidan nation-building. Moreover, the reforms will be viewed by Ukrainian ultranationalists as a setback forced by European partners – and are likely to generate domestic pushback.

They may also, on the other hand, encourage further demands from minority communities, including over the glorification of controversial wartime figures – an issue that still strains relations with Poland. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian tensions with neighbors have been a recurring feature of the regional landscape – Hungary being a case in point.

As part of its EU accession plans, Kyiv is reviewing chauvinistic policies regarding some minorities – while leaving the largest linguistic community outside the latest concessions.

The “macro” dimension of the conflict involves great-power rivalry, proxy dynamics and the long trajectory of NATO expansion. The micro or rather “meso”-level dimension remains the unresolved issue of post-Soviet borders and the ethnopolitics of a post-Soviet republic still consolidating its nation-building project.

In the words of Kristin Henrard (Professor of International Law at the Brussels School of Governance): “Ukraine will need to acknowledge that the Russian minority, as one of the several minorities with kinstates in its territory, is special because of that strong numerical size, and traditional presence.” This would be “in line with Ukraine’s international obligations”, she writes.

So much for the idea that minority-rights problems were ever merely “Russian propaganda.” They were real enough for Hungarians and Romanians that Kyiv had to legislate; they remain real for Russian speakers. The civil-rights issue remains.

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Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 26, 2026

Sputnik – 25.10.2026

Even as the US diesel deal with Russia that was brokered by Donald Trump could help bring the price of oil down, the Democrats’ Russophobia “is leading them to try to sabotage the deal,” Dr. Jeremy Kuzmarov, managing editor of CovertAction Magazine, tells Sputnik.

“Trump may be making some steps at the beginning to try to end the conflict in Ukraine, whereas the Democrats, I think, want to escalate that conflict. And they are totally irrational,” he adds.

Only a small number of Democrats opposed the anti-Russian sanctions bill, arguing that it is “totally irrational and is going to have a very negative effect on the US economy.”

“This is a case in point where this hysteria about Russia and Russophobia reaches the extent that the government is actually advocating for positions that are very harmful to the American economy and to American workers or farmers — even though the Democrats purport that they are more for the working people.”

American farmers complain that they cannot stay in business due to the cost of fuel, the soaring cost of living does a number on the budgets of working Americans, and many businesses in the US are struggling.

“Some of that also has to do with the war spending of the government and all the money they put into warfare, including Ukraine. That is the thing that Democrats are so hypocritical about. Because they just want to spend more and more billions on Ukraine,” notes Kuzmarov.

“That is what has been ruining the American economy and American society over decades now — the excessive military spending. The Democrats undercut their claim to be for the working people or for farmers if they are trying to sabotage an economic arrangement that would actually work to bring the cost of fuel down.”

Meanwhile, more and more Americans may start seeing the numerous opportunities for economic deals with Russia, potentially leading them to “put more and more pressure on the government to ease relations, restore regular diplomatic relations, end the war in Ukraine, stop the sanctions, and restore ties for the benefit of both countries.”

The Europeans are also “increasingly protesting their governments’ policies and the position they have taken against Russia,” seeing how purchasing more Russian oil and gas would have been beneficial to the European economies.

American people ended up being the losers in their government’s scheme to weaken Russia through the Ukrainian conflict, with billions of dollars that are “needed here in the United States” being lost in the process.

“Ukraine has sacrificed generations of its youth now, its economy has been devastated, and it has become more of an autocratic country under Volodymyr Zelensky,” Kuzmarov says, noting that US Democrats support the “destruction of Ukraine” rather than Ukraine itself.

“That has been destructive for everybody except the weapon contractors and maybe the Wall Street financial firms that own those weapon contractors.”

On October 22, The Washington Post reported that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had asked companies involved in Russian diesel imports to preserve relevant documents as Democrats prepared for a possible probe.

Strategic Culture Foundation | October 23, 2026

Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.

If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.

Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.

Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.

Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.

But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.

Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.

The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.

Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.

Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.

The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.

Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.

On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.

Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?

As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.

What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.

In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.

When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.

The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.

Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.

One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.

The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.

For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.

By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.

Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.

There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.

So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.

By Patrick LAWRENCE | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 24, 2026

Given the gush of vitriol and condemnation since Oct. 9, when Donald Trump announced his deal to import 5 million metric tons of Russian diesel, roughly 37 million barrels, one would think the president had surrendered the United States’ sovereignty to the Kremlin, or handed over the Ukrainians to the Russian army, or rankly betrayed the Europeans or altogether renounced what we picturesquely call Western civilization.

This is, indeed, what we read daily in the corporate press these days and what we are supposed to think. It is 2016 redux, it seems. Another round of Russiagate may not be far off, given 16 House Democrats have introduced a Prohibit Corrupt Russia Oil Deals Act and 12 senators now attack the diesel accord as “a gift to our adversary.”

If there is one thing essential to recall about those dreary years it is that the wobbly-from-the-first Russiagate edifice, the whole of it, was made of mis– and disinformation, hyperbole, innuendo, extravagant abuses of office and propaganda incessantly disseminated in corporate media.

It was, in short, the Deep State’s attempt to scuttle any effort to advance beyond the poisonous Russophobia it had spent a decade cultivating (taking my date from Vladimir Putin’s era-defining speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007).

It is the same again as Trump tries once more to end the war in Ukraine and refashion East–West relations, a project the old “MICIMATT”— the military-industrial, congressional, intelligence, media, academic and think tank blob — simply cannot abide.

Let us listen to this new round of rubbish with the recent past in mind.

“Donald Trump, meet Neville Chamberlain.” That is Tom Friedman, writing in The New York Times last week under the headline, “Trump’s Democracy–for–Diesel Deal Shames Us All.”

“When future students search online for ‘sellout,’ ‘appeaser’ or ‘traitor to his country’s core values,’” Friedman elaborates, “their two pictures will come up first, side by side.” There is no matching our Tom when it comes to overdrawn historical reference dressed up as intellectual gravitas.

Harold Meyerson, writing in The American Prospect Tuesday under the headline, “Why Putin Is Now Our Ally,” is unhappy that Americans are not angrier and more contemptuous than they appear to be in response to Trump’s latest démarche to Russia.

“We’ve grown so inured to Trump’s outrages,” he writes, “that his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime hasn’t yet stoked the level of horror and rage it deserves.”

Putin’s neo–Tsarist imperialist regime. We’re back to this, are we?

We’re also back to the good old Trump–Putin “bromance” bit, it seems, as in “Trump’s man-crush on the Russian dictator has been well documented and need not be recounted in all its unctuous detail.”

This bizarre suggestion of homophilia repeats a tiresome trope from the Russiagate years — never in the slightest documented, for the record — and this time comes from Tom Nichols, a neoliberal hack of long standing. Writing Oct. 18 in The Atlantic, Nichols wants us to see matters this way:

“Donald Trump has now abandoned pretense and is openly aiding the Kremlin in its war against a friend and partner of the U.S. The American commander in chief has abandoned the Western order, the most successful — and powerful — security arrangement in human history.”

Are we clear on all this? The corrupt, Nazi-infested regime in Kiev is America’s friend and partner, simple as that.

The Western order as we have it is the finest thing humanity has ever managed, and Donald J. Trump has forsaken this finest-ever order.

All because the Trumpster signed an agreement whereby the United States will purchase, all in, about two weeks’ worth of Russian diesel fuel.

Paranoia strikes deep, as should be plain to all as the imperium proceeds into its self-inflicted decline. Into the pages of The Atlantic it will creep whenever the topic is “Putin’s Russia” (as against “Russia”).

Trump’s ‘Simple’ Decision

How to account for this outpouring of nitwittery from all these pseuds? Why so suddenly does the world seem to be coming to an end? These are our questions.

Trump II has proven disastrously worse than Trump I, to state the obvious. He had a few good ideas the first time around: end the wars of adventure, bring the soldiers home, decommission NATO, a new détente with Moscow.

This time — and you have to credit the Trumpster for this, strange as it is to credit him with anything — he has only one. He still wants to restore relations with Russia to a working order of some kind, and this must begin with ending the war the Biden regime provoked very quickly after Trump was voted out of office.

Trump is a Manhattan property man for whom everything is transactional, we have to remember. Exploring “deals” does not figure at the higher end of statecraft — certainly not given all that is at issue between Russia and the West — but this is a question of method, not purpose. Let us not get lost in the former while losing sight of the latter.

Peaceful, constructive relations with Russia, based on an enduring settlement of benefit to all sides, are a good thing altogether to be welcomed, however often Americans and West Europeans are told any such eventuality would amount to the horror of horrors.

As everyone thinking about this has remarked, Trump’s immediate intent in striking his diesel deal is to get prices down as best he can before the midterm elections and to pretend the price crisis has causes other than the U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran.

I’m for setting the politics aside. A few days’ worth of diesel — all that can possibly arrive from Russian refineries before Nov. 3 — won’t make any difference, and Trump cannot but know this.

My mind goes to a remark Trump made on Truth Social, his digital bullhorn, at the beginning of this week in response to all the shrieking and shouting that followed his Oct. 9 announcement:

“My decision on Russia is a very simple one. I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don’t want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”

It is important to read this together with other things the Trump regime has got up to lately. While the United States is in plausible-denial mode, Kiev reports that it has disrupted some of the early-warning satellite intelligence vital to Ukraine’s defenses.

Elon Musk, apparently after consultation with the White House, has restricted Ukraine’s use of Starshield, the military-grade version of the Starlink communications system.

These are day-to-day lifelines. So is the Prioritized Ukraine Requirement List, the arrangement whereby the United States sells arms to the Europeans, who send them on to Ukraine. To date the volume of shipments through the P.U.R.L. channel has come to $7 billion. Trump is reportedly threatening to end the program.

Atop all this he has suspended implementation of a sanctions bill he signed into law only a month ago. Concurrently, the Witkoff–Kushner duo presented Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian dictator, with a new settlement proposal that reads to me like a condensed version of the very creditable 28–point plan they presented a year ago next month.

Something is afoot, it seems to me. I see a thought-through strategy in all this. I see renewed determination on Trump’s part.

Trump is out of the closet at last — and perfectly accurate — as he asserts that Zelensky is the principal impediment to a settlement accord and, so, should be either removed from office or forced to accept defeat and recognize Russia’s legitimate interests.

Trump’s new push to bring the Ukraine crisis to a close, to be clear on this point, is not a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. It is just the opposite.

There are a lot of reasons to question how far Trump will get either in ending the war or restoring relations with Russia to a livable détente. But if he maintains the present momentum, we may be watching the beginning of the endgame in Ukraine.

This is a “may,” conditional verb required. But it is this prospect that has all the warmongers in the MICIMATT complex in a dither.

Strange it will be if a president so wrong about so much manages to achieve the peace he is after. But maybe the Tom Friedmans and the Tom Nichols and the rest of their kind are useful as a mirror.

Maybe the extent of their panic is a measure of the Trumpster’s chances of success this time around.

The HighWire with Del Bigtree | October 22, 2026

From military speeches to civil-defense drills, Europe’s leaders are openly preparing their countries for conflict. Jefferey looks at the warnings coming out of Britain and the polling that suggests the public may not be ready to answer the call.

RT | October 23, 2026

‘Cambridge Analytica’ is by now a byword for the social media Wild West of 2016, when regulations were non-existent and unscrupulous brokers sold personal user data to advertisers and political operatives. RT explores the scandal that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg still can’t dodge.

On October 22, Meta was ordered by a New Mexico judge to pay $25 billion in civil penalties over the collection of personal data from 44 million Facebook users by Cambridge Analytica more than a decade earlier.

The judge concluded that Meta’s misconduct warranted a penalty exceeding $219 billion under state law, but reduced the amount to $25 billion, making it one of the largest fines ever imposed on an American corporation.

Meta, operating at the time as Facebook, knowingly and systematically deceived users about how it managed their personal data and allowed its harvesting by third-party companies like Cambridge Analytica. The jury also found Meta’s senior executive team knew of, and lied about, deceiving users about how it planned to investigate data-harvesting companies after the Cambridge Analytica scandal became public.

To understand how Meta ended up owing an eighth of its annual revenue in just one judgment, it’s necessary to go back to 2013, when Cambridge Analytica emerged from Britain’s shadowy private intelligence sector.

What was Cambridge Analytica?

Cambridge Analytica was founded in 2013 as a subsidiary of SCL Group, a London-based private intelligence firm that has provided data analytics and “behavioural analysis” services to the British Defense Ministry and Foreign Office.

Cambridge Analytica CEO and SCL Group Director Alexander Nix has admitted under oath that his companies worked with American and British intelligence agencies, provided psychological warfare training to several Western militaries, employed multiple staff with security clearances in the UK and US, and hired former Israeli spies.

SCL Group’s work for NATO, Israel, Ukraine, and other governments and militaries was extensive, and Cambridge Analytica drew on its parent company’s experience in military psyops to become one of the world’s most effective election influence operations, according to whistleblower Christopher Wylie. On the other hand, SCL insists that its military and political wings were separate entities. Whichever account is true, Cambridge Analytica had been hired by political candidates in 200 elections by 2018, according to company documents. These included parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, India, and Italy, the Brexit referendum in the UK, and most infamously, the 2016 presidential election in the US.

What did Cambridge Analytica do in 2016?

Cambridge Analytica was paid nearly $6 million by then-candidate Donald Trump’s campaign in the runup to the 2016 election. The company used its unprecedented access to Facebook user data to identify persuadable voters and potential donors, select effective markets for television ads, and target certain Hillary Clinton supporters for “deterrence” – adverts discouraging them from going to the polls on election day.

How did this become a scandal?

Cambridge Analytica did not break any laws to obtain this data. It was scraped from tens of millions of Facebook users who had, unbeknownst to themselves, given a third-party Facebook quiz application access to their messages, their profile data, and that of their friends.

Cambridge Analytica hired a Cambridge University professor, Aleksandr Kogan, to develop a personality quiz app, named ‘This is Your Digital Life’. Between 250,000 and 270,000 American Facebook users took the quiz in 2015, and by accessing their data, but crucially, under Facebook terms, accessing the data of all of their friends on the platform, Cambridge Analytica was able to compile detailed psychological profiles on roughly 87 million users.

Cambridge Analytica employee Christopher Wylie revealed the workings of the scheme to The Observer in 2018, telling the British newspaper that “we exploited Facebook to harvest millions of people’s profiles, and built models to exploit what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the entire company was built on.”

Was Cambridge Analytica the only data-scraper doing this?

“Facebook never cared,” Kogan told NBC News in 2018, explaining that “tens of thousands” of developers created apps like his quiz, and sold user data to companies like Cambridge Analytica. Among the developers were CubeYou, which used a “one-click personality test” app to gather information for commercial use, and LocalBlox, which scraped data from 48 million users, which it then sold to marketers.

AggregateIQ, Global Science Research, and Eunoia Technologies all used data gleaned by Kogan for political ends. However, long before these companies existed, Blue State Digital, an American political consultancy, surreptitiously harvested Facebook data, including friends’ data, for use by Barack Obama’s 2012 campaign.

Cambridge Analytica, however, had its work for the Trump campaign exposed at the height of the ‘Russiagate’ hoax, at a time when Democrats and liberal media outlets were convinced that Russia intervened in the election on behalf of Trump. Cambridge Analytica’s data-scraping dovetailed neatly into a narrative of “Facebook bots” and “Russian military hackers” working with the Trump campaign, and the company became a whipping boy for an industry that transcended partisan lines.

US Special Counsel Robert Mueller and the Senate Intelligence Committee eventually investigated claims that Cambridge Analytica helped the Russian government target political ads at American voters, but both determined that these claims were untrue, and neither investigation found any proof of “collusion” between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin.

Has Facebook been punished?

At the time that the information was collected, Facebook had stopped allowing third-party apps to access friends’ data. However, a loophole allowed apps active on the platform before this change to continue harvesting information through 2015. Within days of Wylie’s revelations hitting the headlines, SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica were suspended from Facebook. Two months later, both companies ceased operations, leaving Facebook to handle the fallout.

Facebook initially went into damage control mode, insisting that “People knowingly provided their information” to Kogan’s app, and that “everyone involved gave their consent.”

However, the US Federal Trade Commission determined that Facebook made its privacy settings deliberately opaque, spreading them out over 20 separate screens and opting users into sharing data with third-parties by default. Facebook settled with the FTC for $5 billion in 2019, setting the stage for a series of similar payouts in the following years.

In 2018, Zuckerberg told lawmakers on Capitol Hill that Facebook was aware that user data had been transferred from Kogan to Cambridge Analytica (this transfer was in breach of its policies) since 2015, but opted not to inform users. He said that Facebook asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the data, but never followed up and made sure the company did. “We considered it a closed case,” he told Congress.

The following year, the US Securities and Exchange Commission accused Facebook of misleading investors by presenting “the risk of misuse of user data as merely hypothetical,” when it knew since 2015 that “a third-party developer had actually misused Facebook user data.” Facebook settled the case with the SEC for $100 million.

In 2022, Meta settled a $725 million class-action lawsuit brought by a group of Facebook users, who alleged that the company violated privacy and consumer protection laws by misrepresenting its data-sharing laws and failing to protect their personal information.

Meta attempted to shut down further legal action over the Cambridge Analytica scandal this August, when it reached an $18 billion settlement with 51 attorneys general across US states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Although the cases concerned the addictive design of Meta’s platforms and their effect on children’s mental health, the settlement included a clause resolving a multistate investigation into Facebook’s sharing of user data with third parties “whether known or unknown,” including Cambridge Analytica.

Even if participating states were to discover new facts about the data sharing, they have now waived their right to sue Meta. New Mexico was one of two states that was not party to this agreement, hence the $25 billion penalty.

Did Cambridge Analytica get Trump elected?

Ten years after the fact, it remains unclear how prominent a role Cambridge Analytica played in Trump’s victory over Clinton. The Trump campaign’s use of Facebook and X (then called Twitter) is widely cited as instrumental in his win, but the campaign’s digital director, Brad Parscale, has since said that he stopped using the company’s data several months before election day, considering it inaccurate.

What about Brexit?

Cambridge Analytica worked with Nigel Farage’s Leave.EU organization in late 2015 and early 2016, and carried out some preliminary data analysis for the campaign. However, the data was never used, and the UK Information Commissioner’s (ICO) office concluded in 2020 that the company had no impact on the referendum. As in the US, the ICO found no links between Cambridge Analytica and Russia, and no evidence that Russia interfered in the vote.

Is Zuckerberg in the clear?

The $25 billion judgement handed down on October 22 may be the largest fine ever imposed on Meta, but it does not mark the end of Zuckerberg’s legal woes. In addition to a Washington DC lawsuit holding him personally responsible for the Cambridge Analytica debacle, Zuckerberg’s company is being sued by investors in California over Facebook’s alleged efforts to conceal the misuse of user data by the company.

Meta will likely settle the latter case, just as it did with the similar SEC case in 2019. However, should Zuckerberg fight the lawsuit, he could find himself in the dock, as the plaintiffs have sought recorded depositions from him, former COO Sheryl Sandberg, and former CFO David Wehner – all of whom could be forced to shed more light on just how much Facebook knew about the scandal, and when.

By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 23, 2026

There is a straightforward way to alleviate the social chaos sweeping Europe, as well as the war in Ukraine threatening to engulf the continent. It’s an easy fix – and it’s not shoving more white powder up Zelensky’s nose paid for by European taxpayers.

European leaders just have to find the resolve to stop fueling the war against Russia and engage in diplomacy with Moscow to establish an all-encompassing security architecture (as Russia had proposed back in December 2021). That, in turn, will salvage European nations from unsustainable debt driven by militarism and propping up a kleptocracy in Kiev, whose puppet leader is obviously degenerating from cocaine addiction.

Across Europe, cities are looking like battle zones with mass protests, public tensions, buildings burning, shops looted, riot police baton-charging crowds, and masked mobs running amok. France is bearing the brunt of street violence, but so too are Italy, Belgium, and others. Spain and Portugal are seeing their cities turned into tent camps in protests against a lack of affordable housing.

In the turmoil, it is easy to lose sight of the basic problem. People en masse are suffering from economic privation. Why can’t their individual and social needs be met in an efficient and effective manner? Why is there seemingly no money to fix broken societies?

Curfews are declared in Paris and cities across France while Italy moves to deploy soldiers in Milan to restore a semblance of order. Thousands of arrests have been made in recent days. Revolution is in the air, and so too is the sinister possibility of supposedly democratic governments flipping to become police-state dictatorships.

In this volatile, explosive situation, it is tempting to look for scapegoats.

French President Emmanuel Macron goes on national television to denounce “ultra-left groups” who he says are mindlessly trying to destroy France.

Even American President Donald Trump weighs in to claim that a once great nation (France) is being “conquered by immigrants, jihadists and communists.”

There were also predictable accusations in Western media that Russia is fomenting the unrest across Europe.

Another misdirection is to portray the European governments as cash-strapped and unable to deliver relief from the cost-of-living crisis and deteriorating public services. The governments and media tend to define the problem as one of balancing fiscal bookkeeping, overspending on social welfare, aging populations, or some other demographic factor.

European nations, we are told by pundits, are in massive debt and under pressure from bond markets to ramp up austerity by slashing public spending. The challenge for France and other governments is that they “no longer have the fiscal room to simply throw more money at these problems,” as one commentator put it.

Another commentator lamented that: “Hamstrung governments seem to have no answer to the public’s furious demands, making further discontent likely.”

In other words, we are told, “there is no alternative to austerity,” to paraphrase the late British leader Margaret Thatcher.

But that premise deceptively tells only part of the picture. The crucial part omitted is that the fiscal crunch of European governments is largely caused by the reckless funnelling of money to fuel the war in Ukraine and inordinately build up their own military forces. That wasteful misallocation of resources is “justified” by relentlessly and absurdly demonizing Russia as a “threat to Europe”. The news media play the role of amplifying the propaganda.

The media do not question, never mind expose, how Europe’s economies have been exhausted by a proxy war agenda against Russia that has involved cutting themselves off from Russian affordable energy, the lifeblood of industry, and on top of that racking up hundreds of billions in debt by propping up the endemically corrupt Kiev regime.

That regime is losing the war against Russia as it runs out of conscripts for the meat grinder. Yet, European governments are fixated on keeping the futile war going with ever more funding of the regime.

Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, dissembled this week by claiming that “Ukraine would have surrendered a long time ago if not for European support”. This is a tacit admission that the EU and Britain are fueling the war.

She also accused the Trump administration of forcing Ukraine into a surrender. In her soulless view, diplomacy and peace are sneered at as surrender.

European societies are deprived of financial resources for vital public services and infrastructure all in the fraudulent name of “defending” Ukraine in a war that has gone on for nearly five years. There is no end in sight if the European leaders have their way.

The European Union’s unelected bureaucracy has donated €90 billion to the Kiev regime for 2026 and 2027 alone, in addition to over €200 billion already allocated. This largesse is still not enough. The Zelensky dictatorship is calling for an extra €70 billion to be doled out, and the EU Russophobic elites are clamoring to oblige.

No wonder that European societies are visibly falling apart from underinvestment and widespread hardship from the soaring cost of living. The social implosion is a direct consequence of a policy of militarism and war, a policy that the Euro elites are running with impunity and unaccountability. That’s dictatorship by any definition.

The depiction of fiscally constrained and helpless European governments is an illusion. The constraint is not a natural condition of societies. It is the consequence of a deliberate, criminal policy of warmongering.

So spare us the scapegoating and misdirection. Spare us the curfews and calls for emergency police state powers to curb “hooligans and extremists.” That misdirection is playing into the hands of the ruling class, which has delegitimized itself by its sponsoring of war in Ukraine, its support for American aggression against Iran and Yemen, and its complicity in Israeli genocide in Gaza and Lebanon.

Contrary to the politicians and pundits claiming that there is “no easy fix” to the chaos erupting in Europe, there is. It is for the European governments to stop fueling the war in Ukraine and actually manage societies according to democratic needs.

However, that rational and feasible solution is probably out of reach under the prevailing political system. The elites in control of the system are incapable of overseeing any meaningful reform. They will not engage in diplomacy to find a peaceful settlement in Ukraine with Russia.

And so the outcome seems to be either they consolidate the emerging dictatorship and quash the legitimate social demands of the people, or the people will prevail by sweeping away the corrupt regimes that masquerade as “democratic”.

RT | October 23, 2026

Russia remains ready to negotiate a lasting settlement in Ukraine but will achieve its objectives regardless, Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalist Pavel Zarubin on Thursday. He also outright rejected “schizophrenic” claims in Western media that Moscow could be seeking a war with Europe.

Putin’s comments followed nearly three hours of talks with US envoy Steve Witkoff in St. Petersburg on Wednesday. Witkoff brought new peace talk proposals following his own discussions with Vladimir Zelensky, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s Chief of Staff Bjoern Siebert, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store in Oslo.

The new diplomatic engagement comes after Putin’s October 9 agreement with US President Donald Trump on Russian diesel supplies, whereby Washington eased fuel export restrictions while engaging with Moscow on broader economic cooperation.

Lasting peace, rather than a temporary pause

Putin confirmed Russia’s readiness to resume trilateral contacts with the US and Ukraine, focusing on security arrangements for both countries after a final settlement. The goal is to achieve definitive peace agreements, rather than “a suspension of hostilities for some short period,” he stressed.

The Russian leader also stated that he agrees with Witkoff’s argument that such discussions would also need to address Europe’s wider security architecture.

Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov previously suggested the talks could resume around mid-November, potentially in Abu Dhabi.

Putin said an agreement was possible, but insisted that “all the goals of the special military operation will be achieved” one way or another.

Europe’s ‘political schizophrenia’

European claims that Russia poses a military threat and preparations for confrontation amount to “political schizophrenia,” Putin said, arguing that European populations do not want war with Russia and explicitly rejected suggestions that Moscow is preparing to attack them.

“We do not want, we are not preparing for any war with Europe,” he said.

Putin described inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia as unrealistic, expressing hope that its opponents would recognize that peaceful relations better serve their own populations.

‘Historic Russia’ and the territorial question

Asked about Zelensky’s recent comments to Fox News that he would be willing to give up 25% of his territories in order to freeze the conflict on the current battle lines, Putin rejected the premise.

“It is not their territory, it is the territory of historic Russia,” he said, citing residents’ votes for independence and subsequently for reunification with the Russian Federation.

He acknowledged that the issue remained disputed, but argued that describing these developments as Ukraine losing territory was inappropriate.

Fighting ‘to the last Ukrainian’

Putin called it “incomprehensible” that Kiev expects that “the entire world should pay them, fight for them, supply them with weapons, ammunition, equipment,” and stressed that Russia has no desire to fight Ukraine.

“If Ukraine’s current leadership wants to wage war, let them fight. But why do they think everyone should pay for it and supply them with weapons?” Putin questioned.

He noted that much of this desire for war can be attributed to foreign countries that want to fight against Russia in order to weaken it and have promised support to Kiev.

However, Putin stressed that these foreign entities are prepared to fight until “the last Ukrainian” and questioned whether Ukraine’s leadership similarly treats its citizens as expendable cannon fodder.

Putin accused Ukrainian authorities of rounding up men “like stray dogs” and forcibly sending them to the front, undermining motivation. He also argued that nationalist groups that carry out this so-called “busification” do not always bear the frontline burden themselves.

He recalled that, according to official figures, there have been half a million deserters in Ukraine and over 300,000 criminal cases opened, adding that the actual numbers could be significantly higher.

Shared history and missed opportunities

Putin said Moscow had sought a negotiated resolution with Kiev since 2014, including through the Minsk agreements intended to settle the Donbass conflict. He blamed Ukrainian authorities for repeatedly rejecting opportunities to reach an agreement before Russia’s military operation began in 2022.

He described Ukrainians as a people closely related to Russians, pointing to genetic research that has shown they are “one people.” However, he acknowledged that some wished to identify differently and said Russia accepted that reality.

“We are ready even now to negotiate and seek solutions to this difficult, complicated situation,” Putin said. “Everything can be agreed upon.”

RT | October 19, 2026

Anti-government rioters have torched Albania’s education ministry and supreme court, as protests spread across the Balkan nation. Prime Minister Edi Rama is refusing to step down and blames the unrest on Russia. What’s really going on?

As of October 19, the Albanian capital of Tirana has been rocked by seven consecutive days and nights of rioting, while protests and clashes between demonstrators and police have been reported in the cities of Lezhe, Vlore, Elbasan, and Shkoder. A large group of rioters breached the perimeter of the education ministry in Tirana on October 14, setting the building on fire.

Running battles between demonstrators and police have broken out around the ministry on several occasions since. On October 19, hundreds of demonstrators pelted rocks at riot police, who responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. The previous night, offices of the Albanian Supreme Court were set on fire, and arson attacks on several police stations in the city were reported.

Some 500 demonstrators had been detained and 167 of them formally arrested as of October 17, according to Reuters. 295 people had been injured, including 196 police officers, as of October 19, according to Interior Minister Ervin Demo.

What do the protesters want?

The protests follow more than a year of unrest in Albania, which began when Rama banned TikTok in the runup to last March’s parliamentary elections, following similar measures inposed by the EU during every major election across the bloc since 2024. The ban was lifted in February of this year, but demonstrations broke out again in May after Rama’s government authorized the sale of protected wetlands to a development company operated by US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
WATCH smashed storefronts, burned buildings as Europe faces aftermath of latest violent protests READ MORE: WATCH smashed storefronts, burned buildings as Europe faces aftermath of latest violent protests

The protesters demanded the resignation of Rama and his entire cabinet, and the cancellation of a planned twin-phase resort project on the wetlands and on nearby Sazan Island.

The protesters’ core demand – that Rama resign – remains unchanged. However, the movement is now calling for a root-and-branch reform of the entire Albanian establishment, with demonstrators accusing both Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha of corruption. Unemployment, underfunding of schools, and declining living standards have also been cited by protesters as grievances.

What did Rama say about the protests?

Despite the repeated chants of “Rama resign” heard at the protests, Rama has claimed that the demonstrators do not oppose his government, but Albania’s “mission” of joining the EU.

“I am not being challenged,” he said in a video address on October 18. “The government is not being challenged, a government majority or a winning party in the elections is not being challenged but a path is being challenged, a mission is being challenged”

“Albanians need to think ​very clearly,” he continued. “Do they want this, do they want that, or do they want the EU?”

Rama has refused to resign, and blamed the protests on “foreign hands that do not wish for Albania to be at peace.” Back in June, Rama accused “the enemies of Albania and of Israel” of waging a “hybrid war” to stop the wetlands development. In two separate speeches on October 18 and 19, the embattled PM blamed the unrest on Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin and a “wave of Russian influence in the entire social media system,” and on “the Khomeiniist republic of Iran, the pinnacle of disinformation.”
Was Russia involved?

In short, no. Rama has not backed up any of his accusations, and they are being treated with skepticism and ridicule by demonstrators and opposition media. Albania’s Publik Media news outlet criticised Rama for “eturn[ing[ to the Berisha, Russia and Iran alibi,” while Pamfleti, an investigative outlet, dismissed his claims as an “ignorant reaction to those protesting his misgovernance”

Even the US-run Radio Free Europe noted that Rama “did not present public evidence” to back up his allegations.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has rejected Rama’s accusations. “No, Edi Rama,” she said on October 18, “it is the citizens of your country who have taken to the streets in protest.”

“This has all the hallmarks of the ‘highly likely’ British approach,” Serbian journalist Nebojsa Malic told RT on October 19, referring to British Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s failed attempts to blame the 2016 Brexit vote on Russia and a recent ‘terror plot’ at a US airbase on Iran. “We’ll just make an accusation and provide no evidence but say ‘oh it’s highly likely that Russia’s behind this’, and everybody is going to take it for granted.”

Rama is “doing this because he’s hoping it will stick,” Malic said. “He has nothing to lose. He’s seen plenty of leaders in western Europe essentially getting away scot free with covering for their malice and incompetence by blaming Russia.”

“Rama is just as opportunistic as [French President Emmanuel] Macron or any British prime minister in the last ten years,” Malic concluded. “They will say or do whatever, because they think that Russia is not able to defend itself.”

Why did Rama mention Israel?

Rama’s claim that “enemies of Albania and Israel” were behind this summer’s environmental protests stems from the involvement of Kushner in the wetlands project. A close associate of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Kushner has extensive family and financial ties to Israel. His investment firm, Affinity Partners, has funneled Emirati, Saudi, and Qatari cash into multiple Israeli businesses, including five arms manufacturers.

However, all available information suggests that the funding for Kushner’s Albanian projects comes from Albanian, American, and Qatari individuals and entities. Affinity Partners is leading the €1.4 billion Sazan Island project, while Kushner himself is a minority partner in the wetlands development.

Rama visited Israel and addressed the Knesset in January. Less than 24 hours later, Israel’s Channel 12 claimed that the Albanian PM had struck a deal with Netanyahu to accept up to 100,000 Palestinian refugees from Gaza. As speculation spread that the Palestinians would be resettled on land developed by Kushner, Rama clarified that no such deal had been, or would be, made.

Regardless, Rama’s close relations with Netanyahu are at odds with public opinion in Albania, where a 2024 poll found that 73% of the population believe that Israel should be sanctioned over its war on Gaza. Kushner is widely seen in Albania as representing Israeli interests, and Rama’s decision to amend environmental laws and grant “strategic investor” status to Affinity Partners has fueled accusations that the PM is placing Washington and West Jerusalem’s interests above Tirana’s.

Will there be an Albanian Maidan?

Some images emerging from Tirana – burning barricades, police officers set on fire with Molotov cocktails, and smouldering government buildings – are reminiscent of the scenes that played out during the 2014 ‘Maidan’ coup in Ukraine. However, Rama is in far less perilous of a position than Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovich, was during the 2014 uprising.

Unlike the present unrest in Albania, the Maidan coup was planned and directed by foreign actors, namely the US State Department and the British embassy in Kiev. Rama, on the other hand, is a close partner of the EU and US, and neither Washington nor Brussels have backed the protesters. Instead, Rama has apparently been given carte blanche to squash the demonstrations, with columns of military vehicles seen entering Tirana between October 15 and 19.

The EU has condemned the use of violence by protesters, with the European Commission criticizing them for “arson, attacks on State institutions and the destruction of public and private property.” In a statement on October 18, the commission praised Rama’s progress toward EU membership and welcomed his “commitment that the right to protest will be protected.”

One week earlier, an EU delegation in Tirana said that Brussels was “aware of allegations of excessive use of force by the police against protesters and journalists,” adding that the government’s response to protests and riots “must remain within the law.”

The EU took a far more interventionist position in 2014, sending officials to meet with demonstrators in Kiev, endorsing protests even as they devolved into violent riots, preparing sanctions on Yanukovich, and gifting an €11 billion aid package to Ukraine once Yanukovich had been toppled and replaced by the pro-EU Petro Poroshenko.

The West is still firmly on Rama’s side, and he is unlikely to face any calls for resignation from abroad. However, he is still facing the most sustained public pressure campaign of his 13-year stint in power, and if the protests continue and more buildings burn, he may be left with no choice but to admit defeat and step down.

Remix News | October 19, 2026

France’s fuel shortages persisted Monday, with roughly 14 percent of the country’s service stations reporting at least one product out of stock and hundreds completely dry, as diesel prices hovered near multi-year highs and President Emmanuel Macron began a Gulf tour aimed at securing additional supplies.

Official data from the Economy Ministry showed 14 percent of stations nationwide facing shortages of diesel or gasoline as of 9 a.m. Monday, up from 10 percent on Saturday.

Independent trackers drawing on the same government feed reported more than 1,600 stations with at least one temporary shortage and several hundred that had run completely out of the fuels they normally sell. Diesel was among the products affected, with median prices around €2.35–€2.36 per liter.

The disruptions have been most acute at TotalEnergies stations, which have capped prices at €1.99 per liter for gasoline and €2.25 for diesel since July.

More than half of the company’s roughly 2,300 sites have reported shortages in recent days, according to data analyses, as drivers seek the cheapest fuel and inventories run low. Regions including the Grand Est, Île-de-France and Normandy have been among the hardest hit.

The shortages are rooted in global market tightness linked to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz amid conflict involving Iran, which has constrained refined product flows, particularly diesel. However, Ukraine’s ongoing strikes against Russian refineries have also played a key role.

France and other G7 members agreed earlier this month, under French chairmanship and with International Energy Agency coordination, to release up to 100 million barrels of emergency oil and diesel stocks. France is drawing down 10 million barrels of its own diesel reserves over three months, with the government estimating the move could cut pump prices by 12 to 18 cents per liter starting around Nov. 1.

TotalEnergies has separately pledged reductions of roughly 8 to 12 cents at its stations over the same period.

Macron arrived in Kuwait on Monday for a three-day tour that also includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. The Élysée said the goal is to secure additional diesel and oil volumes and explore alternative shipping routes, with senior executives from TotalEnergies and Engie accompanying him.

A presidential adviser said that the aim is “additional volumes and more supplies for the French people, which will indirectly have an effect on prices.” Macron has linked the price surge to the Hormuz disruptions and maintained the trip despite the weekend’s violent cost-of-living protests, during which fuel prices were among the grievances cited by demonstrators.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has said the reserve release should begin easing prices from Nov. 1 and that electricity bills will not rise this winter. Opposition figures have called the plan insufficient or a “scam,” arguing it does little to address longer-term vulnerabilities or the immediate empty pumps. The government has maintained that strategic stocks remain adequate and that the main issue has been logistics and distribution under high demand.

Drivers across multiple regions reported long searches for open pumps over the weekend, with some stations posting “out of stock” signs for diesel. The combination of high fuel prices and shortages has added to broader cost-of-living pressures that [have fueled] large demonstrations and mass riots on Oct. 17, which turned violent in several cities.

RT | October 17, 2026

Russia’s Foreign Ministry has warned citizens to exercise caution when traveling abroad “amid a worldwide hunt for Russians.”

The statement follows the detention of Russian military blogger Mikhail Zvinchuk in Montenegro, a NATO member state in the Balkans, on October 9.

After nine hours in custody, Zvinchuk, founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, his wife and three associates were expelled from the country on the grounds of what Montenegro’s leading daily, Vijesti, described as “criminal, operational and intelligence processing.”

“We are compelled to once again remind people of the need to remain vigilant when traveling abroad, even if there is the slightest suspicion of any kind of claims by US law enforcement agencies, amid a worldwide hunt for Russians,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Friday.

Montenegro, where the blogger was detained, is not on Russia’s list of unfriendly states, Zakharova said, adding that similar situations were unfolding in countries not considered unfriendly to Russia.

The arrest was described as targeting alleged “hybrid activity” by the Rybar network, but no specific evidence supporting the accusation has been presented.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on the details of the arrest but warned Russian citizens that visiting Europe is “currently dangerous.”

The Rybar channel, which has around 1.3 million subscribers, had previously also faced US and British accusations of spreading Russian propaganda and conducting information operations abroad. The US State Department had even issued a $10 million bounty in 2024 for any information about the individuals behind the channel.

Russians who have been targeted include basketball player Daniil Kasatkin, a point guard playing for the national team, who was arrested at Paris airport in June 2025 at the behest of the US, which accused him of being a member of a ransomware gang. He denied the allegations and was released in January 2026 as part of a Russia-France prisoner exchange.

RT | October 14, 2026

Did Ukraine’s strikes on Russian data centers destroy the Kremlin’s pro-MAGA bot army? Or are Vladimir Zelensky and his European patrons insulting their citizens with remedial-grade propaganda? RT takes a trip down the rabbit hole.

Ukrainian forces hit three Yandex (Russia’s equivalent to Google) data centers with long-range drones between October 8 and 11. Yandex confirmed that operations were “completely halted” at the facility struck on October 8, and temporarily halted at the center struck on October 11. This much is true, but the story that followed veers into NAFO fiction.

How did the ‘Russian bots’ story begin?

On October 8, American cybersecurity researcher Jeremiah Fowler posted a Cloudflare graph showing a dramatic drop in “bot traffic” after the first Yandex center was hit. As Yandex is primarily a search company, its bots crawl the internet indexing content for users. All search engines function in this way, but Fowler – either through malice or ignorance – conflated this search bot activity with social media bot activity, claiming that the drop in traffic could “disrupt the midterm elections in the US.”

The story spread, hitting the mainstream media on October 11 when Tom’s Hardware published an article claiming that “Russian disinformation bot traffic” had been “nearly eliminated” after the strikes. The word “disinformation” was later pulled from the headline, but the tale had already taken on a life of its own.

That same day, an AI-created graph began circulating, claiming that “Russian bots” were making 56% fewer posts in support of Germany’s right-wing AfD party in the aftermath of the strikes. The graph, which was unsourced and had one axis unlabeled, measured the “decline in activity of Russian bots” up to October 15, four days in the future at the time it appeared online.

Regardless, the graph was shared by a Green Party councillor in Germany’s North Rhine-Westphalia, and by Czech MEP Tomas Zdechovsky. “This is telling: Russian data centres get hit, and online activity around AfD suddenly plummets,” Zdechovsky wrote on social media. “So much talk about German patriotism… then the connection from Russia goes down.”

Who spread the lie?

By October 12, the story had been reported by Germany’s Der Standard and Focus. That morning, Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky spread it further, claiming at the Warsaw Security Forum that his strikes on Yandex data centers had made it “a little easier to breathe on many social media platforms.”

“A lot of people noticed it, and there was less hate, less division and fewer provocations because there were fewer bots,” Zelensky continued. “And it’s pretty clear where those bots were coming from. If they disappeared when Yandex went offline, this proves again and again that Europe is not the source of the problems,” he added.

Speaking on the sidelines of the forum, Polish minister Tomasz Siemoniak claimed that the country’s domestic intelligence agency was “observing a significant, radical decline in Russian bot activity online,” while Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius said that “we should ask Mr. Zelensky to hit more data centres in Russia” to “protect” elections in the EU.

Anti-Kremlin activist and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov weighed in, claiming that “the Russian troll bots” in his X feed had “dropped dramatically,” while former US ambassador Michael McFaul thanked the Ukrainian weapons industry for granting him reprieve from “daily” harassment by “armies of Russian bots.”

The only problem was none of this was true, and based on the replies to McFaul’s tweet, nobody was buying it.

How was the bots story debunked?

The story didn’t take long to fall apart. Common Consultancy, a Scandinavian NGO that has previously accused Russia of orchestrating social media influence campaigns, concluded that there was “no visible effect” on pro-MAGA or pro-AfD social media posts after the Yandex strikes. Leonid Volkov, an anti-Kremlin activist associated with deceased opposition figure Alexey Navalny, slammed Zdechovsky for spreading “nonsense and falsehood.”

CeMAS, a liberal German think tank, stated that it was “not seeing a drop in the number of posts that could be explained by an attack on data centers.” The Hasso Plattner Institute and Polisphere, two tech nonprofits, concurred, and German newspapers began quietly editing their articles on Monday night.

Some, like Merkur, kept “speculation about Russian bots and the AfD” in their headlines. Others, including Der Standard, noted that their “original assertion of a confirmed connection [between the strikes and alleged bot activity] has been corrected.” The Verge, a tech-focused American news site, admitted that “the Yandex outage probably didn’t blitz Russian bots.”

Is this hybrid war?

By the time the story was debunked and corrected, the damage was done. In the public’s eye, the strikes were tied to a drop in “Russian bot” activity, and none of the speakers at the Warsaw Security Forum, including senior Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian officials, bothered to correct the record.

These same leaders have spent the last two months amping up their accusations of “hybrid war” – acts of sabotage, disinformation, and cyber-harassment that do not rise to the level of actual war – against Russia, with Berlin’s foreign intelligence chief warning last week that Moscow’s supposed “shadow war” against the West could see Germany “becoming embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia.”

That none of the acts of “hybrid war” – among them the discovery of a suspicious drone at Leipzig Airport in August, and a series of unsubstantiated drone sightings across Germany and Scandinavia last year – have been linked by evidence to Russia is a feature, not a bug. “Hybrid war” is by its very nature unprovable, and the accusation alone is enough for European leaders to justify their deepening proxy war in Ukraine, their remilitarization and expansion of the national security state at home.

Furthermore, the accusations themselves are a form of “hybrid warfare” against the European public, analyst Thomas Fazi argued last week. “Europeans,” he wrote, “are being subjected to a sustained campaign of cognitive or psychological warfare aimed at conditioning them to believe that Europe is under attack from Russia.”

Who stands to gain?

For Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), accusations of ‘hybrid warfare” and “AfD bots” serve a much more petty and venal political end. Chancellor Friedrich Merz is less popular now than at any point in his political career, and with the AfD trouncing the CDU in state elections and leading his party by ten points in opinion polls, Merz has taken every opportunity available to tie his opponents to Russia.

“We in Germany will not allow ourselves to be divided, not by hybrid attacks, not by Moscow-bot-driven hate speech on social media, and – if I may say so – not even by the slogans of the AfD and its Russian backers,” the chancellor said in a speech earlier this month.

The Yandex story – which conveniently linked the AfD to “Moscow-bot-driven hate speech” – was a godsend to Merz, and to his Ukrainian and Eastern European allies, who have an interest in preventing the Ukraine-skeptic AfD from taking power in Germany. Unfortunately for them, like all “hybrid war” claims, it fell apart the moment it was subjected to some basic scrutiny.

RT | October 14, 2026

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s attempt to blame Russia for the Brexit vote is a crude attempt to undo the referendum and tie the UK back to Brussels. It’s also imploding dramatically.

In an appearance on the ‘The Rest is Politics’ podcast on Sunday, Burnham said that he sought answers about alleged meddling in the 2016 Brexit referendum after taking office this summer.

“I asked the question coming to Downing Street: Well, was there interference in the 2016 referendum from Russia? I’ve had the clear answer that yes, there was.”

Burnham did not identify who had provided the assessment or present any evidence to back it up. Nor did he say whether the alleged interference actually affected the result of the referendum. However, he insisted that anti-establishment movements in Britain, France, and Germany – where Chancellor Friedrich Merz has claimed that the right-wing AfD are “Russian-backed” – are “instigated via our enemies, namely Russia.”

Haven’t we heard this all before?

On June 23, 2016, Britain voted to leave the EU by a margin of 51.89% to 48.11%. The vote was largely driven by a public desire to reclaim sovereignty, control immigration, and humiliate the country’s political elites, the majority of whom favored continued EU membership.

Six months later, Labour MP Ben Bradshaw announced in parliament that Russia “probably interfered” in the vote. Bradshaw conceded that “we do not have the evidence for that yet, but it is highly probable.” His claims were picked up by media outlets in Britain and the US, where the ‘Russiagate’ hoax was taking root in Washington.

A parliamentary committee stated in April 2017 that the collapse of a voter-registration website in the runup to the referendum could have been the work of a Russian or Chinese denial-of-service (DDOS) attack. In November of that year, City University alleged that 13,000 bot accounts – some of them Russian – were tweeting about Brexit before and after the referendum.

X, then called Twitter, rejected the City University study, stating that it found no evidence linking the bot accounts with Russia; separate research tying Russia to the ‘leave’ campaign was found to be fabricated by an anti-Brexit group funded by liberal billionaire George Soros; and in 2020, a parliamentary report found “no evidence of successful interference in the EU referendum.” At the time, Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared that “a retrospective assessment of the EU referendum is not necessary” in light of the report.

All of this begs the question: ten years after the Brexit vote, why is Burnham conjuring up the specter of “Russian interference” again?

Burnham’s big break

Burnham’s political maneuvering is obvious here. The British PM has repeatedly said that he would like to see the UK rejoin the EU, and two weeks before appearing on ‘The Rest is Politics’, he opened his speech at the UN General Assembly with a reference to Brexit, lamenting that “my country has lived through the disruption it brought.”

Speaking at his Labour Party’s annual conference a week later, Burnham argued that “Brexit has done more harm than good.” The following day he pledged to forge closer relations with Brussels and, if politically feasible, “go all the way” and rejoin the union.

Burnham has refused to say whether he intends to run his next election campaign on a platform of EU membership. However, he has promised to have “a serious dialogue about the different options for our relationship in the long-term” when he meets EU leaders in Brussels next month.

With the UK and EU both embroiled in a proxy war with Russia, there is no more effective way to delegitimize the Brexit vote at the moment than by tying it to Moscow. Burnham made this explicit in an address to Parliament on October 12, arguing that it would be “a dereliction of duty” not to pursue closer relations with the EU, given Russia’s alleged interference in the referendum.

The hoax crumbles

The prime minister’s confidence began to crumble under questioning. Asked by Conservative MP Julian Lewis “exactly how he thinks Russia was able to alter the result of the referendum,” Burnham replied that Moscow’s interference in British elections was “a matter of record,” without elaborating further.

Responding to Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, Burnham claimed that he never implied that the result of the referendum was invalid, before repeating the same “matter of record” line.

Burnham’s lack of evidence became clear when his foreign secretary, Stephen Doughty, appeared on ITV’s ‘Good Morning Britain’ the same day.

“What did Russia do during that Brexit referendum?” host Susanna Reid asked Doughty, who responded that he was “not going to get into the specifics.”

“Why are you not getting into specifics when the Prime Minister has just got into the specifics on the podcast?” Reid pressed.

Asked repeatedly about Russian interference in the Brexit vote, Doughty gave a variation on “Russia attempts to interfere in all of our democratic processes. They’ve been doing this for many, many years” every time.

“This is embarrassing,” co-host Ed Balls interjected. “It’s really bad for politics when you just blatantly don’t answer the question on something so important and go back to a nonsensical line, which is contradicted by what the prime minister just said.”

The final nail in the coffin came from MI5 Director Ken McCallum. McCallum is no stranger to anti-Russian opportunism, having pushed for mass internet surveillance to prevent Russia causing “mayhem on British and European streets.” However, he warned on Tuesday against exaggerating “Russian influence” on Brexit, arguing that debating the influence of “Russian trolls” on the vote “play[s] into our adversaries’ hands by making these trolls look 10ft tall.”

The Burnham playbook

Burnham has a habit of making extraordinary claims without the extraordinary evidence to back them up. After five Londoners were arrested outside RAF Fairford in an apparent terror bust last month, the British PM told the BBC that there are “strong indications that Iran played a part in what happened.”

The five men – plus two more suspects arrested afterwards – have all been released on bail. No explosives were found in their vehicles, and no link between the men and the Iranian government has been established, according to all available information. However, Burnham told the BBC that “we can confirm our belief that we believe Iran to have played a part,” before telling Parliament that the supposed terror plot was “almost certainly” directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Tehran has described the incident as “a clumsy false-flag operation,” aimed at “advancing an anti-Iran campaign and evading accountability for Britain’s involvement in the US-Israeli military aggression against the Iranian people.”

Likewise, Moscow has repeatedly denied interfering in the Brexit referendum. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described Burnham’s allegations as “the latest baseless accusations made without any proof.”

One final irony

Burnham’s claim would never have been torn apart in parliament, in the media, and by his own domestic intelligence agency had ‘The Rest is Politics’ host Alastair Campbell [not] pushed back and demanded evidence or elaboration. However, Campbell has a track record of embellishing facts to suit political narratives, with disastrous consequences.

Campbell was serving as then-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s communications adviser in 2002 when he ordered a dossier on “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction” to be “sexed up” in order to make a stronger case for joining the US-led invasion, according to Defense Ministry expert Dr David Kelly.

An inquiry found that Campbell changed multiple lines within the dossier to make Iraq appear more threatening. Among them was a line stating that Iraqi forces “may be able to deploy” chemical weapons against British troops within 45 minutes of receiving an order, which became “are able to deploy.”

Campbell then compiled a second dossier, now known as the “Dodgy Dossier.” This document contained plagiarized and fabricated claims about Iraq’s intelligence services, alleging that they were concealing weapons of mass destruction and “supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes.” None of these claims were true.

The second dossier was published in February 2003. Five weeks later, Parliament held a vote to join the invasion, with Burnham one of 139 Labour MPs voting in favor of the war. Burnham has since said that, if he could go back to 2003, he “wouldn’t have voted for it.”

More than two decades later, Burnham is once again making “dodgy dossier”-tier accusations in service of two foreign conflicts, and in aid of his own political ambitions.

By Lucas Leiroz | October 14, 2026

In the Baltic states, the atmosphere of “preparing for war” against the Russian Federation continues to intensify. Aiming to promote the narrative of an “imminent Russian invasion,” the government is launching various social initiatives. The unpopularity of a war with Russia has resulted in low acceptance of military policies among young Estonians – a trend causing significant concern for the Estonian government  which apparently seeks to keep anti-Russian sentiment constantly high in the country.

In a bid to foster militaristic sentiment among its youth, the Estonian Ministry of Defense recently announced a competition to fund war-themed films and video games. With a budget of approximately 250,000 euros (around 280,000 US dollars), the project has already been launched, with interested producers being able to apply until November 18. Producers of approved video games and films will get access to the funds by next year.

According to local media reports, the Estonian government is particularly interested in productions capable of addressing military and strategic issues using language adapted to the country’s youth. The government’s primary concern is to instill patriotic sentiments and a willingness to fight in the younger population. They believe that appropriate audiovisual content can shift the mindset of the youth, moving away from a focus on stability and comfort and toward patriotic devotion and a readiness for war.

Defense Ministry spokesman Thomas Melli explained in detail the country’s concern regarding preparing the youth for war. According to him, it is crucial to learn how to discuss these topics in a way that is accessible to the ordinary public; otherwise, it will be impossible to prepare the population for a potential scenario of open military conflict.

Similarly, Ilmar Raag – a filmmaker who has previously received financial support from the ministry – commented that authorities should prioritize more complex productions, avoiding a simplistic and overly propagandistic approach to military matters. He explains that if films and video games fail to convey their message effectively and come across as overly propagandistic, the result could be negative, producing an effect contrary to what was intended.

“Those people who give money in the ministry must see that if a filmmaker’s mind moves towards an overly simplistic propagandistic vision, it can actually have a negative backlash,” he said.

In fact, Raag’s concern is quite significant. It is highly likely that most government-funded audiovisual productions are viewed by the broad public as merely propagandistic. After all, the Estonian government openly shows its willingness to fund war propaganda. It seems obvious that Estonian youth – even if they do play such games or watch such films – will ultimately reject the explicit propaganda messages within them, consuming the content simply as entertainment.

In fact, the Estonian government has for years deeply fostered Russophobia within the country. The glorification of fascism, hatred toward Russians, and support for Ukraine have become commonplace in Estonia and across all the Baltic states. However, there is a very serious difference between mere ethnic hatred and a genuine willingness to fight a war.

Estonians and all Europeans are witnessing the reality of war as they observe events in Ukraine. A real armed conflict is far more difficult than it appears in theory. Few people are truly willing to fight a war. Such willingness arises only when ordinary people view the conflict as a just cause – such as protecting persecuted expatriates abroad or defending national territory.

Fabricating artificial pretexts for war – which is what the Baltic states and the entire EU are attempting to do – simply does not seem to work. While it may serve to spread hatred, it is not enough to instill in the youth a willingness to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield.

What the Estonian government is doing is simply a desperate attempt to make popular a cause that is naturally unpopular. Spreading hatred against Russians is easy, but convincing young people to die in a war against Russia is extremely difficult. And state-funded movies or video games won’t change that reality.

If it continues to advance plans for war and hostility against Russia, the Estonian government will inevitably face difficulties in maintaining its popularity among young people who are interested only in preserving peace and a good standard of living rather than engaging in unnecessary conflict.

Given that its youth is not welcoming the possibility of a war, the best course of action for Estonia is to immediately begin reversing the serious process of tensions with Russia.

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Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

By Fyodor Lukyanov | RT | October 12, 2026

The latest turn in Russia-US relations has shocked Kiev, outraged the EU, provoked discontent among a considerable number of politicians in the US, and left many observers around the world perplexed.

The Trump administration’s sudden decision to suspend sanctions on Russian diesel supplies appears to contradict its recent actions, including the adoption of tough new sanctions legislation intended to increase pressure on Moscow, and while some attribute the reversal to US President Donald Trump’s unpredictability, others see the beginnings of a new policy, or evidence of a fundamental change in the administration’s approach to Ukraine.

To understand what’s happening, however, we must look beyond the peculiarities of the US president’s public behavior. Trump’s extravagance, which frequently borders on the absurd, often conceals a relatively clear set of objectives, but whether those objectives are sensible is another question.

The most likely explanation for his latest reversal lies in domestic American politics, as the congressional midterm elections are less than a month away, and the Republican Party faces difficult prospects. Trump maintains an air of indifference, but losing control of both houses of Congress would condemn him to two years of political confrontation and considerable frustration.

He probably understands that there’s little prospect of fundamentally improving the economic situation, particularly consumer prices, before voters go to the polls, so for now, the emphasis is on psychological impact.

Russia isn’t the first country Washington has approached about increasing fuel supplies to international markets, and the more agreements Trump can announce, the more opportunities he has to proclaim that the White House is working tirelessly to protect ordinary Americans from rising prices.

The expectation, presumably, is that voters will forget how much of the present difficulty stems from Trump’s own actions in the Persian Gulf.

We shall soon discover whether this approach works, but there’s nothing particularly irrational about it, and Trump is pursuing a deliberate political objective. The fact that his latest decision contradicts previous statements doesn’t trouble him because he’s long operated on the assumption that words have value at the moment they’re spoken, but impose few obligations thereafter.

What does this mean for Russia, beyond the welcome prospect of additional budget revenues?

Colleagues from the Vatfor project have identified an important development, in that for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the US president has made a significant decision regarding Russia without making Ukraine the determining consideration.

Until now, the Ukrainian question has been inseparable from virtually every aspect of Washington’s policy towards Moscow, but this time, not only has it been set aside, the decision directly contradicts Kiev’s interests at a particularly difficult moment.

Hence the indignation of the Ukrainian leadership, as from its perspective, the Americans have behaved unfairly.

There are probably several reasons for this change, but the principal one appears to be Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s unwillingness to accommodate Washington’s demands that Ukraine stop attacking Russian energy infrastructure.

The strikes have become one of Kiev’s principal instruments of warfare, and American requests to curtail them have largely gone unanswered.

Trump, meanwhile, has become fixated on Russian oil supplies as a means of addressing rising fuel prices, and their importance shouldn’t be exaggerated, even if additional Russian supplies alone are unlikely to transform the global market. Nevertheless, Trump has evidently decided that Zelensky bears responsibility for aggravating the situation.

Once the US president reaches this conclusion, persuading him otherwise becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, for the moment, Kiev’s objections have simply been disregarded.

The more consequential question concerns American intelligence assistance, because to stop, or at least substantially reduce, Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets, Washington would have to restrict the intelligence it provides to Kiev, and much of this information amounts, in practical terms, to targeting assistance.

Trump already demonstrated willingness to use this instrument when around a year and a half ago, he temporarily suspended intelligence cooperation for several days to put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership.

A longer interruption would be a different matter and it would represent a genuine change in Washington’s approach to the conflict, effectively distancing the US from its Ukrainian partner, but whether Trump is prepared to take this step is uncertain.

There is, after all, an extensive informal coalition interested in maintaining the present course, and it includes the US defense industry, increasingly influential technology companies, European governments, and their political allies in Washington.

Trump encountered these forces during his previous attempt to advance his preferred settlement following the Anchorage summit, and that initiative ultimately produced little, so it remains to be seen whether the present effort will fare any better.

If Washington proves unwilling to exert sustained pressure on Kiev, the latest initiative could gradually lose momentum, and this is especially likely after the congressional elections, when the immediate political value of announcing presidential achievements will diminish.

The decisive question, therefore, is whether the US leadership can compel its partners to move in the direction it considers necessary, and if it can, an opportunity for further negotiations on a settlement could emerge.

There’s also a second conclusion which is particularly important for Russia, because Washington’s latest actions offer a glimpse of how Russia-US relations could develop after the military phase of the conflict ends.

The enormous collection of sanctions imposed on Russia is unlikely to disappear, and removing them would be exceptionally difficult, both procedurally and politically, given too many restrictions have become embedded in law and institutional practice.

Instead, the sanctions will probably remain formally in place, while decisions about their enforcement are taken according to circumstances; thus, when a particular restriction conflicts with US interests, Washington could suspend its application, but when the circumstances change, it can be restored.

In other words, sanctions will become instruments to be activated or deactivated according to immediate political and economic requirements, rather than permanent expressions of an immutable policy, and this is an important distinction between the American and European approaches.

The Americans generally display a greater degree of pragmatism as they are perfectly capable of proclaiming principles with great conviction, abandoning them when circumstances demand it, and returning to the same principles when doing so becomes convenient. European governments, by contrast, have increasingly bound themselves to political commitments from which retreat is both institutionally complicated and publicly embarrassing.

For Moscow, understanding this difference will be essential when constructing its future relationship with Washington now that the confrontation over Ukraine has reached a stage at which its consequences extend far beyond the immediate military and territorial questions.

Whatever the eventual outcome, it will help determine the structure of future political relations between Russia and the various components of the Western world, and while that structure is already beginning to emerge, its geometry remains unsettled, and the lines are still moving.

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Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.

By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | October 12, 2026

For four years, Europe presented its energy break with Russia as a strategic and moral necessity, with Brussels expanding sanctions, promising to cut Moscow’s revenues and preparing a complete ban on Russian liquefied natural gas. Yet European companies bought more LNG from Russia’s Yamal project in the first nine months of 2026 than in the same period of 2025.

EU ports received a record 12.18 million tonnes of Yamal LNG between January and September 2026, an increase of 9.5% over the same period in 2025. The gas arrived in 167 cargoes, roughly one every 1.6 days. The EU received 85% of Yamal’s recorded deliveries by volume even as the project’s worldwide shipments fell by 1.3%.

Urgewald, a German environmental and human rights organisation, placed the estimated benchmark value of those deliveries at €7.88 billion, using cargo volumes and monthly European TTF gas prices rather than disclosed contract payments. European leaders spoke of economic separation while EU ports remained the destination for a multibillion-euro Russian LNG trade.

Sanctions that preserved trade

The EU’s ban on Russian LNG under existing short-term contracts took effect on 25 April 2026. Eligible long-term agreements signed before 17 June 2025 could continue supplying Europe through the end of 2026, with the prohibition taking effect on 1 January 2027. Brussels could announce the coming break while established contracts kept Russian cargoes moving.

Five months after the ban on imports under eligible short-term LNG contracts took effect, EU ports received 792,440 tonnes of Yamal LNG in September, slightly more than a year earlier.

Yamal sold most of its output under long-term contracts signed before the war. TotalEnergies agreed to buy 4 million tonnes a year directly from the project, CNPC contracted 3 million, Germany’s SEFE inherited a 2.9 million tonne agreement, and Spain’s Naturgy held another for 2.5 million tonnes. Novatek sold part of its own allocation through separate agreements with TotalEnergies, Shell and Gunvor, now known as Centalion Group Ltd, These contracts kept major European energy companies commercially tied to Yamal after the political rupture with Moscow, securing supplies that could be sold or traded through their international portfolios, with destination flexibility varying by agreement.

TotalEnergies chief executive Patrick Pouyanné confirmed that its Yamal agreements were linked to Brent crude. During periods of extreme volatility, those long-term contracts secured supplies that could cost less than replacement gas on the European spot market. When spot prices outpaced oil-linked purchase prices, the gap created an opportunity to earn more from selling the contracted cargoes.

Buyers could exploit that opportunity through global portfolios spanning ships, terminals, storage facilities and supplies from several producing countries. They could exchange cargoes, redirect available gas and meet customer obligations from alternative sources, freeing supplies for sale in markets offering stronger returns.

Russian officials acknowledged that portfolio buyers could swap Yamal supplies against gas from other sources and direct available cargoes towards the most lucrative markets. A Yamal cargo could fulfil one obligation while freeing another supply for sale elsewhere, allowing traders to earn from price differences across markets.

The contracts that bound companies to Russian suppliers also secured access to gas that could cost less than replacement cargoes bought at crisis prices. Keeping those agreements meant preserving both the supply and the trading opportunities it created.

The profits behind the policy

TotalEnergies owns 20% of Yamal LNG and holds 19.4% of Novatek, the project’s controlling shareholder. It also buys and markets Yamal cargoes, giving it commercial interests as both a shareholder and a cargo trader.

In July 2026, chief executive Patrick Pouyanné told analysts that lifting and selling Yamal cargoes generated an average of about $400 million annually. TotalEnergies had direct access to the cash booked through its UK trading entity. The income fluctuated with Brent crude prices because the contracts were linked to oil.

TotalEnergies also retained rights to dividends through its ownership positions, although sanctions limited its ability to transfer those funds from Russia to Europe. Pouyanné confirmed that some cash flows had been distributed without disclosing how much had been repatriated, while the company’s Novatek dividends, which he had valued at around $600 million annually in 2024, had previously remained stuck abroad.

The commercial incentive extended beyond the immediate Yamal income, as continued deliveries preserved access to contracted gas while removing Russian LNG before replacement supplies became available could drive prices higher across the wider market. Pouyanné warned at a French Senate hearing that replacing those supplies would force Europe to pay more, and told analysts in April 2024 that sanctions on Yamal would benefit TotalEnergies’ global portfolio by pushing LNG prices higher.

TotalEnergies had commercial interests under either outcome, as continued Yamal trade generated sales income while a sudden prohibition could tighten supply and raise the value of gas sold elsewhere in its portfolio. Continued access and greater scarcity offered different routes to income, leaving the company with a potential financial benefit even if Russian deliveries stopped.

A French Senate inquiry called in 2024 for France to lead efforts to sanction Russian LNG and end its own imports as soon as possible, yet two years later TotalEnergies was still earning about $400 million annually from Yamal sales.

Germany’s retained Russian contract

Germany’s state-owned energy group SEFE inherited a contract for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually through the former Gazprom Marketing & Trading business, after Berlin nationalised its parent company, Gazprom Germania, in 2022. The group became Securing Energy for Europe, retaining the Russian supply agreement under German state ownership.

SEFE’s trading operation later attributed substantial profits across its LNG portfolio to contractual flexibility, freight optimisation and arbitrage, while its 2024 financial report recorded £411.2 million in EBITDA and £199.4 million in profit after tax. Those figures covered SEFE Marketing & Trading and its subsidiaries, without isolating the contribution from Yamal.

That flexibility extended to its Indian supply obligations, for which Reuters reported that the business had arranged cargoes from other sources to reduce freight costs. SEFE’s chief executive also explained that it could retain Yamal supplies in Europe and serve India from elsewhere in its portfolio when doing so was cheaper, although that account described an available trading option rather than documenting individual cargo swaps.

Under German state ownership, SEFE retained a long-term agreement for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, even as Europe sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Berlin’s nationalisation changed the ownership of Gazprom’s former German business, but the Russian supply agreement remained in place, preserving its commercial ties to Yamal inside a state-owned international trader.

Shell’s phased withdrawal

On 8 March 2022, Shell announced a phased withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons, including oil, gas and LNG, but later acknowledged that long-term contractual commitments remained despite the end of its spot purchases of Russian LNG.

Among those commitments was a 2015 agreement with Novatek for approximately 900,000 tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, with a term exceeding 20 years. In February 2023, a Shell spokesperson confirmed that the company was still receiving Russian LNG cargoes under that contract, almost a year after announcing its withdrawal.

Shell’s Yamal agreement sat within a global LNG portfolio, with its cargoes passing through a contractual transhipment point at Montoir-de-Bretagne in France. Across the wider business, Shell used its international operations to capture differences in regional demand and prices, and chief executive Wael Sawan attributed strong late-2023 trading results to arbitrage between eastern and western markets. Those results demonstrate the commercial value of portfolio flexibility, without identifying how much came from Yamal.

Naturgy and former Gunvor also retained access to Yamal supplies through long-term agreements, with Naturgy contracted for 2.5 million tonnes annually and Centalion Group Ltd,  for about 500,000 tonnes through Novatek. Reporting on Yamal’s portfolio buyers describes how companies could exchange those supplies with gas sourced elsewhere and direct cargoes towards more lucrative markets.

The contracts therefore carried commercial opportunities alongside their obligations, preserving access to gas that could be sold or exchanged within wider portfolios. Remaining in the trade could generate value even where companies presented their continuing purchases as a contractual constraint, although that potential should not be confused with a verified profit from each agreement.

Russian gas beyond Nord Stream

On 7 February 2022, then US President Joe Biden stood beside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and said that a Russian invasion would bring Nord Stream 2 to an end. Asked how Washington could achieve that when Germany controlled the project, he maintained that the United States could ensure the outcome without explaining the mechanism.

Germany halted Nord Stream 2’s certification on 22 February 2022, preventing a pipeline that had never entered commercial service from beginning operations. Nord Stream 1 had already stopped delivering gas when explosions ruptured three of the system’s four pipeline strings on 26 September 2022, leaving only one Nord Stream 2 string intact. With the Nord Stream route out of operation, Russian LNG continued reaching European terminals through the contracts held by companies such as TotalEnergies, SEFE and Shell.

Yamal had begun exporting LNG in December 2017, almost five years before the Nord Stream explosions, and its seaborne supply network survived the loss of the pipelines. European companies continued buying Russian gas under long-term contracts, receiving by-sea supplies that remained commercially valuable even as the direct pipeline connection between Russia and Germany stood idle.

America captured the market

The decline of Russian pipeline supplies opened a larger European market for American LNG, and Washington worked with Brussels to expand the trade. In their 25 March 2022 agreement, the United States pledged to work towards at least 15 billion cubic metres of additional LNG for the EU that year, including supplies from international partners, while maintaining a regulatory environment that would support additional export capacity. The European Commission committed to working with member states to secure demand for approximately 50 billion cubic metres of additional American LNG annually until at least 2030, giving the effort to reduce Russian dependence a long-term market for US supplies.

American deliveries to the EU rose from 22 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 56 billion in 2022, exceeding the initial expansion target. By the second quarter of 2026, the United States supplied 63.2% of EU LNG imports, with Russia second at 17.3%. Europe’s retreat from Russian pipeline gas had been accompanied by a US-European policy effort to expand American supply, while Russian LNG retained a substantial place in the same market.

Dependence became leverage

Europe’s reliance on American supplies extended beyond LNG, giving Washington leverage over another essential fuel when the Trump administration asked the EU to release 120 million barrels of emergency diesel over six months. Washington presented reserve releases as an alternative to restricting American diesel exports, a threat with considerable force because the United States supplied around half of the EU’s diesel imports in August 2026.

Washington was pressing Europe to release finished diesel that could reach consumers without further refining, while its own emergency contribution consisted of crude offered to companies under loan arrangements requiring repayment in oil with additional barrels. The US Department of Energy’s September solicitation explicitly built replenishment into those contracts, leaving Europe under pressure to draw on immediately usable fuel while American releases carried a contractual obligation to restore its crude reserves.

The pressure was followed by a G7 agreement on 2 October 2026 to coordinate the release of 100 million barrels over four months, with a substantial diesel release brought forward into the first 20 days. G7 leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from energy export restrictions against one another, placing continued access to supplies alongside the agreement to draw down emergency stocks.

Washington had helped build a larger European market for American energy as part of the effort to reduce dependence on Russia, then used the prospect of restricting diesel exports to press European governments to release their reserves. Europe’s reliance on an allied supplier had left it exposed to pressure over access to fuel, with emergency stocks becoming part of the negotiation over keeping those supplies flowing.

A credibility crisis

European leaders need to explain how their effort to cut Russia’s energy revenues can be reconciled with rising Yamal deliveries to EU ports and European traders earning income from the cargoes. TotalEnergies’ disclosure of about $400 million in annual income makes continued trade harder to present solely as an unwanted contractual obligation, when the same agreement also sustained a valuable business. Compliance with the sanctions timetable does not resolve the political contradiction; it shows how much commerce that timetable allowed to continue.

Brussels also committed to building long-term demand for American LNG, while Washington later demonstrated its willingness to use fuel exports as leverage over European governments.

Whose interests are being served when Europe distances itself from Russian pipeline supplies, remains a paying customer for Russian LNG and becomes more exposed to American pressure?

European leaders owe their citizens an explanation of why Russia remained an acceptable supplier for profitable LNG contracts while economic separation was presented as a strategic necessity. They must also explain whose interests were served by replacing that dependence with greater exposure to Washington.

Quando si torna indietro e si osserva davvero la rappresentazione storica delle «realtà russe» nei media di lingua inglese, si nota che Putin è sull’orlo della destituzione dal 2000 e da allora anche l’economia russa è sull’orlo del collasso. Tutto ciò che viene scritto sulla Russia in inglese in Occidente è una menzogna.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Parleremo dei vari aspetti della presunta “epidemia” in Russia, ma emerge una tendenza più ampia quando si esamina l’interpretazione data dai media a questo evento, che sia reale, falso o una sorta di enigma. Chiunque abbia familiarità con il mio lavoro mi avrà sentito affermare qualcosa del tipo: «Tutto ciò che sapete sulla Russia, scritto in inglese, è una menzogna», e continuo a credere in questa affermazione. Quando i politici occidentali dichiarano che «la Russia ha il potenziale economico della Spagna» o che «la Russia è la Nigeria con la neve», o fanno altre affermazioni simili, non stanno mentendo in modo diretto e consapevole.

Sulla base di tutti i dati e le informazioni di cui dispongono «laggiù» riguardo all’economia russa, questa visione era logicamente «vera». Se si analizzano i numeri basandosi sui dati occidentali, immagino che la Russia sia semplicemente un’economia enigmatica avvolta nel mistero, delle dimensioni di una nazione dell’UE di secondo piano, ma ovviamente nella realtà non è così. La Russia è terribilmente draconiana e repressiva, perché ovunque si legge che è proprio così. I calcoli secondo cui la Russia avrebbe ceduto immediatamente e il «rublo sarebbe crollato» dopo l’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale non erano falsi, erano semplicemente basati su dati errati. Se si esaminano le informazioni occidentali sulla Russia, sembrerebbe davvero che l’economia del Paese poggi esclusivamente sui prezzi del petrolio, che la popolazione attenda una sola scintilla per ribellarsi al tiranno e che, nel complesso, il castello di carte sia pronto a crollare da un momento all’altro. Ma, come hanno dimostrato gli anni di guerra, non è stato così; tuttavia, le stime iniziali erano «corrette» sulla base dei dati su cui si fondavano.

Persino la famosa citazione di Lenin secondo cui «una menzogna ripetuta abbastanza spesso diventa verità» – ironia della sorte – potrebbe non essere mai stata pronunciata da lui, ma questa pseudo-affermazione getta un’ombra negativa sulla Russia, per cui l’Occidente continua a ripeterla. In Russia, poiché alcune persone sono state arrestate per attività online dall’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale – tra cui l’organizzazione di atti terroristici – ciò viene considerato «negativo»; tuttavia, il fatto che nel Regno Unito vi siano 70 volte più persone dietro le sbarre per ciò che hanno espresso online non viene preso in considerazione, poiché si tratta di una situazione diversa e non è mai stata nemmeno presa in esame da un giornalista britannico. Gli arresti per dichiarazioni e azioni online si applicano solo a coloro che sono considerati «cattivi», a riprova della loro cattiveria.

Se l’esercito russo è forte, si tratta di militarismo; se l’esercito russo è debole, è prova di corruzione e inettitudine. Se vi sono processi per corruzione, ciò dimostra che il regime autoritario di Putin sta eliminando i propri nemici; se invece non vi fossero processi per corruzione, ciò costituirebbe prova della corruzione e del controllo totalitario del regime. Non esiste alcuna possibilità di vittoria per la Russia nella stampa occidentale; persino durante il presunto trattamento mediatico favorevole riservato a Eltsin nei «bei vecchi tempi», l’intero establishment si è abbandonato a un’orgia di schadenfreude per la caduta dell’URSS e per lo stato di umiliazione della Russia degli anni ’90.

Per dirla senza mezzi termini: se accade qualcosa o si dice che sia accaduto qualcosa in relazione alla Russia:

– Se i media russi lo avallano, ciò è prova che la Russia è cattiva

– Se i media russi si oppongono, ciò è prova di un insabbiamento del misfatto che dimostra che la Russia è cattiva

– In definitiva, qualsiasi azione o inazione da parte della Russia è negativa e costituisce prova della sua malvagità.

La posizione della CNN su questa questione è la classica russofobia

E, puntuale come un orologio, ecco che la CNN interviene per sostenere questa narrativa sulla peste che sembra essere fondamentalmente falsa. Parleremo di ciò che sta realmente accadendo con questa «epidemia» un po’ più avanti, ma per ora concentriamoci sull’aspetto mediatico della questione. Già nel titolo dell’articolo della CNN in questione «Liste di controllo, mascherine e mistero: cosa sappiamo sull’allarme peste in Russia» si nota chiaramente come la propaganda stia prendendo piede.

«Le autorità russe hanno cercato di placare le preoccupazioni globali in merito alla morte di una giovane donna che lavorava in un laboratorio siberiano specializzato nella lotta alla peste. Tuttavia, le misure adottate per isolare i suoi contatti e introdurre nuove misure di controllo della malattia negli ospedali locali hanno suscitato preoccupazioni tra le persone che temono di non essere informate su tutta la verità.»

Per quanto riguarda il paragrafo precedente, come potete vedere, la parte russa è vista in modo negativo perché presenta una versione dei fatti diversa e ha l’audacia di condividerla con il mondo. Tuttavia, se i media russi avessero taciuto su questa vicenda, ciò sarebbe stato ugualmente negativo, in quanto avrebbe costituito una prova di colpevolezza per omissione. Il fatto che le autorità russe stiano adottando alcune misure per cercare di fermare un’epidemia è negativo perché tali misure generano paura o qualcosa del genere, ma quantomeno ciò è sufficiente per giustificare una condanna. Tuttavia, se il governo adottasse misure estreme, queste sarebbero «draconiane», mentre se non adottasse alcuna misura, ciò sarebbe «terribilmente irresponsabile». Pertanto, adottare misure di livello medio «induce paura» o qualcosa del genere e, naturalmente, ciò è negativo e assolutamente inaccettabile.

«Ulyana Gavryunina, una blogger ventinovenne di Angarsk, città della regione di Irkutsk, ha dichiarato alla CNN di aver dovuto cambiare ospedale ostetrico alla quarantesima settimana di gravidanza, poiché le restrizioni di quarantena appena imposte impedivano a suo marito di stare con lei durante il travaglio.»

Pertanto, poiché l’amministrazione locale dispone di strutture limitate, purtroppo questa donna ha dovuto partorire in condizioni tutt’altro che ideali. È una situazione spiacevole per lei e sono certo che sia stata piuttosto frustrante, ma ancora una volta la CNN sostiene che l’intervento delle autorità russe sia negativo perché ha avuto ripercussioni negative sulle persone; tuttavia, se non avessero fatto nulla, sarebbe stato altrettanto grave. Se le persone non fossero state messe in quarantena in quella struttura, ciò sarebbe stato «pericoloso e irresponsabile» o qualcosa del genere.

«Mercoledì l’autorità sanitaria russa ha affermato che non sussiste alcun rischio epidemico a seguito della morte della donna e che sta riducendo gradualmente l’intervento. Rospotrebnadzor ha dichiarato che il monitoraggio medico è stato completato per “oltre il 90%” dei contatti della ricercatrice deceduta e che non sono stati rilevati agenti patogeni “pericolosi”. Tuttavia, permangono alcune domande senza risposta».

L’espressione «ma rimangono domande senza risposta» è stata utilizzata in questo contesto per negare l’opinione del governo russo. Se questo paragrafo si fosse concluso senza queste parole, avrebbe fatto apparire pienamente legittime le opinioni delle autorità locali. Quando «rimangono domande», si allude a una cospirazione, al fatto che la versione ufficiale non corrisponda alla realtà. Ancora una volta, indipendentemente da ciò che le autorità russe avrebbero dichiarato pubblicamente, la reazione sarebbe stata negativa perché la CNN le considera nemiche. Il nemico non può fare nulla di giusto. E le azioni della Russia sono quelle di un nemico e, pertanto, sono universalmente negative agli occhi di qualsiasi giornalista che si rispetti.

“Secondo il proprio sito web, l’Istituto Antipeste impiega circa 95 ricercatori ed è un’importante struttura sanitaria pubblica responsabile del monitoraggio e della prevenzione dei focolai di infezioni batteriche e virali ad alto rischio in tutta la Siberia e nell’Estremo Oriente russo.

L’istituto è stato fondato nel 1934 per combattere la peste e continua a studiare la malattia poiché la Yersinia pestis, il batterio che causa la peste, circola ancora naturalmente nella fauna selvatica in alcune zone della Siberia e nelle regioni limitrofe».

Sorprendentemente, la CNN non ha definito la struttura di ricerca in cui lavorava la signora Shipilova come un «laboratorio biologico» né ha utilizzato altri termini infamanti. In realtà, si è limitata a «crederle sulla parola» e a riportare semplicemente le informazioni presenti sul sito web. Ciò è risultato veritiero e piacevole da leggere.

Cosa è realmente accaduto, quindi?

Passiamo ora ad analizzare la situazione reale relativa a una potenziale epidemia di peste e alla misteriosa morte della ricercatrice che stava lavorando per combatterla. Esiste un video realizzato da una donna americana anonima residente a Irkutsk (nome del canale: American in the Motherland) sull’intera vicenda che, in meno di 15 minuti, analizza l’intera storia con fonti, fatti e filmati provenienti direttamente dalla regione. Per brevità, condividerò i punti salienti delle sue argomentazioni. Come potete vedere, ancora una volta una sola giornalista cittadina smonta punto per punto la versione dei media mainstream. L’immagine qui sotto è tratta dal video e mostra la «genialità» della stampa internazionale e le sue reazioni affrettate su questo tema.

I punti chiave del video erano:

• Non vi sono lockdown di massa a Irkutsk né in nessun’altra parte della Russia; le uniche persone sottoposte a quarantena hanno avuto contatto diretto con la donna deceduta (Daria Shipilova) e il loro numero è inferiore a 200.
• La Shipilova non lavorava in un laboratorio biologico militare, bensì in un istituto di ricerca sulle epidemie e sulle malattie, progettato per combattere le patologie. La sua ubicazione e la sua attività non erano né segrete né di natura militare.

La signora Shipilova è stata ricoverata in un ospedale fuori da Irkutsk perché in quella sede era presente una struttura progettata per gestire questo tipo di focolai epidemici dell’era Covid, e non nell’ambito di una qualche cospirazione.

Non si è verificato nessun altro decesso per la stessa causa di quello della signora Shipilova.

La causa della morte di Daria Shipilova è stata una «polmonite di origine sconosciuta».

La storia della «provetta rotta» è un mito, poiché è stata inventata da un blogger russo. Quando si lavora con malattie gravi, non si va in giro in un ambiente simile a un ufficio con provette fragili. La Russia non opera secondo la stessa metodologia della Umbrella Corporation, agitando a casaccio fiale fragili contenenti agenti patogeni.

La parte russa non ha trovato alcuna prova di un incidente presso la struttura di ricerca.

La ricercatrice non si era recata in Buriazia prima della sua morte. Pertanto, non ha contratto la malattia da marmotte locali o da altri tipi di roditori.

Al momento della stesura di questo articolo o della realizzazione del video collegato sopra, non si sono verificati altri casi simili a quello che ha causato la morte della signora Shipilova.

La peste è curabile, poiché è causata da un batterio che continua a esistere in tutto il mondo. Ogni anno, negli Stati Uniti e in altri paesi, una manciata di persone la contrae ancora. Gli antibiotici rappresentano una contromisura efficace contro questa malattia; pertanto, ciò non sembra costituire motivo di panico internazionale.

Perché la peste si diffuse nella Russia medievale?

Un aspetto importante da sottolineare a questo proposito è che, storicamente, sebbene la peste bubbonica abbia mietuto vittime anche al di fuori dell’Europa occidentale, ha avuto effetti devastanti solo all’interno di quest’ultima. I russi continuano ancora oggi ad andare fieri di possedere un elevato livello di igiene culturale che risale al Medioevo. I russi del Medioevo e altri popoli al di fuori dell’Occidente sembravano aver «capito da soli» la necessità di lavarsi regolarmente e di lavarsi le mani. Si ritiene che questa cultura igienica sia la ragione per cui la Russia, nel XIX secolo, vantasse una popolazione così numerosa rispetto alle nazioni circostanti. Molti in Russia ritengono che, se non fosse stato per errori madornali quali la Prima guerra mondiale, la Rivoluzione, la Seconda guerra mondiale e gli anni ’90, la popolazione attuale sarebbe molto più vicina a quella della Cina o dell’India.

Pertanto, da un punto di vista culturale russo, ciò appare chiaramente come un’altra campagna di proiezione: un terzo della popolazione inglese morì a causa della peste, mentre in Russia ne morirono solo pochi. Di conseguenza, la peste nera non ebbe in realtà alcun impatto culturale sulla Russia e, a giudicare dagli scritti del XIX secolo, la tubercolosi sembra essere stata un problema molto più persistente e fastidioso per questa società, che ancora oggi riveste una certa rilevanza. In tutta la Russia esistono strutture antitubercolari e non è possibile immigrare nel Paese se si presentano sintomi della malattia. L’intera questione del «vivere con i parassiti» non era una realtà quotidiana per i russi né nel Medioevo né in epoca moderna; tale primato spetta all’Occidente liberale e illuminato.

I media sono il vero problema.Abbiamo esaminato solo un particolare articolo su questo tema, ma vi sono numerose riflessioni assurde da parte della stampa occidentale che seguono la formula «maledetti i russi se lo fanno, maledetti se non lo fanno». Titoli come questo del Daily Mail ne sono l’esempio perfetto:

«Trump offre a Putin un’ancora di salvezza mentre la Russia si affanna a contenere una mortale epidemia trasmessa per via aerea dopo la morte di un ricercatore di laboratorio».

Ancora una volta, se «Putin» non facesse nulla sarebbe cattivo, ma sta facendo qualcosa, quindi si sta «affannando» in preda al panico, il che è altrettanto negativo. Il fatto che Trump gli offra un «ancora di salvezza» implica che Putin non abbia altra scelta se non quella di accettare questo aiuto, qualunque esso sia, altrimenti sarebbe cattivo. Ma indovinate un po’? Se accetta l’ancora di salvezza, ciò significa sicuramente che è debole o qualcosa del genere, il che significa che è cattivo.

Quando si torna indietro e si osserva davvero la rappresentazione storica delle «realtà russe» nei media di lingua inglese, si nota ovunque questa manipolazione narrativa isterica e nietzschiana da «untermensch». Putin è sull’orlo della destituzione dal 2000 e da allora anche l’economia russa è sull’orlo del collasso. Tutto ciò che viene scritto sulla Russia in inglese in Occidente è una menzogna.