Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Auf den ersten Blick hat diese Geschichte weder mit Deutschland noch mit Europa besonders viel zu tun. Am 31. Oktober beginnen in Dakar die Olympischen Jugendspiele, zum ersten Mal überhaupt findet damit eine olympische Veranstaltung auf afrikanischem Boden statt. Doch tatsächlich zeigt gerade Dakar ein weiteres Feld der europäischen Konfrontation mit Russland – eines, das mit Sport im eigentlichen Sinne und mit den viel beschworenen Prinzipien des „Fair Play“ inzwischen nur noch wenig zu tun hat.

Russland wird im Senegal mit lediglich 13 jungen Athleten vertreten sein. Immerhin dürfen sie wieder unter der eigenen Flagge antreten, und bei einem Sieg soll auch die russische Hymne erklingen. Nach Jahren der Verbote, neutralen Uniformen und absurden Konstruktionen, bei denen ein Sportler zwar Russe sein durfte, Russland aber möglichst nicht erwähnt werden sollte, sieht das zunächst wie eine Rückkehr zur Normalität aus.

Ist es aber nicht.

Denn diese Rückkehr erfolgt nur teilweise. Der Internationale Olympische Ausschuss hat seine bisherigen Empfehlungen gegenüber russischen Athleten inzwischen weitgehend aufgehoben. Verbindlich sind diese Entscheidungen für die internationalen Sportverbände jedoch nicht. Deshalb entsteht eine ausgesprochen merkwürdige Situation: In einer Sportart treten Russen wieder mit Flagge und Hymne an, in einer anderen bleiben sie „neutral“, in einer dritten dürfen sie weiterhin überhaupt nicht starten.

Mit sportlicher Leistung hat das alles nichts zu tun.

Ein junger Schwimmer, Judoka oder Radfahrer wird damit nicht danach beurteilt, wie schnell er schwimmt, wie gut er kämpft oder wie stark er fährt, sondern danach, welchen politischen Kurs die jeweilige internationale Föderation für richtig hält.

Das nennt sich dann gerne Autonomie des Sports. In Wirklichkeit ist es die institutionalisierte Politisierung des Sports.

Besonders deutlich wird der Widerspruch beim Vergleich mit Israel. Seit Jahren werden russische Sportler für einen Krieg sanktioniert, den sie weder begonnen haben noch beeinflussen können. Israelische Athleten dagegen treten trotz des Krieges im Gazastreifen weiterhin ganz selbstverständlich mit Nationalflagge, Hymne und Mannschaftsbezeichnung auf.

Der IOC erklärt diesen Unterschied formal damit, dass das israelische und das palästinensische Nationale Olympische Komitee die Olympische Charta einhalten. Gleichzeitig betont dieselbe Organisation inzwischen wieder ausdrücklich, dass Athleten grundsätzlich nicht für die Handlungen ihrer Regierungen verantwortlich gemacht werden dürften.

Eine ausgezeichnete Erkenntnis. Nur hätte man sie vielleicht auch schon 2022 auf russische Sportler anwenden können.

Genau darin liegt das eigentliche Problem. Nicht darin, dass israelische Athleten teilnehmen dürfen – selbstverständlich sollen sie teilnehmen. Sondern darin, dass für Russen jahrelang völlig andere Maßstäbe galten.

Entweder trägt ein Athlet Verantwortung für die Politik seines Staates – dann müsste diese Regel für alle gelten. Oder er trägt sie nicht – dann hätte man russische Schwimmer, Turner, Fechter und Jugendliche niemals kollektiv bestrafen dürfen. Eine dritte Variante gibt es eigentlich nicht. Es sei denn, die Regeln werden abhängig davon angewendet, welches Land gerade politisch bestraft werden soll. Und genau danach sieht es aus.

Der Ausschluss Russlands aus weiten Teilen des internationalen Sports war von Anfang an weniger ein sportliches Instrument als eine Form politischer Sanktion. Er sollte Russland isolieren, aus internationalen Strukturen verdrängen und zugleich demonstrieren, dass ein Land, das sich dem westlichen politischen Konsens widersetzt, selbst in Bereichen bestraft werden kann, die mit Außenpolitik überhaupt nichts zu tun haben.

Dass dabei ausgerechnet junge Sportler getroffen wurden, machte die Angelegenheit nur noch grotesker.

Gerade die Jugendspiele in Dakar zeigen nun, wie widersprüchlich das System geworden ist. Einerseits erklärt der IOC plötzlich, insbesondere junge Athleten dürften nicht für Entscheidungen ihrer Regierungen verantwortlich gemacht werden. Andererseits bleiben die Folgen der früheren politischen Entscheidungen bestehen, weil einzelne Verbände weiterhin eigene Restriktionen anwenden können.

So entsteht keine Rückkehr zum Sport, sondern ein Flickenteppich politischer Loyalitätsprüfungen.

Dazu kommt die besondere Behandlung russischer Athleten im Anti-Doping-System. Wer nach längerer Abwesenheit wieder in internationale Wettbewerbe zurückkehrt, muss mehrfach getestet worden sein, russische Anti-Doping-Programme werden zusätzlich international überwacht, und einzelne Verbände können weitere Anforderungen festlegen.

Formal lässt sich das alles mit der Vorgeschichte des russischen Dopingsystems begründen. Praktisch entsteht aber erneut eine zusätzliche Hürde, die ausschließlich eine bestimmte Nationalität betrifft. Auch hier lautet das Problem nicht, dass kontrolliert wird. Dopingkontrollen sind notwendig. Die Frage ist vielmehr, wann Kontrolle aufhört, allgemeine sportliche Regel zu sein, und wann sie zum zusätzlichen politischen Zulassungsinstrument wird.

Parallel dazu verkauft der IOC Dakar 2026 als großes historisches Projekt: die ersten Olympischen Spiele auf afrikanischem Boden, ein Fest der Jugend, Afrikas und der internationalen Verständigung. Schöne Worte.

Die finanziellen und infrastrukturellen Risiken trägt allerdings vor allem Senegal. Sportstätten müssen modernisiert, Infrastruktur geschaffen, Sicherheits- und Organisationskosten übernommen werden. Der IOC erhält dagegen genau das, was eine Organisation seiner Art am dringendsten benötigt: neue Märkte, neue Bilder und den enormen symbolischen Gewinn, erstmals die olympischen Ringe auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent präsentieren zu können.

Auch das gehört inzwischen zum modernen Olympismus: Risiken werden lokalisiert, der internationale Reputationsgewinn wird globalisiert.

Und gleichzeitig spricht man weiter von Frieden, Völkerverständigung und politischer Neutralität. Vielleicht liegt gerade darin die größte Ironie. Der Sport sollte eigentlich einer der letzten Räume sein, in denen ein Mensch nicht als Bürger eines „richtigen“ oder „falschen“ Staates betrachtet wird, sondern schlicht als Athlet. Genau deshalb existiert überhaupt die Idee des Fair Play.

Doch im Verhältnis zu Russland wurde dieser Grundsatz jahrelang außer Kraft gesetzt. Nicht weil dadurch ein Krieg beendet worden wäre. Nicht weil ein russischer Judoka Einfluss auf Entscheidungen im Kreml hätte. Nicht weil ein 17-jähriger Schwimmer die russische Außenpolitik bestimmen könnte. Sondern weil Russland bestraft werden sollte.

Und besonders in Europa wurde diese Bestrafung längst zu einem politischen Selbstzweck. Russland muss ausgeschlossen, isoliert und sanktioniert werden – selbst dort, wo der Zusammenhang zwischen Sanktion und angeblichem Ziel vollkommen verschwunden ist.

Wenn dieselben Prinzipien bei anderen Kriegen plötzlich nicht mehr gelten, bleibt am Ende nur eine Erklärung übrig: Es geht nicht um universelle Regeln. Es geht darum, gegen wen sie angewendet werden.

Spätestens dort endet Fair Play und beginnt Politik. Oder, präziser gesagt: blanke Russophobie im Sportdress.

A live tracker map developed by Greenpeace, an international environmental organization, shows Russian tankers currently moving across the Atlantic Ocean, with one vessel approaching the U.S. East Coast.

The Trump administration is carrying out the most intense pressure campaign on Cuba in decades. The Cuban government says its plan is simply to endure.

© Graham Dickie for The New York Times

Tensions have risen between the United States and Cuba as the Trump administration tries to force the island’s Communist government to make drastic changes.

© Doug Mills/The New York Times

"I'm sending a sledgehammer message to shipping companies whose tankers are transporting illegal Russian diesel to our ports," Sen. Richard Blumenthal said. "Reverse course while there's still time."

U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) is demanding that a tanker reportedly carrying Russian diesel to the United States reverse course, warning its owner that delivering the cargo would violate federal...

Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) has published the names of 49 Russian and Belarusian companies and institutions building Rassvet, Russia’s low-orbit satellite internet system, on its War&Sanctions portal, the agency said on 28 October. It needs it for its military purposes.

Russian troops ran front-line communications and long-range strike drones on smuggled Starlink terminals until SpaceX blocked them on 1 February 2026. Ukraine still flies on Musk’s network, and on 24 October it got back to full speed after a ten-day cap imposed abroad. Rassvet is meant to give Russia’s army satellite links under its own control.

HUR has said Moscow may struggle to obtain components for more satellites, and its list names the suppliers that sanctions would need to target while the network is still being built.

Terminals for Iskander-M command vehicles

Rassvet is first of all a military communications system. Russia plans to use it for command and control, strike platforms, and drones, and to install terminals in the command-and-staff vehicles of Iskander-M missile systems, HUR says.

The Central Research Institute of Automation and Hydraulics is involved in integrating Rassvet into army communications, including fitting command vehicles, Iskander ones among them, with terminals once 292 satellites are in orbit, according to the portal. The same institute produces guidance components for the Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles.

Planned coverage takes in Ukraine and the EU first, and once it is wide enough, Russia could use the system in hybrid attacks on other countries. That is why partners should block Rassvet’s access to components, equipment, and software now, the agency said.

Roscosmos launches it, a Belarusian missile maker signs on

The lead company is Bureau 1440, part of the IKS Holding tech group. According to the portal, it is linking its flight control center to systems of the Russian Defense Ministry. Roscosmos launches the satellites into orbit, and its head, Dmitry Bakanov, personally oversees Rassvet.

Meanwhile, Belintersat, Belarus’s national satellite operator, signed a partnership with Bureau 1440 in May 2026 to bring Rassvet into Belarus’s telecom network. It is a branch of the Plant of Precision Electromechanics, Belarus’s lead missile developer and maker of the Polonez rocket launcher.

Another Belarusian firm, Aerospace Instruments, prototypes components for the system.

23 of 49 not sanctioned by Kyiv’s allies

Of the 49, 23, Roscosmos among them, are not under sanctions by any country in the sanctions coalition. The companies involved “must be included in all blacklists” of countries, banks, and businesses, the agency wrote.

32 satellites launched, seven launches to go

Russia launched its first 16 Rassvet satellites earlier this year. Stable communications would need 200–250 in orbit, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, then adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, said in May.

By August, Russia had launched 32 Rassvet satellites and planned seven more launches by the end of 2026, a HUR official told Janes. Only 12 of them, all from the first batch, had reached a sustainable altitude by the end of August, ISW reported.

Rassvet's planned coverage is expected to focus primarily on Ukraine and Europe, HUR said, warning that the system could also support Russian hybrid operations against other countries.

U.S. President Donald Trump is considering lifting sanctions against Russia's government investment fund, the New York Times reported Oct. 27, citing an unnamed U.S. official.

Russia expects cargo transits along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to more than double in 2026, marking a substantial increase in Arctic shipping despite Western sanctions, although volumes remain far below Moscow’s original ambitions for the route.

The move would be the latest U.S. concession to Moscow as President Trump pursues economic incentives he hopes will secure an end to war in Ukraine.

© Ramil Sitdikov/Reuters

President Pezeshkian Says U.S. Naval and Air Blockades Destabilize Global Energy Markets.

On Tuesday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian branded U.S. actions that cause dangerous surges in hydrocarbon prices on the world market as “economic terrorism.”

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“Economic terrorism, in the form of the U.S. naval and air blockade against Iran, in addition to Washington’s pressure on other countries to comply with this blockade, are illegal actions that seriously destabilize energy markets,” he said during his address at the summit of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), the so-called “gas OPEC.”

Pezeshkian also pointed out that U.S. military interventions in the Persian Gulf region not only affect regional actors but also disrupt the process of energy pricing, supply and transportation, which threatens global economic growth.

The Iranian leader then invited international investors to do business with the Persian nation. “Foreign investors can, without running any risk, take advantage of incentives and benefits that we offer in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors,” he stressed.

🇶🇦🇷🇺🇮🇷 Qatar’s Emir Tamim joins Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at the eighth Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit in Moscow. Ahead of the group photo, Tamim held separate talks with Pezeshkian: Qatar’s published account lists Hormuz, energy supplies and… pic.twitter.com/g1ipI3Z0Ux

— Gölge Veri (@golgeveri) October 27, 2026

Pezeshkian highlighted that, despite the sanctions imposed on Tehran, Iran was able to increase its natural gas production capacity to 300 billion cubic meters per day.

Commenting on the Iranian leader’s speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that “illegal sanctions” only have harmful consequences.

“You drew attention to the illegal sanctions that some countries impose in the energy sector. I completely agree that they only have harmful consequences for all market actors, both producers and gas exporters,” he said.

teleSUR/ JF

Source: EFE

Irán y Rusia, ambos sometidos a sanciones que los llevan al olvido, están, de hecho, más alineados que nunca, coordinando todo en un frente común.

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En lo que respecta a Ucrania, Washington podría estar pasando a un modo total de “salvar las apariencias”.

Después de todo, la magnitud de la derrota estratégica del Imperio, sumada al desmoronamiento de Occidente en el país 404, es abrumadora. A esto se suma la derrota estratégica en Irán y el implacable golpe que Yemen le está asestando a la Casa de Saud.

El gran maestro Lavrov lo expresó así:

Occidente nunca volverá a ser el actor principal que dicta las condiciones”.

La tentación de identificar un camino más directo hacia un orden mundial multinodal y policéntrico puede ser grande —a raíz de todas esas concesiones descabelladas y sin precedentes de Trump a Moscú—. Pero entonces siguen llegando las verdaderas nubes negras.

El culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental y el Sindicato de Epstein en su conjunto han logrado dominar a toda la masa de neoconservadores rusófobos repartidos por todo el MICIMATT (complejo militar/industrial/congresional/de inteligencia/mediático/académico/de think tanks, según la memorable definición de Ray McGovern) y reconstituir a Irán como la única e indiscutible emergencia de seguridad nacional.

El plan de 7 puntos o nada

El apresurado viaje del mariscal de campo Asim Munir, organizado a última hora desde Islamabad a Teherán a principios de esta semana, al final no pudo mediar en nada.

Munir se reunió con todas las personas importantes. Le preguntó sin rodeos al presidente del Parlamento, Ghalibaf: ¿qué se necesita para encontrar una solución al estancamiento entre Irán y EE. UU.?

Ghalibaf fue contundente —y lo repitió al menos ocho veces durante su reunión—:

Washington debe implementar las condiciones de siete puntos de Irán, que son esencialmente un resumen del memorando de entendimiento (MoU) que ha fracasado una y otra vez, el cual Trump firmó y luego destruyó.

Los siete puntos se propusieron por primera vez a Tweedledum y Tweedledee —Witkoff y Kushner— a través de los qataríes en una ronda anterior de negociaciones indirectas entre Irán y EE. UU.

El presidente Pezeshkian y el secretario del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaee, en sus reuniones, hicieron hincapié exactamente en lo mismo. Ese es el mensaje que Munir debería transmitir al «sociópata en jefe».

Las fuentes oficiales iraníes no lo confirmarán; solo la versión estadounidense, fuertemente manipulada. Pero es posible que Munir haya transmitido un ultimátum definitivo de EE. UU. a Rezaee, Pezeshkian y Ghalibaf: abandonen su programa nuclear o enfrenten ataques masivos, dirigidos principalmente contra la Montaña del Pico.

Además de los 7 puntos, Mohsen Rezaee le informó nuevamente a Munir —y, por lo tanto, a la Casa Blanca— que ni una sola partícula de polvo nuclear saldrá de Irán. Volviendo a la única posibilidad de retomar las negociaciones: Washington debe aceptar los 7 puntos.

El ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Araghchi, sigue insistiendo en lo esencial: «Estados Unidos no ha logrado ninguno de sus objetivos de guerra».

Así que la cadena de causalidad es ineludible: no hay victoria militar (ni cambio de régimen); los costos económicos son insoportables; la situación política es insostenible; por lo tanto, la única salida son los siete puntos.

Y, además de todo eso, Teherán controla el tiempo.

Paralelamente, en medio de la «Tormenta Yemení», Saná también controla el tiempo.

Con Aramco —el sustento vital de EE. UU., Israel y los matones salafistas-yihadistas al estilo del ISIS, y una fuente privilegiada de financiamiento para las «guerras eternas»—, ahora en la línea de fuego directa de Ansarallah, el impulso yemení es trabajar «para secar las fuentes del terrorismo».

Sin embargo, Riad está redoblando la apuesta, amenazando con bombardear cada reunión de tribus yemeníes. Si eso ocurre, más de un millón de yemeníes más se unirán a las Fuerzas Armadas de Yemen y marcharán hacia la frontera entre Yemen y Arabia Saudita.

Después de todo, las tribus, bien entrenadas y fuertemente armadas, solo están esperando una orden del líder de Ansarallah, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, para invadir el sur de la «Arabia Saudita» y recuperar las tres provincias —Najran, Jizan y Asir— que son tierras ancestrales yemeníes robadas por los británicos en 1934.

Un precio que no te puedes permitir pagar

Se puede desatar el infierno: ahora; pronto; o a más tardar a finales de noviembre. Si llegara a suceder antes, antes de las elecciones israelíes, es un hecho que el impulsor es el culto a la muerte.

El sociópata en jefe prefiere un ataque después de las elecciones de mitad de mandato.

El culto a la muerte está preparando un ataque masivo contra centrales eléctricas iraníes, infraestructura petrolera, objetivos militares e instalaciones nucleares.

Teherán ha advertido repetidamente que cualquier ataque, ya sea conjunto o por separado, por parte de EE. UU. e Israel, será tratado como una «Totalen Krieg», una guerra total, y que la respuesta romperá cualquier límite o restricción.

La inteligencia interna de Irán está totalmente enfocada en un escenario de bombardeos a gran escala que ocurriría antes del próximo martes, día de las elecciones en el culto a la muerte.

Pase lo que pase, la respuesta de Teherán se asegurará de que el precio a pagar sea más que prohibitivo. En cuanto a Israel, Irán contraatacará ambas refinerías israelíes; los puertos de Haifa y Ashdod; todas las bases aéreas; y Dimona, solo si se atacan las propias instalaciones nucleares de Irán.

En caso de un ataque de EE. UU., cualquier monarquía petrolera del Golfo que albergue un punto de lanzamiento se convertirá instantáneamente en un objetivo legítimo, incluyendo redes eléctricas; plantas desalinizadoras; refinerías; puertos; centros de datos; sedes e instalaciones de empresas estadounidenses.

El Estrecho de Ormuz quedaría completamente cerrado. El precio del barril de petróleo se disparará. La economía mundial entrará en una Gran Depresión.

Desde un punto de vista imperial, eso sería tan desolador como que Washington permitiera a Irán administrar el estrecho de Ormuz y cobrar tarifas por el tránsito: en realidad, el humillante fin de la talasocracia unilateral —con la Quinta Flota de EE. UU. teniendo que pedir permiso para entrar o salir de su propia base en ruinas en Bahrein—.

Mohammad Mokhber, uno de los principales asesores del líder Mojtaba Jamenei, subrayó que

si Estados Unidos e Israel atacan nuestra infraestructura petroquímica o nuestras centrales eléctricas, Irán atacará a nueve países».

Además, la agencia de noticias Fars, muy cercana al Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (CGRI), se enteró de una serie de nuevas directivas: si los ataques implican el asesinato de funcionarios iraníes y la muerte de civiles, la respuesta iraní incluirá objetivos políticos asociados con Estados Unidos y todas las naciones que participen en la guerra, además de su infraestructura.

Lavrov y Araghchi reactivan el RIC

En medio de tanto horror, intentemos destacar al menos una tendencia positiva. Durante la reciente visita de Lavrov a Teherán, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Araghchi, fue directo al grano:

Nunca en nuestra historia Rusia e Irán han colaborado tan estrechamente como ahora.

El concepto clave es «Nunca en nuestra historia». Lavrov y Araghchi hablaron de «todo, desde Europa hasta Asia Occidental». Pero especialmente de estos cuatro temas: Líbano, Palestina, Ucrania y Yemen. Sin mencionar todo lo relacionado con la ampliación de la cooperación económica y «nuclear».

La cooperación económica se refiere especialmente al INSTC —el Corredor Internacional de Transporte Norte-Sur que conecta a tres socios de los BRICS y la OCS: Rusia, Irán e India.

Vean mi documental sobre el INSTC filmado en Irán el año pasado.

El Imperio del Caos se basa en sanciones, amenazas y bombardeos. La integración de Eurasia se basa en la construcción de infraestructura, el aumento del comercio y la cooperación soberana.

Por eso, Lavrov y Araghchi tuvieron que reactivar una vez más el RIC: la conexión original entre Rusia, India y China, concebida inicialmente como el Triángulo de Primakov, pero ahora con Irán en lugar de India.

Lavrov propuso que el nuevo RIC estableciera una «estructura de seguridad común» en el Golfo Pérsico mediante una cumbre trilateral. Eso equivale a que el RIC defina un marco unificado para el Estrecho de Ormuz.

La respuesta del Imperio será una mayor desorientación. Porque, una vez más, se trata de la «indivisibilidad de la seguridad» —tal como Rusia se lo propuso a EE. UU. y a la OTAN en diciembre de 2021—. En ese entonces, eso fue recibido con una respuesta que no fue tal.

En cuanto al Líbano, Palestina, Ucrania y Yemen, Lavrov y Araghchi se encontraban en primera línea de combate. Donde tenemos al Imperio del Caos y a sus aliados/vasallos de un lado, y a Rusia y a los aliados de Irán del otro.

Todo está interconectado, por supuesto. Un arco imperial de presión militar se extiende desde Ucrania hasta Yemen. La respuesta gira en torno a cómo coordinar la resistencia (cursiva mía) a dicha presión.

En cuanto a la cooperación económica, tanto Irán como Rusia se encuentran bajo un tsunami de sanciones. Sus bancos han sido expulsados de SWIFT y las exportaciones de petróleo están severamente restringidas. Por lo tanto, el comercio entre ambos países debe eludir el dólar estadounidense; todo el sistema financiero occidental; y la talasocracia impuesta por la Marina de los Estados Unidos.

El conocimiento técnico para eludir las sanciones es algo que Irán y Rusia podrían compartir con todo el Sur Global, a través de liquidaciones en monedas locales; el comercio de trueque; los corredores terrestres; el INSTC; y el comercio a través del mar Caspio.

Y eso nos lleva una vez más al estrecho de Ormuz, que controla Irán. Las petro-monarquías del Golfo están en pánico total. Rusia mantiene canales sólidos tanto con Irán como con el Golfo. Lavrov está en total sintonía con todos ellos. Llevó las preocupaciones del Golfo a Teherán y, a su vez, transmitió las condiciones de Teherán de regreso al Golfo.

Lavrov enfatizó que el Memorando de Entendimiento de Islamabad —que ha sido declarado muerto en repetidas ocasiones— es el único camino a seguir. Exactamente lo que Xi le dijo a Trump en el Despacho Oval. Exactamente lo que los líderes iraníes le dijeron a Asim Munir en Teherán.

También hizo hincapié en que las petro-monarquías del Golfo Pérsico deben ponerse de acuerdo y entablar un diálogo serio sobre seguridad con Irán y las naciones árabes, incluidos vecinos como Irak y Jordania, e involucrar a la Liga Árabe, la Organización para la Cooperación Islámica (OCI) y a los miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU.

Una vez más: la indivisibilidad de la seguridad.

Irán y Rusia, ambos sancionados hasta el olvido, están de hecho sincronizados como nunca antes, coordinando todo en un frente común, mientras que el desesperado Sindicato de Epstein permanece atrapado en su propia pesadilla de la «Guerra Eterna».

Traducción:  Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

The United States is not simply declining to uphold international law; it is imposing costs on others for attempting to uphold it.

The investigation found that Russian designs for rocket-launched drones likely helped shape weapons China unveiled in 2025 and that Russian wind tunnels kept testing aircraft models for China's top arms maker after the invasion of Ukraine.

For 14 years, Serbia’s government kept the country close to Moscow. Now, the opposition “Student List” has won the country’s snap parliamentary election, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine is ready to deepen its cooperation with Serbia, welcoming the result as “a new page” in a post on X.

The win could end the 14-year rule of President Aleksandar Vučić’s political force and weaken Moscow’s position in the Balkans. Serbia has remained an important Kremlin partner in Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Belgrade never joined the EU's sanctions against Moscow.

“A new page”

In his post, written in Ukrainian, Zelenskyy said that "changes have taken place in Serbia, the victory of the Student List, and this is clearly a new page in the history of the country and its people."

“We wish Serbia success, real development, and warm relations with the European community,” he wrote.

He said Ukraine was grateful to Serbia “for the respect shown to our people and our state, our independence,” and added: “We are ready to keep increasing our cooperation, and may all the good hopes of the people of Serbia come true.”

But the winners rule out sanctions on Russia

Vučić had earlier predicted that a new government could impose restrictions on Moscow by March or April, according to Novosti. The Student List says otherwise: it has no plans to align with the EU or to sanction Russia over the war in Ukraine, according to Reuters.

Its candidates frame Serbia’s reliance on Russian gas, with Gazprom as the largest supplier at around 2.2 billion cubic meters a year at below-market prices, as an acute economic dependency rather than a geopolitical alignment.

The movement’s top candidates have also said a future government would end all arms exports to war zones, including sales to Western intermediaries who pass weapons to Ukraine. Around €800 million worth of Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine through that route since 2022.

A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers is warning major banks and port authorities against facilitating Russian diesel shipments under President Donald Trump’s controversial agreement with Vladimir Putin, raising the prospect...

The prime minister also told Israelis to 'prepare yourselves' for U.S. aid to end, saying that 'the United States has changed. It's over, and it will come to an end. It's only a matter of time'

L’Iran e la Russia, entrambi sottoposti a sanzioni che li stanno portando alla rovina, sono davvero più allineati che mai e coordinano ogni cosa su un fronte comune.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Washington, sul fronte ucraino, potrebbe passare alla modalità “salvare la faccia” a tutti i costi. Dopotutto, la portata della sconfitta strategica subita dall’Impero e dall’Occidente allo sbando nel Paese 404 è sbalorditiva. A ciò si aggiunga la sconfitta strategica in Iran, oltre allo Yemen che martella senza tregua la Casa dei Saud. Il Gran Maestro Lavrov l’ha definita così: «L’Occidente non sarà mai più l’attore principale, a dettare le condizioni».La tentazione potrebbe essere forte di individuare un percorso più diretto verso un ordine mondiale multinodale e policentrico – sulla scia di tutte quelle concessioni sfrenate e senza precedenti di Trump a Mosca. Ma poi le vere nuvole nere continuano ad addensarsi.Il culto della morte nell’Asia occidentale e il «Sindacato di Epstein» nel suo complesso sono riusciti a sopraffare l’intera massa dei neoconservatori russofobi sparsi in tutto il MICIMATT (complesso militare/industriale/congressuale/di intelligence/mediatico/accademico/dei think tank, secondo la memorabile definizione di Ray McGovern) e a ricostituire l’Iran come l’indiscutibile e unica emergenza di sicurezza nazionale.Il piano in 7 punti o nienteIl viaggio affrettato e organizzato all’ultimo minuto del feldmaresciallo Asim Munir da Islamabad a Teheran all’inizio di questa settimana, alla fine, non ha potuto mediare nulla.Munir ha incontrato tutte le figure di rilievo. Ha chiesto senza mezzi termini al presidente del Parlamento Ghalibaf: cosa occorre per trovare una soluzione all’impasse tra Iran e Stati Uniti? Ghalibaf è stato schietto – e lo ha ribadito almeno otto volte nel corso del loro incontro: Washington deve attuare le condizioni in sette punti dell’Iran, che costituiscono essenzialmente una sintesi del memorandum d’intesa (MoU) ripetutamente fallito, che Trump aveva firmato per poi distruggerlo.I sette punti erano stati proposti per la prima volta a Tweedledum e Tweedledee – Witkoff e Kushner – tramite i qatarioti in un precedente ciclo di negoziati indiretti tra Iran e Stati Uniti.Il presidente Pezeshkian e il segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC) Mohsen Rezaee, nei loro incontri, hanno sottolineato esattamente la stessa cosa. Questo è il messaggio che Munir dovrebbe trasmettere al «sociopatico in capo».Le fonti ufficiali iraniane non lo confermeranno; solo la versione americana, pesantemente manipolata. Ma Munir potrebbe aver portato un ultimatum finale degli Stati Uniti a Rezaee, Pezeshkian e Ghalibaf: abbandonate il vostro programma nucleare, oppure andrete incontro a massicci attacchi, mirati principalmente a Pickaxe Mountain.Oltre ai 7 punti, Mohsen Rezaee ha infatti comunicato nuovamente a Munir – e quindi alla Casa Bianca – che nemmeno un granello di polvere nucleare lascerà l’Iran. Si torna così all’unica possibilità di un ritorno ai negoziati: Washington deve accettare i 7 punti.Il ministro degli Esteri Araghchi continua a ribadire l’essenziale: «Gli Stati Uniti non sono riusciti a raggiungere nessuno dei loro obiettivi di guerra». La catena di nessi è quindi ineludibile: nessuna vittoria militare (e nessun cambio di regime); costi economici insostenibili; situazione politica insostenibile; pertanto l’unica via d’uscita sono i 7 punti.E, come se non bastasse, Teheran fa scorrere il tempo.Parallelamente, nel contesto dell’operazione «Yemeni Storm», anche Sana’a tiene il tempo.Con Aramco, linfa vitale degli Stati Uniti, di Israele e dei sicari salafiti-jihadisti sul modello dell’ISIS, nonché fonte privilegiata di finanziamento per le «guerre infinite», ora nella linea di fuoco diretta di Ansarallah, l’obiettivo yemenita è quello di adoperarsi «per prosciugare le fonti del terrorismo».

Riad, tuttavia, sta raddoppiando la posta in gioco, minacciando di bombardare ogni raduno delle tribù yemenite. Se ciò dovesse accadere, oltre un milione di yemeniti in più si uniranno alle Forze Armate yemenite e marceranno verso il confine yemenito-saudita.

Dopotutto, le tribù, ben addestrate e dotate di armamenti all’avanguardia, stanno solo aspettando un ordine dal leader di Ansarallah, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, per riversarsi nell’Arabia «saudita» meridionale e recuperare le tre province – Najran, Jizan e Asir – che sono terre ancestrali yemenite sottratte dagli inglesi nel 1934.

Un prezzo che non potete permettervi di pagare

Potrebbe scatenarsi il finimondo: ora; a breve; o al più tardi entro la fine di novembre. Se dovesse accadere prima, prima delle elezioni israeliane, è certo che a guidare il tutto sarà il culto della morte. Il sociopatico in capo privilegia un attacco dopo le elezioni di medio termine.

Il «culto della morte» sta preparando un attacco su vasta scala contro centrali elettriche, infrastrutture petrolifere, obiettivi militari e impianti nucleari iraniani. Teheran ha ripetutamente avvertito che qualsiasi attacco, congiunto o separato, da parte degli Stati Uniti e di Israele, sarà considerato una «Totalen Krieg», una guerra totale, e la risposta supererà ogni limite o moderazione.

I servizi segreti interni iraniani sono interamente concentrati su uno scenario di bombardamenti su larga scala che si verificherà prima di martedì prossimo, giorno delle elezioni nel «culto della morte».

Qualunque cosa accada, la risposta di Teheran garantirà che il prezzo da pagare sia ben oltre ogni limite. Per quanto riguarda Israele, l’Iran sferrerà un contrattacco contro entrambe le raffinerie israeliane; i porti di Haifa e Ashdod; tutte le basi aeree; e Dimona sarà aggiunta solo se i siti nucleari iraniani dovessero essere colpiti.

In caso di attacco da parte degli Stati Uniti, qualsiasi monarchia petrolifera del Golfo che ospiti un punto di lancio diventerà immediatamente un bersaglio legittimo, comprese le reti elettriche, gli impianti di desalinizzazione, le raffinerie, i porti, i centri dati, i quartier generali e le installazioni delle aziende americane.

Lo Stretto di Hormuz verrebbe completamente chiuso. Il prezzo del barile di petrolio schizzerà alle stelle. L’economia globale entrerà in una Grande Depressione. Da un punto di vista imperiale, ciò sarebbe altrettanto desolante quanto il fatto che Washington lasci all’Iran la gestione dello Stretto di Ormuz e la riscossione dei diritti di transito: in realtà, la fine umiliante della talassocrazia unilaterale – con la Quinta Flotta degli Stati Uniti costretta a chiedere il permesso per entrare o uscire dalla propria base fatiscente in Bahrein.

Mohammad Mokhber, uno dei principali consiglieri della Guida Mojtaba Khamenei, ha sottolineato che «se gli Stati Uniti e Israele colpiranno le nostre infrastrutture petrolchimiche o le nostre centrali elettriche, l’Iran colpirà nove paesi».

Inoltre, l’agenzia di stampa Fars, molto vicina al Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Islamiche (IRGC), è venuta a conoscenza di una serie di nuove direttive: qualora gli attacchi comportassero l’assassinio di funzionari iraniani e l’uccisione di civili, la risposta iraniana includerà obiettivi politici associati agli Stati Uniti e a tutte le nazioni partecipanti alla guerra, oltre alle loro infrastrutture.

Lavrov e Araghchi rilanciano il RIC

In mezzo a tanto orrore, cerchiamo di sottolineare almeno una tendenza positiva. Durante la recente visita di Lavrov a Teheran, il ministro degli Esteri iraniano Araghchi è andato dritto al sodo:

«Mai nella nostra storia la Russia e l’Iran hanno collaborato così strettamente come ora».

Il concetto chiave è «mai nella nostra storia». Lavrov e Araghchi hanno discusso di «tutto, dall’Europa all’Asia occidentale». Ma in particolare di questi quattro temi: Libano, Palestina, Ucraina e Yemen. Per non parlare di tutto ciò che riguarda l’ampliamento della cooperazione economica e «nucleare».

Per cooperazione economica si intende in particolare l’INSTC – il Corridoio Internazionale di Trasporto Nord-Sud che collega tre partner dei BRICS e della SCO: Russia, Iran e India.

Si veda il mio documentario sull’INSTC girato in Iran lo scorso anno.

L’Impero del Caos fa affidamento su sanzioni, minacce e bombardamenti. L’integrazione eurasiatica si basa sulla costruzione di infrastrutture, sull’incremento degli scambi commerciali e sulla cooperazione sovrana. Pertanto, Lavrov e Araghchi hanno dovuto ancora una volta rilanciare il RIC: l’originario collegamento Russia/India/Cina, inizialmente concepito come «Triangolo di Primakov», ma ora con l’Iran al posto dell’India.

Lavrov ha proposto che il nuovo RIC istituisca una «struttura di sicurezza comune» nel Golfo Persico attraverso un vertice trilaterale. Ciò equivale a definire, nell’ambito del RIC, un quadro unificato per lo Stretto di Hormuz.

La risposta dell’Impero sarà un’ulteriore disorientazione. Poiché, ancora una volta, si tratta dell’«indivisibilità della sicurezza» – come quando la Russia l’ha proposta agli Stati Uniti e alla NATO nel dicembre 2021. Allora ciò fu accolto con una risposta che equivaleva a una mancata risposta.

Per quanto riguarda il Libano, la Palestina, l’Ucraina e lo Yemen, Lavrov e Araghchi erano in prima linea. Da un lato abbiamo l’Impero del Caos e i suoi alleati/vassalli, dall’altro la Russia e gli alleati dell’Iran.

È tutto interconnesso, naturalmente. Un arco imperiale di pressione militare si estende dall’Ucraina allo Yemen. La risposta ruota attorno a come coordinare la resistenza (corsivo mio) a tale pressione.

Per quanto riguarda la cooperazione economica, sia l’Iran che la Russia sono sottoposti a un vero e proprio tsunami di sanzioni. Le loro banche sono state espulse dal sistema SWIFT e le esportazioni di petrolio sono severamente limitate. Pertanto, il commercio tra i due Paesi deve aggirare il dollaro statunitense, l’intero sistema finanziario occidentale e la talassocrazia imposta dalla Marina degli Stati Uniti.

Il know-how necessario per aggirare le sanzioni è qualcosa che l’Iran e la Russia potrebbero condividere con l’intero Sud del mondo, attraverso pagamenti in valute locali, il baratto, i corridoi terrestri, l’INSTC e il commercio attraverso il Mar Caspio.

E questo ci riporta ancora una volta allo Stretto di Ormuz – che l’Iran controlla. Le petro-monarchie del Golfo stanno andando completamente nel panico. La Russia mantiene solidi canali di comunicazione sia con l’Iran che con il Golfo. Lavrov è in perfetta sintonia con tutti loro. Ha portato le preoccupazioni del Golfo a Teheran e, a sua volta, ha trasmesso le condizioni di Teheran al Golfo.

Lavrov ha sottolineato che il Memorandum d’intesa di Islamabad, più volte dichiarato «morto», è l’unica via da seguire. Esattamente ciò che Xi ha detto a Trump nello Studio Ovale. Esattamente ciò che la leadership iraniana ha detto ad Asim Munir a Teheran.

Ha inoltre sottolineato che le petro-monarchie del Golfo Persico devono darsi una regolata e avviare un serio dialogo sulla sicurezza con l’Iran e le nazioni arabe, compresi i paesi confinanti come l’Iraq e la Giordania, coinvolgendo la Lega Araba, l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione Islamica (OIC) e i membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite.

Ancora una volta: l’indivisibilità della sicurezza.

L’Iran e la Russia, entrambi sottoposti a sanzioni fino all’oblio, sono infatti in sintonia come mai prima d’ora, coordinando ogni cosa su un fronte comune – mentre il disperato «Sindacato di Epstein» rimane intrappolato nel proprio incubo di una «guerra eterna» da lui stesso architettato.