© Marko Djurica/Reuters
The parliamentary election of 25 October represents more than the rejection of an increasingly centralised political leadership. It raises a fundamental question about the Serbian state: whether the institutions shaped by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can function independently of the political organisation that controlled them.
According to preliminary figures released by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List secured 52.54 per cent of the vote against 39.29 per cent for Vučić’s United Serbia coalition, with 8,077 of 8,392 polling stations counted. Projections give the students approximately 140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, enough to govern without coalition partners.
Vučić had resigned from the presidency in September, hoping to return to power as prime minister. Instead, the election deprived him of the parliamentary majority necessary to complete that manoeuvre. His concession has substantially reduced the immediate prospect of a disputed transfer of power, although the election results still require formal certification.
But losing an election and losing control of a political system are not necessarily the same thing.
Vučić’s political career provides important context for understanding the significance of his defeat.
He entered politics through the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, and served as information minister in Slobodan Milošević’s government from 1998. During that period, Serbian authorities employed restrictive media legislation against independent newspapers and broadcasters, imposing substantial financial penalties and limiting critical reporting.
After Milošević’s removal in 2000, Vučić remained politically active. His subsequent association with the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in 2008 following a split within the Radical Party, allowed him to reposition himself as a politician promising economic modernisation and European integration.
This transformation proved remarkably successful.
The SNS came to power in 2012, and Vučić subsequently served as prime minister and president. Serbia attracted foreign investment, undertook major infrastructure projects and maintained its formal ambition of joining the European Union. At the same time, political authority became increasingly concentrated around Vučić and his associates.
The distinction between Serbia under Milošević and Serbia under Vučić should not be overlooked. The former governed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and pursued policies that brought international isolation. The latter operated through electoral institutions, international economic partnerships and a declared European orientation.
Nevertheless, Vučić’s political career illustrates a continuity in personnel and political methods that Serbia’s post-2000 democratic transition never entirely resolved.
The OSCE’s assessment of Serbia’s 2023 parliamentary elections documented advantages enjoyed by the governing party, political pressure on public employees, media bias and the misuse of state resources. These findings demonstrated how electoral competition could continue while the conditions under which parties competed became increasingly unequal.
The Student List has now broken that pattern at the ballot box. Whether it can prevent its reconstruction remains uncertain.
The immediate origins of the political upheaval lie in the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people.
The disaster became a symbol of wider concerns about public procurement, construction oversight and political accountability. Demonstrations demanding responsibility subsequently developed into a nationwide movement challenging the government’s legitimacy.
As EU Today previously examined, the protests exposed a deeper conflict between Serbian society and institutions widely perceived by demonstrators as serving political interests rather than the public.
Unlike established opposition parties, the student movement did not depend on a familiar political leader or traditional party machinery. It mobilised university communities, academics, professionals and citizens who had previously remained outside organised political activity.
Its central demand was institutional accountability rather than a comprehensive ideological programme.
That distinction was crucial. By concentrating on corruption, democratic standards and the functioning of the state, the movement attracted voters with differing views on nationalism, foreign policy and European integration.
However, the same diversity that helped it win the election could complicate governing. Its candidates must now agree on economic priorities, ministerial appointments, foreign relations and the extent of institutional reform.
A protest movement can unite around opposition to a political leader. A government must reach agreement on decisions that inevitably divide its supporters.
One of the most important consequences of the election concerns Serbia’s relationship with Moscow.
Throughout his presidency, Vučić cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining productive relations with Brussels, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously.
Serbia continued its EU accession negotiations and benefited substantially from European investment and trade. Yet Belgrade consistently refused to join the principal European sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The contradiction was particularly striking because Serbia’s economic relationship with the EU vastly outweighs its trade with Russia.
The European Commission’s assessment found that the EU accounted for 58.3 per cent of Serbia’s total trade in 2024. European markets, investment and regulatory structures have therefore become fundamental to the Serbian economy.
Vučić nevertheless preserved close political links with Moscow, benefiting domestically from nationalist sentiment and Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.
He also attempted to demonstrate that relations with Russia did not preclude cooperation with Ukraine.
In June 2025, Vučić travelled to Odesa for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Serbia provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but declined to sign the summit’s joint declaration. Its continuing refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow remained the most substantial distinction between Serbian policy and the EU position.
Yet a Student List government would not necessarily reverse that policy.
In September, the movement explicitly declared its opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia, referring to Serbia’s historical experience with international restrictive measures.
Vučić nevertheless predicted during his concession speech that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Moscow by March or April. He also attributed his defeat to interference by European governments and what he called the American “deep state”, supposedly opposed to President Donald Trump.
His prediction about sanctions was therefore inconsistent with the movement’s publicly stated position.
This exposes an important misconception about Serbia’s political transformation. Opposition to Vučić does not automatically translate into support for every element of EU foreign policy. Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, Kosovo and national sovereignty extend beyond the electorate traditionally associated with the SNS.
The new government may pursue closer integration with European institutions while retaining positions that Brussels considers incompatible with membership.
The challenge extends beyond diplomatic relationships.
Russia’s presence in Serbia includes strategic energy interests, notably its controlling shareholding in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which operates the country’s principal oil refinery.
American sanctions against the Russian-owned company have complicated its operations, while negotiations over the proposed acquisition of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL Group illustrate how energy security, foreign ownership and international sanctions have become interconnected.
For an incoming administration, reducing such dependencies will require commercial negotiations, regulatory oversight and alternative energy supplies. Political declarations cannot achieve these objectives on their own.
Equally important will be the examination of public contracts and relationships between political officeholders and businesses that benefited from government decisions.
The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report identified persistent corruption concerns, insufficient transparency in major infrastructure procurement and weaknesses in institutional accountability.
Any investigation into alleged wrongdoing under Vučić must be independent, evidence-based and subject to judicial scrutiny. Allegations of corruption do not themselves establish criminal responsibility.
A government elected to restore the rule of law would undermine its own mandate if it replaced politically selective justice with prosecutions directed by a new political majority.
The central objective must be to ensure that prosecutors, courts and oversight bodies can investigate former as well as current officials without political interference.
For the European Union, the election provides an opportunity to reconsider its approach towards Belgrade.
For years, European institutions confronted a government that professed commitment to EU membership while resisting reforms considered essential to the accession process.
In July 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that Serbia’s negotiations should advance only when measurable improvements are achieved in the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Parliament also called for alignment with EU sanctions against Russia.
The Student List’s victory may improve the prospects for domestic institutional reform, but the disagreement over sanctions remains unresolved. Brussels cannot assume that a new Serbian government will satisfy every accession requirement simply because it defeated Vučić.
Nor should it overlook the political significance of the result.
The movement’s strongest mandate concerns the restoration of public accountability. Supporting independent institutions, transparent procurement and genuinely competitive elections would address both Serbian public demands and longstanding EU concerns.
There is also the unresolved question of Kosovo. A change of government in Belgrade does not remove the political and constitutional difficulties surrounding relations with Pristina. The new leadership will inherit negotiations that have repeatedly stalled under previous administrations.
The EU will therefore need to distinguish between areas where rapid progress is possible and disputes that require more sustained diplomacy.
Serbia has removed one of the central figures of its post-Yugoslav political order from government. It has not yet demonstrated that the system surrounding him can be dismantled through constitutional means.
The immediate tasks are substantial: forming an effective cabinet, protecting the independence of prosecutors, scrutinising public expenditure, reforming media regulation and ensuring that state institutions no longer operate as extensions of the governing party.
A separate presidential election must also follow Vučić’s September resignation, adding another important stage to the transition.
The greatest danger is not simply that the former governing party could eventually return to office. Electoral competition must allow that possibility in any democracy.
The more consequential danger is that the political methods associated with Vučić’s administration could survive under different leadership.
Serbia’s experience after Milošević demonstrated that removing a dominant political figure does not necessarily eliminate the structures, interests and habits of government accumulated during his rule.
The student movement has now been given an opportunity to confront that unfinished transition.
Its success will ultimately be measured not by the political fate of Aleksandar Vučić, but by whether Serbia develops institutions capable of investigating misconduct, restricting the arbitrary use of power and operating independently of whichever party wins the next election.
That would represent a more fundamental transformation than the defeat of any single political leader.
Serbia’s student-led opposition has secured a decisive parliamentary victory over Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling party, according to preliminary results, ending 14 years of political dominance by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and opening a new chapter in the country’s politics.
RELATED: Serbia’s Vucic Concedes Victory to Opposition Students Party
Vučić acknowledged the defeat on Sunday, saying initial projections indicated that the Student List would win between 135 and 140 seats, compared with about 105 for his party. The result follows nearly two years of student-led demonstrations against corruption and what protesters describe as growing authoritarianism.
The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a non-governmental organization, projected that the Student List would win 139 seats after 56% of ballots had been counted, against 104 for the SNS. Unofficial estimates from polling institute Ipsos put the student movement at 140 seats and Vučić’s party at 103, down 26 seats from the 2023 parliamentary election, when it secured an absolute majority.
The setback was compounded by the failure of the Socialist Party, a longtime ally of Vučić, to clear the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation. The party previously held 18 seats. Preliminary estimates also gave three seats to Serbia’s Hungarian minority party and two to the Albanian minority list.
Turnout approached 70%, the highest since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 and close to the record set in the 2000 parliamentary election.
The student movement grew out of protests that began in 2024, after 16 people died when a canopy collapsed at a railway station in Novi Sad. The disaster prompted mass demonstrations across Serbia, with protesters demanding accountability over the collapse and the construction work carried out by a Chinese company following a tendering process criticized for its lack of transparency.
Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, turning the demonstrations into a broader challenge to corruption and the concentration of political power. The student movement emerged as a nationwide opposition force and sustained pressure on Vučić’s government for nearly two years.
Vučić, who had led the country for 14 years, resigned as head of state in September to run for prime minister.
The preliminary results sparked celebrations across Belgrade, where thousands gathered to dance, chant slogans and set off flares and fireworks. Crowds shouted “Victory” and “Vučić is leaving” as people embraced and wept with joy.
Slavija Square, a focal point of the mass protests against the government, filled with supporters of the student movement. At Pioneers Park, between parliament and the presidential palace, hundreds of people tore down the fence surrounding the grounds and entered the public space.
The park had been closed to the public for months and periodically occupied by groups of masked Vučić supporters, who were accused of being used as a force to confront government opponents.
The celebrations underscored the scale of the political shift after more than a decade of SNS rule. Vučić had weathered previous opposition challenges, but the student movement turned sustained street protests into an electoral campaign that defeated his party.
The Student List has presented itself as an alternative to Vučić’s centralized model of leadership. It operates through a horizontal structure and has avoided putting forward a single public face, arguing that political decisions should be made from the bottom up rather than imposed from above.
Its slate of 250 candidates includes university professors, actors and farmers, many of them little known to the wider public.
Radomir Sajcic, a University of Belgrade professor representing the movement, celebrated the result at its headquarters. “Dear Serbia, tonight the voice of the people can be heard,” he declared. “Tonight we celebrate victory; tomorrow we will build the future.”
Sajcic also described the outcome as “a victory of courage over fear, a victory of hope over indifference, a victory of faith that Serbia can and must be different.”
The movement’s platform calls for restoring the separation of powers and the autonomy of the prosecutor general’s office, as well as increasing investment in health care and education. It also pledges to tackle corruption and individual privileges to boost public revenue, while promoting technological modernization across the economy, including agriculture.
Serbia’s score in Transparency International’s corruption index has deteriorated during Vučić’s tenure. The European Union has also raised concerns about the country’s declining adherence to the rule of law.
European institutions have welcomed the student movement’s victory, describing it as an opportunity to advance democratic reforms, strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen congratulated the students and offered support for reforms and greater press freedom. Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset highlighted Vučić’s acceptance of the results and his commitment to a peaceful democratic transition.
Today, the people of Serbia turned out in record numbers to shape their country’s future.
— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) October 25, 2026
Congratulations to the Student List on its victory in the parliamentary elections.
We stand ready to support reforms on the rule of law, media freedom, the fight against corruption and…
Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić and Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar also congratulated the winners and expressed their willingness to cooperate with them.
The election could also affect Serbia’s relations with the European Union and Russia. Under Vučić, the country has pursued EU membership while maintaining close ties with the Kremlin. Serbia has been an official candidate for EU accession since 2012.
Before the vote, EU foreign policy spokesperson Christian Wigand said the bloc would monitor the election closely and stressed the need for a free, fair and transparent process.
The Student List has offered fewer details about its international priorities than about its domestic reform agenda. Available indications suggest it may maintain Serbia’s EU candidacy while continuing to oppose sanctions against Russia, although the movement has yet to clearly outline its foreign policy plans.
The student movement’s victory marks a major political turning point for Serbia after 14 years of Vučić’s dominance. Its ability to convert demands for accountability and institutional reform into a parliamentary majority has reshaped the country’s political landscape, but the incoming government’s approach to domestic reform and foreign relations remains uncertain.
The election comes amid growing allegations of political intimidation, surveillance and restrictions on independent journalism. International observers have expressed concern about the conditions under which the campaign is taking place, while opinion polls suggest that the opposition Student List could challenge Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
Vučić, who resigned from the presidency to seek the prime minister’s office, has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade. His attempt to retain power through a different constitutional position comes at a time when Serbia’s relationship with the European Union has deteriorated over judicial independence, media freedom and its continuing ties with Russia.
The opposition movement developed following the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people.
The disaster triggered demonstrations demanding accountability for alleged corruption, failures in public procurement and inadequate construction oversight. What began as a student protest subsequently developed into a nationwide political movement.
As EU Today previously reported, the demonstrations exposed mounting dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of public institutions and corruption allegations.
The Student List, formally registered for Sunday’s election, has brought together academics, professionals and activists who argue that Serbia requires fundamental changes to public administration and political accountability.
Unlike conventional opposition parties, the movement has developed without a single dominant political leader. Its organisers have sought to mobilise voters who previously abstained from elections, including younger citizens dissatisfied with the established political parties.
The movement is fielding 250 candidates and has emerged as the principal electoral challenger to the SNS.
The closing stages of the campaign have been overshadowed by allegations involving Serbian police, intelligence services and political supporters.
A Reuters investigation published on 22nd October documented accounts from activists and journalists describing intimidation, physical attacks and alleged misuse of surveillance technology.
The investigation cited the SHARE Foundation, a Serbian digital rights organisation, which reported that at least 14 individuals had been targeted with advanced spyware.
Independent cybersecurity researchers have also examined alleged attempts to compromise the devices of political activists and opposition figures.
Serbian authorities have denied accusations of systematic political repression and rejected allegations that state agencies conducted unlawful surveillance.
Concerns about media freedom have nevertheless intensified. Reporters Without Borders ranked Serbia 104th among 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting a deterioration in the environment for independent journalism.
The ruling party maintains that it remains committed to democratic institutions and Serbia’s European integration.
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has deployed an election observation mission to monitor campaigning, electoral administration and voting procedures.
Its mission includes 14 core experts and 30 long-term observers, with additional short-term observers requested for election day.
A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is also observing the election alongside representatives of the European Parliament and other international institutions.
Earlier this month, the Council of Europe’s pre-electoral delegation described the campaign environment as highly polarised and called for electoral rights to be respected.
The findings of international observers will become particularly important if the result is close or either side disputes the count.
Preliminary assessments are expected on 26th October.
The election could influence Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union, which have made limited progress despite Belgrade’s formal commitment to membership.
Brussels has repeatedly raised concerns about judicial independence, the treatment of journalists, corruption and Serbia’s alignment with European foreign policy.
As EU Today examined in July, the failure to advance accession negotiations reflects disagreements extending beyond individual judicial reforms.
Serbia has maintained close economic and political relationships with Russia and China while continuing to seek access to European markets and investment.
A victory for the Student List could create an opportunity to reconsider the country’s approach to EU integration, although its candidates would still face the difficulties of governing a politically divided country.
A victory for Vučić would preserve much of Serbia’s existing political leadership, but the scale of the opposition challenge suggests that domestic pressure for institutional reform would continue.
Much will depend on turnout, the distribution of parliamentary seats and whether the results are accepted as legitimate.
For Brussels, Sunday’s election will be an immediate test of its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and its ability to reconcile strategic interests with the democratic requirements attached to EU membership.
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