Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

Overnight, Russian forces launched 126 drones, 61 of which were jet-powered, while Ukraine's air defense managed to suppress 101 drones, including 50 jet-powered drones, the Air Force said.

Russia’s Rubicon drone unit, which is sent to hunt Ukrainian drone pilots, was not used to being hunted itself, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi told journalists on 19 October. He was summing up Operation Vivaldi, which his Third Army Corps fought in northern Donetsk Oblast from May to mid-October. Once its pilots realized they were being killed, Rubicon’s morale dropped sharply, he said.

Russia has fought for 12 years to take all of Donetsk Oblast, and Sloviansk and Kramatorsk anchor the fortress belt of cities Ukraine still holds there. Vivaldi retook 277 km² in northern Donetsk Oblast. Biletskyi says it destroyed Russia’s bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River and forced Moscow to drop its plan to bypass Lyman from the north and encircle the two cities. On that front, the Third Corps had flagged Rubicon, Russia’s elite drone unit, as a threat.

Hunting the hunters

Once a Rubicon position was found, the Third Assault Brigade and the KRAKEN drone regiment committed any number of FPV and bomber drones to destroy its crews, Biletskyi said.

The brigade’s commander, Yaroslav Levenets, said his troops prepared for Rubicon’s arrival and concentrated on killing its pilots. He gave no details.

“Not stable in defense,” Levenets said of Rubicon’s troops.

They dislike sitting in trenches, he said, and under pressure they grow nervous and change positions.

Named for four seasons

Biletskyi said the name was chosen at the very start of planning, in winter 2025–2026, many months before the operation began. The original plan had four stages, one for each season, and later grew to slightly more, ArmyInform reported.

When he first unveiled the operation in September, he put it this way:

“Vivaldi, as is known, has four seasons. And this is only the first one.”

He credited two planners, known by the call signs Yurist and Leshyi. Leshyi, an assault soldier wounded seven times who later moved to staff work, was killed. Yurist was seriously wounded.

A new hand at the Third Corps

Major Dmytro Rohoziuk is now acting commander of the Third Army Corps, the corps press service said on 20 October. The press service said the move is not a transfer, and Biletskyi keeps his formal post as corps commander while he leads the “Center” grouping of the Third, 11th, and 19th corps.

Rohoziuk took over the 60th Mechanized Brigade in October 2025. Its previous commander was arrested in January after the State Bureau of Investigation accused him of embezzling about $1 million in weapons procurement. The brigade fought in all four phases of Vivaldi and retook Kolodiazi without street fighting.

Biletskyi also declined command of the Ground Forces, which oversee mobilization.

“There’s no point taking on something you don’t truly believe you can improve,” he said.

Biletskyi’s count

Russian losses in Vivaldi topped 8,000 troops, and about 270 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner, Biletskyi said. More than 20 officers surrendered, including a chief of staff and three company commanders.

The territory matters less than disrupting Russia’s strategic plan, he said. Russian forces still press toward Dobropillia, where Ukraine is counterattacking.

Russia has kept striking Ukraine’s energy sector throughout the week since US President Donald Trump announced an energy ceasefire, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 18 October. From overnight into Sunday, Russian drones and a ballistic missile hit substations, homes, and industrial sites from Odesa to Volyn. They killed civilians and left tens of thousands of families without power.

Russia fights along the front line while hitting cities and the grid behind it with drones, missiles, and glide bombs. Ukraine says Moscow plans up to 1,000 such munitions against 60 key infrastructure sites this winter, and jet-powered drones partly free it to concentrate missiles on fewer targets, the Institute for the Study of War assessed. With Graham Act penalties on hold and US sanctions on Russian diesel suspended, Russia faces no new US cost for its strikes on Ukraine’s grid. Protecting and restoring the grid falls to Ukraine’s air defenses and repair crews.

Russia hit energy sites 76 times in a week

Zelenskyy counted 76 deliberate Russian strikes on energy and oil-and-gas facilities since Trump’s announcement. Overnight, Russia hit substations in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Odesa oblasts, he said. In the past week, Russia fired almost 2,700 attack drones, 1,700 aerial bombs, and 66 missiles, most of them ballistic, mainly to cause a blackout. His message was aimed at Washington.

“America must see that Russia is not taking steps in return for the lifting of sanctions or deals. On the contrary, they take every signal that they can make money as proof that their bet on war is working and they can keep fighting,” Zelenskyy wrote.

Overnight, Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 180 Shahed-type drones, 26 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 152 drones, but strikes hit 20 locations.

Power cuts from Odesa to Ternopil

Strikes left about 24,000 consumers in Odesa Oblast without power, oblast head Oleh Kiper said. In Vinnytsia Oblast, the attack damaged critical infrastructure and forced emergency outages, oblast head Natalia Zabolotna wrote. Drones hit three energy facilities in Ternopil Oblast, one of them for the second time, and cut power to some consumers, oblast head Taras Pastukh said.

Civilians killed and injured

A Russian strike on Zaporizhzhia killed a 27-year-old woman and injured two others, including a 16-year-old, the State Emergency Service reported. In Poltava, an evening attack killed one person, injured four, and damaged 10 detached houses, city council secretary Kateryna Yamshchykova said.

A drone hit a high-rise in Odesa and set its roof on fire. A 13-year-old girl was hurt, city military administration head Serhii Lysak said, and Kiper put the number of injured at two.

In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russian drones and artillery injured three people, oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha said. In Donetsk Oblast, Russian attacks killed seven civilians on Saturday, six of them in Sloviansk, oblast head Vadym Filashkin reported.

Fires in the west, alerts across the border

A morning drone strike set warehouse and production buildings ablaze at an enterprise in Manevychi, Volyn Oblast, oblast head Roman Romaniuk said. With heavy smoke blowing toward the town, Romaniuk urged residents to stay indoors, shut windows and doors, and switch off ventilation. A repeat strike set an enterprise in the district on fire again, the State Emergency Service said, adding that air tests found no dangerous concentrations outside the site. In Lviv Oblast, drone debris damaged a logistics warehouse and two houses, oblast head Maksym Kozytskyi said.

Polish military aircraft operated in Poland’s airspace twice during the attack, as the Government Security Centre warned residents of Lublin Voivodeship and later alerted Subcarpathian Voivodeship. In Lithuania, NATO jets failed to identify an object that apparently entered from Poland, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said.

A ceasefire Moscow never confirmed

Trump announced the energy ceasefire on 11 October, news that surprised Zelenskyy. A White House official said Russia was still weighing it. Hours later, Russia hit a Kharkiv power plant, and on 14 October it fired 39 ballistic missiles at the grid. Then Trump waived Graham Act penalties on buyers of Russian oil, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration wants 60 days to weigh the economic effects.

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) detained two men suspected of scouting targets for Russian strikes on Sloviansk and Dnipro, the agency reported on 14 October. Catching both early let it secure Ukrainian reserve command posts and the gas stations the alleged agents had been hunting, the agency added.

Sloviansk anchors the northern end of the Fortress Belt, the chain of fortified cities that has held Ukraine’s defense of Donetsk Oblast since 2014. Russia is pushing to seize them, and its aircraft bombed a residential area of Sloviansk on 11 October. Where Ukrainian convoys stop and troops gather is exactly what Russian handlers allegedly asked these suspects to supply.

A gas station worker suspected of filming convoys

The first suspect worked at a gas station complex in Sloviansk, Donetsk Oblast. Russian intelligence allegedly reached him through a former classmate who left for Russia after the full-scale invasion and now works for its special services, the SBU said. He then allegedly used his phone to secretly film Ukrainian army convoys at or near gas stations. He was allegedly supposed to send the photos and videos to Russia to help it prepare a targeted strike. He also allegedly drove his own car around other gas stations and bridges that the Defense Forces use for logistics.

Spotted through Telegram comments

The second suspect, a former Pokrovsk resident, moved to Dnipro in 2024 and settled in a dormitory. Russian intelligence noticed him through pro-Kremlin comments he posted in Telegram chats, investigators say. A female handler in Russia allegedly tasked him with guiding missile and drone attacks on places in the city where Ukrainian troops and equipment were concentrated. He allegedly scouted on foot or took public transport to reach outlying districts.

Officers seized computers and smartphones containing evidence of the men’s alleged work for Russia. Both are suspected of treason under martial law and of unauthorized dissemination of information on Ukrainian troop movements or deployment, under Articles 111(2) and 114-2(2) of the Criminal Code. They remain in custody without bail and face up to life imprisonment with confiscation of property. The SBU’s office for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts ran the operation under the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office.