Ukraine’s energy strategy is built for Russia’s attacks but not global shocks





There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.
The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.
This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.
It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?
The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.
According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.
The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.
Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.
However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.
Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.
Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.
The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.
Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.
Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.
The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.
In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.
The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.
Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.
Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.
The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.
That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.
Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.
Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.
In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.
His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.
For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.
If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.
The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.
The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.
Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.
In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.
Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.
As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.
Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.
There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.
In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.
In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.
This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.
One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.
After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.
The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.
Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.
Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.
There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.
The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.
There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.
An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.
For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.
Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.
Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.
Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.
Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.
These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.
A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.
The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.
An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.
Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.
Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.
Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.
For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.
It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.
Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.
The distinction matters.
Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.
That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.
The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.
It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.


Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.
The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.
Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.
“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.
Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.
Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.
Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.
The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.
According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.
The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.
Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.
Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.
American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.
According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.
Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.
The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.
The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.
As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.
The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.
According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.
He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.
These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.
Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.
The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.
Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.
For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.
The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.
With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.








The missile landed between the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO World Heritage site, and the Holy Presentation (Sviato-Vvedenskyi) Monastery. Monastery buildings, homes, shops, cafés and other civilian infrastructure sustained damage in the surrounding area.
Zelenskyy disclosed that Russian forces had used three cluster-equipped ballistic missiles during the assault. Ukrainian authorities described weapons designed to explode in the air as they approach their targets, distributing explosive submunitions over an area approximately 400 metres in diameter.
After receiving reports from officials overseeing emergency operations across Ukraine, the president accused Moscow of deliberately choosing a weapon capable of inflicting extensive civilian casualties in a densely populated district.
“This was a deliberate choice of weapon and area of deployment,” Zelenskyy said.
He maintained that there were no military installations in the vicinity and that the attack had been intended to inflict maximum damage on civilians and their property.
Pecherskyi is one of Kyiv’s oldest districts, containing religious institutions and architectural monuments associated with centuries of Ukrainian history.
Among them is the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, established in the 11th century and subsequently developed into an important centre of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
The complex includes historic churches, monasteries and an extensive system of underground caves. Together with Saint Sophia Cathedral and its related buildings, it forms part of a UNESCO World Heritage property that has appeared on the List of World Heritage in Danger since 2023.
Thursday’s explosion occurred in the area separating the Lavra from the Holy Presentation Monastery. Ukrainian authorities identified damage to buildings belonging to the latter, alongside neighbouring residential and commercial premises. Assessments of the destruction across the historic district were continuing.
This was not the first occasion in 2026 on which Russian weapons had damaged the area’s religious heritage.
On 15 June, a Russian drone struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra complex, causing severe damage to the Dormition Cathedral. Its roof and structural elements suffered extensive destruction, prompting UNESCO to undertake emergency stabilisation measures.
Ukraine’s Security Service subsequently published evidence identifying fragments of a Russian Geran-2 drone recovered from the site.
The October strike has again exposed the vulnerability of the capital’s historic religious buildings, as well as the civilian neighbourhoods surrounding them.
The reported choice of ammunition has particular implications for the investigation into the attack.
Whereas a conventional missile warhead delivers its explosive force around a principal impact point, cluster munitions release numerous smaller explosive devices capable of striking separate locations across a broad area.
In an urban environment, such weapons can cause casualties and destruction well beyond an intended target. Unexploded submunitions may remain dangerous after the initial attack, posing further risks to residents and emergency workers.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that deploying cluster munitions in populated areas creates a high likelihood of indiscriminate effects.
Under international humanitarian law, military operations must distinguish between civilian persons and objects and legitimate military targets. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
The reported deployment of cluster warheads in central Kyiv therefore raises questions about whether those requirements were observed. Zelenskyy’s account of the three missiles had not, at the time of reporting, been independently established through publicly available forensic evidence.
The Pecherskyi explosion was one incident in a much larger attack on the Ukrainian capital.
According to Zelenskyy, Russia launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in three successive waves overnight. Ukrainian authorities reported at least two people killed and more than 30 wounded, with strikes damaging apartment buildings, commercial premises, transport infrastructure and energy facilities.
The bombardment took place shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin met US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October.
During their discussions, Putin indicated that Russia was prepared in principle to resume negotiations with Ukraine and the United States, potentially in November. However, no confirmed timetable emerged.
Witkoff’s visit followed consultations in Norway between American, Ukrainian and European representatives over possible arrangements to end the war.
The renewed diplomatic activity has done little to resolve the underlying disagreements. As EU Today has previously examined, Moscow continues to advance territorial demands while the parties remain divided over Ukraine’s future security guarantees.
Meanwhile, Kyiv faces an immediate requirement for additional air-defence ammunition.
Zelenskyy has repeatedly appealed for more Patriot interceptor missiles capable of engaging ballistic targets. Difficulties surrounding American military assistance and intelligence cooperation have increased tensions between Washington and Kyiv at a time when Russia is intensifying attacks against Ukrainian cities.
The latest strike also presents Ukrainian investigators with the task of establishing whether the reported use of cluster munitions against a historic civilian district constituted an unlawful attack.
For Zelenskyy, the bombardment following Putin’s latest diplomatic discussions demonstrates that Moscow’s military conduct remains unchanged. He has argued that Russia’s actions provide no evidence of a genuine intention to bring the war to an end.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed on Thursday morning that at least two people had been killed and 34 injured, including five children, in Russian attacks affecting 12 Ukrainian regions. The capital sustained extensive damage, with strikes reported against railway and metro infrastructure, shopping centres, industrial premises and a monastery.
The bombardment followed a three-hour meeting between Witkoff and Putin on Wednesday, during which the Russian president indicated his willingness to resume trilateral negotiations involving Moscow, Washington and Kyiv. The Russian attacks continued despite the diplomatic initiative, prompting Zelenskyy to call for renewed international pressure on the Kremlin.
In a statement published on Telegram, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched three waves of ballistic missiles against the Ukrainian capital, causing numerous direct hits and widespread destruction.
The Ukrainian president referred sarcastically to Russia’s supposed humanitarian intentions, an apparent reference to Witkoff’s description of Putin as a humanitarian during their meeting the previous day.
Emergency services were deployed across several districts of Kyiv, where residential and commercial buildings suffered damage. Part of the capital’s metro infrastructure on the Southern Bridge was affected, disrupting traffic, while a strike on an ambulance station in the Pecherskyi district damaged six emergency vehicles. No medical personnel were injured at that location.
According to Ukrainian military and emergency service reports, the overnight assault also involved 210 attack drones and several types of missiles, including Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Oniks weapons.
By Thursday morning, Ukrainian air defences had intercepted or suppressed 181 drones. Russian weapons struck 32 locations, while debris from intercepted drones fell at eight others.
The assault followed several consecutive days of Russian attacks against Kyiv, including earlier strikes on hospitals, residential buildings and the capital’s transport network.
The timing of the latest bombardment placed renewed scrutiny on Washington’s diplomatic engagement with Moscow.
On 21 October, Witkoff met Putin at the Konstantin Palace in St Petersburg, accompanied by Russian officials, including Kirill Dmitriev, the Kremlin’s representative for international economic cooperation. The discussions lasted approximately three hours.
The meeting followed talks in Oslo on 20 October, where Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Zelenskyy alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.
Following the St Petersburg meeting, Witkoff described the discussions as constructive and indicated that negotiations would continue at the technical level between representatives of the United States, Russia and Ukraine.
Putin reportedly expressed agreement in principle to restarting trilateral negotiations, potentially during the first half of November. However, no agreement on a ceasefire or suspension of Russian attacks was announced.
The meeting also attracted controversy after Witkoff praised Putin as a humanitarian following the release of Stephen Hubbard, a 74-year-old American citizen who had been detained in Russia for more than four years.
The remarks prompted criticism from Republican lawmakers in Washington, who questioned the characterisation of the Russian president while Moscow continued its military campaign against Ukraine.
Zelenskyy characterised the overnight missile attack as evidence that Russia’s participation in negotiations had not produced any substantive change in its conduct.
He argued that diplomatic efforts to end the war should continue but must be accompanied by measures capable of altering Moscow’s military calculations.
Those measures, according to the Ukrainian president, include stronger air defence capabilities, faster deliveries of interceptor missiles, the ability to destroy Russian ballistic missile launchers and continued economic sanctions.
The latest attacks also place Ukraine’s air defence requirements firmly within the ongoing negotiations with Washington. Kyiv has repeatedly sought additional Patriot missiles and more reliable advance warning of Russian ballistic launches, particularly as repeated strikes place increasing demands on its interception capabilities.
For the Trump administration, the immediate question is whether Russia’s stated willingness to negotiate can produce verifiable commitments to reduce hostilities.
The Kremlin has offered the prospect of further talks without announcing a halt to its offensive operations. Kyiv, meanwhile, continues to face missile and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure even as discussions concerning a possible settlement proceed.
The events of 21–22 October leave Washington’s diplomatic initiative moving forward against the background of an expanding Russian aerial campaign, with no indication that Moscow intends to suspend its attacks while negotiations continue.
The latest negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have produced a renewed diplomatic initiative, with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff preparing to travel to St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October, following consultations with Ukrainian and European leaders in Oslo.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Witkoff alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Tuesday. Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, participated remotely. The discussions covered territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions and proposals for a partial ceasefire.
The meeting concluded with cautious expressions of optimism. Stubb suggested that the negotiating process was back on track, while Støre confirmed that Witkoff would present proposals developed by American, Ukrainian and European representatives to the Russian leadership.
However, the diplomatic improvement contrasts with Trump’s renewed public pressure on Zelenskyy, raising questions about Washington’s negotiating strategy and whether Moscow has any intention of accepting the proposed settlement.
Speaking in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Trump again insisted that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia, portraying Moscow’s military position as increasingly advantageous.
His remarks closely resembled arguments advanced during earlier disputes with Zelenskyy, when Washington pressed Kyiv to accept territorial concessions rather than increase pressure on the Kremlin.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure the Ukrainian leadership that American military cooperation had not been deliberately restricted.
Rubio denied that Trump had ordered changes to intelligence-sharing or weapons assistance. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed that Ukraine was again receiving American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic missile attacks.
Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Ukraine has reported delays in deliveries of American-made Patriot interceptors purchased by European allies, while restrictions affecting the military Starshield satellite communications system have not been fully resolved.
These difficulties are particularly serious as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, attempting to undermine civilian services ahead of winter.
The conflicting signals leave Kyiv negotiating with an administration whose diplomatic representatives promise continued cooperation while its president publicly demands Ukrainian concessions.
Among the proposals discussed in Oslo were security arrangements intended to provide Ukraine with protection comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence provision.
Zelenskyy acknowledged that American representatives had discussed such guarantees, although their precise obligations and enforcement mechanisms remain undisclosed.
The proposal presents a fundamental negotiating problem.
Russia has consistently opposed Ukrainian NATO membership, partly because the alliance’s collective-defence commitments would increase the consequences of any renewed Russian aggression.
An alternative arrangement offering genuinely comparable protection would consequently encounter many of the same Russian objections.
Conversely, guarantees lacking a credible enforcement mechanism would leave Ukraine exposed to another attack after a ceasefire.
Moscow’s record provides little reassurance. Russia violated Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 despite previous commitments to respect Ukrainian sovereignty.
Washington’s approach appears increasingly concentrated on securing an agreement involving territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements.
Yet Putin’s objectives have consistently extended beyond the territories occupied by Russian forces.
The Kremlin has demanded constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities, international alliances and strategic independence. Accepting territorial gains alone would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s wider political ambitions.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has maintained that Moscow is unwilling to make substantial political concessions, while the Kremlin continues to insist that any agreement must address what it describes as the underlying causes of the conflict.
Those conditions have previously included demands that would substantially restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Consequently, even a Ukrainian willingness to consider elements of Washington’s proposals would not guarantee Russian acceptance.
One possibility under consideration is a limited ceasefire protecting energy and potentially food-related infrastructure.
Zelenskyy has indicated that Ukraine could suspend attacks against Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian infrastructure.
Such an arrangement could reduce immediate civilian suffering. It would also have military and economic consequences.
Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, oil terminals and other energy installations have increasingly targeted infrastructure supporting Moscow’s war economy.
A temporary suspension could allow Russia to repair damaged facilities, restore production and stabilise export revenues. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, Moscow could exploit a limited agreement while leaving the wider conflict unresolved.
Trump has additional reasons to seek a rapid diplomatic result. With American congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, his administration is attempting to contain domestic fuel prices and demonstrate progress towards ending the war.
His recent decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports has already provoked concern in Kyiv and European capitals over the potential financial benefits to Moscow.
The danger for Ukraine is that an agreement presented as a diplomatic achievement in Washington could provide Russia with economic relief without altering its military objectives.
Witkoff’s visit to St Petersburg will establish whether Moscow is prepared to engage with the proposals developed in Oslo.
Putin could accept a temporary arrangement, particularly one suspending Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while postponing discussions over territorial and political questions.
Alternatively, Moscow could reject the initiative and maintain its existing demands.
In either case, Washington will face a decision over the consequences of Russian intransigence.
For Kyiv, continued engagement with the United States remains essential because American intelligence, satellite communications and advanced air-defence weapons cannot readily be replaced.
But the prospects for a negotiated settlement will depend less on further Ukrainian concessions than on whether Russia faces sufficient political, military and economic pressure to abandon its maximalist demands.
The Oslo negotiations have restored cooperation between Ukraine, Europe and American mediators. They have not established that Putin is prepared to end the war on terms compatible with Ukraine’s continued independence.
Germany’s Bundestag has formally recognised the country’s particular historical responsibility towards Ukraine for atrocities committed during the Nazi occupation, adopting parliamentary resolutions commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre near Kyiv.
The decision, taken on 9 October, has implications beyond historical remembrance. For decades, Germany’s responsibility for the destruction inflicted on the Soviet Union during the Second World War was frequently interpreted through its relationship with Russia. Moscow occupied a privileged position in German efforts at reconciliation, although some of the Nazi occupation’s worst atrocities took place in territories belonging to present-day Ukraine and Belarus.
The Bundestag’s parliamentary debate and resolutions reflect a different emphasis. Germany’s historical obligations are now being connected explicitly to Ukraine’s sovereignty and its defence against Russia’s invasion, challenging an interpretation of the past that had long influenced Berlin’s approach towards Moscow.
Following German reunification, reconciliation with Russia became a central element of Berlin’s eastern policy. The Soviet Union’s immense wartime losses, officially estimated at approximately 27 million people, were frequently invoked to explain Germany’s special obligation to maintain constructive relations with Moscow.
That historical argument became intertwined with political and economic considerations, contributing to the belief that Russia should remain closely integrated into Europe’s security and economic arrangements, even as relations with its neighbours deteriorated.
The difficulty lay in the frequent conflation of Russia with the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany invaded a multinational state, not the present-day Russian Federation. Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Jews and numerous other peoples suffered under an occupation whose policies included mass murder, starvation, deportation and the systematic destruction of communities.
Ukraine was among the principal territories where the German war of annihilation unfolded. The Holocaust by bullets, the destruction of entire settlements, the exploitation of occupied agricultural regions and the deportation of civilians for forced labour were central features of Nazi rule there.
Nevertheless, German political discourse often approached this history primarily through the framework of German-Russian reconciliation. The suffering of Ukraine and Belarus was acknowledged, but neither country occupied a comparable position in Berlin’s strategic thinking.
This imbalance has been examined by German scholars of foreign policy, who have argued that the historical justification for rapprochement with Russia sometimes obscured the distinct wartime experiences of other former Soviet republics.
The anniversary of Babyn Yar provides a particularly direct illustration of the historical problem.
On 29 and 30 September 1941, German SS and police units, with assistance from local collaborators, murdered 33,771 Jewish men, women and children in a ravine outside Kyiv. The massacre was among the largest single mass shootings of the Holocaust.
Killings continued at the site throughout the German occupation. Approximately 100,000 people were murdered there, including Jews, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and other civilians persecuted by the Nazi authorities.
Babyn Yar was not an isolated atrocity. Similar mass executions occurred across occupied Ukraine, while millions of people suffered under German military occupation. The country’s experience formed a substantial part of the wider catastrophe conventionally remembered in Germany as the war against the Soviet Union.
The geographical distinction matters because the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 did not transfer the historical experiences of its constituent peoples exclusively to Russia. Nor did Moscow’s position as the principal diplomatic successor to the USSR confer ownership of their wartime suffering.
Recognition of Ukraine’s separate experience therefore requires more than acknowledging the location of Nazi crimes. It involves reconsidering the political assumptions that allowed Russia to become Germany’s principal partner in commemorating a history shared by several nations.
In its resolution on the Babyn Yar anniversary, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU and its Social Democratic coalition partner explicitly connected remembrance of Nazi crimes with Germany’s present obligations towards Ukraine.
The document declares that responsibility for German atrocities does not end with commemorating their victims. It requires opposition to antisemitism, racism, historical revisionism and imperialist violence.
The parliamentary motion calls for continued political, economic, financial, humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine, together with support for its European integration and efforts to secure the return of children transferred to Russia.
The opposition Greens separately submitted a resolution centred on Germany’s historical responsibility towards Ukraine, advocating greater attention to the German occupation in historical education, research and cooperation between memorial institutions.
The development does not mean that Germany has only now recognised Ukrainian victims of Nazi persecution. German officials have previously acknowledged responsibility towards Ukraine alongside Russia and Belarus. In 2016, then foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier explicitly referred to the suffering of all three countries in an address marking the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
What has changed is the political weight attached to that recognition. The historical relationship with Moscow can no longer be treated as the principal expression of Germany’s obligations arising from the war, particularly when Russia is conducting a war of territorial conquest against another country devastated by Nazi aggression.
The reassessment also exposes a contradiction in Germany’s earlier Russia policy.
Historical responsibility was among the arguments used to defend engagement with Moscow, including economic cooperation and efforts to accommodate Russian security concerns. Such reasoning remained influential even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The Nord Stream pipeline projects exemplified the wider policy of maintaining substantial economic ties with Russia despite objections from Ukraine and several Central and Eastern European governments. Those projects had commercial and geopolitical motivations, but they developed within a political culture in which reconciliation with Moscow carried particular historical significance.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 fundamentally undermined that approach. Germany subsequently expanded military assistance to Ukraine, while President Steinmeier acknowledged serious errors in his previous assessment of relations with Moscow.
The Bundestag’s latest resolution adds a historical dimension to that policy correction. Rather than regarding restraint towards Russia as the principal lesson of Germany’s wartime conduct, parliament has articulated a responsibility to assist Ukraine in preserving its independence.
The two positions are not necessarily incompatible as matters of historical remembrance. Germany retains an obligation to commemorate Russian victims of Nazism, just as it does Ukrainian, Belarusian and other victims. The distinction concerns whether responsibility for past atrocities should influence contemporary policy towards the Russian state when that state itself is violating another nation’s sovereignty.
That question has become increasingly important as German political parties debate the duration and extent of military assistance to Kyiv. Calls for renewed accommodation with Moscow continue to feature in domestic politics, including among those opposed to further weapons deliveries.
The Bundestag’s recognition of Ukraine’s particular historical experience does not resolve those disputes or establish a new military commitment. It does, however, challenge one of the historical arguments that shaped Germany’s previous relationship with Russia.
The significance of the Babyn Yar anniversary therefore extends beyond the commemoration of crimes committed in 1941. It concerns a belated adjustment in Germany’s understanding of where its wartime responsibilities lie, and the extent to which those responsibilities should inform its conduct towards Ukraine today.