Brussels is considering unprecedented restrictions on the rights of future EU members, including the possible suspension of voting rights for serious breaches of European values. France and the Netherlands favour stronger safeguards, while Italy and Austria warn that excessive conditions could undermine enlargement.

European Union governments have begun negotiations over proposals that would allow Brussels to impose additional restrictions on future member states, exposing divisions over how to prevent democratic backsliding without discouraging countries seeking accession.

The discussions, held among EU ambassadors on 28 October, concern draft safeguards proposed by the European Commission for inclusion in future accession treaties.

Montenegro, currently the most advanced candidate in the Western Balkans, is expected to become the first country subject to the proposed arrangements.

The measures would potentially allow the EU to suspend certain membership rights, including voting rights, during a transitional period lasting up to 15 years after accession.

However, the negotiations have revealed disagreement not only over the duration of the safeguards but also over the powers that should be granted to the Commission and the legal thresholds for intervention.

The controversy raises a broader question about the nature of EU membership: whether countries that have completed accession negotiations should immediately enjoy the same institutional rights as existing members.

France and the Netherlands seek stronger guarantees

According to Euronews’ reporting on the ambassadors’ discussions, France and the Netherlands have pressed for stronger guarantees that newly admitted states will continue respecting the rule of law and other EU obligations.

Their position reflects concern that the Union’s existing procedures have proved difficult to enforce against governments accused of undermining judicial independence or democratic institutions.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union already provides for sanctions, including suspension of certain membership rights, where a serious breach of European values is established.

However, the procedure involves demanding political and voting requirements.

The Commission’s proposed safeguards are intended to provide an additional instrument specifically applicable to newly admitted members.

They would operate during a defined period after accession and could be activated in response to serious breaches of EU values or the principle of sincere cooperation.

For governments supporting the proposal, the objective is to ensure that reforms undertaken during accession negotiations remain effective after membership has been secured.

Italy and Austria warn against excessive restrictions

Not all member states share this approach.

Italy and Austria, among countries supporting faster integration of the Western Balkans, have warned against imposing conditions that could make EU membership appear provisional or unequal.

Their concern is that candidate countries may face an increasingly complicated accession process even after meeting the formal requirements.

The credibility of EU enlargement depends partly on the proposition that successful reforms will eventually lead to full membership.

If new members are subjected to extensive additional restrictions, political leaders in candidate countries could find it more difficult to justify the domestic compromises required by accession negotiations.

The debate is particularly sensitive in the Western Balkans, where prolonged delays have already generated frustration over the pace of integration.

The challenge for Brussels is to strengthen safeguards without creating a permanent distinction between established and newly admitted members.

A proposed 15-year period

The Commission’s draft institutional safeguard would remain available for 15 years following accession.

This period is intended to permit intervention if a new member reverses reforms after joining the Union.

Yet ambassadors have questioned whether such an extended period can reasonably be described as temporary.

The proposed decision-making mechanism has also attracted criticism.

Under the draft, the Commission could propose restrictive measures that would take effect unless a qualified majority of member states rejected or amended them within two weeks.

This would reverse the usual political dynamic by requiring governments to assemble a blocking majority rather than actively secure support for sanctions.

The proposal could therefore make intervention easier than under the existing Article 7 mechanism.

Critics are concerned that the arrangement would give the Commission excessive influence over the institutional rights of newly admitted countries.

Supporters argue that a more effective enforcement mechanism is necessary precisely because existing procedures have proved difficult to use.

Monitoring could begin before accession

The proposed safeguards are not confined to the period following membership.

The Commission also wants stronger monitoring between the signing of an accession treaty and the date on which a country formally joins.

This period can last several years, during which a candidate government may change and reform commitments may weaken.

Under the draft arrangements, monitoring could include regular assessments, reviews involving existing member states and formal warnings.

As a last resort, accession could be postponed if there were clear evidence that a candidate would not meet the required conditions.

The voting procedure for such a postponement remains unresolved.

These provisions would add another stage of oversight to an accession process that already requires extensive negotiations and the implementation of EU legislation.

Montenegro faces a new uncertainty

Montenegro began accession negotiations in June 2012.

According to the European Commission’s enlargement records, all 33 screened negotiating chapters have been opened and 16 provisionally closed.

Its progress has made the country a leading candidate for the next round of enlargement.

However, its accession treaty may now become the vehicle through which the EU establishes a new framework for future entrants.

The implications extend beyond Montenegro.

Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are also pursuing accession, although they are at different stages of the process.

Any safeguards introduced for Montenegro could influence the terms eventually offered to those countries.

Enlargement becomes a test of EU governance

The Commission’s proposals reflect a wider debate over whether the EU’s institutions can function effectively with substantially more members.

New entrants would participate in decisions concerning the budget, sanctions, foreign policy and the internal market.

Their admission could also affect areas where unanimity remains necessary, potentially increasing the risk of institutional deadlock.

The European Parliament’s research service has identified the proposed safeguards as part of a broader programme addressing decision-making and governance ahead of enlargement.

Negotiations over the draft clauses will continue at the technical level, with ambassadors expected to revisit the matter in November.

The central disagreement remains unresolved.

The EU wants future members to maintain democratic and legal standards, but it must also decide whether those guarantees can be enforced without creating a separate class of membership.

Montenegro’s accession negotiations will provide the first practical test of that approach.

Serbia has achieved something that appeared improbable only months ago. Aleksandar Vučić, who dominated the country’s political institutions for more than a decade, has acknowledged electoral defeat. A movement born from student demonstrations against corruption is now preparing to take power. Yet the most consequential struggle may only be beginning.

The parliamentary election of 25 October represents more than the rejection of an increasingly centralised political leadership. It raises a fundamental question about the Serbian state: whether the institutions shaped by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can function independently of the political organisation that controlled them.

According to preliminary figures released by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List secured 52.54 per cent of the vote against 39.29 per cent for Vučić’s United Serbia coalition, with 8,077 of 8,392 polling stations counted. Projections give the students approximately 140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, enough to govern without coalition partners.

Vučić had resigned from the presidency in September, hoping to return to power as prime minister. Instead, the election deprived him of the parliamentary majority necessary to complete that manoeuvre. His concession has substantially reduced the immediate prospect of a disputed transfer of power, although the election results still require formal certification.

But losing an election and losing control of a political system are not necessarily the same thing.

The political inheritance of the 1990s

Vučić’s political career provides important context for understanding the significance of his defeat.

He entered politics through the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, and served as information minister in Slobodan Milošević’s government from 1998. During that period, Serbian authorities employed restrictive media legislation against independent newspapers and broadcasters, imposing substantial financial penalties and limiting critical reporting.

After Milošević’s removal in 2000, Vučić remained politically active. His subsequent association with the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in 2008 following a split within the Radical Party, allowed him to reposition himself as a politician promising economic modernisation and European integration.

This transformation proved remarkably successful.

The SNS came to power in 2012, and Vučić subsequently served as prime minister and president. Serbia attracted foreign investment, undertook major infrastructure projects and maintained its formal ambition of joining the European Union. At the same time, political authority became increasingly concentrated around Vučić and his associates.

The distinction between Serbia under Milošević and Serbia under Vučić should not be overlooked. The former governed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and pursued policies that brought international isolation. The latter operated through electoral institutions, international economic partnerships and a declared European orientation.

Nevertheless, Vučić’s political career illustrates a continuity in personnel and political methods that Serbia’s post-2000 democratic transition never entirely resolved.

The OSCE’s assessment of Serbia’s 2023 parliamentary elections documented advantages enjoyed by the governing party, political pressure on public employees, media bias and the misuse of state resources. These findings demonstrated how electoral competition could continue while the conditions under which parties competed became increasingly unequal.

The Student List has now broken that pattern at the ballot box. Whether it can prevent its reconstruction remains uncertain.

Why the students succeeded

The immediate origins of the political upheaval lie in the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people.

The disaster became a symbol of wider concerns about public procurement, construction oversight and political accountability. Demonstrations demanding responsibility subsequently developed into a nationwide movement challenging the government’s legitimacy.

As EU Today previously examined, the protests exposed a deeper conflict between Serbian society and institutions widely perceived by demonstrators as serving political interests rather than the public.

Unlike established opposition parties, the student movement did not depend on a familiar political leader or traditional party machinery. It mobilised university communities, academics, professionals and citizens who had previously remained outside organised political activity.

Its central demand was institutional accountability rather than a comprehensive ideological programme.

That distinction was crucial. By concentrating on corruption, democratic standards and the functioning of the state, the movement attracted voters with differing views on nationalism, foreign policy and European integration.

However, the same diversity that helped it win the election could complicate governing. Its candidates must now agree on economic priorities, ministerial appointments, foreign relations and the extent of institutional reform.

A protest movement can unite around opposition to a political leader. A government must reach agreement on decisions that inevitably divide its supporters.

Russia’s influence will not disappear with Vučić

One of the most important consequences of the election concerns Serbia’s relationship with Moscow.

Throughout his presidency, Vučić cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining productive relations with Brussels, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously.

Serbia continued its EU accession negotiations and benefited substantially from European investment and trade. Yet Belgrade consistently refused to join the principal European sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The contradiction was particularly striking because Serbia’s economic relationship with the EU vastly outweighs its trade with Russia.

The European Commission’s assessment found that the EU accounted for 58.3 per cent of Serbia’s total trade in 2024. European markets, investment and regulatory structures have therefore become fundamental to the Serbian economy.

Vučić nevertheless preserved close political links with Moscow, benefiting domestically from nationalist sentiment and Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.

He also attempted to demonstrate that relations with Russia did not preclude cooperation with Ukraine.

In June 2025, Vučić travelled to Odesa for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Serbia provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but declined to sign the summit’s joint declaration. Its continuing refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow remained the most substantial distinction between Serbian policy and the EU position.

Yet a Student List government would not necessarily reverse that policy.

In September, the movement explicitly declared its opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia, referring to Serbia’s historical experience with international restrictive measures.

Vučić nevertheless predicted during his concession speech that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Moscow by March or April. He also attributed his defeat to interference by European governments and what he called the American “deep state”, supposedly opposed to President Donald Trump.

His prediction about sanctions was therefore inconsistent with the movement’s publicly stated position.

This exposes an important misconception about Serbia’s political transformation. Opposition to Vučić does not automatically translate into support for every element of EU foreign policy. Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, Kosovo and national sovereignty extend beyond the electorate traditionally associated with the SNS.

The new government may pursue closer integration with European institutions while retaining positions that Brussels considers incompatible with membership.

The economic structures behind political influence

The challenge extends beyond diplomatic relationships.

Russia’s presence in Serbia includes strategic energy interests, notably its controlling shareholding in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which operates the country’s principal oil refinery.

American sanctions against the Russian-owned company have complicated its operations, while negotiations over the proposed acquisition of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL Group illustrate how energy security, foreign ownership and international sanctions have become interconnected.

For an incoming administration, reducing such dependencies will require commercial negotiations, regulatory oversight and alternative energy supplies. Political declarations cannot achieve these objectives on their own.

Equally important will be the examination of public contracts and relationships between political officeholders and businesses that benefited from government decisions.

The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report identified persistent corruption concerns, insufficient transparency in major infrastructure procurement and weaknesses in institutional accountability.

Any investigation into alleged wrongdoing under Vučić must be independent, evidence-based and subject to judicial scrutiny. Allegations of corruption do not themselves establish criminal responsibility.

A government elected to restore the rule of law would undermine its own mandate if it replaced politically selective justice with prosecutions directed by a new political majority.

The central objective must be to ensure that prosecutors, courts and oversight bodies can investigate former as well as current officials without political interference.

Brussels faces a test of its own

For the European Union, the election provides an opportunity to reconsider its approach towards Belgrade.

For years, European institutions confronted a government that professed commitment to EU membership while resisting reforms considered essential to the accession process.

In July 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that Serbia’s negotiations should advance only when measurable improvements are achieved in the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Parliament also called for alignment with EU sanctions against Russia.

The Student List’s victory may improve the prospects for domestic institutional reform, but the disagreement over sanctions remains unresolved. Brussels cannot assume that a new Serbian government will satisfy every accession requirement simply because it defeated Vučić.

Nor should it overlook the political significance of the result.

The movement’s strongest mandate concerns the restoration of public accountability. Supporting independent institutions, transparent procurement and genuinely competitive elections would address both Serbian public demands and longstanding EU concerns.

There is also the unresolved question of Kosovo. A change of government in Belgrade does not remove the political and constitutional difficulties surrounding relations with Pristina. The new leadership will inherit negotiations that have repeatedly stalled under previous administrations.

The EU will therefore need to distinguish between areas where rapid progress is possible and disputes that require more sustained diplomacy.

The difference between victory and democratic transition

Serbia has removed one of the central figures of its post-Yugoslav political order from government. It has not yet demonstrated that the system surrounding him can be dismantled through constitutional means.

The immediate tasks are substantial: forming an effective cabinet, protecting the independence of prosecutors, scrutinising public expenditure, reforming media regulation and ensuring that state institutions no longer operate as extensions of the governing party.

A separate presidential election must also follow Vučić’s September resignation, adding another important stage to the transition.

The greatest danger is not simply that the former governing party could eventually return to office. Electoral competition must allow that possibility in any democracy.

The more consequential danger is that the political methods associated with Vučić’s administration could survive under different leadership.

Serbia’s experience after Milošević demonstrated that removing a dominant political figure does not necessarily eliminate the structures, interests and habits of government accumulated during his rule.

The student movement has now been given an opportunity to confront that unfinished transition.

Its success will ultimately be measured not by the political fate of Aleksandar Vučić, but by whether Serbia develops institutions capable of investigating misconduct, restricting the arbitrary use of power and operating independently of whichever party wins the next election.

That would represent a more fundamental transformation than the defeat of any single political leader.

A delegation from the European Parliament has begun a three-day mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to examine foreign interference in the country’s political institutions, electoral processes and public information environment.

The visit, taking place from 26th to 28th October, comes three weeks after parliamentary elections exposed persistent divisions over Bosnia’s political direction and its prospects of joining the European Union.

The mission is being conducted by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, chaired by French MEP Nathalie Loiseau. Its purpose is to assess vulnerabilities to disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure and other forms of hybrid interference, and to identify measures that could strengthen Bosnia’s institutional resilience.

According to the European Parliament’s announcement, the delegation will meet government officials, parliamentary representatives, civil society organisations, journalists and researchers. Joining Loiseau are Finnish MEP Mika Aaltola, Portugal’s Ana Catarina Mendes and Romania’s Cristian Terheş.

The investigation comes at a politically sensitive moment. Bosnia’s general election on 4th October confirmed the persistence of competing political priorities between the country’s constituent entities, with pro-Russian politician Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats retaining considerable support in Republika Srpska.

As EU Today reported following the election, parties favouring closer European integration also performed strongly, particularly in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The resulting political balance will influence the formation of new administrations and their ability to implement reforms demanded by Brussels.

From electoral interference to institutional security

The European Parliament’s investigation extends beyond conventional disinformation campaigns.

MEPs intend to examine how foreign actors may exploit weaknesses in electoral administration, cybersecurity, political financing and the country’s wider economic relationships. They will also consider the role of digital platforms in distributing manipulated information and the legislative gaps that could make interference difficult to identify or prosecute.

The distinction matters in Bosnia, where political influence cannot be separated from the country’s complicated constitutional arrangements.

Under the Dayton peace settlement, the state operates through institutions that distribute authority between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and the central government. Political disagreements can therefore obstruct decisions requiring cooperation between different levels of administration.

External actors seeking influence may exploit those divisions, although identifying a political relationship with a foreign government is not, by itself, evidence of unlawful interference.

The European Union has repeatedly expressed concern about Russia’s activities in the Western Balkans, particularly its relationships with political forces opposing closer integration with European institutions. Chinese investment and economic relationships also raise questions about strategic dependence, although legitimate commercial activity must be distinguished from coercion or covert political operations.

The delegation’s task is to establish which vulnerabilities can be substantiated and whether existing safeguards are adequate.

Accession negotiations remain incomplete

Bosnia received EU candidate status in December 2022. In March 2024, European leaders agreed in principle to open accession negotiations, but progress has remained conditional on institutional and legal reforms.

Following the October election, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos issued a joint statement calling for the prompt formation of new administrations and progress on judicial reform.

The Commission also highlighted shortcomings identified by international election observers, including technical difficulties, complicated voting procedures and concerns about ballot secrecy.

Those findings do not automatically establish foreign interference. They do, however, demonstrate why the integrity of electoral institutions remains central to Bosnia’s relationship with Brussels.

A test for the European Democracy Shield

The Sarajevo mission follows the EU’s decision on 13th October to include enlargement partners in the European Centre for Democratic Resilience.

The initiative is intended to improve cooperation on election security, information manipulation, crisis management and institutional protection before candidate countries enter the Union.

EU Today has previously examined the European Democracy Shield’s proposed mechanisms, including closer coordination with technology companies and improved systems for identifying foreign information operations.

Bosnia now offers a practical opportunity to examine whether those instruments can operate effectively in a country where political authority is fragmented and accession remains incomplete.

The delegation’s findings could inform recommendations on institutional cooperation, election safeguards and support for independent media. Any substantial improvement, however, will depend on the willingness of Bosnia’s authorities to implement reforms and enforce existing legislation.

For Brussels, the immediate issue is whether its emerging framework for democratic resilience can provide practical protection to candidate countries while respecting their political sovereignty and the freedoms it is intended to defend.

Serbia’s student-backed opposition has won a decisive victory in Sunday’s snap parliamentary election, according to preliminary projections, after Aleksandar Vučić conceded defeat. The result, if confirmed, would end the Serbian Progressive Party’s (SNS) 14-year hold on power and give the protest movement a majority in the 250-seat National Assembly.

Vučić said his coalition had lost, estimating that the Student List would win between 135 and 140 seats, against about 105 for his political camp. A representative sample by CESID-IPSPS pollsters put the Student List on 138 seats and the SNS on 104. The results announced by Vučić were preliminary; the official count had not been completed when he made his statement.

The independent election-monitoring organisation CRTA put the Student List on 51.47 per cent of the vote and Vučić’s “United Serbia” coalition on 40.42 per cent in its preliminary estimate. Other parties were not projected to pass the threshold for parliamentary representation, apart from lists representing national minorities, which are subject to different rules. Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission has yet to confirm the final results.

The margin was far wider than the close contest suggested by pre-election polling. Surveys cited before the vote showed the student-backed list and Vučić’s coalition within a few percentage points of each other, with estimates varying between polling organisations. The transcript cited similar mixed projections, including polls that put the Student List ahead and one conducted by Sputnik Serbia that favoured Vučić’s bloc. The preliminary count has shifted the focus from whether the governing camp could retain its majority to how the new parliament will be formed.

Turnout was exceptionally high. CRTA estimated that 67.8 per cent of voters had participated by 7pm, while Ipsos and CESID put the figure at 67.6 per cent. The final turnout remains pending, but both estimates were well above the 58.77 per cent recorded in the December 2023 parliamentary election. CRTA’s election-day updates also documented reports of pressure on voters and irregularities at polling stations.

The Student List grew out of demonstrations that began after a concrete canopy collapsed at Novi Sad railway station in November 2024, killing 16 people. Public anger over the disaster and demands for accountability developed into a wider challenge to the government. Students organised protests and blockades, calling for action over alleged corruption and failures in the handling of the station’s renovation.

As EU Today reported before the election, the campaign grew from the protests into an electoral coalition that displaced traditional opposition parties as the central challenger to the SNS. A previous report on the protests and Serbia’s EU accession process traced how the Novi Sad disaster became a wider test of state accountability and democratic standards.

Vučić, who resigned as president during the campaign to head the ruling coalition’s list, has been central to Serbian politics since the SNS came to power in 2012. His political camp has maintained close relations with Moscow while continuing Serbia’s formal bid to join the European Union. The Student List brings together candidates from a range of civic and political backgrounds. Its electoral victory does not, by itself, settle the movement’s positions on foreign policy or Serbia’s future relations with Brussels, Moscow and Pristina.

The vote took place amid reports of intimidation, violence and procedural problems. CRTA observers said they recorded pressure on voters, election workers or observers at 29 per cent of the polling stations they monitored. They also reported ballot photographing, which can compromise vote secrecy, and filed a report over suspected vote-buying and “carousel” voting in Veternik. These are allegations and observer findings; they do not establish that the overall result was invalid.

The election campaign had already drawn scrutiny over the conditions facing the opposition. In its pre-election assessment, CRTA cited pressure on voters, use of public resources and a blurred boundary between the state and the ruling list. Those findings concern the campaign environment; election-day reports concern specific incidents at polling stations.

Vučić’s concession reduces the likelihood of an immediate dispute over which bloc won, but the final count and formal allocation of seats remain necessary. CRTA’s estimate and the projections cited by Vučić both point to the Student List clearing the 126 seats required for a majority. The formation of a government will depend on the certified results and the parliamentary process.

The Student List must now turn a broad protest coalition into a governing administration. Its candidates campaigned under a common banner, but the movement includes participants with differing views and priorities. It will have to agree on a cabinet and determine how quickly it can pursue commitments on accountability, public institutions and the economy.

The result leaves the SNS facing a new role after more than a decade in government. A movement that began after a fatal infrastructure collapse is now on course to take power through parliament. If the preliminary projections hold, the transition will be the clearest test yet of whether Serbia’s student-led opposition can convert mass mobilisation into a stable government.

Albanian lawmakers clashed in parliament on Thursday after opposition representatives attempted to force a debate on student demonstrations that have continued for ten days in Tirana.

Opposition MPs displayed photographs of students injured during confrontations with police and blocked the parliamentary podium. The assembly continued voting on legislation despite the disruption.

The protests began on 13 October, with demonstrators calling for improvements to universities and student accommodation, more affordable education and stronger employment prospects for graduates.

The political confrontation places renewed pressure on Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government and raises questions about the handling of public demonstrations in a country seeking membership of the European Union.

The developments are detailed in the latest reporting and official material, against the background of EU Today’s earlier coverage.

How the demonstrations developed

The initial protests outside the education ministry turned confrontational, with police deploying crowd-control measures and making arrests. Subsequent demonstrations broadened the dispute from university conditions to the government’s response.

Students have raised demands about accommodation, fees, public investment and the transition from education to employment. Those concerns should be distinguished from the strategies of opposition parties that have subsequently sought parliamentary scrutiny.

The government faces the task of responding to the original educational demands while addressing allegations about police conduct. Claims of excessive force require independent examination rather than assumption.

A parliamentary confrontation

Thursday’s disorder followed the refusal of parliamentary leaders to hold the debate requested by the opposition. Blocking the podium was intended to interrupt proceedings and draw attention to the treatment of protesters.

The governing side proceeded with legislative business, producing a direct confrontation over parliamentary procedure and accountability. Footage and descriptions of the clashes do not in themselves establish criminal liability for those involved.

The disagreement is also a test of the institutions intended to resolve disputes through political debate rather than confrontation.

Albania’s European ambitions

As an EU candidate country, Albania is assessed on reforms covering the rule of law, public administration, judicial independence and fundamental rights. The management of demonstrations and the operation of parliament can therefore become relevant to enlargement scrutiny.

European integration does not dictate a particular response to student fees or education policy. It does, however, require institutions capable of handling public grievances lawfully and transparently.

EU Today has already reported on Albania’s recent anti-government demonstrations. The latest development is the transfer of that conflict into the legislature, together with renewed questions about the handling of student complaints.

The immediate test is whether government and opposition can reopen debate on the protesters’ demands without further disorder, while the authorities account for their response to earlier demonstrations.

Serbia is approaching a decisive parliamentary election on Sunday, 25th October, with former President Aleksandar Vučić facing an unprecedented challenge from a student-led political movement that emerged from nationwide anti-corruption protests.

The election comes amid growing allegations of political intimidation, surveillance and restrictions on independent journalism. International observers have expressed concern about the conditions under which the campaign is taking place, while opinion polls suggest that the opposition Student List could challenge Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

Vučić, who resigned from the presidency to seek the prime minister’s office, has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade. His attempt to retain power through a different constitutional position comes at a time when Serbia’s relationship with the European Union has deteriorated over judicial independence, media freedom and its continuing ties with Russia.

Student protests become an electoral challenge

The opposition movement developed following the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people.

The disaster triggered demonstrations demanding accountability for alleged corruption, failures in public procurement and inadequate construction oversight. What began as a student protest subsequently developed into a nationwide political movement.

As EU Today previously reported, the demonstrations exposed mounting dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of public institutions and corruption allegations.

The Student List, formally registered for Sunday’s election, has brought together academics, professionals and activists who argue that Serbia requires fundamental changes to public administration and political accountability.

Unlike conventional opposition parties, the movement has developed without a single dominant political leader. Its organisers have sought to mobilise voters who previously abstained from elections, including younger citizens dissatisfied with the established political parties.

The movement is fielding 250 candidates and has emerged as the principal electoral challenger to the SNS.

Allegations of intimidation and surveillance

The closing stages of the campaign have been overshadowed by allegations involving Serbian police, intelligence services and political supporters.

A Reuters investigation published on 22nd October documented accounts from activists and journalists describing intimidation, physical attacks and alleged misuse of surveillance technology.

The investigation cited the SHARE Foundation, a Serbian digital rights organisation, which reported that at least 14 individuals had been targeted with advanced spyware.

Independent cybersecurity researchers have also examined alleged attempts to compromise the devices of political activists and opposition figures.

Serbian authorities have denied accusations of systematic political repression and rejected allegations that state agencies conducted unlawful surveillance.

Concerns about media freedom have nevertheless intensified. Reporters Without Borders ranked Serbia 104th among 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting a deterioration in the environment for independent journalism.

The ruling party maintains that it remains committed to democratic institutions and Serbia’s European integration.

European observers scrutinise the vote

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has deployed an election observation mission to monitor campaigning, electoral administration and voting procedures.

Its mission includes 14 core experts and 30 long-term observers, with additional short-term observers requested for election day.

A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is also observing the election alongside representatives of the European Parliament and other international institutions.

Earlier this month, the Council of Europe’s pre-electoral delegation described the campaign environment as highly polarised and called for electoral rights to be respected.

The findings of international observers will become particularly important if the result is close or either side disputes the count.

Preliminary assessments are expected on 26th October.

Consequences for Serbia’s European ambitions

The election could influence Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union, which have made limited progress despite Belgrade’s formal commitment to membership.

Brussels has repeatedly raised concerns about judicial independence, the treatment of journalists, corruption and Serbia’s alignment with European foreign policy.

As EU Today examined in July, the failure to advance accession negotiations reflects disagreements extending beyond individual judicial reforms.

Serbia has maintained close economic and political relationships with Russia and China while continuing to seek access to European markets and investment.

A victory for the Student List could create an opportunity to reconsider the country’s approach to EU integration, although its candidates would still face the difficulties of governing a politically divided country.

A victory for Vučić would preserve much of Serbia’s existing political leadership, but the scale of the opposition challenge suggests that domestic pressure for institutional reform would continue.

Much will depend on turnout, the distribution of parliamentary seats and whether the results are accepted as legitimate.

For Brussels, Sunday’s election will be an immediate test of its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and its ability to reconcile strategic interests with the democratic requirements attached to EU membership.

Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas during a fifth consecutive day of unrest in Tirana, as student demonstrations over corruption, employment and education developed into a nationwide challenge to the government.

Albania’s political crisis deepened on Saturday, 17th October, as violent anti-government protests continued for a fifth consecutive day, with demonstrators attacking police and public buildings in the capital, Tirana, and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.

Police used tear gas, water cannon and rubber bullets to disperse protesters outside the Ministry of Education after groups of masked demonstrators threw stones, petrol bombs and fireworks at security forces. The disturbances subsequently spread through the city centre, including areas near the prime minister’s office.

According to the latest figures released by Albanian police, 167 people had been arrested and 132 officers injured during five days of unrest. Seven police officers were also suspended pending investigations into allegations of excessive force.

The demonstrations have become one of the most serious domestic challenges to Rama since his Socialist Party came to power in 2013.

Students transform an environmental protest into a political movement

The current unrest grew out of a campaign known as the Flamingo movement, which began earlier this year in opposition to a controversial luxury tourism development associated with Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of US President Donald Trump.

The development attracted objections from local residents and environmental campaigners concerned about land ownership, planning decisions and potential damage to protected coastal areas.

What began as a dispute over tourism development subsequently expanded into a wider protest against alleged government corruption, unemployment, education standards and the cost of living.

The involvement of high-school and university students has considerably increased both the scale and political significance of the demonstrations.

Students have demanded improvements to educational facilities, additional financial support and better employment opportunities for graduates. Frustration over the limited prospects available to young Albanians has also brought emigration into the debate.

During Saturday’s demonstrations, protesters burned a suitcase outside the Education Ministry, using it as a symbol of the pressure on young people to leave Albania in search of work.

The protests began peacefully before violence erupted when masked participants attacked police positions.

According to accounts from Tirana, government offices, banks and commercial premises have been damaged during several days of confrontations.

Demonstrations have also spread beyond Tirana to other Albanian cities.

Rama refuses to resign

Rama, who is serving his fourth term as prime minister, has rejected demands for his resignation and accused political opponents of encouraging violence to destabilise the government.

He has acknowledged the right of citizens to demonstrate but insisted that attacks on public institutions and private property cannot be treated as legitimate political protest.

The government has pledged to prosecute those responsible for vandalism and assaults on police officers.

National Police Chief Skender Hita has defended the security operation, arguing that officers have faced repeated attacks by masked groups. At the same time, the suspension of seven officers indicates that allegations concerning police conduct are being investigated.

The political opposition has sought to capitalise on the unrest, although the Flamingo movement initially developed outside Albania’s established party structures.

That distinction complicates the government’s argument that the demonstrations are primarily the result of opposition-party activity.

The protests have also exposed tensions between the government’s economic development policies and opposition from communities concerned about corruption, land rights and access to employment.

EU accession adds another dimension

The crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment in Albania’s negotiations to join the European Union.

On 13th October, just as the demonstrations were gathering momentum, Brussels and Tirana provisionally closed negotiations on enterprise and industrial policy.

The agreement marked another step towards membership, bringing the number of provisionally completed negotiating chapters to four out of 33.

Albania has already opened all 33 chapters, placing it among the more advanced candidates in the Western Balkans.

However, the EU’s negotiating framework makes clear that progress on fundamental reforms, including judicial independence, democratic institutions and the rule of law, determines the overall pace of accession.

As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is considering additional safeguards designed to prevent democratic backsliding following enlargement.

The current protests do not automatically jeopardise Albania’s accession negotiations. Public demonstrations, including those directed against an elected government, are not themselves evidence of a failure to meet democratic standards.

The relevant questions for Brussels concern the authorities’ response, the independence of investigations into police conduct, the treatment of detainees and whether allegations of corruption are properly examined.

These matters fall directly within the EU’s assessment of the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions.

A political test ahead of possible EU membership

Rama has made EU membership by 2030 a central objective of his government, presenting accession as the foundation of Albania’s future economic and political development.

The acceleration of negotiations has given his administration a substantial diplomatic achievement. It has not, however, resolved dissatisfaction over domestic governance or living standards.

The growing involvement of students also means the demonstrations are no longer confined to the environmental dispute that originally triggered the movement.

For the European Commission, the immediate challenge is to maintain a credible distinction between technical progress in accession negotiations and its assessment of political developments inside the candidate country.

For Rama, the question is whether he can restore public order without intensifying opposition to a government that has been in office for more than 13 years.

Further demonstrations would place additional pressure on the authorities, particularly if the movement continues to spread beyond the capital and attracts broader support from trade unions, students and other dissatisfied groups.

Montenegro and Albania will hold separate accession conferences on 12 and 13 October as the European Commission introduces proposals for stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, linking the next phase of EU enlargement to reforms within the Union itself.

Montenegro and Albania are preparing for another round of European Union accession negotiations this week, with meetings in Luxembourg scheduled to advance their membership bids as Brussels considers substantial changes to the conditions under which future countries will join the bloc.

Montenegro’s 29th accession conference will take place on Monday, 12 October, followed by Albania’s tenth conference on Tuesday. The meetings come less than a week after the European Commission presented a package of proposals intended to prepare the EU for enlargement while strengthening its ability to respond to breaches of democratic standards by newly admitted members.

For Montenegro, the immediate objective is to continue closing negotiating chapters after years of institutional and legal reforms. Albania’s meeting has a more precisely defined agenda: the provisional closure of Chapter 20, covering enterprise and industrial policy.

Both countries have made progress towards membership, but the Commission’s latest proposals indicate that the terms of accession could become more demanding as the EU considers admitting several new members.

Montenegro moves towards the final negotiating stage

Montenegro is widely regarded as the most advanced candidate among the Western Balkan countries.

Accession negotiations began in 2012, and all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened. Progress towards closure has accelerated as the government seeks to complete the process and secure an accession treaty.

At the end of 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five chapters covering services, capital movements, company law, agriculture and fisheries.

As EU Today reported following that conference, the agreements brought the number of provisionally closed chapters to twelve at that stage, while the EU continued to emphasise the importance of judicial reform and sustained implementation.

Subsequent accession conferences have continued the negotiating process, with the 29th conference scheduled for 12 October.

The Commission has identified Montenegro as a country capable of concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2026, provided sufficient progress is maintained.

That objective does not mean membership would follow automatically. A completed negotiation must still lead to an accession treaty, which requires approval by all existing member states and ratification under their constitutional procedures.

Outstanding questions include the independence of the judiciary, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the capacity of state institutions to apply EU law consistently.

Albania advances in industrial policy negotiations

Albania’s accession process has also gained momentum, supported by renewed EU interest in incorporating the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures.

The conference scheduled for 13 October is expected to provisionally close Chapter 20, which covers enterprise and industrial policy.

The chapter concerns the legal and institutional environment in which businesses operate, including industrial competitiveness, entrepreneurship and policies supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.

Provisional closure would represent further progress in Albania’s alignment with EU legislation and policy, although it would not constitute a final agreement on accession.

As with Montenegro, the negotiating framework requires sustained progress on the fundamentals of membership, notably judicial independence, fundamental rights, corruption and organised crime.

Brussels prepares stronger safeguards

The latest accession conferences follow the European Commission’s proposals of 6 October, which address the institutional consequences of admitting new countries.

The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated within the existing treaties, but that the EU will need additional safeguards and improvements to decision-making.

Among the most consequential proposals is the possibility of suspending a new member state’s voting rights in the Council if it commits serious breaches of the Union’s fundamental values or the principle of sincere cooperation.

Such provisions would be incorporated into future accession arrangements, making some membership conditions enforceable after a country has joined.

The proposal reflects concerns that the EU’s existing mechanisms for responding to democratic backsliding can be slow and politically difficult to apply.

In June, EU Today reported on proposals advanced by five member states seeking stronger protections against governments that might undermine common decisions after accession.

The Commission’s October package develops that argument into a broader programme of institutional preparation.

Enlargement beyond the Western Balkans

The debate extends to Ukraine and Moldova, whose membership applications have acquired greater strategic importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Commission is examining how candidate countries can progressively participate in EU policies and programmes before obtaining full membership.

These arrangements could include greater integration in energy, transport, defence and selected areas of the single market, subject to the implementation of relevant reforms.

Brussels is also considering transitional arrangements affecting agricultural support, financial transfers and sensitive sectors of the economy.

The political challenge is to provide candidate countries with credible membership prospects while reassuring existing members that enlargement will not weaken common decision-making or create unsustainable budget commitments.

For Montenegro and Albania, the October conferences therefore take place at a pivotal point in the accession process.

Both governments are moving through the technical stages of membership negotiations while the EU is still determining how its next enlargement will operate.

The outcome will depend not only on their progress towards meeting accession conditions, but also on whether the existing 27 member states can agree on the institutional changes required for a larger Union.

What happens if your economy is suddenly in crisis, Brussels offers help with strings attached—and Turkey, China or Russia can move faster? What if your country delivers every reform the EU asks for, only for a member state to block the next step anyway? And after years of waiting, would voters still choose to join?

In this special bonus episode, The Neighbourhood goes live from Lisbon for an EU enlargement game. Jessica Hendrick brings together RE-ENGAGE experts representing six EU candidate countries and throws a series of fictional—but very plausible—political and economic shocks at them inspired by real headlines: Russia’s intensified attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, Ireland’s EU presidency push on enlargement, Iceland’s referendum, Germany’s regional elections and the upcoming 2026 Enlargement Package. Drawing on three years of surveys, interviews and crisis simulations, each expert has to answer for their country.

Playing for each country:

• Albania: Morten Bøås, research professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), representing RE-ENGAGE’s Albanian partners at the European University of Tirana
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: Damir Kapidžić, director of the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of Sarajevo
• Georgia: Ketevan Bolkvadze, senior lecturer in the department of political science at Lund University, originally from Georgia
• Moldova: Mathilde T. E. Giske, research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), representing RE-ENGAGE’s Moldovan partners at Moldova State University
• Serbia: Luka Filipović, research associate at the Institute for Contemporary History in Serbia
• Ukraine: Roman Petrov, president of the Ukrainian European Studies Association

The result is part enlargement simulation, part policy conversation and part game night. The experts bargain over a fictional €100 million EU cheque, decide whether the EU can compete with faster offers from other powers, test how easily disinformation could exploit frustration with enlargement, and imagine what would happen if EU membership was finally put to a public vote. Along the way, Serbia proposes keeping its relationship with Brussels “casual”, Bosnia finds a creative use for €100 million, and Ukraine calls for Hungarian “Varangians” when backsliding strikes.

When a crisis hits, does speed matter more than values? Can “Europe never wanted you anyway” become a winning political message? And if a country finally joins the EU, what stops democracy from sliding backwards once the prize of membership is secured?

Further reading:
RE-ENGAGE research overview
RE-ENGAGE research on Albania
RE-ENGAGE research on Bosnia and Herzegovina
RE-ENGAGE research on Georgia
RE-ENGAGE research on Moldova
RE-ENGAGE research on Serbia
RE-ENGAGE research on Ukraine

This podcast was recorded live in Lisbon on September 3rd, 2026.

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