After the US officially admitted it deployed weapons into outer space earlier this week, Russia and China expressed concerns, calling it a threat to international peace and demanding the immediate stoppage of all such activities.
During a regular press conference on Tuesday, September 15, Guo Jiakun, official spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that “China opposes any arms race in outer space or any attempt to weaponize it and turn it into a warzone.”
He further said that “China stands for the peaceful use of outer space and keeping it safe” and urged the US to “stop expanding military build-up in outer space, and uphold global strategic stability with concrete actions.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the US weapons deployment is a threat to international security and puts a question mark on the stability in outer space.
“Russia has for many years been consistently drawing the attention of the global community to the grave consequences for international security that Washington’s destructive course may lead to,” Zakharova said.
She said her country seeks “urgent practical measures to prevent arms race in outer space” and reiterated Russia’s push for a “multilateral legally binding instrument banning the deployment of weapons in outer space.”
Though it has long been a subject of speculation, a couple of US military officials, earlier this week, admitted that its military is operating weapons deployed in outer space.
The admission was made by US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink on Monday during a conference. He said that the US “has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the joint force against hostile adversary action.”
Meink’s statement was substantiated by US Space Force chief Douglas Schiess, who a day later, on Tuesday, said that in the coming years the US is even planning to increase the number of orbital weapons already used by the members of his military unit.
Urgent need of legal prohibitions
Underlining the threat that the deployment of weapons in outer space poses, several countries, including Russia and China, have been calling for an international treaty to prevent any arms race in outer space for decades now.
The existing instrument, the UN Outer Space Treaty (1967) makes clear that “outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”
It also prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space in any other manner,” but it says nothing about the deployment of conventional weapons, despite declaring it should be used for peaceful purposes only.
None of the US military officials spoke about the nature of weapons deployed by the US in outer space.
Though only a handful of countries have the technological capability to explore outer space in any significant way, several countries have used satellites for military and war purposes for decades now.
The US has a dedicated space force which has recently held exercises related to possible military conflicts in space.
The deployment of weapons and claims of exclusivity, apart from increasing possibilities of an arms race between the existing powers in space; the US, Russia, and China, may also make the rest of the world more insecure.
Zakharova said that Russia is planning to submit a proposal for the creation of an international instrument legally prohibiting all weapon deployment in outer space during the upcoming annual UN General Assembly session.
She asked for more countries to join the Russian initiative and co-author the treaty document.
A fine agosto l’Istat ha pubblicato le previsioni della popolazione italiana residente fino al 2080. Sono dati che vengono adottati per stimare i fabbisogni per pensioni o spesa sanitaria. Comprendono anche il ruolo dei flussi migratori. Con qualche sorpresa.
At the BRICS Business Forum in Bharat Mandapam on Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin read out the numbers. The eleven members of this grouping now produce more than 40% of the world’s output. The G7 produces 29. Over the last five years, BRICS countries generated more than half of all global growth. The G7 managed 18%. Narendra Modi, speaking at the same event, added that the bloc is home to half of humanity and a quarter of world trade.
This is not rhetoric. The center of gravity of the world economy has moved, and India is in the chair while it happens.
Now recall something else that took place in that same hall. On May 24 of this year, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sat down in Bharat Mandapam for an interview with India Today. Asked about Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he called it “illegal, unlawful, reckless, dangerous, and unacceptable.” Then he said something more revealing. “I think the whole world needs to say that, and most of the countries in the world are saying that. India is saying that.“
A US official, sitting in Delhi, announced India’s foreign policy position on its behalf. Nobody in the room corrected him. In the same interview Rubio said the trade agreement was “weeks, not months” away. Four months later, it is still unsigned.
India and the construction of the Global South
In March 1947, months before independence, Delhi hosted the Asian Relations Conference. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was among the chief architects of an idea that seemed audacious then and remains unfinished now: that newly free countries did not have to rent themselves to Washington or Moscow to be taken seriously. The Bandung spirit produced the Non-Aligned Movement, then the Group of 77 in 1964, and then the demand through the 1970s for a New International Economic Order, which was simply a demand that the IMF and the World Bank stop working only for the countries that funded them. India made those arguments first and made them at a time when the material conditions were not as conducive as we see today.
What India has done inside BRICS follows directly from that. At the Delhi summit of 2012, under Manmohan Singh, the group took up the idea of a development bank and asked its finance ministers to study it. That became the New Development Bank, with an Indian, K.V. Kamath, as its first head. The same summit set up the $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement. At Goa in 2016 both were made operational, and India put forward the idea of a BRICS credit rating agency, aimed squarely at the three Western firms whose verdicts decide what every poor country pays to borrow. In 2021 India proposed the BRICS platform for digital public goods. Across four chairships and two very different governments, India’s contribution has been consistent: turning complaints about an unfair world into institutions that can actually be used.
Now look at how Washington talks about the country.
In July 2025, announcing his first tariffs, US President Donald Trump called India and Russia “dead economies” and said they could “take their dead economies down together, for all I care.” He has called India the “tariff king” and its trade rules “obnoxious.” After Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Trump called the relationship “a totally one-sided disaster.” In April this year he shared, without comment, a post describing India as “some other hellhole on the planet.” Our foreign ministry replied that this was “uninformed, inappropriate and in poor taste.” When Rubio was asked in Delhi about the racist abuse Indians face in America, he said that “every country in the world has stupid people.”
No country of India’s size is spoken to this way. The damage is not to anyone’s feelings. It is what other governments now expect of us.
Standing is not a sentiment. It is a prediction that other capitals make about how you will behave when you are pushed. For seventy years, the prediction about India was that it would not be told what its position was.
Five things India should do this week
Start with Iran, because the silence there has cost us the most.
Standing with Tehran has nothing to do with liking its government. A member state of the United Nations was illegally bombed by Israel and the United States of America, and its leadership killed. If the largest grouping of developing countries cannot say so plainly, then sovereignty becomes a privilege granted at Washington’s pleasure, and every country sitting in Bharat Mandapam holds it on loan. Bandung was convened to reject exactly this, and India wrote the rejection.
Our own losses are not abstract. The frigate Dena was sunk on March 4 with 87 men aboard, days after exercising with the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam. Admiral Arun Prakash, a former navy chief, called it “a perverse act” by a country “supposed to be friends and partners.” More than 11 Indian sailors have been killed since. The Hormuz carries most of our cooking gas, and its closure puts queues outside Indian kitchens. The Iranian port city and free-trade zone Chabahar, representing a decade of Indian money and our only road to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan, was abandoned when an American waiver was allowed to lapse in April. We have been here before. In Trump’s first term, India resisted American sanctions on Iran and then gave in completely, ending every barrel of Iranian oil and damaging a relationship built over centuries.
So why does the Indian state keep walking towards Washington after every humiliation? Not out of confusion. The corporate class that matters politically in this country raises money in New York, lists there, sells services there and answers to regulators there. For them, alignment is good business. For the sorghum farmer in Rajasthan, whose tariff protection was traded away in February, it is ruined. Over 45% of Indians still depend on farming.
The chairship is the one thing Washington cannot take from India this week. Five demands would make the Delhi Declaration an important step towards global south solidarity and action.
One. Name it. The declaration must say what was done to Iran and to the Strait of Hormuz and must reject unilateral secondary sanctions as a category. Washington has increased sanctions on its targets by 933% in recent decades. A bloc that cannot describe the main act of force in its own year has told everyone what its words are worth.
Two. Put Global South debt at the center. Some 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on debt interest than on health or education. In 2023 the poorer nations paid $25 billion more to foreign creditors than they received. India should make debt relief the bloc’s headline demand and push the New Development Bank to lend without IMF-style conditions attached.
Three. Open the door wider. BRICS should stop behaving like a club of the eleven. Expand New Development Bank membership to developing countries outside the grouping, give partner states a real say rather than a seat at the back, and have India publicly champion Africa’s place in the bloc’s decision-making.
Four. Build food security together. Set up the grain exchange, and behind it a shared reserve that member and partner countries can draw on. India, of all countries, knows what it means to depend on someone else’s harvest. We must remember the history when India went to Washington for wheat in the 1960s and spent thirty years making sure we would never do it again.
Five. Make reform a demand of the bloc, not a bid for ourselves. India has spent two decades asking for a permanent Security Council seat. It should spend this week asking for Africa’s, and for an end to the 85% voting rule that gives the United States a permanent veto at the IMF. Ask for everyone, and the asking carries weight. Ask only for yourself, and it looks like what it is.
In 1947 India convened the Asia Relations Conference in Delhi with no power and enormous standing. In 2026 it has real power and is spending the time standing down. A new Bandung will not be built by a country that waits to be told what it thinks.
Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei refuted United States President Donald Trump’s latest claims about his country seeking fresh talks. He reiterated that there will be no new talks with the US until it implements the conditions already agreed upon.
“Dont get distracted by the US president’s mix signals-from ‘no negotiations’ to ‘we are ready to talk.’ The stakes around oil and the straits have changed. Damage control won’t stop what’s coming,” Rezaei said in a post on X on Tuesday, September 15.
Rezaei was responding to Trump’s latest claims made on his social media post about Iran seeking a deal “quickly and badly.” Trump called Iran a “failing nation” and said he will decide “whether or not the US will choose to engage.”
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, during his visit to the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi earlier this week, also said there is no need for fresh talks with the US until the conditions in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed between the two countries in June, are implemented.
Iran and Oman are seeking regional consensus
On Monday, Iran claimed it had finalized an agreement with Oman regarding the management of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and said it’s details would be announced soon.
“The understanding between Iran and Oman, as two littoral states, has been finalized. In consultation with Oman, we will decide on the next step, including how to announce or register the understanding,” official spokesperson of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Esmail Baghaei said in a press conference on Monday, September 14.
He also claimed that a scheduled discussion over the issue with the Persian Gulf countries on Monday was canceled at the last minute after Saudi Arabia’s intervention. He called the Saudi move “ill-advised” and a lost opportunity.
It is speculated that the Saudi intervention is linked to recent attacks carried out by Yemen’s Ansar Allah forces inside its territories, hitting a crucial oil pipeline and King Khalid Air Base, along with other infrastructure.
Ansar Allah claimed its attacks inside Saudi Arabia were in retaliation to hundreds of Saudi airstrikes and over a decade-long blockade of the country.
Ansar Allah has also announced it will target Saudi ships carrying crude through the Bab-al Mandeb in the Red Sea.
In the past, Saudi Arabia had accused Iran of supporting Ansar Allah militarily. Iran has denied such claims, calling Ansar Allah an ally with its own independent agenda.
Earlier, both Iran and Oman had claimed that the regional meeting on Monday was not postponed for a later date, with Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi saying the delay was in the “interest of consensus.”
The talks for an agreement over the joint management of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz with Oman began in June, after Iran proposed it.
On August 25, Iran and Oman announced an initial agreement on the establishment of a temporary joint maritime corridor and a joint-mine clearance project.
The agreement, once finalized, is expected to “restore safe navigation” through the Strait while preserving the sovereignty and sovereign rights of coastal states, Press TVreported.
Strait of Hormuz is closed
On the evening of September 14, a super tanker hit a mine after trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz through what Iran calls the “illegal route” near Omani waters, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said in a statement.
Later it was reported that several of the crew members of the said ship were missing.
The IRGC reiterated its warnings to all the ships in the Persian Gulf to refrain from using the US-backed Omani route, repeating the claims about the Strait of Hormuz being shut and under its full control.
The IRGC has repeatedly questioned US President Donald Trump’s claims of the restoration of free navigation through the Strait, calling them lies.
The Strait, through which nearly 20% of the global energy trade flowed before the US-Israeli war on Iran began in February has seen a massive fall in traffic, causing disruptions in energy supplies after the Iranians restricted traffic in retaliation.
Oil prices have crossed USD 100 per barrel several times since then. They again crossed the mark earlier this week due to the renewed escalation and fear of a blockade of oil trade through the Bab-al-Mandeb, after Ansar Allah’s warnings of targeting Saudi ships.
Nearly 12% of global trade in energy happens through the Bab-al-Mandeb.
On Monday, Iran reiterated that the US is solely responsible for the global impacts caused by the blockade of oil trade in the region.
The US war and naval blockade against Iran are the direct reasons for the closure of the Strait, Ali Bahreini, Iran’s permanent representative at Geneva, said during a UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting asking the international community to acknowledge the fact that such unilateral actions are harmful for the global economy.
Iran assured that it will lift the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz the moment the US announces the end of its war and lifts the naval blockade and economic sanctions on Iran.
Cover image: picture alliance / ZUMAPRESS.com | Pib Handout/Press Information
Problem
The BRICS summit concluded in New Delhi on Sunday, with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi having hosted the two-day gathering as chair. As with many meetings of the group of emerging economies, this edition brought together the leaders of China, India and Russia and featured plenty of anti-Western rhetoric. This was also Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s first visit to India for more than six years, in the latest example of Sino-Indian normalisation following a sustained period of tensions.
New Delhi’s normalisation with Beijing over the last year looks like more of a tactical de-escalation than a realignment. Nevertheless, India has over that time begun to agree more measures to provide greater access to Chinese investment in manufacturing and climate technology, both areas important for India’s development. This should act as a warning for Europeans. If India cannot source technology and capital from partners in Europe, it will seek to do so from China even while remaining suspicious of Beijing from a security point of view.
Solution
New Delhi continues to view Beijing as a threat and seeks deeper security and economic ties with Brussels, as well as with Washington, despite the difficulties President Donald Trump presents. Modi has thus worked to prevent the BRICS from tipping into a purely anti-Western vehicle, since this would run against India’s interests.
Europeans also see India as an increasingly vital partner, following the EU-India trade deal agreed earlier this year, as Europeans diversify geopolitically in the face of tense transatlantic relations. But India’s bilateral agreements with China, including on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting, show that the EU must not take the mutual benefits of closer ties for granted.
Ahead of Modi’s anticipated visit to Brussels later this year, the EU should accelerate its plans further to strengthen Europe-India ties. For instance, it should enhance the existing Trade and Technology Council to drive cooperation in areas like AI, while also moving forward cooperation on defence and security, and making faster progress on India’s plans to join the Horizon Europe funding programme for research and innovation.
Context
The EU and India signed a landmark free-trade agreement in New Delhi in January, alongside a new security and defence partnership. Both sides aim to build on these with wider cooperation initiatives to encourage greater cooperation and investment in areas like semiconductors, AI and clean-tech supply chains.
India supported moves at the 2023 BRICS summit to agree on a major membership expansion. The group began as a much smaller coalition of just Brazil, Russia, India and China, and South Africa—hence “BRICS”—but has since grown to eleven members, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as a wider grouping of observer and partner countries that attend summits and align themselves loosely with the bloc’s agenda. The group is internally divided, and not just in terms of China and India. Both Iran and the UAE are members, for instance, despite longstanding regional tensions. This year’s summit produced a limited declaration including vague promises to enhance cooperation.
BEIJING, CHINA - AUGUST 19, 2026 - A humanoid robot plays table tennis with an audience at the 2026 World Robot Conference in Beijing, China on August 19, 2026. | picture alliance / CFOTO | CFOTO
For much of the 20th century, the US represented not just a place on the map. It was also a point in time. When Western Europeans looked at images of America after the second world war—depictions of Hollywood’s glamour, American cars and newfangled labour-saving devices—they thought they were looking into the future.
The American Dream had an especially irresistible draw for Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain, and for tens of millions of Chinese during the opening and reform era that began after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. China’s great economic reinvention was inspired, in part, by Deng Xiaoping’s awe at American modernity, which he witnessed firsthand during an official visit in 1979.
But fast-forward to 2026, and the positions have been reversed. For most people in most countries, the future can now be seen in China. Just as Hollywood once showed the world what modern life looked like, China is showing African, Latin American and even American young people what an economy built on green energy, mobile payments and other services, and advanced robotics looks like. For Cobus van Staden of the China-Global South Project, the West is “increasingly being framed as backward-looking [and] associated with the past”, a phenomenon presumably accelerated by Trumpism, with its rejection of renewable energy, diversity and its social conservatism.
In the global south, young people aren’t just imitating Chinese practices like drinking hot water or trying out tai chi. They are watching as China reshapes their daily experiences
In many parts of the West, disillusionment has given rise to Chinamaxxing on social media, with American and European influencers performatively embracing Chinese mannerisms and aesthetics. And in the global south, young people aren’t just imitating Chinese practices like drinking hot water or trying out tai chi. They are watching as China reshapes their daily experiences.
This signals a genuine historical rupture. For generations, most countries defined themselves in relation to the West. Some sought (or were convinced) to emulate Western development models like the Washington Consensus, and many were keen to acquire Western technology and aid, or simply to get the West’s approval. Other countries did push back against the West’s influence and attack Western hypocrisy, but their counter-models were themselves defined by opposition to the West.
Either way, West-centrism was the prism through which geopolitics was conducted and interpreted. When countries in the Sahel invited Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries to help them deal with insurgencies, it was seen as a reaction against France and its traditional role in the region. When Angola invited Sinopec to exploit its oil fields, it was seen as a snub to Portugal and Britain. And then there are the many challenges to US hegemony in the Middle East, Latin America and South-East Asia. Around the world, memories of bloody Western interventions or financial crises still linger.
Yet younger generations around the world are not even pro- or anti-Western so much as they are post-Western. For them, China, not the US, is at the centre of their conceptual universe and envisaged future.
What happened? One of the big differences between countries in the global south and the global north is their demographic profile. In the US and Europe, the median age is 40–50, compared to 19 in Nigeria, and 29 in South Africa, India and Lebanon. That means some 70% of Nigerians aren’t even old enough to have registered the 2003 US invasion of Iraq or the 2008 global financial crisis. As Cobus points out, young West Africans “never knew anything more than the US as we know it now”. The era of Donald Trump encompasses their entire political memory, and they presumably are not very impressed.
This shift in perceptions is not just an African story, of course. In Vietnam, which has long had a fraught relationship with China, young people are becoming less reflexively Sinophobic than their elders. Chelsea Nguyen, a researcher at the London School of Economics, credits the covid-19 pandemic for catalysing this change. The West’s perceived mishandling of the pandemic undermined its status as a model worthy of emulation. Many Vietnamese turned to exploring their own history and that of their Asian neighbours, including China. As in much of Africa, growing exposure to China’s rapid technological progress and Chinese consumer goods transformed the country’s global brand.
Meanwhile, Loubna El Amine, a China scholar at King’s College London, notes that in regions riven by instability—such as the Middle East, where the US itself is a big part of the problem— “a lot of the attraction of China is its absence rather than presence”. The latest Arab Opinion Index bears this out, showing that 77% of respondents view US policies as a threat to the region’s security and stability, compared with just 25% for China—and that was well before Trump launched his catastrophic war against Iran. And, of course, China carries none of the colonial baggage that complicates European interventions (or even peacebuilding efforts) in the region.
Still, China has been known to be aggressive in pursuing its economic agenda in the developing world, whether through predatory loans, acquiring critical national infrastructure or deliberately exporting its domestic overcapacity. Such behaviour ruffles feathers as much in Thailand, Mexico and Nigeria as it does in the US and Europe. Moreover, young people’s widespread distrust of their governments can easily bleed into unhappiness with China when political leaders are seen to be giving it undue privileges.
Since the pivot to China as an exemplar of modernity is in many ways pragmatic and non-ideological, its hold on the popular imagination is still tenuous. Lots of leaders in the West want to compete with China for “soft power”. But the key is not to counter Chinese “propaganda” or improve Western PR. The winners in the battle for hearts and minds will be those who offer real solutions to people’s problems and create more opportunities for prosperity than are currently available.
This article was first published by Project Syndicate on August 18th 2026
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The increasing intensity of heatwaves is generally attributed to climate change as a result of the global reliance on fossil fuels. While cutting carbon emissions remains the focus of EU climate policy, European governments also need to ensure that their societies can better adapt to extreme weather. Many households have already taken matters into their own hands by turning to portable air conditioners—often Chinese-made—for relief.
And China’s air-conditioner export boom points to a broader challenge: whether confronting extreme weather or fragile economic dependencies, Europeans need to adapt to the consequences while also addressing underlying sources of vulnerability. They should not just accept the status quo; here, some answers may lie in the lessons of China’s own industrial transformation.
China leads on AC
Once again, when Europe looks for a climate solution, China has one ready to ship. China is a powerhouse in technologies used to mitigate climate change, from solar panels to wind turbines; it is also a vital player in helping Europe adapt to warmer temperatures. China produces over 80% of the world’s air conditioners: exports of Chinese AC units to the EU rose by 43% year on year in the first half of 2026. Chinese brands now account for 41% of the European market, up from 27% in 2023.
This success is not only about price and scale. Chinese manufacturers have adapted their products for the European market: for example, Midea’s PortaSplit model is tailored to overcome cumbersome building regulations and high installation costs. Chinese manufacturers were also early adopters of refrigerants less harmful to the climate, ensuring their products meet Europe’s strict environmental rules.
But this is not all. Chinese commentators say that Europe should not only adapt to the hotter climate—it should adapt to the patterns of EU-China trade. They portray the EU’s de-risking and trade-defence measures to tackle economic imbalance with China as economically self-defeating, arguing that Europe lacks confidence in its own industries. European policymakers, they say, are approaching trade as a game of “cold statistics” that will ultimately hurt ordinary consumers.
This is a fatalistic prescription for industrial policy from a country that refuses to accept that its position in global supply chains or its existing competitive advantage is fixed. For decades, Beijing has made industrial upgrading a central policy objective that has reoriented global trade patterns. Europeans are experiencing this firsthand in the AC boom, where China’s position reflects decades of deliberate industrial upgrading. And now Beijing is advising Europe to be content with trade patterns as they stand: strange advice, given that this would not pass the political sniff test in Zhongnanhai.
Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have not simply passively adapted to their inherited competitive advantages. Neither do they treat the existing global division of labour as an efficient market outcome to be preserved. This is especially the case when such patterns risk constraining China from developing the sectors it considers strategically important—robotics, clean technology or aviation, for example.
These policies helped Chinese firms “import, digest and absorb” foreign know-how, build scale, and create globally competitive and innovative companies across supply chains. But while the European debate on competitiveness centres on many of the same concepts, European politicians, industries and member states are divided over future industrial policy. One prevailing idea is that Europe should pull a “reverse Deng” by ushering in a new era of industrial policy capable of matching the scale of support and protection that China extended to its domestic industries during the 1990s and 2000s.
Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change
But Europe should be cautious in trying to beat China at its own game. It has no centralised state to direct capital and help companies navigate commercial losses in pursuit of their goals. The main lessons from China’s industrial policy lie in the assumptions behind it: Europeans should minimise dependencies that could be strategically constraining; industrial competitiveness is not only about efficient production; Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change.
This logic is becoming more relevant as climate shocks intensify and geopolitics grows more volatile.
What Europeans should do
Europeans need to consider what such options would look like in practice. To borrow the question posed by Chinese commentators: what could Europe do right now without Chinese air conditioners?
Cooling is becoming essential infrastructure. Much like heating and water, Europe will need a broader portfolio of solutions to meet demand. AC is part of the answer, alongside low-energy and passive-cooling technologies such as evaporative cooling, reflective roofs and building retrofits, and stronger building standards. But Europe does not need to develop every solution itself; it could build a network of alternative suppliers and production capabilities.
For example, Singapore and the Gulf states are confronting many similar challenges and could be potential partners in deploying more efficient solutions such as district cooling. Europe can build similar partnerships in clean-tech supply chains. South Korea, the second-largest battery manufacturer globally, holds 78% of installed battery capacity in Europe. It can learn from countries such as Japan, which has diversified its rare-earth supply through partnerships with Australia and Malaysia, as well as Vietnam. India doubled solar-cell manufacturing capacity in the first half of 2026 alone, backed by localisation incentives extending to upstream components like ingots and polysilicon.
China will remain part of Europe’s clean-tech supply chains. For Europe, preserving its options does not mean that it needs to produce every critical technology in the clean-tech supply chain. But it should work with external partners to maintain commercially viable alternatives at scale. This can be done through reciprocal access to public procurement markets, targeted incentives and shared product standards.
Where climate and competitiveness collide
Fundamentally, having options means being able to adapt to a problem while tackling its cause. Climate policy offers a useful framework: Europeans have concluded that the impact of heatwaves or floods are not inevitable; they are not relying on AC, seawalls and floodgates as their only response. Instead, they are tackling the cause of climate change by pursuing adaptation while mitigating the underlying problem through cuts in fossil-fuel emissions.
Europe should dare to do the same with its competitiveness and economic dependencies. Rather than simply adapting to change, its governments should invest in Europe’s capacity to innovate, work with partners and build alternatives, with the aim of reducing vulnerabilities and helping preserve its choices.
The summer heat of 2026 is a reminder of the cost of delayed climate action. The same lesson applies to economic security: adapting to today’s dependencies in the name of efficiency will leave Europe with fewer options—and come with a larger bill—tomorrow.
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Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey recently signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement”. Many analysts believe this trilateral pact is aimed at checking Iranian and Israeli “hegemony” in the tumultuous Middle East region.
Meanwhile, the biggest question running through India’s nearly 1.5 billion people is how this trilateral defense pact will impact India, which has fought multiple wars with Pakistan and maintains a tense relationship with Islamabad.
Despite hogging global media limelight for playing the role of mediator in the ongoing Iran war, Pakistan’s position back home looks scary with relentless terror attacks and a deteriorating security situation.
Pakistan continues to face tremendous domestic pressures. Protests in Pak-controlled Kashmir have intensified since mid-2026, with scores of innocent protesters killed by the security forces.
Islamabad imposed a communication blockade, ordered foreign journalists to leave the region, and limited access to international media outlets, including Al Jazeera’s digital platform.
This is no ordinary region. India claims the Pak-controlled Kashmir as its own and has vowed to integrate it with Jammu and Kashmir. Reportedly, pro-India slogans and flags were seen in the demonstration.
Then, regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel. Separatism in these two regions appears to have gone beyond the control of the Pakistan Army, and looks as volatile as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during 1971. The question is how long Pakistan can hold these two regions, and at what cost.
Dismal economic conditions, disgruntled population, and heightened tensions with neighboring India and Afghanistan have intensified Pakistan’s problems. The question is: does Pakistan have the financial muscle or resources to fight a five-front conflict — Balochistan, KPK, Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, simultaneously?
On top of it, Pakistan has signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which means they should be prepared to fight outside the country as well, probably against Houthis in Yemen. That would open a sixth front.
Indian military exposed Pakistan’s defense architecture during Operation Sindoor last year in May. India not only managed to breach Pakistani defenses to hit multiple terror targets in the first wave of attacks, but India also launched precision strikes that impaired critical Pakistani military infrastructure across the country.
Indian military targeted multiple airbases including Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Mushaf (Sargodha), Murid, Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan, Sukkur, Jacobabad, Bholari, and others—using supersonic BrahMos and other precision munitions.
Satellite imagery confirmed the heavy damage, including destroyed runways, hangars, command-and-control centers, and loss of up to 14 aircraft (as per IAF) and scores of personnel on the ground. Pakistan also claimed downing multiple Indian jets, but it could hardly penetrate the Indian air defense network, led by the S-400.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that Pakistan’s defenses could be easily penetrated and its Air Force could be crippled even with limited, restrained strikes.
Meanwhile, Turkey is already a member of NATO, arguably the most powerful Islamic country in terms of military. It does not really need Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to defend itself. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been battered by Iran and Houthi rebels. But when the US could not completely defend it, what can Pakistan and Turkey do?
In the case of Pakistan, it is the most vulnerable of the three.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, assumes utmost importance for Islamabad. The pact’s core clause treats an armed attack on any one party as an attack on all three.
It directly follows the September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, it’s another insurance policy, but for Pakistan—still repairing airbases more than a year later—the pact is aimed at sending a strong deterrence message to India, which has pledged a devastating response to any terror attack on the country.
File Image
Collective defense commitments from Riyadh and Ankara are sure to boost Pakistan’s morale, but Turkey (and Saudi Arabia) have been supporting Pakistan since 1947 and have never managed to turn the tide against India.
For instance, during the 1971 war, Turkey provided critical military and diplomatic support to defend Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Operating under the CENTO defense pact, Ankara provided substantial material support to Pakistan by providing aircraft assistance and military hardware, but to little avail.
Even politically, Turkey refused to recognize the newly independent state of Bangladesh for over two years. It only recognized Bangladesh in February 1974 after Pakistan did.
Meanwhile, India has already established strong military ties with Ankara’s adversaries, Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia. India also shares robust military ties with Israel. There might not be a formal agreement on paper, but India-Israel ties go beyond any melodramatic pact.
No doubt, the Mecca pact embeds Pakistan in a broader Islamic-world security architecture at a moment when its conventional defenses have been publicly tested while the country’s biggest province, Balochistan, continues to fight for its liberation, just like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
For a country simultaneously battling insurgencies in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir while managing tense borders with both Afghanistan and India, the Mecca defense pact is far more valuable to Pakistan than it is to either Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Nitin J Ticku holds a double master’s degree in Journalism and Business Management from the University of Glasgow. He has over 20 years of global experience in MARCOM, Journalism, and Digital Marketing, and has worked & traveled widely across Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Nitin is the Editor of the EurAsian Times.
This is an Opinion Article
He can be reached at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
India appears poised to overlook Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter and opt for a sixth-gen aircraft instead.
Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently clarified that New Delhi has “not thought about” new Sukhoi variants, prioritizing the upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet under the ‘Super Sukhoi’ program and the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) instead.
Moscow’s aggressive pitch—including local production, full source codes, and a two-seat variant—has failed to sway planners wary of diverting resources from self-reliance goals.
With AMCA still a far away and China fielding growing J-20 numbers, India is actively exploring partnerships in sixth-generation programs.
India’s Ministry of Defense has reportedly initiated efforts to join the French-led sixth-generation fighter program. This was stated in a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, presented in Parliament, according to news agency PTI.
The ministry has sought a roadmap from the French side for acquiring such aircraft. The panel noted that two major consortia are developing sixth-generation fighters: one involving the UK, Italy, and Japan; another involving (now-defunct) France and Germany.
The Indian Air Force plans to partner with one of these groups so that India does not fall behind in advanced combat aircraft technology.
End of Su-57?
In 1962, the USSR agreed to transfer technology to produce nearly 800 MiG-21 jet fighters for India, which it had earlier denied to China. They helped India set up factories for the aircraft, aero-engines, and avionics.
India’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically, culminating in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
Through the 1971 India-Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh, the Soviet Union stood by India against US and Chinese intimidations.
During the Cold War, India and the USSR maintained a “special and privileged strategic partnership” that was built on five major components: politics, defense, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism cooperation, and space.
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India maintained warm relations with Russia’s successor state. The first major political initiative after the dissolution was the Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries in 2000.
The IRIGC (India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission) is the main body responsible for conducting official affairs between the two countries at the governmental level. Both countries are members of international bodies, including the UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, and Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping. Russia supports India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
India is one of the largest markets for the Russian defense industry. Approximately 60 percent of the Indian military’s hardware today is of Russian origin. Military hardware supplies and, more recently, joint-venture production have been key pillars.
The Soviet Union was the first to support Make in India defense production.
The MiG-21 factories set up in the early 1960s later produced the MiG-27 (170) and the Su-30 MKI (230). Su-30 MKI was a joint D&D project. Russia also learned a lot from the Su-30 MKI project and imbibed some of these ideas for its Su-30SM aircraft.
222 Su-30 MKI were produced under license at HAL’s Nashik plant since 2004. An estimated 920 AL-31FP turbofans were manufactured at HAL’s Koraput Division. The Su-30MKI is the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet.
In 1965, Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) was set up at Avadi, Chennai, with Soviet assistance. HVF products included Russian-designed T-72 Ajeya and T-90 Bhishma tanks.
In September 1965, the Soviet Union and India signed the first contract for the delivery of naval equipment, including four Project I641 diesel-electric submarines, five Project 159E corvettes, and five Project 368P motor boats. The Agreement also envisaged rendering Soviet technical assistance for the construction of a submarine naval base in Vishakhapatnam.
Recently, two frigates, the INS Tushil and INS Tamala, were built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard, while the remaining two are under construction at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) in India through technology transfer.
Russia is reportedly expanding its shipbuilding cooperation with India, with two Indian shipyards being considered for the construction of four non-nuclear icebreakers. Russian shipbuilding officials have reportedly offered New Delhi their nuclear-powered design for an Indian Navy aircraft carrier.
GSL is also constructing 24 river-sea class cargo ships for Russian clients in the Caspian Sea by 2027. Cooperation with India in shipbuilding has its benefits for Russia, as the unit cost per vessel is projected to be half of what it would cost Russian shipbuilders.
Between 2012 and 2016, Russia accounted for 68% of India’s defense imports. Russia and India’s cooperation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service-to-service contacts, and joint exercises.
India and Russia have a strong success story with Joint Ventures (JVs). The BrahMos is a medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, and fighter aircraft. BrahMos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The missiles are already being exported.
Under an over ₹5000 crore contract signed in July 2021, over 610,000 AK-203 assault rifles are to be manufactured in India with technology transfer from Russia, by the JV Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL).
Indian companies hold a controlling 50.5 percent share, and Russian companies hold 49.5 percent. The level of indigenous content has already reached 50% and is rising rapidly, with a target of 100% in the near future.
India and Russia have also agreed to expedite the delivery of spare parts of Russian-origin military platforms by setting up a JV in India.
Notwithstanding the above, some JVs did not take off. India had withdrawn from the joint Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program due to technical issues. Finally, Russia continued the project and today has a successful Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon’ 5th generation fighter.
Following the selection of the Ka-226T to meet an Indian requirement for 197 helicopters, an agreement was signed in December 2015 to create a JV between Rostec, Russian Helicopters, and HAL to build the helicopters at a new factory in Tumakuru, India.
Later, India decided to make its own Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) based on the indigenous ‘Dhruv.’ India’s LUH is delayed, and Russia has been pushing the case for Ka-226T again.
Similarly, India canceled the Indo-Russian program to develop a new Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) for both countries through a JV between Russia’s UAC and India’s HAL.
In February 2023, on the sidelines of the Aero India 2023 air show, the Russians offered to jointly develop the Il-276. However, India would prefer the aircraft to be powered by a European engine rather than a Russian one.
India has operated a wide range of Soviet and Russian combat jets that formed the backbone of the Indian Air Force for decades. Key types include the prolific MiG-21 (in multiple variants including Bison), MiG-23 (BN and MF), high-altitude MiG-25, ground-attack MiG-27, and air-superiority MiG-29 (including upgraded versions).
From the Sukhoi stable came the Su-7 fighter-bomber and the highly successful Su-30MKI, which remains the IAF’s primary multi-role platform that India is looking to upgrade.
India’s decision to effectively rule out the Su-57 marks a noticeable shift. After decades of reliance on Russian fighters—from the MiG-21 to the Su-30MKI—New Delhi is prioritizing the AMCA program and partnerships in sixth-generation projects.
While the historic Indo-Russian defense ties remain strong in other domains, the rejection of Moscow’s most advanced stealth jet signals a clear preference for next-generation technology.
With China rapidly expanding its stealth fleet and AMCA still years away, India appears to be choosing long-term capability over Russian platforms.
With Inputs from EurAsian Times story by Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired)
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Adriana Abdenur, a Brazilian policy expert and co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy, and Jorge Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico and professor at Sciences Po, to explore debates about development and ideas of strategic autonomy across Latin America.
Jorge explains why China’s role is varied across the region, arguing that Mexico and much of Central America remain deeply constrained by their economic ties to the US. Adriana discusses Brazil’s long tradition of strategic autonomy, describing how policymakers engage with China as both an economic partner and a source of ideas on development, technology and global governance.
Together, Mark, Adriana and Jorge explore how intensifying US-China competition is reshaping the region’s choices. Can Latin American countries balance relations with both powers? Is China a model, a market or simply another partner in a multipolar world? And what does strategic autonomy look like in an increasingly coercive geopolitical environment?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 31st 2026.
If anything, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s call on August 3 for greater “military-civil integration” to create “a robust defense ecosystem to tackle emerging challenges” implies that there is still a structural mismatch between generalist bureaucrats (critically called Babus) and uniformed personnel within the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
In other words, in India’s higher defense reforms, integration between the military and civil components of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is being seen as important as greater jointness among the three armed services (army, air force, and navy).
For decades, the relationship between civilian staff and military personnel within the MoD has been described by experts as both a strength and a fault line, particularly at the level of defense management.
Therefore, as India moves toward theatre commands, self-reliance under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) scheme, and faster procurement of defense components, the question is: how has this synergy worked in retrospect, and what should it look like in the future?
Addressing the 85th Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civilian Services Day celebrations in New Delhi on Monday, Singh emphasised that both the uniformed and civil services cannot proceed along separate paths, adding that, as joint and integrated structures develop, there will be a need for continuity and expertise across all areas – policy, administration, human resource management, financial processes, logistics, and institutional knowledge.
He highlighted the importance of further enhancing structured cross-exposure between civilian and military officers, suggesting joint training programs and developmental assignments for both sides to learn from each other’s experiences.
“Military officers bring operational experience, a command perspective, and an understanding of warfare, while civilian officers contribute through administrative continuity, policy experience, an understanding of government processes, and institutional memory. When these strengths combine, decision-making becomes more informed, balanced, and effective,” stated the Defense Minister.
As things stand today, there are nine major participating groups dealing with India’s defence – three military services, and the non-military six – Department of Defence(DoD), the Department of Military Affairs(DMA), the Department of Defence Production ( DDP), the Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D), the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW), and Defence Finance.
While these nine groups are — three military services, and the non-military six – inside the MoD, there are three others outside the domain having considerable influence on defense matters – the Ministry of Finance (controlling the defense spending), the Cabinet Secretariat (policy matters that have implications for other ministries) and the Prime Minister’s Office (which can always intervene or arbitrate selectively).
However, we will focus here only on the MoD, particularly on the integration of the military services with the non-military ones.
To begin with, one is reminded of what late Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara had said: each of the major participating groups in Indian defense is known for “jealously guarding its turf and mistrustful of the others”.
Incidentally, the Admiral was talking of eight groups, because the DMA was a later creation. But the spirit behind his comment remains intact.
It may be noted that the total workforce under the MoD stands at approximately 2.92 million (29.2 lakh) personnel, making it the largest employer in the world. Expenditure on salaries and pensions for both civilian and non-civilian personnel is fully integrated into the official MoD budget.
The total strength encompasses active military personnel, reservists, and defense civilians. Approximately 1.43 million active-duty personnel serving across the Army, Navy, and Air Force are complemented by roughly 1 million reserve personnel.
Approximately 400,000 defense civilians are distributed across administrative services. They come mainly from the Indian Defense Accounts Service, Indian Ordnance Factories Service, Defense Research & Development Organization scientists, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service, the Defense Accounts Department (DAD), Border Roads Organization (BRO), DRDO, and top bureaucracy.
The apex bureaucratic positions like the Defense Secretary, Secretary (Defense Production), and Secretary (Ex-Servicemen Welfare) are often held by IAS officers.
The last 5 years have seen some important defense reforms in India. For the first time, a serving 4-star General became Secretary in MoD as Chief of Defense Staff. DMA handles procurement, tri-service matters, and jointness. This is said to have broken the wall between the civilian secretariat and the military.
Service HQs have been integrated with the HQ of MoD. Joint Secretaries from the military now sit in the MoD and sign files. This means operational officers are now part of the procurement and policy process.
Before this reform, the MoD was entirely dominated by generalist civilian bureaucrats under the Department of Defense (DoD), led by the Defense Secretary. The Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters operated merely as “attached offices,” meaning military files had to be routed through junior civilian desk officers for approval.
However, there are still well-documented latent and reported mutual resentment between military and civilian personnel in the MoD, which analysts and scholars refer to as “civil-military dissonance”.
The friction does not stem from opposition to the constitutional principle of political/democratic civilian control, which the military fully accepts. Instead, the resentment focuses on “bureaucratic control,” where career civil servants are perceived to act as a barrier between the uniformed leadership and the political executive.
File Image: Indian Army/Twitter
A primary driver of public friction involves rank parity and protocol equivalence between military officers and civilian cadres. As Admiral Arun Prakash points out, the three Chiefs have been accorded “no locus standi in the structure of the GoI, so much so that the Secretary of the Department of Defense is deemed to represent the three Services in most forums”.
According to the “Government of India Allocation of Business Rules” (AoB Rules) and the “Government of India Transaction of Business Rules” (ToB Rules), the Secretary of DoD (a IAS officer) is allocated the responsibilities of “(a) Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective Demobilisation; (b) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force; (c) Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters”.
This looks particularly strange as, in terms of protocol, the Defense Secretary ranks at 23 in the order of preference, along with “Army Commanders/ Vice-Chief of the Army Staff or equivalent in other services”. In contrast, a Service Chief of Staff holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank is at number 12.
Even at 16, Officiating Chiefs of Staff holding the rank of Lieutenant General or equivalent rank are higher in protocol than the Defense Secretary.
Similarly, the Military officers are said to have resented the equation of lower-tier civilian administrative posts of Joint Secretary with senior military ranks like Major Generals. It is argued that a Major General has significantly more operational responsibility and seniority (often over 32 years of service) compared to an IAS officer reaching Joint Secretary level in roughly 18 years.
Military officials often point out that allowances, non-functional financial upgrades, and pension structures have favored civilian bureaucracies over the unique hazards of military service. Successive Central Pay Commission awards have frequently triggered military dissatisfaction.
In other words, there is an underlying perception of hierarchical degradation that persists within the armed forces.
Secondly, there are gaps between the military and civilian officials over what is called “Policies vs Operations”. While civilians are accused of lacking operational understanding, the military is accused of not understanding procurement rules. This really leads to delays in equipment purchase.
Perhaps, realizing these deep-seated systemic silos, Defense Minister Singh said on Monday that the military and civilian wings can no longer afford to operate in isolated silos to build an effective national defense ecosystem.
As he underscored, the civilian officials should read Indian military history, examining it from a civilian perspective, thereby fostering fresh ideas and new perspectives. He called upon the Civilian Services to evolve into the “strategic brain” of India’s defence management architecture by developing a comprehensive understanding of the defence sector, functioning effectively in a joint environment, and continuously enhancing its expertise to face the emerging challenges.
Notably, when one talks of dissonance between the military and civilian officers, it is perhaps more to do with purely civilians like IAS and other central services within the MoD rather than the non-military technical and scientific personnel.
There has been relatively smoother synergy in areas like defense production and infrastructure building. For instance, Defence Public Sector Undertakings like the HAL, BEL, BDL and OFB, which are run with a mix of civilian managers, engineers, scientists and military users, have produced platforms and ammunition like Tejas, Arjun, BrahMos. succeeded because civilian scientists in DRDO worked with military feedback loops.
Similarly, the BRO, a civilian-led organization with military engineers, has built highly acclaimed critical roads in the country’s northern and north-eastern border (Line of Actual Control) with China.
However, it is with the civilian officials working within the MoD that military officials have some issues, such as policy decisions, pay, and ranks.
But then, it is also to be noted that while services may all agree on their fight against the civilians, when it comes to “promoting jointness” in military matters, they do not have the same ideas. There is an intense rivalry amongst them. Although the situation has improved of late, there are differences over whether the country should have theater commands, and if it will have them, then how those will be operated.
In other words, there are, overall, challenges in building better “Civil-Military Synergy”. There seem to be merits when some experts argue that National Defense College (NDC) and the College of Defense Management (CDM) could bridge strategic and administrative silos, fostering deeper synergy, mutual understanding, and coordinated policy-making between senior civilian bureaucrats and military leadership.
There are also ideas like extending the DMA model to have military officers in all key procurement and policy wings, and civilian officers in Integrated Theatre Commands. Defense civilians should have tenures in field formations and military officers in MoD finance and policy.
Another interesting suggestion is to extend the synergy beyond the MoD and involve the private sector, startups, academia and state governments. Of course, in a way this is happening with projects like defence corridors, and through collaboration in the space, cyber and AI sectors.
Viewed thus, the core challenge to the synergy that the Defense Minister has talked about is removing what is said to be the “Trust Deficit” between the civilian and military wings within the MoD, due to decades of suspicion.
The synergy does not mean the dilution of civilian supremacy at the policy-making level, be it the MoD, or the Union cabinet, or the Parliament. But it means the military’s voice is heard in policy-making. The military does not grudge civilian control; it opposes “the bureaucratic control”.
Synergy does not imply that civilians are made into soldiers, or soldiers into ‘babus’. Its goal is to make both into “defense managers”
Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
Her voice is that of a frail, elderly woman, but ousted Bangladesh leader Sheikh Hasina still has the power to incite from exile, vowing to return home despite facing the gallows.
Analysts say her defiance is not a death wish, but a desperate bid to remain politically relevant, claw on to her supporters, and revive an outlawed party which once dominated Bangladesh.
To her enemies, Hasina is evil incarnate — a convicted fugitive sentenced to hang for crimes against humanity over her failed bid to crush the 2024 revolution that toppled her.
The 78-year-old told AFP in July from India that she wanted to return to Bangladesh by the year’s end.
“I may be killed. I may be arrested. I may be sent to prison,” Hasina wrote in an email sent from hiding.
“I am fully aware of my fate. Still, I want to go back because my people are calling me.”
On Wednesday, marking two years since she fled by helicopter to old ally India, she is due to address by telephone a New Delhi event entitled “Sheikh Hasina’s homecoming”.
“Sheikh Hasina’s return is important for the survival of the party — she is still a symbol,” said Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder, a political science professor at North South University (NSU) in Dhaka.
One senior member of her Awami League (AL) party said he believed she was genuine in wanting to return.
“She feels obligated because party members are being arrested left and right, despite having no involvement in any crimes,” he said, too fearful himself to speak on record.
“Her return is a way of repaying the party’s loyalty.”
Dhaka’s Prothom Alo newspaper suggested her vow was “part of a strategy to energize party members, build pressure for the lifting of the ban on the party, and reclaim political space”.
But former senior Awami League member Mahmudur Rahman Manna, now a fierce critic of Hasina, dismissed the vow as self-serving.
“There are people in the AL who have some degree of public acceptance. Sheikh Hasina could have given them a little space to help bring the party back after the ban. She didn’t,” he said.
“The idea that she would come back for the sake of the party is absurd.”
Hasina also knows that simply threatening to return will needle Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, who swept February’s elections in which the Awami League was barred, Sikder said.
Political imprisonment has a long history in Bangladesh.
Under Hasina’s rule, Rahman’s mother, former leader Khaleda Zia, spent years in jail in Dhaka on graft charges that her party said were politically motivated.
“The Bangladesh government isn’t ready to accept her, even if she lands in jail directly from India,” Sikder told AFP.
“Her return will create political instability… I doubt the government can handle that.”
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina at the inauguration of various projects in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangladesh. (Source: PIB)
‘Ensure Justice’
Not so, says Zahed Ur Rahman, an adviser to Bangladesh’s prime minister.
“We want her back — please return,” he told reporters. “We have written to India. The individual we want to bring back intends to return. We are ready — let her come, and we will ensure justice.”
Hasina refused to attend her trial in Dhaka, where she was found guilty of incitement, ordering killings and failing to prevent atrocities.
Her vow to return comes as Bangladesh and India seek to repair strained ties, with Hasina remaining a persistent point of friction.
Dhaka has repeatedly requested her extradition, while New Delhi has said only that the request is being examined through the legal process.
But relations have improved since Rahman, leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, became leader, and India has invited him to a BRICS summit in September.
India’s foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal, speaking to reporters on Tuesday, sought to distance New Delhi from Hasina’s “homecoming” speech.
“The government has no involvement whatsoever in it, nor does it endorse any views that may be expressed at the forum,” he said.
But some in Bangladesh see India’s hand in using Hasina’s return threat as leverage.
Mahmudur Rahman, editor of Dhaka’s Amar Desh newspaper, told AFP he saw her threat as part of a power struggle between New Delhi and Dhaka. “Delhi wants to gain the upper hand,” he said.
“India is just playing the ‘Hasina card’ to put pressure on the government.”
The Indian Air Force (IAF) held a week-long counter-drone exercise to strengthen its capabilities against low-cost unmanned aerial systems.
The primary goal of the exercise, dubbed “Rotor Clap-III”, was reportedly to assess and refine operational principles to address emerging aerial threats from unmanned systems. The exercise concluded on August 2.
The Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) drill was held at the Pokhran Field Firing Range in the Thar Desert.
The site is best known as the location of India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, but its vast, sparsely populated expanse near the India-Pakistan border supports secure live-fire practice, helicopter operations, and high-intensity training while closely matching the terrain, climate, and conditions of the western theatre.
The drills were also aimed at improving the IAF’s helicopter fleet’s operational capabilities against threats posed by drones.
#IAF Helicopters undertook, Exercise ROTOR CLAP III themed "Counter-UAS" in Rajasthan.
Several IAF helicopter units participated in the exercise, conducting tactical missions such as coordinated actions against both aerial and ground-based threats, soldier insertion, reconnaissance, precision attacks, battlefield support, and casualty evacuation.
The drills evaluated integrated helicopter tactics, procedures, and coordination in simulated combat conditions.
Moreover, the aircrew and operational units had the opportunity to test and validate mission planning, inter-unit coordination, quick response, and cooperative operations in near-war scenarios throughout the exercise. According to reports, special emphasis was placed on ensuring smooth coordination among multiple helicopters in the desert terrain.
Notably, helicopters are increasingly being employed worldwide in counter-UAS roles, especially against slower, low-cost loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones. Russia and Ukraine, for example, routinely use military helicopters for this purpose, whereas Gulf countries have recently started deploying their own choppers to down Iranian drones.
File: IAF helicopters participated in ROTOR CLAP III themed “Counter-UAS” in Rajasthan
In general, helicopters make good counter-UAS platforms because many of them cruise at speeds similar to those of propeller-driven drones such as the Shahed class, enabling them to close the distance, match altitude, and make repeated engagement passes—advantages not available to fast jets, which are limited to a single high-speed pass.
Typically, helicopters can also operate from dispersed or improvised sites, fly low and slow, and loiter over threat areas. Equipped with thermal or electro-optical sensors and night-vision systems, they are effective at detecting and engaging low-flying drones after dark.
Once the helicopter matches the drone’s path, gunners or automated systems use proximity-fuzed rockets or brief bursts of cannon or machine-gun fire to neutralize a drone.
Therefore, these armed helicopters form one mobile layer alongside ground-based guns, electronic warfare, interceptor drones, and high-end surface-to-air missiles (SAM).
Using helicopters as counter-drone platforms is also cost-effective, given that machine guns, cannons, and rockets are far cheaper per engagement than surface-to-air missiles or fighter sorties. In fact, the US has now integrated its Apache helicopters with APWKS laser rockets to further reduce the cost of hunting drones.
The IAF operates a range of different military choppers—AH-64 Apache, the aging Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, the LCH Prachand, Chinook Heavy-lift transport helicopter, the Mi-17 Medium utility helicopter, and the ALH Dhruv
Sources said the exercise reaffirmed the IAF’s commitment to high operational readiness and adaptation to new security challenges. It forms part of India’s broader push to strengthen counter-UAS capabilities at a time when inexpensive small drones, loitering munitions, and sophisticated unmanned systems have upended the cost calculus of conflict and changed the face of conventional warfare that India has participated in.
India’s Counter-Drone Effort Inspired By Op Sindoor
India’s heightened focus on counter-drone measures is driven by global trends, persistent cross-border drone activity, and, most significantly, experience gained during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which it launched against Pakistan-based terror infrastructure.
Pakistan retaliated almost instantly and employed large numbers of drones as a core element of its response codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.
Indian official briefings stated that Pakistan launched swarms of drones in major coordinated waves. According to the Government of India’s official press briefing, Pakistan launched 400–500 drones in a coordinated reconnaissance and SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) operation. These were intended to clutter Indian radars, force air-defense systems to expend ammunition and attention, probe for gaps, and mask the presence of a smaller number of more capable surveillance or attack drones.
Pakistan has invested heavily in drone manufacture using indigenous capabilities acquired from allies like Turkey and China, as previously explained in detail by the EurAsian Times. During the conflict,it used Turkish Asisguard Songar, Turkish Yiha-III, Bayraktar TB2 drone, and Chinese drones like the CH-4 and Wing Loong II, to name a few.
India stated that the large majority of incoming drones were neutralized by a combination of kinetic systems (anti-aircraft guns, including the L-70, ZU-23, and Schilka, as well as surface-to-air missiles such as Akash), and non-kinetic measures (spoofing and jamming).
File Image: Akash Missiles
While India has significantly expanded its own inventory of drones, many of which were used successfully and decisively against Pakistani targets during the war, the intensity of drone use by the Pakistani military during the four-day intense conflict has accelerated Indian investment in counter-drone programs and tactics.
For example, counter-drone grids are being incorporated into Mission Sudarshan Chakra, a long-term, AI-enabled, multi-layered national air-defense shield announced last year.
In early July 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council granted Acceptance of Necessity for procurement proposals worth approximately ₹52,000 crore. These include the indigenous Akash Tarang anti-UAV electronic-warfare system for the Army, Very Short-Range Air Defense Systems (V-SHORADS) to bolster low-altitude defense against drones, and jet-powered kamikaze drones, underscoring the priority now attached to both unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities
A range of new counter-drone systems developed jointly by public- and private-sector entities are at various stages of testing.
Last year, for instance, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) unveiled the D4 (Drone Detect, Deter, Destroy) anti-drone system, which is now being deployed along key border areas. This integrated counter-drone solution is designed to detect and neutralize rogue unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with precision.
Earlier this year, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes. The ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.
Similarly, India-based Zen Technologies launched an enhanced variant of its counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) that is already in service with the Indian Armed Forces in May 2026. The new variant of the system reportedly has increased detection and jamming ranges and is integrated with AI for improved threat detection.
These are just a few examples of India’s counter-drone effort.
The armed forces are also conducting dedicated counter-drone exercises based on lessons from Operation Sindoor. In October 2025, for instance, India’s largest drone and counter-drone warfare drill, Exercise Cold Start, was conducted in Madhya Pradesh to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing air defense
Therefore, the recently concluded Rotor Clap-III, focused on the IAF’s helicopter fleet, is another step in preparing for operations on a battlefield increasingly dominated by drones.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
The United States (US) floated a pitch to supply India with advanced Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter jets. US President Donald Trump publicly stated that Washington was paving the way to provide India with the fifth-generation aircraft.
In February 2025, during Indian PM Modi’s visit to the US, Trump told a joint news conference, “Starting this year, we’ll be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We’re also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters.”
Later, Vice President JD Vance said: With regular joint military exercises, it’s only natural for India to buy more of our defense equipment, including the F-35s,” pitching the stealth aircraft to cement US-Indian defense relations.
Some believe that the statement(s) were meant to please India, but much more, the American arms lobby.
Meanwhile, some new prospective customers of F-35 have emerged. Qatar has reportedly begun exploratory talks with Washington. Saudi Arabia has pursued the acquisition of up to 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters to modernize its air force and counter regional threats. Turkey is lobbying hard to get back into the F-35 program.
Turkey was earlier removed from the program in 2019 and hit with CAATSA sanctions after purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defense system, but renewed diplomatic push and potential shifts in U.S. policy have reopened discussions.
However, the US is insisting that Turkey will have to dispose of the S-400 units, which Ankara could sell, as per reports, to either the UAE or Qatar.
While countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, among others, have been desperately trying to seek the F-35 stealth jets, why did India not aggressively pursue the US aircraft?
India Needs a Fifth Generation Fighter
The IAF is already down to 29 fighter squadrons. Pakistan could possibly receive its first initial batch of Chinese Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter jets by 2027.
Reports indicate an expected first delivery of 4 to 12 export-grade J-35 (or J-35E/A) aircraft. Pakistan plans to acquire up to 40 units by 2029. However, there are some reports that the timelines may slip.
Notwithstanding, this could change the air-combat dynamics in the subcontinent.
There are reports that China has already built nearly 500 J-20 fifth-generation fighters, and over 350 are in service with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Some have been deployed close to India’s Ladakh, in Xinjiang.
They have also been exercising over Tibet. Both Pakistan and China operate in collusion.
There will thus be pressure on India’s security establishment to acquire interim fifth-generation aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-57 has been offered with full technology transfer, and the F-35 is still at the “mind-games” stage.
The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is widely considered the best fifth-generation multirole fighter because it combines extreme, low-observable stealth with revolutionary sensor fusion, acting as a flying computer and “quarterback of the skies” that networks data seamlessly with friendly platforms.
The low radar cross-section lets it bypass modern air defense networks undetected, as demonstrated in Iran. Around 1,400 F-35s have been built. 12 countries already operate them. Another eight countries have ordered them.
The U.S. and its major international partner nations have already committed to acquire over 3,100 F-35 stealth aircraft through 2035. The United States intends to purchase 2,456 jets.
Undoubtedly, it is the best fifth-generation fighter currently.
F-35 Offer & Complexities for India
For India, the F-35 proposal faced almost immediate hurdles due to subsequent tariff frictions and India’s core push for technology transfer for domestic manufacturing of its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the aero-engines.
There have been tremendous delays by GE Aerospace on its 2021 contract to supply 99 F404-IN20 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Tejas Mk1A fighter program. Only six out of the promised engines have been delivered instead of the targeted 12-plus a year, prompting HAL to invoke contractual penalty clauses.
The tariffs on “friend” India and delayed engines for AMCA badly strained the Indo-US ties.
India also operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, a factor that previously caused frictions between the US and Turkey.
India already operates the S-400 and Su-30MKI. The U.S. fears these networks could compromise classified F-35 stealth data. The jet relies on the U.S.-controlled Operational Data Integrated Network for software and logistics.
The US is perhaps already accessing such data through many other American platforms on Indian soil.
Meanwhile, introducing a complex new Western platform adds severe maintenance challenges to an already diverse military fleet. Even in the US, there are very few airbases where the stealth coatings can be serviced.
Buying foreign fifth-generation jets risks diverting funds from India’s indigenous AMCA project. Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable US basket will also be an issue. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to putting sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support.
While operationally, the F-35 could present major strategic advantages for the IAF, any potential deal involves deep geopolitical, logistical, and financial complexities. Acquisition costs range from $80 to $110 million per jet alongside very high hourly operational expenses, creating budgetary issues for New Delhi.
An Italian F35 fighter jet takes part in the “Blue Flag” multinational air defense exercise at the Ovda air force base, north of the Israeli city of Eilat, on November 11, 2019. (Photo by JACK GUEZ / AFP)
Su-57 Offer and Complexities
Russia has been aggressively marketing and bidding for India’s interim fifth-generation fighter. Due to Western sanctions, its military sales have slowed down considerably in the last few years.
It has offered India complete technology transfer and local licensed production of the Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter jet.
Russian leadership has pitched the deal with no restrictions. The full technology offer includes access to stealth design, engines, AESA radar, optics, and AI elements. A phased transfer of production to Indian facilities, using existing Su-30MKI infrastructure, is proposed.
There is willingness to co-develop a twin-seat variant and integrate Indian weapons. As the IAF faces a growing stealth gap, the offer looks attractive.
But unfortunately, only 42 Su-57 have been built to date. Even the Russian Air Force has ordered only around 72 aircraft. Yearly production is still around 10-12 aircraft.
Unlike the F-35, Su-57 is unlikely to get large orders. Russia is still in a major war, and its military industrial complex is busy producing for its front lines. Delivery of Su-57 could be 5-6 years after signing the contract, as not many fly-away units are available.
There is normally a big gap between publicly stated offers of technology vis-à-vis when being penned on paper or actually delivered. While the Su-57 is very impressive during displays, some are questioning the quality of its stealth.
Not many Su-57s have been heard of attempting to penetrate the Ukrainian air defenses. The Indian establishment has thus not made any statements on Su-57 acquisition.
India’s AMCA program is in the critical stealth validation and prototype manufacturing preparation phase. The three consortiums led by private sector conglomerates have been short-listed. These include Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, and Bharat Forge. Bids are being prepared for the ₹15,000 crore ($1.57 billion) development-cum-production contract.
A full-scale engineering model recently underwent specialized Radar Cross Section (RCS) testing at the ORANGE facility in Dundigal, Hyderabad. The prototype rollout is anticipated around late 2026 or early 2027, with the first flight planned roughly within 30 months of contract finalization. Serial production and initial induction into the Indian Air Force (IAF) are targeted for the mid-2030s.
A clean internal stealth layout would involve carrying about 1.5 tons of weapons for initial penetration, and a non-stealth “beast mode” payload carrying up to 7 tons across 14 stations. The Twin-engine, all-weather platform is built for deep strikes, electronic warfare, and low radar cross-section operations.
Considering that the IAF has still to receive the first LCA Mk1A, due to delayed GE-404 engine deliveries and some integration issues, the timelines for the very technology-intensive AMCA are very optimistic.
To accelerate the AMCA, India has shifted from a single-agency monopoly to a competitive public-private consortium model, engaging shortlisted private industrial heavyweights such as L&T with BEL, Tata Advanced Systems, and Bharat Forge, alongside the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), to build five prototypes.
All these consortia have industrial and project management capability and have been in the defense production ecosystem for quite some time. They will handle development, manufacturing, and future series production with dedicated capacity and speed.
Core specialized flight-testing and integration centers have been established (such as the facility in Puttaparthi, Andhra Pradesh), and dedicated airspace commitments have been secured from civil aviation authorities to streamline flight trials. Procuring interim GE-414 engines for prototype testing while simultaneously engaging with global partners like France’s Safran and Rolls-Royce for high-thrust indigenous engine development to avoid power plant bottlenecks.
India has set up high-level monitoring committees chaired by top defense officials to shrink timelines from the drawing board to the first scheduled prototype flights. However, I feel that a national project of this kind must be monitored directly by the PM Office.
The decision-making has to be much faster. Some risks will have to be factored and taken. More funds would have to be put on the table. Private sector commercial connections and national diplomacy must be used to acquire critical technologies. Reverse-engineering must no longer be a taboo word. AI needs to be extensively used for design and manufacturing to cut timelines.
Supply chain redundancy and diplomatic, secure sourcing are required. Aero-engine has to be a national priority project. India needs to invest more in critical minerals and special metals manufacturing.
Our manufacturing excellence has to reach the levels to make single-crystal blades with high-precision cooling ducts. The best talent has to be nurtured. The exodus of the kind that happened from ISRO must be prevented through more attractive opportunities. A few dedicated aerospace universities should be set up. A skilled manufacturing force has to be built.
After two decades of relationship ascendancy, in the last two years, there has been a level of distrust between the largest and oldest democracies of the world.
While it is hoped that it is a transitory phase, it is becoming clear that the US is not interested in India’s rise as a global power. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated at the last Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi that Washington will not repeat its past approach (read mistake) with China by granting India unfettered market and tech access that could lead to strong commercial competition.
The US wants India to be strong enough only to be a bulwark against China and not become an independent power center or a technology and economic power.
The US seems keen only to supply platforms to India through large contracts. Even for aero-structures and smaller components, they prefer make-in-India “Build to Print” and not any significant technology sharing.
Even the proposed India-USA deal to co-produce GE Aerospace F414 engines with HAL faces major hurdles. The primary complications involve a nearly threefold cost surge, alongside intense disputes over sensitive hot-end technology transfer and the risk of delays to India’s Tejas Mk2 and AMCA programs.
Many Indians are wondering if we have invested too much in a partner with whom there is a high trust deficit and who has a vacillating foreign policy. US is known to have “dumped” friends and allies for immediate national interests. The way the Trump administration has publicly threatened or admonished its own NATO allies in the recent past further strengthens Indian concerns.
USA has already gotten deep into India’s airborne platforms and supplied India with transport aircraft (C-17, C-130), maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I), UAVs (MQ-9), and helicopters (Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and MH-60R).
For a long time, the US was trying to sell the F-16 ‘Viper’ (renamed F-21) and the F-18 Super Hornet as part of India’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) proposal. Later, it offered the F-15EX. The F-35 was never officially on offer.
Despite being the oldest democracy, the US finds it easier to deal with dependent military Generals, and West Asian Sheikhs, rather than growing democracies. The US has a poor opinion of India’s “Non-Alignment” and “Strategic Autonomy.”
Washington continues to prefer unstable Pakistan, which helps it connect with China and West and Central Asia, and is willing to toe the American line for a few bucks. This Pakistan connection causes further distrust in India.
Most analysts feel that allowing the USA into India’s fighter aircraft ecosystem is not a great idea. Any F-35 deal, like the other aircraft deals, will be just a supply and support contract. There will be no transfer of technology, and no “Make-in-India” element.
While India pushes its own AMCA program, if at all, the better choice for an interim fighter may still be the Su-57.
Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran, fighter test pilot, and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals during his 40-year tenure in the IAF.
THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
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