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Mali’s army recaptures town of Kidal

Mali’s armed forces have recaptured the northern city of Kidal following a large-scale military offensive conducted alongside Russia’s Africa Corps. It is a major development in the government’s efforts to restore state control over territory held by armed groups.

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) announced that their troops consolidated their operational deployment in Kidal on October 7, 2026, under Operation Dougoukoloko, following several days of airstrikes and coordinated air and ground operations against the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an armed group affiliated with al-Qaeda.

In a statement, the military said the operation had weakened the armed groups’ fighting capacity and disrupted their logistical networks.

“As part of the large-scale offensive conducted in the Eastern theater, under Operation DOUGOUKOLOKO, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) consolidated their operational deployment in the city of KIDAL on Wednesday, October 7, 2026,” the statement said.

The military added that the offensive followed an intense air campaign and several air-ground operations that had “neutralized several elements belonging to the FLA-JNIM terrorist coalition” and inflicted significant damage on their logistical capabilities.

According to the statement, the operation was conducted by Malian forces and their partners, referring to Russia’s Africa Corps, which has supported Mali’s military authorities in security operations.

The military said the offensive aimed to strengthen security for communities in northern Mali, ensure the free movement of people and goods, reinforce border security, and disrupt the criminal economic activities of armed groups.

“Through this operational dynamic, the FAMa continue their sovereign mission of securing the national territory and protecting civilian populations and their property against abuses by Armed Terrorist Groups,” the statement added.

A strategic city in the conflict

Kidal, long a stronghold of Tuareg separatism, has been at the center of the conflict in northern Mali since 2012. The Malian army first retook the city on November 14, 2023, after more than a decade with almost no state presence there.

That control ended in April 2026. On that day the FLA and JNIM launched near-simultaneous assaults on several cities, including the capital, Bamako, as well as Kati, Mopti, Gao and Kidal. The attacks targeted military installations and strategic sites. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was among those killed. Malian troops and Africa Corps forces subsequently withdrew from Kidal.

For the transitional government led by General Assimi Goïta, which has made territorial sovereignty its central promise, the recapture is a major symbolic victory.

Mali’s sovereignty and regional security

The recapture comes as Mali continues to pursue a security strategy centered on strengthening its armed forces and working with external partners, particularly Russia, following the deterioration of its relations with several Western governments and the expulsion of French forces.

For the Malian government, securing Kidal is more than a military objective but also a question of national sovereignty. Control of the city would strengthen the state’s position in the north.

In its statement, the military said the operation was intended to provide lasting security for the population, protect civilian property, and restrict the activities of armed groups operating in the region.

The recapture of Kidal does not by itself resolve Mali’s broader security crisis. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) broadly continues to face security threats and destabilization campaigns from adversaries in its fight to assert sovereignty.

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ICC ignored ‘very well-documented’ NATO crimes – ex-Libyan minister

RT – October 11, 2026

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has ignored allegations of “very well-documented” NATO war crimes brought before it, former Libyan Information Minister Moussa Ibrahim has told RT.

In an interview on Saturday, he argued that the US-led military bloc has never been held accountable for what he described as “very well-documented” crimes committed during military interventions in several countries.

“In Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Libya, we have literally… millions of documents, videos, footage, statements, witnesses who testify to the crimes against humanity committed by NATO collectively and NATO countries individually,” he said.

The former minister said he had personally participated in a 2013 effort to bring allegations of NATO war crimes before the ICC over the bloc’s 2011 intervention in Libya, which left the country devastated and deeply divided.

“We presented a very powerful profile of thousands and thousands of pages. And it was not even allowed to be seen or heard or discussed. It was dismissed right away,” Ibrahim said, adding that prominent European human rights lawyers had been involved in preparing the case.

The failure to pursue such cases demonstrated the “limitation” of the system, he said, urging the East, particularly China and Russia to “rethink the whole equation.”

The ICC needs to be “radically, not superficially” reformed or replaced with a new international judicial institution capable of upholding human rights without Western political interference, he stressed. A handful of powerful Western countries currently exploit the ICC for their own advantage while ensuring “that they are immune against any cases brought forward against them,” he said.

The remarks come just days after Washington imposed sweeping new sanctions on the court after accusing it of overstepping its jurisdiction in pursuing alleged crimes involving American and Israeli nationals. The move followed the ICC’s 2024 issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Meanwhile, the ICC’s investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by American forces during the US-led war in Afghanistan never resulted in criminal charges against US personnel.

Watch the RT segment.

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The cyber-fueled cult of Ibrahim Traoré

Thomas Sankara had a signature look: a natty red beret, worn with military fatigues. A striking figure, Sankara was a military officer and the radical, anti-imperialist prime minister of the Republic of Upper Volta. His arrest in 1983 led to demonstrations, followed by a coup, after which Sankara was released and installed as president. By the following year Sankara had given the country he now led its new name — Burkina Faso. He fashioned a Burkinabè identity in his own anti-imperialist image, eschewing French for local languages, promoting economic self-reliance and national pride. 

In 1986, he famously took the then French president François Mitterrand to task in a fiery speech broadcast both in Burkina Faso and France. Sankara’s dashing uniform played an outsized role in how his words were interpreted. Here was Africa’s own Che Guevara. But by October 1987, Sankara was dead, killed during a military coup led by his former friend and ally Blaise Compaoré.

France, the old colonial power, backed Compaoré. Soon after the coup, French officials once again flocked to Ouagadougou, helping to prop up Compaoré for decades. 

Burkinabè children wearing false kepis during the military parade in Ouagadougou to commemorate the second anniversary of the revolution of the Burkina Faso. August 4, 1985. Daniel LAINE / AFP via Getty Images.

This potted history is important to understanding the phenomenon of Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s current president, an authoritarian head of state who in his charisma and self-presentation so deliberately echoes Sankara.

On September 30, thousands of Burkinabè gathered in Ouagadougou’s Place de la Révolution to hail Traoré on the fourth anniversary of the coup that brought him to power. As the second coming of Sankara, Traoré — whatever their entirely different political ideologies – is arguably the face of contemporary African anti-imperialism. It is a meticulously cultivated image that has almost nothing to do with Traoré’s actual record, or his achievements in Burkina Faso. 

Traoré is a pan-African leader for a digital age, an autocrat who has suspended his country’s constitution, dismantled its admittedly fledgling democratic institutions and been accused of crimes against humanity, but who has used artificial intelligence, particularly deepfakes, to bury that record beneath a highly effective cyber cult of personality.

How do Burkinabè reconcile the man with the persona? And is Traoré a triumph of the algorithm, the kind of politician increasingly familiar from Ouagadougou to Delhi, Berlin, Buenos Aires, and of course Washington, DC?

Left: Burkina Faso President Thomas Sankara during a speech on October 5, 1983, in Paris, France. Alain MINGAM/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images. Right: New coup leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré at a news conference on October 2, 2022 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

The man, the myth, the algorithm 

Ibrahim Traoré came to power in September 2022. In his own telling, while Sankara was installed as president, Traoré led the putsch himself. By January 2023, Burkina Faso terminated its military accord with France, giving French special forces one month to leave the country. In June this year, Burkina Faso ended all diplomatic relations with France. 

As Traoré turned away from France, he strengthened relations with Moscow. It’s in keeping with the pattern across the countries of the Sahel — Burkina Faso and its neighbours Mali and Niger — as the region’s colonial history with France has been swept clean by a broom held first by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and latterly the Russian state itself, represented by the Africa Corps. 

But in April and May 2026, Africa Corps forces were dealt a humiliating defeat in northern Mali by a combination of Tuareg separatists and allegedly Al-Qaeda linked Islamists. The Malian defence minister was assassinated in a suicide bombing at his home near the capital Bamako. With Russia so involved militarily in the Sahel countries, Ukraine has admitted to assisting rebel forces. Both Mali and Niger have cut diplomatic ties with Kyiv. And Burkina Faso has described Kyiv as a destabilising force in the region, making the Sahel effectively a front in Russia’s war with Ukraine. As recently as September, Traoré named Ukraine as a part of Burkina Faso’s “map of enemies” for which, he added menacingly, “we need to prepare.”

Russia, as Coda Story has reported for years, has used everything from weapons sales to mercenaries to paying African influencers to both spread Russian narratives and hold Moscow up as the alternative to continuing to rely on exploitative economic relationships with the West, particularly erstwhile European colonialists.

Despite the extent of Russian attempts to influence the Sahel, it’s not Moscow that is signing the most consequential deals with the military juntas it helps prop up. It’s Beijing. And the deals being signed with China to mine the region’s extensive mineral wealth — the lithium, gold, copper, zinc, bauxite and uranium — have served as a reminder to the United States that it too should resume stalled relationships in the Sahel. Early in 2026, Burkina Faso signed a near $150 million healthcare deal with the U.S. in exchange, it appeared, for favourable access to minerals. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe backed away from similar deals, expressing concern about U.S. demands for data and minerals that amounted to an infringement of sovereignty. 

Burkina Faso's President Ibrahim Traoré arrives in Moscow, Russia on May 8, 2025. Grigory Sysoev / RIA Novosti/Anadolu via Getty Images.

The deals with China and the United States are being negotiated alongside a drive to reduce reliance on foreign loans and grants and ramp up domestic production, particularly of gold. Traoré claims his economic policies emphasise nationalisation and self-reliance. His government has taken over major mining operations and increased state stakes in other industries. In early 2024, his administration suspended export permits for small-scale gold production to crack down on smuggling and keep mineral wealth inside the country. Last month, he inaugurated Burkina Faso’s first gold refinery. 

Some of this has had positive economic effects. The World Bank, in a June 2026 update, said the country had an estimated 5.3% growth in 2025, up from 4.8% in 2024, and its fiscal deficit narrowed from 5.8% of GDP to 1.8%. Inflation was also negative, 0.5%, compared to 4.2% in 2024. Reports by the World Bank and IMF have ascribed these growth to external factors such as the gold rally, climate-driven increase in agricultural outputs, and reduction in energy prices. 

Economic growth, though, is part of a larger story that includes a crackdown on the press, particularly critical coverage of alleged human rights violations. Human Rights Watch documented 1,840 civilian deaths between January 2023 and April 2025, over 1,200 of which were directly attributed to government forces. Even as the report acknowledged widespread violations by Islamist groups, the actions of the Burkina Faso military, it said, “amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” At the same time, Traoré has clamped down on Burkinabè civil society, banning over 100 human rights organizations and dissolving all political parties.

None of it appears to have affected his carefully-honed image in certain online spaces.

Street of Ouagadougou shows a poster celebrating former President Thomas Sankara, known as "Africa's Che Guevara" and the portrait of the Argentine-born guerrilla leader Ernesto Che Guevara. Ahmed Ouobaa/AFP via Getty Images.
Streets of Accra, Ghana, May 9, 2026. Olatunji Olaigbe.
A graffiti portrait of the president of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traoré. Boniface Muthoni/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.


A pan-African hero 

Traoré is everywhere. In Accra, the capital of Ghana, his image is pasted onto buses and in parks. In January 2025, at the swearing-in of the Ghanaian president John Mahama, it was Traoré who the crowd responded to, cheering for a rockstar rather than a head of state. Even Mahama joked that Traoré had stolen the show. Artwork celebrating Traoré is frequently posted online. The commentary that accompanies the art is gushing. “Through this artwork,” reads one Facebook tribute, “I celebrate the spirit of a man who stands for sovereignty, truth, and the rise of a self-determined Africa.”

Meanwhile, the Ivory Coast government has granted refugee status to at least 69,000 Burkinabè fleeing Burkina Faso.

In May, when I travelled to Ghana and Ivory Coast to talk to people displaced from Burkina Faso, at least five sources decided they no longer wanted to speak. Guaranteeing anonymity didn’t seem to matter. A Burkinabè journalist who was helping me find people to speak to, stopped responding to my messages the day after I arrived in Accra. Those who did speak to me refused to be quoted for fear that harm would come to family and friends left behind in Burkina Faso.

Reporters have been intimidated into silence. “Today, any journalist living in the country is forced to practice self-censorship to avoid being arrested,” says Harouna Simbo Drabo, disinformation analyst and Director of Programs & Partnerships of Faso Check. “Burkinabé journalists have two options,” he told me, “either practice self-censorship or go into exile.” After threats to his life, Drabo has left Burkina Faso.

He’s one of the luckier journalists. Since 2022, at least seven Burkinabè reporters have been forcibly conscripted into the army after criticizing the Traoré junta's crackdown on the press. Guezouma Sanogo, Boukari Ouoba, and Luc Pagbelguem were abducted days after their union denounced state media as "instruments of propaganda." Atiana Serge Oulon, editor-in-chief of L'Événement, is among the disappeared. Many, like Drabo, have either left Burkina Faso or quit their jobs. 

As conditions deteriorate, what information is becoming available is government propaganda amplified by social media linked to Russian misinformation. In the absence of accurate, verified information, there is inevitably only disinformation. For instance, one of the most persistent pieces of disinformation is the story that Traoré — a supposedly avowed anti-imperialist despite his kowtowing to Moscow, Beijing and Washington — rejected billions of dollars in International Monetary Fund handouts because he believes, à la Thomas Sankara, in economic self-reliance. It is a story that has been debunked but was repeatedly told to me by Traoré supporters, including at least one journalist.

The claim was cited more than 700 times in a single three-day window in January 2025 alone, racking up millions of views across Facebook, X, and TikTok. Dubawa fact-checked the story and found that rather than rejecting money from the IMF, the Burkina Faso government had negotiated a 48-month IMF loan program in September 2023 and drew on World Bank financing in 2024. 

By mid-2025. Code for Africa's analysis found social media in sub-Saharan Africa flooded with AI-generated videos casting Traoré alongside Beyoncé, Rihanna, and, in one particularly unhinged iteration, Pope Leo XIV, all of whom supposedly endorsed him as a Pan-African hero holding the line against the West. After US AFRICOM commander Michael Langley criticized Traoré's handling of Burkina Faso’s gold reserves in a Senate hearing, a network of 165 Facebook accounts began posting identical language claiming Putin had deployed special forces to protect Traoré from an American assasination plot. In ten days it pulled 10.9 million views. 

In Accra, I caught a bus with a picture of Traoré emblazoned on the side. The driver, who only identified himself as Kofi, insisted that before we spoke I should tell him what I thought of Traoré. I say I am not Burkinabè, that I have not visited Burkina Faso but that I have spoken to many people whose lives have been upended by Traoré’s strongman politics. I told him about Burkinabè journalists in exile, forced to join the army, or even disappeared. I told him that when asked about a transition to democracy, Traoré said it was important for Burkinabè to “forget” about democracy. “We have to tell the truth,” Traoré said, “democracy isn’t for us.” I told him about the Burkinabè refugees I met in Treichville, a district in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast capital.

Kofi listened and then told me that “good things take sacrifice,” including the death of a free press. When I asked what he meant by good things, he showed me AI-generated videos of a smart city Traoré had supposedly built.

African identity is tightly wound around the belief that the continent has more potential than it has achieved. The deficit can be attributed to a lot of issues, but chiefly to Western exploitation and the complicity of African leaders. “African countries have also fallen into autocratic democracy,” Sanusi Sanusi, Research Analyst at the Digital Tech, AI & Information Disorder Analysis Centre, DAIDAC, tells me. “There is an election every couple of years but it isn't free or fair.”

Supporters of Traoré wave Burkina Faso and Russian flags during a rally at Place de la Nation Ouagadougou on April 30, 2025. AFP via Getty Images.

Neil Postman, in Amusing Ourselves to Death, writes that “disinformation does not mean false information. It means misleading information — misplaced, irrelevant, fragmented or superficial information — information that creates the illusion of knowing something but which in fact leads one away from knowing.”

Many Traoré supporters I spoke with, most of whom were men, were convinced they knew things I did not. They told me to educate myself more on Western hypocrisy in Africa. They said they did not have faith in those who appointed themselves arbiters of what was fact and what was disinformation. In Lagos I met Lemi Ghariokwu, who designed album covers for the iconic Nigerian musician Fela Kuti, a revolutionary figure. Ghariokwu, who has a portrait of Ibrahim Traoré hanging in his studio, told me that “Western education and propaganda has made our elite class toothless bulldogs.” Listening to them, it seemed as if a successful Africa needed strongmen, needed autocrats.

In Abidjan, the last person I spoke to about Traoré was Oumar, a Burkinabè taxi driver who had moved to the Ivorian capital in 2021. He told me he “supports Traoré with all my heart.” But as we talked, he admitted he had not been back home because “things are only getting worse.” Three Burkinabè refugees I spoke to told me they thought I might be a government agent planted among them to find out what they really thought about Traoré and that I would then report those thoughts back to Ouagadougou.

Many of the Traoré supporters I spoke with thought I was brainwashed by Western media or, worse, too docile to participate in an African revolution. For my part, I thought they were ill-informed and unable or, worse, unwilling to see through propaganda.

The fundamental curse of the age of information and connection is that we rarely confront how the mediums meant to unite us have fractured us. An unprecedented flood of data has shattered shared reality into millions of customized, mutually hostile subcultures.

With the help of AI and social media, Traoré has managed to decouple national and anti-imperial pride from government performance. By the middle of next year, Burkina Faso will no longer be part of the International Criminal Court, denounced by Traoré as an “instrument of neocolonial oppression”, and thus no longer accountable in any international forum. His government has said it is “decolonizing” the school curriculum. Cheered on by social media, Traoré has used anti-imperial grievances and resentments to argue that authoritarian military rule is the only safeguard for sovereignty.

As some Burkinabè exiles told me ironically, they thought both I, so sceptical of Traoré, and the Traoré die-hards in the African diaspora could use a few months living in Burkina Faso. We should, they said, experience the country Traoré has made IRL. See past the carefully curated myth of the man himself, the largely online fantasy of the pan-African, anti-imperial revolutionary who needs to break a few eggs to make the omelet, and assess the country he runs unchallenged.

The post The cyber-fueled cult of Ibrahim Traoré appeared first on Coda Story.

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Retired KC-10 Extender Tankers Could Get A Second Life With North African Mystery Operator

Just over two years after the U.S. Air Force retired the last of its KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tankers, four of those aircraft may be bound for a new career in North Africa for a mysterious end user.

The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) put out a contracting notice yesterday “solely for information and planning purposes” with the express intent “to identify potential industry sources that possess the capability, expertise, and facilities to execute the regeneration, one-time flight clearance, depot-level return to service, worldwide ferry delivery, in-country Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), and operational/maintenance training for up to four (4) KC-10 Extender aircraft.”

The KC-10s could be “transferred via Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to a partner nation in North Africa,” the notice adds, without naming the country in question.

Retired KC-10 tankers seen at the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona in 2025. US Military

The Air Force operated KC-10s between 1981 and 2024. TWZ has reached out to the U.S. Air Force, as well as the U.S. State Department, for more information. The State Department directed us to contact the Pentagon.

The EDA program allows for materiel deemed extraneous to U.S. military needs to be transferred to allies and partners either at a reduced cost or as a grant. The foreign nation in question has to pay for those assets to be delivered, as well as refurbishment, if applicable.

It is important to note here that the Extender, as designed, is capable of refueling receivers using either the boom or the probe-and-drogue method. Tankers equipped for the probe-and-drogue method are, by far, more common internationally. We will come back to this later on.

A KC-10 seen refueling F-16 fighters via the boom. USAF
A KC-10 refuels a US Navy F/A-18 Hornet via the probe-and-drogue method. USN

While we don’t know what the North African country might be in line now to receive the quartet of KC-10s, Egypt and Morocco would seem to be the most likely candidates based on their current and planned aircraft inventories. They are also both major U.S. allies.

The Egyptian Air Force currently does not operate any dedicated aerial refueling tankers. The country is in the process of acquiring two new C-130J-30 Hercules aircraft for use as airlifters, as well as tankers, using the probe-and-drogue method. It does already fly C-130s, but none explicitly configured for aerial refueling duties. Egypt also has a very diverse array of fighters that includes U.S.-made F-16 Vipers that can only be refueled in mid-air via boom.

A US Air Force KC-10 refuels an Egyptian F-16 during an exercise in 2023. USAF/Staff Sgt. Emily Farnsworth

Morocco’s Air Force also flies F-16s and is in the process of acquiring more. The first new-production Block 72 F-16D for the Moroccan Air Force just flew for the first time earlier this week. Morocco does have an organic aerial refueling capability now, but in the form of C-130s equipped to dispense fuel via probe-and-drogue.

A Moroccan F-16 seen linking up with a US Air Force KC-135 tanker during an exercise. USAF

As mentioned, the KC-10 was designed to connect with receivers via probe-and-drogue, as well as boom, and could be used to refuel other tactical jets in Egyptian or Moroccan service. As an aside, fighters belonging to both regularly receive foreign tanker support during exercises, as already seen earlier in this story. Just last month, Chinese YY-20 tankers (also sometimes referred to as Y-20Us) notably did just this in an exercise in Egypt.

Footage released by Egypt’s official authorities from the “Eagles of Civilization 2026” joint air exercise shows Egyptian **MiG-29M/M2s and Rafale fighters receiving aerial refueling from a Chinese Y-20 tanker aircraft. pic.twitter.com/pvxkpsDHxG

— 笑脸男人 (@lfx160219) September 7, 2026

Whichever country may be in line to receive the four KC-10s, there is a question about the current state of those aircraft. Earlier in this story, we talked about the Extender’s capabilities as designed.

McDonnell Douglas (since absorbed into Boeing) delivered a total of 60 KC-10s to the U.S. Air Force between 1979 and 1987. The Extender was derived from the three-engine DC-10 airliner, the last of which was produced in 1989. The Air Force lost one of its KC-10s in an accident in 1987.

Of the remaining 59 KC-10s, 10 were put up for auction in a non-flyable state last year. For reasons that remain unclear, a single engine had been removed from under one of the wings of each of those aircraft. These Extenders were also among the first to be retired, and their booms had been stripped to be used as spares for the examples that remained in service until 2024. Private aerial refueling contractor Omega Air looks to have subsequently won those auctions. Omega also operates two ex-Dutch KDC-10 tankers, which are broadly similar to the KC-10, as well as another DC-10 converted into a probe-and-drogue-only tanker. The company has several Boeing 707-based tankers, as well.

One of Omega Air’s KDC-10s refuels US Air Force F-16s. USAF

The condition of the remaining 49 Extenders is unclear. Congress included a provision in the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2026 Fiscal Year that required the Air Force to preserve remaining retired KC-10s, but only stipulated they be maintained “in the same storage condition” they were in as of September 30, 2025. The bill, which was signed into law in December 2025, also made clear that the Air Force could still “dispose” of the aircraft in accordance with existing property management statutes.

Regenerating military aircraft, especially larger ones, back to service can be costly, complex, and time-consuming, even when they are kept in storage in a highly maintained state. In this particular case, acquiring KC-10s via the EDA program, with a very low up-front purchase price, could still be attractive to the right buyer, especially compared to the cost of acquiring new-production tankers.

Personnel at the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base apply a protective coating to a KC-10. USAF

For a country like Egypt or Morocco that has never operated a boom-equipped tanker, second-hand Extenders could be a valuable entry point to future aerial refueling capabilities, as well. In general, organic aerial refueling capability is an important force multiplier for any air arm.

There is a possibility that KC-10s could be regenerated not as tankers, but as cargo aircraft, though this seems less likely to be the case. Cargo carrying was also an important duty for the Extenders while in U.S. Air Force service, and they still could operate in this role even when returned to service as tankers.

Though the aging KC-10s were getting increasingly more difficult to operate and maintain, the Air Force’s decision to retire them was still controversial. The Extender was a highly flexible tanker that could carry more fuel than the KC-46s that supplanted them. Clearly, there are others still interested in operating them.

It should be stressed that the AFLCMC contracting notice does not present the transfer of the four KC-10s as a done deal. At the same time, it has revealed that one of America’s partners in North Africa could breathe new life into four of these retired tankers.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Retired KC-10 Extender Tankers Could Get A Second Life With North African Mystery Operator appeared first on TWZ.

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Why is Israel maneuvering to shift the Middle East conflagration to Africa?

From David Ben-Gurion—the architect of a state whose foundations remain a subject of debate—to Benjamin Netanyahu, a master of maintaining constant tension, the “periphery doctrine” has remained a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy. Its essence lies in forging alliances with states that surround hostile neighbors. Israeli authorities operate on the premise that secure borders do […]
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Subcontinent Ports Benefiting from Geopolitical Disruptions 

Today's trade flows resemble a windy waterpark slide more than the traditional waterway superhighway. The three-dimensional chess game being played by ocean carriers and tankers has delivered big bucks in day rates, container rates, and surcharges. But there is a group of winners not currently being highlighted.
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African Union launches continent’s first credit rating agency to counter what it says is bias inflating borrowing costs

The African Union (AU) on Wednesday launched a continental credit rating agency aimed at providing risk assessments that it says will be more credible and realistic than those produced by the major international rating agencies. The goal is to lower Africa’s borrowing costs and support the continent’s development and industrialization. To that end, the African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA), which will be headquartered in Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius, will operate as a private and independent entity, with no ownership stake held by the AU or any government.

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© Sean Gallup (Getty Images)

The main lobby of the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa.
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Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia escalate, as fighting in Tigray intensifies

A new war of words has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It comes as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia pulls the country’s long-running disputes with its neighbors back into the open.

Ethiopia’s government has blamed neighboring states for the escalating conflict in the north. The government has accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could expand regionally. Birhanu Jula, Ethiopia’s army chief, stated that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has clearly needed outside support and supplies from Egypt, Sudan, and other foreign powers to sustain its campaign. 

Cairo rejected the claim. Foreign Ministry spokesman Nader Zaki said Egypt’s foreign policy rests on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of other states and on staying out of their internal affairs, adding that claims to the contrary had no basis in fact. 

Tension over Ethiopia minister’s remarks

The dispute quickly returned to the Nile. On Saturday, Ethiopia’s minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Itefa, published a social media post, later deleted, comparing the GERD to Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. “Before criticizing Ethiopia, Egypt should explain why it built the Aswan High Dam without Ethiopian consent.”

Cairo responded the same day. A source at the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation called the post “shameful” and said it reflected political confusion.

“Responding to such nonsense and the political confusion reflected in the post would be nothing more than a waste of time,” the source said. The source called the post “a desperate attempt to divert attention from the core dispute: Ethiopia’s continued unilateral actions over its illegal dam, which violate international law.”

Habtamu made the same argument. He said it was shameful to hear Egyptian politicians demand that Ethiopia obtain their consent for dams that do no significant harm, and argued that Egypt had not consulted Ethiopia when it built Aswan. He described Cairo’s insistence on prior consent as an outdated approach rooted in colonial-era arrangements. 

The $5 billion GERD sits on the Blue Nile, about 14 kilometers from the Sudanese border. It is 1.8 kilometers wide and 145 meters tall, with a design capacity of 5,150 megawatts. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated it on September 9, 2025. Egypt and Sudan, the downstream states, have long demanded a legally binding agreement on how it is filled and operated. The United States has also stepped back, in a January 2026 letter to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, US President Donald Trump offered to restart US-led mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia on Nile water-sharing. 

The El Alamein declaration

The leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia met in El Alamein and issued a joint declaration covering both the Red Sea and the Nile, and among other things. On the question of the Red Sea, the four states affirmed “the principle of freedom of navigation and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states.” 

Regarding the Nile, the declaration emphasized “the importance of respecting international law regarding transboundary rivers including the Nile River particularly the principle of ‘no harm’ and the obligation to cooperate through prior notification, consultation, and consensus.” It also categorically rejected “any unilateral measures that harm the existing water uses of the two downstream Nile states.” The four countries pledged to keep strengthening “consultation and coordination among the four countries and other sisterly African nations.”

“Realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric”

Ethiopia issued its own statement in response to the El Alamein declaration, arguing, “Ethiopia is the source of the Abay River, commonly known as the Blue Nile. Virtually all of the Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands, and the Abay contributes about 85% of the Nile River’s total flow. Any discussion concerning the utilization and management of the Abay River should be informed by these fundamental realities.”

Insisting that, “Despite changes in political boundaries over time, Ethiopia remains closely connected to the Red Sea, with its nearest border lying barely 30 miles from the coast. Accordingly, any serious discussion of regional maritime affairs and security architecture must account for Ethiopia’s legitimate interests and its enduring connection to the Red Sea.”

It added, “These geographic and historical realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric, coercive measures, or acts of destabilization. Actions taken through proxies or acts of aggression will not change the facts on the ground, nor will they diminish Ethiopia’s legitimate interests, role, and responsibilities in the region.”

Reaffirming that it “stands ready to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and core national interests,” Ethiopia urged regional actors to pursue “constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness rather than confrontation and zero-sum approaches.”

With fighting is spreading in Ethiopia’s north and rival blocs are forming along the Red Sea, the Nile dispute could be tied into a wider regional confrontation.

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First F-16 Block 72 Has Flown

The first-ever F-16 Block 72 has taken to the air, marking a major milestone for the program and for Morocco’s long-running effort to field what Lockheed Martin describes as the most advanced version of the Viper.

The first of the jets for the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF), a two-seat F-16D, completed its maiden flight at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Greenville, South Carolina, the company announced today. The aircraft will now proceed through flight testing ahead of its delivery to Morocco.

Morocco’s first @LockheedMartin F-16 Block 72 aircraft has taken flight in Greenville, South Carolina. The milestone marks another step toward delivering the most advanced F-16 configuration to the Royal Moroccan Air Force.

— Lockheed Martin News (@LMNews) October 6, 2026

Interestingly, one of the photos of the jet published by Lockheed Martin shows the pilot in the front cockpit wearing a Digital Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (D-JHMCS). This advanced helmet is not often seen worn by F-16 pilots and it is not clear if it has been ordered by Morocco.

Regardless, Morocco was the first customer to select the Block 72 configuration when the U.S. government approved its purchase in March 2019.

At that time, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Morocco was seeking 25 F-16C/D Block 72 aircraft in a package estimated at $3.787 billion. The proposed aircraft were to be equipped with the AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), an active electronically scanned array type, new mission computers, Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems, modernized navigation systems, helmet-mounted cueing systems, and a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.

A Royal Moroccan Air Force F-16 prepares to receive fuel from a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, during exercise African Lion 2019 over the skies of Morocco, April 2, 2019. African Lion 2019 is an annual, combined multilateral exercises designed to improve interoperability and mutual understanding of each nation’s tactics, techniques and procedures while demonstrating a strong partnership between nation’s militaries. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ceaira Tinsley)
A Royal Moroccan Air Force F-16C/D Block 52+ with a pair of AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) under the wings. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ceaira Tinsley

The distinction between the Block 70 and Block 72 is the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129, while the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229, providing fractionally more power. The two configurations otherwise share the same major avionics and systems modernization package.

The F-16 began life as a Pratt & Whitney-powered fighter, with the F100 selected to power the original F-16A/B. But reliability and maintainability problems with early F100s prompted the U.S. Air Force to launch its Alternate Fighter Engine competition in the 1980s, leading General Electric to develop the F110 as an alternative. The resulting “Great Engine War” established two competing F-16 engine families, with Pratt & Whitney’s F100 and GE’s F110 ultimately becoming the principal powerplants for later F-16C/Ds. Although U.S. procurement eventually became heavily concentrated on the GE-powered F-16, Pratt & Whitney continued to supply F100-powered aircraft to international customers.

Airmen from the 49th Component Maintenance Squadron conduct a test run on a Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan engine in the hush house at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, Sept. 6, 2022. The hush house is a safe, enclosed environment designed to facilitate aircraft engine testing. (U.S. Air photo by Airman 1st Class Isaiah Pedrazzini)
Airmen conduct a test run on a Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan engine in the hush house at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. U.S. Air photo by Airman 1st Class Isaiah Pedrazzini

For Morocco, the choice of the Block 72 is based on ensuring as much fleet commonality as possible. The RMAF already operates F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft powered by F100 engines, making the new aircraft a natural fit within its existing support infrastructure.

Morocco is also upgrading its existing F-16 fleet to the F-16V configuration, which is broadly similar to the new-build Block 70/72 standard.

That will eventually provide the RMAF with a larger fleet centered around a common, substantially modernized F-16 standard.

A separate notification in March 2019 covered the upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft to the F-16V standard.

Morocco’s new and upgraded F-16s could also provide a significant boost to combined operations with its other international partners. In recent years, Moroccan F-16s participated in the campaign against ISIS, while the country has also deployed the aircraft on missions against Houthi rebels as part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen. In 2015, a Moroccan F-16 crashed in Yemen. Although the Houthis claimed they had shot down the aircraft, Moroccan authorities attributed the loss to a technical malfunction.

Reported wreckage of #Morocco Air Force F-16 lost during #Yemen operations http://t.co/bZUOnFm0vp pic.twitter.com/x5H7CQ0puD

— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) May 11, 2015

Outside of combat operations, the RMAF also frequently takes part in exercises with its allies, including the African Lion series, the largest annual, multinational joint military exercise led by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and partner nations.

A Utah Air National Guard KC-135 Stratotanker refuels a Royal Moroccan Air Force F-16 aircraft over central Morocco as part of exercise African Lion 2019, March 18, 2019. This multinational air-to-air refueling training promoted interoperability and enhanced strategic cooperation. African Lion 2019 is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored, U.S. Africa Command-scheduled, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa-led, joint and combined exercise conducted in the Kingdom of Morocco with a spoke in Tunisia. (Courtesy Photo )
A Utah Air National Guard KC-135 Stratotanker refuels a Royal Moroccan Air Force F-16 over central Morocco as part of Exercise African Lion 2019. U.S. Air Force/Courtesy Photo

Meanwhile, the new-build Moroccan aircraft also arrives at an interesting point in the F-16 program.

The Block 70/72 has attracted customers across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, with Bahrain, Bulgaria, Jordan, Peru, the Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Turkey also having selected the latest-generation Viper configuration. So far, only Block 70s have been ordered, although tbe Block 72 has been offered to some customers and potential customers. There is also apparent U.S. Air Force interest in a version of the Block 70 tailored for its specific needs and referred to by the manufacturer as the F-16G.

Air Force Reserve Crews over Southern California with the 370th FLTS from Edwards Air Force Base provide aerial refueling from a KC-135 to a Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 aircraft for the Royal Bahraini Air Force. The F-16 Block 70 is currently in developmental test with the 416th FLTS, Airpower Foundations Combined Test Force at Edwards. A sub-mission of the 416th FLTS is to provide flight test services for Foreign Military Sales customers of the F-16.
An F-16D Block 70 aircraft for the Royal Bahraini Air Force prior to delivery. U.S. Air Force

Morocco’s position as the Block 72 launch customer means the aircraft now flying is effectively the prototype-standard production aircraft for an export configuration that other countries can now buy.

The Moroccan F-16 program is also increasingly tied to a broader effort to develop the country’s military-industrial and sustainment infrastructure.

Lockheed Martin says it is working with Moroccan industry, including Maintenance Aero Maroc, on an upcoming MRO facility at Benslimane. The more than 86,000-square-foot facility is intended initially to support heavy maintenance and modernization of C-130 Hercules aircraft, with plans to expand into additional platforms, including the F-16.

A Royal Moroccan Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft taxis down the runway during Exercise African Lion 21 at the 3rd Royal Moroccan Air Force Base in Kenitra, Morocco, June 14, 2021. U.S. C-130J Super Hercules aircraft assigned to the 37th Airlift Squadron conducted an inter-fly formation with the RMAF C-130H to maintain regional support of superior airpower capabilities. African Lion is U.S. Africa Command’s largest, premier, joint, annual exercise hosted by Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal, 7-18 June. More than 7,000 participants from nine nations and NATO train together with a focus on enhancing readiness for U.S. and partner nation forces. AL21 is a multi-domain, multi-component, and multi-national exercise, which employs a full array of mission capabilities with the goal to strengthen interoperability among participants. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Devin Nothstine)
A Royal Moroccan Air Force C-130 Hercules taxis down the runway at the 3rd Royal Moroccan Air Force Base in Kenitra, Morocco. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Devin Nothstine

That could eventually give Morocco a greater role in sustaining its own expanding fleet and potentially supporting other aircraft in the region.

The F-16 program itself is part of a much broader U.S.-Moroccan defense relationship that dates back more than five decades. The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces now operate a range of U.S.-supplied systems, while Morocco is also set to receive HIMARS and has expanded its rotary-wing capabilities with AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.

For the RMAF, however, the F-16 remains central to its combat-aircraft modernization and, once it arrives, it will be the spearhead of the country’s fighter fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post First F-16 Block 72 Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.

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Red Sea in a Viсe Grip: How Djibouti Became a Hostage of the West

About 12% of world trade passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, but the strait is only part of the story: tiny Djibouti, leasing its geography to five military powers, has become an epicentre of rivalry where strategic rent may turn into catastrophe. An Oil Crossroads Turned Battleground for Influence Approximately 12% of global trade and […]
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The first national gold refinery: How Burkina Faso’s mining revolution advances its struggle for sovereignty

After expanding domestic control over mining to pursue economic sovereignty, Burkina Faso has moved up the value chain with its first gold refinery, inaugurated by its president, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, on September 28.

Most of the gold mined in the country was previously exported as unrefined dore to be processed abroad. Now, it will be processed, tested for purity, and certified domestically at the Raffinerie Nationale d’Or du Burkina Faso, built at a cost of USD 19 million on more than 12 acres in the capital, Ouagadougou.​

“From now on, gold … must not only be extracted in Burkina Faso, it must be processed, controlled, valued and certified in Burkina Faso,” Traoré said, inaugurating the new facility.​

Inviting the country’s youth “to learn to master the whole value chain,” he added, “Natural resources belong to the people. They must contribute to improve their living conditions.”​

In the struggle for sovereignty​

Burkina Faso has long been one of Africa’s largest gold producers. However, proceeds from its extraction were historically siphoned out of the country by foreign companies owning its mines. Burkinabe ownership was limited to only one mine, which a former mines minister owned privately.​

The state-owned mining company, Société de Participation Minière du Burkina Faso (SOPAMIB), served only as a dormant holder of 10% stakes in Burkina Faso’s foreign-owned mines.​

Changes began in 2022 with the ouster of then-president Roch Kaboré in a popularly supported military coup amid mass protests against the Burkinabe state’s subjugation to French neocolonialism.​

Subsequently, in 2023, Traoré’s transitional military government (backed by the trade unions, the anti-France protest movement, and wide sections of the civil society) consolidated mass support by expelling French troops from the country, asserting Burkina Faso’s sovereignty.​

Recognizing that control over its own economy and natural resources is a central pillar of sovereignty, his government launched sweeping reforms to the mining sector in mid-2024.

It revived the dormant SOPAMIB and began transferring foreign-owned mines to the state-owned mining company, nationalizing five key gold mining assets within a year.​

Following the nationalization of yet another gold mine later in September 2025, six of the country’s 15 industrial mines, accounting for 40% of the national mining operations, are domestically owned – three by the state, and three by Burkinabe private companies.​​

In the remaining foreign-owned mines, the reforms raised SOPAMIB’s free stake from 10% to 15%. It also enabled the state to buy an additional paid stake of 30%, either entirely through SOPAMIB or in partnership with domestic private investors, potentially raising the Burkinabe stake in foreign companies to 45%.​

Mining revenues finance national development

As state revenues grew from its expanded ownership, the government undertook major infrastructural projects. In 2025, it laid 500 kilometers of low-voltage lines and 165 kilometers of transmission lines, connecting almost 160,000 new households to the national grid and electrifying 131 rural localities.

​Its National Development Plan (NDP) for 2026–2030 is one of the largest economic programs ever rolled out in the Sahel. It is a 64-billion-dollar plan, two-thirds of which is to be funded domestically from state revenues generated and citizen shareholding programs.

​Read more: Burkina Faso launches Five-Year plan

​Further inspiring confidence in the viability of its five-year plan, the government expanded the 2026 annual budget by 7.58% mid-year, having already collected almost 57.5% of the projected annual revenue. This has boosted infrastructural spending without increasing the budget deficit.

​The government has also used its rising revenues to improve its fiscal position. Cashing in on the rally in gold prices in 2025, the government repaid USD 2.13 billion in domestic debt last year. To systematize the use of additional revenue generated from the cyclical movement of mineral prices, it established the Burkina Faso Sovereign Mining Investment Fund (FSMIB) in May 2026.​

Read more: Burkina Faso asserts financial independence from the West with mineral-backed sovereign fund​

Financed by surpluses generated when international mineral prices rise above the state-set benchmark, the FSMIB is not for easing short-term budgetary pressures. It is ring-fenced for long-term strategic infrastructural and industrial projects to reduce the need for external funding, on which such projects have historically depended.​

The mining reforms have not only reorganized the distribution of mining proceeds away from foreign extraction toward national economic development, but have also helped to massively increase production itself.  The 94-ton annual output in 2025 is the highest ever recorded in Burkina Faso – a nearly 47% increase from the 64 tons in 2024.​

Formalization of artisanal mining – a game changer​

Critical for this rise was the formalization of artisanal mining. In the absence of state procurement infrastructure, artisanal miners have historically sold the gold they mined to smugglers who paid the international spot price in cash. Tons of gold were thus extracted from Burkina Faso every year with no paper trail, no taxes, and no yield to the national economy, beyond sustaining the meager livelihoods of the artisanal miners.​​

A meager quarter to less than half a ton of the gold extracted by artisanal mining annually entered the official channels overseen by the National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mining Operations (ANEEMAS). [See: years].

​In October 2023, the government reorganized ANEEMAS into the National Society of Precious Substances (SONASP), tasking it with developing infrastructure to procure metals from artisanal miners. The annual official artisanal production rose in 2024 to 7.13 tons, a 15-fold growth over the previous year.

​When the annual gold production in 2025 reached a historic high of 94 tons, roughly 42 of those came from artisanal miners. Rising from just over seven a year ago, artisanal production was nearing the industrial mines’ output of about 52 tons by 2025, as SONASP’s procurement infrastructure expanded.

​To further help SONASP expand coverage in a concentrated manner, the government established nine new cooperatives of artisanal miners in the first half of 2026. It also delineated four mining corridors exclusively for artisanal miners, de-escalating the historic conflict between artisanal and industrial miners.

​With this state support structure in place, artisanal miners had already supplied 29 tons to SONASP this year by June 30, exceeding the 26 tons produced by industrial mines in the first half of this year. In this period, the government completed the construction of four new power plants, adding 126.4 megawatts of generating capacity to the national grid.

​Due in part to the improved power supply, the industrial mining output rose in the first half of this year by 7.25% over the first half of 2025. Official artisanal output grew by 45%.

​“We want to master everything to the last detail”​

“Comrades, producing in quantity is no longer enough. Extracting is no longer enough. Exporting our resources is no longer enough,” Mines Minister Yacouba Zabré Gouba said on September 28 at the inauguration of the country’s first gold refinery with an initial annual capacity of 164 tons.​

“The revolution we have engaged in requires that each national resource be used by the nation,” processing it across all stages of the value chain. “Our gold will no longer be used” by foreign companies “to create added value” while “our people remain in need,” he added.

​”We start with gold,” said Traoré. But there are “many other metals … in our subsurface that we want to extract,” including manganese, copper and zinc. “We want to master everything to the last detail.”

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The Ethiopia–Tigray Crisis: The Fragile Peace That Failed to Hold

The Pretoria Agreement brought an end to Ethiopia’s devastating Tigray war—but not its underlying disputes. Four years later, renewed fighting and shifting armed alliances are threatening to reopen the conflict. The consequences could extend far beyond Tigray, destabilising the wider Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s fragile post-Pretoria peace is rapidly unravelling as renewed fighting between federal […]
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The struggle for African unity today, an interview with Hakim Adi

Wars, neocolonial destabilization, the “aid” ideology, and the influence of Western financial institutions have sabotaged the African continent from the inside and kept it in a state of economic dependency. Yet its peoples have consistently expressed a desire for sovereignty and a rejection of external interference. 

What current manifestations of the struggle for African unity can we observe nowadays, and what continuity can be drawn with the Pan-Africanist movement of the 20th century? In the context of Trump’s administration US policies, which are targeting migrant workers, and the promotion of far-right ideology in the capitalist countries, can we say that African diasporas still play an important role in these challenges and in the emergence of a new Black power? 

Professor Hakim Adi, the author of “Panafricanism: a History” was interviewed by Alex Anfruns, a journalist and researcher, on the African struggles for emancipation.

“History has shown us that an attack on anyone

 is an attack on everybody”

Alex Anfruns: Let’s start from a chronological perspective. In the 1950s there were different strands within the Pan-Africanist movement that, despite sharing common goals such as anti-racism and anti-colonialism, diverged in their views on the liberation struggle. Which key figures and moments of that Pan-Africanism debate would you highlight?  

Hakim Adi: A key moment was the 1958 All African People’s Conference, which was held in Accra, Ghana, organized by two of the leading Pan-Africanists at the time: Kwame Nkrumah who was prime minister of Ghana, and George Padmore who was a Trinidadian Pan-Africanist and had been the main organizer of the famous 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. That Conference held in1958 was a very important moment because at that time there were very few independent African countries. Ghana had just become independent, it had achieved its formal political independence from Britain.

Some countries were still fighting for their independence like Algeria … one or two countries were already independent but most of the African continent was not yet independent … So it was very important to have this conference to bring together people from across the African continent, as well as some from the diaspora, and to discuss the necessary unity between Africans and also the politics of Pan-African liberation. It was a very successful conference in the sense that it brought together many different people, leaders from across the continent, like Felix Moumié from Cameroon, Joshua Nkomo from Zimbabwe, Patrice Lumumba from Congo and many others, including many organizations…

One of the key participants was Frantz Fanon. He was a Caribbean and Martinican Pan-Africanist, who personified Pan-Africanism, as even though he came from the Caribbean, he gave much of his life to the liberation struggle in Africa, and he was a representative of the FLN in Algeria at that time. He came to that famous conference and put forward a perspective of the liberation struggle in Africa which was different to the perspective of the main organizers of the conference, Nkrumah and Padmore. They had argued that Pan-African liberation could be non-violent, if people were organized properly and so on…

Fanon came along and based on his experience, and indeed the experience of other countries in Africa, he put forward a different perspective and said that force and violence might be necessary to truly liberate Africa. So this was a very important moment: the recordings and personal memoirs of that conference highlight Fanon’s intervention, that he created a great debate, so that the organizers even tried to find ways to combat Fanon’s ideas … It demonstrated a major difference within the Pan- African movement at that time: how to actually achieve liberation?

It’s interesting that in 1945 in Manchester the conference congress decided that force would be necessary to achieve anti-colonial liberation. By 1958 two of the key participants in the Manchester Conference had changed their minds. Fanon had the experience of the Algerian revolution and therefore said: “hold on a minute, it may well be the case that force and violence is necessary.” So I think this is a very important moment and a significant difference between these key Pan-Africanist figures of the 1950s. Of course there are many others but I think that’s a good example of the differences which emerged in the movement at that time.

AA: In your other seminal work, you have exhaustively analyzed the relationship between Pan-Africanism and communism. How did communism influence the Pan-African movement during the fight for independence?

HA: When we talk about communism as it developed historically, we can define it as the condition for the liberation of the wealth producers, the workers. This is what communism is about. The communist movement of the 1920s, the 1930s, of the Third International took a very great interest in the liberation struggle in Africa as well and in other parts of the world. Just as Pan-Africanists in the US and Africa and the Caribbean and everywhere else took a very great interest in communism and the impact of the Russian Revolution, the ideas of Lenin and the Bolsheviks and so on.

People in Africa and in the diaspora were used to the impact of capitalism, to what the capitalist-centered system meant. It meant enslavement, it meant colonial rule and the division of the African continent. While the Russian revolution showed that this entire political system could be brought to an end, there was an alternative to it. That alternative opened many possibilities, for a different kind of society, where the majority of the people made the decisions, a society in which people who spoke different languages and different nations could live together.

The other thing that the communist movement brought to the colonies was a perspective of how you could struggle. If we look at the 1930’s, 1940’s, at that time generally speaking the approach of the Pan-African movement was to petition the big powers, the colonial powers, to say to the big powers: “hang on, colonial rule should be reformed, it should be made better and nicer…”

The communists said “that’s not going to change things”. What is going to change things is the organization of the masses of the people: organizing amongst the farmers, workers and so on. Secondly, the communists argued that force may need to be used and probably will need to be used to remove this system. And thirdly, this anti-colonial struggle of masses of people should be in unity with the struggles of people all over the world, whether in Europe, America, Asia, etc., who were struggling for common aims.

The communist movement brought this perspective to Pan-Africanism and was very influential during that period but also influential in the latter period: the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s. If we think about some of the key liberation struggles that took place in Africa in the period from the 1960s onwards, especially after Nkrumah was overthrown, but even before were influenced by Marxism. The liberation struggles in Angola, in South Africa, in Mozambique, in Zimbabwe, etc.

On September 12, we celebrated the anniversary of the birth of Amilcar Cabral, one of the greatest Pan-Africanists and leader of the liberation in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, who was also influenced by Marxism. If we think of the big figures in the South African struggles, they were all communists: Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, etc. So, the influence of communism in general and Marxism were a very big influence on the Pan African movement in general.

AA: Would you say that events like Lumumba’s assassination and the long Algerian War pushed new African countries toward a more radical Pan-Africanism?

HA: I don’t think so. It was a very difficult period: first of all, the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s, was in the midst of the cold war. The influence of anticommunism was immense and had a massive impact on Africa as well as on other parts of the world. This put pressure on African countries to do the impossible, to trying to find a way of achieving some kind of independence within the boundaries established by the big powers,

You might say that the fact that Algeria had to fight a war of ten years towards its liberation, that people in Kenya had to fight a war in order to achieve its liberation and other countries … this would have made clear to people in Africa the kind of struggle that was necessary…

Also the fact that in a country that had just achieved the independence like Congo, the big powers like Belgium, US and others could organize a mutiny within the army, could divide a country, arrest its leader and murder him … those facts would galvanize the whole continent and would have created a very different kind of Pan-Africanism. In fact, these events and particularly the arrest and murder of Lumumba did galvanize the continent amongst the masses of the people. It was a major event, but as far as the states were concerned, the governments were concerned, it was a different matter.

This is one of the things that we have to remember about this period: that the sixties were entering into the era of Pan-Africanism of states, and these states, even the most radical ones, we can call them, like Ghana, Algeria, Guinee perhaps, they operated within the conditions of that time. They tried to find a way of organizing that perhaps didn’t completely involve struggle, they tried to seek some kind of accommodation with the big powers. The majority of countries, especially the francophone countries, for example, maybe with one or two exceptions, nearly all of them stayed within the orbit of French imperialism.

It was a very difficult period and I don’t think those events in themselves pushed African states into different positions. It showed the limitations of this new independence, because African countries apparently had an independent state but then with a leader like Lumumba emerged, who showed a tendency to charter an independent cause, he was just removed like that by the big powers.

We saw the same thing a few years later when Nkrumah was removed, and that happened to many other leaders: Felix Moumié was assassinated in Cameroon. It showed more the strength and ruthlessness of the big powers, particularly the assassination of Lumumba. The struggle in Algeria did show what could be achieved by organizing among the majority of people and through armed struggle, but in most cases that wasn’t the course that was taken by African states.

AA: What do you think about the way Nkrumah and other liberation fighters analyzed neocolonialism in that period?

HA: There were analyses of neocolonialism by Nkrumah, Fanon and others but by then it was almost too late, Africa and Africans were not in the position to do very much about it, other than embark on new forms of struggle. These were lessons for the future. Neocolonialism meaning a new form of colonialism, where there appears to be an independent state, and an independent government and country but there is in fact a government which is tied to one of the old colonial powers, or perhaps a new power by economic ties, by military or political ties … and therefore it’s not operating in an independent way. Many people would argue that most of the states in Africa since the 1960s have been this kind of state. They have anthems and flags but they do not pursue independent paths that favor the majority of their citizens.

Nkrumah’s solution, or one of the things that Nkrumah argued for, was a United States of Africa, that if African countries could get together, they could be stronger economically, politically and perhaps also militarily, and that unity which would be able and strong enough to deal with neocolonialism.

The problem was that the nature, the characteristics of neocolonialism already existed in the 1960’s. And so the states that he was appealing to, for the United States of Africa were already essentially neocolonialist states, under the influence of the French, the British, the Belgians, and others, and so it became very difficult to unite in a way that Nkrumah envisioned.

Fanon wrote an incisive analysis of what neocolonialism was, how it worked, the reasons why it came about, the fact that it was a particular class of people that came to power, that economically they were dependent on foreign interests, and so on. That’s useful for everybody else, but for those governments existing in Africa, as well as in other countries, it hasn’t and could not have had a major effect.

What is important in the African context was that at least with all its limitations, these governments were able to come together in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity. And with all its limitations, to struggle to unite for the liberation of the rest of the continent, from settler colonialism, so in other words against the colonial states: South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe … So they united to achieve those victories, but to go beyond that, we haven’t really seen too much other evidence. Indeed, even the African states recognized the limitations of the OAU and replaced it with the AU.

AA: In your book, you address the ongoing debates that shaped Pan-Africanism across different geographic regions, highlighting its vitality and the diversity of expressions within the movement. What shared goals did diaspora activists have, how did they connect with Africa, and what challenges did they face fighting from inside Western countries?

HA: Yes, I suppose the most well-known activist who many people like is Malcolm X in the US, and the Black Panthers in the US and so on. And there were other activists like Walter Rodney in Guyana and so on. I think that for all of them and many others Africa was a great inspiration, Malcolm X is the best example. He traveled to Africa in the 1960’s he was impressed with the fact that these countries were becoming independent, that Africans were beginning to determine their own affairs and make their own decisions.

In his speeches he constantly talked about the importance of Africa and African liberation. To such an extent that when he formed an organization he called it the Organization of African-American Unity, the OAAU. And to such an extent that he called the African leaders to take responsibility for those in the diaspora, saying that “we are the lost sheep and you are the shepherds and you should be concerned with us as Africans, as people with African heritage, and fight for us in the United Nations” and so on …The Black Panthers similarly even had at one time a headquarters in Algiers, and they were influenced by struggles that were going on in Congo and many other places.

But as Malcolm X and the Panthers found out the struggles were different, although one could influence the other. We have to remember that the kind of politics which emerged in the US in the 1960’s, we tend to talk about it as Black Power, also had its influence in Africa, particularly amongst people like Steve Biko and the Black Consciouness movement in South Africa. But the struggles were different, they were struggles that were made in the US, although they were struggles by African people, there were  struggles within the confines of the US and that meant that African Americans had to struggle alongside others in the US. The most far-sighted recognized that, people like the Black Panthers, they recognized they had to organize alongside other population groups within the US, and so they realized that liberation meant an alternative to the existing political and economic system.

Again, Malcolm X recognized that those who were oppressing African American in the US were also oppressing people in Africa. So removing that oppression, fighting to remove that oppression in the US would also help those in Africa. But, of course, they had many difficulties and many problems based on the way they organized, and also the fact that the US attempted to wipe them out, assassinated many of the leaders, including Malcolm X and many leaders of the Black Panthers, and imprisoned them …That was one of the main issues.

And then for someone like Walter Rodney, who was best known as an intellectual, a writer, an historian, and perhaps made the greatest impact in that way, but also in his analysis of what was going on in Africa, because he was involved in the work leading out to the 6th Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in 1974. If we look at what he wrote, he was very critical of neocolonialism, critical of many African leaders including Nkrumah, and many Pan-Africanists like Georges Padmore, he said that they had lost their way, they lost sight of class struggle, that there were different classes involved and you had to struggle against them, as well as against the imperialist system of states, that you couldn’t just do things peacefully, without changing fundamentally the political system and the economic system.

He was also a victim of state’s terrorism, because he was assassinated in Guyana at a very young age. Those were some of the problems they faced, but there were many others…

AA: How are people fighting for African unity today, and how does it connect to the 20th-century Pan-African movement?

HA: Again, it’s very, very, difficult conditions today, it’s very complicated. I think the best example of modern Pan-Africanism would be something like the reparations movement. It is a movement for repair, to be carried out for the crimes of enslavement, of human trafficking, of colonialism and so on … and if we look at this struggle for reparations, that existed since the 20th century … even the 17th century! It has been one of the key elements of Pan-African struggles throughout the centuries, that restitution needs to be made, that repair that needs to be made for these crimes that have been carried out against Africans.

But if we look at that movement today, we see that it is headed by states. There has recently been a big conference in Barbados in the Caribbean about the reparation struggles, but it is led by the Organization of Caribbean States (CARICOM), the Organization of African Union (AU). Although these two organizations work together, there are differences within them and between them. Individuals and countries also have their own particular concerns, for example Algeria had a very big conference last year on the question of colonialism as a crime against humanity. It’s not a new perspective, but this is something that should be highlighted.

So we have these slightly different perspectives. Those in the Caribbean are most concerned with slavery, human trafficking, those in Africa are slightly more concerned with colonialism. These movements and organizations come together, but they are organizations of states. Then there are non-state actors in Europe, in the US, in the diaspora in general who say “hang on a minute, we are not being represented by any states, or more importantly we’re not represented in these deliberations.” It could be argued that the states don’t really have much of a mandate to represent the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean either, because they are not consulted any more than those in the diaspora outside these states.

So we have a movement which is very powerful, it is being discussed in the news all the time, there are conferences, it’s gathering momentum, but there are all kinds of tensions and contradictions within that make it quite difficult, yet it’s a very long lived movement that goes back to the 17th century … So it’s a very important movement and how it develops remains to be seen.

AA: How is the anti racist movement in the US and English-speaking world dealing with Trump’s anti-migrant policies?

HA: Well, the anti-racist movement is not only in the US, because it’s also important in Europe and elsewhere. In the US it’s a broad movement, it has different facets to it, because the Trump government in particular is launching an assault on everything: so we find first of all that it’s an attack on books, even the books that could be held in public libraries, school or university libraries are under attack, and are being banned or being burnt, that’s one struggle. And the next struggle is to defend books by black writers, about anti-racism, and books about all kind of other things too, because other people are also being attacked. Then there is an attack on the general principle of equality, what in the US they call the DEI (Diversity, Equality and Inclusion), in terms of employment, particularly in universities but also in government departments, public institutions … they’re also under attack.

Then there are other attacks, various forms of state racism, attacks by the police, and so on, then there are attacks by immigration officials, by ICE, then there are just general attacks that come from the government about people who they deem to be immigrant, or from immigrant backgrounds, since Trump makes racist speeches against Somalis, Haitians and others … So these are very serious escalations of attacks and they have influence also outside of the US, including in Britain and other countries as well, it then became seen as almost acceptable that somebody can be attacked.

We’ve recently had a case in Britain a Black professor in the University, we don’t have many Black professors, who was accused by some self-confessed racist of plagiarism, and this accusation was taken up and repeated by the whole of the British press, it was on the TV … and the consequence is that this young professor took his life … This was an openly racist attack, and there are many other manifestations.

Of course, those in the US are organizing, and I think the key again of this organizing is that it cannot be only African-Americans, or those from the Caribbean organizing, but people in general have to be organized against this attack on their rights, because history has shown us that an attack on anyone is an attack on everybody. So everybody has to organize against these attacks. So yes, these are very important struggles and of course they are linked to other attacks which the US are launching internationally against Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Canada … against everybody else, against whoever. So it’s a very dangerous situation in the US and everyone needs to get together, but the Pan-Africanists have to be part of this broad struggle to change the situation in the US, Britain, and elsewhere.

Hakim Adi is an internationally renowned historian based in London, and the author of the book “Pan-Africanism: A History,” already published in Spanish, French, Portuguese and many other languages.

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Prospects of Dangote East Africa Petroleum Refinery: Industrialization and Self-Sufficiency

The construction of an oil refinery in the Kenyan city of Lamu is a strategic project that will enable East African countries to increase the added value of their natural resources, achieve energy self-sufficiency, and strengthen the region’s economic and political independence. The proposed East African refinery in Lamu will refine crude from Turkana, estimated […]
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Colonialism Did Not Die — It Changed Its Suit for New Clothes

How Europe and the U.S. cynically turned Africa into a “cage without bars.” In 1960, remembered in history as the Year of Africa, 17 countries on the continent gained long-awaited political independence. It seemed that the nearly 500-year era of Western European empires had sunk into oblivion. But if you look closely at socioeconomic indicators, […]
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His Excellency President of the Republic of Ghana John Dramani Mahama : “ I have no doubt that we will achieve our objectives because we are firmly united across the African world and we will never give up ”

For “New Eastern Outlook”, this interview is not merely a political conversation, but a sign of special trust. It is a great honour for us to present to our readers a dialogue with a leader whose influence extends far beyond the borders of his country. We discussed topics that shape the global agenda: unity, historical […]
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Ghana swiftly rejects US health deal, calls it ‘humiliating’

Ghana has rejected a proposed health compact with the United States that would have provided an estimated $109 million in US health funding over five years, with President John Dramani Mahama saying the agreement raised serious concerns over health data, financing obligations, and Ghana’s regulatory authority.

The decision places Ghana among a few African countries that have pushed back against new US health agreements introduced as Washington restructures its foreign assistance following the dismantling of USAID. Zimbabwe has also rejected a similar agreement, while Zambia has raised concerns over provisions in its negotiations with the United States.

Ghana raises concerns over health data

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September 25, Mahama said the proposed compact was presented to Ghana as a replacement for health funding previously provided through USAID.

He said Ghana’s Ministry of Health reviewed the document before preparing a Cabinet Information Paper.

“Ghana is a sovereign nation, and we have our own processes. We are a democratic country,” Mahama said.

According to the President, the Cabinet identified several provisions that raised concerns, particularly those relating to Ghana’s health information.

“One, it says that we shall give the United States our pathogen profile,” he said, adding that the agreement also required Ghana to provide medical records.

“It also says we should give our medical records. I mean, who takes another country’s medical records? And so that was strange.”

Concerns over health-data sharing have been central to resistance to the new US health agreements in several African countries. 

No FDA inspection

Mahama also raised concerns about the treatment of medicines and other medical products supplied under the proposed arrangement.

He said Ghana would have been required to contribute funding to the program while, according to his account of the compact, the country’s Food and Drugs Authority would not have been able to inspect medicines or other medical products entering Ghana under the program.

“And then it also says that any medications or any medical products that shall be brought into our country, our Food and Drugs Administration has absolutely no right to inspect,” Mahama said.

“I mean, it was humiliating.”

Ghanaian officials had previously cited concerns about the proposed handling of sensitive health information as a reason for rejecting the agreement. Reporting on the negotiations also indicated that the proposed arrangement would have required additional investment from Ghana alongside the US contribution.

Cabinet rejected the agreement

Mahama said the proposal was rejected after the Health Ministry presented its assessment to the Cabinet.

He described the decision as unusually swift.

“It was the compact that was thrown out in record time in our Cabinet. I’ve never seen anything thrown out as fast as that.”

He said the government subsequently instructed the Health Minister to communicate Ghana’s position to the US ambassador.

“And so, of course, we rejected it. And we asked the health minister to inform the US ambassador that we didn’t need it. We’ll manage ourselves.”

The proposed agreement would have provided Ghana with about $109 million in US health assistance over five years. The negotiations had begun in late 2025.

A wider concern over health sovereignty

Ghana’s decision comes as the United States seeks to shift its approach to global health cooperation. The new US strategy places greater emphasis on recipient countries taking responsibility for financing and delivering health programs, while Washington reduces its traditional aid commitments.

Kenya became the first African country to sign the agreement which was challenged in court, followed by similar arrangements with Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda, Lesotho and Eswatini, among other countries. Ravi Ram from the People’s Health Movement (PHM) East and South Africa, told BreakThrough News in December 2025, that  “Bilateral agreements between the US and Kenya and other African countries are meant to limit the ability of any one ‘partner’ country to challenge the terms of implementing the agreement, due to the unequal power relations.”

The concerns among health activists and concerned Africans is the ability of African states to determine their own health priorities, regulate medicines, control sensitive health information, and collectively negotiate the terms of international health cooperation.

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Cape Town’s ‘Apartheid wall’ met with protest

A proposed R114 million wall along Cape Town’s N2 has sparked protests, with residents and civil society groups accusing the city of investing in a barrier that could deepen the divide between poorer communities and surrounding suburbs.

Residents marched on September 25 to oppose the N2 Edge project, a planned 9-kilometer wall development that the city says is aimed at improving safety and security along the highway.

But protesters say that the wall risks reproducing the spatial divisions created under apartheid, saying public money should instead be spent on housing, public services and opportunities for communities that have been pushed to the margins.

Movement for CARE, which was among those involved in organizing the protests, had criticized the project, saying;

“Instead of investing in dignified housing, safe neighborhoods, quality public services, and opportunities for communities that have been pushed to the margins for generations, the city wants to invest millions in a barrier that deepens exclusion and reinforces the geography of apartheid.”

The organization said from the beginning when the news about the proposal was announced, that Cape Town does not need more walls but rather affordable housing close to work and economic opportunities, as well as greater investment in communities.

“We need investment in communities, not their isolation. We need a city that brings people together instead of driving them further apart,” it said.

The Movement for CARE described the proposed structure as an “Apartheid Wall,” arguing that the first step towards justice is refusing to normalize and hide existing inequalities.

City defends the R114 million project

The City of Cape Town has defended the project as a safety intervention. In January, Cape Town Mayor Geordin Hill-Lewis said the city’s adjustment budget had committed “R114m to the N2 Edge project.”

The investment “will make a positive difference to the safety of every motorist along that stretch, and reduce pedestrian fatalities,” Hill-Lewis said.

He said the project would repair safety barriers and introduce other safety improvements for communities along the N2.

Hill-Lewis also said that a small number of “criminal elements” were affecting the safety of hundreds of thousands of daily N2 users.

According to the mayor, the N2 Edge project would be accompanied by increased highway patrols, with more than 40 new Metro police officers deployed to the N2, supported by CCTV cameras, automatic number plate recognition and digital coordination for rapid response.

Despite the widespread backlash, the city maintains it will continue with the project.

Abahlali baseMjondolo backs the protest

Abahlali baseMjondolo also supported the protests, saying in a post that the project would deepen racial and economic divisions in the city.

“The City of Cape Town continues to entrench neo-apartheid laws in post-apartheid South Africa by building a wall that segregates and hides the poor from the rich along the N2,” the organization said.

Adding that the project shows that the Democratic Alliance-led City does not recognize the needs of poor communities, particularly Black communities.

Read more: “A declaration of war against the poor”: AbM leads resistance against South Africa’s anti-occupation bill

The organization said it supported the struggles of residents in Khayelitsha, Langa, Dunoon, Gugulethu and Mitchells Plain who continue to face what it described as segregation and racism.

The protests have raised questions over whether the R114 million allocated to the N2 Edge project represents the right priority for Cape Town. With the protesters arguing that public resources should instead be directed towards reducing inequality, improving services and providing better housing and opportunities for communities living along the N2, instead of separating communities and concealing poverty.

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