Ukrainian drones struck St. Petersburg’s oil terminal, a fuel depot, an Ozon distribution center, and a VK data center overnight, setting off fires across the city, monitoring channels reported. Russian outlet Meduza called it apparently the largest attack on the city and Leningrad Oblast since the war began. Russian officials acknowledged fires, damaged homes and substations, and power cuts.
Russia keeps fighting along the front while bombarding Ukrainian cities and the grid behind it. Ukraine’s long-range drones, in turn, target the oil exports and logistics that fund and supply that war, and Russia’s Baltic oil ports have been hit repeatedly this year. St. Petersburg is a symbolic place: Russia’s so-called second capital and Putin’s hometown.
Ukrainian forces struck the Petersburg Oil Terminal with FP-1 drones, starting a fire, Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said. The company described the terminal as one of the region’s largest, handling 12.5 million tonnes of petroleum products a year, including for export.
Piter port and oil facility in one shot pic.twitter.com/KfptwkhsDS
— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026
St. Petersburg Governor Aleksandr Beglov acknowledged fires at the terminal and in four city districts, adding that Pulkovo airport had restricted flights. By morning, firefighters were still battling blazes at the terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot, and industrial warehouses in the Kolpinsky district, he wrote. He claimed one person was killed and five injured. Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported that the Ruchyi depot had been burning since the night.
An Ozon distribution center in Kolpinsky district caught fire after the attack, the company said, Russian independent outlet Astra reported. Astra’s open-source intelligence analyst described it as one of Ozon’s busiest fulfillment centers in northwestern Russia, covering up to 79,000 m².
Ozon in St. Peterburg pic.twitter.com/tA9iwRJf7d
— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026
FP-1 drones also hit a VK data center in Novosergiyevka, Leningrad Oblast, causing serious damage, Fire Point said. VK acknowledged a drone attack on the site but claimed its services were working normally. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed air defenses downed 145 drones over the oblast alone. He acknowledged damage to the data center’s transformer equipment and warehouse complex, and minor damage to the Vostochnaya substation. Two other substations in Yanino went offline, cutting power to about 20,000 people, he said.
A drone also hit the cable-stayed bridge over the Korabelny fairway, part of a toll highway linking the city’s north and south, Exilenova+ reported, adding that the extent of the damage was still being clarified. The channel also reported a fire near a Russian Aerospace Forces radar company outside the village of Kaporskoye.
To reach St. Petersburg, Ukrainian drones had to cover 1,000 km across four Russian regions guarded by air defenses and electronic warfare, said Serhii Beskrestnov, adviser to Ukraine’s president on defense technology.
“And these are not cruise missiles with special systems, these are drones that fly at speeds of up to 200 km/h,” he wrote.
The same night, Russia hit Ukraine’s grid again, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy counted 76 Russian strikes on energy since the ceasefire was announced. US President Donald Trump declared the truce on 11 October. Ukraine paused its refinery strikes for three days at Washington’s request, but Russia struck a Kharkiv power plant within hours and kept hitting the grid. Zelenskyy then said Ukraine was resuming strikes on Russian oil and would stop again only in exchange for more US interceptors for its Patriot systems. Trump called the renewed strikes “a disgrace” and said he found Zelenskyy “more difficult to deal with than Putin.”
Ukraine has hit the St. Petersburg area before. In July, drones set fire to Wildberries warehouses near the city. In August, Ukraine began striking Ozon hubs, starting in Samara Oblast. The hubs move dual-use goods such as electronics and drone components.
Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.
On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.
The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.
The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.
The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.
Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.
This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.
The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.
The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.
Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.
Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.
After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.
According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.
This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.
Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.
The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.
Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.
The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.
For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.
The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.
Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.
The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.
The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.
Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.
The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.
Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.
The Middle East has seen many explosions of violence in recent years. But while the US-Iran war has grabbed the headlines this year, the rapidly escalating conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia risks becoming just as consequential for the region. The complexity of Yemen’s internal conflict cannot be underestimated. […]
The post How Yemen’s renewed civil war could set the whole region ablaze appeared first on Asia Times.
The war between the United States and Iran is no longer just a confrontation between Washington and Tehran. A second contest is taking shape alongside and behind it. China is not fighting the United States directly, but its economic, technological and diplomatic links to Iran are complicating Washington’s strategy and ability to win the conflict. […]
The post The China factor behind the Iran war appeared first on Asia Times.
Pakistan exported about 169,000 metric tons of rice to Saudi Arabia in 2025, worth around $163 million.
The post Pakistan, Saudi Arabia set $3 billion agricultural export target within two years appeared first on BOL News.
CHICAGO: Corn and wheat futures have rallied to their highest prices in more than three years, though the factors driving the gains for each crop remain distinctly different. Wheat futures settled Friday at $7.84 per bushel, up 3.1% on the day, after hitting an intraday peak of $7.9025, the highest level since Feb. 14, 2023. ... Read more
The post Corn, wheat prices surge to multi-year highs on divergent supply threats appeared first on BOL News.
Purchases of crude oil and petroleum products increased 58.1%.
The post Jordan’s total exports jump 14.5% in H1 as trade deficit narrows appeared first on BOL News.
In the second quarter of 2026, the EU recorded a trade deficit of €21.8 billion, as goods imported from non-EU countries (€701.8 billion) exceeded exports (€680.0 billion). This is the first trade deficit registered since the second quarter of 2023, the last of a series of deficits fuelled by soaring energy costs observed between late 2021 and mid-2023.
The deficit in the trade balance was primarily due to an increase in the deficit on energy products (from -€71.3 billion in Q1 2026 to -€101.1 billion in Q2 2026), raw materials (from -€7.9 billion to -€9.4 billion) and other manufactured goods (from -€8.3 billion to -€9.1 billion). Additionally, there was a reduction in the surplus of machinery and vehicles (from €24.9 billion in Q1 2026 to €23.2 billion) and other goods (from €11.6 billion to €9.1 billion).
On the other hand, there were surplus increases for chemicals (from €47.1 billion to €54.0 billion) and food and drinks (from €10.7 billion to €11.5 billion).
Source dataset: ext_st_eu27_2020sitc
Overall, exports increased by 5.4% (+€34.9 billion) and imports by 9.9% (+€63.4 billion) compared with the previous quarter.
Exports and imports had been declining since the second quarter of 2025, a trend that halted in the first quarter of 2026. Those declines had been partly attributed to tariff tensions.
Source dataset: ext_st_eu27_2020sitc
Products are defined according to the standard international trade classification (SITC). The main categories are:
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