Venezuela’s National Assembly installed a Judicial Nominations Committee on Friday to evaluate and select new Supreme Court justices, a step lawmakers described as central to consolidating institutional stability.
The committee was formally established on October 23, at the Federal Legislative Palace in Caracas, one day after being sworn in during a legislative session.
Giuseppe Alessandrello, who presides over the body, announced that its immediate task is to draw up a work schedule under the Law of the Supreme Court of Justice.
Alessandrello said the law opened the selection process to ordinary citizens. Writing on social media, he stated that the legislation brought people into the work of “evaluating and selecting the leadership, in this case of the Supreme Court of Justice, to seek plurality.”
#23Oct || Desde el Palacio Federal Legislativo se realiza la Instalación del Comité de Postulaciones Judiciales. pic.twitter.com/MczZA2GxJ7
Text reads: “From the Federal Legislative Palace is carried out the installation of the Judicial Applications Committee.”
The committee operates within a broader national dialogue that authorities describe as “building a new Venezuela.” Officials have repeatedly framed the judiciary as the institution responsible for guaranteeing what they call true and just peace among citizens. “The judicial branch is the institution that will guarantee peace among us,” Alessandrello said.
The work schedule will set specific periods for the call for nominations, the evaluation of candidates, and the handling of challenges and responses.
The final goal is to present a definitive list of eligible candidates to the National Assembly.
Alessandrello stressed the weight of the assigned tasks, linking them directly to institutional stability. The committee’s operational work and the eventual delivery of the list will follow the terms and periods established by current law.
The process is governed by the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It covers the selection of both principal and alternate justices of the Supreme Court of Justice.
Subrayó el rol clave de la ciudadanía:
"La ley incorporó a los ciudadanos y ciudadanas de la sociedad en este trabajo de evaluar y seleccionar a las directivas, en este caso del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, para buscar la pluralidad". pic.twitter.com/LhNVkaK6ov
Text reads: “The President of the committee, Giuseppe Alessandrello, highlighted the group’s harmony: “Everything we produce is decided unanimously and the auspices with the work of the committee are positive.” He also emphasized the importance of plurality in this process. He stressed the key role of citizenship: “The law incorporated citizens of society in this work of evaluating and selecting directives, in this case from the Supreme Court of Justice, to seek plurality.”
Selecting Court Leadership
The mandate extends beyond the high court itself. It also includes related judicial positions, among them the directorship of the National School of Magistrates.
The committee emerged from a process announced earlier this month. The National Assembly opened the nomination period between October 2 and October 9, allowing interested citizens and institutions to take part in the selection of the court’s leadership.
Once the schedule is finalized, the committee will move through successive phases, receiving nominations, reviewing candidates, and addressing any challenges filed against applicants. Each challenge will carry its own opportunity for a formal response before the list reaches the legislature.
The final list of selected candidates will be delivered to the National Assembly for consideration. The body’s work therefore functions as a preliminary filter within a process whose ultimate decisions rest with the legislature.
Welcome back, Deadline: Legal newsletter readers. Supreme Court justices were off the bench this week because they’re in between their October and November hearing sessions. But they still made plenty of news, in both their written work and public comments.
They started by adding two potent cases to a docket that is growing this term in both size and importance. Following last week’s agreement to review a discovery dispute over Elon Musk’s purported government efficiency effort, on Monday the court added two more appeals: on race in middle school admissions and congressional authority to ban home distilling. The court will keep adding cases throughout the year, with all the rulings in argued cases typically coming by July.
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Neil Gorsuch were together again, speaking out for the second week in a row about a case the court refused to hear. Last week, Gorsuch joined Sotomayor to lament what they saw as unjust prosecution. This week, the Trump appointee joined the Obama appointee to critique what they saw as constitutional problems with car seizures in Chicago. It’s not new for this duo to team up in a certain type of case that lends itself to bipartisan agreement, but they have been ramping up that agreement so far this term.
Sotomayor’s statement appeared on the order list, which, as regular readers know, is an important document that announces the latest actions on pending petitions. That’s where we learned about the two new cases that the court took up and the (much longer) list of cases the court rejected. It takes four justices on the nine-member bench to grant review, and the court denies most petitions.
But Sotomayor’s statement reminds us that the justices occasionally offer their thoughts even when, as here, they agree with the denial but still find it important to highlight broader issues. These writings help us understand the justices’ priorities and what new cases the court might take up in the future.
Another sort of signal came from Justice Samuel Alito, who didn’t explain himself but noted that he wanted to review one of the petitions the court denied on the list. The failed petition came from Missouri officials who wanted the court to revive a rule that registered sex offenders must put signs on their doors for Halloween that read, “No candy or treats at this residence.” An appeals court said the rule wrongly compelled speech under the First Amendment. Although Alito merely noted, without explanation, his difference of opinion, the vote fits with his overall approach, because he generally backs law enforcement and has split from his colleagues in other First Amendment disputes.
Alito had company later in the week when the court rejected the Trump administration’s request to immediately enforce its preferred policy on gender-affirming care in prison. The justices did not explain the rare (albeit temporary) win for transgender people at a court that has ruled against them in a series of other cases. But whatever the justices were thinking, we know it wasn’t unanimous, because Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas both indicated (also without explanation) that they wanted to grant the government’s request.
Justice Elena Kagan made news outside her written work, with an appearance at a law school in Washington, D.C., the sort of speaking engagement that the justices will do from time to time. Kagan, who was dean of Harvard Law School before she became a justice, gave her GOP-appointed colleagues a failing grade when it comes to democracy. Reprising impassioned criticisms of rulings on voting and campaign finance that she has made in dissenting opinions, the Obama appointee said the court “has kind of blinded itself to the very deleterious effect of their rulings on how the political system works and has created a democracy that does not work as well as it should.”
Kagan apparently agreed with her colleagues this weekin an election case, when the Supreme Court granted a Republican-backed request from New Hampshire to block the use of student IDs for voting in the midterms. In a brief unsigned order, the high court chided a lower court judge for, as the justices saw it, improperly interfering with state rules right before an election. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was the only one to publish a dissent, in which she contended the judge was justified in trying to protect voting rights.
The justices are still off the bench for another week, as they are set to return to the courtroom in November to hear the next batch of regularly scheduled arguments. But as Election Day approaches on Nov. 3, they will continue to field unscheduled emergency applications on voting and whatever else comes their way.
Subscribe to theDeadline: Legal newsletterfor expert analysis on the top legal stories of the week, including updates from the Supreme Court and developments in the Trump administration’s legal cases.
“If Donald Trump defies court orders because the Supreme Court said he cannot be prosecuted for actions he takes as president, could those people who carry out his illegal requests be prosecuted or fined even though they are acting on his orders?” — Kit Read
Hi Kit,
Maybe.
The Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling in Trump v. United States only dealt directly with criminal immunity for presidents, holding that they have at least presumptive immunity for all official acts, as well as absolute immunity for acts within their “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority.
What all that means in practice hasn’t been fully fleshed out. It would take a follow-up case to clarify the ruling’s limits, and it’s unclear if or when such a case will come.
At any rate, the court focused on presidents in that ruling. It did not grant immunity to aides acting on the president’s behalf.
Yet, while arguments have been made against subordinate immunity, it’s technically an open question that the justices haven’t decided one way or the other.
So the answer to your question at the moment is: maybe.
But you might wonder: What could the argument be for immunizing presidential underlings?
One scholarly account argued that the logic of the immunity ruling “renders the President’s subordinates absolutely immune for a potentially broad range of official acts, even if those acts are otherwise unlawful.” That’s because if the president has complete power over executing the law, then, the argument goes, subordinate actions that implement that power are lawful, as opposed to being unlawful but immune from prosecution.
As with clarifying the immunity ruling’s limits as it applies to presidents, whether the Supreme Court will decide the subordinate immunity question depends on the court taking an appeal that raises that issue in the future. And as with presidential immunity itself, there is no clear candidate for an appeal the court would take to answer that question.
Either way, if a president wants to ensure that any of his henchmen won’t be federally prosecuted, he could always pardon them.
A short excerpt from the long opinion in Jackson Fed. of Teachers v. Fitch, decided yesterday by Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith, joined by Judge Kurt Engelhardt:
In April 2025, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1193 (H.B. 1193), a law designed to keep Mississippi public education funds from being spent on diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") initiatives and similar controversial programs. The law prevents government-run institutions from requiring activities such as diversity training or pushing DEI ideology, so defined, in the course of government-funded business.
H.B. 1193 does four main things. First, it prevents educational institutions from mandating DEI programs and diversity trainings in a variety of contexts. Second, it stops public educational institutions from punishing students for their views on DEI. Third, it prohibits regulated institutions from endorsing or promoting DEI through course materials. Finally, it prevents institutions and their educators from otherwise engaging in DEI methods or actions, preventing bad actors from circumventing prohibitions and frustrating its purposes. The statute also creates an administrative process to handle claims that a given educational institution is not in compliance. H.B. 1193 excepts several activities from its sweep, including scholarly work, the activities of students and their groups, and creative engagement.
Plaintiffs sued, claiming (among other things) that the law violated the First Amendment, but:
The proceedings in the district court were a botch job, to say the least. Judge Henry Wingate issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining enforcement of H.B. 1193 that contained several factual assertions nowhere to be found in the record, or indeed, in any proceeding of the case. Those included mention of plaintiffs and defendants not in the complaint, supposed "declarations" from non-existent or never-present individuals, false quotations purporting to be taken from the text of H.B. 1193, and several erroneous claims that the law had already led to the demise of apparently fictitious programs.
After this came to light, Judge Wingate replaced the TRO without explaining.
Forging forward despite the bungled TRO, Judge Wingate issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction. The various state defendants appeal.
At oral argument in this court, it was discovered that even the "corrected" TRO—which was incorporated by reference into the preliminary injunction order—still contained hallucinated information (namely, a citation to a purported Fourth Circuit case, "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk," that does not exist).
This district judge carelessly exercised his Article III power by issuing sloppy edicts based on falsehoods and fabrications. Upon discovering some of these falsehoods, Judge Wingate dug in his heels and claimed that the hallucinated claims had no bearing on its reasoning; he offered no explanation as to why he included such apparently irrelevant material in the original TRO or why the TRO nevertheless was justified in its absence.
Moreover, the district court got the law wrong. The TRO and preliminary injunction order rested on impoverished legal analysis that barely paid lip-service to the precedents of the Supreme Court or this court, seeming at times purposely to misconstrue the law by manipulating the words of statutes and cases, without regard to their texts' meaning as a whole. The district court—or perhaps, being charitable, its AI agent—ignored and manipulated governing law, apparently to satisfy a policy agenda.
Because of the extraordinarily grave errors by the district court, we vacate and remand for assignment to a different district judge. Per the Supreme Court's decision in Moody, we instruct the new judge to conduct proceedings consistent with federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this circuit….
The original TRO—the one actually issued on July 20, 2025—named as plaintiffs eleven individuals and organizations who had never been party to the case; named as defendants two officials who were not actually sued; claimed, without evidence, that three post-secondary institutions had already cancelled DEI initiatives or programming because of the act; further declared, again without evidence, that staff at another school had been told not to discuss certain topics, including "historical interpretations involving systemic racism"; misquoted H.B. 1193 as applying to "race or sex stereotyping," "race or sex scapegoating," "critical race theory," and "institutional bias," despite none of these terms' appearing in the act's text; and referenced purported declarations of four individuals who do not appear in the record at all and may not even exist….
On July 22, 2025, defendants filed a motion to clarify, pointing out these errors. In response, the court, without explanation, replaced the original TRO with a seemingly corrected version. Though that document was docketed on July 22, it was backdated to July 20. Defendants requested that the original order be restored to the docket to keep the record whole and requested that the court explain the inaccuracies in the original order. The district court denied that motion, claiming the factual inaccuracies were merely "clerical."
In response, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley accused the district court of using artificial Intelligence ("AI") to prepare the TRO, with the substantive errors' arising from AI-generated hallucinations. Fifteen days later, Judge Wingate admitted the errors, claiming that a law clerk had used AI to assist drafting an earlier version of the TRO that was docketed by mistake. His letter stated that he had removed the original TRO from the docket to avoid confusion and that the errors were clerical, in his view, because they did not relate to "core legal reasoning or the ultimate judgment on the merits" but instead to "failure to confirm the accuracy of certain information."
The seemingly corrected TRO did not explain how or why the factual inaccuracies were not necessary to the reasoning of the original TRO. The merits analysis failed to cite a binding authority from after the year 2000. It claims that H.B. 1193 constitutes viewpoint discrimination, without any analysis whatsoever of a state government's authority to regulate its own speech. And the document did not correct all of the errors: At Fifth Circuit oral argument, it was discovered that the doctored TRO cited to "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 503 F.2d 422, 426–27 (4th Cir. 1974)." That case does not even exist; it is an apparent AI hallucination….
Judge Catharina Haynes did not join these parts of the opinion.
There's also some interesting First Amendment analysis in the case, which I hope to blog about later today. (I'm tied up for the next several hours.) Thanks to @WillChamberlain and Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit) for the pointer.
Anthony M. Shults, Justin Lee Matheny, Rex Morris Shannon, III, and Scott G. Stewart represent defendants.
Pinhas Ran allegedly fired toward car after driver, fearing attack, refused baseless demand to show ID and sped off; one bullet lodged itself in passenger's lung, prosecutors say
The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled New Hampshire’s top election official can fully stop voters from using their student IDs when showing up to the polls in the midterms — a request backed by the Republican National Committee (RNC). A lower judge ruled officials had improperly gone further than a new state law placing restrictions on…
A nearly unanimous Supreme Court has granted New Hampshire’s emergency request to block the use of student IDs for voting in the November midterm elections.
The case raised a recurring theme at the high court about the propriety of judgesintervening on the eve of political contests, against the familiar backdrop of GOP-backed voting restrictions purporting to ensure election integrity.
On Thursday, the majority said that the district court judge who ruled against the state failed to justify deviating from the general principle that federal courts shouldn’t alter election rules on the eve of an election. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, writing she “would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes.”
The Biden-appointed justice said she wasn’t as sure as the majority that the judge’s action falls under that general noninterference rule, known as the “Purcell principle.” She said the judge was trying to address alleged misinformation rather than change state law.
“When a federal court determines that material misrepresentations are being made about a State’s election rules, an injunction to prohibit that conduct does not contribute to public confusion, it prevents that very problem,” Jackson wrote in her solo dissent.
While New Hampshire’s federal representatives are Democrats, Republicans run the state government. Gov. Kelly Ayotte signed a bill into law this year that prohibits the use of student IDs for voting.
A New Hampshire-based nonprofit called Coalition for Open Democracy sued the state over the law, which the group said needlessly burdens young voters under the guise of trying to solve the “non-existent problem” of nonresident voter fraud.
In a ruling earlier this month, U.S. District Judge Joseph Laplante refused to block the law, called HB 323. But the George W. Bush appointee said related guidance from New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan, a Republican, went too far. Laplante said Scanlan overstepped in barring election officials from considering student IDs even as evidence under a “safety-valve provision” that lets voters prove who they are if they don’t otherwise have a proper photograph.
“The State has offered no independent justification for that broader prohibition,” wrote Laplante, explaining that such justification is needed even for minimal burdens on voting rights. He blocked enforcement of Scanlan’s directive to the extent it “prohibits or discourages election officials from considering student IDs as evidence of voter identity,” and he ordered the secretary of state to issue revised guidance for the midterms.
Laplante declined to halt his ruling, as did an appellate panel over dissent from a Trump-appointed judge. State officials then turned to the justices in Washington, arguing that Laplante’s order risks late-breaking confusion. The Republican National Committee filed an amicus brief supporting the state.
Opposing the state’s emergency application, Open Democracy said granting the application would be the chaos-inducing move. The group noted that Scanlan had already quickly complied with the order to provide revised guidance, and that his website “has told voters since the October 2 Order that supervisors may consider a student ID along with other evidence.”
That guidance is now the status quo, Open Democracy observed. Therefore, it said, granting the state’s application would “reverse the rules for a second time in a month.”
Subscribe to theDeadline: Legal newsletterfor expert analysis on the top legal stories of the week, including updates from the Supreme Court and developments in the Trump administration’s legal cases.
On December 2, the Supreme Court will consider constitutional challenges to "assault weapon" bans in Connecticut and Cook County, Illinois, that cover widely owned rifles, including the AR-15. As the plaintiffs in those consolidated cases see it, such laws plainly violate the Second Amendment because they prohibit arms in common use for lawful purposes. In briefs filed on Wednesday, Connecticut and Cook County urge the justices to reject that test, saying a weapon's popularity is not dispositive. The relevant question, they say, is whether their rifle restrictions fit a historical tradition of banning "unusually dangerous weapons."
Cook County and Connecticut have the burden of showing that their laws are "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," the test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. On the face of it, that is a daunting challenge.
In the 2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment protects the right to own "bearable arms" that are "in common use" for "lawful purposes like self-defense." That description indisputably encompasses "AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles," the firearms at issue in these cases. But Heller also recognized "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Cook County and Connecticut argue that the rifles they have deemed intolerable fall into that category.
"There is a robust historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons that
compromise public safety," Cook County says. "Such regulations, which long
predate the founding, have included outright bans and other restrictions on exceptionally dangerous weapons like launcegays, trap guns, Bowie knives, and slung shots."
Cook County argues that its ordinance is "relevantly similar" to those historical restrictions because it targets "exceptionally lethal weapons that are disproportionate to the end of self-defense." AR-15s are "offensive weapons of war designed for maximum lethality and are not customarily used for self-defense," the brief says. "The purpose and operation of the ban is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition and accounts for the exceptional dangerousness of these technologically advanced weapons."
The ban is "an appropriate contemporary restriction implemented by the legislature in response to dramatic technological change and unprecedented societal concern," the brief says. "It is tailored to respond to the particular dangers presented in areas with mass casualty exposure and acute public safety risk."
Connecticut offers a similar argument. One problem with this defense is the premise that "assault weapon" bans focus on "exceptionally lethal weapons." As critics of such laws have been pointing out for decades, the features they target, such as folding stocks, pistol grips, and barrel shrouds, do not affect a rifle's basic operation. With or without them, a rifle fires the same ammunition at the same rate with the same muzzle velocity. And because AR-15s use intermediate-caliber ammunition, they are arguably less lethal than shotguns and many hunting rifles that are not classified as "assault weapons."
Cook County's emphasis on technological developments is also questionable. Constitutional guarantees establish principles that courts routinely apply to technologies that did not exist at the founding. Although the Framers did not have radio, television, or the internet, for example, the First Amendment nevertheless constrains government regulation of those media.
More specifically, Heller rejected the idea that modern weapons are not covered by the Second Amendment by recognizing a constitutional right to own semiautomatic pistols. The Supreme Court said "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." The Court confirmed that point in the 2016 case Caetano v. Massachusetts, which involved a state ban on stun guns.
Cook County also asserts that AR-15s are not suitable for self-defense, a claim that would be hotly contested by many owners of such rifles, who commonly report using them for that purpose. "Plaintiffs have shown that AR-15s are well-adapted for self-defense," U.S. District Judge Peter Sheridan wrote in 2024, when he reluctantly concluded that New Jersey's AR-15 ban was inconsistent with Heller while expressing his dismay at that result. "Evidence has been presented to the Court that the build of the AR-15 makes it well-suited to self-defense because it is 'light weight, [has] very mild recoil, and [has] good ergonomics'; it is a weapon which is 'well suited to younger shooters, female shooters, and other shooters of smaller stature.'"
Sheridan added that "the AR-15's design features—including the effectiveness of its cartridge for self-defense use and its better continuity of fire when used with available magazines—make the AR-15 a good choice for self-defense." And he noted that "the AR-15 has been used recently in several, relatively high-profile self-defense events in Florida, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma."
Cook County and Connecticut are also wrong in suggesting that self-defense is the only "lawful purpose" that matters. While Heller emphasized the use of handguns "in defense of hearth and home," it did not say that was the full extent of the Second Amendment right. To the contrary, the phrase "lawful purposes like self-defense" implies that the right extends to other uses, such as hunting, pest control, and target shooting. The decision explicitly mentioned hunting as a "reason Americans valued the ancient right."
The briefs are misleading in another way that may prove decisive. They conflate "dangerous and unusual" with "unusually dangerous," which is not the same thing.
During the 19th century, state legislators restricted (and sometimes banned) weapons such as Bowie knives, spears, sword canes, slungshots, and brass knuckles. But the historical evidence suggests those weapons were not targeted simply because they were "unusually dangerous." Legislators were also concerned about how the weapons were typically used.
Solicitor General D. John Sauer, who filed a brief supporting the challenges to the AR-15 bans, notes that the 19th-century laws targeted weapons associated with "duels, brawls, and other criminal activities." And in reviewing those laws, state courts distinguished between arms favored by criminals and arms commonly used for lawful purposes.
In 1871, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that legislators could ban weapons that were "not usual" but could not ban "the usual arms of the citizen." The top courts of Texas, Arkansas, West Virginia, North Carolina, and Michigan concurred that the right to arms encompassed weapons commonly owned by law-abiding people, including rifles.
AR-15s and similar rifles readily pass that common-use test. In January, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the gun industry's trade association, reported that Americans own more than 32 million "modern sporting rifles," its preferred term for the models covered by "assault weapon" bans. Survey data suggest that somewhere between 16 million and 25 million Americans have owned AR-15-style rifles. Last year, a unanimous Supreme Court described the AR-15 as "the most popular rifle in the country."
According to Cook County and Connecticut, however, none of that matters. "Once it is established that a regulation pursues a legitimate public safety objective in a permissible manner, raw ownership numbers cannot immunize a firearm from regulation," Cook County says. It argues that opponents of its ordinance have misconstrued the significance of the common-use test and misunderstood how it interacts with Bruen.
"When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct," the Supreme Court said in Bruen. "To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"
The common-use question, Cook County argues, figures only in the first Bruen step: "the inquiry whether the weapon at issue is one 'the Second Amendment protects.'" But even if ownership of AR-15s is covered by "the Second Amendment's plain text," it says, that does not resolve the question of whether they can be banned, which depends on the historical analysis required by the second step of the Bruen test.
"This Court's decision in Bruen confirms that the Second Amendment's step-two inquiry does not insulate popularly owned firearms from regulation," the brief says. In Bruen, it was "undisputed" that "handguns are weapons 'in common use' today for self-defense," including "outside the home." But "instead of being the end of this Court's inquiry, that observation was just the beginning." The decision also included an "extended analysis" of the historical laws that New York cited to justify its "proper cause" requirement for carry permits. "If lawful common use alone were enough to forbid regulation," Cook County argues, "there would have been no need to engage in that careful and prolonged analysis."
The question in Bruen was not whether the Second Amendment precludes "regulation." It was whether New York's specific approach, which required residents to demonstrate a "special need" before they were allowed to exercise the right to bear arms, was consistent with the historical tradition. That is why the Court considered (and rejected) the purported historical analogs that New York offered.
Cook County conflates requirements for carry permits, the issue in Bruen, with an outright ban on ownership, the policy it is defending. Connecticut likewise blurs the distinction between carry restrictions and complete prohibition.
"The Bowie knife was 'widely carried by Americans of all stripes,' including 'upstanding citizens and villains' alike," Connecticut's brief says. "The widespread use of Bowie knives and other weapons for lawful purposes did not prevent dozens of States from restricting those weapons." But those laws generally restricted or banned public carry. They rarely made it illegal to acquire or possess a Bowie knife, which is the approach that Connecticut and Cook County have taken with AR-15s.
That policy is hard to reconcile with Heller. I will quote Sheridan again, since his comments made it clear that he would have preferred to uphold New Jersey's AR-15 ban. Under Heller, he said, "a categorical ban on a class of weapons commonly used for self-defense is unlawful." Given "the Supreme Court's clear direction on this point," he concluded, New Jersey's law "is unconstitutional" as applied to "the Colt AR-15 for use for self-defense in the home."
Last July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed and went further, extending that conclusion to "the full class of semi-automatic rifles" banned in New Jersey. "Together, Heller and Bruen teach that bans or broad prohibitions on possessing or carrying of a class of weapons in common use for lawful purposes fail to find support in our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation," Judge Arianna Freeman, a Joe Biden appointee, wrote in the majority opinion. "That principle resolves our inquiry here."
To beat back the challenges to their laws, Connecticut and Cook County will have to persuade the justices that the 3rd Circuit's understanding of Heller and Bruen is wrong, meaning they are free to ban firearms in common use for lawful purposes. That seems like a tall order, and Cook County's position is especially puzzling. According to its brief, the fact that a weapon is covered by the Second Amendment does not mean Americans have a right to possess it. The more you think about that claim, the less sense it makes.
On November 3, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case that asks whether Colorado has unlawfully discriminated against a religious preschool because the school is barred from participating in the state's universal preschool program due to its refusal to accept LGBTQ families. In addition to involving multiple hot-button political and cultural issues, the case also has big implications for the future of federal antidiscrimination law.
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy is not about a state law that directly prohibits a religious preschool from operating. Rather, at issue here is a government requirement that any preschool that wants to participate in the state's universal preschool program, and receive the public benefits that follow, must first satisfy various criteria, including that "each preschool provider provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability."
According to the Catholic preschools overseen by the Archdiocese of Denver, however, complying with that rule would force the schools to violate their religious beliefs. "It is undisputed that these preschools would otherwise be eligible [universal preschool] providers," the schools told the Supreme Court. "They are excluded solely because of their religious exercise—namely, their religious practices of ensuring that all enrolling families are supportive of the Catholic Church's teachings on sex and marriage and of treating enrolled four-year-olds in accordance with their biological sex."
These schools can point to a pair of recent Supreme Court precedents that will very likely count in their favor. In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), the Court held that if a state provides educational subsidies that help parents send their children to private schools, the state "cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious." Then, in Carson v. Makin (2022), the Court held that Maine's tuition assistance program violated the Constitution by excluding private schools that offered "sectarian" education. "A State's antiestablishment interest," the decision said, "does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise."
I would expect the outcome of St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy to follow in this same general pattern and hold something to the effect that when a state provides an educational public benefit, it must make some sort of accommodation for the religious views of the recipients.
In Other Legal News
Justice Elena Kagan made news a few months back when she defended her conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court from the oft-heard charge that they are totally in the tank for President Donald Trump. "I don't see this as a court that is just like, 'We're just going to rubber stamp what the current administration does.' You know, quite the opposite," Kagan said. "I think that that is a bad rap." In support of her argument, Kagan pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court had recently ruled against Trump on the two big issues that Trump himself valued the most: tariffs and birthright citizenship.
Kagan was in the news again on Tuesday, this time because she publicly blasted those same conservative colleagues for issuing decisions on voting rights and political gerrymandering that, in Kagan's words, have produced "a democracy that does not work as well as it should." According to Kagan, the Court's conservative majority "has kind of blinded itself to the very deleterious effects of their rulings on how the political system works."
Does this mean that Kagan has now stopped defending the conservative justices from the pro-Trump charge? Not at all. In fact, as The New York Timesput it, "she reiterated her defense of the conservative-dominated bench from a July appearance and said it was a 'bum rap' to suggest the court had been too deferential to Mr. Trump."
I don't know about you, but I find Kagan to be a refreshing public figure in these simplistic, partisan times. She is a staunch legal liberal with clearly stated objections to what the Supreme Court's conservative majority is getting up to, yet she refuses to be associated with the laziest progressive attacks on the Court. How many people of comparable public stature these days are willing to call out the shortcomings of their own side?
The battle to save the global court and its capacity to enforce accountability for the most heinous crimes is one struggle with many fronts, writes Marjorie Cohn.
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied an emergency petition from the Trump administration, which sought a stay on a lower court’s injunction on a policy that would have denied gender-affirming care to federally incarcerated transgender people.
That policy was implemented by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after President Donald Trump signed an executive order in January 2025 that denied the existence of transgender people. The order also directed federal agencies to take steps that would be consistent with that view, and included specific instructions for the BOP.
“The Attorney General shall ensure that the Bureau of Prisons revises its policies concerning medical care to be consistent with this order, and shall ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex,” the order reads.
After the BOP conformed to the order, a group of incarcerated trans people who had been receiving gender-affirming care sued the administration. The group is being represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which argued that their Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment were being infringed upon.
A federal judge agreed, and, in August, ordered the policy to be blocked. The Trump administration challenged that finding, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld it, prompting Solicitor General John Sauer to submit an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court has regularly ruled against transgender people, allowing state bans on trans athletes’ participation in sports, ruling in favor of a ban on transgender people in the military, and upholding state laws that bar gender-affirming care for trans children and teens. Yet on Wednesday, the court denied the Trump administration’s request.
“The application for stay presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court is denied,” the order read, giving no further explanation. Two justices for the court — Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas — would have granted the Trump administration’s request for a stay, the document said.
Around 1,000 federally incarcerated trans people have also been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. The ruling means these individuals can continue receiving gender-affirming care while they remain in federal prisons or jails and the case moves forward in the lower courts.
The European Parliament has awarded the 2026 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its officials, recognising the Hague-based tribunal’s work in investigating and prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.
Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.
The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.
The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.
The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.
The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.
Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.
Arrest warrants involving Russia and Israel
The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.
Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.
Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.
The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.
The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.
European Parliament backs international justice
The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.
Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.
The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.
European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.
The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.
Other nominees and award ceremony
The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.
The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.
The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.
It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.
Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.
In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.
The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.
Author withdrawn from France’s Prix Goncourt last month has repeatedly denied using artificial intelligence to write novel
The publisher of top-selling Haitian Canadian writer Thélyson Orélien, who was removed from France’s most prestigious literary prize list last month, has confirmed the author used artificial intelligence to help write his novel C’était ça ou mourir (It Was Either That or Die).
Orélien has denied allegations that he used AI on his breakthrough novel and, last week, Canadian publisher Les Éditions du Boréal said it was standing by the 38-year-old writer.
The Supreme Court on Wednesday refused to allow the Trump administration to immediately enforce new medical restrictions for transgender people in prison. The decision leaves in place a lower-court block on the policy.
In late August, President Donald Trump announced what he called the “biggest oil deal in world history.” Since then, the full text of the accord — which grants the U.S. sweeping access to Venezuela’s oil reserves — has been one of the most sought-after secrets in Washington, DC. ProPublica has reviewed a copy of the […]
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to hearAssociation for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education. The case, which was originally brought forth in 2020 by the Association for Education Fairness (AFEF), a coalition of Montgomery County, Maryland, parents, alleges that Montgomery County's selection process for magnet programs (gifted programs for STEM and humanities studies in middle schools) violates the Constitution'sEqual Protection Clause by discriminating against Asian American students. The county insists that the selection process is race-neutral.
Montgomery County changed its selection process in the 2021–22 school year. According to reporting from The New York Times, the county was facing pressure from community groups, including the NAACP and Citizens Assisting and Sheltering the Abused (CASA Inc.), over the underrepresentation of black and Latino students in its magnet programs. Previously, students were selected based on test scores and grades. The new process implemented a lottery system in which high-achieving students are placed in a selection pool and selected at random.
The AFEF's central complaint is that the new system factors school poverty levels into the criteria for pool eligibility. This means students' eligibility depends on their scores relative to students in similarly affluent or disadvantaged schools, rather than the general population. They argue that since Asian Americans are concentrated in high-performing, lower-poverty schools, they have to clear a higher bar to become eligible. The group alleges the new system has caused fewer Asian American students to be admitted into magnet schools, a claim that is backed up by admissions data (which also show that the share of Asian American applications has fallen). The AFEF alsocites Montgomery County's 2015 hiring of Metis, a national consulting firm, to recommend ways to make the system more "equitable" as an indication of the county's effort to "racially balance" its magnet programs.
The complaint was dismissed by U.S. District Judge Paula Xinis in 2022, whoruled that the parents hadn't shown the policy disproportionately harmed Asian American students, citing the fact that they made up a larger share of admitted students than of the applicant pool. Xinis drew a distinction between accounting for economic disparities, which she called "wholly permissible," and racial discrimination. "Alleged disparity in treatment based on socioeconomic status alone does not make plausible discrimination on account of race," she wrote in the ruling. The tension raised by Xinis sits at the center of many debates regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion, as factors like poverty levels can often become a proxy for race; therefore, policies that are neutral on their face can still disparately impact a certain race.
In February, the 4th Circuit Court of Appealsupheld the dismissal, ruling that precedent from the Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board (2023) requires parents to show the policy disproportionately harmed Asian American applicants, which they hadn't. However, there is a real legal question as to whether racial groups should have to prove they were harmed as a group, as opposed to the individual, and lower courts have given mixed answers.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), a public-interest law firm representing the AFEF, litigated asimilar case in New York City, where the city implemented an economic need index in its admissions process for competitive high schools, aimed at increasing the number of black and Hispanic students. Again, parents alleged that the requirement discriminated against Asian American students. In 2024, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals found that if the city intended to discriminate, the parents don't have to prove Asian Americans were harmed as a group and that harm to an individual was enough for the case to move forward. The case was sent back to the district court to determine whether the city intended to discriminate, where it remains pending.
The Supreme Court will now settle the issue anddetermine "whether a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the applicant pool," according to SCOTUSBlog.
In a statement on Monday, PLF Senior Attorney Chris Kieser said, "The Constitution protects students as individuals, not as members of a racial group. A school district should not be able to defeat a discrimination claim by showing that its policy did not harm enough Asian American children. Every family deserves admissions rules that judge their child on their own merit."
HRF alleges that Sean Glass likely gave the order to open fire. His alleged responsibility extends across Gaza: attacks on Al-Shifa Hospital, destruction of UNRWA headquarters, and the razing of entire neighbourhoods—devastation he publicly celebrated.
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2026–2027 term just got a whole lot boozier. On Monday, the justices agreed to hear arguments later this year or next in the case of Department of Justice v. McNutt. At issue is whether the 1868 federal ban on distilling liquor at home is unconstitutional because it exceeds the lawful regulatory power of the federal government. If any modern Supreme Court case ever deserved its own drinking game, this one is it.
In April, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit found the federal ban on home distilling to be unconstitutional because Congress lacked the proper authority to issue such a ban in the first place. It was not a legitimate exercise of the congressional authority "To Lay and collect Taxes," the appellate court reasoned, because "the purpose of a tax is to raise revenue for the government;" yet this law "amount[s] to an anti-revenue provision" that only "prevents distilled spirits from coming into existence." And if it does not exist, of course, the government cannot tax it.
The 5th Circuit also denied that the federal ban on home distilling could be saved by the government's appeal to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which says that Congress has the authority "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
But the federal ban on home distilling cannot be "necessary" to the execution of the enumerated taxing power, the 5th Circuit argued, because the provisions of federal law at issue "tax nothing, and are distinct from the regulation of distilling alcoholic products that is permitted by federal tax law."
Nor did the 5th Circuit find the ban to be "proper." "By purporting to ban activity without a plain connection to the exercise of Congress's taxation power," it held, "Congress has essentially—and 'improperly'—invaded the reserved police and regulatory power of the states."
The Trump administration lost this case at the 5th Circuit and has now successfully urged the justices to hear its appeal. In its petition seeking review, the Trump administration faulted the 5th Circuit for its overeagerness to "second-guess" the "legislative judgment" of Congress. Instead, the Trump administration argued, the federal judiciary owes a great deal more deference to the federal government's regulatory priorities in a case like this. "A law is necessary and proper if it is 'convenient' or 'useful' for carrying an enumerated power into effect, and 'plainly adapted' to that legitimate end," the Justice Department's brief argued. "That is the case here."
This case may lead to an interesting divide among the Supreme Court's more conservative members. In United States v. Comstock(2010), a 7–2 Supreme Court embraced the Necessary and Proper Clause as sufficient constitutional grounding for the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which had empowered federal officials to order the indefinite civil commitment of "sexually dangerous" individuals who had already finished serving their prison sentences. Chief Justice John Roberts joined the majority opinion in that case, while Justice Samuel Alito voted in concurrence. In other words, they both endorsed a broad view of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. By contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, voted in dissent. The Comstock ruling, Thomas protested, "comes perilously close to transforming the Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police power that 'we always have rejected.'"
Are we about to see a similar Alito-Thomas split over the proper reach of federal power in this case? And what about Justices Neil Gorsuch, Amy Coney Barrett, and Brett Kavanaugh? Will one or more of them play the Scalia part and similarly reject the Trump administration's broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause?
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