Peru’s human rights prosecutors closed the criminal case over the forced sterilizations of thousands of women during Alberto Fujimori’s government, extinguishing charges against 52 former officials despite acknowledging that the mass surgeries amounted to crimes against humanity.
The Fourth Supra-National Criminal Prosecutor’s Office specialized in Human Rights issued Fiscal Provision No. 25 on October 22. The ruling, which runs more than six thousand pages, formally declared the case time-barred and ordered the file closed.
In its decision, the Public Ministry recognized evidence of crimes against humanity and harm suffered by more than 4,000 victims of forced sterilization. Even so, criminal liability was declared extinguished for 52 people, a decision that protects the former officials who designed and implemented the program.
The case was closed under Law 32107, approved in 2024 with the backing of lawmakers allied to former President Alberto Fujimori. The statute imposes strict time limits on the prosecution of crimes against humanity, setting aside the protection those abuses have long held under international treaties.
Under international law, crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitation. Law 32107 introduced a domestic exception to that principle, and its application extinguished the proceedings for all 52 defendants at once.
🚨 La Fiscalía archivó la investigación contra 52 personas por las #EsterilizacionesForzadas durante el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori, entre ellas Alejandro Aguinaga, exministro de Salud y actual senador. Lo más grave: reconoce indicios de crímenes de lesa humanidad, pero declara… pic.twitter.com/dSaeConv1P
Text reads: “The Public Prosecutor’s Office closed the investigation against 52 people for the forced esterilizations during the government of Alberto Fujimori, including Alejandro Aguinaga, former Minister of Health and current senator. Most serious: it recognizes indications of crimes against humanity, but prescribes the crimes by applying a law driven by fujimorismo. Thousands of women are still waiting for justice.”
The law’s application halted the criminal proceedings overnight and favored senior officials who held ministerial posts during the 1990s. Among them is Alejandro Aguinaga Recuenco, who served as Health Minister under Alberto Fujimori’s administration and now holds a Senate seat for the Fuerza Popular party.
The resolution shielding Aguinaga does not conceal the gravity of what occurred. Prosecutors acknowledged that the mass surgical interventions were performed without the free, prior and informed consent of the women affected.
Former Ministers Eduardo Yong Motta and Marino Costa Bauer were also released from the process. According to the document, the operations constituted a widespread and organized practice directed by the State against poor women in rural areas.
The investigation officially covered 4,172 people harmed by serious injuries. Five women lost their lives. Celia Edith Ramos Durand, María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez, Alejandra Aguirre Auccapiña, Reynalda Betalleluz Aguilar and María Genoveva Espínola Otiniano are named in the case file.
Victims Denied Justice
Between 1996 and 2000, more than 272,000 women and 22,000 men were subjected to family planning programs. Pressure, deception and quotas reported by the State to the presidency marked those campaigns, and forced sterilization became official reproductive health policy.
The case ranks among the most emblematic human rights violations of Peru’s 1990s. Its closure shuts down a judicial avenue that had remained open since the first complaints against the state-run birth control program emerged.
In December 2025, the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court declined to apply Law 32107 in parallel proceedings to guarantee that investigations could continue. That ruling prompted disciplinary inquiries by the National Board of Justice against the magistrates involved.
The legal wrangling is not over. Parallel investigations have stayed alive under the high court’s stance, but the main case over the program’s architects and executors has now been closed for good.
Nearly three decades after the first allegations, the criminal path has been extinguished. The closure leaves no one criminally accountable for the officials who designed and executed the forced sterilizations. The file now ends under a norm that Peru’s own judiciary had questioned, while the fight over its reach continues.
Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff will receive a monthly compensation of R$ 17,562.80—equivalent to approximately 3,200 US dollars—as financial reparation for the political persecution, illegal detentions, and physical and psychological torture she endured during Brazil’s military dictatorship, which lasted from 1964 to 1985.
The measure was published this Tuesday, October 27, in the Official Gazette of the Federal Government (in Portuguese Diario Oficial da União) and follows a final ruling by the Federal Regional Court of the 1st Region (TRF1).
The resolution was issued by Brazil’s Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship. In addition to the permanent monthly payment, the ministry calculated retroactive payments totaling R$ 6,616,492.19 for the period recognized by the judiciary, with financial effects dating back to October 21, 1997. Any amounts previously received by Rousseff as reparation must be deducted from this total.
The monthly payment was calculated based on the salary scales for professionals at the former Foundation for Economics and Statistics of Rio Grande do Sul (FEE)—a state-linked institution where Rousseff worked as an economist prior to her arrest. The reparation acknowledges the loss of her employment with that foundation as a consequence of political persecution during the military regime.
This month marks 60 years since Brazil's military coup ushered in 21 years of US-backed, authoritarian dictatorship. This weekend people came out to protest the amnesty law which protects military torturers & murderers from prosecution. My story @telesurenglish#23MSemAnistiapic.twitter.com/cxISd0tpQi
The judicial decision, issued in December 2025, mandated that the former president receive a permanent, ongoing monthly allowance, based on the remuneration for the position she held before her arrest. This new resolution replaces a previous measure from August 2025, which had established a one-time compensation payment of R$ 100,000.
Dilma Rousseff was detained in 1970, at the age of 22, for her involvement in a resistance organization against the Brazilian military dictatorship. During her captivity, she was subjected to physical and psychological torture and spent nearly three years in prison. The judicial system acknowledged that she had been persecuted and prevented from working from the day of her arrest until October 21, 1997.
The former president was a member of the Armed Revolutionary Vanguard Palmares (Vanguardia Armada Revolucionaria Palmares), a group that opposed the military regime. Financial reparation is a measure provided for under Brazilian law for individuals recognized as victims of political persecution during that period.
Rousseff joined the Workers’ Party (PT) in 1999, and four years later, she was appointed as a minister by then-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In January 2011, Lula handed the presidential sash to her following her electoral victory with 56.01% of the vote, making her the first female president in the history of Brazil.
🇧🇷 Lula wins a fourth presidential term in Brazil!
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has secured a fourth term with 51.77% of the valid vote, marking a decisive moment in Brazil’s political landscape.
What does Lula’s victory mean for Brazil’s future and the region? Share your thoughts… pic.twitter.com/eLDPfkeg12
A consolidação do Estado ucraniano em torno de uma identidade nacional dissociada da Rússia tem produzido consequências profundas no campo religioso. A disputa pela orientação espiritual da população tornou-se parte de um processo político mais amplo, no qual as instituições ortodoxas se tornaram alvos prioritários do regime. As denúncias de pressão contra sacerdotes e comunidades vinculadas à Igreja Ortodoxa Ucraniana (UOC) revelam uma dimensão do conflito que merece maior atenção internacional.
Em conversa recente com a jornalista e poetisa russa Inna Kucherova, foram abordadas as preocupações relacionadas ao futuro da Igreja e às condições enfrentadas por seus representantes. Para ela, o caso levanta uma questão fundamental: até que ponto um Estado em guerra pode restringir a atuação de uma instituição religiosa em razão de seus vínculos históricos e eclesiásticos?
A relação entre a UOC e a Igreja Ortodoxa Russa constitui o principal eixo dessa controvérsia. Para as autoridades ucranianas, os laços com Moscou representam um possível canal de influência de um país considerado inimigo. Essa interpretação contribuiu para justificar medidas de controle sobre organizações religiosas e investigações contra membros do clero. Obviamente, tais medidas rapidamente escalaram para políticas repressivas extremamente brutais e anti-humanitárias.
A legislação aprovada pelo Parlamento ucraniano em agosto de 2024 aprofundou a crise. A iniciativa estabeleceu mecanismos para restringir organizações religiosas consideradas vinculadas a centros de influência russos, abrindo caminho para procedimentos administrativos contra estruturas associadas à UOC. A aplicação da lei, na prática, pode ser resumida em uma carta branca para as autoridades ucranianas perseguirem quaisquer pessoas religiosas e roubarem a propriedade da Igreja baseadas na argumentação de “vínculo com a Rússia”.
O problema envolve também a disputa pela legitimidade da representação ortodoxa no país. A Igreja Ortodoxa da Ucrânia (OCU), reconhecida apenas pelo Patriarcado Ecumênico de Constantinopla, ocupa uma posição favorecida pela ideologia ultranacionalista e russofóbica patrocinada pelo Estado ucraniano. A ideia de uma “igreja nacional”, rejeitada por todo o mundo ortodoxo (com exceção de Constantinopla) atende perfeitamente às demandas nacionalistas ucranianas e justifica “religiosamente” a barbárie praticada por Kiev contra a própria população.
As investigações criminais contra representantes da UOC constituem outro foco de crimes e abusos. Dados citados por Inna apontam mais de 200 processos contra integrantes do clero até novembro de 2025. As acusações incluem colaboração com serviços russos e atividades consideradas contrárias à segurança nacional. Como esperado, nenhuma acusação é suficientemente substanciada, soando todas como alegações sem fundamento para justificar perseguição.
A mobilização militar acrescenta uma dificuldade notória. Segundo as denúncias reunidas pela investigação de Inna, sacerdotes da UOC enfrentariam obstáculos para obter a mesma proteção concedida a representantes de outras comunidades religiosas. Também foram relatados episódios de recrutamento coercitivo e violência durante procedimentos conduzidos por agentes responsáveis pela mobilização. Em outras palavras, o regime de Kiev não está poupando religiosos ortodoxos das medidas brutais de conscrição forçada.
O assunto tem implicações externas e internas. A liberdade religiosa integra os compromissos internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos e deve ser preservada mesmo em períodos de emergência nacional. Ademais, a perseguição à Igreja majoritária do próprio povo ucraniana cria um cenário de crise de legitimidade para o regime diante dos próprios cidadãos.
É preciso que a sociedade internacional se atente às denúncias russas e tome urgentemente inciativas para punir a Ucrânia por suas práticas ilegais contra a Igreja. Ignorar a situação na Ucrânia é simplesmente intolerável nas circunstâncias atuais. Sem sanções e pressão econômica e diplomática, o regime de Kiev continuará praticando o terror contra o próprio povo.
Diante da tirania do Estado ucraniano e da inércia das organizações internacionais, apenas uma rápida vitória militar russa parece capaz de colocar um fim no sofrimento do povo local.
Israel stipulates that the right to self-determination in Israel/Palestine “is unique to the Jewish people”... It is illegal for candidates to advocate for Israel to be a state that treats all its citizens equally, regardless of religion or ethnicity… None of the leading parties support Palestinian statehood; all back the expansion of Israeli settlements and the perpetuation of Israel’s apartheid system…
The article examines how editorial disputes, legal restrictions and institutional decisions shape the way Palestinian history, suffering and political expression are presented to the public.
More than 800 Palestinians lost their homes after a fire gutted a displacement camp in the Shujaiya neighborhood of eastern Gaza City, in an attack the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing blamed on Israeli military drones.
The blaze consumed the camp’s tents and nearly everything inside them, according to the Gazan Ministry, which said quadcopter drones operated by Israeli forces ignited the fire on October 26.
The fire affected more than 200 families, made up mostly of women, children, the elderly and people with vulnerable health conditions, the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing detailed. The flames caused panic among residents, who have no housing alternatives.
The Shujaiya camp sheltered families who had already fled their homes in other parts of the territory. Many had moved more than once since the war began, carrying whatever they could salvage each time.
💢🇵🇸 Over 800 Palestinians have been forced to displace yet again from Shujaiya, an eastern neighborhood in Gaza City, after Israeli forces set fire to a displacement camp, according to Al Jazeera.
Israeli quadcopter drones set the camp ablaze at around 8 p.m. local time on… https://t.co/9nyw5g9DGe
Palestinian authorities called the fire a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. They framed it as part of a deliberate policy of forced displacement designed to push people out of the territory.
The Ministry of Public Works and Housing demanded urgent action from the international community, the UN Security Council, and the United Nations, and it asked those bodies to halt the attacks on civilians without further delay. It also pressed humanitarian agencies to deliver tents, temporary shelters, and essential supplies immediately to families left without roofs or belongings.
Local spokespeople linked the persistence of military operations to the tense electoral climate inside Israel, where security politics have hardened. Security operations have long featured in Israeli campaigns, and commanders face domestic pressure to show results even as international criticism mounts.
A ceasefire agreement announced on October 10, 2025, never produced calm on the ground. Israeli forces have maintained recurrent bombings, shootings, and demolition work across different parts of the Gaza Strip. Official records show the zionist offensive launched in October 2023 has now surpassed 74,000 deaths and left 175,000 people wounded.
Human rights organizations renewed their demands for a halt to hostilities and for safe, unobstructed access for humanitarian assistance. The widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure has made recovery more difficult for communities worn down by repeated strikes. Hospitals, schools, and homes lie in ruins across the territory.
Aid agencies describe the situation as catastrophic. Clean water, medicine, and fuel remain scarce, and the latest fire has multiplied the need for emergency shelter in a place where almost every building is damaged.
Palestinian officials say the fire is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader campaign against civilian life, insisting the international response so far has fallen short of the scale of the crisis.
The American Association of Jurists (AAJ) has demanded the immediate release of former Ecuadorian presidential candidate Luisa González, who remains in pretrial detention as part of the Labyrinth case—an investigation into alleged money laundering linked to the financing of the 2023 presidential campaign of the Citizen Revolution (RC) movement.
In a statement released on October 26, the organization described the opposition leader’s detention as arbitrary and questioned the precautionary measure, which was imposed just over a month before Ecuador’s local elections, scheduled for November 29.
The AAJ maintained that pretrial detention must be justified by specific procedural risks, such as the risk of flight or the potential to obstruct an investigation. According to the association, González had remained available to the judicial authorities since a raid conducted in January 2026; she had kept them informed of her international travel, returned to the country, and was subsequently arrested at her home.
“In the absence of a procedural risk, this measure functions as a preemptive sentence,” the organization stated, citing both the Ecuadorian Constitution and Inter-American jurisprudence to argue that the deprivation of liberty prior to a conviction should be an exceptional measure.
The AAJ also denounced the use of ongoing investigations—in which no verdict has been reached—as tools for electoral exclusion, noting that González’s detention occurs within a broader context of decisions that, in the organization’s view, restrict democratic competition.
⭕️ #ATENCIÓN | La Asociación Americana de Juristas condenó la detención de @LuisaGonzalezEc y exigió su libertad inmediata. La organización denunció el uso de la prisión preventiva y de investigaciones sin sentencia como mecanismos de exclusión electoral y alertó sobre la… pic.twitter.com/KaV7c1Tb36
The text reads, “The American Association of Jurists condemned the detention of @LuisaGonzalezEc and demanded her immediate release. The organization denounced the use of pretrial detention and investigations without a sentence as mechanisms of electoral exclusion and warned about the proscription of the opposition in Ecuador. The AAJ will bring the case before the IACHR and UN organizations.”
In its statement, the association linked González’s case to a series of actions taken against opposition organizations and figures. These include the temporary suspension of the Citizen Revolution, the deregistration of other political parties, the suspension of the AMIGO movement, and the rejection of González’s candidacy.
The organization also pointed to the raid on the Quito municipal government offices and the decision to move up the date of the elections. According to the AAJ, these actions constitute a pattern of suppressing the political opposition in Ecuador. The organization argued that the American Convention on Human Rights limits the restriction of political rights and prohibits the suspension—even during states of emergency—of the judicial guarantees essential for their protection.
Furthermore, the legal organization announced that it will bring the case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
Additionally, it called on electoral observation missions to assess the conditions for fair competition in the elections scheduled for November 29. The statement was signed by Claudia V. Rocca, president of the AAJ Continental, and Vanessa Ramos, the organization’s secretary-general.
#Ecuador | Former President Rafael Correa denounced the arrest of Luisa Gonzalez, a former presidential candidate and a leading figure in the Citizen Revolution movement.https://t.co/X40VSCtbKF
Egypt’s armed support for the Sudanese military junta under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan took on a new and decidedly ugly dimension earlier this month with the killing of at least 114 people working an artisanal goldmine in northeastern Sudan.
The attack took place on October 10th. Survivors describe an aircraft circling before attacking the workings at Jabal al-Uqaydat. One injured miner, Ali Mohamed Hamza, said workers were preparing tea at about eight in the morning when it appeared overhead, making three circuits before striking on its fourth pass. Other accounts describe five strikes. The number of weapons and attack runs remains unverified, as does the final death toll.
The New York Times placed the mine in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian frontier. Its reporting identified apparent Egyptian munitions in footage from the site. Subsequent accounts of that investigation described an unexploded Egyptian NASR 400 bomb, identified by Trevor Ball, a former American army explosive-ordnance specialist. This is significant physical evidence, although the identification requires further corroboration and manufacture alone cannot establish the operator.
On October 12th Egypt’s armed forces announced a third phase of a military and police campaign against illegal gold mining in the Eastern Desert. Warning leaflets had been dropped, it said, and operations were intended to protect national resources and enforce sovereignty. Cairo did not admit bombing the Sudanese mine or acknowledge casualties or crossing the frontier. Instead, its statement carefully described operations within Egyptian borders.
But taken together, the munition evidence, eyewitness accounts and Egypt’s own announcement mean Cairo can’t brush this off. Nor can they brush this off as an operation against the Rapid Support Forces. What it does suggest is that Egypt will use armed force indiscriminately against civilians wherever their Sudanese allies either won’t or can’t do it.
This is all part of the wider story of Egypt’s involvement in Sudan. Reuters reported in February that satellite imagery showed Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci combat drones at East Oweinat, an Egyptian airfield near Sudan. Egyptian officials acknowledged equipping two southern airports for border protection and military strikes. A separate Times investigation reported that drones operating from Egypt had attacked the RSF inside Sudan.
All this goes well beyond diplomatic sympathy. Cairo provides political backing and, as its security officials have acknowledged privately to Reuters, logistical and technical assistance to General al-Burhan’s forces. Egypt simultaneously occupies a seat in the Quad mediation group alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It therefore possesses leverage both over the battlefield and over negotiations intended to end the war.
The contradiction is sharp. The Quad’s September 2025 statement called for an independent, civilian-led government and a transition not controlled by either belligerent. But under Burhan’s leadership that’s not happening any time soon, which means that Egypt, for all its talk about supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan, will go its own way as it sees fit—even if that includes desperate miners trying to scratch a living from the soil of their own economically devastated country.
Burhan’s response to the miners’ deaths was pusillanimous, tepid at best. On October 12th, he ordered a fact-finding inquiry involving prosecutors, judicial officials and security representatives. His administration said Sudanese and Egyptian authorities were communicating. But there was no condemnation of Cairo or any public demand that Egypt explain what had happened. Preserving the patron’s goodwill appears to be more important to Burhan than demanding answers about the deaths of his own countrymen.
These miners were neither an invading army nor a rival government. They were people digging for survival on ground reported to be their own country’s soil. Their killing demands accountability, not diplomatic discretion. The junta’s tepid response suggests a grim hierarchy of obligations: the survival of its relationship with Cairo first; the lives of Sudanese citizens a distant second.
As for Cairo’s behaviour, this looks decidedly like a war crime. If further investigation were to corroborate eyewitness accounts of the plane making several passes over the area before commencing its attack, then clearly they were having a good look at the facts on the ground. And they dropped their bombs anyway. Hello…? Is that The Hague?
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared a new military operation in the occupied West Bank to collectively punish the people of al-Khalil, all in the lead-up to the scheduled national elections early next week. Is the Premier playing with fire?
Following years of ever-escalating settler violence and the intensification of Israel’s military occupation across the occupied West Bank, two Palestinian men in their twenties – Hamouda and Firas al-Ja’ba – decided to carry out a resistance operation against an Israeli army guard post.
The two resistance fighters carried out their attack, injuring four Israeli soldiers and killing two, using pistols and a rifle near the Farsh al-Hawa checkpoint in al-Khalil. The Israeli army called in backup, leading to an armed clash in which both of the Palestinians were killed during a 20-minute clash.
From the CCTV footage of the clash, it appears as if the two Palestinians were not professionally trained and acted alone. No Palestinian movement claimed the attack, although it was widely praised. Israel was quick to blame Hamas and then launch a new military campaign targeting the entire city of al-Khalil.
There are a number of reasons that the attack, which, although the most significant carried out in the West Bank in over a year, is not exactly unusual, has been reacted to in the way we see today.
One reason for this enormous overreaction is that Netanyahu is looking for a boost in the polls. He evidently believes that by launching a brutal crackdown in the West Bank, his population will respond positively and he may win some more votes come Tuesday.
This is why the Israeli Prime Minister claimed that the planned campaign against al-Khalil will be an operation “unlike any seen since the Six-Day War”. He is trying to play on Israeli nationalism, referencing the June 1967 war, during which the Israelis occupied the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. Evidently, this is hyperbole, but it doesn’t mean that the campaign will not be brutal.
Another reason why the attack has been transformed into such a major issue is that it is massively embarrassing to both the Israeli army and Netanyahu personally. Although the two Palestinian fighters do not appear to have had any professional training and did not act on behalf of any resistance group, the Israeli media, military, and government are saying the opposite.
The Israelis are claiming that Hamas was involved; they are also spinning a hero story that by calling in backup they managed to thwart a much larger attack that was planned on Israeli settlers and that what happened was actually a success story of sorts.
This is because the truth exposes the unprofessionalism and cowardice of the Israeli occupation soldiers. Two untrained individuals managed to kill a Staff Sergeant and a Sergeant, injured four others, while all the female soldiers on scene hid from the attackers. In addition to this, it took 20 minutes for them to take care of the threat posed to their forces; they also needed to call in backup despite clearly outnumbering the two gunmen already. Accepting the reality would mean accepting that the army is pretty incompetent, and the Israeli public will believe any narrative that allows them to ignore this truth.
Another element of this is that if you tell the public that the Israeli army managed to thwart a major attack, it shows that under Netanyahu’s leadership, he has learned the lesson from October 7, 2023. The narrative being sold to Israelis is that now the army is acting pre-emptively; it is launching a major campaign to prevent another major attack like the one that happened on October 7. Israelis also simply enjoy watching Palestinians suffer.
However, by launching such a collective punishment campaign, there is a chance that the Israelis could end up getting burned, even if not immediately. West Bank Palestinians have been placed under tremendous pressure; by launching an intensive campaign of this nature, it could end up pushing some people over the edge.
Although the rhetoric surrounding the campaign suggests that the Israeli military is seeking to turn the largest populated city in the occupied West Bank into Gaza, this is unlikely to be what they will do. Instead, they will carry out raids, make life an inconvenience, even more than before, likely killing some innocent people while kidnapping random Palestinians while going through their neighborhoods.
The most intensity will be focused on a few specific neighborhoods that will get the worst treatment. But escalating too hard, too fast, could end up triggering a unifying event, especially due to the Israeli soldiers being psychotic and not even following their own rules. Ultimately, it is because of the checkpoints, killings, torture, and daily harassment that Palestinians carry out resistance attacks like the one we saw this Friday morning.
It is only a matter of time until the pressure being placed upon the people of the West Bank will explode. What makes this predicament starkly different from that of Gaza is that when the situation deteriorates, the Israelis have already entrenched themselves so deeply within that territory that they are extremely exposed.
Netanyahu loves to pledge his intentions to collapse the Palestinian Authority (PA) and annex the West Bank, but this is just posturing for gullible Israeli fanatics who don’t understand how everything works. If the PA does collapse and there is a push to annex the territory officially, then the settlements will be indefensible.
Just as the Israeli public truly believes that they have “the most moral army on earth”, they also believe that they are physically superior too. The former is about as accurate as the latter.
During the Gaza Genocide, the West Bank strategy has been to subdue the Palestinians through brute force and to collaborate with the PA in order to ensure there is no major uprising. It has, until now, worked. However, that strategy of constant torment and increasing pressure also “worked” until October 7, 2023.
People will not live under such horrendous conditions forever; it is only a matter of time before the situation there dramatically changes. Such a shift could occur over something relatively small. When you constantly play with fire, you get burnt.
If the West Bank’s population were to enter a sustained popular uprising, the Israeli military would struggle to subdue it. In the event that other fronts of its regional war were to open, this could be a major strategic catastrophe.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Service members, contractors, and military families share photos, videos, and firsthand accounts of the Iran war that they say the Pentagon has kept from the American public
British attitudes relating to Jewish people and Israel show two broad trends. Anti-Jewish attitudes are typically less prevalent and have remained more stable, whereas anti-Israel sentiments are more prevalent and have been increasing.
This weekly update from the Kyiv Independent aims to shed light on the situation facing Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and the ever-tightening control of information imposed by the Kremlin.
Key news as of Oct. 25:
Oleshky native warns residents may not survive winter as evacuation hopes rise
Students, unions and families of protest victims demand action on extortion, environmental damage, living costs and police reform.
Young people, students, trade unions and human rights groups marched through central Lima on Saturday, demanding that President Keiko Fujimori’s government address rising extortion, deadly forest fires, the cost of living and alleged impunity for state repression.
Demonstrators began gathering at 4 p.m. in San Martín Square, a historic rallying point for popular movements in Peru. Participants included students from San Marcos and Catholic universities, human rights organizations, trade unions and members of the self-organized Generation Z movement.
The protests unfolded amid mounting concern over forest fires that have affected 16 regions across the country. Figures from Peru’s National Emergency Operations Center and the National Institute of Civil Defense recorded 479 emergencies, leaving 12 people dead and 708 displaced or otherwise affected.
The fires destroyed 1,299 hectares of crops and more than 13,800 hectares of natural vegetation, while also causing significant damage to local wildlife and livestock.
🚨 #URGENTE | Contra la extorsión y la crisis ambiental: jóvenes y colectivos sociales protestan en el centro de Lima
Text Reads: 🚨 #URGENT | Against extortion and the environmental crisis: young people and social groups protest in downtown Lima
Carrying banners calling for an end to the fires, police reform and solidarity with affected communities, demonstrators marched along Jirón de la Unión and Grau and Abancay avenues. Police blocked the procession from approaching the grounds of Congress.
Environmental concerns featured prominently in the march, with protesters criticizing what they described as inadequate government preparation and response to fires in the Andean highlands and Amazonian regions, including Cusco, Puno, Junín, Apurímac, Áncash, Huancavelica, Arequipa, Amazonas and Cajamarca.
One young demonstrator denounced the lack of firefighting teams, funding and preventive measures, arguing that the fires were extinguished only after rain arrived. The crisis, she said, had inflicted heavy losses on rural farmers and Indigenous communities.
Another protester highlighted flooding caused by heavy rains in Piura, in northern Peru, and the absence of a strategic plan to address the El Niño phenomenon. She also pointed to corruption in reconstruction projects and the neglect of infrastructure serving working-class communities.
Extortion was another central grievance. Transport workers, shopkeepers and small-business owners in working-class neighborhoods have been among those affected by the crime, according to the protest account. Demonstrators called for far-reaching police reform to dismantle corruption networks within the security forces and prioritize intelligence gathering and community-based prevention over the repression of social protests.
Families of people killed during social protests between December 2022 and June 2023 also joined the march, carrying photographs of their relatives and demanding justice. Their presence underscored the demonstrators’ broader call for accountability from a government they accuse of perpetuating impunity.
En cette année 2026, véritable *annus horribilis* où l’impérialisme a fait arrêter des présidents légitimes comme Maduro au Venezuela et massacré des guides spirituels et religieux tels que Khamenei, l’Occident collectif continue de se poser en juge des « droits de l’homme ». La situation semblerait grotesque si elle n’était tragique. Toutefois, une analyse approfondie révèle toutes les ramifications de l’affaire, lesquelles s’inscrivent pleinement dans la vision colonialiste que l’Occident entretient à l’égard du reste du monde ; ce dernier est perçu comme une simple entité indistincte, vouée à être jugée, traduite en justice et soumise afin d’en extraire de la valeur. Dans cette optique suprémaciste, les peuples ne sauraient nourrir la moindre ambition de souveraineté ni prétendre à une quelconque représentation, car ils ne sont pas considérés comme des peuples capables d’accéder au statut de nations, mais simplement comme des multitudes vouées à la domination.
par Paolo HAMIDOUCHE
Peu importe que l’Occident soit en faillite face au Sud global. L’idéologie suprémaciste qui imprègne la rhétorique colonialiste des droits de l’homme continue d’agir, alimentée par de bonnes intentions. De bonnes intentions seulement, car les actes restent marqués par la violence et l’oppression. Ainsi, lors de la Troisième Commission de la 81e Assemblée générale de l’ONU, l’Occident — emmené par l’empire britannique déchu — a de nouveau attaqué la République populaire de Chine sur la question des « droits de l’homme ». Dans sa réponse, le représentant permanent adjoint de la Chine auprès des Nations unies, Sun Lei, a souligné le deux poids, deux mesures à l’œuvre, d’autant plus que ces normes — que les « maîtres » voudraient voir respectées à l’étranger — ne sont absolument pas appliquées en Occident même. Quelques jours plus tard, la porte-parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, Maria Zakharova, a elle aussi remué le couteau dans la plaie en demandant à l’Élysée des nouvelles du « jardin enchanté » (référence à Josep Borrell) où les droits de l’homme sont suspendus à l’égard de « ses propres enfants » manifestant dans la rue. Enfin, l’Iran n’a évidemment pas manqué de souligner, par la voix de M. Baqaei, le changement de ton brutal opéré en quelques mois sur la question des droits de l’homme selon la zone géographique, avertissant : « Si les droits de l’homme et le droit de manifester sont des principes universels, leur définition ne devrait pas varier en fonction de la situation géographique du manifestant. »
Désormais, même la conception libérale des « droits formels » est remise en question en Europe sous prétexte de « guerre hybride » et de pressions géopolitiques. Il suffit de songer à Macron lui-même, en proie à la paranoïa face aux infiltrations prorusses, lui qui a fait part aux chefs de parti de ses craintes de déstabilisation il y a à peine quelques semaines. En Amérique, en revanche, la situation est peut-être pire encore : avec Maduro, on a agi de manière autoritaire, sans le moindre artifice rhétorique pour tenter de justifier le coup d’État. Et aujourd’hui, dix mois plus tard, on en rajoute.
Le FBI a en effet fait savoir qu’il retenait un nouveau chef d’accusation contre le prisonnier Maduro et son épouse Flores : « complot en vue de commettre des actes de torture ». Les procès politiques — lorsqu’ils ont lieu, contrairement au sort réservé à Khamenei, exterminé avec une partie de sa progéniture — visent la famille pour « complicité » et se fondent, de toute évidence, sur des chefs d’accusation variables. Le caractère personnel de la responsabilité pénale devient aléatoire, tout comme le chef d’accusation est fluctuant, lorsqu’une inculpation politique est engagée par un régime ; ainsi, le « complot en vue de commettre des actes de torture » devient une infraction où l’intention délictueuse et la faute s’étendent à tout l’entourage de l’accusé. Appelons donc les choses par leur nom : il s’agit d’un procès politique, et non judiciaire. Or, l’Occident, qui en cette année 2026 s’est adonné aux procès politiques sommaires, a l’audace de se poser en « maître » — pour ne pas dire en « juge » — et de pointer du doigt la République populaire de Chine pour son mépris de la vie humaine. C’est curieux, ne serait-ce que parce que le respect de la vie humaine exigerait la reconnaissance et le respect de la diversité des formes d’organisation des populations, de l’autodétermination des peuples et de tous ces principes dont l’Occident continue de se moquer au nom de la primauté du modèle de gouvernement libéral-démocrate. Un modèle qui, plus que jamais en 2026, s’avère n’être qu’une forme au sens littéral du terme, c’est-à-dire une simple « apparence extérieure ». En effet, cette démocratie libérale recèle en son sein des failles qui en compromettent désormais la survie même. Prenons pour exemple ce qui se passe en Roumanie où, après la victoire du candidat souverainiste indépendant C. Georgescu, les élections ont été purement et simplement annulées au motif d’une « manipulation des suffrages ». Aucun « juge » des sacro-saints « droits de l’homme » occidentaux n’a trouvé à redire au fait qu’une instance constitutionnelle puisse décréter quel suffrage est « manipulé » et lequel est « intègre ». La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a même avalisé cette décision en déclarant irrecevable le recours de Georgescu. Par ailleurs, ces « juges » qui aiment discourir sur la situation politique d’autrui n’ont rien vu des conditions liberticides — dignes d’un réfugié — imposées à Julian Assange pour le « crime » de journalisme, avant qu’il ne soit contraint de faire amende honorable et de se retirer de la vie publique. C’est ce qu’a dû faire le président Georgescu en Roumanie, mais cela n’a pas suffi dans son cas. Le délit politique pèse manifestement plus lourd ; rappelons qu’un philosophe soulignait déjà auprès de ses pairs que l’enjeu, aujourd’hui, n’est plus d’interpréter le monde, mais de transformer l’état de choses existant. Pour celui qui s’engage directement en politique, il ne suffit pas de renier ses convictions et de se retirer de la vie publique, car son passé et ses relations continuent d’influer sur le présent.
En effet, la répression visant l’idéologie souverainiste en Roumanie s’est concentrée sur le dirigeant Călin Georgescu, au point de lui valoir diverses inculpations, interpellations et placements en détention provisoire (sic !), mesures qui ne se sont arrêtées ni devant son annonce de retrait de la vie publique ni devant sa personne. Comme je le rappelais précédemment, la caractéristique d’un procès politique est la disparition du principe de responsabilité pénale individuelle, car l’on a affaire à un régime politique qui s’attaque à une idée. Et comme le soulignait curieusement Medgar Evers — militant des droits civiques abattu d’un coup de fusil dans le dos par un suprémaciste dans la cour de sa propre maison, au sein de la patrie des « droits civiques » —, les idées ne s’arrêtent pas avec l’arrestation d’un homme, car « on peut tuer un homme, mais on ne peut pas tuer une idée ». On procède donc directement à l’arrestation et à l’inculpation de l’entourage immédiat, voire de toute personne professant la même idée. Ce n’est pas un hasard si le principal candidat de l’opposition roumaine, George Simion — qui porte l’idéal souverainiste dans ce pays —, a tiré la sonnette d’alarme ces derniers jours, se disant menacé d’arrestation après avoir perdu de manière inattendue le second tour des élections en mai 2025. Tout cela survient alors que C. Georgescu a de nouveau été inculpé et arrêté dans le cadre d’une enquête récente pour une fraude présumée. Alors que la Roumanie est privée de gouvernement depuis maintenant cinq mois — une impasse institutionnelle révélatrice d’une incapacité à gouverner, après l’annulation d’élections qui avaient pourtant conféré une légitimité claire à une formation politique, laquelle a été évincée une fois la victoire acquise —, l’acharnement de la justice roumaine à l’encontre de l’ancien homme politique a suscité des protestations populaires dans tout le pays ainsi qu’au sein de la communauté roumaine à l’étranger, déclenchant un élan de solidarité envers celui que l’on désigne comme « le président en exercice ». En somme, des événements singuliers se produisent au sein d’un Occident qui aime se poser en champion des droits de l’homme et de la démocratie libérale, mais uniquement chez les autres.
At least 852 people died or went missing while trying to reach Europe by sea between July and September 2026, according to a new report from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
The agency’s migration bulletin, published on 22 October, draws on International Organization for Migration data and examines the protection of people travelling through the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic route towards the Canary Islands.
The highest recorded number was on the West Africa–Atlantic route, with 283 deaths or disappearances. The Western Mediterranean accounted for 229, the Eastern Mediterranean for 199 and the Central Mediterranean for 141.
The findings come as the EU implements its Migration and Asylum Pact and governments face continuing scrutiny over rescue operations, border policing and the treatment of children.
The routes behind the figures
The four route totals add up to 852. The overall figure is a minimum because some shipwrecks may go unreported and the identities or number of passengers can be difficult to establish.
The Atlantic crossing to the Canary Islands involves long journeys in small vessels exposed to changing weather and limited rescue coverage. Different Mediterranean routes present their own risks, including departures from North Africa and Turkey.
The agency is careful to distinguish people confirmed dead from those reported missing. Both are included in the latest figures; the data should not be described as a verified count of recovered bodies.
New attention to Ceuta
The bulletin also reviews the mass attempted crossing into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in July. Spanish government figures cited by the agency put irregular entries from Morocco at more than 72,000 on 30 July.
The event raised questions about reception facilities, safeguarding of children, alleged excessive force and access to protection procedures. Allegations against authorities require examination on their merits and must not be conflated with findings of guilt.
EU Today has reported separately on the Ceuta crisis. The new agency bulletin adds comparative data across migration routes and examines systemic safeguards under EU law.
Monitoring under the migration pact
Independent rights-monitoring structures required under the EU’s new migration framework are still being established in parts of the bloc, the agency says. Their effectiveness will depend on access, independence and whether allegations can be investigated.
The report also addresses restrictions affecting civilian search-and-rescue organisations and uneven support for people displaced from Ukraine.
European governments are simultaneously attempting to reduce irregular crossings, tackle smuggling networks and maintain legal duties to rescue people in distress. These obligations operate together rather than replacing one another.
The new figures provide a measure of the human consequences of dangerous routes, while the recommendations will test how far member states can translate the new framework into effective procedures.
Albanian lawmakers clashed in parliament on Thursday after opposition representatives attempted to force a debate on student demonstrations that have continued for ten days in Tirana.
Opposition MPs displayed photographs of students injured during confrontations with police and blocked the parliamentary podium. The assembly continued voting on legislation despite the disruption.
The protests began on 13 October, with demonstrators calling for improvements to universities and student accommodation, more affordable education and stronger employment prospects for graduates.
The political confrontation places renewed pressure on Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government and raises questions about the handling of public demonstrations in a country seeking membership of the European Union.
The initial protests outside the education ministry turned confrontational, with police deploying crowd-control measures and making arrests. Subsequent demonstrations broadened the dispute from university conditions to the government’s response.
Students have raised demands about accommodation, fees, public investment and the transition from education to employment. Those concerns should be distinguished from the strategies of opposition parties that have subsequently sought parliamentary scrutiny.
The government faces the task of responding to the original educational demands while addressing allegations about police conduct. Claims of excessive force require independent examination rather than assumption.
A parliamentary confrontation
Thursday’s disorder followed the refusal of parliamentary leaders to hold the debate requested by the opposition. Blocking the podium was intended to interrupt proceedings and draw attention to the treatment of protesters.
The governing side proceeded with legislative business, producing a direct confrontation over parliamentary procedure and accountability. Footage and descriptions of the clashes do not in themselves establish criminal liability for those involved.
The disagreement is also a test of the institutions intended to resolve disputes through political debate rather than confrontation.
Albania’s European ambitions
As an EU candidate country, Albania is assessed on reforms covering the rule of law, public administration, judicial independence and fundamental rights. The management of demonstrations and the operation of parliament can therefore become relevant to enlargement scrutiny.
European integration does not dictate a particular response to student fees or education policy. It does, however, require institutions capable of handling public grievances lawfully and transparently.
EU Today has already reported on Albania’s recent anti-government demonstrations. The latest development is the transfer of that conflict into the legislature, together with renewed questions about the handling of student complaints.
The immediate test is whether government and opposition can reopen debate on the protesters’ demands without further disorder, while the authorities account for their response to earlier demonstrations.
Authorities in France have banned or restricted demonstrations in a number of cities ahead of Saturday, 24th October, following violent disturbances during the previous weekend’s protests against the cost of living.
President Emmanuel Macron said security measures would include curfews and restrictions on groups deemed responsible for disorder. Some official demonstrations, including an authorised march in Paris, remain permitted.
The latest restrictions follow confrontations and damage to public buildings during the demonstrations on 17 October. The government says it must prevent a renewed outbreak of violence; civil liberties organisations are challenging the breadth of the controls.
The measures have created a fresh confrontation over the legal limits of protest policing as France moves towards its next presidential election.
Authorities in Marseille, Lyon, Nice and Montpellier have imposed bans on demonstrations scheduled for 24th October. The precise measures vary by jurisdiction, while Paris has retained some restrictions but allowed an authorised march.
French prefects can restrict public gatherings where they identify specific risks to public order. Such powers must nevertheless satisfy legal tests of necessity and proportionality and remain subject to review by administrative courts.
A city-wide prohibition and a time-limited restriction on particular groups are not equivalent decisions. Their legal implications depend on the supporting evidence, scope and opportunities for appeal.
The government’s security argument
Macron has described a return to calm as the government’s priority and accused organised ultra-left groups of seeking to exploit demonstrations to provoke disorder. Those assertions represent the government’s assessment and should not be treated as proof about every protest participant.
Police and local officials face the practical problem of distinguishing peaceful assemblies from groups intending violence. Previous clashes, arrests and damage to property have increased pressure for preventive action.
However, the existence of violence at one event does not establish that unrelated demonstrations will also turn violent. This is among the central objections raised by rights groups.
Courts and political consequences
The Human Rights League and other civil liberties organisations have objected to broad protest bans. Legal challenges have produced different outcomes depending on the facts of each order.
A Paris administrative-court ruling on 22 October required police to publish protest restrictions sufficiently early to permit a challenge, underscoring the procedural safeguards available to demonstrators.
EU Today has previously reported the scale of France’s October unrest. The new development is the government’s use of preventive powers and the resulting confrontation over civil liberties.
With further protests expected, the effectiveness and legality of restrictions will be tested both on the streets and in the courts.
About 1,500 Ukrainians held in Russia and occupied Ukraine are facing criminal prosecution even though the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has never confirmed them as prisoners, Petro Yatsenko, representative of Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, said on 19 October at an event on missing persons at UN headquarters in New York. The event was organized by the permanent missions of Ukraine and Poland to the UN.
Without ICRC confirmation, there is no official record that a person is alive or held, which leaves captives without proper protection, the headquarters said. Amnesty International calls this enforced disappearance, a practice that puts people outside the protection of the law. The ICRC itself has been shut out. Under the Geneva Conventions it is supposed to visit prisoners of war, but on 18 September it told Reuters that Russia has given it no access to Ukrainian POWs since 2024. UN investigators have gathered evidence of systematic torture in the detention centers where they are held. Russia denies torturing or mistreating POWs.
Families lose track of captives as Russia moves them between prisons
Kateryna Nazarii, who coordinates families of the 24th Mechanized Brigade, is the wife of a Ukrainian serviceman held by Russia. The ICRC has not been able to confirm his status as a prisoner of war. Russia does not let the ICRC or other humanitarian organizations into the prisons where Ukrainians are held, and does not hand over complete lists of prisoners, Nazarii said at the event. When families do find out where a relative is held, she said, that person is moved to another prison, and contact is lost again.
Many of those whose captivity Russia has not confirmed are civilians. Among them, Yatsenko said, are about 200 young people born after 2000 and nearly 400 people over 60. None of them has been confirmed through the ICRC, according to the headquarters.
Secrecy and torture in Russian captivity
Most Ukrainian POWs are cut off from the outside world. In a March 2025 report, Amnesty International found that 24 of the 43 families of confirmed POWs it interviewed had received no word at all from their relative. Counting prisoners allowed only one brief call or text at the start of captivity, 72% of those 43 were held incommunicado. The UN monitoring mission found that only 21 of 174 former POWs it interviewed had been able to correspond with their families, Amnesty noted.
Silence is what makes the abuse possible, Amnesty argues. The UN monitoring mission found that 97% of former POWs it interviewed had been tortured or ill-treated, the report notes, and methods include beatings, electric shocks, burns, and sexual violence. A UN commission of inquiry concluded in 2024 that the torture amounted to a "coordinated state policy," the report adds.
A Ukrainian defender who returned from Russian captivity shows the effects of his detention. June 2023. Photo: libkos/Instagram
When the Red Cross did get in, it saw what Russia chose to show. An OSCE expert mission reported in September 2025 that, according to former prisoners, Russian staff presented only prisoners in relatively good physical condition during ICRC visits and kept the sick and tortured out of sight. The experts also found that Russia blocked visits to some facilities and gave incomplete prisoner lists.
The unconfirmed are not a small group. A quarter of the 3,767 POWs who returned to Ukraine by November 2024 had never been confirmed by Russia as captives, the Coordination Headquarters said, as cited by Amnesty. Hundreds or possibly thousands more may still be held without Russia notifying the ICRC, Amnesty concluded.
Those who come back describe the conditions. Anatolii Zemlianyi, a soldier of the 2nd Assault Brigade released in the May 2025 exchange, told Frontliner that he spent eight months in a hospital in occupied Donetsk with a grenade wound in his leg and got no proper treatment. In captivity, he said, prisoners drank water from puddles.
A Ukrainian service member who returned from captivity compares his current appearance with a photo taken before his detention. June 2023. Photo: libkos/Instagram
Russia continues to hold Ukrainian civilians unlawfully
Nobody knows how many Ukrainian civilians Russia holds. "It is not known," the UN human rights office said in a September 2025 report, which cites Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office as having identified 15,250 civilians detained by Russia between February 2022 and August 2025. Exchanges bring very few of them back: of 5,941 people released from Russian captivity between February 2022 and 14 August 2025, 352 were civilians, Ukraine's human rights commissioner Dmytro Lubinets told The Week.
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, an occupying power may intern civilians only for imperative reasons of security, and only under a regular procedure with periodic review, the same UN report notes. Russia instead treats detained civilians as criminals, Oleksandr Kononenko, a representative of Ukraine's human rights commissioner, told relatives of civilian hostages in 2023.
"This convention clearly states that civilian hostages should not be detained. They should be released. What is Russia doing? It 'makes all these people criminals' and accuses them of terrorism, opposition to a special military operation, and assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which is completely absurd from the point of view of an independent state and those people who are patriots of their state," Kononenko said.
Kyiv believes Russia detains civilians partly to trade them. Regular civilian swaps risk signaling to Russia that by detaining more Ukrainians it could get more Russians released, so it may seize more people to replenish its "exchange fund," Lubinets said. Ukraine therefore demands that civilians be released unconditionally. Amnesty sees a second motive. It concluded that Russia has long used arbitrary arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance to intimidate civilians in areas it controls.
Without the protective gear, “I probably would have been dead,” Levine said, pointing out that Palestinians do not have such protection, and more than 20 had been killed by settlers this year.
Login
