The big gains made by Palestinian parties in Israel’s general election pose an urgent and fundamental challenge to the country’s mainstream opposition: either cooperate with Arab Israelis or hand Benjamin Netanyahu a roadmap to political survival.
In the wake of Tuesday’s exit polls, the leader of the opposition bloc, Gadi Eisenkot, declared them a victory for “Israel’s Zionist national majority” but the real outcome looks as if it will be far more complex than that.
Israel’s election appeared to have delivered no clear winner on Tuesday night after a historic turnout by voters for an election described by some as the most consequential in the country’s history, and marked by a record participation by Israeli Arab voters.
Exit polls published on Tuesday evening suggested that the opposition bloc of parties led by the former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Gadi Eisenkot, would win most seats in the Knesset by a slight margin, edging out Benjamin Netanyahu’s right and far-right coalition despite the prime minister’s Likud emerging as the largest party.
Le bloc d'opposition au Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu est arrivé en tête des élections législatives mardi, mais sans obtenir la majorité nécessaire pour former un gouvernement, selon de premiers...
The vote for the 26th Knesset serves as a crucial referendum on the state’s institutions, economy, and military strategy.
The legislative elections for the 26th Knesset, the legislative power, take place at a critical political crossroads for Israel. Scheduled as the first parliamentary contest since the outbreak of hostilities against Gaza following the events of October 7, 2023, these elections serve as a national referendum on the governance model of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The outgoing 25th Knesset became the first Israeli legislature since 1988 to complete its full four-year term without early dissolution, surviving despite severe domestic turmoil, mass protests over judicial reforms, and persistent coalition instability.
However, the upcoming vote occurs under international scrutiny and severe domestic polarization. Official data from the Israeli Central Elections Committee shows the number of ballots needed across the country to fill all 120 seats in parliament.
Political analysts note that the campaign reflects deep fractures within Israeli society regarding military strategy, economic priorities, and the future shape of the state’s institutional structure.
Social and Geopolitical Context of the 2026 Elections
The socio-political environment surrounding the current electoral moment is marked by the prolonged attacks on Gaza and wider regional escalations involving Lebanon and Iran.
These conflicts have heavily strained the Israeli economy, accelerated militarization across public life, and deepened existing social divides.
Economic pressures, driven by soaring military expenditures and disruptions across key industrial sectors due to a labor crisis resulting from the movement of Palestinians, the trade blockade, and the brain drain, have intensified Israeli public debate concerning state budgets and resource allocation.
Simultaneously, domestic divisions have intensified around long-standing structural issues, most notably the military conscription exemptions granted to the ultra-Orthodox Haredi population, generating coalition crises and widespread friction between secular citizens and religious factions.
On the diplomatic front, the state faces unprecedented international isolation, underscored by ongoing proceedings at the International Court of Justice and arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court against Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, former Israeli Defense Minister, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Despite mounting global pressure and civil society accountability campaigns, the political establishment continues to rely heavily on strategic diplomatic and military backing from Western allies, maintaining an insular focus on security doctrines as voters head to the polls.
Netanyahu escalates racist incitement with false claims of ballot raids by Muslim Brotherhood —— Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intensified his election-day rhetoric, publishing inflammatory claims on social media that supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were… pic.twitter.com/Oq6hWpSDku
The Electoral System: Proportional Representation and Coalition Dynamics
Israel uses a closed-list nationwide proportional representation system to elect the 120 members of the Knesset. The entire country forms a single electoral district.
Voters select a political party slate rather than individual constituency representatives. To gain representation in parliament, a party list must clear an electoral threshold of 3.25 percent of the total valid votes.
Because no political party in Israeli history has ever won an absolute majority of 61 seats on its own, every administration requires a multi-party governing coalition.
Following the Central Elections Committee, official vote tallies determine seat allocations using the d’Hondt method, which allocates parliamentary seats among the various candidate lists based on the votes received.
Parties frequently enter formal surplus vote-sharing agreements before election day to capture remaining unallocated seats.
Once results are certified, the President of Israel holds consultations with elected party leaders before tasking a chosen candidate, typically the head of the largest faction or coalition bloc, with forming a government within a 28-day timeframe.
This framework gives smaller sectoral and single-issue parties significant leverage during post-election negotiations. Far-right, religious, and nationalist slates often demand key ministerial posts, policy concessions, or budget allocations in exchange for their critical coalition votes.
Political analysts note that institutional features of the system, combined with state policies, impact electoral participation among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Electoral threshold adjustments and legal challenges against Arab-led party slates continuously shape voter turnout in Palestinian municipalities.
While Palestinian citizens account for roughly 20 percent of the population, their representative parties face ongoing systemic exclusion from executive coalition agreements, restricting their influence within the parliamentary framework.
As Arab voter turnout rises, Israel’s far-right leaders are sounding the alarm. War criminal Netanyahu accused “supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood” of raiding polling stations and “stealing the elections,” saying Israel is “in a war for the home.”
The candidate field for the 26th Knesset reflects a fragmented political landscape divided into distinct ideological camps, which we will detail:
The Right-Wing and Religious Coalition
• Likud: Led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the ruling party centers its platform on national defense, state security, and maintaining its long-standing parliamentary dominance.
• Otzma Yehudit: Headed by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, this far-right faction advocates for expanded settlements, strict law-and-order policies, and hardline security measures.
• Religious Zionist Party–Zehut: Led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich alongside Moshe Feiglin, this nationalist alliance focuses on West Bank administration, land policies, and conservative social programs.
• Ultra-Orthodox Parties: Shas, led by Aryeh Deri, and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), led by Yitzhak Goldknopf, prioritize state funding for religious institutions and maintaining draft exemptions for Haredi seminary students.
The Opposition Alliances
• Together (Beyachad): A political alliance formed by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid. The joint platform focuses on institutional stability, economic reform, and governance changes.
• Yashar: A new political movement launched by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. The party presents a technocratic platform focused on national security, military management, and state administration.
• Yisrael Beiteinu: Headed by Avigdor Lieberman, this right-wing secular nationalist party focuses on mandatory military conscription for all demographic groups and civic policy reforms.
• The Democrats: Formed through the merger of the Labor and Meretz parties under the leadership of former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan, this unified center-left party emphasizes judicial independence and social-democratic domestic policies.
Arab-Majority Parties
• Joint List: Re-established by Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad under the leadership of Yousef Jabareen, the alliance campaigns on civil rights equality, an end to house demolitions, legal recognition for unrecognized Bedouin villages, and opposition to military occupations.
• United Arab List (Ra’am): Led by Mansour Abbas, this pragmatic Islamist faction focuses on securing municipal development funds, infrastructure investments, and crime-reduction programs for Arab communities.
Netanyahu: Governance Record, Systemic Corruption, and Legal Jeopardy
Benjamin Netanyahu, with more than 15 years, is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Israel. Netanyahu governance has consistently centered on maintaining military administration over occupied Palestinian territories, expanding West Bank settlements, and privatizing state assets.
Netanyahu administrations restructured national tax policies, deregulated key economic sectors, and prioritized defense spending over social welfare initiatives. Netanyahu’s political trajectory remains deeply entwined with ongoing legal proceedings across both domestic and international courts. In domestic tribunals, he faces active criminal charges across three separate indictments known as Cases 1000, 2000, and 4000.
– Case 1000 involves charges of fraud and breach of trust regarding allegations that he received expensive gifts from wealthy business figures in exchange for political favors.
– Case 2000 includes fraud and breach of trust charges related to negotiations with media publishers to secure favorable press coverage in return for legislation restricting competing news outlets.
– Case 4000 contains the most severe charges, bribery, fraud, and breach of trust, alleging that Netanyahu granted regulatory concessions to telecom giant Bezeq in exchange for positive coverage on the Walla news platform.
Netanyahu consistently denies all allegations, maintaining that the investigations represent a politically motivated campaign by law enforcement authorities. In early 2023, his government introduced a major judicial reform initiative designed to restructure judicial appointments and limit Supreme Court oversight over executive decisions.
Opposition figures and legal experts argued that these proposals aimed to undermine judicial independence and stall his ongoing trial, prompting widespread domestic protests and deep institutional instability.
On the international stage, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, determining that reasonable grounds exist to hold him criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
The court cited specific charges, including the deliberate use of starvation as a method of warfare and intentional attacks directed against civilian populations.
Although the Israeli government rejects the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the warrants impose severe diplomatic constraints and travel limitations on Netanyahu across states parties to the Rome Statute.
Voter turnout in Israeli elections as of 16:00 GMT surpassed all votes cast in the 2022, as per data released by the Central Elections Committee.
The final distribution of seats in the 120-member Knesset will determine whether the incumbent coalition or opposition alliances secure the 61-seat majority required to govern.
If the right-wing and religious coalition retains power under Netanyahu’s leadership, the administration is expected to immediately revive paused judicial reform packages to restructure judicial selection processes and restrict legal oversight of executive actions.
Under this outcome, state policy would focus on expanding West Bank settlement infrastructure, maintaining long-term military control over Gaza, and preserving military conscription exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox population to maintain internal coalition stability.
Alternatively, if an opposition alliance formed by figures such as Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, or Yair Lapid captures a parliamentary majority, executive authority would shift toward institutional stabilization. An opposition-led government would likely halt proposed judicial overhauls, reinstate traditional oversight mechanisms, and launch official state inquiries into military and intelligence failures.
Regarding military service, an opposition government would attempt to implement universal conscription policies that include Haredi citizens, a move likely to provoke significant resistance from religious sectors.
Striped of executive protections, Netanyahu’s domestic criminal trials would proceed without executive delays, while international legal pressures stemming from International Criminal Court warrants would remain active.
In the event that neither political bloc achieves a clear 61-seat threshold, the Knesset would enter a state of severe parliamentary deadlock. Under Israeli electoral law, Netanyahu would remain in power as caretaker Prime Minister while political factions negotiate prospective coalition agreements or initiate procedures for new legislative elections, extending the prevailing political uncertainty.
Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – Al Mayadeen – Press Tv – Anadolu Agency – TRT World – RT – The Times of Israel – Reporteros Sin Fronteras – BBC – DW – EFE – AP News – AFP
Bereaved families tell voters to remember the victims while others have flown thousands of miles to cast their ballots
Election day in Israel began with a protest by some of the voters with most at stake. Bereaved families of those killed in the 7 October attacks held a minute of silence at 6.29am, the moment when Hamas launched its onslaught just over three years ago.
They gathered in a Tel Aviv plaza that has become known as “hostages square” because it was the centre of demonstrations demanding the return of more than 200 captives from Gaza. Holding pictures of their loved ones, they stood in silence then called on voters to remember the losses and betrayals of that day when deciding on the next government.
Israel’s 2026 elections are dominated by competing Zionist interpretations of October 7, while Palestinian victims and political representation remain excluded from meaningful debate. The article argues that substantial change will require external pressure, including Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions.
Participation record, duel serré entre Benjamin Netanyahu et l’opposition, accusations de fraude et fortes tensions politiques : les Israéliens se rendent massivement aux urnes ce mardi 27 octobre pour un scrutin...
Israel stipulates that the right to self-determination in Israel/Palestine “is unique to the Jewish people”... It is illegal for candidates to advocate for Israel to be a state that treats all its citizens equally, regardless of religion or ethnicity… None of the leading parties support Palestinian statehood; all back the expansion of Israeli settlements and the perpetuation of Israel’s apartheid system…
The article examines how editorial disputes, legal restrictions and institutional decisions shape the way Palestinian history, suffering and political expression are presented to the public.
"Just cancel the whole f***ing tour, then play for free outside each venue, raise a bunch of money, rather than let a f***ing billionaire tell you what to do," the singer-songwriter-producer, who has given pro-Palestinian statements during his performances, said in a recent interview.
More than 800 Palestinians lost their homes after a fire gutted a displacement camp in the Shujaiya neighborhood of eastern Gaza City, in an attack the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing blamed on Israeli military drones.
The blaze consumed the camp’s tents and nearly everything inside them, according to the Gazan Ministry, which said quadcopter drones operated by Israeli forces ignited the fire on October 26.
The fire affected more than 200 families, made up mostly of women, children, the elderly and people with vulnerable health conditions, the Gaza Ministry of Public Works and Housing detailed. The flames caused panic among residents, who have no housing alternatives.
The Shujaiya camp sheltered families who had already fled their homes in other parts of the territory. Many had moved more than once since the war began, carrying whatever they could salvage each time.
💢🇵🇸 Over 800 Palestinians have been forced to displace yet again from Shujaiya, an eastern neighborhood in Gaza City, after Israeli forces set fire to a displacement camp, according to Al Jazeera.
Israeli quadcopter drones set the camp ablaze at around 8 p.m. local time on… https://t.co/9nyw5g9DGe
Palestinian authorities called the fire a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. They framed it as part of a deliberate policy of forced displacement designed to push people out of the territory.
The Ministry of Public Works and Housing demanded urgent action from the international community, the UN Security Council, and the United Nations, and it asked those bodies to halt the attacks on civilians without further delay. It also pressed humanitarian agencies to deliver tents, temporary shelters, and essential supplies immediately to families left without roofs or belongings.
Local spokespeople linked the persistence of military operations to the tense electoral climate inside Israel, where security politics have hardened. Security operations have long featured in Israeli campaigns, and commanders face domestic pressure to show results even as international criticism mounts.
A ceasefire agreement announced on October 10, 2025, never produced calm on the ground. Israeli forces have maintained recurrent bombings, shootings, and demolition work across different parts of the Gaza Strip. Official records show the zionist offensive launched in October 2023 has now surpassed 74,000 deaths and left 175,000 people wounded.
Human rights organizations renewed their demands for a halt to hostilities and for safe, unobstructed access for humanitarian assistance. The widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure has made recovery more difficult for communities worn down by repeated strikes. Hospitals, schools, and homes lie in ruins across the territory.
Aid agencies describe the situation as catastrophic. Clean water, medicine, and fuel remain scarce, and the latest fire has multiplied the need for emergency shelter in a place where almost every building is damaged.
Palestinian officials say the fire is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader campaign against civilian life, insisting the international response so far has fallen short of the scale of the crisis.
Israeli regime’s airspace – the airspace over the occupied territories – is widely regarded as among the most heavily defended in the world.
Yet the scale of its protection cannot be explained by Israeli military technology alone. Russia, China and even the United States do not benefit from an equivalent network of allied support dedicated to intercepting threats before they reach their territory.
Israel’s own defenses are indeed formidable. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, while Arrow 2 targets ballistic missile threats within it. David’s Sling is built to counter medium-range threats, and Iron Dome intercepts rockets and other short-range projectiles.
These systems are backed by fighter jets and an extensive radar network, creating multiple layers of protection against incoming attacks.
But Israel’s air defense shield extends well beyond its own arsenal. From October 2023 through Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone operations in 2024, 2025 and 2026, a group of allied states has played an active role in protecting the regime.
They have provided interceptors, radar capabilities, fighter aircraft, military bases and personnel, helping the Tel Aviv regime detect, track and counter incoming threats.
What emerges is not simply a domestic air-defense network, but a wider umbrella sustained by the resources and involvement of powerful allies – from the US to Europe to Arab countries.
This ironclad commitment of regional and extra-regional countries to Israel’s protection has come at a considerable cost.
The price goes well beyond dollars and shekels. It includes depleted weapons stockpiles that could take years to replenish, damaged radars and military bases, soldiers killed or wounded, and governments facing domestic political backlash for a costly partnership that much of their own public fiercely opposes and protests against.
The burden, however, is not shared equally. The United States has shouldered the largest financial and military inventory costs. The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan have faced intense operational demands and direct security risks. European states have incurred more limited but still significant costs, particularly in munitions and the political fallout from a war that has driven up energy prices and compounded the cost-of-living pressures facing their populations.
The Israeli bill
The Israeli regime’s direct costs are the easiest to track because they fall on its own treasury. In April 2024, after Iran launched a large number of drones and missiles at the occupied territories, Brig. Gen. Reem Aminoach, an economic adviser to a former Israeli military chief of staff, estimated in an interview with Ynet that defending against the attack that night had cost 4-5 billion shekels, or roughly $1.1–$1.35 billion at the exchange rate at the time.
Haaretz later put the total cost of defending against the same retaliatory attack at around $1.5 billion. That was just one night. Many more retaliatory strikes have hit the occupied territories since then.
The cost structure follows a clear logic. Iran uses inexpensive drones and mass-produced missiles, while Israel relies on some of the world’s most expensive interceptors to defend against them.
This disparity lies at the heart of the war’s financial burden. Israel’s broader budget picture adds another dimension. Sustained, high-intensity defensive operations have forced the regime to spend far more than it did previously.
With a net budget of about 60 billion shekels in 2023, the Israeli military could not sustain repeated nights of interceptions without substantial increases in funding and continued US support.
Israel has been able to sustain this costly imbalance largely because of extensive financial backing from American taxpayers. Much of its interceptor production is funded or co-developed through US programs, and the Arrow missile defense system is produced with American participation.
US Congress has also repeatedly approved emergency supplemental funding for Israeli missile defense. These ties mean that Israel’s financial burden and America’s are deeply interconnected and difficult to separate, which explains the public anger in the US.
The American inventory crisis
No country has spent more on Israel’s defense than the United States, and no factor is more consequential than the state of its interceptor stockpiles. Washington may be willing to spend the tens of billions of dollars required to protect their genocidal ally, but willingness alone cannot resolve the US military’s primary challenge: replenishing its dwindling missile interceptors.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank, has published some of the most widely cited public estimates of US missile interceptor inventories.
Its analysis, updated following the 40-day war against Iran, found that American Patriot and THAAD inventories had declined dramatically.
According to CSIS estimates, the US inventory of Patriot interceptors fell from approximately 2,330 before the war began on February 27, 2026, to between 759 and 827 by July 27, 2026, marking a decline of roughly two-thirds.
The THAAD inventory also dropped sharply, falling from an estimated 452 interceptors before the war to between 239 and 257 by July 27, representing a decline of approximately 43 to 47 percent.
Estimates of remaining American Interceptor inventory (Source: CSIS)
Many military experts believe CSIS’s estimates are overly optimistic. Some, for instance, argue that the United States may have fired as many as 290 of its roughly 360 THAAD interceptors during the early phase of the war. That would amount to more than 80 percent of its pre-war stockpile.
Whatever the exact figures, Washington’s decision to prioritize Israel’s defense has left the US military dangerously underprepared and more vulnerable to another round of war if it breaks out.
The cost of replenishing stockpiles
The US Army’s FY2027 figures put the unit cost of a PAC-3 MSE interceptor at roughly $5 million and that of a THAAD interceptor at nearly $12 million.
Based on these figures, replacing the Patriot and THAAD interceptors expended would cost an estimated $10 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has offered a higher estimate, putting the cost of replacing the depleted interceptors at approximately $13.1 billion.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in recent remarks noted that the US spent about $11 billion on missile defense for Israel over three years. In a post on X, quoting a tweet of a former Obama administration official, he said US forces had fired 609 interceptors in defense of the Israeli regime between October 2023 and June 2026, including SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Patriot, and THAAD missiles.
The naval picture
The US Navy’s missile interceptor inventories are also under severe strain. The SM-3 and SM-6 are among the principal naval weapons used to counter ballistic missiles and other high-speed threats.
Public estimates vary widely, with some reports placing combined naval inventories in the low hundreds. A figure of 150–200 for the two interceptor types combined is plausible as a rough order of magnitude, but no precise public count is available.
The broader concern is that naval interceptors are expensive and slow to manufacture, while the Navy must preserve sufficient stocks to address other potential threats, including those posed by China and Russia. Every interceptor expended in the defense of Israel is therefore one fewer available for other contingencies until it can be replaced.
Not all US and allied defenses against Iran relied on ground-based or naval interceptors. Fighter jets also engaged Iranian drones using air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-9X and AIM-120. The AIM-9X reportedly costs several hundred thousand dollars per missile, while the AIM-120 AMRAAM costs more than $1 million.
Using such expensive weapons to destroy drones that cost only thousands of dollars compounds the economic imbalance, even when the immediate tactical objective is achieved.
The trade-off
By the final phase of the 40-day imposed war, following the initial ceasefire, it had become clear that US commanders were holding back dedicated SM-3 and THAAD interceptors rather than expending them to protect American bases in Jordan and elsewhere.
Footage of nighttime defensive missile launches appeared to show almost exclusively Patriot interceptors, with only one exception. The implication was stark: stocks had dwindled to the point where US commanders could no longer afford to use these missiles freely.
The apparent logic was to preserve the remaining interceptors for a larger war, prioritizing the future defense of Israel over the immediate protection of American service members.
That decision carried its own cost. Aircraft on the ground were hit, and US personnel were killed in some of the retaliatory attacks. This matters because it illustrates the full price of managing depleted stockpiles. A shortage of interceptors weakened the US military’s defensive capacity across multiple theaters, leaving American personnel exposed to attacks that more robust defenses might have helped repel – all in the effort to protect the Israeli regime.
Cost, however, is only part of the problem. Production capacity is the more consequential constraint in a prolonged campaign.
Patriot and THAAD interceptors are manufactured in limited quantities, and expanding output takes time.
CSIS estimates that restoring Patriot and THAAD inventories to their pre-war levels will take at least three years. Interceptors ordered in fiscal year 2027 are not expected to arrive until 2029, leaving a prolonged gap between expenditure and replenishment.
The China and Asia-Pacific dimension
The most serious long-term cost to the United States may emerge far from the West Asia region. As US interceptor stocks are depleted in the region, the Pacific is left more exposed.
The Indo-Pacific is where Washington faces its most formidable strategic competitor. Taiwan’s defense depends in part on US air and missile defenses, while Pentagon war plans for a potential war with China assume that American forces can withstand and respond to large-scale missile attacks.
If SM-3, SM-6, and Patriot inventories fall to a fraction of their previous levels, the margin for absorbing such an attack narrows considerably. A few hundred interceptors would be insufficient to sustain even several days of high-intensity combat in East Asia.
The extent to which US military capabilities in the South China Sea and across East Asia have been weakened cannot yet be quantified.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern is widely recognized among defense analysts: a shortage of interceptors in one theater affects the military’s ability to respond in every theater, and the Pacific is particularly difficult to reinforce quickly.
Persian Gulf states and early-warning network
The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan contributed to Israel’s defense in a different but equally consequential way.
Their role was not primarily to supply interceptors, but to provide sensors, airspace access, military bases, and the political authorization needed to put these assets to use.
Missile defense depends on early warning. A THAAD battery cannot intercept a missile it has not detected, and detection depends on radars capable of identifying and tracking threats at sufficient range and speed. The AN/TPY-2 radar used by THAAD is a large, transportable system. The US Missile Defense Agency’s 2025 budget puts the cost of each unit at approximately half a billion dollars.
In March 2026, during the first days of the 40-day imposed war of aggression, the American THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan was struck and destroyed. Imagery showed craters around the site, suggesting that multiple strikes may have been involved.
Buildings housing similar radar systems were also hit at two locations in the United Arab Emirates. Another THAAD radar, at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, was destroyed as well.
Iran also targeted and struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, which was used to track Iranian missile launches.
Taken together, these incidents point to a broader pattern of Iranian retaliatory attacks on US-aligned early-warning radars and THAAD sites across the region.
This interpretation is consistent with the available satellite imagery, which indicates that the campaign extended beyond individual military installations to the sensor network underpinning regional missile defense that has been at the service of the US and the Israeli regime.
Such radars are expensive and exceptionally difficult to replace. Their value lies not only in the hardware itself, but also in their integration with interceptor batteries and the data links connecting them to other sensors.
Destroying a single radar can compromise an entire interceptor network’s ability to detect and track threats approaching from a particular direction. Replacing these systems can take months or even years, and rebuilding them does not necessarily restore the coverage they previously provided.
Radar losses therefore carry a strategic cost as well as a financial one. Once a radar is destroyed, the states that depend on it must decide whether to rebuild it at an exposed location, relocate it, or accept a gap in their defensive coverage.
By providing Israel and the United States with tracking data on Iranian projectiles, Arab monarchies exposed themselves to Iranian retaliation and risked becoming direct targets in a war they had helped shape.
These losses also raised questions about Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability as the wider regional confrontation extended to other fronts.
Yemen is a prominent example. Damage to radar and air defense assets across the Persian Gulf may have further complicated Saudi Arabia’s position in its prolonged war against Yemen.
Although the Ansarullah-led Yemeni military possesses independent capabilities, and Saudi Arabia’s difficulties in Yemen stem from numerous military, political, and strategic factors, the decision to contribute to Israel’s defense added another layer of risk for the Persian Gulf monarchies.
Their involvement exposed critical military infrastructure to retaliation and potentially weakened their ability to respond to threats beyond the immediate confrontation with Iran.
Jordan’s exposed position
Jordan’s case is perhaps the most striking because of its small military and fragile economy. The country hosts US occupation forces, including a THAAD battery at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, and lies along the flight paths of missiles and drones traveling between Iran and the Israeli-occupied territories.
During Iran’s 2024 retaliatory strikes, Jordan’s air force was reported to have intercepted many of Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace. The Jordanian government defended these actions as necessary to protect its territory and citizens – a lame justification.
For a country with limited military resources, however, the cost was significant: every interceptor fired and every fighter jet scrambled placed additional demands on an already constrained defense budget.
The political cost was even greater. Jordan has a large population of Palestinian origin, and public opinion is strongly sympathetic to Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank as well as the Axis of Resistance.
Jordan’s decision to intercept Iranian projectiles launched in retaliation for Israeli strikes proved controversial domestically, with Jordanians slamming their government for helping protect the Israeli regime.
Jordan made this choice despite facing its own concerns about Israel’s regional ambitions. Members of Israel’s ruling regime have openly advocated annexing the occupied West Bank, while some have promoted proposals that would displace Palestinians into Jordan.
This context makes Amman’s involvement in regional missile defense particularly sensitive. The country faces the dual risk of Iranian retaliation against US military assets on its soil and growing domestic anger over its role in protecting Israel.
Jordan’s economic vulnerabilities compound these pressures. Public debt, energy costs, and the burden of hosting refugees already strain its finances. Against this backdrop, even a relatively modest additional military expenditure can have significant consequences.
Jordan’s experience illustrates how participation in regional missile defense can impose not only military and financial costs, but also serious domestic political risks.
Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16s were used numerous times to intercept drones launched at Israel
Europe’s price
European states paid in a different currency. Most did not expend large numbers of interceptors against Iranian drones, but their involvement carried costs across three main areas: munitions, military operations, and the economic shock of the war imposed on Iran.
France deployed air assets to the region to intercept drones and missiles over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Some reports suggested that French stocks of air-to-air missiles, including the MICA, came under strain.
Such shortages would be significant, given France’s other military commitments. Its air force and weapons inventories are already stretched across support for Ukraine, operations in the Sahel, and the maintenance of its own strategic deterrent. Each additional deployment reduces the resources available for other missions.
Britain used its bases in Cyprus, including RAF Akrotiri, as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf, to support operations against Iran. Reports indicated that RAF aircraft intercepted drones and missiles. The British armed forces are considerably smaller than they were at the height of the country’s military power, and sustained operations of this kind consume substantial flying hours, spare parts, and personnel capacity.
Europe’s greatest burden, however, has been economic and political. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the collapse of Persian Gulf energy exports drove up oil, gas, and diesel prices.
Europe’s dependence on imported energy meant that the shock quickly fed into household bills, transport costs, and food prices. Many European governments were already grappling with public dissatisfaction over the cost of living before the 40-day war. The war intensified those pressures as is evident now with protests raging across European countries.
European governments that committed military resources to Israel’s defense and offensive operations now face a difficult question: will their own citizens view that commitment as a principled security measure or as complicity in policies that have contributed to worsening economic conditions?
There is no straightforward answer, but the issue has become part of Europe’s domestic political debate. The costs of defending Israel have reached far beyond the battlefield, affecting budgets, energy security, and public confidence in government policy.
Defending the indefensible
The costs of protecting Israel have been substantial, although they have fallen unevenly across the countries involved.
The United States has spent billions of dollars and depleted significant portions of its advanced interceptor stockpiles, with replenishment expected to take years. The Persian Gulf states and Jordan have suffered damage to radar and air defense assets while assuming additional security risks.
European countries have borne the costs of munitions and military operations, alongside an energy shock that has intensified public anger over the cost of living.
Yet the financial figures tell only part of the story. The more fundamental question is whether the policies driving these expenditures serve the interests of the governments and populations bearing the costs.
The costs are real and continue to mount: public expenditure, depleted interceptor stockpiles, damaged radars and military bases, and the heightened risk of retaliation against countries drawn into a war beyond their borders. Meanwhile, rising fuel, food, and housing costs have placed additional pressure on ordinary households, deepening public frustration with government decisions.
Israel’s regional military campaign has drawn its partners further into a confrontation whose consequences extend well beyond the immediate battlefield. For these governments, the challenge is no longer simply how to sustain their support for Israel, but how to justify its mounting costs to their own populations.
The question is how much more they are willing to spend, how much additional risk they are prepared to accept, and how long their citizens will continue to support a policy whose burdens are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
As the Left unites with Islamists to march against Israel, what it forgets is that Zionism was always a progressive movement – and the Irish forget that they originally identified with the Jews, says Andres Roth.
Israel’s election on Tuesday (27 October) could bring a new government without changing the country’s course. Having worked as a parliamentary adviser in the Knesset and later as executive director of Peace Now, I know how that can happen.
Many of the parties seeking to replace Benjamin Netanyahu are avoiding clear positions on the Israeli-Palestinian question, but some of their candidates may end up overseeing annexation they never campaigned for.
Israel’s previous coalition, led by Naftali Bennett in 2021, offers a warning.
Called the “government of change” because it ended Netanyahu’s 12-year run in office, it brought together a variety of parties, from Bennett’s rightwing party to Labor and Meretz, leftwing parties.
Its answer to profound ideological disagreements, particularly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was to preserve the status quo. The coalition lasted roughly 18 months, and although it changed the tone of government, it left much of the policy towards the West Bank intact.
For example, Merav Michaeli, then Labor leader and transport minister, opposed settlement expansion.
Yet her ministry continued to implement previously approved infrastructure commitments, including substantial budgets for roads facilitating that expansion.
Through my work at Peace Now, I saw how the coalition’s status-quo agreement constrained her ability to challenge projects inherited from the previous government. A minister could thus find herself implementing a vision she opposed.
Today, the stakes are higher.
Another slice of the West Bank
Consider E1, between Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, where construction would threaten Palestinian territorial contiguity and the viability of a future Palestinian state.
The government has advanced tenders for all 3,401 planned housing units, with crucial stages of the tender process set to be completed before a new government takes office.
E1 exemplifies wider efforts to establish difficult-to-reverse facts: new settlement outposts, including in areas under Palestinian civil administration, expanding settlements and administrative changes that entrench Israeli control.
A successor government would have to intervene actively to reverse them.
These developments are backed by an explicit political vision. The current government’s guidelines and coalition agreements assert exclusive Jewish rights throughout the land of Israel and commit to advancing Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank.
Under Bezalel Smotrich, serving as a minister within the defence ministry, a new settlement administration and civilian positions have been established, shifting significant aspects of West Bank governance from military administration to civilian political control.
These structures will not disappear when their architects leave office. The far-right has equipped the state with both a vision and the machinery to advance it.
Inertia is not neutral when the machinery is already moving in one direction.
Parties seeking to replace Netanyahu need not necessarily agree on a final-status agreement with the Palestinians, but they must find enough common ground to commit to halting annexation and reversing the structures that enable it.
Those understandings belong in coalition negotiations, when parties still have leverage, rather than in battles left for individual ministers once they are in office.
Nor is this a distant constitutional question. Palestinians in the West Bank already face systematic violations of their basic rights and freedoms, from restrictions on movement and access to land to violence and forced displacement. Each new settlement and outpost deepens this injustice and makes the prospect of a political settlement more remote.
Facts on ground
The entrenchment of permanent Israeli control is creating a reality that is increasingly difficult to reverse, making political intervention more urgent with every passing year.
The current government’s response to growing international pressure illustrates the danger.
After the UK announced measures targeting settlements, foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar ordered the closure of its consulate in East Jerusalem. Britain considered expelling Israeli diplomats in response, and a compromise left a much smaller British mission operating.
The episode illustrates Netanyahu’s vision of a ‘Super Sparta’: an Israel preparing itself for international isolation rather than addressing the policies contributing to it.
A future government seeking to change that trajectory should start with two tasks.
‘Messianic minority’
First, it must take seriously the reasons behind international sanctions and address the policies driving them, including settlement expansion and settler violence. A messianic minority must not be allowed to drag Israel into international isolation and economic decline.
Second, the government should help European partners distinguish between Israel and the settlements, including through transparent supply chains and clear proof of origin, so that restrictions aimed at settlements do not spill over into the broader Israeli economy.
Both tasks require urgent and concrete policy changes, beyond a more moderate diplomatic tone.
European governments should not expect a new coalition, or even international sanctions themselves, to bring about these changes automatically. They need to make their expectations explicit, press prospective coalition partners to incorporate concrete commitments into their agreements, and judge the resulting government by its actions.
Without that pressure, politicians who never endorsed annexation may become useful idiots for a project they do not support, helping to consolidate a single undemocratic state in which millions of Palestinians are permanently denied equal rights and freedoms.
Preventing that outcome requires urgent political action, while a different future is still possible. Neither Israelis seeking change nor their European partners can afford to assume it will happen on its own.
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