A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.

Venezuela oil production reaches 1.252 million barrels per day, its highest level since 2019, as Caracas advances an energy agreement with Washington.

Related: Venezuelan Acting President Reviews Progress on U.S. Oil Agreements

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Venezuela Oil Production Reaches 1.25 Million Barrels Daily

Venezuela oil production reached 1.252 million barrels per day on Friday, October 23, its highest level since 2019, according to Petróleos de Venezuela, known as PDVSA.

Eduardo Lorenzo Pinto Salazar, PDVSA’s vice president for exploration and production, announced the figure during an operational review led from Caracas.

The increase marks a significant recovery for Venezuela’s energy sector, which has faced years of sanctions, underinvestment, infrastructure damage and operational constraints.

Pinto Salazar said the country had “truly broken the limits” that the industry had maintained in recent years. He said the improvement was driven mainly by higher output in western Venezuela.

Production in the western region reached 382,500 barrels per day, according to PDVSA officials.

The company also reported a record output of 115,000 barrels per day at the Petrozamora joint venture in Zulia state. Officials expect production there to rise to 120,000 barrels per day by the end of the year.

The announcement was made during an inspection of oil fields along the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo, in Zulia.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led the review from Caracas, alongside US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett.

The two officials monitored the technical progress of projects linked to the Venezuela-US energy agreement signed in August.

The agreement covers the development of 17 oil fields with an estimated 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

Venezuelan authorities say the accord is based on mutual respect, sovereignty and bilateral complementarity. They say it is designed to attract investment while ensuring that oil revenues support social programs and public services.

The agreement includes eight greenfield blocks in the Orinoco Oil Belt and nine fields in the Maracaibo Basin, according to statements from the Venezuelan government.

Venezuela’s government says the plan could attract more than $100 billion in investment and generate more than $209 billion in tax revenue over 25 years.

The stated goal is to raise national production to more than 1.5 million barrels per day over the life of the agreement.

Venezuela Oil Production Rises in Lake Maracaibo

PDVSA | OPEC

The rise in Venezuela oil production has been concentrated in the Lake Maracaibo basin, the country’s historic oil-producing heartland.

The region has long been central to Venezuela’s petroleum industry, but it has suffered from aging infrastructure, power shortages, maintenance problems and reduced investment.

PDVSA said the recent increase reflects improved operational performance, rehabilitation of wells and stronger coordination with joint ventures.

The company reported that the Bachaquero and Ceuta fields, located in Zulia state, contributed to the recent gains.

Petrozamora, one of the joint ventures operating in the area, reached its highest daily production level to date.

The increase in western Venezuela is significant because the region had been one of the areas most affected by the decline in national output.

Venezuela’s oil industry was once among the largest in the world. The country holds some of the largest proven crude reserves globally, particularly in the Orinoco Oil Belt.

However, production fell sharply after 2017 as a result of US sanctions, capital flight, loss of technical personnel, deteriorated infrastructure and reduced access to international markets.

PDVSA’s output had fallen below 1 million barrels per day in recent years, according to independent estimates and OPEC data.

The current recovery has been supported by agreements with international partners and a partial easing of restrictions on oil operations.

The Venezuelan government says oil revenues must now be directed toward restoring essential services.

Rodríguez said the recovered oil wealth should generate stable and dignified incomes for workers and help reverse the damage caused by years of economic pressure.

She said priority would be given to funding the national electricity system, health care, education and drinking-water services.

The government has emphasized the need to use revenues from industrial recovery to address the needs of communities in oil-producing regions.

Zulia has faced recurring electricity failures, water shortages and deterioration of public infrastructure.

Officials say the increase in production could provide resources to stabilize wages and improve living conditions in the region.

The Venezuelan government has also stressed that oil revenues should be used to strengthen national sovereignty and reduce dependence on external financing.

Venezuela-US Agreement Reshapes Energy Relations

White House fact sheet | Center for Strategic and International Studies

The Venezuela oil production increase comes after the signing of a strategic energy agreement between Caracas and Washington in August 2026.

The agreement grants North American Blue Energy Partners, known as NABEP, concessions to develop 17 oil fields for up to 100 years.

The White House says the deal gives the United States majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven reserves.

NABEP has granted the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity stake in its corporate parent.

The agreement also gives the US Department of State the right to purchase 20 percent of production at cost and a right of first refusal over the remaining 80 percent.

The White House says the arrangement is intended to secure a stable and low-cost oil supply for the United States and to support the replenishment of its Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Venezuelan authorities describe the agreement as a partnership based on sovereignty and mutual benefit. They say it will finance the recovery of the country’s oil industry and generate revenues for social investment.

The agreement has generated debate because of its long-term concessions and the extent of US involvement in Venezuela’s energy sector.

Supporters argue that it could bring much-needed capital, technology and expertise to an industry that requires major rehabilitation.

Critics say the arrangement raises questions about national control over natural resources, transparency and the distribution of benefits.

The full text of the agreement has not been made public, according to international media reports.

The deal is part of a broader shift in relations between Venezuela and the United States after years of confrontation, sanctions and diplomatic tensions.

Washington has said the agreement is intended to secure energy supplies and support Venezuela’s economic recovery.

Caracas has said the accord will strengthen bilateral relations and facilitate investment in strategic infrastructure.

The agreement covers both oil and gas projects and includes plans for the development of new production blocks.

Venezuela’s government says the partnership will allow the country to increase output while maintaining sovereignty over its natural resources.

Geopolitical Context

The increase in Venezuela oil production has implications for global energy markets, regional politics and relations between Latin America and the United States.

Venezuela holds one of the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but its output remains far below its historical peak.

A sustained recovery could increase Venezuela’s role in global oil markets and strengthen its position within OPEC.

The country’s return to higher production levels could also affect oil prices, particularly if output continues to rise over the coming years.

For the United States, the agreement represents an effort to secure access to oil supplies within the Western Hemisphere.

The deal could reduce US dependence on suppliers in other regions and strengthen energy security at a time of global market volatility.

For Latin America, the agreement signals a major change in the political and economic relationship between Venezuela and Washington.

The accord could influence investment flows, regional energy cooperation and the position of other countries that have maintained relations with Venezuela despite US sanctions.

It could also reshape debates over sovereignty, foreign investment and the role of multinational companies in the region’s natural-resource sectors.

Venezuela’s government says the recovery of its oil industry is essential to rebuilding the economy and restoring public services.

The country has faced years of economic crisis, inflation, migration and infrastructure deterioration.

The increase in production could provide resources to address some of those challenges, but experts say the impact will depend on how revenues are managed.

The government has pledged to direct oil revenues toward social investment, including electricity, health care, education and water services.

The coming months will show whether Venezuela can sustain the recent increase and move closer to its target of 1.5 million barrels per day.

For now, the country has recorded its highest daily output since 2019, a milestone that could mark the beginning of a broader recovery in its energy sector.

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The European Union has signed a comprehensive association agreement with Andorra and San Marino, establishing a framework that will allow the two small European states to participate more fully in the EU single market while remaining outside the bloc.

The agreement was signed in Brussels on Monday, 19 October, by representatives of the European Commission and the two governments, marking the conclusion of negotiations that began more than a decade ago.

The arrangement covers trade, investment and regulatory cooperation, alongside provisions concerning financial services, education, environmental protection, consumer rights and other areas normally governed by EU legislation.

However, the agreement has not yet entered into force. It requires further approval procedures, including consent from the European Parliament and ratification by the participating countries. Andorra intends to submit the agreement to a binding national referendum.

Access to the European single market

According to the European Commission’s announcement, the agreement will provide Andorra and San Marino with access to the single market under shared regulatory requirements and conditions intended to ensure fair competition.

The principal objective is to remove barriers that continue to restrict economic activity between the two countries and the EU’s 27 member states.

For businesses, the arrangements should provide greater predictability concerning the rules governing cross-border trade, investment and commercial operations.

Participation will nevertheless require both countries to implement relevant EU legislation and maintain systems capable of enforcing the applicable standards.

In practice, access to the European market will carry obligations comparable to those imposed on companies established inside the Union, particularly concerning product standards, competition, environmental rules and consumer protection.

The agreement also establishes institutional arrangements for managing cooperation and dealing with future regulatory developments.

For two countries whose economies are closely connected to neighbouring EU members, greater regulatory consistency could reduce administrative barriers and facilitate commercial expansion.

Financial services to be integrated gradually

Financial services represent one of the more sensitive elements of the agreement.

Andorra has a banking and financial sector with substantial links to Spain and France, while San Marino’s economy is closely integrated with Italy.

Both countries already use the euro under separate monetary arrangements with the European Union, although neither is a member of the eurozone or the EU.

The new association framework would provide a route towards broader participation in the EU financial services market, but integration will be gradual and subject to specific conditions.

The Commission has made clear that the process will involve assessments of the regulatory and supervisory arrangements operating in both countries.

This means the signature does not provide their financial institutions with immediate, unrestricted access to all services available within the EU.

Brussels has also signed updated monetary agreements designed to remove overlapping requirements between existing arrangements and the new association framework.

Financial supervision, the prevention of money laundering and compliance with European regulatory standards will be central to the implementation process.

Integration without EU membership

The agreement illustrates how the Union can extend significant elements of its economic framework to neighbouring countries without admitting them as members.

Andorra and San Marino will not acquire voting rights in EU institutions or the political representation enjoyed by member states.

Their participation will instead depend on accepting relevant common rules and complying with the institutional provisions established under the association agreement.

The EU already operates differentiated arrangements with several non-member European countries, including Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein through the European Economic Area.

Earlier European Council conclusions on relations with non-EU Western European countries identified Andorra and San Marino among the states with which Brussels sought closer economic and institutional cooperation.

The newly signed agreement does not replicate every aspect of existing arrangements, but it follows the broader principle that access to the single market can be negotiated separately from EU membership.

That principle is also relevant to discussions about how candidate countries might receive selected economic benefits before completing the full accession process.

Brussels has been considering wider market participation for countries such as Ukraine and Moldova ahead of possible membership.

Referendum and ratification ahead

The immediate political challenge now moves from negotiation to approval.

Following the signature, the Council will seek the European Parliament’s consent before the agreement can be formally concluded. Its application will also depend on the completion of the necessary national procedures.

In Andorra, Prime Minister Xavier Espot’s government has committed to a binding referendum, although no voting date has yet been fixed.

The referendum will determine whether Andorran voters accept the economic opportunities and regulatory commitments established by the agreement.

San Marino must also complete the procedures required under its constitutional system.

Until those requirements have been satisfied, the agreement remains a signed framework rather than an operational extension of the EU single market.

For both countries, the eventual implementation will determine how far their economies can integrate with the Union while retaining their existing status as independent non-member states.

Washington’s proposed energy ceasefire could force Ukraine to abandon one of its most effective means of economic pressure against Russia without securing equivalent concessions from Moscow. Donald Trump’s parallel agreement with Vladimir Putin over Russian diesel raises further questions about whether American energy priorities are beginning to dictate the terms of negotiations over Ukraine.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has placed an important qualification on Donald Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire: Ukraine will stop attacking Russian energy facilities only if Moscow stops targeting Ukraine’s electricity generation and distribution infrastructure. Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on Monday, 12 October, Zelenskyy confirmed Kyiv’s willingness to accept a reciprocal arrangement while pointing out that Russian attacks had continued after the American president announced that a ceasefire was already in effect.

The sequence of events has exposed a fundamental weakness in Washington’s initiative. On 11 October, Trump announced an immediate energy ceasefire, declaring that Russia and Ukraine had both agreed to suspend attacks on energy infrastructure. Yet Kyiv had not received the agreement’s terms, Moscow had offered no public confirmation, and Russian drones continued striking Ukrainian power facilities, including a combined heat and power plant in Kharkiv.

Zelenskyy’s response was deliberately restrained. Rather than reject Trump’s initiative, he welcomed the possibility of an agreement while insisting that Russia demonstrate its acceptance through its actions. His remarks also exposed the difference between announcing a diplomatic understanding and establishing an enforceable military arrangement.

An unequal exchange

The apparent symmetry of an agreement prohibiting attacks on energy facilities disguises substantial differences between the two countries.

Russia retains an extensive oil-refining industry, producing fuels for domestic consumption, military operations and export. Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries have consequently become an instrument of economic warfare, disrupting production, increasing operating costs and forcing Moscow to divert resources towards protecting strategically important industrial installations.

Ukraine occupies a different position. Its major oil-refining capacity was devastated early in the full-scale invasion, including the Kremenchuk refinery. Russia’s present campaign is concentrated heavily on electricity generation, substations, heating systems and other installations essential to maintaining civilian life and economic activity.

An agreement narrowly focused on oil refineries would therefore protect an important Russian asset while offering Ukraine comparatively little protection. A comprehensive energy ceasefire could be reciprocal, but only if it explicitly covered the infrastructure each side actually possesses and attacks.

Zelenskyy’s insistence on equivalent obligations is consequently more than a negotiating formula. It seeks to prevent Washington from treating attacks on Russian fuel production and the destruction of Ukraine’s electricity and heating networks as interchangeable military activities without examining their respective consequences.

The distinction becomes particularly consequential with winter approaching. A Ukrainian suspension of attacks on Russian refineries could allow Moscow to restore production and rebuild damaged facilities. Unless Russia simultaneously halted attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Kyiv would surrender an important means of pressure while remaining exposed to further disruption of electricity and heating supplies.

The American pressure campaign

The concern in Kyiv is no longer confined to the proposed ceasefire’s wording. European officials have disclosed that Washington is threatening to restrict military assistance and intelligence sharing unless Ukraine suspends its strikes against Russian refineries.

According to accounts of the American pressure campaign, the threatened measures include suspending the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the NATO-coordinated mechanism through which European countries finance purchases of American weapons for Ukraine. Reuters was unable to independently verify the reported threats, and the White House had not responded publicly.

If implemented, such restrictions would establish a direct connection between Ukraine’s willingness to accommodate Washington’s energy priorities and its access to essential military support.

This creates an imbalance in the negotiations. Moscow could continue military operations while Kyiv faced the possibility of losing American assistance for refusing an agreement whose Russian obligations remain undefined.

The diesel agreement and its political significance

The ceasefire proposal also needs to be examined alongside Trump’s separate agreement with Putin, announced on 9 October, to increase Russian diesel supplies.

Trump stated that Russia would initially release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by another 500,000 tonnes in November and one million tonnes thereafter. Further supplies were envisaged, depending on Russia’s refining capacity.

The US Treasury subsequently issued General Licence 135, authorising transactions involving Russian-origin diesel that would otherwise face sanctions restrictions.

The initial volumes are unlikely to transform international diesel markets. Nevertheless, the agreement gives Washington a commercial interest in maintaining Russian refinery output at precisely the moment Ukrainian attacks are disrupting it.

Trump has an evident domestic incentive to seek lower fuel prices before the American congressional elections on 3 November. Putin, meanwhile, has an interest in preserving Russia’s refining capacity and reopening sanctioned markets.

These interests need not prove the existence of a coordinated political strategy against Kyiv. They do, however, create conditions in which American economic priorities and Russian military objectives could converge.

The possibility becomes more significant when considered alongside Trump’s public criticism of Zelenskyy and his suggestion that Ukraine requires different leadership.

The risk of a diplomatic trap

The most consequential scenario is one in which Washington demands immediate Ukrainian compliance while leaving Russia’s obligations subject to subsequent negotiation.

If Kyiv suspends refinery attacks without obtaining verifiable Russian commitments, Moscow gains relief from a costly Ukrainian campaign. If Kyiv refuses, Washington could present that refusal as an obstacle to peace and use it to justify restrictions on military assistance.

This is a possible negotiating outcome, not an established secret agreement between Trump and Putin. There is no publicly verified evidence that the two presidents arranged the ceasefire specifically to force Ukraine into such a position.

Nevertheless, the combination of the diesel agreement, American pressure over refinery strikes and the premature announcement of a ceasefire creates a credible risk that Ukraine could be required to make concessions before Russia demonstrates any corresponding restraint.

The implications extend beyond Ukraine. European governments financing American weapons through PURL would find their own assistance programmes vulnerable to Washington’s decisions over an energy arrangement negotiated separately with Moscow.

For Brussels, the immediate question is therefore whether European military support can remain dependable if American commercial interests increasingly influence the conditions attached to supplying Ukraine.

Kyiv’s remaining leverage

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian refineries cannot by themselves compel Moscow to end the war. They can, however, impose material economic costs and complicate Russia’s ability to maintain fuel production, exports and military logistics.

Abandoning those attacks without an enforceable agreement would remove pressure from Moscow without ensuring that Ukrainian civilians receive any corresponding protection.

Zelenskyy’s position preserves an alternative: simultaneous, reciprocal restrictions covering electricity generation, heating installations, oil refineries and other specified energy infrastructure, supported by clear verification procedures and consequences for violations.

Whether Washington is prepared to enforce such an arrangement against Russia remains unanswered.

The central danger for Kyiv is not an energy ceasefire itself. It is an arrangement in which Ukraine’s obligations are immediate and enforceable through the threat of lost American support, while Russia’s obligations remain uncertain.

Until that imbalance is resolved, Trump’s initiative risks delivering Moscow protection for its oil industry without securing protection for Ukraine’s energy system.

KARACHI: Pakistan LNG Limited has issued a fresh tender on Wednesday to procure a spot LNG cargo for delivery between September 8 and 12, after rejecting the sole bid received for an earlier delivery window as too expensive. The state-owned buyer turned down an offer from BP Singapore at $26.969 per million British thermal units ... Read more

The post Pakistan floats fresh LNG tender after rejecting costly single bid appeared first on BOL News.

Greece and Israel signed on Monday a €3 billion deal for the massive “Achilles Shield” agreement, under which Israel will build Greece a multi-layered air defense array based on Israeli systems architecture. The intergovernmental agreement for the development of an anti-aircraft, anti-ballistic missile and counter-drone shield – known as the “Achilles Shield” – reportedly features […]

The post Achilles Shield: Greece and Israel sign €3 billion defense deal appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Berlin (dpa) – Germany’s Greens are backing the European Union’s landmark trade deal with India, days after the party’s lawmakers in the European Parliament played a key role in challenging the bloc’s agreement with the South American Mercosur countries.

Andreas Audretsch, the party’s deputy group leader in the German parliament, said the deal with India, which was announced earlier on Tuesday, was good for businesses and workers in Germany.

In view of the “destructive rage” of US President Donald Trump, Europe must build new alliances for trade and cooperation, Audretsch argued.

The deal was finalised during an EU-India summit in New Delhi, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proclaiming the agreement on Tuesday.

“The EU and India make history today, deepening the partnership between the world’s biggest democracies,” von der Leyen said.

The latest agreement will not be as comprehensive as the one recently concluded between the EU and Mercosur countries Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Last week, several Green lawmakers in Brussels voted in favour of referring the bloc’s deal with Mercosur to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which could result in a substantial delay to ratification. Their votes were decisive in passing the motion, prompting severe criticism for the party in Germany, whose export-led economy stands to benefit from the boost to trade.

In a paper, the Green leadership has said that Germany needs “new economic partnerships” to diversify foreign trade. “That is why it is important to provisionally apply the agreement with the Mercosur countries and then ratify it,” the paper continued. (January 27)