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After Portugal wasted no time in congratulating President Lula da Silva of Brazil over his 4th time win in presidential elections last Sunday, President of the United States, Donald Trump,
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Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro published a letter on Wednesday night, deleted and edited twice thereafter, in which he addressed his departure from Brazil after losing Sunday's presidential election, declaring himself the victim of a "witch hunt" and insisting he had not abandoned his country.
The post ‘I Did Not Flee Brazil’: Flávio Bolsonaro Compares Himself to Charles de Gaulle in Letter from Miami appeared first on Breitbart.
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The trouncing of the far right provides a playbook for social and environmental movements in other countries facing elections, including the US, Spain and France
Thank you, Brazil, for demonstrating how the far right can be trounced while protection for the Amazon is strengthened. In a world where nature and democracy appeared to be bleeding out in tandem, voters and forest defenders in this global south powerhouse have shown it is possible to staunch the flow. This should provide much needed inspiration and, more practically, a playbook for social and environmental movements in other countries facing elections, including the US, Spain and France.
The astonishing comeback victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Sunday’s presidential runoff against his extreme right challenger Flavío Bolsonaro has brought oceans of rapturous supporters on to the streets, while also thrilling conservationists, climate activists and social justice campaigners across the world.
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© Photograph: Andre Coelho/EPA
© Photograph: Andre Coelho/EPA
© Photograph: Andre Coelho/EPA
Genocidal Chinese dictator Xi Jinping personally congratulated Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Tuesday after Brazil affirmed his victory in this year’s presidential election, extending his rule for a fourth term in office.
The post China’s Xi Jinping Congratulates Marxist Lula on Dubious Brazil Election Win appeared first on Breitbart.
Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro, who lost Brazil's presidential election to leftist incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Sunday, declared himself the country's leader after arriving in Florida on Wednesday.
Bolsonaro fled his country after Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered his passports to be seized less than a day after Lula won the election.
"I want to say, not only to my 60 million voters but to the Brazilian people, that I am the leader and that the criminals who stole Brazil’s election are part of a criminal organization that has established a tyranny," he said in an open letter posted on X.
According to Reuters, Bolsonaro initially declared himself "the elected president" in a since-deleted post. He then sent out an updated letter on X, which included calling himself the rightful "leader" of Brazil.
Bolsonaro, who lost the runoff election by a 3.58% margin, was served with an order to forfeit his passports and not to leave the country on Monday.
"I was ordered right on the street to hand over my passports, and I'm also prohibited from leaving the country," Bolsonaro said, according to a Fox News Digital translation of a video he posted to his social media channels Monday.
The order was signed by de Moraes, who Bolsonaro supporters accuse of being a staunch ally of Lula.
TRUMP'S FINGERPRINTS SEEN ON LATIN AMERICA'S RIGHTWARD SHIFT AS BRAZIL BECOMES NEXT TEST
Bolsonaro landed at Opa Locka Executive Airport just north of Miami with his family Wednesday morning after President Donald Trump granted Bolsonaro and his family visas.
When asked Wednesday if he would approve of Bolsonaro coming to the U.S. following his defeat, Trump told reporters he would, adding, "I think they’re fine people."
"The election was very strange," Trump continued. "And I thought it was terrible. It’s gotten bad reviews. You look at what happened to their market."
BRAZIL’S RAPID ELECTION COUNT PUTS SPOTLIGHT ON VOTING SECURITY AHEAD OF US MIDTERMS
Brazil's stock market plummeted Monday after Lula's victory. Its benchmark index, the Ibovespa, closed down nearly 14% on the first day of post-election trading. The Brazilian real also suffered one of its steepest drops in history, losing nearly 11% of its value relative to the U.S. dollar.
Trump also said, "I didn’t take sides, but it looked like another rigged election."
Brazilian news outlet MD+ reported that Brazilian Federal Police requested Bolsonaro's passport seizure order just seven minutes after Brazil's Superior Electoral Court confirmed Lula's victory.
Bolsonaro, the son of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, initially said he would comply with the order, but ultimately chose to leave.
THE UNLIKELY SOUTH AMERICAN ALLY HELPING LEAD TRUMP'S DRUG CARTEL CRACKDOWN
"I have never thought about leaving the country," Bolsonaro said in a social media video on Monday. "I will hand over my passports and defend myself against this travesty, which is a clear attempt to intimidate me."
But Bolsonaro ultimately crossed the border into Argentina, Argentina's National Directorate of Migrations confirmed, saying the Bolsonaro family entered the country "with valid travel documentation and without any legal impediment" Tuesday night. The family then crossed into Ecuador where they boarded a private plane for Florida, according to Time Magazine.
Lula called his decision to leave "a shameful act," recalling his own 2018 arrest for corruption.
Bolsonaro said the order came as a result of a social media post his brother Eduardo made in which he said Flávio should leave the country if he loses the election.
US TAXPAYER DOLLARS ALLEGEDLY FUELED LEFT-WING POLITICAL CAUSES IN LATIN AMERICA
Flávio was under multiple criminal investigations for alleged money laundering, corruption and tax evasion, according to Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo.
According to Reuters, Bolsonaro denied fleeing Brazil, saying he left to protect himself and his family. He said he was avoiding a witch hunt being carried out by Lula and the Brazilian Supreme Court.
"I want to make this clear: I did not flee Brazil," Bolsonaro said. "I left Brazil, but I did not abandon the Brazilian people."
On Tuesday, Brazil's Supreme Court also ordered the Federal Police to open an investigation into alleged illegal foreign funding for Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign, specifically focusing on Rockbridge Network, a conservative donor group co-founded by U.S. Vice President JD Vance.
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Flavio Bolsonaro, President Lula da Silva, President Trump and Vice President JD Vance's offices did not immediately respond to Fox News Digital for comment.
Por motivos geográficos inevitáveis e por uma diminuição da autonomia psicossocial, a política brasileira é extremamente dependente dos câmbios políticos que ocorrem de tempos em tempos nos EUA.
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Estando confirmada a vitória eleitoral de Lula (e apesar das controvérsias e da crise que perduram) agora é o momento de refletir sobre a possibilidade de mudanças significativas na política externa do presidente do Brasil em seu 4º mandato, que durará até 2030.
Uma pequena revisão das posições assumidas ao longo deste mandato que começou em 2023 se faz necessária.
Numa lista que não deve ser considerada exaustiva, Lula: 1) Reativou a participação brasileira em vários organismos internacionais para os quais Bolsonaro havia dado pouca atenção; 2) Ensaiou uma aproximação com a China no início de seu governo e aumentou laços comerciais após tarifas dos EUA, mas paralisou e recusou a participação na Iniciativa Cinturão & Rota; 3) Reativou a Cúpula da Amazônia, a organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica e realizou na Amazônia a COP30, demonstrando um enfoque na Agenda Verde e na internacionalização (mediada por ONGs ocidentais) da região amazônica; 4) Condenou a operação militar especial russa na Ucrânia, mas se opôs a sanções ocidentais à Rússia, atribuindo responsabilidade pelo conflito tanto à OTAN quanto à Rússia, além de recusar enviar armas e munições para os ucranianos, por outro lado defendendo a retirada das tropas russas e a devolução de todos os territórios libertados/integrados à Ucrânia (incluindo a Crimeia); 5) Condenou a Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa do 7 de outubro de 2023 como um ataque terrorista, criticando também a reação israelense como desproporcional e, depois, como genocídio, gerando tensões com o governo de Netanyahu; 6) Pressionou por “eleições livres” na Venezuela, se recusou a reconhecer a reeleição de Maduro, vetou a entrada da Venezuela nos BRICS; 7) Presidiu os BRICS no ano de 2025, sem muitos avanços; 8) Acordo de livre-comércio com a União Europeia; 8) Condenou a Nicarágua e Daniel Ortega na ONU e em organizações de direitos humanos; 9) Criticou o recrudescimento dos embargos contra Cuba e deu seguimento à ajuda humanitária ao país; 10) Levou o caso das tarifas de Trump à OMC; 11) Ampliou parcerias de defesa com Suécia, Itália, Turquia e outros países da OTAN para a produção de equipamentos militares (aviões, veículos, etc.); 12) Se aliou ao Canadá e União Europeia na iniciativa “Parceiros pelo Multilateralismo”, que visa fortalecer a ONU contra ameaças de revisão da velha ordem internacional; 13) Fez publicamente frente comum com os EUA (quando ele era governado por Joe Biden) contra a ameaça das “autocracias” e da “extrema-direita internacional”.
A partir dessas posturas assumidas pelo governo Lula entre 2023 e 2026 podemos deduzir alguns padrões e tendências bem específicos:
1) Defesa do fortalecimento da ONU, dos organismos multilaterais e da “ordem mundial baseada em regras” do pós-Guerra Fria, contra o unilateralismo dos EUA e o revisionismo multipolarista defendido por potências contra-hegemônicas; 2) Inclinação para a União Europeia, enquanto durar o domínio trumpista nos EUA; 3) Máxima diversificação das relações comerciais; 3) Enfoque temático na Agenda Verde, na defesa da democracia liberal e na defesa dos “direitos humanos”.
Ao ignorarmos aos discursos de Lula e atentarmos exclusivamente para uma desconstrução das posições concretas e das ações efetivas do Brasil durante seu atual governo, adquirimos uma imagem que é bastante diferente daquela que é vista por uma grande parte dos analistas estrangeiros, que não raro possuem uma imagem mais “chavista” de Lula.
Em tese, não há motivo para que a postura internacional do Brasil mude nos próximos anos. Ela tende a permanecer aproximadamente a mesma, com as tendências já indicadas.
O único fator disruptivo na previsibilidade do governo brasileiro são os EUA.
Por motivos geográficos inevitáveis e por uma diminuição da autonomia psicossocial, a política brasileira é extremamente dependente dos câmbios políticos que ocorrem de tempos em tempos nos EUA.
Nesse sentido, portanto, diante da atual crise política brasileira, se o governo dos EUA deixar de reconhecer o resultado eleitoral e partir para tentativas diretas de desestabilização do Brasil através de sanções, o reconhecimento de um “governo no exílio”, etc, isso de fato pode forçar o Brasil a uma postura mais contra-hegemônica.
Não obstante, se Trump ignorar o lóbi bolsonarista e buscar algum modus vivendi com Lula, existe a forte tendência à manutenção daquelas tendências que já indicamos.
E finalmente, se os Democratas retornarem à Casa Branca após as eleições de 2028, então o governo do Brasil fará uma virada mais pró-EUA, buscando a reaproximação com Washington, tal como vinha acontecendo quando Joe Biden era presidente dos EUA.
Coalizão Negra por Direitos, financiada por Soros, elege 16 deputados federais que aplicam a agenda identitária da Open Society no Congresso.
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A política identitária dita “antirracista” tem recebido uma atenção crescente da Open Society. Em documento publicado em 2021, o diretor da divisão do Programa de Saúde Pública da organização, Kayum Ahmed, descreveu uma mudança na estratégia de financiamento para melhor incorporar a questão racial, de poder e de privilégios à política de financiamento da OSF.
“Estamos trabalhando para incorporar uma abordagem interseccional ao nosso financiamento; para mudar a distribuição do poder, precisamos mudar com quem trabalhamos, por meio do financiamento e da nossa capacidade de convocar atores”, escreveu.
O documento recomenda expressamente que as estratégias de financiamento incluam análises de poder e privilégio e objetivos para enfrentar estruturas de opressão e discriminação. Também orienta que a fundação seja específica ao falar de racismo, perguntando se está se referindo ao racismo antinegro e à supremacia branca. É uma orientação para modificar a seleção dos beneficiários, as relações institucionais e a distribuição de recursos segundo uma análise “interseccional” de poder.
No meu último artigo para a SCF, abordei os parlamentares eleitos em outubro com o apoio de ONGs que se passam por defensoras dos negros e que são financiadas pela Open Society. A organização guarda-chuva que reivindica a luta dos negros é a Coalizão Negra por Direitos, que promoveu candidaturas a partir do projeto Quilombo nos Parlamentos. São ao menos 16 novos deputados federais. Entre eles está Jones Manoel (PSOL).
Em agosto deste ano, Jones Manoel foi um dos destaques do lançamento do Quilombo nos Parlamentos em Pernambuco. Em seu discurso, ele afirmou: “acho que na atual conjuntura brasileira, há dentro da própria esquerda uma ofensiva contra o movimento negro, e não só, tachando-o, a partir de um debate equivocado, de identitarismo. Então há uma fala de que lutas antirracistas, antipatriarcais, antilgbtfóbicas, seriam lutas identitárias menores.”
O deputado eleito pelo PSOL também confirmou ter assinado a carta compromisso do Quilombo nos Parlamentos, aderindo oficialmente às diretrizes estabelecidas pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos. Isso significa que Jones se comprometeu a aplicar a política da Coalizão como deputado no Congresso Nacional.
A política da Coalizão Negra por Direitos segue exatamente a cartilha de sua financiadora, a Open Society. A organização guarda-chuva de George Soros financia o movimento Black Lives Matter nos EUA, que desmontou a revolta popular contra o assassinato de George Floyd e levou à eleição de Biden/Harris. No Brasil, copiou-se o movimento Vidas Negras Importam. No mesmo momento em que Soros impulsionava o BLM, a Coalizão publicou um manifesto de direitos humanos: “exigimos a garantida de direitos humanos a negras e negros. Queremos viver, não apenas sobreviver! Vidas negras importam. Basta de genocídio.”
Enquanto a OSF, ao anunciar as iniciativas em torno do legado de Marielle Franco, destacou sua intenção de “apoiar mulheres negras na política brasileira”, o manifesto de 2024 do Quilombo nos Parlamentos deixava claro que estava “impulsionando candidaturas, mandatas e bancadas negras”.
A teoria do racismo estrutural e do genocídio negro, propagada pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos e pelas organizações negras identitárias, tampouco é original. Anos atrás, Alexander Soros, filho, herdeiro e continuador do legado de George Soros na OSF, já utilizava exatamente o termo “racismo estrutural”. O relatório “Advancing Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Grant Making”, publicado em 2021 pela OSF, também afirmava: “a maioria [das sociedades] também incorpora o racismo estrutural e a desvalorização sistêmica de pessoas com pele mais escura.”
Jones Manoel é conhecido por relativizar o papel do financiamento imperialista a organizações que se dizem representantes dos oprimidos. Para ele, fundações como as de George Soros realmente fazem filantropia e não seria um absurdo receber financiamento delas. Agora fica claro porque ele pensa dessa maneira: ele próprio acaba de ser impulsionado pelas entidades de Soros para se eleger deputado.
Erika Hilton é um caso de envolvimento profundo com a Open Society. Além de ser promovida pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos, a fundação de Soros impulsiona a deputada a partir da pauta transexual, como demonstrado em artigo recente. Em 2025, Hilton destinou R$ 1,5 milhão em recursos de emendas parlamentares à Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (Abong), incluindo a prestação de serviços para a Frente Parlamentar LGBT+, liderada pela própria Hilton. A Abong recebeu R$ 4,3 milhões de financiamento da OSF entre 2016 e 2024 e também integra a Coalizão Negra por Direitos, como mostrado no artigo anterior.
Além disso, tal como foi promovida pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos, Hilton também recebeu apoio da Associação Nacional de Travestis e Transexuais (ANTRA) nas eleições de 2026. A ANTRA recebeu 25,8 milhões da OSF, através do Fundo Brasil, entre 2016 e 2024. A deputada também chegou a indicar Bruna Benevides (presidente da ANTRA e integrante do conselho deliberativo da Conectas Direitos Humanos, que é financiada pela OSF e também faz parte da Coalizão) para receber a Medalha do Mérito Legislativo da Câmara Federal em 2024. Por fim, um documentário biográfico chamado House of Hilton foi produzido com o aporte de 25 mil dólares de um fundo da Firelight Media, uma organização sediada em Nova Iorque que tem entre seus apoiadores a Open Society Foundations.
Os atuais mandatos de Dandara Tontzin e Carol Dartora são responsáveis pela indicação de uma emenda parlamentar que permitiu um termo de fomento de R$ 2,4 milhões entre novembro de 2025 e fevereiro de 2027 ao Instituto de Referência Negra Peregum, uma das ONGs da Coalizão Negra por Direitos que é financiada pela Open Society.
Tontzin também apresentou, em abril de 2025, o requerimento para realizar, em conjunto com outra comissão, o seminário “Racismo Ambiental e Transição Energética Justa”. Entre os convidados estavam representantes do Peregum, do Geledés, do Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC) e da Terra de Direitos. O INESC e a Terra de Direitos também são receptores de fundos da Open Society (o primeiro recebeu R$ 8,6 milhões e o segundo R$ 4,6 milhões). O seminário ocorreu em 28 de maio de 2025. A página oficial da Câmara registra a participação de Carol Dartora e de Maíra Rodrigues da Silva, coordenadora da área de combate ao “racismo ambiental” do Peregum.
O funcionamento do esquema Soros, que é repetido mundo afora, fica muito claro. Primeiro, localiza indivíduos com ideias e objetivos compatíveis com os da Open Society. Depois, promove esses indivíduos através de suas ONGs. Quando eles se elegem deputados, passam a representar os interesses de Soros no Parlamento. E ainda por cima ajudam as ONGs que os promoveram, fortalecendo-as ainda mais para que continuem o seu trabalho de treinamento de novos agentes.
Todos esses deputados se apresentam como políticos de esquerda e até mesmo socialistas e anticapitalistas. Não passam de enganadores de um público ingênuo de esquerda, que gostaria de verdadeiras mudanças no País mas que estão capturados pelas ideias identitárias. Essa falsidade ideológica leva setores de direita a acreditarem que George Soros é um socialista, pois financia a esquerda. No entanto, ainda que acreditem ser de esquerda, esses deputados não podem ser considerados como verdadeiros esquerdistas, socialistas ou anticapitalistas. O socialismo é a antítese do capitalismo e, portanto, seu inimigo mortal. Se um dos maiores capitalistas do mundo os financia não é para instaurarem o socialismo, mas sim para aprimorarem o sistema de dominação capitalista sobre o povo brasileiro. Esses deputados “socialistas” são os negros da casa de Soros.
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s re-election on October 25 may have frustrated Donald Trump’s ambitions in Latin America, but the more consequential story lies beyond the ballot box on China. Brazil’s relationship with Beijing is now so deeply embedded in its economy that even a president more sympathetic to Washington would struggle to unwind it. […]
The post Lula can’t decouple from China, whatever Trump may want appeared first on Asia Times.
The complaint was presented before the Federal Court in Puerto Iguazu, in Misiones province. It seeks to establish the circumstances of Bolsonaro’s entry into Argentina and his later departure toward United States.
The far-right senator, son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, lost the presidential run-off to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on Sunday. He faces criminal cases in Brazil for corruption and money laundering, and Supreme Federal Court justice Alexandre de Moraes had prohibited him from leaving the country.
RELATED: What Role Did Milei Play in Flavio Bolsonaro’s Escape?
Pagano framed the matter in stark terms. “The justice system has to establish who organized Bolsonaro’s passage through our territory toward U.S. and whether Argentine officials facilitated it. A government cannot become the escape route for someone who is barred from leaving his country by court order”, she said.
The reconstruction presented to the court traces the route in detail. The Brazilian Senator crossed the international border between Foz do Iguazu and Puerto Iguazu through the Tancredo Neves crossing at 10.50 P.M. local time on Tuesday.
Forty minutes after entering Argentine soil, Flávvio Bolsonaro and his family boarded a private Gulfstream G400 jet at Iguazu International Airport. The aircraft belongs to the firm Baires Fly and had been positioned there since Monday.
🇧🇷 "I address the Brazilian people and the international community as the true elected president of Brazil."
— Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) October 28, 2026
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, who lost Sunday's presidential runoff to incumbent Lula da Silva by about 4.4 million votes, is claiming the presidency in a statement released… pic.twitter.com/oTTodsaOcU
The jet traced a path through the airspace of Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru. It made a technical stop in Guayaquil, Ecuador, before landing Wednesday in Miami, avoiding Brazilian airspace at every stage.
Pagano detailed that Flávio Bolsonaro reached the air terminal under escort from an Airport Security Police patrol car. That force answers to the Security Ministry, which falls under the federal Executive.
The National Directorate of Migration initially denied on Tuesday that the conservative leader was present or had any flight plans. Yet the government of Javier Milei officially acknowledged his passage at 2.00 A.M. Wednesday, when the aircraft was already airborne.
The complaint demands clarification of another element, the presence in Misiones of Santiago Caputo, political strategist and chief advisor to the Argentine presidency. Caputo reportedly arrived in the province earlier in the week aboard the same private plane.
La Dirección Nacional de Migraciones informa que a las 22:50 hs del dia 27/10, ingresaron por el paso fronterizo de Puente internacional Tancredo Neves en la provincia de Misiones, los ciudadanos Flavio Nantes Bolsonaro, Fernanda Antunes Figueira Bolsonaro, Carolina Figueira…
— Migraciones (@Migraciones_AR) October 28, 2026
Text reads: “The National Directorate of Migration reports that at 10:50 P.M. on October 27, entered through the border crossing of Tancredo Neves International Bridge in the province of Misiones, citizens Flávio Nantes Bolsonaro, Fernanda Antunes Figueira Bolsonaro, Carolina Figueira Bolsonaro and Luiza Figueira Bolsonaro, who did so with skilled travel documentation without any legal impediment to entry into the country, also the transits were registered by the enforcement authority without incidents. For its part, at 11:30 P.M., the incoming party boarded a private flight dispatched by the company Baires Fly S.A to the city of Guayaquil, Ecuador, as reported in the flight plan.”
The written filing asks the court to investigate alleged crimes of illegal trafficking of persons, facilitation of illegal stay, abuse of authority, violation of public official’s duties, and cover-up. It requests urgent evidence measures including camera footage from the border bridge, aeronautical records, and the Airport Security Police duty logs.
The political fallout reached the legislature quickly. Argentine Congressman and former Defense Minister Agustin Rossi formalized a request to summon the Chief of Cabinet, Diego Santilli, to answer before Parliament.
The sequence raises the question at the heart of the complaint. A senator barred from leaving his country crossed a border, boarded a private jet, and flew to Miami without touching Brazilian airspace, all with a police escort on Argentine soil.
The government first denied any knowledge. It then confirmed the passage hours later, after the plane was gone. That gap between denial and confirmation sits at the center of the criminal filing.
The denunciation now forces the federal justice system to determine whether officials in the Milei administration facilitated a fugitive’s exit. The demand in Congress puts the same question to the Cabinet’s Chief.
© Victor Moriyama for The New York Times
On October 25, Brazil’s three-time and current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, surprised the entire world by overcoming an electoral setback in the first round (in which he was defeated by the far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro) and securing victory and the presidential seat in Brasília.
Lula, the legendary union leader during the dictatorship, secured 51.79%, equivalent to 64,256,232 votes, while Bolsonaro (son of the detained former president Jair Bolsonaro) received 48.21%, or 59,826,041 votes.
What is truly surprising about Bolsonaro’s defeat (given that most pollsters had predicted a very likely victory for him) is the enormous number of votes Lula managed to gain during the three weeks between the first and second rounds of voting. In that first round, Bolsonaro took first place with 48.21% (more than 56 million votes), and Lula came in second with 45.15% (just under 54 million votes).
Many believed that the nearly 9 million votes obtained by all the other candidates combined in the first round would be distributed in a way more favorable to Bolsonaro, since most of those votes were cast for right-wing and center-right candidates. This seemed even more evident after many of the leaders of those parties endorsed Bolsonaro.
Added to this question was the high probability that, in a society highly polarized between the two candidates, many voters who either cast blank or invalid ballots or abstained from voting in the first round would support one of the two candidates.
Indeed, both of these circumstances played out. According to available data, more than 14 million Brazilians who had voted for other candidates, cast invalid ballots, or abstained from voting participated in the runoff, supporting either Lula or Bolsonaro.
And this is precisely the key factor in understanding Lula’s victory. Assuming that very few voters would have switched their support from Lula to Bolsonaro or vice versa, it is important to note that of those 14 million votes that were redistributed, Lula managed to secure 10.37 million more votes than he received in the first round, while Bolsonaro managed to gain just under 4 million votes. This was enough for Lula not only to close the gap against his opponent but also to surpass him by a comfortable margin.
Faced with this surprising turn of events, hundreds of analysts in Latin America and around the world have rushed to present countless charts, hypotheses, and analyses in an effort to fully understand the reasons behind this victory. And the reasons have to do not only with the clearly impressive comeback by Lula’s Workers’ Party and its allies, but also with the fact that he appears to have put a halt to a seemingly unstoppable string of victories by the far right in Latin America.
Given this, the question seems clear: How did Lula manage to convince such a staggering number of people to vote for him in the runoff who had not done so in the first round? In response, technical reasons have been put forward (such as campaign strategy, the use of social media, and mass mobilization), as well as political ones (fear of a far-right government, social-class alliances, the formation of a broad-based coalition, etc.).
Among the technical reasons, Lula’s tremendous effort to turn the runoff campaign into a genuine, nearly constant mass mobilization (in both large cities and small towns) has been highlighted. The former union leader once again demonstrated his great charisma and ability to rally people before thousands of PT activists and members of other allied parties who fought day and night without stopping to overturn the result.
Added to this is the PT’s digital strategy; the party had repeatedly accused major social media platforms of boycotting the presidential campaign by hindering or reducing the visibility of Lula’s ads – but not those of Bolsonaro. In response, André Janones proposed a change in strategy.
Lula’s WhatsApp channel grew from 3.7 million subscribers to more than 10 million in the span of 12 days. Through this channel, users were instructed to post certain messages, search for information online, comment on specific posts, and so on. In other words, to circumvent an algorithmic system that, they claimed, was deliberately sabotaging Lula’s campaign.
The result was astonishing: despite the alleged media blockade on social media, the platforms were flooded with messages, images, and videos (many generated by AI) featuring Lula and attacking Bolsonaro’s candidacy, which undoubtedly had a major impact on the political communication strategy of the PT’s campaign, led by re-elected Governor Rafael Fonteles. For example, online interactions about Lula increased from 41% to 65% during the runoff election.
But Lula also took the risk of bringing about tangible changes in people’s lives, and he sent what may have been his final message during the runoff election, when his party and allies succeeded in passing legislation to end the six-day workweek. The move was celebrated by the country’s workers and clearly gave Lula’s campaign a pro-worker tone. That is why he gained so many millions of votes in the second round of the election in the working-class suburbs of major cities.
And yet, there remains a certain suspicion that if this set of measures had been applied in any other similar situation, something would have been missing to set it in motion and give deeper meaning to the purely political campaign – with its communication, marketing, and other tactical decisions. And that something is Lula.
At times it seems that only someone with his political stature, his charisma, and the historic place he has already carved out in the history books could have won an election in Latin America against the far right, which enjoys the support of the most influential imperial powers of our time and an international oligarchy.
The “warrior of the Brazilian people
Lula achieved this, as already mentioned, thanks to a series of changes in his campaign strategy and concrete improvements in people’s lives. But it must be said without fear of contradiction: he did so by blending two dimensions that might seem contradictory, yet which a figure like him could bring together.
The first is that, as some of his campaign strategists recount, he began to speak extensively about Brazil’s future despite having already served as president three times. In this way, he moved away from nostalgia for the past and began to speak of hope for the future.
And second, Lula insisted throughout the campaign that this future was threatened by the Bolsonaros, whom he constantly linked to a submissive attitude toward US interests. In this way, Lula also employed a discourse of fear and danger, personifying it in Bolsonaro, who, as is well known, had reportedly left Brazil for the United States.
But Lula did not do so in a pitiful or apocalyptic way; rather, he presented himself as the only one capable of halting that advance. And more than just capable, as the only one who, without a doubt, would do so. In other words, Lula established himself, at the age of 80, as a “warrior of the Brazilian people,” just as his supporters chanted in the streets.
Then, in the debates (which undoubtedly had a huge impact on the runoff election) it seems Lula had had enough of the far right always appearing to be on the offensive, while the left and progressives always seemed to be waiting for the next blow. Lula put on his boxing gloves and began playing the game the far right had set for him … and won by knockout.
And for that very reason, Lula, his followers, and many of those who supported him (not necessarily because they believe in his agenda, but because they feared a new far-right government, as the numbers show) must realize that, with a hostile legislature and an opposition united around a single family, Lula’s fourth term will likely be the most difficult of his life.
Lula will have to seek ways to overcome the clear obstacles that the right and the far right will place in his path in order to achieve what he called “the best government in Brazil’s history.” For now, he has managed to prevent another Bolsonaro from reaching the presidency, but that does not mean the remainder of his term will be a “Brazilian pax.”
In this regard, there is a Japanese proverb that Lula should keep in mind: “When you’ve won a battle, tighten your helmet.”
Brazilian Senator Flavio Bolsonaro on Wednesday declared himself the rightful president-elect of Brazil, saying his victory had been denied by an electoral coup d’etat by leftist President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the country’s Supreme Court.
Bolsonaro, who lost Sunday’s presidential election and left Brazil for Miami where he and his family received US visas, thanked US President Donald Trump and Argentine leader Javier Milei for helping him leave his country and for welcoming him.
“I want to say, not only to my 60 million voters but to the Brazilian people, that I am the elected president and that the criminals who stole Brazil’s election are part of a criminal organization that has established a tyranny,” he said in an open letter shared with journalists by his allies.
Bolsonaro did not provide evidence for the alleged electoral fraud. International observers have found Sunday’s vote fair.
Bolsonaro and his family arrived in Miami on Wednesday, leaving Brazil after he refused to comply with a Brazilian Supreme Court order to surrender his passports. He left under a shroud of secrecy after the court order, which relates to a money-laundering investigation in which he denies wrongdoing.
Neither Lula’s office, the federal electoral court or the supreme court immediately responded to requests for comment.
Bolsonaro based his rejection of the result on the fact that the a Lula-appointed Supreme Court justice had extended voting by two hours on Sunday due to allegations of voter suppression in left-leaning northeastern state brought by Lula’s campaign. However, Bolsoanro’s campaign also sought an extension due to rains in conservative-leaning southern states.
Bolsonaro lost to Lula by more around 4.5 million votes. Fewer than 35,000 votes, or some 0.03% of the total, were cast in the extra two hours of voting ordered by the Supreme Court, according to an analysis of electoral records by Insper professor Pedro Burgos.
The Secretariat of Social Communication (Secom), denied that any change had been made to the constitutional amendment that ends the 6×1 workweek.
The posts, which spread after the presidential run-off, offered incorrect information about labor legislation and social benefits.
RELATED: Brazilian Senate Ends 6×1 Schedule, Approves 40-Hour Workweek
Constitutional Amendment 141 guarantees two paid rest days each week without any reduction in salary. The way those free days are organized can be settled through collective bargaining, as long as the constitutional conditions are respected. The Secretariat of Social Communication stressed that the norm remains in force and untouched.
The false claims included an alleged exclusion of certain professional categories from the new rules. No such proposal exists. The Secretariat of Social Communication explained that conversations with different sectors concern only how to implement rules that have already been approved.
The reduction of the workweek will unfold gradually. The initial limit will be 42 hours a week, and later 40 hours, with no salary reduction at any stage.
The government offered a blunt explanation of why the Executive holds no power over the text. Since the measure is a constitutional amendment approved by the National Congress, the Executive cannot modify or veto it.
O Governo do Brasil alerta para informações falsas que circulam nas redes sociais neste período pós-eleitoral sobre um suposto recuo no fim da escala 6×1 e cortes no Bolsa Família e no Gás do Povo. pic.twitter.com/SIR0but5Vl
— Governo do Brasil (@govbr) October 27, 2026
Text reads: “The Government of Brazil warns about false information circulating on social media in this post-election period about a supposed retreat at the end of the 6×1 scale and cuts to Bolsa Família and Gás do Povo.“
Separate rumors suggested that the Bolsa Família program faced suspension or reduced benefits. The Secretariat of Social Communication confirmed that the program keeps operating normally, with payments continuing and no cuts applied.
In October the minimum amount per family rose by 15.04%, from R$600 (about 112 U.S. dollars) to R$691 (around 129 U.S. dollars). That adjustment contradicted the online claims, since a program facing cuts does not raise its floor. Families can verify their information through the Bolsa Familia app, the Caixa Tem platform, or by calling 111, the direct line of the Caixa Economica Federal bank.
The government also rejected rumors about Gas do Povo, the program that provides free refills of 13-kilogram gas cylinders to families that meet the requirements. The Secretariat of Social Communication (Secom) affirmed that the initiative already has budget assigned for 2026 and that resources appear in the 2027 budget proposal sent to Congress.
The pattern was consistent across all the false messages. Each one targeted a program or a right that benefits working families, and each one crumbled against the official record.
The Secretariat of Social Communication (Secom) advised the public to distrust messages that do not identify reliable sources. Citizens should verify whether information has been confirmed by competent authorities before sharing it. The Social Direct Line 121 and official digital channels remain open for questions about benefits.
The warning reflects a government trying to contain a wave of misinformation at a politically charged moment. False posts about labor rights and welfare can spread faster than corrections, especially when they play on fear of losing income or benefits.
The facts, however, tell a different story. The workweek amendment stands. The Bolsa Familia Program pays more than before. Gas do Povo holds its funding for this year and next. None of the alleged changes appears in any official document.
The government’s message closed with a practical instruction. Before passing along a message about labor law or social programs, check the source. The tools to do so, apps and official channels, remain available.
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An in-depth look at thirty years of dynastic clientelism, illicit property purchases, and attacks on democratic institutions
The Bolsonaro family’s political trajectory marks a polarizing era in modern Brazilian history. Led by patriarch Jair Bolsonaro, a former army captain who served nearly three decades in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, the political clan built its brand on anti-establishment rhetoric, militarism, social conservatism, and zero-tolerance policies toward crime.
RELATED:
Brazil’s Court Probes Foreign Funds in Flávio Bolsonaro’s Campaign
Despite promoting an image centered on traditional values and law enforcement, investigative records and judicial proceedings of the Bolsonaro family depict a political network deeply tied to public fund diversion, money laundering, and connections with armed paramilitary groups.
The Bolsonaro family expanded its influence into a dynasty, embedding sons Flávio, Carlos, and Eduardo across local, state, and federal offices.
Flávio Bolsonaro served as a Rio de Janeiro state deputy for sixteen years before his election to the Federal Senate in 2018. Carlos Bolsonaro directed public messaging as a Rio city councilor, while Eduardo Bolsonaro represented São Paulo as a federal deputy.
The structural base of this network began unraveling following political shifts, election defeats, and growing scrutiny from the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and federal authorities.
Clientelism, Militias, and the Rio de Janeiro Subculture
Jair Bolsonaro’s public life began in the late 1980s following his departure from the Brazilian Armed Forces. Elected to the Rio de Janeiro City Council in 1988 and to Congress in 1990, Jair Bolsonaro established a conservative political base anchored in military sector interests, opposition to progressive social policies, and public defense of paramilitary activity.
During his parliamentary career, Jair Bolsonaro openly defended Rio de Janeiro’s irregular security forces, known locally as milícias. These militias are armed paramilitary groups formed by former and active police officers who exercise territorial control over neighborhood communities.
Unlike drug trafficking networks, militia groups operate illegal local monopolies in extortion, land sales, private security, public transport, and cooking gas distribution. In parliamentary speeches, Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly characterized these militia groups as “self-defense units” that brought order to neglected communities.
The expansion of the Bolsonaro family’s political influence relied heavily on these political networks. In 2002, Flávio Bolsonaro was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ) at age twenty-one. Carlos Bolsonaro secured his city council seat in 2000 at age seventeen.
This strategy allowed the family to secure multiple legislative budgets, employ political operatives across jurisdictions, and maintain influence in local communities.
During his time at ALERJ, Flávio Bolsonaro maintained direct political and employment ties with figures associated with Rio’s militia structures. Flávio Bolsonaro employed Raimunda Veras Magalhães and Danielle Mendonça da Costa—the mother and ex-wife of Adriano Magalhães da Nóbrega—in his legislative office.
Nóbrega was a former Special Police Operations Battalion captain who led the Crime Bureau (Escritório do Crime), a professional hit squad linked to militia extortion and high-profile assassinations.
Official records show Flávio Bolsonaro conferred the Medal of Tiradentes, the highest honor awarded by the Rio legislature, on Nóbrega in 2005 while Nóbrega was incarcerated on murder charges.
Financial audits showed that funds drawn from legislative payrolls were routed through accounts controlled by Nóbrega’s family members, linking parliamentary staff operations directly to informal militia networks.
Defeated Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro and his family have landed in Miami after fleeing his country.
— The Associated Press (@AP) October 28, 2026
This comes a day after they were granted United States visas by the Trump administration. pic.twitter.com/oB91ejWab5
Flávio Bolsonaro and the Rachadinha System
During his mandate in the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, Flávio Bolsonaro operated a systematic financial embezzlement enterprise through his parliamentary office.
This illicit network relied on a practice known locally as a salary kickback scheme (rachadinha), a scheme in which legislative staff members are required to return a substantial portion of their public salaries to the elected official or an appointed intermediary.
Investigations conducted by the public prosecutor’s office of Rio de Janeiro and financial intelligence reports from the Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF) revealed that numerous staff members appointed to Flávio Bolsonaro’s office did not perform their legislative duties, functioning instead as nominal ghost employees.
Fabrício Queiroz, a retired military police officer, long-term associate of the Bolsonaro family, and former advisor to Flávio Bolsonaro, served as the primary operator of the collection network. COAF reports identified atypical financial transactions moving through Queiroz’s bank accounts, including transfers directed to members of the Bolsonaro family.
Investigators documented that a significant portion of the embezzled funds was funneled back to cover personal expenses for the Bolsonaro family, ranging from utility and school tuition payments to real estate acquisitions.
To legitimize the illicit funds generated through the rachadinha structure, Flávio Bolsonaro acquired commercial and residential properties and established a franchise business, a chocolate shop located in a Rio de Janeiro shopping mall.
Financial audits of the chocolate business revealed statistical anomalies: cash deposits into the store’s accounts frequently mismatched daily retail sales volumes, indicating the business operated partly as a front to inject cash from the legislative payroll scheme into the formal financial system.
Public prosecutors formally denounced Flávio Bolsonaro for embezzlement, money laundering, and running a criminal organization based on these findings.
Flávio Bolsonaro just two days ago:
— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 27, 2026
“I will not give up on my Brazil.”
Two days later, he has reportedly fled Brazil for the U.S. pic.twitter.com/f91KsZ3V74
Broader Crimes and Systemic Attacks on Brazilian Democracy
The financial allegations against Flávio Bolsonaro formed part of a broader pattern of asset accumulation and institutional interference linked to the wider Bolsonaro family network.
Investigative reports tracking real estate transactions across Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília revealed that a substantial portion of the family’s property acquisitions over three decades were conducted using physical cash payments.
Public registries and journalistic investigations showed that family members purchased multiple residential and commercial units without utilizing standard banking mortgages or formal credit lines, raising concerns regarding the origin of the funds and potential systemic money laundering.
Beyond financial offenses, the family’s political dominance was maintained through continuous friction with investigative bodies and democratic institutions.
Throughout Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential term and the subsequent legislative mandates of his sons, the administration systematically attempted to alter leadership positions within federal agencies, including the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office.
The systemic subversion extended to public discourse, where state apparatuses were utilized to discredit journalists, civil society organizations, and judiciary members examining the clan’s legal exposures.
By framing routine judicial oversight and anti-corruption investigations as partisan political persecution, the Bolsonaro network undermined public trust in regulatory institutions while insulating its members from administrative accountability.
These maneuvers laid the groundwork for an escalating judicial crisis that culminated when electoral outcomes shifted control of the executive branch and removed institutional protections from the family’s inner circle.
The Anatomy of the Bolsonaro Exodus
The national elections on October 25 and subsequent rulings by the magistrate Alexandre de Moraes, representing Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court, marked a decisive shift in the legal landscape surrounding the Bolsonaro family.
As anti-corruption investigations advanced, the Supreme Federal Court, under the leadership of justices overseeing inquiries into financial crimes, institutional subversion, and antidemocratic acts, began tightening judicial restrictions on key figures within the clan. For this reason, Justice Moraes prohibited Flávio Bolsonaro from leaving Brazil and ordered the seizure of his passports—both his ordinary and diplomatic ones. After 24 hours, as he had not physically surrendered them, the Federal Police proceeded to officially cancel his travel documents.
It has been known through the medias that since October 27 Flávio Bolsonaro, along with his family, traveled via private transport to cross Brazil’s border; they are currently in the United States, having arrived there by private plane.
This strategic retreat mirrored patterns observed among regional political figures seeking to evade national accountability systems through foreign asylum or extended stays abroad.
The exodus highlighted broader questions regarding international cooperation and judicial jurisdiction. Right-wing political factions and sympathetic organizations abroad played a facilitative role, offering platforms and legal assistance to political figures fleeing Latin American jurisdictions.
Other media outlets reported that a U.S. State Department official stated that Flávio Bolsonaro and his family would be granted visas, allowing them to reside in the United States following his loss in the Brazilian election to Lula.
The departure of key family members underscored the challenges facing Brazilian legal institutions as they sought to enforce judicial rulings against individuals with transnational resources and foreign political allies.
WATCH: Brazilian President Lula on Flávio Bolsonaro leaving Brazil for the U.S.:
— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 27, 2026
For the Bolsonaro family, Brazil is their second homeland.
Their first homeland is licking boots in the United States, just as they are accustomed to doing. pic.twitter.com/ugCdYWD9gg
Impunity vs. Institutional Resilience in Brazil
The trajectory of the Bolsonaro family and the specific criminal charges leveled against Flávio Bolsonaro illustrate the structural contradictions of contemporary populist right-wing political movements.
While campaigning on platforms of moral renewal, fiscal discipline, and strict law enforcement, the Bolsonaro’s constructed a sophisticated network of public fund embezzlement, real estate money laundering, and structural alignment with paramilitary groups.
The legal actions and subsequent international flights of Flávio Bolsonaro and his family carry profound implications for Brazilian democracy. On one hand, the coordinated evasion of judicial mandates highlights the enduring vulnerability of state institutions when confronted with entrenched political dynasties possessing international safety valves.
On the other hand, the rigorous investigative work conducted by federal prosecutors, financial intelligence units, and the judiciary demonstrates the operational capacity of Brazil’s democratic framework to investigate and prosecute powerful political actors regardless of office.
Ultimately, the handling of the Bolsonaro family’s legal exposures serves as a critical test for the rule of law in Latin America.
As Brazilian courts continue to address the financial and institutional infractions of the Jair Bolsonaro administration, the outcome will define the boundaries of accountability for political elites in the region for decades to come.
Sources: Brasil de Fato – Agência Brasil – Gov.br – O Globo – Folha de S.Paulo – O Estado de S.Paulo – El País – CNN Brasil – EFE – TeleSUR – NYT
Over the last 12 hours, Argentine and Brazilian media outlets have continued to stir up controversy regarding the role President Javier Milei played in the flight of far-right Brazilian senator Flavio Bolsonaro to the United States—a journey that included a stop in Argentina.
RELATED:
Flavio Bolsonaro Enters U.S. After Fleeing Brazilian Justice
On Tuesday, outlets reported that Bolsonaro might flee through Argentina. Immigration authorities, however, responded by saying there were no records of Bolsonaro entering the country.
Presidential spokesman Adrian Ravier said only at a news conference that Argentina had received no asylum request from the Brazilian senator. Milei chose to remain silent.
In an interview with channel A24 on Tuesday night, Mexican lawyer Simon Levy, who is close to the Bolsonaro family, claimed that Milei was aware of the efforts to coordinate Bolsonaro’s escape to Miami.
“Thanks to President Milei, Flavio Bolsonaro is alive today. The only person who knew about this was President Milei. He has been and was involved in part of the coordination of this entire operation,” Levy said.
Flávio Bolsonaro fugiu para os Estados Unidos em um jato de uma empresa que aparece numa investigação sobre lavagem de dinheiro ligado a contratos públicos para atender pessoas com deficiência na Argentina.
— Paulo Pimenta (@Pimenta13Br) October 28, 2026
A aeronave pertence à Baires Fly, de Luis Grande. A companhia também… pic.twitter.com/qx3n14dJX5
The text reads, “Flavio Bolsonaro fled to the U.S. on a jet belonging to a company that appears in an investigation into money laundering linked to public contracts for the care of people with disabilities in Argentina.
The aircraft belongs to Baires Fly, which is owned by Luis Grande. The company also transported Javier Milei to the U.S. following his 2023 electoral victory. On that trip, Grande himself piloted the plane. Argentine judicial authorities are investigating transfers made by suppliers of the National Disability Agency (ANDIS) to Baires Fly accounts.
Following these payments, invoices were issued for the advance purchase of flight miles. It is suspected that these transactions were used to provide a veneer of legality to funds derived from irregular contracting. Flavio left Brazil despite a court order prohibiting him from exiting the country and requiring him to surrender his passports. Sources: Reuters, elDiarioAR, and Ambito.“
The newspaper La Nacion reported that presidential adviser Santiago Caputo was in Misiones province, which borders Brazil, on Tuesday night, when the aircraft carrying Bolsonaro took off. This would confirm that the Milei administration actively assisted in the operation.
According to Argentina’s National Directorate of Migration, Flavio Bolsonaro, his wife, Fernanda Antunes Figueira, and their two daughters entered the country on Tuesday at 10:50 p.m. local time via the Tancredo Neves International Bridge in Misiones province.
Bolsonaro used his Italian passport, while his family members traveled with their usual identification documents, according to the flight plan. Argentine immigration authorities said no laws had been violated: “We cannot prevent him from entering the country with his European passport.”
Where is ICE? https://t.co/dPmX9ihGbJ pic.twitter.com/l7MyeLU5Zq
— Pamphlets (@PamphletsY) October 27, 2026
Forty minutes later, at 11:30 p.m. local time, the Bolsonaros boarded a private aircraft operated by Baires Fly S.A. at Puerto Iguazu Airport, bound for Guayaquil, Ecuador, from where they traveled to Miami, United States.
So far, neither Milei nor his ministers and aides have made any public statements about the operation that enabled the escape of Bolsonaro, a far-right politician who faces several criminal investigations.
His departure came after Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered him to surrender his passports and barred him from leaving the country as part of money laundering investigations.
All opposition parties to Milei in Argentina’s Congress have demanded explanations about what role the government may have played in the operation.
teleSUR/ JF Source: EFE
Brazilian Sen. Flavio Bolsonaro and his family landed in Florida on Wednesday morning, hours after Argentina confirmed that they legally entered the country and boarded a flight toward Ecuador.
The post Reports: Flavio Bolsonaro Lands in U.S. After Fleeing Brazil Through Argentina appeared first on Breitbart.
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