The Council of Europe’s latest report on Denmark exposes a gap between the country’s commitment to combating racism and the protection experienced by Muslim communities. The challenge now is to turn international recommendations into meaningful political action.

By Hüseyin DOĞRU

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Built to fight foreign interference, Europe’s security apparatus is now turning on its own people. Muslims and critics of Israel are first in line.

On 8 October 2026, the European Parliament passed a deeply Islamophobic resolution on “Islamist entryism”. Behind the text is the hand of the European People’s Party, the conservative bloc that holds sway over EU politics. Backed by the liberals of Renew Europe and the far right, it was put to a vote and passed 381 to 167. The resolution is put forward as a way to shield European democracy from extremists, but its provisions are enough to give pause to anyone with an eye on the future of our rights and freedoms in Europe.

Take for instance the matter of “hatred of Israel”. The resolution puts this undefined notion forward as an indicator of ideological radicalisation, while also sounding the alarm on the “instrumentalisation of anti-discrimination frameworks”. One has to wonder at the implications: does this mean that a campaign against discrimination or even criticism of a state under accusation for war crimes can be subsumed under the EU’s widening net of security threats?

This resolution is more than an assault on a Muslim population already demonised in Europe; it is part of a broader, unexamined shift in the Union where dissent is viewed with suspicion. I am living with the consequences of it.

From foreign interference to domestic dissent

For years, the EU has been building a security apparatus around the alleged threats of disinformation, foreign interference and hybrid warfare.

Central to this is Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a framework developed largely in response to “Russian information operations”. The EU’s diplomatic service describes FIMI as a “mostly non-illegal” pattern of behaviour that can negatively affect political processes and values.

The definition is telling in what it leaves out. Political officials, not judicial ones, are left to decide what constitutes a manipulation of European values and what does not. What becomes of political critique and journalism when their arbitrary judgments are applied?

In May 2025, the EU sanctioned me and my media company, red., under its Russia-related hybrid-threats regime. My alleged offence was my journalism, particularly my coverage of Palestine solidarity protests in Germany, which the EU claims supported Russia’s efforts to destabilise Europe. The evidence against me consists of screenshots of factual posts from red. and my personal social media accounts, most of them reporting or criticism of German domestic and foreign policy. Not one page of the evidence dossier so much as mentions Russia.

Without a criminal charge, trial or conviction, my bank accounts were frozen and I was banned from working and travelling.

Then there is the question of administrative sanctions. The EU will say due process is observed since one can take them to court, but by the time a judge is sitting in on the case the damage has been done. Livelihoods are in ruins, bank accounts frozen and lives in disarray, all while the sanctioned individual endures years of expensive and politicised legal wrangling to have restrictions lifted. It is an extraordinary power to wield; the punishment is meted out first and the chance to contest it later, with no need to prove criminality. Violate a sanction and you face prosecution and prison, even if your only offence was buying nappies for your own babies, which could be deemed to have circumvented the rules.

On 8 October, the same day Parliament voted on “Islamist entryism”, the EU Council renewed the sanctions regime I am listed under until October 2027 and reinstated the reasons for my listing. The new text still describes the protesters whose university occupation red. covered as “anti-Israel rioters”. To justify the renewal, the Council cited a Parliament report from September on hybrid threats. One institution supplies the political mood, another uses that mood to put names like mine on a list.

The enemy within

The Islamist entryism resolution takes this logic in another direction. “Entryism” refers to political groups infiltrating established institutions to influence them from within. In this case, the Parliament warns that Islamist networks are using charities, youth organisations, universities and other parts of civil society to gain influence over European politics. The idea was imported from Paris; the resolution leans on a May 2025 report by the French interior ministry, the same ministry that once governed Algeria’s Muslims as colonial subjects.

The threat is no longer just a foreign power supposedly interfering in European affairs. Now the EU is turning its attention to an enemy within.

The phrase has a history. In July 1984, Margaret Thatcher told Conservative backbenchers that Britain had fought the “enemy without” in the Falklands and now faced the “enemy within”. She meant the striking miners.

The way in which the resolution singles out “hatred of Israel” as a sign of radicalisation without defining the term is noteworthy. A couple of paragraphs on it concedes this is not a bar to “legitimate criticism” of the state, yet it offers no guidance on how the line between the two will be drawn, or by whom. Since when has hostility to a government been cause for suspecting extremism? Or are we to assume Europeans must love Israel? One might ask whose interests are really being served. The European Commission tells us the EU was Israel’s top trading partner in 2024, with €42.6 billion in goods. To call for an end to that trade or an arms embargo is not a danger to democracy, but to the business interests of Europe.

Working with other organisations, maintaining certain associations or allegedly misusing anti-discrimination campaigns can also become grounds for suspicion. Among the warning signs the resolution lists are “the recurrence of certain partnerships”, “proximity to already identified networks” and even “the production of activist reports”.¹⁷ The resolution calls for restrictions on institutional access and funding, as well as tighter checks on visas, residence permits and mobility involving people, including academics, linked to individuals designated as “hate preachers”.

Even the European Network Against Racism is cast in doubt, its funding said to raise “serious questions”. When an anti-racism body is conflated with entryism, the whole concept is made to look suspect. Under the terms of the resolution, a professor could be slapped with travel restrictions because of a tenuous association with a so-called “hate preacher”, having broken no law in the process. We have seen this sort of thing before. In 1972, Germany’s Radikalenerlass saw the domestic intelligence service vet some 3.5 million public sector applicants. Communists and others on the left were dismissed or denied their jobs as teachers, postmen or train drivers for who they were rather than any act they had committed.

The resolution also tells us which Muslims Europe is willing to tolerate. It promises support for “Muslim representatives” who defend democratic values and resist “Islamist pressure”.²² The good Muslim, in other words, is the one the state approves of.

Not being legally binding does not make the resolution any less alarming. The Parliament has rubber-stamped the idea that lawful activity is a security risk, laying the groundwork for enforceable restrictions down the line. The same rationale once used to counter foreign interference is now being turned on organisations and people here in Europe.

Repression in the name of democracy

Both the FIMI sanctions regime and the Islamist entryism resolution are justified in the name of defending democracy and protecting European values. Yet the EU is increasingly treating the exercise of those very freedoms as grounds for suspicion.

None of this is happening in a vacuum. Europe is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War (the Commission’s ReArm Europe plan alone aims to mobilise up to €800 billion) while standing by Israel through the destruction of Gaza. A state preparing for war needs a quiet home front. Those who object, to genocide abroad or to paying for rearmament with cuts at home, have to be recast as foreign agents or fifth columnists.

What counts as “hatred of Israel”? Who decides when fighting discrimination becomes “instrumentalising” it? When does criticism of EU foreign policy become foreign interference? And how many connections does it take before a journalist, academic or activist is branded a security threat?

These are not abstract questions for those of us already living with the consequences. The EU’s authoritarian turn exposes the limits of its professed liberal values, where freedom of expression and political participation are celebrated until they challenge the interests of capital and the states that serve it. Liberal democracies have always kept a second rulebook in the drawer, for strikers, communists and the colonised.

What began as a campaign against foreign interference is increasingly being turned against dissent at home, with Muslims and critics of Israel, already among the most marginalised and harassed people in Europe, first in the firing line. But they won’t be the last. Trade unionists, climate activists and anyone who stands in the way of the war economy should take note.

While Europe’s political establishment continues to congratulate itself on defending democracy, the machinery for silencing its opponents is being built in plain sight.

Original article:  braveneweurope.com

 

France’s unrest has brought a European debate over political Islam into sharper focus. As the French authorities investigate arson, looting and attacks on public buildings, attention has also turned to organisations supporting the demonstrations and their alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Those concerns intersect with a European Parliament resolution adopted on October 8th calling for a coordinated response to what MEPs describe as “Islamist entryism”. The connection concerns overlapping organisations and questions of influence, not an established explanation for the violence.

The chronology matters. Parliament adopted its resolution nine days before the October 17th violence described in France. The vote was therefore not a response to those events. It reflected an existing concern among a parliamentary majority that Islamist networks could use associations, educational initiatives and institutional partnerships to build political influence within Europe.

Tabled by the European People’s Party, the resolution passed by 381 votes to 167, with 15 abstentions. It calls for closer scrutiny of EU funding, stronger checks on institutional partnerships and an assessment of whether individuals or entities linked to the Muslim Brotherhood meet the legal criteria for inclusion on the EU terrorist list.

FEMYSO connects the two debates

The clearest organisational overlap is the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations, or FEMYSO. On October 9th, the organisation publicly supported students demonstrating in France and Belgium, calling for better educational conditions, adequate funding and protection of peaceful assembly. Its statement framed the mobilisation as a campaign over education and fundamental rights.

FEMYSO also features explicitly in Parliament’s resolution. MEPs criticised its invitation to the European Parliament on September 21st by members of The Left and the Greens. They called for organisations they associate with the Council of European Muslims, including FEMYSO, to be denied access to EU institutions, removed from the EU Transparency Register and excluded from institutional events where participation could legitimise alleged Brotherhood-linked influence strategies. These are Parliament’s assessments and demands, rather than judicial findings.

In France, the Washington Examiner has reported that Étudiants Musulmans de France, or EMF, repeatedly promoted the demonstrations through social media. The newspaper describes EMF as a FEMYSO member and reports allegations of Muslim Brotherhood connections, which EMF denies. Its reporting places the organisation within the debate over mobilisation and ideological influence.

What Parliament wants Brussels to examine

The resolution’s significance lies partly in its focus on networks rather than formal membership alone. Parliament argues that political influence can operate through recurring partnerships, opaque financing, associated organisations and structures reconstituted under new names. It wants a common European methodology for identifying such patterns, rather than relying solely on whether an organisation formally declares an affiliation.

For the European Commission, the principal requests concern money and transparency. MEPs want an overview of EU funds awarded to people or entities suspected of Brotherhood or political-Islam links, alongside greater traceability through funding chains and stronger checks on partners and beneficiaries. Parliament also calls for scrutiny of foreign funding and transnational partnerships, particularly those involving actors linked to Qatar or Türkiye.

Those requests must be distinguished from decisions already taken. The non-binding resolution does not itself ban the Muslim Brotherhood, designate FEMYSO as a terrorist organisation or automatically withdraw funding. It asks the Council to assess possible terrorist listings under the applicable legal criteria and urges the Commission to use existing financial safeguards. Further action would require separate institutional decisions.

France’s policing failures remain a separate issue

The European debate does not remove the French government’s responsibility to explain its handling of the unrest. Reuters reports that Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu acknowledged intelligence and deployment failures, while Interior Minister Laurent Nunez also accepted a share of responsibility. Authorities have assigned 200 investigators to identify those involved in the violence, and parliament is establishing an inquiry into the disorder.

Nor does scrutiny of ideological networks resolve the grievances behind peaceful mobilisation. Student demands over educational conditions and public funding remain substantive political questions. Treating all demonstrators as participants in an Islamist project would obscure the diversity of the movement and make it harder to distinguish legitimate advocacy from attempts at political exploitation.

Parliament’s own resolution draws an important boundary: it states that Islam must not be equated with political Islamism and that protecting Muslim citizens from discrimination is a democratic obligation. That distinction should guide any investigation of organisations, funding or institutional access. Scrutiny must concern identifiable conduct and demonstrable relationships, not religious identity.

A test of evidence and institutional judgment

France’s unrest and Parliament’s vote meet at a question of accountability: how should democratic institutions examine organisations seeking influence within legitimate social movements, and what evidence should justify restrictions on funding or access?

The answer cannot rest on association alone. Investigators must establish who committed or directed violence; EU institutions must examine funding and partnerships against clear legal standards; and governments must address the public-service grievances that brought peaceful demonstrators onto the streets.

The October 8th vote gives political weight to closer European scrutiny of alleged Brotherhood-linked networks. France’s unrest makes careful scrutiny more urgent—but also makes precision more important. A credible response must distinguish political advocacy from covert influence, and both from criminal responsibility.

Main Image: Genevieve ENGEL © European Union 2018 – Source : EP

The first state to be ruled by Al Qaeda might not be in Afghanistan or the Arab world—and its ruler might be a former whiskey-drinking rock star. In April, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims ("JNIM" in Arabic) led an uprising in the African nation of Mali, killing Defense Minister Sadio Camara, breaking open a prison holding thousands of inmates, and besieging Bamako, the capital. The fighting was still underway as of August.

Mali is not the only place threatened by a JNIM takeover. The West African branch of Al Qaeda is active in a belt of countries known as the Sahel. Its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was the former percussionist for the rock band Tinariwen. He now leads a campaign to stamp out the "music of Satan." Perhaps the one saving grace for Sahelian metalheads is that puritans can't get along with each other: The JNIM is locked in a war with the rival Islamic State Sahel Province.

The Sahelian civil wars are a testament to the failure of the global war on terror. Despite spending $355 billion on African counterterrorism from 2001 to 2021, the U.S. government has been unable to stop Al Qaeda or related Islamist groups from taking root across the continent. A study by the Pentagon's Africa Center for Strategic Studies found a 101,300 percent increase in terrorism fatalities from 2002 to 2022, mostly concentrated in the Sahel and Somalia.

These wars demonstrate that the solution to terrorism isn't maximum violence. President Donald Trump launched four times as many airstrikes against Somalia in his first 18 months of his second term as the U.S. did over the past four years combined. U.S. military aid has flowed to repressive governments across Africa with little respect for their citizens' rights. Since 2020, there have been coups d'etat across the Sahel by military men promising that they can do the dirty work that civilian leaders are afraid of. Many of them were trained by the U.S. government. The new regimes have imported Russian mercenaries with a reputation for brutality and no real restraints on their activities.

"People need to forget about the question of democracy," Ibrahim Traoré, leader of Burkina Faso, declared in April.

Instead of restoring order, these heavy-handed tactics have caused more chaos. The military juntas in the Sahel are plainly losing to the JNIM. While the Russian fighters have no difficulties massacring civilians or mutilating prisoners, they have found it much harder to face people who can actually shoot back, facing repeated battlefield humiliations. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led campaign against al-Shabab, the Somali branch of Al Qaeda, has stalled out despite the heavier use of airpower.

The African war on terror began shortly after the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. To some extent, the U.S. created the very threats that it is trying to fight in Africa. Somalia had been at civil war since the fall of socialism, and in the early 2000s, the CIA began funding Somali warlords to stop the rise of Islamist revolutionaries. The (relatively moderate) Islamic Courts Union took over anyway in 2006—uniting Somalia for the first time in more than a decade—and the U.S. encouraged neighboring Ethiopia to invade. When al-Shabab emerged to fight the Ethiopian invaders, the U.S. tapped a former leader of the Islamic Courts Union to lead a new Somali government.

Soon after the Ethiopian-Somali war, President George W. Bush created the Pentagon's Africa Command, and Congress budgeted $500 million in aid to militaries in the Sahara Desert and the Sahel. At the time, the main Islamist threat to that region was a mostly defeated insurgency in Algeria.

But the Libyan civil war in 2011 created terrible new monsters. Soon after President Barack Obama intervened in support of the Libyan revolution, weapons and hardened fighters from Libya flooded the ethnic Tuareg region of Mali, which declared independence a few months later. Soon after, Al Qaeda and its affiliates took over the Tuareg rebellion. With the Malian government coming close to collapse, France intervened in January 2013 and made many of the same mistakes that the U.S. did in its own war on terror.

Ag Ghali, the current leader of the JNIM, got his start as a Tuareg nationalist. A leaked U.S. embassy cable from 2008 called him a "proverbial bad penny" who enjoyed "playing both sides" and had ties to Islamist and secular nationalist rebels. By the time of the French intervention, he was fully committed to Islamic theocracy. In 2017, he united Islamist rebels across the Sahel under the banner of Al Qaeda. That same year, four U.S. Special Forces troops were killed in Niger by the Islamic State group, which was busy uniting Ag Ghali's rivals.

Despite the failures of the Sahelian governments to stop Ag Ghali—and their willingness to ally with Russia—the Trump administration is eager to double down on supporting them. The U.S. government increased intelligence sharing with Mali in 2025, and as of July it was considering a direct military intervention against the JNIM, according to The Washington Post. But every American escalation on the continent has produced the enemy that the next one had to fight.

The post America Is Spending Billions To Fight the War on Terror in Africa. The Terrorists Are Winning. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The president contended that Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, a Muslim, would “invite hordes of jihadis to our shores” as he sought to bolster the G.O.P. candidate in a tight Senate race.

© Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times