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Senate Democrats warn that the Trump administration is hiding a damning surveillance report

Happy Tuesday! Here’s your Tuesday Tech Drop, the past week’s top stories from the intersection of technology and politics.

Dems want damning surveillance report

A pair of Democratic senators are accusing President Donald Trump’s administration of hiding a report that “details serious abuses of Americans’ rights under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” Sens. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and Adam Schiff, D-Calif., are trying to pry loose a report they say the administration is legally required to make public after a FISA court opinion detailed abuses of the program in March.

Since retaking office, Trump has expanded the federal government’s arsenal of creepy surveillance tools en route to building what appears to be an unprecedented spy machine that can track Americans. It’s in that context that Democrats — with some GOP help — tanked a vote in June that would have extended the controversial FISA powers that give the government broad latitude to sweep up data, including information belonging to Americans.

In a letter to Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton and Attorney General Todd Blanche, the two Senate Democrats said the damning FISA report from on alleged surveillance abuses should have been released already — and demanded that it be released now so lawmakers can consider whether to extend FISA powers next year.

They wrote:

The administration has now had over seven months to declassify and release this opinion. It is time to stop violating the law and finally release this opinion. And if this administration won’t follow this simple statutory directive, it is unclear why Congress or the American people should trust this administration to follow any of the other legal limits to Section 702.

Read more at Gizmodo.

AI bots’ banking break-ins

Artificial intelligence bots are increasingly gaining unauthorized access to people’s bank accounts, according to new reporting from Axios. The report homes in on concerns among bank officials about security in the age of AI.

Read more at Axios.

Massive Meta judgment

A judge ordered Meta to pay $25 billion after the company lost a lawsuit alleging that the company broke New Mexico’s consumer protection laws and jeopardized its users after the Cambridge Analytica scandal nearly a decade ago. Meta has vowed to appeal the ruling.

Read more at MS NOW.

Republican outcry over Colom ad

After Mississippi’s Republican attorney general issued legal threats last week, the state’s Democratic Senate nominee, Scott Colom, deleted an ad using AI tools to mock his Republican opponent, Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith. I wrote about how it seems like Republicans are fretting over this race in a deep-red state.

Read more at MS NOW.

Pro-ICE activist reportedly faces deportation

Samuel Sey, a popular right-wing influencer known for supporting Trump’s racist anti-immigrant crackdown, reportedly has been detained by immigration officials and is now facing deportation after allegedly overstaying a temporary visa.

Read more at The Roys Report.

What AI guidelines?

The good news is the Pentagon apparently has some guidelines around the development of AI tools to avoid the risk of escalating wars or harming civilians and troops. The bad news? Defense officials aren’t always adhering to these rules, according to a congressional report.

Read more at NPR.

Anthropic bots get alarming access

Anthropic says its AI tool accessed Georgia voting data typically only available to people who pay for it. The company and Georgia’s secretary of state said no individual voter records were accessed, but the intrusion marks yet another disturbing security breach involving AI. A new report explains why “the company’s statements about what its bot accessed raise more questions.”

Read more at The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

Alpha School shortcomings

An investigation from The New York Times suggests that Alpha School, the network of AI-fueled private schools that have been backed by the Trump administration and vow to offer a superior learning experience, is failing to live up to its promises.

Read more at The New York Times.

MAGA influencer meddling fails

Several MAGA influencers have recently been in Brazil and Serbia, hoping to sway elections in both countries — but the pro-authoritarian candidates they supported flamed out over the weekend. Now, especially when it comes to Brazil, Trump and a bunch of extremely online conservatives are pushing lies about the election being rigged, as my colleague Brandy Zydrozny explained.

Read more at MS NOW.

The post Senate Democrats warn that the Trump administration is hiding a damning surveillance report appeared first on MS NOW.

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Why Putin Demands Donbas: The Territorial Ultimatum That Could Shape Ukraine’s Next War

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

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Libya's maritime deal: Why Haftar is turning towards Turkey

Tripoli, Libya - Six years ago, Libya’s Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously rejected the 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tripoli and Ankara.

Under Resolution No. 6/2020, the House severed political ties with Turkey and accused the former prime minister, foreign minister, and interior minister of high treason, referring them to the Attorney General.

Yet on 20 October 2026, the eastern-based HoR abruptly reversed its position, unanimously approving the maritime deal.

Parliament did not ratify the accompanying security pact, nor did it repeal the 2020 treason referrals - leaving it unclear if the Attorney General will act on a dormant mandate while the accused officials live openly in Tripoli.

The 2019 Istanbul agreements were born of an existential crisis for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). As Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) advanced within 10 kilometres of the capital, Ankara provided a vital military lifeline at a heavy political price.

The package comprised two parallel instruments: a security pact deploying drones and mercenaries to rout the LNA, and a maritime MoU securing Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean ambitions.

Both pacts sparked immediate outrage, with critics arguing a besieged GNA could not bargain freely. One Libyan border expert, who wished to remain anonymous, told The New Arab that the arrangement was a clear “case of blackmail” of a desperate government.

Others, however, reject that description. Mohamed Taher Siala, Libya’s foreign minister at the time and one of the agreement’s signatories, told The New Arab that criticism of the deal would only be fair “if it fails to serve the [Libya] country's national interests”.

In his view, Tripoli conceded nothing to Ankara. Instead, it secured a substantial expansion of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), unlocking vital offshore oil and gas reserves.

That perspective is shared by Baghdadi Saleh, a retired Libyan border expert, who verified that the maritime MoU does not deprive Libya of a single square meter of territory. Speaking to The New Arab, Saleh noted that the deal effectively “does not infringe” on Libya’s rights.

Yet, despite these potential territorial gains, the circumstances of 2019 have rendered both MoUs deeply controversial. Besides the HoR’s rejection, regional countries including Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus rejected the maritime boundaries as a direct violation of their own rights, while the European Union declared the deal legally null and void.

This history makes the HoR’s ratification of the deal all the more striking, raising the central question: what has changed in 2026 to make former adversaries embrace an agreement they once condemned as high treason?

Haftar's shift towards Turkey

Between 2019 and 2026, two developments help explain the HoR’s reversal. The first is the change in its leadership, with Al-Salhin Abdulnabi replacing Aguila Saleh, who had occupied the speakership since 2014.

The second, and likely the most important, is the recent pragmatic rapprochement between Haftar’s camp and Turkey.

Seven years after the military conflict, the former adversaries are moving closer. Ankara has consolidated its position in western Libya while increasingly engaging with Saddam Haftar, who is not only deputy to his father but also hoping to become president of Libya one day. Closer relations with Ankara could certainly serve his ambitions.

For Khalifa Haftar, meanwhile, cultivating ties with Turkey offers a way to advance his family’s political influence, even if his own long-standing ambition of governing Libya remains unrealised.

The 2019–2020 LNA military campaign on Tripoli was accompanied by a bitter war of words that makes today’s rapprochement all the more striking.

At the time, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan branded Haftar a “putschist,” while Haftar denounced Turkey as an occupying power and called for mobilisation against a “Turkish invasion”.

Egypt, meanwhile, backed Haftar fully. In June 2020, as Turkish-backed forces advanced toward Sirte, President Sisi declared the city a “red line” and threatened direct military intervention - a move publicly backed by then-HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh.

This confrontation went far beyond maritime boundaries, with Ankara and Cairo backing opposing camps and raising the spectre of a wider regional conflict.

Regional tensions

Reactions to the HoR’s reversal came quickly, led by Greece and Egypt, which rejected not only the agreement but also the legal effect of its ratification.

The Greek Foreign Minister declared that “the memorandum will not be implemented under any circumstances” because “it is illegal.” Cairo stated that the ratification had no “legal consequences for Egypt”.

The European Union followed, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa reiterating the bloc’s opposition and expressing solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

Meanwhile, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, issued a further statement reiterating the EU’s rejection. Israel also strongly condemned the ratification while accusing Ankara of destabilising the region.

Washington’s response was more restrained. On 22 October, a US State Department spokesperson urged all parties to resolve maritime disputes through negotiations. Greece briefed the UN Security Council on the matter.

The controversy surrounding Turkey’s footprint in Libya is not confined to high-level diplomatic calculations or military bases - it extends directly into daily life in the capital.

In Tripoli’s Zawiyat al-Dahmani neighbourhood, the Turkish Embassy’s long-standing closure of a primary public road has become a persistent local grievance.

Security roadblocks have exacerbated the city’s severe traffic congestion, disrupting local businesses and often obstructing emergency access to the nearby Eye Hospital. The Turkish Embassy was contacted for comment, but no response was received by the time of publication.

The dispute serves as a local microcosm of the broader friction defining the Turkey–Libya relationship: a dynamic where foreign security arrangements regularly override public accountability and everyday Libyan rights.

Maritime ambitions, uncertain returns

In August 2022, then-Oil and Gas Minister Mohamed Aoun expressed approval of the deal, saying it gave Libya access to “vast maritime areas”.

His point is echoed by pro-Haftar commentator Ahmed Alhossein, who told The New Arab that the MoU should be viewed positively “as long as it secures Libya’s interests”.

But for other analysts, the main question is whether Libya is actually ready to exploit this vast maritime area.

Since 2011, the country has been struggling to manage and develop even its less costly onshore oil production and its existing infrastructure, let alone attract the huge investment needed for offshore exploration in disputed waters.

In the politically unstable country, violence could erupt at any moment and “oil production is regularly interrupted and sometimes stopped for months”, the Libyan border expert told The New Arab.

Major oil potential partners are unlikely to commit millions of dollars to contested offshore areas in this environment of instability.

The agreement has also put Libya at odds with Greece and Cyprus, backed by the European Union. The dispute could ultimately end up being decided through international legal proceedings, which are often lengthy, adding further uncertainty for investors.

Many Libyans argue that their country, already deeply weakened, needs fewer disputes, not more, particularly with its immediate neighbours and trading partners such as the EU.

Any potential gains from offshore resources must be weighed against the diplomatic, legal, and investment risks the agreement could create.

The question is not simply what Libya might gain, but whether those potential benefits will outweigh the problems the agreement could bring.

Mustafa Fetouri is an award-winning Libyan journalist, columnist, author, and translator, with contributions to major outlets like Middle East Monitor, Al-Monitor, and Washington Report, and a focus on North Africa and the Sahel region

Follow him on X: @MFetouri

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

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Today, we hand over the newsletter to you, our readers


This is the Oct. 27, 2026 edition of “The Tea, Spilled by Morning Joe” newsletter. Subscribe here to get it delivered straight to your inbox Monday through Friday.

Hello, “Morning Joe” family!

We love hearing from you. Here’s what was on your mind this week. As always, you can write to us anytime.

CALLING THE MORNING JOE FAMILY: MIDTERMS MAILBAG

On Election Day, the “Morning Joe” family will answer reader questions about the midterms in the newsletter. Do you have a question to ask? Send it to us here.

LETTERS FROM OUR READERS

I don’t have a question, just a comment. I enjoy watching “Morning Joe” when I get the chance. I have been experiencing some health issues. The Morning Tea gives me a chance to catch up. I’m not always able to get to my computer, so that is why I fall behind. Oh one more thing … Go Brewers!!

—Joe W., Weston, Wis.

No question — just thanks for the wonderful interview with Amy Acton and recap in The Tea. Ad was as low as it could go — a disgrace … I hope Amy succeeds.

— Georgie H., N.J.

I see a lot of similarities between Trump brushing aside the notion that the ad against Amy Acton crosses a line and the seemingly callous way in which Michael Dukakis answered the debate question about why he would still be against the death penalty even if his wife were brutally raped. Not to say those things are on par, but do you think the complete lack of empathy for a child rape victim will stick to Trump and become a major part of his legacy the way the debate response sunk Dukakis?

— Wendy B., Fort Wayne, Ind.

I don’t generally agree with judging people by what group they identify with, but it’s hard not to judge the Republican Party as more corrupt, lying, and hateful than I’ve seen in my life and I’m an old man. Can we the people sue these politicians for lying about us in these ridiculous campaign ads and then doubling down when proved wrong? Are we so far gone in this country that defamation lies can never be prosecuted? Of course even if prosecuted they will bankrupt us through the process and that may even be their plan … all of course with impunity.

— Keith M., Stamford, Conn.

My daughter who is a senior in college asked me yesterday: Why isn’t Election Day a national holiday? Wouldn’t that make it more likely for more people to vote? They could even make it a holiday every other year; midterms and presidential election years. Could alternate that day off with Columbus Day, almost make it a floating holiday. Israel has it this way, where everyone is off that day.

— Matt R., Arlington Heights, Ill.

One week to Election Day. Wow. I’m finding I’m getting more and more excited with each day that passes. I feel I should be feeling more and more anxious, but I’m not.

— Scott, an MS NOW Member

Not a question honestly, but a huge thank you for all of your insight and knowledge. It is what gets me through this nightmare. I so enjoy you ALL! Thank you!

— Cyndi M., Kennebunkport, Maine

[And a happy early birthday to Cyndi!]

The post Today, we hand over the newsletter to you, our readers appeared first on MS NOW.

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Israeli media analysis: 2 Paths to War With Iran Loom Over Israel’s Election

Behind the scenes, Netayahu has been waging a fight against Israel’s defense establishment & the US administration. He recently made a huge effort to reignite the war with Iran, which sparked a direct clash with the Israel Defense Forces' top brass… If Netanyahu's opponents win they must make it clear that they won't allow the outgoing government to embark on any last-minute military adventures and embroil the country in more wars before a well-thought-out strategy has been developed…

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The high-stakes Montana court race flying under the radar

This is an adapted excerpt from the Oct. 24 episode of “Connect with Jacob Soboroff.”

With just days until Election Day, the truism “all politics is local” feels especially relevant this year. Some of voters’ most consequential choices will be the bubbles they fill in for statewide ballot measures and local races. These contests will have a direct effect on their communities — like in Montana, where a highly consequential race has been flying somewhat under the radar.

On Nov. 3, voters there will choose a justice for their state Supreme Court. Two district judges are running: Amy Eddy and Dan Wilson. While the race is officially nonpartisan, Eddy is generally viewed as liberal-leaning, backed by labor unions and conservation groups. Wilson is generally viewed as conservative-leaning, backed by the Montana Republican Party.

The Associated Press says the fight over this court “ranks among the most intense” of the nearly two dozen states also electing justices this fall. Millions of dollars are being spent to win this one seat.

Montanans are trying to fight dark money in politics once again.

Montana’s Supreme Court currently leans liberal, 4-3, but if Wilson wins, that majority flips. In just the past several years, Montana’s Supreme Court has issued major rulings protecting legislation around climate, reproductive rights and democracy.

On climate, the court ruled 6-1 in 2023 in favor of 16 young people who sued the state, arguing that its promotion of fossil fuels violated their right to a clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution. It was the first ruling of its kind in the country.

On abortion, Montana’s Supreme Court responded to the Dobbs decision by turning to its own state constitution to expand abortion access. That’s the power of state courts: They can protect certain rights even when the federal courts no longer guarantee them.

On voting, in 2024 a 4-3 ruling from the court struck down four voter suppression laws, including one that would have ended Election Day registration. The court held that those laws impermissibly interfered with the right to vote. It noted, “The record shows that more than 70,000 Montanans have utilized election day registration to vote since 2005 and that many electors would be disenfranchised without the availability of election day registration.”

Republicans in the state didn’t love those decisions, which is probably why there’s so much attention and money going into this race.

To be clear, the money flows from both sides. According to the Brennan Center, two political action committees — Montanans for Freedom and Responsibility and Justice Watch — have spent a combined $1.8 million on ads against Wilson. And the PAC More Jobs, Less Government has spent about $460,000 on television ads against Eddy.

According to the Google Ads Transparency Center, another PAC targeting Eddy is the First Principles PAC, which is linked to none other than Leonard Leo. At least one anti-Eddy ad funded by First Principles PAC can be found on YouTube.

Leo, a right-wing money man and longtime Federalist Society chairman, is the same man who helped handpick the conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court. Leo’s network has been involved in state court races across the country.

Now, you may be asking: Why is this particular state race so important to Leo, who doesn’t live anywhere near Montana?

Just consider those decisions noted above. Montana is the fifth-largest coal-producing state in the country, and its court handed down the nation’s first constitutional climate ruling. On abortion, Montana’s state constitution continues to protect access after Dobbs. Meanwhile, Leo’s network has poured millions into anti-abortion groups pushing for bans all over the country.

If this story feels like déjà vu, it’s because we’ve seen a version of it. In Wisconsin last year, more than $100 million from both sides of the aisle was spent on a single state Supreme Court seat, a national record. Elon Musk spent at least $20 million on the candidate backed by Republicans. He tried to promise $1 million checks to those who voted. The liberal candidate won anyway, by about 10 points.

But here’s some fun history: Montana has, in fact, lived through this before. In the early 1900s, wealthy industrialists known as the Copper Kings bought legislators, judges and even a U.S. Senate seat.

In 1912, Montana voters fought back through a ballot initiative, banning corporate spending in elections outright. That law stood for a century until 2012, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down, citing Citizens United.

Now Montanans are trying to fight dark money in politics once again. On the ballot this year is a measure that would bar corporations, unions and dark money nonprofits from spending on elections in the state, which President Donald Trump won by almost 20 points.

The Montana Chamber of Commerce sued to keep the measure off the ballot and lost. The state Republican Party, of course, opposes it. But former Republican Gov. Marc Racicot supports it, calling the measure a “brilliant idea.” He added, “If we get this done, it’s going to spill over and be an example for every other state in the nation.”

Here’s where we come full circle. The ballot measure would target exactly the kind of money that funds most PACs: anonymous dollars routed through nonprofits. And if the measure passes, expect a legal fight, one that could land before the Montana Supreme Court — the very court Leo’s PAC is spending money to flip.

This November, Montana voters will answer two consequential questions on a single ballot: who sits on their highest court and whether corporations get to keep spending money to influence their elections.

That’s why you should never overlook these downballot races. The billionaires writing those checks in back rooms aren’t just trying to shape outcomes in Washington, D.C., they’re working to extend their influence all the way down to your state government and local communities.

Allison Detzel contributed.

The post The high-stakes Montana court race flying under the radar appeared first on MS NOW.

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The Memo: El-Sayed allies argue Trump’s anti-Muslim attacks will backfire

President Trump is intensifying his anti-Muslim attacks on Abdul El-Sayed in the final stretch of campaigning before Election Day. At a Sunday rally in Michigan, Trump unleashed a volley of Islamophobic comments against El-Sayed, the Democratic nominee who is seeking to become the first Muslim senator in history. Trump said El-Sayed is “on the side…

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