This year’s midterms have dovetailed with the moment experts have been warning about for years: when generative artificial intelligence makes content that looks real enough to fool people, is accessible to almost everyone and can be deployed at massive scale.
Political action committees and campaigns spent well over $100 million on fake ads to influence federal, state and local elections this year. Fake pollsters used AI to make up shops and reports overnight. And political-attack websites disguised as nonprofit think tanks swayed local elections. I wrote in September about the Local Government Accountability Institute, a fake research organization that used AI to spin up fake studies and papers as well as attack videos and ads targeting two Sarasota County commissioners in Florida.
This kind of “slopaganda” — which researchers define as unwanted AI-generated content spread in order to manipulate beliefs to achieve political ends — is everywhere.
A Russian disinformation campaign doctored celebrity videos to mock Democrats and urge social media users to vote Republican. A Republican running for a county judge seat in Texas shared an AI-generated video depicting Black voters expressing support for his campaign. In Wisconsin a Republican U.S. representative running for re-election prompted Grok for a video of his opponent ordering “peasants” to vote for her. President Donald Trump has depicted himself as Jesus, the pope and the Green Lantern.
Slop was used by campaigns big and small this year, almost exclusively in support of right-wing candidates. Slopaganda is affordable and so easy to produce that anyone with a basic understanding of the internet can deploy it with minimal effort.
So I did.
With an afternoon to spare, a few prompts to ChatGPT and Claude and Grok, and a $14 charge to the company card, I created a website for the Generative Research Institute for Truth (or GRIFT). I wanted to show how easy it would be to launch a fake political organization like LGAI, and convince the algorithms — and, if I wanted to take it further, the voters — that my slopaganda was legit.
The site features a mission statement, an advisory council, research papers full of statistics and even an award section, all created by AI. I announced the organization on Substack and Facebook pages I set up, and had Grok create videos using my likeness to advertise. The GRIFT was on, and my slopaganda campaign was more successful than it had any business being.
Watch “SLOPAGANDA!” the second episode of “The Deep End with Brandy Zadrozny” on YouTube and at MS NOW.
The post ‘Slopaganda’ has taken over the midterms appeared first on MS NOW.
Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.
Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.
The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.
Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.
Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.
The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.
There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.
Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.
Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.
For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.
The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.
Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.
That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.
But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.
The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.
As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.
Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.
The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.
The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.
Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.
The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.
However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.
A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.
Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.
Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.
The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.
If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.
Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.
The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.
For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.
The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.
Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.
Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.
Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.
The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.
The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.
But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.
The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.
Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.
These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.
Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.
China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.
Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.
The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.
But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.
For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.
For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.
Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.
Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.
The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.
Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.
The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.
But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.
For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.
A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.
On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.
The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.
Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.
According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.
Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.
More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.
The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.
Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.
Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.
Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.
A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.
The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.
European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.
On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.
The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.
Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.
The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.
These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.
Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.
Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.
The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.
Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.
The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.
American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.
European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.
If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.
European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.
More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.
The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.
No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.
Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.
As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.
Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.
But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.
It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.
The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.
Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.
Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.
Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.
Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.
The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.
Its precise contents have not yet been announced.
A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.
Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.
Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.
Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.
A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.
Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.
The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.
It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.
The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.
The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.
American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.
The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.
The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.
The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.
The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.
Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.
He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.
His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.
Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.
The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.
If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.
Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.
One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.
There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.
But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.
Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.
Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.
The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.
The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.
Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.
European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.
German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.
These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.
The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.
There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.
Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.
A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.
For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.
Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.
That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.
The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.
It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.
NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.
They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.
Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.
Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.
The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.
What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.
The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.
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