The foreign ministry of El Salvador said on Wednesday that over 2,000 troops will be dispatched to Haiti to support ongoing U.N. anti-gang operations and rescue four missing Salvadoran aircraft technicians.
The post El Salvador Pledges 2,000 Troops to Restore Order in Haiti appeared first on Breitbart.
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) reported that no presidential ticket has yet completed formal registration, a step the Electoral Code requires to be done in person. Voters will fill 582 public posts, including the presidency, 60 Legislative Assembly seats, and 44 municipal councils, with mayoralties, municipal trustee offices and council seats also on the ballot.
RELATED: El Salvador Sets Feb. 28, 2027 Date For General Elections
Nuevas Ideas party (New Ideas) has put forward Nayib Bukele and Félix Ulloa for reelection as president and vice president. On the other hand, the FMLN party ticket would pair physician and union leader Rafael Aguirre with nurse Madaí Santos. According to media reports, Arena party would run lawyer Mayteé Iraheta for head of state and agricultural engineer Verónica Henríquez for vice president. Meanwhile, the PCN internally chose General Alirio García Flamenco and former San José Guayabal mayor Mauricio Vilanova, pending formal ratification.
Six other parties will not field presidential tickets: Fuerza Solidaria, Democracia Salvadoreña and PAÍS opted against nominating a ticket; PDC and GANA backed Bukele’s reelection project; and Vamos withdrew, arguing that the current officeholder’s continuity violates the Constitution.
Bukele and Ulloa ran for reelection in July 2023 despite its unconstitutionality. In August 2025, with full control of Parliament, Nuevas Ideas approved indefinite presidential reelection.
El Tribunal Supremo Electoral de El Salvador convocó oficialmente las elecciones generales para el 28 de febrero de 2027, en una jornada donde más de 6,5 millones de salvadoreños están llamados a votar. ¿Qué está en juego en estos comicios?
— teleSUR TV (@teleSURtv) October 1, 2026
Entra al enlace y conoce los detalles… pic.twitter.com/eHs72zX3oE
The 2027 process will for the first time apply the constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits, opening the way for unlimited consecutive candidacies. The measure was approved in 2025 through an expedited procedure pushed by the ruling Nuevas Ideas bench in the Legislative Assembly, without public consultations. The amendment removed provisions barring consecutive terms, extended the presidential term to six years, eliminated the runoff election and reorganized the institutional calendar to shorten the current term so that presidential, legislative and municipal elections coincide on a single general election day.
Opposition sectors and social organizations rejected it, saying the amendment alters the Constitution’s 1983 principles of alternation in power.
President Nayib Bukele has ordered a troop deployment to Haiti after the disappearance last Sunday of four Salvadoran soldiers in an area controlled by gangs in Port-au-Prince. As of Friday, at least six aircraft — three Salvadoran and three American — have landed in the Haitian capital with around 100 elite members of the international Gang Suppression Force (GSF) coalition, to carry out search-and-rescue operations.
© Patrice Noel (REUTERS)
Within the first two months of the state of emergency in El Salvador imposed by President Nayib Bukele back in 2022, two of Gladis Álvarez’s sons were arrested and accused of being gang associates. Since then, the 53-year-old woman’s life has fallen apart. “There were eight of us in my family. Now, I’m the only one left,” Álvarez laments. “Since my sons were arrested, our lives have been destroyed in a terrible way,” she adds.
© Jose Cabezas (REUTERS)
Bolivia prison project “La Tumba” would isolate high-risk inmates in Santa Cruz, inspired by El Salvador’s controversial CECOT model.
Related: Seven People Killed by Flooding in Santa Cruz, Southern Bolivia
The Bolivia prison project announced by Santa Cruz Governor Juan Pablo Velasco would create a maximum-security facility in the Chaco region, inspired by El Salvador’s controversial Terrorism Confinement Center, known as CECOT.
Velasco said his administration is seeking international financing to build the prison, which would be named “La Tumba”—The Tomb.
The facility would be located in an isolated area of the Chaco cruceño, far from major urban centers, to ensure a strict confinement regime.
According to the governor, the prison would operate with permanent surveillance and severely restricted communication with the outside world. Inmates would be allowed to contact relatives only through authorized video calls.
Velasco presented the proposal as a response to organized crime networks that operate from inside Bolivia’s prisons.
“Prisons turned into offices for organized crime are over,” the governor said. “Dangerous criminals must be isolated from society, not running their businesses from a cell.”
He added that the project would respect rights but end what he described as criminal privileges inside detention centers.
The proposal takes direct inspiration from the CECOT prison built in El Salvador under President Nayib Bukele. That facility was created as part of Bukele’s hard-line security strategy against gangs and organized crime.
CECOT has become a symbol of Bukele’s security policy, but human rights organizations have raised serious concerns about due process, prison conditions and allegations of abuse.
The Santa Cruz governor did not provide details about the cost of the project, the source of financing, the construction timeline or the number of inmates the facility would hold.
The announcement comes amid growing pressure to address crime and violence in Bolivia’s prison system.
Santa Cruz is Bolivia’s most populous department and includes Palmasola, the country’s largest and most conflictive prison.
Bolivia’s Defensoría del Pueblo | United Nations Human Rights Office
The Bolivia prison project is intended to separate inmates considered high-risk from the general prison population.
Velasco argues that the current system allows criminal organizations to continue operating from prison cells. He says the new facility would prevent leaders of criminal networks from directing illegal activities while in detention.
The governor’s proposal is part of a broader security agenda that includes efforts to strengthen police patrols and increase the number of officers on the streets.
The Santa Cruz governorate has also promoted a legislative route to return command authority over the police to the departmental government.
Currently, Bolivia has only one maximum-security prison: Chonchocoro, located in the highland department of La Paz.
Santa Cruz has four main detention centers administered by the General Directorate of the Penitentiary System.
The most important is Palmasola, an urban prison located within the city of Santa Cruz. It houses both men and women and is considered the country’s largest, most populated and most violent detention facility.
Palmasola has been the scene of serious episodes of violence between inmates in previous years.
The proposed prison in the Chaco would seek to decentralize the custody of high-risk detainees and reduce the risks created by locating large prisons near residential areas.
The project would also aim to prevent criminal groups from maintaining control over prison populations.
However, the proposal raises questions about the legal framework, the definition of “high-risk” inmates and the safeguards that would protect due process.
Human rights organizations have warned that maximum-security facilities can become sites of isolation, abuse and lack of transparency if they are not subject to independent monitoring.
The Defensoría del Pueblo has repeatedly warned that Bolivia’s prison system is facing a structural crisis.
The institution reported that the country’s prison population reached 33,058 people in 2025, nearly double the 17,305 inmates recorded in 2020.
The increase has intensified overcrowding, weakened security and reduced access to health services.
Bolivia’s prisons are currently operating at approximately 109 percent of their installed capacity, according to the Defensoría del Pueblo.
More than half of the prison population is being held under pretrial detention, meaning they have not received a final conviction.
The institution has warned that overcrowding, poor nutrition, limited medical care and inadequate security are creating a humanitarian crisis inside the country’s 46 detention centers.
The Defensoría has called for measures to reduce overcrowding, including judicial congestion programs, alternative sentences and legal reforms.
It has also urged the state to guarantee food, medical care and dignified conditions for all people deprived of liberty.
Amnesty International—El Salvador | Human Rights Watch—El Salvador
The Bolivia prison project is inspired by a model that has generated significant controversy in El Salvador and across Latin America.
El Salvador’s CECOT was inaugurated in 2023 as part of President Nayib Bukele’s campaign against gangs. The facility was designed to hold up to 40,000 inmates.
The prison became the centerpiece of a state of exception declared in March 2022. That measure suspended several constitutional protections and expanded police powers to arrest and detain suspected gang members.
El Salvador’s government says the policy has drastically reduced gang violence and restored public security.
The administration argues that the state of exception was necessary to dismantle criminal organizations that had controlled neighborhoods, extorted businesses and committed violent crimes for decades.
Bukele remains highly popular among many Salvadorans who credit his government with improving safety and reducing gang activity.
However, human rights organizations have documented serious concerns about the policy.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported mass arbitrary detentions, lack of due process, mistreatment of detainees and restricted access to legal defense.
Rights groups have also raised concerns about prison conditions at CECOT, including overcrowding, prolonged isolation and limited contact with families and lawyers.
Reports by human rights organizations have alleged that detainees have faced beatings, sexual violence, denial of medical care and incommunicado detention.
The Salvadoran government has rejected those accusations and says its policies respect human rights while protecting citizens from criminal violence.
The debate over the Bukele model has become increasingly influential across Latin America. Several governments have expressed interest in adopting tougher security policies, including mass detention, military deployment and the construction of large prisons.
Supporters argue that the model responds to public demands for security in countries affected by organized crime, extortion and drug trafficking.
Critics warn that it can weaken democratic institutions, criminalize poverty and allow abuses to occur without accountability.
The Bolivia prison project will therefore be closely watched by human rights organizations, legal experts and regional governments.
The proposal could mark a significant shift in Bolivia’s approach to crime and incarceration.
Impulsamos una ruta legislativa para devolver al gobernador facultades de mando sobre la Policía, fortalecer los patrullajes y garantizar más efectivos en nuestras calles. pic.twitter.com/UXKDT0ip18
— Gobernación de Santa Cruz (@GobSantaCruz) October 21, 2026
The Bolivia prison project reflects a broader regional debate over security, democracy and the limits of state power.
Latin American governments have faced growing pressure to respond to organized crime, drug trafficking, extortion and prison violence.
In several countries, public demand for security has strengthened political leaders who promise hard-line measures, including mass arrests, military deployment and the construction of maximum-security prisons.
El Salvador has become the most visible example of that approach. Bukele’s government has used the state of exception to detain tens of thousands of people and build large-scale detention facilities.
The model has gained influence across the region, but it has also raised concerns about the erosion of constitutional protections and judicial independence.
Bolivia’s proposal could place the country within that wider trend. Santa Cruz is a key economic and political region, and its governor has made security a central issue of his administration.
The project could also affect relations between the departmental government and Bolivia’s central authorities.
Prison administration, criminal justice and policing are areas that require coordination between national and subnational governments. Any new prison would need to comply with national law, budget rules and human rights obligations.
The proposal comes at a time when Bolivia’s prison system is already under severe strain. The Defensoría del Pueblo has warned that overcrowding and pretrial detention are weakening the rule of law.
A new maximum-security prison could reduce pressure on existing facilities, but it would not solve the underlying causes of prison overcrowding.
Experts say that reducing pretrial detention, improving judicial efficiency and addressing poverty and inequality are essential to creating a sustainable solution.
The Bolivia prison project will therefore test whether the country can strengthen security while preserving human rights and democratic institutions.
© RODRIGO SURA/EPA
© Fred Ramos for The New York Times
© Fred Ramos for The New York Times
On October 18, 2026, an explosive ambush in Croix-des-Bouquets, Haiti, targeted an armored vehicle with four Salvadoran Air Force aviation technicians attached to the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force.
Forced to evacuate after their vehicle caught fire, the four support personnel were kidnapped by Haitian armed groups operating near the capital.
RELATED: Salvadoran President Bukele Issues Stern Warning to Haitian Gangs
In response, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele announced a military rescue operation led by Task Force Libertad II, threatening an expanded offensive against Haitian gangs if the hostages are not safely returned.
In addition, the government of Haiti stated that it will work in conjunction with the United Nations Gang Suppression Force (GSF) mission to rescue the kidnapped Salvadorans.
While the Haitian government and international bodies coordinate security protocols, Bukele’s unilateral escalation in a foreign country projects his signature “iron-fist” stance against gangs onto the international stage, all with the backing of the United States.
The UN Security Council established the “Gang Suppression Force” that operates in Haiti. Created in October 2023 as the Multinational Security Support Mission following the Haitian government, the international force was reorganized in October 2025 into the Gang Suppression Force.
As of October 2026, the authorized strength of the Gang Suppression Force stands at 5,550 personnel, though deployed uniformed troops numbered 1,563 as of mid-October.
The Gang Suppression Force mandate focuses on assisting the Haitian National Police, protecting critical infrastructure, and restoring order across urban centers controlled by armed coalitions.
The region where the October 18 ambush took place, Croix-des-Bouquets, is controlled by several prominent armed groups. Security evaluations list the Chèn Méchan, Kraze Barye, and 400 Mawozo groups among the primary organizations holding territorial control over the corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to the Dominican border.
Key leaders of these groups, including Vitelhomme Innocent of Kraze Barye and Lanmo Sanjou of 400 Mawozo, are subject to active sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council and the U.S. government.
Data released by the UN indicates that between January and mid-September 2026, Haitian gang-related violence resulted in more than 5,700 deaths and injuries, alongside more than 230 reported kidnappings. Over 1.5 million residents remain internally displaced due to gang territorial expansion.
Foreign workers, international humanitarian staff, and local civilians have consistently been targeted for kidnapping as Haitian criminal groups use hostages for financial leverage or political concessions.
President Bukele addressed the Haitian gang leaders directly, publishing a message written in Haitian Creole on October 21, 2026. Bukele stated that the four technicians were non-combatant technical personnel and warned that current operations were minor compared to potential future actions.
Addressing the gang leadership, Bukele wrote: “We have already finished with the gangs in El Salvador, and we can finish with you too. Return our four compatriots alive and unharmed, and everything will return to how it was before the kidnapping. The decision is in your hands”.
Reactions from official international bodies followed the announcement of the rescue campaign. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, Mike Waltz, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, condemned the ambush and affirmed that international search efforts would continue.
Waltz stated that attacks on international contingents would not compel the Gang Suppression Force to withdraw from its mandate. Simultaneously, Salvadoran Ambassador to the UN Egriselda López formally requested international coordination to secure the location and release of the four kidnapped personnel.
The Haitian government also issued an official response regarding the crisis. In an executive statement, Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé announced that securing the release of the four Salvadoran technicians was an absolute priority for the national administration.
Haiti: According to a statement issued on October 18 by El Salvador’s Armed Forces (@FUERZARMADASV), four Salvadoran aviation technicians from Task Force Libertad II were ambushed by armed gangs while returning to their camp in an armored vehicle. The vehicle was set on fire, but… pic.twitter.com/2R2TCCpkJP
— lequotidien509 in English (@lequotidien509E) October 19, 2026
The diplomatic and institutional responses to the kidnapping of the four Salvadoran technicians highlight the complex interactions between national military initiatives and international peacekeeping frameworks.
At the institutional level, the United Nations operates under structured protocols regarding force security and hostage negotiation. Officials within the UN framework maintain that search and rescue operations must adhere to rules of engagement established for the Gang Suppression Force to prevent operational conflict among contributing member states.
The Haitian government under Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has aligned its public stance with the international mission, declaring the recovery of the personnel a primary national objective.
However, the administrative capacity of the Haitian state remains restricted, as law enforcement agencies depend on foreign logistical, intelligence, and tactical support to operate within gang-controlled corridors like Croix-des-Bouquets.
Diplomatic representatives from key UN Security Council member states, including United States, have reinforced support for the mission while addressing the threats posed by armed groups. Statements issued during Security Council proceedings reaffirmed that attacks against international contingents will not alter the mandate or compel the withdrawal of the Gang Suppression Force.
To the gang bosses terrorizing Haiti, your days of operating with impunity are numbered. The Gang Suppression Force is coming for you. pic.twitter.com/lkkfJLmiO6
— Ambassador Mike Waltz (@USAmbUN) October 19, 2026
The armored vehicle transporting four aviation technicians from the Salvadoran Air Force was ambushed in Croix-des-Bouquets, a commune located near Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. Following the explosion, the four Salvadoran technicians were forced to evacuate the vehicle and were subsequently kidnapped.
Initial search and rescue efforts of the four Salvadorans faced immediate armed resistance. On October 19, a search helicopter dispatched to locate the personnel was targeted by gunfire.
Subsequent joint counter-offensives conducted by the multinational security contingent and the Haitian National Police in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac area resulted in severe clashes, leaving several gang members dead and four multinational security personnel injured.
El Salvador deployed the missing personnel to Haiti as part of its specialized military contingent, known as Task Force Libertad II. El Salvador’s initial military involvement in Haiti began after the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly passed a decree on October 30, 2024.
That measure authorized the deployment of Salvadoran Air Force personnel, including pilots, air mechanics, and medical evacuation units, to support international security operations.
In early 2025, eight aviation technicians arrived in Haiti, followed by an additional 70 military personnel. On September 29, 2026, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly voted to extend the military deployment through October 2027 and expanded the mandate.
The updated legislative mandate lets Salvadoran troops engage beyond medical evacuations, allowing them to deploy personnel based on operational requirements dictated by security needs in the field.
Task Force Libertad II operates under these expanded terms, providing technical aviation logistics, air support maintenance, and operational security inside the country.
The four Salvadoran kidnapped were serving as non-combatant aviation support specialists within Task Force Libertad II. Following days of uncertainty regarding their status, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele made a public statement on October 21, 2026, confirming that the kidnapping was executed by armed gangs from Haiti.
El Salvador prez announces MILITARY OP to rescue hostages kidnapped by gangs in Haiti
— RT (@RT_com) October 21, 2026
Aviation technicians 'kidnapped in a cowardly manner' — Bukele
'Today's attack is NOTHING compared to what is coming if we do not get all 4 hostages back alive' pic.twitter.com/7WkyhLvuoQ
President Nayib Bukele’s public declaration led El Salvador to escalate its physical military presence in Haiti. On October 22, 2026, the Salvadoran government deployed 100 special forces soldiers to Port-au-Prince to assist in locating and securing the release of the four missing aviation technicians.
This deployment brought additional tactical ground units to support the existing aviation support unit attached to Task Force Libertad II.
Before October 2026, the Salvadoran contingent operated primarily as an air support unit focused on logistics, maintenance, and medical evacuations. The introduction of dedicated special operations personnel expands the operational parameters of the mission, introducing direct combat and search-and-recovery capabilities alongside the Gang Suppression Force and the Haitian National Police.
The deployment of specialized personnel aims to mitigate these conditions through targeted intelligence collection and rapid-response capabilities.
While the deployment of specialized tactical units and the escalated military posture by El Salvador aim to address the immediate security emergency, long-term stabilization in Haiti depends on addressing broader structural issues.
The proliferation of heavy weaponry, sustained by international trafficking routes, continues to provide armed groups with substantial tactical capacity within urban sectors.
Furthermore, long-standing economic instability, institutional fragmentation, and high rates of poverty create conditions that enable armed organizations to maintain territorial influence despite international security deployments.
Military rescue missions and tactical escalations provide targeted responses to specific security threats, such as the kidnapping of Task Force Libertad II personnel.
However, international observers and analysts emphasize that sustainable security across Port-au-Prince and surrounding communes requires comprehensive institutional reform, economic development, and consistent administrative governance alongside law enforcement actions.
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has launched a military rescue operation in Haiti following the abduction of four Salvadoran soldiers by local armed groups. In a stern statement on Wednesday, Bukele demanded the immediate, safe release of the personnel and warned of a severe… pic.twitter.com/QIQS18JGso
— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 22, 2026
Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – DW – BBC – CNN – La Prensa Gráfica – elsalvador.com – EFE – El Diario de Hoy – RSF – El Faro – presidencia.gov.sv – Asociación de Periodistas de El Salvador – Dialnet – Resumen Latinoamericano.
The Donald Trump administration has done with Ukrainians and Sudanese this week what it did last month with Salvadorans: it has not terminated Temporary Protected Status (TPS), but it has not renewed it either. The program that provides legal immigration status to 101,000 Ukrainians and 1,800 Sudanese citizens was set to expire on Monday, but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has declined to comment, which for now leaves them protected from deportation.
© Kevin Lamarque (REUTERS)
Celia Salmerón had never voted for a Republican candidate. Not until 2024. Then, in the presidential election, she became one of many Latino voters who believed Donald Trump when he promised at every rally that he would deport all criminals and improve the economy. Two years after giving him her support, Salmerón — like so many other Hispanic voters — regrets her decision and says she will vote for the Democratic Party in the midterm elections on November 3. “For everything he’s doing to poor people, for separating parents from their children,” she says as she inserts hair extensions.
© David McNew (Getty Images)
In late August, President Donald Trump's administration carried out its first deportation flight to Haiti since the Supreme Court allowed it to end temporary protected status (TPS) for the embattled country in June. "There are no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals…from returning in safety," the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claimed in its TPS revocation, describing a country the State Department warns Americans not to visit "for any reason."
The Trump administration has eroded America's humanitarian avenues, including TPS, which shields migrants from deportation. As a result, many noncitizens may become undocumented and could be forced to return to unsafe places.
The DHS secretary may grant TPS for countries facing armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other disruptive events. TPS designations last anywhere from six to 18 months and may be extended. The government has designated 29 countries for TPS since Congress established the status in 1990, offering protection to Salvadorans fleeing a 12-year civil war, Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake, and millions of others. The Biden administration repeatedly made and extended TPS designations, but the Trump administration has been working to terminate them.
There were 1.3 million people living in the U.S. under TPS in March 2025, according to the Pew Research Center. By August 2026, the Trump administration had ended TPS for 13 countries, leaving 1 million people without its protections. Once someone loses TPS, he reverts to his previous immigration status, which is often undocumented. Over 600,000 Venezuelans, 330,000 Haitians, 170,000 Salvadorans, and 100,000 Ukrainians had TPS protections as of March 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Critics often point out that TPS isn't really "temporary." That's frequently true: Although some designations have been brief, others have been decades-long. Designations for Haiti, Syria, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, and El Salvador have all lasted at least 14 years, according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI).
This says more about the U.S. immigration system and presidential power than it does about TPS. "In the absence of Congress acting to legalize what has become a long-settled unauthorized immigrant population, Republican and Democratic administrations, lawmakers, immigrants, and foreign governments had come to tacitly rely on TPS despite its nominally temporary nature," notes the MPI. Immigration policy is increasingly subject to presidential whims, and due to lengthy processing times and narrow qualifications, more durable immigration pathways such as asylum and refugee status are often inaccessible to eventual TPS beneficiaries. An immigrant-friendly president may use TPS designations to temporarily shield noncitizen populations, but an anti-immigrant successor can also revoke those protections. In either scenario, a TPS holder faces uncertainty.
In a rare bipartisan immigration effort last February, Reps. Laura Gillen (D–N.Y.) and Mike Lawler (R–N.Y.) introduced a bill to extend TPS for Haiti for three years. It passed the House this April and has been languishing in the Senate since. Its future, too, is uncertain.
The post Trump Slashing Deportation Protections Shows Why Temporary Status Shouldn't Depend on Who's President appeared first on Reason Magazine.
El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele announced on October 13 his intention to release nearly 50% of the prisoners accused of collaborating with gangs in the country. According to the president, the measure would involve early release, albeit conditional.
“We have a plan that would benefit roughly 50% (give or take) of the prisoners in El Salvador who have collaborated with gangs … In other words, early release – meaning they are guilty but are released conditionally. Released under supervision,” Bukele told the press.
In this regard, he said that his government would evaluate the situation of each detainee to keep the country free from the structural violence that has plagued it for decades: “Considering that we come from a country where violence was part of everyday life and gangs were the real government, the real dictatorship. These people lived under that yoke, but it is not the same to be among those who enforced it as it is to simply survive that reality.”
If we take into account the figure provided by the authorities (according to which nearly 100,000 people are currently detained on various charges) this could mean the release of tens of thousands of people.
Before Bukele took office, El Salvador was in the throes of a severe crisis of insecurity and violence. His administration imposed a perpetual state of emergency that began in 2022 and has led to the imprisonment of thousands of Salvadorans accused of belonging to gangs (or “maras”) that controlled large swaths of the Central American country.
And while the pacification of the streets has been celebrated by a significant portion of the population, the harsh actions of the government and its police and military forces have drawn criticism from various human rights organizations, which have accused the government of excessive use of force, mistreatment of prisoners, and the unjust detention of individuals who do not belong to gangs.
Another criticism has been leveled at the practice of mass trials, which charge and convict a large number of people at the same time. Rights groups say this has led to countless errors in the treatment of individual defendants. Added to this are allegations of arbitrary detentions, crimes against humanity, and disappearances.
The prison system implemented by Bukele in El Salvador has also faced international criticism. The Central American country became a focal point of controversy when hundreds of people deported from the United States were detained in the Salvadoran prison system, which drew widespread criticism of the Bukele government.
Bukele, however, had defended the decision and reaffirmed his alliance with the Donald Trump administration and his participation in the Washington-led geopolitical and military initiative known as Shield of the Americas.
The news of the possible release of tens of thousands of detainees sparked even more intrigue, considering that Bukele’s announcement came immediately after his conversation with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in which they discussed combating “malign foreign influence.” However, it remains unclear how the two issues are linked, according to El País.
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A anedota foi contada pelo jornalista Carlos Dada, fundador do site El Faro, de El Salvador, durante o festival Piauí.
Ele estava em um debate na Europa explicando como funciona a política de segurança pública do presidente de El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, quando foi interpelado por um empresário brasileiro, que lhe disse: “precisamos de um Bukele no Brasil”.
Dada, que conhece o Brasil e fala português, pediu mais explicações. “Qual é o problema que enfrentamos na segurança pública?” O interlocutor explicou que as favelas aqui, assim como as comunidades pobres em El Salvador, são dominadas por organizações criminosas. O jornalista respondeu: “Então é fácil resolver o problema. Basta lançar bombas nas favelas”. Surpreso, o brasileiro retrucou: “Mas não podemos fazer isso”. “E por quê?”, perguntou Dada. “Porque iríamos matar gente inocente”.
“Pronto, então você já entendeu o que é o modelo Bukele”.
Carlos Dada é meu amigo desde a fundação da Agência Pública, e é uma das pessoas que conhece mais profundamente o que significa na prática o tal “modelo Bukele” defendido por vários candidatos da direita. À frente do El Faro, primeiro site jornalístico do continente e um dos mais premiados, ele viu o número de encarceramentos do país se tornar o maior do mundo em apenas alguns anos, relativamente à população.
Hoje, 1 em cada 50 salvadorenhos estão na prisão, ou 120 mil dentre 6 milhões de cidadãos. Se transportado para o Brasil, isso significaria mais de 4 milhões de brasileiros na cadeia. Atualmente temos mais de 960 mil presos, terceira maior população carcerária do mundo.
O “modelo Bukele” é defendido por empresários como aqueles da cúpula da Fiesp que, em 31 de agosto, fez um evento com candidatos da direita, entre eles o ex-juiz Sérgio Moro, candidato ao governo do Paraná pelo PL e o candidato a Senador por SP, Guilherme Derrite (PP) para ouvirem o ministro de Segurança Pública de El Salvador, Gustavo Villatoro. O presidente da Fiesp, Paulo Skaf, disse na ocasião: “O que precisamos como sociedade é dar o apoio que for necessário para que um novo governo possa fazer as transformações que o Brasil necessita e para que as pessoas possam sentir segurança” – reforçando sua torcida por um “novo governo”.
O que o empresariado de São Paulo não sabe é que o “sucesso” da redução imediata da criminalidade pelo governo Bukele não se deveu a um plano milagroso, mas a um acordo com os líderes das organizações criminosas mais conhecidas, como a Mara Salvatrucha. Quem descobriu detalhes destes acordos foi Carlos Dada e sua equipe.
“O acordo incluiu a libertação ilegal e em segredo de alguns chefões que já estavam presos. Implicou também o alívio de medidas em cadeias de segurança máxima. Seus parentes sim podiam visitá-los, eles tinham mais horas livres, tinham muitas saídas a hospitais onde se reuniam com seu pessoal”, explica. Do lado dos criminosos, a promessa era baixar o número de homicídios e garantir o voto a Bukele em suas comunidades.
A equipe do El Faro recebeu vazamentos de documentos mostrando como as “saidinhas” de chefões se tornaram muito mais frequentes, assim como as visitas. E eles obtiveram áudios nos quais um ministro de Bukele pessoalmente confessa ter tirado o chefão chamado Crook da cadeia e o levado em seu carro até a Guatemala. A viagem foi confirmada por um registro insuspeito: durante todo o trajeto a namorada do criminoso tirou fotos e postou no seu Instagram, tentando esconder o namorado. “Mas apareciam os braços e as tatuagens dele”, explica Dada.
A coisa ficou ainda mais escancarada, explica Dada, quando alguns destes líderes foram presos no México e extraditados para os Estados Unidos. Dada e seus colegas conseguiram comprovar que a própria justiça americana beneficiou estes criminosos – a pedido do governo Trump.
“Os criminosos estavam para ser julgados nos EUA, e alguns assinaram acordos como testemunhas protegidas e revelaram este pacto com Bukele. Dá um Fast Forward. Trump ganha a presidência nos Estados Unidos, Bukele lhe oferece a megacadeia para imigrantes e os dois viram os melhores amigos do mundo”, continua.
Logo nas primeiras levas de imigrantes venezuelanos enviados para El Salvador, os jornalistas do El Faro perceberam um detento que não era venezuelano.
“Você se lembra daquele famoso vídeo em que o avião desce, recebem em San Salvador os venezuelanos, cortam o cabelo deles, e os levam algemados? Todos nós vimos esse vídeo no mundo todo, mas nós vimos uma coisa a mais: entre esses venezuelanos vinha um sujeito que não era venezuelano, que conhecemos pelas tatuagens. Era um dos doze capturados da Mara Salvatrucha”.
Ao analisar os documentos, descobriram que o procurador-geral da Justiça, o que equivale a nosso Ministro da Justiça, pediu ao juiz federal para suspender as acusações contra o criminoso, argumentando interesses de política exterior.
“É incrível o que aconteceu, Natalia!”
Por conta destas revelações, Dada e os jornalistas do El Faro passaram a ser perseguidos pelo governo Bukele. Primeiro foi espionagem: invadiram os celulares de todos com o software israelense Pegasus, enviaram drones às suas casas, mantiveram agentes de inteligência na porta das suas casas. Depois vieram as ameaças anônimas, ameaças de morte, ameaças de carro-bomba. Depois Bukele os acusou em cadeia nacional de lavagem de dinheiro. Fizeram auditorias por evasão de impostos. Depois, começaram a embargar propriedades dos sócios. Em um determinado momento, eles foram avisados que não deveriam retornar ao país. Seriam presos.
Hoje, toda a redação está fora do país. E no total, 50 jornalistas já deixaram El Salvador.
Tudo isso é fruto do “modelo Bukele”, que decretou um estado de exceção que já foi renovado mais de cinquenta vezes, dando poder total ao presidente sobre todas as forças de segurança. Através dele, qualquer policial tem o direito de prender qualquer pessoa sem nenhuma ordem judicial, e esta pessoa vai imediatamente para uma das prisões do país.
Não existe mais direito à defesa.
“Se Bukele controla o Poder Legislativo, o Poder Judiciário, o Poder Executivo, a Procuradoria-Geral da República, a Procuradoria de Direitos Humanos, a Polícia e o Exército, e os controla por cima da lei, na prática é Bukele quem decide quem é criminoso e quem não é criminoso”, resume Dada.
Ao longo de mais de uma hora de conversa, Dada me explicou outros aspectos do tal “modelo Bukele” que são de embrulhar o estômago, como a morte de mais de 400 pessoas por tortura nas prisões – morreram por espancamento – e as audiências de custódia, que agora são realizadas de forma massiva, com 100 ou 200 presos sendo avaliados de uma só vez por um juiz.
Há histórias apavorantes. Um homem foi preso apenas porque ficou nervoso quando abordado pela polícia; em uma cidadezinha, uma cooperativa de taxistas foi denunciada pela cooperativa rival. Foi todo mundo encarcerado como se fossem criminosos.
Por tudo isso, Dada ficou muito surpreso com o evento da Fiesp, que fez questão de assistir por inteiro pelo YouTube. Ele, que é admirador do Brasil e acompanha de perto nossa política, disse que “me pareceu muito preocupante que depois que um ministro faz uma apresentação na qual não mostra o modelo Bukele, mas o que eles querem vender”, o discurso tenha sido tão aplaudido.
“É uma face construída por uma eficiente equipe de propaganda que é o que chamam de ‘modelo Bukele’. E o ministro apresentou seu modelo Bukele em termos bíblicos, como uma luta entre o bem e o mal, literalmente disse: entre os seres de luz e as criaturas da escuridão”.
Dada estranhou os aplausos efusivos de uma plateia qualificada como aquela. “O que eu creio que isso deveria fazer é deixar todo mundo de orelha em pé”.
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