Nurses’ trade unions have insisted that collective labour agreements protecting the rights and benefits of both existing and future nursing staff, including those recruited from abroad, are non-negotiable.

In a joint statement following Thursday’s House health committee discussion on proposed legislative amendments concerning the employment of nurses from third countries, SEK, PEO, Pasydy and Pasyno reiterated their position that staffing needs could be met by Cypriot nurses.

The unions said regulating employment conditions through collective agreements would help attract staff and prevent further departures from the profession.

They also stressed that language proficiency was primarily a matter of patient safety and quality of care, arguing that requirements must reflect the responsibilities of nursing staff and ensure effective communication with patients and other healthcare professionals.

The unions expressed strong dissatisfaction with the health ministry for failing to convene a meeting with trade unions, nursing representatives and employers’ organisations, despite having been given 15 days to facilitate dialogue on a comprehensive solution.

They said discussions before the House health committee had demonstrated that the conditions for a consensus did not exist and that the proposed legislative amendment should not proceed to the House plenum in its current form.

The unions also dismissed claims made by employers’ federation OEV and the private hospitals’ association (Pasin) as unsubstantiated, arguing that they did not contribute to addressing the nursing sector’s problems.

They warned that they would act as “a barrier to any attempt to downgrade the nursing profession or introduce any regulation that could endanger the quality and safety of care provided in Cyprus’ hospitals”.

The unions concluded that addressing healthcare staffing shortages required serious planning, reliable evidence and meaningful dialogue, alongside policies protecting healthcare standards and strengthening the nursing profession.

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The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

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The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

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It was alleged that Furlong had been involved in an incident with Munster’s Gavin Coombes

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

It was alleged that Furlong had been involved in an incident with Munster’s Gavin Coombes

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Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Andy Burnham must tread cautiously, but Brexit was a very grave act of self-harm – and he is right to address it

Andy Burnham’s opening debate on whether Britain should rejoin the EU is divisive, painful and politically risky. That is why it should be welcomed. To jeopardise his popularity so soon after coming to office might seem reckless, but the issue is urgent and not going away. Brexit is continuing to damage the nation’s economy. The prime minister’s job is to challenge, if not reform it.

The Brexit decade has evoked a bizarre sense of guilt among Britons. Opinion polls show nearly 60% regard it as a mistake, with just a third still in favour. Almost a quarter of those who voted for Brexit now regret it. While early forecasts of economic disaster were proved wrong, the accumulated cost of cutting links with Britain’s biggest trading partner is estimated at 6-8% of GDP.

Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist

Paul Nowak says ‘hundreds, if not thousands’ of employers could sign access agreements as ‘transformative’ rules come into force

The TUC general secretary, Paul Nowak, is predicting a wave of union recognition deals in the private sector over the next year as “transformative” rules on accessing workplaces come into force.

From Friday, as part of Labour’s Employment Rights Act, unions will have the right to enter workplaces or communicate with staff electronically. From January, employers will be obliged to inform workers of their right to join a union.

The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.

American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.

According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.

The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.

Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.

Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.

The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.

Military Preparations and Political Timing

The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.

The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.

During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.

The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.

The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.

Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.

However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.

American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.

The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.

Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible

Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.

That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.

The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.

The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.

Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.

Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.

Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.

The Conflict Has Already Spread

The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.

Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.

These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.

The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.

However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.

Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.

None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.

Europe Faces Another Energy Risk

For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.

The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.

An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.

The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.

European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.

The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.

A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.

Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.

The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments

European governments must balance several interests.

They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.

At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.

A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.

European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.

The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.

With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.

Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.

Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).

Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.