PM hoping for improved relations and ‘model of deeper devolution in Scotland and Wales’

Downing Street has paid tribute to Patrick Stewart following the actor’s death. At the daily lobby briefing, the PM’s spokesperson gave a comment that was a bit more extensive than the usual No 10 contribution when a great British celebrity dies. The spokesperson said that was because Andy Burnham feels strongly about the importance of actors.

The spokesperson said:

The prime minister was very sad to hear of the passing of Sir Patrick Stewart.

As a former culture secretary he knows how much Britain’s greatest actors mean to the country, and Sir Patrick was one of the very best.

Just a reminder that when it comes to Wales, we are not comparing like with like. The term ‘region’ in an English context typically refers to an area covering between 1.5 and 3 million people. In Wales, regions cover much less dense areas. The Swansea Bay city region captures some 700,000 people, and similarly North Wales around 690,000 people. In Mid-Wales sheep outnumber people by 7:1. Only the Cardiff city region is comparable to English tiers, and even then at the lower end: around 1.5 million people.

Transposing an English mayoral worldview onto a very different political geography just doesn’t work. Wales may be a similar population size to the PM’s old manor but that’s where the parallel ends.

Andy Burnham talks about the regions of England and Wales interchangeably but the role the new prime minister champions for metro mayors is, in many respects, already performed by the Welsh government. Powers over skills, employment support, economic development, housing investment and major spending programmes sit at an all-Wales strategic level (covering a similar population size to Greater Manchester.)

His argument for England is that powers should flow from Westminster to city regions because they operate at an economically meaningful scale. Yet when the PM turns to Wales, he seems to suggest that powers already devolved to Cardiff Bay should be dispersed further down the system.

But notably he is not calling on his successor as the mayor of Greater Manchester, Bev Craig, to fragment the powers of the Greater Manchester combined authority and redistribute them amongst its ten constituent councils. On the contrary, the whole logic of the Greater Manchester model rests on concentrating strategic authority at a regional level.

Yet the implication of his comments is that Wales should move in the opposite direction.

Speaking at a briefing in Brussels attended by EU Today, Azerbaijani presidential envoy Elchin Amirbayov said his country was prepared to increase natural gas exports to Europe, but warned that insufficient pipeline capacity, investment restrictions and uncertainty over long-term contracts were preventing further expansion.

Azerbaijan is prepared to increase natural gas supplies to the European Union, but further expansion will require investment in transport infrastructure and long-term commitments from European buyers, according to Elchin Amirbayov, Representative of the President of Azerbaijan on Special Assignments.

Speaking at the Azerbaijani Embassy in Brussels on 21 October, during a meeting attended by EU Today, Amirbayov outlined the difficulties facing efforts to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, which has become an important component of Europe’s strategy to diversify energy imports away from Russia.

“Today it’s fully booked already by all those contracts which we have concluded with all recipients of our gas,” Amirbayov said, referring to existing pipeline capacity.

He stressed that Azerbaijan possessed additional natural gas resources but that increasing deliveries depended on the availability of transportation infrastructure and commercially viable investment arrangements.

“As far as our capacity to provide them with gas is concerned, it is there because we have necessary resources. But what we need to be able to do that is also transportation infrastructure,” he explained.

Europe’s 2027 gas target faces infrastructure constraints

In July 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a strategic energy partnership envisaging an expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver at least 20 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas annually to the EU by 2027.

The agreement formed part of Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent restructuring of European energy supplies.

According to the European Commission, Azerbaijan and its state energy company SOCAR supplied 12.5 bcm to EU member states in 2025, an increase of more than 50 per cent compared with 2021.

However, the latest figures published by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy show that during the first nine months of 2026, the country exported 18.4 bcm worldwide, including 8.6 bcm to European destinations.

The figures underline the challenge of achieving the planned increase in deliveries without additional investment.

The Southern Gas Corridor includes the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), connecting Azerbaijani production with European markets.

TAP completed an initial capacity expansion in early 2026, adding 1.2 bcm annually. Further expansion will depend on additional infrastructure and sufficient contractual demand.

As EU Today previously reported, Azerbaijan began supplying natural gas to Germany and Austria in January 2026, extending its presence in central European markets.

Long-term contracts and investment financing

Amirbayov emphasised that additional gas infrastructure could not be developed without long-term commercial arrangements.

“Gas being different from oil, it has to be based on long-term contracts, on long-term expressed willingness,” he said.

He also raised the difficulties created by European restrictions on financing fossil-fuel infrastructure, suggesting that EU institutions and member states needed to reconcile their energy security requirements with existing investment policies.

The regulatory situation is complex. The European Investment Bank no longer finances new unabated fossil-fuel energy projects, including conventional gas infrastructure. However, the EU taxonomy framework permits certain gas-related activities under specific conditions.

Amirbayov said European countries had differing energy requirements and were at different stages of the transition away from fossil fuels. Those differences complicated agreement on the financing of additional gas supplies.

He also explained that Azerbaijan’s own investment resources were heavily committed to reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in territories recovered following the conflict with Armenia.

“We cannot do that job ourselves for the reasons I just explained,” he said, referring to the financial requirements of expanding export infrastructure.

Natural gas and Europe’s energy transition

Amirbayov acknowledged Azerbaijan’s own investment in renewable energy, including wind, solar and hydropower. He highlighted the Caspian Sea’s potential for offshore wind generation and described the country’s efforts to increase renewables in its domestic energy system.

Nevertheless, he questioned whether natural gas could be replaced by renewable sources within a short period.

“I don’t think it’s realistic,” he said when discussing the prospect of replacing natural gas within the next year or two.

His comments come as Brussels continues to balance its climate objectives with energy security requirements and the planned reduction of Russian gas imports.

Azerbaijan has increasingly positioned itself as an alternative supplier to European countries seeking to diversify their energy sources. However, Amirbayov made clear that further expansion would depend on decisions taken by European governments, financial institutions and energy companies.

“We are there, ready to assist,” he said, adding that further progress would require clear intentions and decisions from the European side.

The immediate question is whether European buyers and policymakers can establish sufficient contractual certainty and investment arrangements to support the additional pipeline capacity envisaged in the 2022 partnership.

Nurses’ trade unions have insisted that collective labour agreements protecting the rights and benefits of both existing and future nursing staff, including those recruited from abroad, are non-negotiable.

In a joint statement following Thursday’s House health committee discussion on proposed legislative amendments concerning the employment of nurses from third countries, SEK, PEO, Pasydy and Pasyno reiterated their position that staffing needs could be met by Cypriot nurses.

The unions said regulating employment conditions through collective agreements would help attract staff and prevent further departures from the profession.

They also stressed that language proficiency was primarily a matter of patient safety and quality of care, arguing that requirements must reflect the responsibilities of nursing staff and ensure effective communication with patients and other healthcare professionals.

The unions expressed strong dissatisfaction with the health ministry for failing to convene a meeting with trade unions, nursing representatives and employers’ organisations, despite having been given 15 days to facilitate dialogue on a comprehensive solution.

They said discussions before the House health committee had demonstrated that the conditions for a consensus did not exist and that the proposed legislative amendment should not proceed to the House plenum in its current form.

The unions also dismissed claims made by employers’ federation OEV and the private hospitals’ association (Pasin) as unsubstantiated, arguing that they did not contribute to addressing the nursing sector’s problems.

They warned that they would act as “a barrier to any attempt to downgrade the nursing profession or introduce any regulation that could endanger the quality and safety of care provided in Cyprus’ hospitals”.

The unions concluded that addressing healthcare staffing shortages required serious planning, reliable evidence and meaningful dialogue, alongside policies protecting healthcare standards and strengthening the nursing profession.

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PM hoping for improved relations and ‘model of deeper devolution in Scotland and Wales’

Downing Street has paid tribute to Patrick Stewart following the actor’s death. At the daily lobby briefing, the PM’s spokesperson gave a comment that was a bit more extensive than the usual No 10 contribution when a great British celebrity dies. The spokesperson said that was because Andy Burnham feels strongly about the importance of actors.

The spokesperson said:

The prime minister was very sad to hear of the passing of Sir Patrick Stewart.

As a former culture secretary he knows how much Britain’s greatest actors mean to the country, and Sir Patrick was one of the very best.

Just a reminder that when it comes to Wales, we are not comparing like with like. The term ‘region’ in an English context typically refers to an area covering between 1.5 and 3 million people. In Wales, regions cover much less dense areas. The Swansea Bay city region captures some 700,000 people, and similarly North Wales around 690,000 people. In Mid-Wales sheep outnumber people by 7:1. Only the Cardiff city region is comparable to English tiers, and even then at the lower end: around 1.5 million people.

Transposing an English mayoral worldview onto a very different political geography just doesn’t work. Wales may be a similar population size to the PM’s old manor but that’s where the parallel ends.

Andy Burnham talks about the regions of England and Wales interchangeably but the role the new prime minister champions for metro mayors is, in many respects, already performed by the Welsh government. Powers over skills, employment support, economic development, housing investment and major spending programmes sit at an all-Wales strategic level (covering a similar population size to Greater Manchester.)

His argument for England is that powers should flow from Westminster to city regions because they operate at an economically meaningful scale. Yet when the PM turns to Wales, he seems to suggest that powers already devolved to Cardiff Bay should be dispersed further down the system.

But notably he is not calling on his successor as the mayor of Greater Manchester, Bev Craig, to fragment the powers of the Greater Manchester combined authority and redistribute them amongst its ten constituent councils. On the contrary, the whole logic of the Greater Manchester model rests on concentrating strategic authority at a regional level.

Yet the implication of his comments is that Wales should move in the opposite direction.

Brussels, 30 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European lawmakers are seeking stronger commercial safeguards and more balanced economic cooperation with China as concerns continue over industrial subsidies, market access and Europe’s economic security. The debate surrounding China Trade … Read more

The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

MONTREAL, Canada, 30 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The European Union’s proposal to establish an unprecedented partnership with Canada has encountered significant opposition from several member states, exposing divisions over how Brussels should strengthen relations with international allies … Read more

It was alleged that Furlong had been involved in an incident with Munster’s Gavin Coombes

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

It was alleged that Furlong had been involved in an incident with Munster’s Gavin Coombes

Montreal, Canada, 30 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European Union and Canadian leaders are holding a high-level EU–Canada summit in Montreal to strengthen cooperation on technology, trade, defence and economic security, as both sides pursue a more ambitious … Read more

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Andy Burnham must tread cautiously, but Brexit was a very grave act of self-harm – and he is right to address it

Andy Burnham’s opening debate on whether Britain should rejoin the EU is divisive, painful and politically risky. That is why it should be welcomed. To jeopardise his popularity so soon after coming to office might seem reckless, but the issue is urgent and not going away. Brexit is continuing to damage the nation’s economy. The prime minister’s job is to challenge, if not reform it.

The Brexit decade has evoked a bizarre sense of guilt among Britons. Opinion polls show nearly 60% regard it as a mistake, with just a third still in favour. Almost a quarter of those who voted for Brexit now regret it. While early forecasts of economic disaster were proved wrong, the accumulated cost of cutting links with Britain’s biggest trading partner is estimated at 6-8% of GDP.

Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist

Paul Nowak says ‘hundreds, if not thousands’ of employers could sign access agreements as ‘transformative’ rules come into force

The TUC general secretary, Paul Nowak, is predicting a wave of union recognition deals in the private sector over the next year as “transformative” rules on accessing workplaces come into force.

From Friday, as part of Labour’s Employment Rights Act, unions will have the right to enter workplaces or communicate with staff electronically. From January, employers will be obliged to inform workers of their right to join a union.