Dopo il Vertice di Teheran la palla è interamente nel campo dell’Asia occidentale. Gli Stati Uniti non sono nemmeno in gioco

Segue nostro Telegram.

L’immagine trasmessa è stata sensazionale.

Il ministro della Difesa saudita, il principe Khalid, fratello di MbS; il capo dei servizi segreti turchi, Ibrahim Kalin; e il capo delle forze armate pakistane, il feldmaresciallo Asim Munir, tutti e tre membri a pieno titolo dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca, entrano in una sala sontuosa del proverbiale palazzo persiano per salutare – o baciare l’anello – del potentato, pardon, del segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC), Moshen Rezaee, numero due della struttura di potere iraniana, subito dopo la Guida Mojtaba Khamenei.

Non si trattava dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca che, apparentemente, sfilava in parata – in rappresentanza dei neo-ottomani, degli arabi e dei sudasiatici. Si trattava del Vertice di Teheran – così come definito dai persiani.

L’Iran aveva acconsentito a tenere questo vertice rivoluzionario – in realtà suggerito da Asim Munir durante la sua visita a Teheran la scorsa settimana – solo al di fuori del quadro dell’accordo della Mecca, ed esplicitamente nell’ambito della discussione sulla «sicurezza regionale endogena».

Pertanto, sì, si è discusso di Palestina, Libano, Yemen, sicurezza del Golfo e dello Stretto di Hormuz, nello spirito di ridurre le proverbiali «tensioni regionali» e porre fine alla guerra degli Stati Uniti contro l’Iran e l’Asse della Resistenza.

Il Vertice di Teheran potrebbe alla fine significare l’accettazione – riluttante o meno – delle richieste di sicurezza dell’Iran e dello status definitivo dello Stretto di Hormuz, attualmente in fase di elaborazione tramite l’accordo Iran-Oman.

Tutto dipende, ovviamente, da ciò che la Casa dei Saud deciderà alla fine. E questa decisione è direttamente legata al modo in cui Riyadh risolverà il suo sanguinoso conflitto con lo Yemen.

Teheran è stata esplicita: siamo pronti a mediare e ad assistere nella risoluzione della questione yemenita; tuttavia, spetta a Riyadh affrontare – e accettare – le condizioni di Ansarallah. Altrimenti, la guerra – già in corso – continuerà.

Analisi delle «sette condizioni»

È stato il dottor Ali Bagheri Kani, il vicessegretario dell’SNSC di grande competenza, a fornire la migliore visione dall’interno di ciò che veniva discusso al tavolo delle trattative.

Le quattro nazioni hanno identificato Israele come la principale fonte di instabilità regionale, con l’Iran come bersaglio immediato e altri paesi potenzialmente i prossimi (corsivo mio). L’altra fonte sono gli Stati Uniti. Immaginate il principe Khalid che acconsente a tutto quanto sopra.

Un accordo sulla sicurezza duratura in Asia occidentale deve essere costruito dall’interno, senza dipendere da potenze straniere.

Teheran si è posizionata come l’anello centrale (il corsivo è mio) che collega Arabia Saudita, Turchia e Pakistan. Sentitevi liberi di rimanere sbalorditi.

Tutte e quattro le nazioni hanno concordato di proseguire i colloqui. L’Iran coordinerà il prossimo incontro. Non sono ancora state stabilite né la data né la sede.

Aggiunga ora a questo quadro già sbalorditivo uno speciale «Mohsen Rezaee Unplugged»: era decisamente di umore molto più allegro del solito.

Prenda questo passaggio saliente:

«Percepisco la presenza di una nuova atmosfera nella regione. Si è creata grazie alla resistenza del popolo iraniano e alla capacità delle forze armate. Ho avvertito un’atmosfera estremamente positiva nelle discussioni con questi signori».

Pur elogiando «il successo di questa discussione retorica e delle dichiarazioni», Rezaee si è mostrato cauto: «Abbiamo preferito non rilasciare alcuna dichiarazione in questo momento, ma rilasceremo un’unica dichiarazione congiunta in cui concorderemo su questi punti e raggiungeremo un’intesa; l’attuazione di tali questioni sarà concreta e reale, e procederemo in tal senso».

Nel frattempo, rimane un compito sisifeo: come costringere l’Impero della Pirateria a comprendere la diplomazia in Asia occidentale.

Bagheri-Kani: «Gli Stati Uniti devono soddisfare le sette condizioni dell’Iran». Ha poi aggiunto: «Rezaee ha menzionato oggi che il piano di sette giorni potrebbe essere ridotto a cinque giorni o addirittura a quattro».

Analizziamo questi numeri.

Le sette condizioni rimangono le stesse: sono la versione sintetica di quel «gatto morto» ricorrente, il Memorandum d’intesa (MoU), che lo stesso Trump ha strappato e sul quale insiste nel dire che non abbia alcun significato.

Ricapitoliamo: revoca delle sanzioni; cessazione delle minacce militari; riconoscimento del diritto dell’Iran all’uso pacifico dell’energia nucleare; cessazione del sostegno a Israele; riconoscimento dei diritti sovrani dell’Iran sullo Stretto di Ormuz; cessazione delle interferenze negli affari interni dell’Iran; e fornitura di garanzie credibili contro future aggressioni.
Persino i cammelli nel cuore del Nejd sanno che gli «Eccezionali» non adempiranno mai a nessuno di questi impegni.

Ciò che cambia ora è la tempistica. Secondo il piano originale, nell’improbabile eventualità che gli Stati Uniti avessero soddisfatto le condizioni, il sesto giorno lo Stretto di Ormuz sarebbe stato aperto; e il settimo giorno, come per volere divino, sarebbero iniziati i negoziati.
La nuova proposta di Rezaee può essere interpretata solo come una gioiosa provocazione: tutto può essere fatto in cinque giorni o addirittura in quattro, perché no?

Rezaee sta sostanzialmente affermando che tutte e sette le condizioni rimangono valide; ma se Trump fosse davvero interessato ai negoziati (non lo è: vuole una capitolazione), l’Iran non avrebbe bisogno di attendere sette giorni. Ne bastano quattro.

Qualunque cosa accada in seguito – e dopo le elezioni di medio termine negli Stati Uniti potrebbe benissimo verificarsi un attacco militare alla Trump – è Teheran a dettare ancora i tempi. Oltre alle sette condizioni – che costituiscono i prerequisiti per qualsiasi negoziazione. Oltre alla tempistica. Oltre al fatto che, in assenza di progressi, lo Stretto di Ormuz rimarrà chiuso.
Ciò che Bagheri-Kani e Rezaee – i due massimi responsabili della sicurezza – stanno sottolineando è che l’Iran ha presentato una fattura all’Impero della Pirateria. A proposito, ogni singola voce della fattura è già stata approvata dallo stesso Presidente degli Stati Uniti, per quanto egli cerchi di svicolare.

O sicurezza “endogena” o nulla

A prima vista, l’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca avrebbe dovuto essere vista come un potente allineamento di sicurezza e difesa collettiva guidato dai sunniti.

Eppure l’ultima cosa che l’Impero della Pirateria, strategicamente svantaggiato, si aspetterebbe è che il trio iniziasse a esplorare vie di cooperazione con la nazione che era stato costretto a considerare una minaccia esistenziale.

Non sottovalutate mai i persiani. Dimostrando la loro consueta finezza, ciò che hanno appena fatto è stato ribaltare strategicamente il contenimento dell’Iran.

Nel prossimo futuro l’Iran potrebbe persino prendere in considerazione l’adesione all’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca – che non pochi studiosi musulmani autorevoli descrivono effettivamente come una blasfemia nei confronti della Mecca.

Prima di ciò, gli «sceicchi del petrolio» – quelle controparti del Golfo Persico dei «chihuahua del Baltico» – potrebbero andare incontro alla loro rovina, qualora si rivelassero incapaci di disinnescare l’incessante incitamento anglo-salafita alle guerre settarie.

Gli iraniani sono devoti della sacra Mecca e di Medina tanto quanto gli yemeniti – poiché entrambi i popoli furono direttamente elogiati dal Profeta (gli iraniani furono indicati come impareggiabili nel discernimento della conoscenza e nella ricerca della saggezza).

E ciò spiega in definitiva perché questo incontro sia stato definito «Vertice di Teheran» – senza alcun nesso con l’idea di un patto della «Mecca».

Per quanto riguarda gli yemeniti, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, membro chiave del Consiglio politico supremo di Ansarallah, ha posto le cose in chiaro: ha criticato aspramente le affermazioni dell’Arabia Saudita secondo cui la visita del principe Khalid a Teheran mirerebbe a un allentamento delle tensioni nella regione, sottolineando che la retorica diplomatica di Riyadh è in contraddizione con il protrarsi della guerra, del blocco e dell’occupazione dello Yemen.

Dopo il Vertice di Teheran, la Guida Mojtaba Khamenei ha incontrato di persona Mohsen Rezaee. Il Numero Uno che parla con il Numero Due.

Khamenei ha esplicitamente chiesto di porre fine all’attuale stato di «né guerra né pace» garantendo il rispetto delle sette condizioni e «mantenendo il controllo sullo Stretto di Ormuz».

Rezaee ha infatti illustrato a Khamenei l’idea di una sicurezza «endogena» in tutta l’Asia occidentale. Si tratta di una controparte diretta della spinta russa verso l’«indivisibilità della sicurezza» alla fine del 2021, alla quale gli Stati Uniti e la NATO avevano allora risposto con un silenzio elocitante.

Eppure ora la palla è interamente nel campo dell’Asia occidentale. Gli Stati Uniti non sono nemmeno in gioco. Spetta alla Turchia, all’Arabia Saudita, al Pakistan e all’Iran far sì che ciò avvenga.

par Francesca DE VILLASMUNDO

Le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a fermement mis en garde les dirigeants européens contre toute tentation de lever ou d’alléger les restrictions visant Moscou.

La côte du président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky est en chute libre aux États-Unis

Lors du sommet européen tenu à Bruxelles les 15 et 16 octobre 2026 et dans un entretien vidéo de ce même mois octobre, le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky, dont la côte aux États-Unis est en chute libre, a mis fermement mis en garde les dirigeants européens, ses derniers alliés sur la surface de la terre. Alliés de plus en plus esseulés et eux aussi dans la ligne de mire de Donald Trump, qui peut leur couper les vivres énergétiques comme bon lui semble en raison de leur obstacle à la paix en Ukraine. Car, après s’être coupés du gaz et pétrole russes, à peu près 50% de leurs ressources énergétiques, les Européens se sont tournés vers le géant américain, dont ils dépendent maintenant pour une trop large part.

Sentant le vent tourné contre lui, Zelensky a donc menacé les Européens, si ceux-ci venaient à lever les sanctions contre la Russie, sans tenir compte qu’il dépend cependant grandement d’eux pour le financement de son pays ruiné et les armes.

Menaces de Zelensky contre les Européens s’ils suivaient les traces des États-Unis : «Nous réagirions définitivement»

Ainsi, ce dernier a-t-il déclaré lors de ce sommet et dans cet entretien vidéo :

«Pour l’instant, je ne vois aucun grand pays européen sérieux — et je le dis sérieusement pour tous les pays — dont l’économie européenne soit au point mort. Les pays à forte économie ont une plus grande influence aux États-Unis. C’est pourquoi je ne vois aucune demande immédiate de leur part concernant la levée des sanctions et le rétablissement des alliances énergétiques avec la Fédération de Russie. Je ne le vois pas car nous réagirions. Je réagirais».

«Nous réagirions définitivement», a-t-il lancé avec gravité à l’adresse de l’Europe si une telle décision venait à être prise.

En résumé, le président déchu affirme qu’à l’heure actuelle, aucun pays européen majeur et sérieux ne lèvera les sanctions contre la Russie ni ne rétablira les partenariats énergétiques avec Moscou. Cependant cette hypothèse doit tout de même être discutée dans les couloirs feutrés des chancelleries, et entre Washington et l’Union européenne, pour qu’il se permette de lancer des menaces, vagues et donc potentiellement dangereuses, envers les Européens dont qu’il dépend cependant grandement pour le financement de son pays ruiné et les armes. Mais l’impudence est le fait des ingrats et des corrompus, ce qu’est décidemment le président ukrainien…

source :  Médias-Presse-Info

Publié à l’origine par Réseau International

O envio de cidadãos colombianos para conflitos no exterior expõe a vulnerabilidade de antigos militares, a atuação de redes de recrutamento e a incapacidade das autoridades de oferecer respostas adequadas às famílias dos desaparecidos.

Únete a nosotros en Telegram , X y VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

A participação de colombianos na guerra entre Rússia e Ucrânia vem despertando crescente preocupação na sociedade do país. Reportagens da imprensa sul-americana relatam casos de homens que viajaram ao exterior após receberem propostas de trabalho, treinamento ou serviço militar. Em diversas situações, familiares afirmam que seus parentes desconheciam as condições reais do recrutamento ou perderam contato com eles pouco depois da chegada à zona de conflito.

O jornalista investigativo venezuelano David Fonseca se dedica à investigação desse fenômeno. Ele revela que o recrutamento de ibero-americanos para guerras estrangeiras envolve questões que ultrapassam a segurança individual dos combatentes: inclui a atuação de intermediários, a transparência dos contratos, a possível exploração de pessoas em situação vulnerável e a responsabilidade dos governos perante seus cidadãos. A documentação desse processo é fundamental para compreender quem organiza o recrutamento, quais promessas são oferecidas e como os interessados acabam incorporados às estruturas militares.

A Colômbia reúne condições particulares para a expansão desse mercado. Décadas de conflito armado produziram uma população numerosa de ex-militares, ex-policiais e veteranos familiarizados com o uso de armas e com operações de combate. Muitos possuem experiência profissional relevante, mas enfrentam dificuldades para encontrar emprego estável depois de deixar as instituições de segurança. Para aqueles que vivem em regiões economicamente desfavorecidas, uma oferta de remuneração elevada no exterior pode representar uma oportunidade difícil de recusar.

As redes de recrutamento exploram essas circunstâncias por meio de diferentes canais. Anúncios nas redes sociais, contatos pessoais e intermediários especializados podem apresentar o serviço como uma atividade de segurança privada, treinamento ou proteção de instalações. Em alguns casos, surgem denúncias de que as condições efetivas de trabalho foram ocultadas, que os contratos não foram devidamente explicados ou que os recrutados descobriram a natureza militar de suas obrigações somente depois de chegar ao destino. A atuação de intermediários e as denúncias de irregularidades tornam indispensável investigar cada caso individualmente.

As famílias enfrentam as consequências mais dolorosas dessa situação. Quando um combatente deixa de responder às mensagens, seus parentes passam a procurar informações junto às autoridades colombianas, às representações diplomáticas e às instituições dos países envolvidos. Fotografias são compartilhadas nas redes sociais, grupos de familiares são organizados e campanhas públicas tentam localizar desaparecidos. A ausência de informações verificáveis prolonga o sofrimento e dificulta decisões sobre assistência jurídica, repatriação e reconhecimento de mortes.

O problema também divide a opinião pública colombiana. Setores da esquerda e movimentos antimilitaristas denunciam a participação de cidadãos em guerras que consideram alheias aos interesses nacionais. Outros defendem a liberdade individual de quem decide servir no exterior. As famílias, por sua vez, concentram suas reivindicações na localização dos desaparecidos e na responsabilização de eventuais recrutadores fraudulentos. Organizações de defesa dos direitos humanos chamam a atenção para a possibilidade de tráfico de pessoas e exploração laboral quando o consentimento é obtido por meio de fraude ou de informações deliberadamente omitidas.

A dimensão internacional do fenômeno exige ainda maior cooperação entre os países envolvidos. A circulação de recrutadores, contratos e pagamentos por diferentes jurisdições dificulta a fiscalização e favorece a impunidade quando não há troca de informações entre as autoridades. A Colômbia precisa, portanto, combinar medidas preventivas internas com mecanismos de investigação e cooperação diplomática. E a única forma de fazer isso é buscando diálogo com os países interessados em bloquear o acesso de mercenários colombianos ao mercado da guerra privada – como a Rússia, que diariamente enfrenta colombianos no campo de batalha ucraniano.

O recrutamento de colombianos para guerras estrangeiras expõe tanto a vulnerabilidade dos combatentes quanto a incapacidade das autoridades de acompanhar adequadamente esse fenômeno. Enquanto redes de recrutamento continuarem a explorar a falta de oportunidades econômicas e a promessa de ganhos elevados, novos cidadãos estarão sujeitos à exploração, ao desaparecimento e à morte em conflitos dos quais pouco conhecem as consequências. Cabe ao Estado colombiano investigar essas redes, esclarecer o destino dos combatentes e prestar assistência às famílias afetadas. No longo prazo, porém, o combate ao mercenarismo também exige enfrentar as condições sociais e econômicas que levam tantos colombianos a enxergar a guerra no exterior como uma alternativa de sustento.

Flávio, un cascarón vacío, puede haber perdido unas elecciones. Sin embargo, la máquina infernal que lo respalda nunca se dará por vencida.

Pepe ESCOBAR

Únete a nosotros en Telegram , X y VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

No significa nada si no tiene ese ritmo brasileño. Lo que está en juego no podría ser más alto: es una cuestión de vida o muerte. Así que los brasileños salieron a las calles —y a las casillas electorales— y lograron salir adelante.

No hicieron nada menos que domar a la Madre de Todas las Guerras Híbridas y derrotar, aunque fuera momentáneamente, a una coalición poderosa y tóxica que incluía toda la fuerza de la administración de la «Doctrina Donroe»; el tecnofeudalismo de Silicon Valley, especialmente impulsado por Meta; Wall Street y la Diosa del Mercado; los múltiples tentáculos de Zionism Inc.; las viejas élites reaccionarias —y sus medios de comunicación—; las nuevas élites ostentosas; la demencia evangélica; y, por último, pero no menos importante, una mediocre dinastía neofascista empeñada en convertir a Brasil en una neocolonia extractivista en beneficio de «La Voz de Su Amo».

El efecto —tranquilizador— es similar al de un himno de bossa nova de Antônio Carlos Jobim cantado por Frank Sinatra.

Sí, Brasil es demasiado grande —y demasiado indómito— para ser el patio trasero de nadie. Y qué giro tan radical, en lo que respecta a Lula personalmente: la geopolítica no ha visto un regreso como este desde la Batalla de Stalingrado.

Perdimos: así que la elección estuvo «amañada»

El día de las elecciones amaneció en un clima de gran tensión —pero con Flávio Bolsonaro aún con un 82 % de posibilidades de ganar, según Polymarket, los favoritos de la DARPA. Es como si el Estado profundo supiera el resultado de antemano —tal como en la primera ronda de votación—.

Sin embargo, al final Lula ganó por 4.4 millones de votos. No sin mucho drama. Justo antes de que cerraran las urnas, un juez de la Corte Suprema —quien anteriormente había sido el abogado personal de Lula durante el caso de corrupción «Lava Jato»— extendió el horario de votación en todo el país por dos horas.

El tribunal electoral debería haber tomado una decisión al respecto. No lo hizo porque otro juez de la Corte Suprema —nombrado por Bolsonaro— estaba demorando el proceso.

La prórroga fue vital, porque para entonces ya se había demostrado que los alcaldes bolsonaristas estaban obstaculizando deliberadamente el transporte público, especialmente los autobuses, en bastiones de Lula como Salvador, en Bahía: una táctica sacada directamente del manual de sabotaje oligárquico, utilizada para suprimir el voto popular.

El dato clave es que ambas campañas habían solicitado una extensión del horario de votación. Y eso desmiente por completo las afirmaciones de los imbéciles bolsonaristas y vinculados al movimiento MAGA de que la elección estuvo «amañada».

Como era de esperarse, Flávio Bolsonaro se niega a reconocer la derrota y quiere que se anule la elección. Eso no sucederá —según el mismo juez designado por Bolsonaro que, para empezar, estaba dando largas al asunto—.

En la segunda vuelta, Lula aumentó su total de votos en más de 10.1 millones, mientras que Bolsonaro solo obtuvo 3.6 millones más. A eso se suma algo casi improbable: hubo más de 1.8 millones menos (cursiva mía) votos nulos y nulos en comparación con la primera vuelta —y la abrumadora mayoría fue para Lula.

Varias razones explican el desempeño del «niño del regreso» —o del «abuelo»—. Empezando por una movilización popular masiva: la abstención bajó del 21,08 % al 19,21 %. Casi 3 millones de personas más acudieron a las urnas.

Lula amplió sus márgenes donde era fuerte —en el noreste— y redujo sus pérdidas en el acaudalado sureste.

La campaña de Lula llevó a cabo una importante autocorrección: en lugar de enfocarse en el pasado —los resultados concretos de su gobierno—, comenzó a hablar de la cruda realidad actual: la economía familiar; los enormes niveles de endeudamiento; el costo de vida; los salarios; e incluso presentó propuestas concretas para los próximos cuatro años.

La campaña de movilización digital fue digna de atención, con un arma letal desatada en WhatsApp: el canal «El Ejército de Lula», que pasó de unos 50 000 seguidores a la impresionante cifra de 10 millones en menos de tres semanas: una infantería digital de facto. Brasil es una de las naciones más conectadas del planeta.

Encabezada por el recién elegido diputado André Janones, la campaña demostró cómo Lula venció al hegemón tecno-feudalista Meta en su propio terreno: la estrategia será estudiada en los anales de la ciencia política por generaciones.

Y luego está la asombrosa incompetencia de Flávio Bolsonaro: una mezcla letal de arrogancia e ignorancia que simplemente no se podía vender como una alternativa moderada.

Apenas dos días antes de la segunda vuelta, durante el último y crucial debate, Bolsonaro, en vivo, frente a toda la nación y a millones de votantes indecisos, llamó a Lula «el de los nueve dedos», burlándose de su discapacidad física.

Lula preparó la respuesta en tiempo real como una cobra. Recordó cómo perdió su dedo meñique a los 19 años en una prensa de metal, víctima de la precariedad y la falta de seguridad que sufren millones de trabajadores en Brasil: «Algo muy diferente a ti, Bolsonaro, que nunca has trabajado».

Eso lo selló todo: el dedo meñique perdido como el símbolo definitivo de la dignidad frente al privilegio.

Esto se va a poner muy feo

Gobernar Brasil será una tarea sisífica para el cuarto mandato de Lula. El Senado (81 escaños) está controlado por la extrema derecha (48 escaños): una mayoría absoluta. En el Congreso, la extrema derecha cuenta con 303 escaños (muy por encima de la mayoría, que es de 257), el centro tiene 86 escaños y la izquierda solo 124. Cualquier reforma, presupuesto o ley se enfrentará a un muro de hierro.

Podría decirse que la mejor definición de Lula la ofreció en su momento el difunto y gran El Comandante, Fidel Castro:

Nunca fue un extremista de izquierda, ni alcanzó el estatus de revolucionario desde posiciones filosóficas, sino desde las de un trabajador de origen muy humilde y fe cristiana, que trabajó duro creando plusvalía para otros.

Lula, ahora en sus ochenta, parece haber recuperado esa chispa. No hay duda de que sabe muy bien cómo esta derrota masiva para Trump, el MAGA y la Doctrina Monroe lo obligará a movilizar todas sus fuerzas: para organizar a Brasil mientras contiene la furia descontrolada del Imperio.

Sean cuales sean los resultados de las elecciones intermedias de EE. UU. la próxima semana, Trump inevitablemente intensificará las sanciones y/o los aranceles contra Brasil y seguirá haciendo todo lo posible y lanzando operaciones sucias para desestabilizar al país.

La CIA y el Estado profundo están profundamente enredados en la realidad brasileña y son capaces de desatar un sinfín de trucos sucios.

Lula lo sabe: esto se pondrá muy feo.

En resumen, se podría decir que Lula personifica un Brasil católico, tradicional, lusófono, mestizo y progresista.

Esto entra en un choque frontal con el eje reaccionario, evangélico, neopentecostal y sionista angloamericano. Después de todo, los neopentecostales defienden la lunática teología del Fin de los Tiempos que dio forma al sionismo cristiano angloamericano.

Flávio Bolsonaro —como todos los miembros del clan— prometió trasladar la embajada de Brasil a Jerusalén; desestimó al BRICS calificándolo de «altamente ideológico»; y atacó la relación de Lula con Irán (también miembro del BRICS).

Flávio, un cascarón vacío, puede haber perdido unas elecciones. Sin embargo, la máquina infernal que lo respalda nunca se dará por vencida.

Traducción:  Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

Lindsay Graham is just another example of how the Western-style electoral system ‘doesn’t work’ in the interests of anyone.

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Judging by his extreme lisp and mannerisms, it was obvious to myself and anyone with a reasonable understanding of how the world works, that one of the key authors of the grandest Russophobic sanctions package of all, Lindsey Graham*, was a homosexual. And now that he is safely 6 feet below American soil gay-prostitutes are coming out of the woodwork to say they ‘worked’ for Graham. This ‘October Surprise to no one’ is at least food for thought as to just how an individual like Lindsay could wield so much power in the Senate for so many years. What could his electoral appeal possibly have been in the Bible Belt of America?

Recently, it seems like President Trump has been able to work around the masterpiece of the late senator “H.R. 5334: Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026“ and is making diesel deals with Putin regardless. This is another aspect of the weirdness of the Trump presidency; sign into law a bill that puts insane sanctions on Russia and those who use their products to appease some, then just work around it to appease others and perhaps save the day before midterms in regards to fuel prices. Nothing about Trump’s leadership is truly straightforward, we can only hope that there is a method to the American Emperor’s seeming madness. But regardless, the Multipolar World desperately wants Trump to succeed in his formal vision for American foreign policy and a return to the Monroe Doctrine, we wish you luck Sir.

Of course the Russians and Iranians, the victims of Graham’s finance fueled hate-based legislation, are rejoicing even more so now, than at the moment of his mysterious death, which many believe was actually due to Russian strikes while Graham was in Ukraine. Larry Johnson from Sonar 21 said the following on the issue:

“Lindsey Graham died in Kiev, not Washington, DC. He arrived in Kiev on the morning of 10 July. The trip to Kiev entails flying to Poland and then taking a 8-10 hour train ride. He was visiting a drone factory in Kiev that was hit by the Russians. He did not have enough time to depart Ukraine on Saturday morning, take the train to Poland and then catch a flight back to DC.”

If Graham was killed in Kiev for his support for Ukraine then he was a truly unique Senator (except for John McCain who actually fought against the ‘Commies’ in Vietnam) who really did put their body on the line for the glorious victory they demanded the U.S. taxpayer finance.

Of course the Persian and Russian media are pushing the narrative that Senator Graham was a pedophile because one of the gay male prostitutes in question was 17. Their headlines with the words “pedophile Graham” in a bold type face mislead one into thinking that the senator was on the hunt outside of elementary schools. We must be clear that this is not the case. But who knows what could be found when further Epstein Files get exposed to the public redaction free?

Graham, was so obviously homosexual that I referred to him in my political writings sarcastically as the “Southern Belle” as constant news about his Russophobic and bloodthirsty foreign policy plans made headlines over-and-over again. But this sort of makes one wonder, if Graham was a closeted homosexual who pushed for an America-destroying foreign policy of endless wars, how could he possibly keep getting elected. If you think about it, he should actually appeal to no one right?

If a politician is gay, then that must be part of their agenda in order to appeal to the Left. Being LGBT* means they are brave heroes of the men’s room floor or something. But, Graham stayed in the closet and sat on the Right, and on the Right people want manly-men who talk a conservative game like Trump, Schwarzenegger, Chuck Norris etc. Graham was obviously, in all of his mannerisms and speech patterns, no ‘man’s man’ for sure. So how did he keep getting elected?

I think the answer lies in the fact that both men and women vote and that Democracy creates a sort of weird compromise position between the genders to produce an ideal broad-spectrum candidate that is something like a Macron/Obama/Magyar archetype that ultimately pleases no one. Please allow me to explain.

No matter how much Feminist propaganda they pump into our minds in America only 55% of people will say openly that gender doesn’t matter for a presidential candidate. That is to say, publically, when potentially virtue-signaling, only half of 21st century Americans say it would be acceptable to have a female ruler. This is genetic, as the male ways of thinking and speaking are much more appealing for a prime leadership position. Thus, most successful female leaders tend to become like srhill-voiced men in pantsuits, like Hillary Clinton or Margaret Thatcher. Kamala Harris, was not particularly masculine and thus got crushed. No matter how much some people think we should have a female President, in general, humans are genetically inclined to not want to do so or at least see a female candidate as non top-tier choice.

Thus, we can see there is a natural skew towards male politicians being more appealing in general, but there is a huge nuance to this.

If you ask both men and women to draw ideal versions of each gender, an interesting thing occurs. Men drawing women tend to make them more sexualized, almost aggressively so, that is to say they make them more masculine by being overtly sexual. Women do the opposite, their ideal man is much more of a lean somewhat effeminate gentleman, a womanized man. Perhaps you could say it this way; men see a great man as being Conan the Barbarian or Rambo and women see a great man as being James Bond or one of the cookie-cutter male lead roles in a romantic comedy. The men that women like are not the men, that males find to be cool or leadership worthy. Our ‘tastes in men’ are completely different.

Thus, probably the most broadly appealing type of generic politician would be an effeminate man, who is still male, thus has the default appeal, but is favorable to female taste. Straight men won’t vote for a female candidate en masse. Women en masse won’t vote for a man’s man, they vote for a woman’s man. The old adage that ‘you want a President you could have a beer with’ only applies to men. Women want a president who could be the lead role in a chick flick or at least they could appear sensitive or understanding or something. The overt bisexual vibes of pseudo-men like Obama and Macron are utterly disgusting to straight men, but women often find this appealing or at least acceptable. Men want a warlord king, women want a caring gentleman.

And this is how we get to Lindsay Graham, an obviously gay man that won over-and-over again in the Deep South. He was both male enough and soft enough to be in that golden zone of ‘votability’. He sprinkled on some Conservative/Protestant talking points to not seem like an outsider and that was enough for him to be a viable candidate. That is the sad reality of things.

Democracy as time goes on seems to become more a more of a joke, as candidates that have to appeal to everyone, wind up ultimately being for no one and achieving nothing. The femboys of politics, Trudeau, Macron, Obama, Starmer only exist because their nature lines up with our human instincts in the context of the system of universal suffrage voting that we have today. Thus, underage gay prostitute using, Russophobia peddling, America corrupting, human swine, Lindsey Graham is exactly the type of person that will continue to win elections in regions like South Carolina pending they pander to Protestantism and some other Right-wing talking points. Human genetics + Current Voting System + Lobbyists = Our Doom.

It also must be mentioned that since homosexuals have no families they have a vast competitive edge when it comes to the types of blogging and PR needed to get into office and climb their way up the media ladder. This excess of free time, and perhaps natural showmanship, is one other reason for the success of so many gay politicians, entertainers, etc., they have unlimited resources by comparison to parents of children. Tranny bloggers have infinite time to create content against Middle-American Dad with 4 kids. Graham lived the lifestyle of a truly great 21^st century ‘career politician’ it would seem.

Lindsay Graham is just another example of how the Western-style electoral system ‘doesn’t work’ in the interests of anyone, and it seems like politicians please no one but their donors, while ticking certain check boxes to get elected in a ‘two-party’ system. His legacy will be of the embodiment of the failure of the Enlightenment, Liberalism and Western-style Democracy, along with hysterical Russophobia and Gay Prostitution. What a legend!

* In accordance with the laws of the country in which I reside I must make it clear that the LGBT movement is ‘extremist’ and that Lindsey Graham is considered a ‘terrorist’.

Serbs voted “Students Win” without knowing what their program offers, it doesn’t even matter, “anyone is better than Vučić.”

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

What to make of the present Serbian moment? Post-Milošević politics is closing a two-and-a-half-decade cycle, standing on the threshold of a new era whose dynamics mirror the old. But history does not repeat; it rhymes. Eerily familiar patterns, driven by traits of the collective Serbian psyche, are re-emerging, even as external and internal material conditions chart a divergent course.

Color Revolutions are quite simple on a level identical to basic marketing. Why does the average person opt to pay a considerable premium for Nikes over some generic basketball shoe? There is top-down vertical advertising at the first level, but this is later surpassed by horizontal peer to peer viralization which leverages on social acceptance. Here this is a simple combination of Edward Bernays’ 1923 work, Crystalizing Public Opinion, his 1928 work, Propaganda, combined with Gustav Le Bon’s 1895 work The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Then of course there are Saul Alinsky, Gene Sharp, and Sharp’s student and Otpor! leader, Srđa Popović. But since the Arab Spring series of Color Revolutions, social media starting with Twitter became a critical factor.

There resides a great strength in social media, the TikTok generation, which also characterized by and large the foreign NGO-backed “Student” movement itself. The “Student list” came to power without clearly communicating to its own voters what exactly they would do on economic, territorial, and foreign policy matters if elected. On October 26th, they were placating Serbian nationalists and Eurosceptics on Russian television to absolve them of fears which in reality they are justified in having. We saw this also with Magyar in Hungary, so this part of the play’s script was not only already rehearsed, but had seen its opening night in the Hunnic lands to the north. But the “Student List” color revolutionaries did not wait long, on October 27^th, Ilija Srdanović, lead candidate of the Student List told the U.S. funded Radio Free Europe that the new government will continue EU integration and the EU-mediated dialogue with Pristina, we presume, towards Kosovo recognition.

Screenshot from RFE/RL Interview with Srdanovic

What Serbs before the election were told by the “Student List” was “Trust me, bro”, a gamble that a “majority” of people in the small Balkan country were apparently willing to take. We will not even discuss the improbability of over 600,000 new voters rising from graves or crawling out of strollers to vote, as Vučić is not challenging the results, even though the “Student List” Color Revolutionaries expected him to.

That fact alone relates to a broader economic and military crisis which looms overhead, and will be the subject of further analysis which will better explain why Vučić is in the optimal position politically as an opposition leader over the course of the coming years. But on that note, our prior analysis of the EU/NATO drive to war with Russia in 2029/2030 is all but certain; see Still a failure: The City of London backs EU’s €90 billion Ukraine war-chest.

The vaguemaxxing approach perfected at Occupy Wall Street sixteen years ago allowed the anti-Vučić opposition to present as a Rorschach blot of sorts; appearing as anti-EU/NATO nationalists to the nationalists and appear as pro-EU liberal to the liberals. Though, to wit, most sophisticated-enough liberals understood the strategy: to fool the “under-educated, Orthodox, working class, country-bumpkin nationalists”. This is part of the problem of the Serbian professional managerial class “intelligentsia” as Archibald Reiss understood over a century ago, and as we will discuss later on in this piece.

To understand the present moment requires grasping the years of betrayal that followed the post–Cold War era’s first color revolution, which unfolded in Belgrade twenty-six years ago. We outline those fifteen years before the rise of the Serbian Progressive Party for two important reasons; first to set the record straight on the actual condition of the “selling out” of Serbia as those new to the Serbia story are prone to believe the “Student list” ADHD propaganda that Vučić did these things, and second, perhaps more importantly, as a funhouse mirror forecast of sorts, given that we are nearing the start of a new rhyming historical cycle (back towards chaos and betrayals). However, the broader global context has changed. NATO is in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. Serbia is threatened on all sides, and is obviously both the lowest hanging fruit and the “punching bag” for the EU/NATO: what they cannot inflict upon Russia, they will inflict upon Serbia, which they regard as “little Russia”.

October 5^th – The “Bulldozer Revolution” – Color Revolutionaries storm the Parliament building and overthrow Milošević

Recall back in October, 2000; after winning the election, DOS (Demokratska opozicija Srbije), whose representative at the time was Vojislav Koštunica, the ruling party Socialists hastily betrayed and extradited their man, former president Slobodan Milošević, to an ad hoc tribunal established by bodies that had no jurisdiction over it. Immediately before the election, the sentiment of the people and the opposition movement “Otpor” was that anyone was better than Slobodan Milošević; they promised prosperity, peace and stability, a state without corruption or the mafia, and the people believed it. Following the election results, celebrations lasted for days with the slogan “He’s finished” and with hope for a better tomorrow. Their “better tomorrow” never came.

Serbia was in an abyss from 2000 all the way to 2012, around 1200 state-owned companies were sold for chump change, largely to foreign interests. These had been not only a mark of sovereignty, but also provided fair and reliable wages that working families relied upon. Because of the leaders of the DOS, Serbia was economically destroyed in the years that followed. When it was believed things couldn’t get worse, they proved Serbs wrong. Serbia was ruled by a party whose members were not in agreement regarding politics and the path they wanted to take, for all that united them was the rancid combination of Western backing and opposition to Milošević, (and this is the same contradiction we find with the “Student government” today).

This was evidenced again in 2003 with the extradition of the president of the opposition Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj, to the Hague Tribunal, where he remained until 2014 and was never convicted, and released and returned to Serbia in 2016 as the result of back-channel work done under Vučić in coordination with the Radical Party (an effort which this author participated). Later in that same year of 2003, just a month after Šešelj’s extradition, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was likely assassinated by members of the Serbian security establishment who feared that Đinđić would continue to extradite more Serbian patriots, which further weakened an already shaken state. Following this and the failed presidential elections, the disagreements between the leaders of DOS reached a culmination and the party split into two fronts, DS and DSS. During 2003 and 2004 Serbia had no president but rather a string of acting presidents: first Nataša Mićić (Civic Alliance of Serbia), who held that duty for three months, then Dragan Maršićanin (DSS) held the role for a month, then Predrag Marković (G17plus) performed the function for three months, after which Boris Tadić, of the Democratic Party (DS), was elected president in July 2004.

To make themselves more acceptable to EU membership, Serbian laws were changed and a new Constitution was adopted in 2006, during the term of President Tadić. In that constitution, Kosovo and Metohija were placed in the preamble of the constitution supposedly to emphasize the significance of the fact that Kosovo and Metohija is part of Serbia, forgetting to emphasize that the preamble of a constitution is not necessarily a binding part. Immediately before the adoption of the 2006 Constitution, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was dissolved, leaving Serbia landlocked. This was the culmination of a Western-instructed independence referendum, made possible when Serbian authorities previously signed the Belgrade Agreement to restructure relations between Serbia and Montenegro, where there we saw the renaming of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Union State of Serbia and Montenegro before its eventual split. A questionable constitution was adopted. At that moment, Serbia had no real army, the “Democratic” authorities made sure of this during that period, which in turn laid the perfect groundwork for the ethnic Albanian declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia in February 2008. Serbia had no army to defend it, the people took to the streets and protested, but since preserving Serbian sovereignty was not on the list of Western/NGO requirements of Serbia, nothing came of it. Nota bene: this is what happens when protests are without mass institutional support (foreign or domestic); the elites weather them and people’s spontaneous protests fizzle out and demoralization sets in. Sustained protests for years requires massive organization and high levels of funding and coordination.

After this, Serbia under Tadić signs the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. In 2008 Serbia experiences an economic crash during the global crisis engineered by Wall Street and the City of London (which as an aside led to the next round of Color Revolutions in the form of the Arab Spring within two years), the loss of jobs, and a spike in the euro exchange rate. After that, the then- Democratic Party (DS) authorities under President Tadić extradited more Serbian heroes to the Hague Tribunal: Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadžić in 2008, followed Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in 2011, in exchange for which Serbia received candidate status for EU membership.

Archibald Reiss, the Swiss criminologist and Serbophile was so moved by the Serbian spirit, unity, and sacrifice during the First World War that he made Serbia his home, but in equal measure found himself outraged and indeed demoralized by the levels of corruption, opportunism, and classism among the elites both during and after the war. His insights into the Serbian mentality tell us a lot about what we have just seen, or rather, why things played out the way they did. Reiss meticulously dissected the tragic rift between the noble, heroic ordinary people and a self-serving, corrupt intellectual and political elite. Reiss would have viewed the foreign-backed NGO color revolution that ousted Vučić as little more than another manifestation of the Serbian elite’s moral decay, naivety, and subservience to external powers, and also their sense of entitlement lording over the Serbian masses, in Ottoman style, but worse for it requires manipulating and playing upon Serbian patriotism, sense of duty, and their deep rooted commitment to both personal and collective freedom. Reiss would sharply lament how the populace, endowed with immense bravery yet often prone to political short-sightedness and easily gas-lit by grand rhetoric, allowed themselves to become pawns in a geopolitical game orchestrated by foreign money and nefarious interests. He would fiercely criticize the urban “intelligentsia” and opportunistic political actors for their uncritical envy and imitation of foreign masters (what today we would call a product of autochauvinism combined with foreign soft power acculturation), pointing out that in exchanging one ostensibly “corrupt autocrat” for leaders beholden to external NGOs, Serbia merely traded internal political clientelism for foreign subservience. To Reiss, actual national sovereignty and social justice could never be gifted by foreign-funded apparatuses; rather, by relying on foreign interventions instead of conducting a deep, self-reliant moral regeneration from within, Serbians had once again fallen victim to their tragic flaw: letting the “king of money” and corrupt elites dictate their destiny while losing sight of their own authentic identity.

Čujte Srbi: čuvajte se sebe – by Rodolphe Archibald Reiss

Reiss observed that the Serbian political elite and the self-proclaimed intelligentsia flipped wildly between a sense of superiority over their own populace and deep-seated envy of wealthier, more advanced foreign nations. Their idea of modernizing Serbia was not to build on authentic national virtues, but to copy external models superficially (today, the EU or the ‘Nordic model’) while harboring a hidden disdain for the common Serbian peasant (Vučić voters, derided as Sendvučić, voting in exchange for sandwiches). Modernization, in that sense, was a vanity project rather than a matter of national survival.

Magyar offers congratulations to the Student List

So now here in late October 2026 we hear “He’s finished” on the streets. Once again, Serbs have bought the lie. Once again a state without corruption, without a mafia was promised. Serbs voted “Students Win” without knowing what their program offers, it doesn’t even matter, “anyone is better than Vučić.” The paradox is that now the state will be led by the very people who ruined it in the period from 2000 to 2012 and to finish everything they couldn’t back then. We can forecast the return of the Hungarian separatist movement in Vojvodina, which flourished in the early 2000s with the support of the Provincial Government headed by Bojan Pajtić in the period from 2004 to 2009, who is now on the Students Win parliamentary list. Without Orbán in Hungary, and specifically with Magyar there in charge, we can all but guarantee it. But as we have said, war is on the horizon. Where the Russian army situates by 2028 will determine much. Where the U.S. will situate after presidential elections in November of that same year will determine the rest.

Follow Joaquin Flores on Telegram @NewResistance or on X/Twitter @XoaquinFlores

Il 24 ottobre, l’Ucraina ha annunciato che i suoi sistemi Starlink e Starshield erano di nuovo pienamente operativi dopo oltre una settimana di restrizioni. Nello specifico, il Ministero della Difesa ucraino ha rilevato che la connessione è tornata stabilmente a velocità superiori a 400 km/h, a fronte dei 160 km/h a cui era precipitata giorni prima.
La limitazione, hanno spiegato diversi funzionari ucraini, aveva compromesso la capacità ucraina di intercettare i droni russi in fase di attacco, costringendo le forze armate di Kiev ad annullare alcune operazioni già pianificate.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Tuttavia, a brevissima distanza dal ripristino della piena operatività dei sistemi Starlink a disposizione di Kiev, Elon Musk, amministratore delegato di Space-X, ha accusato l’esercito ucraino di aver violato i termini di servizio.

In un post sul suo profilo X, il magnate di origini sudafricane ha affermato che: «l’uso di Starlink, un servizio commerciale civile, per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone non è mai stato consentito, né dovrebbe esserlo. Starshield è un sistema diverso ed è controllato dal governo degli Stati Uniti. Ciò che decidono di fare spetta a loro».

L’esercito ucraino «ha violato i termini di servizio di Starlink e lo ha utilizzato per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone. Quella falla è stata chiusa la settimana scorsa».

Starlink «rimane cruciale per la difesa dell’Ucraina, poiché è l’unico sistema che non può essere disturbato o distrutto, almeno per ora. Se Starlink venisse spento, il fronte ucraino collasserebbe immediatamente. Questa non è una minaccia, è semplicemente un dato di fatto.

Il sistema si è rivelato cruciale per «impedire alla Russia di sopraffare l’Ucraina nei primi giorni della guerra, poiché tutti gli altri mezzi di comunicazione erano stati distrutti o disturbati dalla Russia».

Space-X «ha fatto molto di più per difendere l’Ucraina di qualsiasi altra azienda privata sulla Terra. Detto questo, non provo che disprezzo assoluto per i guerrafondai che fanno la morale e spingono per un massacro senza fine, senza offrire alcuna soluzione realistica al conflitto. Che possano bruciare all’inferno. Fine della storia».

Starlink è un sistema internet satellitare gestito da Space-X, mentre Starshield è una versione che si avvale della tecnologia Starlink per scopi militari gestita dal governo degli Stati Uniti.

Questa integrazione rende quantomeno ambigua la posizione di Starlink, mettendo in seria discussione la natura privata della casa madre Space-X.

Quella del connubio pubblico-privato negli Stati Uniti è una storia vecchissima, ma che trova negli anni Cinquanta uno dei suoi momenti decisivi.

All’epoca, in piena Guerra Fredda, lo spauracchio sovietico, agitato con cieca ossessività specialmente in seguito allo shock generato dal lancio dello Sputnik (1957) e all’entrata in servizio del bombardiere strategico Tupolev-95, si rivelò determinante a costruire un robusto consenso politico attorno alla decisione dell’amministrazione Eisenhower di destinare una quota crescente di risorse al rafforzamento della marina e al potenziamento dei settori di ricerca e sviluppo.

L’onere di gestire le risorse e coordinare gli sforzi in questo senso ricadde sulla Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), un organismo facente capo al Pentagono fondato, al pari della National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa), nel 1958 in conformità all’esigenza di colmare il divario tecnico-scientifico con l’Unione Sovietica.

Mentre il governo moltiplicava le misure di stimolo alle imprese (assegnazione di commesse pubbliche agli atenei, concessione di agevolazioni fiscali, ecc.), la Darpa elaborava una rete di ricerca e condivisione a maglie strettissime, in grado di interconnettere decine di università, start-up e laboratori di ricerca e portare gli Stati Uniti all’avanguardia nel campo cruciale della scienza. Il lancio dei programmi Gemini e Apollo, lo sviluppo dei missili balistici a medio e lungo raggio, la realizzazione dei sottomarini e delle portaerei a propulsione nucleare si devono al contributo determinante apportato dalla Darpa.

Nel 1982, il Congresso approvò il programma di sostegno alle start-up Small Business Innovation Research (Sbir), affidandone la gestione alla Small Business Administration, predisponendo parallelamente la trasformazione della Darpa nel fondamentale canale di collegamento tra imprese e dipartimenti universitari, in grado di assolvere ai compiti di mediazione tecnologica e imprenditoriale necessari alla commercializzazione delle innovazioni che venivano realizzate nei settori di punta (informatica, telecomunicazioni, biotecnologia, semiconduttori, ecc.) dalle società hi-tech a cui il complesso militar-industriale aveva subappaltato parte delle mansioni legate ai comparti di ricerca e sviluppo, nell’ambito della celeberrima Strategic Defense Initiative (Sdi).

Il progetto, concepito dall’amministrazione Reagan e annunciato urbi et orbi nel marzo 1983, puntava alla creazione di un sistema di difesa aerea multistratificato basato su intercettori spaziali in grado di colpire i missili balistici nemici prima che colpissero il suolo statunitense, “superando” così il principio della mutua distruzione assicurata su cui si era imperniata la Guerra Fredda fino a quel momento.

La Sdi, recita un documento del dipartimento di Stato, «si basava su tecnologie avveniristiche, inclusi sistemi laser spaziali non ancora realizzati», il cui sviluppo assorbì enormi risorse pubbliche in larga parte ridistribuite a beneficio delle aziende private sotto il coordinamento della Darpa.

Una volta convertite all’uso civile, le nuove tecnologie ad elevata intensità di capitale messe a punto contestualmente alla Sdi assunsero rapidamente un grado di pervasività – inteso come capacità di trovare applicazione in un numero sbalorditivo di campi sconvolgendone il funzionamento e i rendimenti – tale da scompaginare il vecchio sistema di produzione fordista ad elevata intensità di manodopera riducendo drasticamente la presenza umana sia nella manifattura che nel settore di servizi.

«Non si tralasciò occasione – osserva Giuseppe Guarino – che si prestasse per la stimolazione e la promozione della Information Technology per finalità militari. Ognuna delle sue fasi essenziali, con successiva trasformazione e utilizzazione dei prodotti a fini commerciali, è stata in pratica resa possibile dal sostegno del Dipartimento della Difesa, dalla Nasa e degli altri dipartimenti militari, compresa la Cia […]. Il merito dell’intervento pubblico non è di aver assorbito l’intera produzione della Information Technology, ma di aver contribuito in maniera determinante con i propri acquisti iniziali a far scendere i prezzi a livelli che avrebbero consentito la diffusione civile e commerciale delle innovazioni, nonché con quelli successivi che hanno favorito l’utilizzazione delle nuove tecnologie nell’organizzazione pubblica, anche civile, e la diffusione delle stesse» (1).

La progressiva affermazione del nuovo modello in tutti i comparti dell’economia ha accelerato il processo di “terziarizzazione” dell’economia statunitense, e palesato il ruolo cruciale giocato dallo Stato rispetto al finanziamento dello sviluppo tecnologico realizzato da aziende private.

Negli anni ’90, sotto la direzione del direttore George Tenet, la Cia iniziò a finanziare generosamente le piccole aziende intente a sviluppare tecnologie applicabili a fini di intelligence aggirando le lungaggini che caratterizzano la mastodontica macchina burocratica statunitense. A questo scopo, la Casa Bianca e il Congresso approvarono la creazione di In-Q-Tel, oscura società di venture capital senza scopo di lucro incaricata di finanziare la messa a punto di tecnologie d’avanguardia per conto – o quasi – della Cia. Come riporta il «Wall Street Journal»:  «i vertici In-Q-Tel considerano l’azienda come indipendente, nonostante i legami molto stretti con la Cia e il fatto che quasi tutte le decisioni di investimento sono gestite dall’agenzia di spionaggio […].La presenza di intricati legami è endemica nel venture capital, in cui la conoscenza intima del settore è essenziale per il successo. Le altre società, tuttavia, giocano con il proprio denaro, o quello di privati».

In-Q-Tel «utilizza denaro pubblico, soggetto a severe norme sul conflitto di interessi e, secondo fonti vicine, si tratta di almeno 120 milioni di dollari all’anno. A volte impegna questo capitale secondo modalità che, anche se non intenzionalmente, avvantaggiano gli stessi amministratori dell’azienda in virtù di altre cariche nel settore hi-tech».

Quasi sempre, le scelte di In-Q-Tel «attraggono altri finanziamenti. Ogni dollaro investito in una piccola impresa in genere è accompagnato da 15 dollari provenienti da altre fonti. Questo aumenta le probabilità di successo del piccolo business in questione e rende le sue stock option più preziose».

Nel 2000, In-Q-Tel ha investito somme piuttosto rilevanti in alcune imprese che producevano satelliti e che si occupavano di raccogliere, classificare e analizzare dati sensibili. In breve tempo, la società ha accumulato quote azionarie di maggioranza di decine compagnie hi-tech, così da dettarne gli indirizzi e allinearle alle esigenze di Washington. Opportunamente orientata dai fondi di In-Q-Tel, una compagnia specializzata nell’elaborazione di soluzioni chimiche adatte alla fabbricazione di tappeti sviluppò in breve tempo una specie di sonda in grado di rilevare la presenza di veleni ed altre sostanze chimiche letali in ambienti chiusi, poi sistematicamente impiegata nei teatri di guerra afghano e iracheno.

Parallelamente, In-Q-Tel investì in un’azienda operante nel settore delle antenne satellitari, ricavando sistemi di localizzazione portatili di cui le truppe e le forze speciali Usa si sono servite per segnalare la propria posizione ai centri di comando.

Più recentemente, i capitali di In-Q-Tel hanno finanziato aziende cruciali come Anduril e, soprattutto, Palantir, saldamente integrata nelle macchine militari statunitense, israeliana e ucraina oltre che nella pubblica amministrazione britannica e in molti altri comparti critici.

L’altissimo livello di “collaborazione pubblico-privato” raggiunto negli Stati Uniti grazie a entità come In-Q-Tel è emblematizzato dal cosiddetto “scandalo Datagate”, scoperchiato nel 2013 grazie alle rivelazioni dello “spifferatore” Edward Snowden. In qualità di tecnico impiegato per una società appaltatrice della National Security Agency, Snowden ha documentato con dovizia di particolari l’esistenza di una rete di sorveglianza capillare e massiccia sui miliardi di comunicazioni sia interne che esterne agli Stati Uniti gestita dalla Nsa stessa attraverso Prism. Vale a dire un sistema in grado di assicurare all’intelligence nazionale la possibilità di accedere in maniera diretta ai server di cui si servivano le aziende operanti nel settore dell’alta tecnologia per ottenere qualsiasi tipo di informazione (messaggi, fotografie, e-mail, ecc.).

Entrato in vigore nel 2007 e beneficiando nel corso degli anni della collaborazione di colossi del calibro di Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, Skype, AoL, YouTube e Apple, Prism ha posto la Nsc e anche il Gchq britannico nelle condizioni di acquisire i metadati in transito attraverso i cavi in fibra ottica collegati ai server centrali di Yahoo e Google.

Space-X non ha beneficiato dei fondi di In-Q-Tel, ma del subappalto sistematico ad opera di agenzie statali come la Nasa o dello stesso Pentagono, che come contropartita gode di libero e completo accesso alla tecnologia  Starlink. Al punto da garantirlo a Paesi alleati come l’Ucraina.

La decisione di ridurre prima e ripristinare poi il servizio Starlink a Kiev non fa quindi capo a Elon Musk, ma sui vertici del potere pubblico statunitense a cui Space-X – così come le altre grandi aziende hi-tech statunitensi – rispondono più o meno indirettamente.

NOTE

1) Guarino, Giuseppe, I soldi della guerra. Gli Stati Uniti: spesa militare, innovazione, economia globale, Mondadori, Milano 2003, pp. 67-80.

By Brett WILKINS

“This reveals the DNA of Bolsonarism,” said one critic. “Bolsonarism is made of cowardice.”

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Just one day after vowing he would remain in Brazil to disprove allegations of money laundering, corruption, and other crimes, far-right Brazilian Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro followed in his disgraced father’s footsteps by fleeing to the United States after losing a presidential election.

Bolsonaro, his wife Fernanda Bolsonaro, and their two daughters, ages 14 and 12, left Brazil for an unknown location in the United States, according to initial reporting by Isadora Teixeira at the Brasília-based news site Metrópoles, which was subsequently confirmed by other Brazilian and international media.

The Argentinian site Infobae reported that Bolsonaro and his family may have crossed into Argentina—which is run by his ally, far-right President Javier Milei—and then traveled to the US in a private jet. It is not known where the family went in the US.

Bolsonaro’s brother, Eduardo Bolsonaro, lives in Texas while facing criminal punishment in Brazil after trying to use the Trump administration to pressure Brazilian authorities over the prosecution of his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who last year was convicted of conspiring to violently remain in power following leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s 2022 election win.

Flávio Bolsonaro, a 45-year-old senator representing Rio de Janeiro, was defeated by Lula in Sunday’s second-round election, but refused to accept the results and groundlessly demanded an annulment. The following day, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered the seizure of Bolsonaro’s passport. He was supposed to have turned in the document Tuesday, but he didn’t.

US President Donald Trump also cast doubt on the election’s outcome, saying the contest appeared to be “rigged.”

Jair Bolsonaro also fled to the United States while refusing to acknowledge his own 2022 defeat, which occurred during the administration of former President Joe Biden.

Like Trump, Bolsonaro incited a violent insurrection in his nation’s capital following his loss.

Unlike Trump, Bolsonaro was held accountable for his crimes, and, in addition to a 27-year prison sentence—now being served under house arrest—is banned from running for any political office for the rest of the decade.

Now, with Trump back in the White House and Secretary of State Marco Rubio in charge at Foggy Bottom, Bolsonaro and his relatives are set to be issued US visas, a senior State Department official told The Associated Press.

The younger Bolsonaro’s flight—which may have been aided by his obtaining an Italian passport in 2023—contradicts his pledge on Monday, when he said, “I have never thought about leaving the country” and “I will hand over my passports and defend myself against this travesty.”

He was referring to de Morães’ order to surrender his passport amid accusations of corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, and foreign currency violations.

Bolsonaro is also the subject of an inquiry pertaining to the millions of dollars he raised from a disgraced banker implicated in a massive corrupt plot to finance a biopic of Jair Bolsonaro.

The senator has not been charged and denies any wrongdoing.

Bolsonaro’s flight stands in stark contrast to Lula, who spent 580 days in prison after being convicted in corruption cases stemming from the sprawling Operation Car Wash investigation.

In 2021, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court annulled Lula’s convictions on procedural grounds, ruling that the court in Curitiba lacked jurisdiction over the cases and separately finding that former judge Sergio Moro had acted with bias in one of them. The decisions restored Lula’s political rights and eligibility to run for office, paving the way for his 2022 presidential victory over Bolsonaro.

Lula responded to the senator’s departure by saying, “Unfortunately, the Bolsonaro family is like that.”

“Brazil is his second homeland,” the president continued, accusing Bolsonaro of “bootlicking in the United States.”

Secretary-General of the Brazilian Presidency Guilherme Castro Boulos ripped Bolsonaro, saying: “Leaders face things head-on! Rats run away!”

“It is a shameful thing, which should make Brazilian society as a whole reflect, especially those who supported and voted for Flávio Bolsonaro,” Boulos asserted. “He slapped his supporters in the face and left them on the side of the road.”

“Almost 60 million Brazilians trusted him as political leadership to run the country, and 24 hours later, he flees,” he continued. “And it’s no use coming up with this talk of persecution, of dictatorship. He ran away because he must.”

“This reveals the DNA of Bolsonarism,” Boulos added. “Bolsonarism is made of cowardice.”

Erika Hilton, a member of the Chamber of Deputies—the lower house of Brazil’s Legislature—representing São Paulo for the Socialism and Liberty Party, weighed in on social media, calling Bolsonaro “a traitor to the homeland.”

In the United States, Congressman Joaquin Castro (D-Texas) said on X that “losing an election is not grounds for asylum.”

“Yet the Trump administration is giving Flávio Bolsonaro safe haven in the United States,” he continued. “The Trump administration owes Congress answers on its role helping Bolsonaro flee Brazil in contravention of Brazilian law.”

Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR), told Common Dreams:

Trump is now the most corrupt president in US history, raking in billions from his presidency. It’s no surprise when the most powerful corrupt authoritarian government in the hemisphere uses international law designed to protect the persecuted to shield another corrupt authoritarian government from criminal prosecution. Perhaps this is what is meant by the Trump-led ‘Shield of the Americas.’

Francesca Emanuele, senior international policy associate at CEPR, noted that “the United States has long served as a destination for numerous right-wing Latin American political figures who fled their home countries while facing corruption allegations, criminal investigations, or accusations of grave human rights violations, including crimes against humanity.”

“The list is extensive,” she added, “ranging from former presidents such as Panama’s Ricardo Martinelli and Bolivia’s Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to dictators such as Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza.”

Emanuele also contrasted the actions of the Bolsonaros and Lula, arguing that the latter’s decision to remain in Brazil “reflected a commitment to the Brazilian people and a determination to defend his rights through the country’s own institutions, even when those institutions failed to uphold them.”

“Rather than leaving Brazil,” she told Common Dreams, “Lula stayed, fought to clear his name, and continued his political struggle alongside the people he sought to represent.”

Original article:  www.commondreams.org

Education binds generations. But “provided sovereignty” is ambivalent – can you build it for someone else?

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Reflection and outlook

The speech delivered by Vladimir Putin on October 28, 2026, at the Gostiny Dvor in Moscow, at the opening of the plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, lends itself to two interpretations. The first, the most immediate, reduces it to a catalog: wheat, fertilizers, hydroelectric power plants, scholarships, mobile laboratories, and language models. The second takes it for what it is: a programmatic text that would be translated the following day into the 2027–2029 Partnership Action Plan. The summit is the third in the series, following those in Sochi and St. Petersburg. The continuity of the format already speaks volumes: the Russian-African relationship has moved beyond the phase of declarations and is seeking a framework.

Moscow does not offer Africa a volume of resources capable of competing head-to-head with Beijing or Brussels, and it knows this; instead, it offers a set of infrastructures related to sovereignty – food, energy, finance, digital technology, and education – whose political value exceeds its accounting value. The geopolitical value of this cooperation lies in this gap. Its limitations, which do exist, lie in the very same point.

The word that underpins the entire discourse is “sovereignty.” Putin uses it about twenty times, but what matters is the definition he provides halfway through the text. It is no longer merely about control over territory and borders: sovereignty encompasses the political and financial stability of the system, the availability of food, water, and energy, reliable transportation and communications, and a distinct cultural identity. Added to this list is a further layer: jurisdiction over data, platforms, and artificial intelligence models.

This expanded definition has a precise logical consequence. If sovereignty consists of material and technical elements, then it can be built – and if it can be built, it can also be provided by a partner. Sovereignty thus becomes, in the Kremlin’s discourse, something to be exchanged: Russia provides the technical means by which African countries can reduce their dependence on other suppliers. It is no coincidence that Putin concludes by announcing a “platform for the sovereign development of African states,” designed in Russia and presented at a dedicated exhibition. This formula carries an obvious ambivalence, which we will return to.

The second theme is that of anti-colonial memory. The quote from Thomas Sankara on debt as a form of neocolonialism – in which the colonizers have transformed themselves into “technical assistants” – is no mere ornament. Sankara is a figure who speaks to the new leadership in the Sahel – particularly in Ouagadougou – and whom urban African youth know well. Invoking him in Moscow means situating Russia within an African, not a Soviet, genealogy. The next passage makes the strategy explicit: the continent’s infrastructure was built to export raw materials to the metropolises; manufacturing value-added remains below 2 percent; and intra-African trade accounts for barely 15 percent of a total trade volume of 1,500 billion dollars. This diagnosis is the same as that found in African literature on structural dependence. Moscow embraces this analysis and presents itself as the means to overcome it.

The scale of trade

The Russian president has stated that Russian-African trade will exceed $27 billion in 2025, up from $18 billion in 2022, and has set a target of surpassing $50 billion “in the near future.” This growth is real and, considering that it occurred under the most extensive sanctions regime ever imposed on a G20 economy, politically significant. It indicates that a substantial number of African governments have chosen not to align with Western measures and have paid the price for this choice in terms of diplomatic pressure. Putin openly acknowledges this when he thanks his partners for their “firm and principled stance.”

This is a market thatcan still grow – if that is the goal. China’s trade with the continent is in the range of $300 billion, as is that of the European Union. Russia’s trade is less than one-tenth of either of those figures. Not only that: the balance is highly asymmetrical. Russian agricultural exports to Africa reached 13 million metric tons in the first nine months of 2026, while imports of African agricultural products totaled about $4 billion – 8 percent of Russia’s needs. Putin himself admits that the figure is low and that it will have to grow. This admission is significant because it touches on the most sensitive point of anti-colonial rhetoric: a partner that sells grain, fertilizers, and weapons but buys very little replicates, in numerical terms, the very structure that the discourse denounces.

This leads to an initial assessment. Russia competes in niches where it enjoys comparative advantages that are difficult to replicate: grains and fertilizers, civil nuclear power, hydroelectric power, mining, higher education, and military cooperation. These are sectors in which the quantity of capital matters less than its strategic nature. A country that depends on Russia for wheat and on Russia for its nuclear power plant has a closer tie to Moscow than the monetary value of trade would suggest.

The most important levers: food, energy, currency

The first lever is food security. Over forty African countries import Russian wheat and fertilizers, and for some, supplies have multiplied. This data must be viewed alongside the demographic trends mentioned in the same speech: over 2.5 billion inhabitants by 2050, 70 percent of whom will be under thirty, according to United Nations projections. For a continent with this demographic trajectory, the price of bread is a key factor in political stability, and whoever guarantees the continuity of supply gains a form of credit that does not appear on any trade balance. Putin, however, adds a new element: the provision of seeds, machinery, logistics, and processing capabilities to support African agricultural self-sufficiency within the framework of the African Union’s program. On the surface, this offer reduces dependence on Russian wheat; in practice, it shifts dependence from the product itself to the technological supply chain.

The second lever is energy. The reference to the 55th anniversary of the Aswan Dam serves as historical proof of reliability. The present is entrusted to RusHydro, to modular power generation for isolated areas, and above all to civilian nuclear power, which was mentioned among the forum’s topics. Putin speaks of over thirty energy projects in sixteen countries. Nuclear power has a distinctive feature that makes it geopolitically more significant than any other sector: a power plant binds supplier and customer together for sixty or seventy years, encompassing fuel, maintenance, staff training, and waste management. It is a form of cooperation that outlasts governments.

The third lever – the least spectacular – is probably the most important from a structural standpoint. Putin proposes consolidating settlements in national currencies, expanding banking correspondent networks, opening cross-border branches, and linking Russia’s SPFS to the Pan-African PAPSS. The PAPSS (Pan-African Payment and Settlement System) was developed by Afreximbank in collaboration with the AfCFTA Secretariat and launched commercially in January 2022. The SPFS is the Bank of Russia’s financial messaging system, operational since 2014 as an alternative to SWIFT. The stated goal is to reduce transaction costs and shield payments from “politically motivated interference.” Then comes a sentence that, in the report, goes almost unnoticed: some countries do not have their own financial systems and are tied to European ones, which limits their sovereignty. The reference is to the CFA franc zone. This is the first time, in a speech of this caliber, that the monetary issue has been linked so directly to the question of African sovereignty. The message is directed primarily at the governments of the Alliance of Sahelian States, which have turned the monetary issue into a political one.

This third point warrants careful consideration. The link between the SPFS and the PAPSS, if established, would create a payment circuit between Russia and Africa entirely outside Western infrastructure. The significance of this circuit, however, would depend on the liquidity circulating within it, and liquidity depends on trade volumes, which, as we have seen, remain modest. It is more likely, in the medium term, that the PAPSS will gain significance as an intra-African infrastructure and that the Russian connection will be one component among others, alongside those from China, India, and the United Arab Emirates. Even so, it would be a success for Moscow: there is no need to dominate an alternative circuit; it is enough to contribute to making it possible.

But also technology

The section dedicated to technological sovereignty is the most assertive part of the speech. Putin claims a complete value chain for generative artificial intelligence, two national language models, banking and healthcare platforms, and digital administration systems that he offers to African partners. More than two hundred officials from twenty countries have already participated in skills-transfer programs on digital administration.

Here, the ambivalence of “provided sovereignty” becomes evident. An e-government system, a healthcare data platform, or a language model are not neutral assets: whoever controls the code, updates, and hosting retains the ability to access and influence them. The problem does not concern Russia alone – and applies even more to U.S. and Chinese platforms already entrenched on the continent – but the speech does not address this. From an African perspective, the advantage lies in diversification: having a third provider increases bargaining power vis-à-vis the other two. This is the logic of multi-alignment that many African foreign ministries have been practicing for years, and which Russia supports rather than opposes.

Education is the area where continuity with the Soviet experience is most pronounced. Forty thousand African students are enrolled in Russian universities – a 50 percent increase since 2020 – with 5,500 government scholarships for the 2026–2027 academic year, the Russian-African University Network with over seventy universities in seventeen countries, consortia specializing in mineral resources and transportation, and fifty-eight open education centers in twenty-nine countries. The Patrice Lumumba University remains the symbolic reference point. This is the slowest-moving component of the strategy, and also the one that yields the greatest returns. The engineers, doctors, and civil servants being trained today in Moscow and St. Petersburg will, in fifteen or twenty years, hold decision-making positions in African governments and businesses, bringing with them language skills, technical standards, and personal networks. The generation of African professionals trained in the USSR sustained a significant portion of Russian-African relations for decades, even after 1991.

The same applies to the media. The call to build a “common media space” – through the expansion of regional offices of Russian news agencies and a greater presence of African journalists in Russia – is a response to a narrative competition that Moscow considers an integral part of the game. The African continent is today one of the main arenas where the ability to produce competing interpretations of the international order is put to the test.

Africa is becoming polarized, and Russia is facilitating the process

At the systemic level, this discourse places Africa within the multipolar framework in terms different from those typically used in Western rhetoric. The continent is not viewed as a recipient of aid but as one of the emerging poles of the global economy and politics, represented by three members in the BRICS. The reference to the BRICS’ share of global GDP – which exceeds that of the G7 – must be contextualized, but the political point is clear: Africa is being encouraged to view its demographic and economic growth as a source of power rather than merely a development challenge.

Within this framework, Russia presents itself as a facilitator of African agency rather than as a hegemonic power, and this role suits it for a practical reason: it lacks the means to be hegemonic. It supports Africa within multilateral institutions, where Moscow proposes strengthening the African voice in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It consolidates this support through its backing of the AfCFTA, which Putin cites in positive terms and which represents the only project capable of addressing the fragmentation of African markets inherited from the colonial era. The calculation can be interpreted in realist terms. A more integrated and autonomous Africa reduces the scope for Western influence – which is Moscow’s primary objective – without requiring Russia to make investments it could not sustain.

The benefit for Moscow is threefold. First, the vote: 54 African states carry weight in the General Assembly, and their abstention or non-alignment on resolutions regarding the conflict in Ukraine has already demonstrated how valuable this is. Second, access: critical mineral resources, outlets for agricultural and energy exports, and markets for Russian technology excluded from Western markets. Third, legitimacy: a summit in Moscow attended by dozens of African delegations effectively refutes the claim that Russia is internationally isolated. And, throughout all this, the summit did not address the important military alliance between Russia and the Sahel, a topic for discussion on other occasions.

The success of Russian-African cooperation will be measured by the ability to truly transfer expertise, to localize the processing of raw materials, and to rebalance trade. Herein lies Russia’s greatest challenge: to help Africa, not to make it dependent. Sankara, whom Putin quoted, warned precisely against those who present themselves as technical advisors. African governments will judge Moscow on this basis, not on the words spoken at Gostiny Dvor.

The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

Auf den ersten Blick hat diese Geschichte weder mit Deutschland noch mit Europa besonders viel zu tun. Am 31. Oktober beginnen in Dakar die Olympischen Jugendspiele, zum ersten Mal überhaupt findet damit eine olympische Veranstaltung auf afrikanischem Boden statt. Doch tatsächlich zeigt gerade Dakar ein weiteres Feld der europäischen Konfrontation mit Russland – eines, das mit Sport im eigentlichen Sinne und mit den viel beschworenen Prinzipien des „Fair Play“ inzwischen nur noch wenig zu tun hat.

Russland wird im Senegal mit lediglich 13 jungen Athleten vertreten sein. Immerhin dürfen sie wieder unter der eigenen Flagge antreten, und bei einem Sieg soll auch die russische Hymne erklingen. Nach Jahren der Verbote, neutralen Uniformen und absurden Konstruktionen, bei denen ein Sportler zwar Russe sein durfte, Russland aber möglichst nicht erwähnt werden sollte, sieht das zunächst wie eine Rückkehr zur Normalität aus.

Ist es aber nicht.

Denn diese Rückkehr erfolgt nur teilweise. Der Internationale Olympische Ausschuss hat seine bisherigen Empfehlungen gegenüber russischen Athleten inzwischen weitgehend aufgehoben. Verbindlich sind diese Entscheidungen für die internationalen Sportverbände jedoch nicht. Deshalb entsteht eine ausgesprochen merkwürdige Situation: In einer Sportart treten Russen wieder mit Flagge und Hymne an, in einer anderen bleiben sie „neutral“, in einer dritten dürfen sie weiterhin überhaupt nicht starten.

Mit sportlicher Leistung hat das alles nichts zu tun.

Ein junger Schwimmer, Judoka oder Radfahrer wird damit nicht danach beurteilt, wie schnell er schwimmt, wie gut er kämpft oder wie stark er fährt, sondern danach, welchen politischen Kurs die jeweilige internationale Föderation für richtig hält.

Das nennt sich dann gerne Autonomie des Sports. In Wirklichkeit ist es die institutionalisierte Politisierung des Sports.

Besonders deutlich wird der Widerspruch beim Vergleich mit Israel. Seit Jahren werden russische Sportler für einen Krieg sanktioniert, den sie weder begonnen haben noch beeinflussen können. Israelische Athleten dagegen treten trotz des Krieges im Gazastreifen weiterhin ganz selbstverständlich mit Nationalflagge, Hymne und Mannschaftsbezeichnung auf.

Der IOC erklärt diesen Unterschied formal damit, dass das israelische und das palästinensische Nationale Olympische Komitee die Olympische Charta einhalten. Gleichzeitig betont dieselbe Organisation inzwischen wieder ausdrücklich, dass Athleten grundsätzlich nicht für die Handlungen ihrer Regierungen verantwortlich gemacht werden dürften.

Eine ausgezeichnete Erkenntnis. Nur hätte man sie vielleicht auch schon 2022 auf russische Sportler anwenden können.

Genau darin liegt das eigentliche Problem. Nicht darin, dass israelische Athleten teilnehmen dürfen – selbstverständlich sollen sie teilnehmen. Sondern darin, dass für Russen jahrelang völlig andere Maßstäbe galten.

Entweder trägt ein Athlet Verantwortung für die Politik seines Staates – dann müsste diese Regel für alle gelten. Oder er trägt sie nicht – dann hätte man russische Schwimmer, Turner, Fechter und Jugendliche niemals kollektiv bestrafen dürfen. Eine dritte Variante gibt es eigentlich nicht. Es sei denn, die Regeln werden abhängig davon angewendet, welches Land gerade politisch bestraft werden soll. Und genau danach sieht es aus.

Der Ausschluss Russlands aus weiten Teilen des internationalen Sports war von Anfang an weniger ein sportliches Instrument als eine Form politischer Sanktion. Er sollte Russland isolieren, aus internationalen Strukturen verdrängen und zugleich demonstrieren, dass ein Land, das sich dem westlichen politischen Konsens widersetzt, selbst in Bereichen bestraft werden kann, die mit Außenpolitik überhaupt nichts zu tun haben.

Dass dabei ausgerechnet junge Sportler getroffen wurden, machte die Angelegenheit nur noch grotesker.

Gerade die Jugendspiele in Dakar zeigen nun, wie widersprüchlich das System geworden ist. Einerseits erklärt der IOC plötzlich, insbesondere junge Athleten dürften nicht für Entscheidungen ihrer Regierungen verantwortlich gemacht werden. Andererseits bleiben die Folgen der früheren politischen Entscheidungen bestehen, weil einzelne Verbände weiterhin eigene Restriktionen anwenden können.

So entsteht keine Rückkehr zum Sport, sondern ein Flickenteppich politischer Loyalitätsprüfungen.

Dazu kommt die besondere Behandlung russischer Athleten im Anti-Doping-System. Wer nach längerer Abwesenheit wieder in internationale Wettbewerbe zurückkehrt, muss mehrfach getestet worden sein, russische Anti-Doping-Programme werden zusätzlich international überwacht, und einzelne Verbände können weitere Anforderungen festlegen.

Formal lässt sich das alles mit der Vorgeschichte des russischen Dopingsystems begründen. Praktisch entsteht aber erneut eine zusätzliche Hürde, die ausschließlich eine bestimmte Nationalität betrifft. Auch hier lautet das Problem nicht, dass kontrolliert wird. Dopingkontrollen sind notwendig. Die Frage ist vielmehr, wann Kontrolle aufhört, allgemeine sportliche Regel zu sein, und wann sie zum zusätzlichen politischen Zulassungsinstrument wird.

Parallel dazu verkauft der IOC Dakar 2026 als großes historisches Projekt: die ersten Olympischen Spiele auf afrikanischem Boden, ein Fest der Jugend, Afrikas und der internationalen Verständigung. Schöne Worte.

Die finanziellen und infrastrukturellen Risiken trägt allerdings vor allem Senegal. Sportstätten müssen modernisiert, Infrastruktur geschaffen, Sicherheits- und Organisationskosten übernommen werden. Der IOC erhält dagegen genau das, was eine Organisation seiner Art am dringendsten benötigt: neue Märkte, neue Bilder und den enormen symbolischen Gewinn, erstmals die olympischen Ringe auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent präsentieren zu können.

Auch das gehört inzwischen zum modernen Olympismus: Risiken werden lokalisiert, der internationale Reputationsgewinn wird globalisiert.

Und gleichzeitig spricht man weiter von Frieden, Völkerverständigung und politischer Neutralität. Vielleicht liegt gerade darin die größte Ironie. Der Sport sollte eigentlich einer der letzten Räume sein, in denen ein Mensch nicht als Bürger eines „richtigen“ oder „falschen“ Staates betrachtet wird, sondern schlicht als Athlet. Genau deshalb existiert überhaupt die Idee des Fair Play.

Doch im Verhältnis zu Russland wurde dieser Grundsatz jahrelang außer Kraft gesetzt. Nicht weil dadurch ein Krieg beendet worden wäre. Nicht weil ein russischer Judoka Einfluss auf Entscheidungen im Kreml hätte. Nicht weil ein 17-jähriger Schwimmer die russische Außenpolitik bestimmen könnte. Sondern weil Russland bestraft werden sollte.

Und besonders in Europa wurde diese Bestrafung längst zu einem politischen Selbstzweck. Russland muss ausgeschlossen, isoliert und sanktioniert werden – selbst dort, wo der Zusammenhang zwischen Sanktion und angeblichem Ziel vollkommen verschwunden ist.

Wenn dieselben Prinzipien bei anderen Kriegen plötzlich nicht mehr gelten, bleibt am Ende nur eine Erklärung übrig: Es geht nicht um universelle Regeln. Es geht darum, gegen wen sie angewendet werden.

Spätestens dort endet Fair Play und beginnt Politik. Oder, präziser gesagt: blanke Russophobie im Sportdress.