Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.

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J’ai passé suffisamment d’années à la Central Intelligence Agency pour apprendre à lire les articles de presse que les amis de l’agence placent pour elle. L’article de Shane Harris, le nouvel ami du directeur de la CIA John Ratcliffe, paru dans The Atlantic du 23 octobre, en est l’un des cas. Il est écrit pour faire passer Ratcliffe pour un professionnel sobre à la tête d’une administration chaotique. Mais lisez-le attentivement et il confirme ce que Washington a passé quatre ans à nier : les États-Unis ne se contentent pas d’approvisionner l’Ukraine. Par l’intermédiaire de la CIA, ils combattent la Russie.

Par Larry C Johnson

« La CIA dirige l’affaire »

Harris ne cache pas les faits. Armée des informations fournies par la CIA, l’armée ukrainienne a lancé des frappes au plus profond de la Russie. Les satellites espions américains avertissent rapidement l’Ukraine de l’arrivée de missiles et de drones russes. Parmi le personnel américain sur le terrain en Ukraine, un officier supérieur à la retraite qui s’y rend fréquemment lui a dit : “la CIA dirige l’affaire.”

Il y a mieux. Un officier du renseignement balte qui travaille en étroite collaboration avec les Américains a déclaré à Harris que, quoi que Donald Trump dise en public, les opérations de la CIA contre la Russie sont maintenant “beaucoup plus agressives” qu’elles ne l’étaient sous Joe Biden. Les officiers du Centre d’activités spéciales de la CIA, les personnes qui dirigent des opérations secrètes et paramilitaires, seraient parmi les plus heureux à Langley, car ils sont très occupés. Et ce n’est pas nouveau. Comme le note Harris, la CIA a aidé à construire l’appareil de renseignement moderne de l’Ukraine après la prise de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014. C’est une guerre que mène l’agence depuis plus d’une décennie.

Permettez-moi de traduire le langage poli d’un article de magazine. Les services de renseignement américains identifient les cibles à l’intérieur de la Russie, les satellites américains gèrent le réseau d’alerte de défense aérienne de l’Ukraine et les officiers américains “dirigent l’affaire” sur le terrain. Si la Russie faisait cela pour le Mexique contre le Texas, Washington appellerait cela un acte de guerre. Moscou dit depuis des années qu’il combat l’OTAN, pas seulement l’Ukraine. Voici, par la gracieuseté du magazine The Atlantic et de ses sources anonymes, la preuve.

Se tirer dans le réservoir de carburant

Maintenant vient l’absurdité. Selon Harris, le succès de la CIA est devenu un problème pour le président. Les frappes sur les raffineries que l’agence aide à activer ont entravé l’économie russe. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie estime qu’au cours des huit premiers mois de cette année, l’Ukraine a frappé une raffinerie russe en moyenne une fois tous les trois jours.

Ces raffineries fabriquent du diesel. Le monde manque de diesel. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie affirme que la pénurie durera au moins jusqu’en 2027. Et Trump, selon Harris, met la flambée des prix sur le dos des attaques contre les raffineries russes et veut qu’elles cessent. Il a menacé de couper le soutien des services de renseignement à l’Ukraine à moins que Kiev ne mette fin aux frappes sur les raffineries.

Réfléchissez à cela. La CIA aide l’Ukraine à éliminer la capacité de raffinage russe. Les prix du diesel montent en flèche. Puis le 9 octobre, en plein pourparlers de paix à Miami, le président annonce un accord pour que la Russie vende son diesel sur le marché mondial, se vantant sur Truth Social que les prix « BAISSERAIENT ET VITE ! ». Harris rapporte que l’annonce a surpris les négociateurs et que Poutine n’a pris aucun engagement réciproque. Ainsi, les États-Unis paient simultanément pour détruire la production russe de diesel et supplient la Russie de lui vendre plus de diesel. Difficile de concevoir une politique plus incohérente.

Le canal de communication des espions

Le passage le plus révélateur de l’article concerne le voyage de Ratcliffe à Moscou en août. Trump l’a envoyé rencontrer ses homologues des services de sécurité russes par le biais de ce qu’on appelle officieusement le « canal de communication des espions« . Son message, écrit Harris, était que personne n’est gagnant : la Russie n’a pas réussi à faire des progrès significatifs et l’Ukraine ne peut pas expulser les forces russes. L’espoir était que Ratcliffe puisse convaincre Poutine qu’il poursuivait une cause perdue.

J’ai deux problèmes avec ça. Le premier est la revendication elle-même. L’État-major général russe a rapporté à Poutine le 16 octobre que ses forces avaient pris environ 6 500 kilomètres carrés et 310 colonies depuis janvier. Vous pouvez argumenter que le chiffre russe est gonflé, et je l’ai fait. Mais même DeepState, le système de cartographie ukrainien, reconnait environ 1 300 kilomètres carrés. La Russie avance. Il ne le fait peut-être pas aussi vite que Moscou le prétend, mais “n’a pas réussi à faire de progrès significatifs” est un vœu pieux déguisé en renseignements.

Le deuxième problème est le messager. Imaginez que vous êtes à la tête du SVR ou du FSB. Le directeur de la CIA s’envole pour Moscou pour vous dire, d’espion à espion, que votre guerre est dans une impasse et que vous devriez y renoncer. Vous savez parfaitement que c’est son agence qui fournit à l’Ukraine les données de ciblage des drones frappant vos raffineries. Ce n’est pas une offre de paix. C’est une menace sous couvert d’un passeport diplomatique. Si Ratcliffe s’attendait à ce que les Russes considèrent son évaluation comme neutre, c’est qu’il ne comprend pas les personnes à qui il parle.

Ce n’est pas ce que Truman a construit

Ratcliffe aime parler du retour de la CIA à ses « racines« . Ses racines fausses. Harry Truman n’a pas créé la Central Intelligence Agency en 1947 pour mener des campagnes paramilitaires. Il l’a créé pour collecter et analyser des renseignements provenant de sources étrangères et dire la vérité au président, afin qu’il ne soit plus jamais aveuglé comme Franklin Roosevelt l’a été pour Pearl Harbor. L’action secrète est entrée par la porte de derrière. Un an plus tard, la directive NSC 10/2 du Conseil de sécurité nationale autorisait les opérations secrètes, et la queue clandestine remue le chien analytique depuis.

Truman a vu cela se produire et l’a dit publiquement. Dans un éditorial publié dans le Washington Post du 22 décembre 1963, un mois après l’assassinat de John Kennedy, il écrivait qu’il était devenu troublé par la mesure dans laquelle la CIA s’était éloignée de « son rôle prévu ». Ses paroles méritent d’être citées: “Je n’ai jamais pensé, lorsque j’ai créé la CIA, qu’elle serait impliquée dans des opérations de cape et d’épée en temps de paix“. L’agence, avertissait-il, « est devenue un bras opérationnel et même décisionnel du gouvernement« . Il a dit qu’en la créant, “la chose la plus importante était de se prémunir contre la possibilité que des renseignements soient utilisés pour influencer ou conduire le président à des décisions imprudentes”, et il a demandé que la CIA soit “rétablie dans sa mission initiale en tant que bras du renseignement du Président”.

Soixante-trois ans plus tard, Ratcliffe a transformé l’avertissement de Truman en un énoncé de mission.

Comment l’action secrète corrompt la vérité

Je veux expliquer pourquoi cela est important, car ce n’est pas un argument abstrait tiré d’organigrammes. Je l’ai observé de l’intérieur.

Lorsqu’une agence de renseignement se contente de collecter et d’analyser des informations, son seul intérêt dans le résultat est d’obtenir une bonne vue d’ensemble. Au moment où la même agence mène une opération secrète, elle a un cheval dans la course. L’opération a un budget, un sponsor au septième étage, des carrières qui en découlent et, plus important encore, un président à qui on a dit que cela fonctionnerait. Maintenant, les analystes au bout du couloir sont invités à évaluer si l’opération de leurs propres collègues réussit. Les mauvaises nouvelles ne sont plus seulement des mauvaises nouvelles. C’est une attaque contre le programme du directeur et un embarras pour l’homme dans le bureau ovale.

La pression est rarement un ordre explicite de changer une conclusion. C’est plus subtil et plus corrosif que cela. L’évaluation pessimiste est renvoyée pour plus d’approfondissement. L’analyste qui n’arrête pas d’écrire que l’opération échoue à la réputation de ne pas avoir l’esprit d’équipe et n’obtiendra pas de promotion. Le briefing pour le président parle des réussites et enterre les coûts dans une annexe. Après quelques tours comme cela, comme Julia Curlee l’a dit à Harris, les officiers arrêtent simplement de dire les vérités qui dérangent et “apprennent à éviter” de dire ce que la Maison Blanche ne veut pas entendre.

Nous avons vu où cela mène. La baie des Cochons a été planifiée par le service clandestin et tenue à l’écart des propres analystes de l’agence, qui auraient pu souligner qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve que le peuple cubain était sur le point de se soulever contre Castro. Les opérateurs ont vendu au président l’opération qu’ils voulaient mener, et l’analyse qui aurait pu l’arrêter n’est jamais parvenue à son bureau. Le schéma se répète chaque fois que l’agence devient à la fois le joueur et l’arbitre.

Maintenant, regardez l’Ukraine. La CIA, selon le récit de The Atlantic, « dirige l’affaire » sur le terrain, en aidant à mener une campagne de frappes profondes à l’intérieur de la Russie. La même CIA est chargée de dire au président si cette campagne fonctionne et si l’Ukraine peut gagner. Est-il surprenant que le message de l’agence, celui que Ratcliffe a transmis à Moscou, soit que la Russie « n’a pas réussi à faire des progrès significatifs » ? Une agence qui a passé douze ans à mettre en place le service de renseignement ukrainien et qui dirige maintenant son ciblage a toutes les incitations institutionnelles à signaler que sa guerre se déroule bien, ou du moins pas si mal. Les conséquences négatives, les avancées russes, les pertes ukrainiennes, une pénurie de diesel qui frappe les consommateurs européens et américains, sont exactement les choses qu’une agence dans cette position est le moins susceptible de mettre au premier plan.

C’est la corruption que craignait Truman. Non pas que la CIA mentirait carrément, mais qu’elle commencerait lentement à diriger l’opération à la place du président, et que le président prendrait des décisions basées sur des renseignements façonnés par des personnes qui ont besoin de lui pour continuer leur travail.

Une agence qui dit au patron ce qu’il veut entendre

Harris rend également compte de l’état de la CIA elle-même, et ce n’est pas joli. Ratcliffe s’est engagé lors de son audience de confirmation à “mener une action secrète sous la direction du président, aller là où personne d’autre ne peut aller et faire des choses que personne d’autre ne peut faire”. Le côté de l’action secrète est florissant, de l’Ukraine au Venezuela en passant par les frappes aériennes de la CIA sur des bateaux soupçonnés de trafic de drogue, qui, selon les experts juridiques, pourraient violer les lois des conflits armés. Un ancien officier a déclaré à Harris « l’agence est en train de déchausser en ce moment ».

Les analystes, quant à eux, sont misérables. Ils sont nombreux à signaler que l’objectivité de leur travail est compromise. Julia Curlee, une analyste senior qui a démissionné en mai, l’a dit sans ambages « Ratcliffe ne protège pas la CIA de la politisation, il la dirige ». Les officiers, actuels et en retraite, disent qu’ils n’ont jamais vu autant de départs à la retraite et de démissions. Une agence où les officiers paramilitaires sont ravis et les analystes ont peur de dire la triste vérité est une agence construite pour mener des guerres, pas pour les comprendre. Et Harris lui-même note que Trump n’a pas tenu compte des avertissements de la communauté du renseignement sur la façon dont l’Iran réagirait aux attaques américaines. Nous payons tous pour cela maintenant.

Choisir une politique

Voici donc où en sont les États-Unis. Le Président qualifie Zelensky de “plus difficile à gérer” que Poutine et exhorte les Ukrainiens à élire quelqu’un d’autre. Son directeur de la CIA mène des opérations contre la Russie qui sont plus agressives que celles de Biden. Sa CIA aide l’Ukraine à détruire les raffineries russes pendant qu’il conclut des accords pour vendre du diesel russe. Son chef espion s’envole pour Moscou pour dire aux Russes qu’ils ne peuvent pas gagner, tandis que les propres analystes de son agence ont peur de lui dire ce qu’ils pensent.

Ce n’est pas une stratégie. C’est une contradiction que le peuple américain paie à la pompe et que les Ukrainiens paient de leur vie. Si Washington veut la paix, il devrait cesser d’être un combattant. S’il veut combattre la Russie, il devrait avoir l’honnêteté de le dire, au Congrès et aux électeurs, avant les mid-terms plutôt qu’après. Ce qu’il ne peut pas continuer à faire, c’est les deux, et prétendre qu’il ne fait ni l’un ni l’autre.

Publié à l’origine par Son of the American Revolution

The great powers may be about to sit down and carve up the world’s spheres of influence again, and that is exactly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warns against. He says a possible meeting of US President Donald Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely focus on the Middle East and Ukraine, and that he does not want it to become a new “Yalta.”

At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill carved postwar Europe into spheres of influence, settling the fate of smaller nations without them at the table.

Zelenskyy warns that a meeting of today’s great powers could revive that practice.

Who stands to gain

Zelenskyy is blunt about who such a format would serve. He says he cannot see what China would gain from it, while Russia stands to gain a great deal.

“I just don’t see the benefit for China, and I definitely see the benefit of this format for Russia. We’ll see what kind of meeting this will be,” Zelenskyy says.

That advantage, he argues, would build on the 2025 Alaska summit, the Trump-Putin meeting that ended without a deal but which Moscow has since invoked as a baseline for its demands.

Zelenskyy warns against a new Yalta

What the three powers would actually discuss is not yet settled, Zelenskyy says, but Ukraine would be on the table whether or not it is in the room.

“They will certainly talk about the Middle East. They will certainly talk about Ukraine. I really don’t want this to be ‘Yalta 2, 3, 4,’ when there is a redistribution of influence,” he says.

He adds that he would like the trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi to take place before any meeting in China.

The European Union (E.U.) is dropping the move to make Canada an associate member of the 27-nation bloc, multiple sources reported Wednesday.

The post Reports: E.U. Dropping Associate Membership Offer to Canada (for Now) appeared first on Breitbart.

Finland and Norway are hinting at the need for a new approach to the continent`s relationship with Russia

By Matthew Blackburn

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The Trump administration’s latest initiative to end the war is creating heartburn in Europe.

“We have to pressure the aggressor to stop the war, not the victim to surrender,” said European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas. “Squeezing Ukraine is not the right approach, and that’s why Europe is standing by Ukraine.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, insists Russia has no genuine desire for peace, pointing in particular to Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilians.

This moral language frames the conflict as a zero-sum, good-versus-evil struggle. In this light, Europeans have no choice but to unite behind Ukraine to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But not all European leaders are talking this way. The press conference in Oslo on Oct. 20 featuring Zelenskyy, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb was full of constructive language about ending the conflict. Stubb said the Oslo summit was the result of “substantive progress” made “under the radar.” Støre emphasised that “Europe has to be at the table” to secure a “lasting peace.” Europe, it seems, is not united on a negotiated end to the conflict.

Then on Tuesday, the two met with Putin unofficially, in an effort at de-escalation, according to reports. “We are neighboring countries to Russia,” Stubb said in a statement afterwards. “The outcome of this war will have a direct impact on our and the broader European security. Ending the war requires direct discussions.”

The Oslo summit was no bolt from the blue; Finnish and Norwegian representatives have been preparing the ground for several months. At last week’s Warsaw Security Forum, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide avoided the usual binary of Ukraine’s victory or capitulation. He stressed that since the Europeans are now paying for the war, they should also lead the diplomacy to end it. Eide noted that a peace agreement could secure a democratic, independent Ukraine integrated into the EU with 80% of its original territory. Advancing this point among more hawkish European colleagues, Eide struck a tone of hope rather than fear. In an interview last Saturday, Eide noted that Europe must contribute concrete proposals for a post-war security architecture: “in the long run, we need to return to a normal relationship with Russia after the war (….) some kind of order must be restored.”

During his recent visit to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stubb presented a complementary argument. Restating his case for a “value-based realism,” he argued that European states should be faithful to their values but would not resolve the conflict by rigidly clinging to the moral high ground. Stubb urged the audience to keep “cooler heads”; fostering a “war mentality” would make it near impossible to conceive of peace.

Eide and Stubb are moving in a different direction from those who claim “victory” over Russia – however defined – is a prerequisite for future European security. They reject the mantra of ex-NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that “weapons are the way to peace” and emphasize the military reality that neither side has the resources to win decisively.

This is a noble recognition of reality. Offensive actions from both sides have repeatedly failed to produce a breakthrough. Costs keep rising for both warring parties, while gains have become increasingly meagre. Europe, Ukraine, and Russia are stuck in a war that cannot be won on the terms set by either side.

Continuing the current course brings problems for all sides. Putin faces an overheating economy and increasing social fatigue and anxiety. Even if Russia destroys more and more Ukrainian infrastructure from the air, land offensives are likely to incur heavy losses. Ukraine’s situation is even tougher. Its chronic manpower shortages have led to intensified forced mobilization and increased social strains. Blockaded at sea and bombarded from the air, Ukraine is also short of money and weapons, constantly appealing to Western allies to plug the gaps.

The European coalition behind Ukraine faces serious problems of its own. Many European states are facing a sovereign debt crisis as war costs mount. The EU has been unable to persuade Belgium to make use of Russia’s frozen assets to fund the war. All the while, the dirty reality is that, since the war began, Europe has spent more on Russian energy imports than on weapons for Ukraine.

Tuesday’s meeting in Oslo provides a way out of this mess. As Stubb said at Tuesday’s press conference: “Peace requires patience. But unfortunately, war does not wait. People are dying each and every day. Our job is to do what we can to end it.” Norway and Finland are communicating the urgency of ending a senseless war. Referring to the recent spat between Trump and Zelensky, Støre advised against dwelling on past disagreements: “What matters now is what lies ahead of us.”

On the same day, Kaja Kallas looked back in anger. She accused the Trump administration of trying to “push Ukraine into surrender” on “Putin’s terms.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, for her part, presented Ukraine as Europe’s only protection: “If we allow Ukraine to fall, we will open the way for Russia to advance into other parts of Europe.”

One can understand fears that, if Ukraine is rendered neutral with limits on its armed forces, Russia would hold the whip hand over Europe. Nobody wants to let Moscow dictate the terms of the European security architecture through violence. But at this point, Europe’s rejection of a “dirty deal” could mean impotently watching Ukraine’s destruction over the next six months. How would this outcome improve European security or prestige?

Norway and Finland have offered the most constructive European response to U.S. diplomacy since Trump returned to the White House. They offer Europe a new language of patient diplomacy to replace maximalist rhetoric. This is in line with both countries’ previous experience mediating and building bridges with Russia. It also recognizes a basic fact: all protracted wars not settled decisively on the battlefield — which is to say, the vast majority of wars — end in negotiated settlements between the aggressor and the defender. America’s signature is absolutely necessary to secure such an outcome.

Mainstream analysis seems unable to accept these realities. It is stuck in moral posturing or fearmongering. There is still little serious discussion of what compromises might be struck. The 28-point plan that U.S.-Russian diplomacy developed in 2025 should not be equated with Ukraine’s capitulation, nor is it a recipe for turning Ukraine into Belarus. Ukraine would enter the EU, receive reconstruction assistance, and retain armed forces on a level comparable to Finland’s. It is time to return to the core points on which a deal must be struck.

Russia has responded positively to the proposals sent from Oslo. Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. have agreed to a three-way summit in November, according to Zelensky. The key question now is whether other European governments will take the Oslo initiative seriously and agree on who can represent Europe in these talks. Dmitri Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, has cautiously welcomed the idea that Alexander Stubb could represent Europe in the negotiations.

Finland and Norway’s more moderate language is a crucial first step toward a shared European understanding that continuing the war in its current form is self-defeating. As Eide observed at the U.N. last month, “diplomacy can work – if we allow it to.”

But first, Europe must decide: will it support or sabotage the U.S. effort to build a diplomatic off-ramp?

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated.

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Every once in a while the Mainstream Media can delight us by choosing to show an actual piece of reality. Of the big ones that are out there, Fox News seems to have at least three droplets of their humanity left and so it shouldn’t be too surprising that they invited Federalist editor-in-chief Mollie Hemingway onto their program Special Report to argue in favor of Trump’s potentially historic deal with Putin. The most interesting part was that she got the real ‘white hat cowboy’ treatment, seeming to offer to the audience the obviously better path; the path of peace with Russia. This type of propaganda is great for those of us who want to avert a nuclear WWIII, Yahoo!News featured a clip from the previously mentioned show under a headline that summed up things quite nicely; “Mollie Hemingway: Trump’s Russian Oil Deal Puts The American People First, “We’re Not At War With Russia“. Oh how lovey that sounds but is it really a good deal for the public of the United States?

The arguments against the deal are both weak and Globalist

The counterarguments against this diesel deal seem to be that ‘the Russians help Iran and thus they are bad’ that is to say, this deal cannot be supported because it would be against the Zionist agenda in an indirect way. The other seemed to be that this move violates the spirit, but not technicalities, of the Lindsay Graham Bill. Well, if anyone would know about violation it’s the dead senator, but was there ever a moment when the majority of Americans cried out for sanctions packages against Russia? How would spitting on the grave of Graham change anything for the worse for the normies? It wouldn’t, and no one raising kids in America cares about Graham’s legacy when they want to put food on the table for their family.

There is also the counterargument that the diesel deal ‘ betrays Ukraine’, which is a sentiment much stronger in Europe than Washington, but Project Ukraine still has plenty of support from the shadows of the American capital, just not so much from within the White House. But if we examine the arguments against having diesel come from Russia as a whole, they are all related to U.S. foreign policy and/or ‘feels’. That is to say, there don’t seem to be any arguments as to how selling diesel fuel to America could possibly make things worse for Joe Average and that is very telling. All of the arguments say it would somehow be bad for our currently disastrous American foreign policy follies.

So again, in a global sense, how exactly does regulated trade, between two countries on a voluntary basis, that brings down prices in the USA, and does not take away any jobs, cause problems for the American people? How does antagonism of the world’s largest nuclear power with the most potent hypersonic technology, that has repeatedly stated that it doesn’t want war, a problem for the American people? How does supporting Project Ukraine, do anything for the American masses? Control of Delaware is important to Americans especially the ones that live there, is control of the Donbass somehow just as vital to everyone across the 50 States?

At this point in 2026, it is very hard to build any sort of argument for any of the insane spending on foreign conflicts of luxury that have been going on since the end of the Cold War in 1991. All of these dubious expenditures that have added up to our 40 trillion+ dollars in debt were never for the benefit of the American people. It is almost like the talking heads that advocate for a blindly aggressive U.S. foreign policy actually hate the average American, because all of their proposed plans, that may kill foreigners directly, certainly punish Main Street just the same, but in a much slower and more agonizing torturous way.

Dmitriev’s ‘World of Optimism’ is one normal people want to live in

Kirill Dmitriev is convinced that economic cooperation between the USA and Russia does not have to be limited to diesel fuel. He believes that Russia’s excess of fertilizer could also be a major benefit to farmers who may finally be able to fuel up their tractors at an affordable price. Although this might be tricky, Russia has cheap energy and plenty of room in Siberia for data centers too and Dmitriev sees a lot of potential in this area. Russia even has energy exports of electricity to neighboring China, so perhaps some sort of data center collaboration could be possible, but that would require much more trust than is currently present. As we all know Dmitriev is a big believer in the building of the tunnel/bridge from Alaska to Chukotka. He has even proposed to Elon Musk a joint venture to use his Boring Company to drill from the American side. A massive friendship project is surely needed between these two countries but there are many difficulties in making the tunnel work, especially the fact that it would be located in an extremely remote and unpopulated area and the train rail/wheel standards of both nations are different.

But again if we take a look at a famous quote from Kirill Dmitriev we see a big argument in favor of the Trump-Putin Diesel Deal that many Americans could agree with:

“International collaboration between the superpowers is key for the stability of the global economy.”

Beyond just the diesel fuel now, do these words sound like something that would be of benefit to the Average American or should we listen to John McCain’s status quo musings from beyond the grave?:

“Giving peace a chance only gives Saddam Hussein more time to prepare for war on his terms, at a time of his choosing, in pursuit of ambitions that will only grow as his power to achieve them grows.”

In the above quote you could take the name Saddam Hussein and substitute it for President Putin or any other person the establishment doesn’t like. It is this dimwitted ‘defense through offense’ attitude that is destroying the U.S. economy, all while the houses outside of DC just keep getting bigger-and-bigger.

Considering the U.S. just finally and formally gave up on Iraq these words above ring true as an anti-argument for the insane foreign policy that is bankrupting what used to be, and should be today, the wealthiest country in the world. If Washington had not invested in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Project Ukraine, the Iran War, PNAC, Globalism, etc., wouldn’t the average gent in Pittsburgh be living much better?

In terms of economic partnership there are other options beyond what the ever optimistic Dmitriev has stated that I thought would be worth at least listing in brief:

• American-style semi-trucks and trucks in general are road legal in Russia unlike many places on the planet with tight streets. Russia and America share ‘bigness’ and so long-haul American trucks could find a great market in Russia and Russian short-haul trucks would be great for America. All of the European automotive brands have bailed on Russia being replaced by China but there is still plenty of room on the market. This ‘bigness’ capable logic applies to all sorts of machinery beyond trucks, ‘Everything is Bigger in Texas and Tomsk’ and that is a point of economic benefit.
• Entertainment media in Russia is desperately underfunded, while the U.S. side of things is committing suicide via the ‘woke agenda’, there must be some sort of synthesis here. Joint Russo-American entertainment media projects could shake up the entire industry and get those big profits Hollywood blockbusters used to make.
• Education is believed to be much better in Russia and ‘Russian Math’ seems to be a hit in the USA, at least in NYC, so if the nation is to give up on Globalist ambitions the population needs to get smarter and more competitive very fast because the BRICS nations push their children to the max. Russia could assist with this but of course under the complete oversight and control of the American side just in case.
• American Football needs a new market with a nation that has violent macho white guys, Eastern Europe is the only option for the NFL. Russians like violent sports and their soccer teams always underperform, they need a new summer sport and the USA has it.
• New embassies consulates and more could be constructed as part of this new normalization. The old ones were taken away, so why not build new amazing ones for fun and profit?
• Russia’s Far East is the ‘window to Asia’ but it also faces towards Oregon and California, there might be many in America who would want to participate in the massive buildup of the Russian region. Trump himself loves a good real-estate deal.
• It is important to note that anything related to security, policing, and things of a secret nature are of course off limits and are never going to be an option. This cooperation cannot come too close to the ‘hearts’ of either system for obvious reasons. Both America and Russian must be fully sovereign in all regards no matter what they agree to.

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated. This deal tells the American Public that finally we need to use peace to make your lives better. We need to not waste resources antagonizing Russia, and this whole Multipolar World thing may just work out for rural Kansas too. But this is only a start, U.S. sanctions are a punishment for a crime that the Russians believe they did not commit and until those sanctions are truly gone we cannot say ‘it’s over’ but perhaps we can say ‘it’s starting’ unless all good will vanishes after the mid-term elections.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 27 October, urging him to de-escalate Russia’s war against Ukraine and resume negotiations. The roughly 90-minute call was coordinated with Kyiv and came ahead of planned trilateral talks between Ukrainian, US, and Russian officials in Abu Dhabi in November.

The initiative marks a rare direct contact between Western European leaders and Putin since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. The Nordic leaders are reportedly seeking to influence peace efforts increasingly shaped by US President Donald Trump, amid concerns in Europe that Washington is shifting toward Moscow’s position and sidelining Ukraine’s European partners.

Stubb and Støre said they discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine, upcoming negotiations, and security in Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the two leaders had urged Putin to take concrete steps toward de-escalation, particularly regarding attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Zelenskyy says leaders urged energy de-escalation

After the call, Zelenskyy said he had spoken with Stubb and Støre to receive a detailed briefing. He thanked them for supporting Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts and said they had clearly told the Russian leader that real de-escalation steps were needed regarding Ukraine’s energy sector and infrastructure.

Zelenskyy also said the leaders discussed preparations for a trilateral meeting planned for November involving Ukrainian, US, and Russian negotiating teams.

In a joint statement, Stubb and Støre said the call followed their 20 October meeting in Oslo and was held in consultation with Ukraine. They emphasized that Finland and Norway, which both share borders with Russia, would continue their longstanding support for Ukraine.

“The discussion was frank and substantive,” Stubb said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect Nordic and broader European security. Støre stressed the war’s enormous human and material costs and said the leaders had emphasized the importance of de-escalation.

Moscow gives no sign of changing its position

The Kremlin’s account of the call offered no indication that Putin was prepared to soften his demands, according to Reuters. It said a just and lasting peace was possible only if Russia’s “legitimate interests” were fully taken into account, while blaming EU and NATO policies for prolonging the fighting.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed the call as offering nothing new on the conflict and accused European countries of seeking a role in negotiations.

A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had said the war must end while taking “the realities on the ground” into account. The source interpreted this as meaning Moscow would not compromise on its goal of capturing the entire Donbas region.

Russia has continued its attacks on Ukraine while demanding territorial concessions. Kyiv, meanwhile, has called for meaningful de-escalation and a settlement that preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.

Nordic initiative draws criticism from European partners

The call comes as European governments seek a greater role in peace efforts led by Trump. Western European leaders have largely avoided direct contact with Putin since the invasion, hoping to isolate Moscow, but concerns have grown that Europe is being sidelined in negotiations.

Stubb said Ukraine had sought to open a new channel of communication and that Europe could no longer remain a bystander to peace efforts. He said the initiative had been discussed with Western allies.

However, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticized the move, saying she saw no signs that Russia wanted peace and arguing that Europe should act together rather than pursue separate initiatives, according to Reuters. 

Reuters added that Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said other European leaders had not been informed of the talks and expressed low expectations for the conversation. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also urged caution.

Stubb and Støre stressed that they had acted as leaders of Finland and Norway, not on behalf of Europe as a whole. They said their countries would continue supporting Ukraine while pursuing diplomatic efforts to end the war.

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have spoken directly with Vladimir Putin before briefing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The initiative, undertaken in consultation with Ukraine, comes ahead of planned negotiations in Abu Dhabi but has drawn criticism from other Nordic leaders.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.

The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.

Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.

“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.

Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.

Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.

Zelenskyy briefed after discussions with Moscow

Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.

The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.

According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.

The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.

Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.

Oslo talks establish new diplomatic channel

Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.

American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.

Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.

The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.

The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.

As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.

Moscow maintains its negotiating position

The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.

According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.

He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.

These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.

Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

Denmark questions independent Nordic diplomacy

The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.

Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.

For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.

The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.

With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.

A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.

Anziché dare priorità ai profitti delle parti interessate, la coppia Witkoff-Europa dovrebbe concentrarsi sull’architettura di sicurezza eurasiatica e sui confini tra NATO, Russia e Cina per guadagnare terreno a Mosca.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Già nel dicembre 2025, il commentatore statunitense Sundance, scrivendo sul Conservative Treehouse, aveva parlato della nuova soluzione di “diplomazia finanziaria” proposta da Steve Witkoff e Jared Kushner per l’Ucraina, che “richiedeva [l’istituzione di] un sistema in cui l’opportunità occidentale di trarre benefici finanziari potesse continuare”.

Da questa prospettiva, i negoziatori statunitensi «proporrebbero un piano a lungo termine per garantire benefici finanziari continui».Dal loro attuale linguaggio sembra che Witkoff e Kushner siano ancora fiduciosi di poter costruire un sistema di ricompense finanziarie per le banche occidentali, gli investitori, i politici e i funzionari ucraini che consenta di mantenere i benefici della guerra senza l’ingrediente accessorio dello spargimento di sangue.Come ha osservato Sundance —«Se la delegazione statunitense riuscirà a portare a termine questa impresa, allora la Russia potrà ottenere il territorio che desidera, i funzionari ucraini corrotti potranno continuare a sottrarre fondi dagli investimenti, l’UE potrà mantenere il potere di cui dispone per esigere pagamenti finanziari, i politici americani potranno utilizzare i “progetti di ricostruzione a lungo termine” per il riciclaggio di denaro e le banche d’investimento di natura mista pubblico-privata potranno trarre vantaggio dallo sfruttamento delle risorse ucraine».

Da questa evidente visione del mondo del settore immobiliare newyorkese, tutte le altre questioni — i confini territoriali, la sicurezza e l’ingerenza della NATO nell’architettura di sicurezza dell’Asia centrale — non sono che «dettagli secondari» «rispetto a ciò che conta davvero, il denaro».

La diplomazia monetaria, tuttavia, non ha portato una soluzione per l’Ucraina (né, del resto, per Gaza neppure). Ciononostante, Witkoff ha un nuovo piano che David Ignatius ha delineato nella sua rubrica sul Washington Post.

Ignatius sottolinea che, nonostante il recente «trambusto» in Ucraina riguardo ai suoi attacchi alle raffinerie russe, «gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa si stanno orientando verso una proposta di pace congiunta che garantirebbe benefici finanziari e di sicurezza sia all’Ucraina che alla Russia come base per una soluzione territoriale che non soddisfi pienamente gli obiettivi bellici di entrambe le parti». In altre parole, un «incentivo» offerto per persuadere le parti a smettere di bombardare le raffinerie avversarie e ad aprire la strada a questa «nuova» iniziativa.

Se Zelensky acconsentisse a sospendere gli attacchi alle raffinerie, «torneremo in gioco e ci recheremo a Mosca», ha dichiarato un funzionario americano a Ignatius.

In sintesi, il piano in quattro punti prevede un generoso quadro di ricostruzione per soddisfare «le innumerevoli esigenze finanziarie di Zelensky»; garanzie di sicurezza per l’Ucraina equivalenti all’articolo 5 della NATO; l’integrazione economica di Russia, Ucraina ed Europa attraverso un accordo energetico — «Questo potrebbe consistere in un oleodotto che trasporti petrolio e gas russi verso l’Europa, con Ucraina e Russia che si dividono i profitti. Un oleodotto di questo tipo potrebbe ridurre drasticamente i costi energetici europei», ha affermato un funzionario statunitense. Oltre a garantire alla Russia «un accesso a lungo termine al mercato energetico europeo», un accordo di pace specificherebbe come e quando verrebbero revocate le attuali sanzioni economiche contro la Russia.

L’ultimo punto – udite udite – sarebbe un cessate il fuoco lungo l’attuale linea del fronte, ovvero la «linea di controllo».

Sembra incredibile: gli Stati Uniti e gli europei negoziano tra loro, apparentemente ignari delle dichiarazioni esplicite rilasciate dalla parte russa.

Petrolio e gas verrebbero forniti dalla Russia agli europei bisognosi che hanno volontariamente rinunciato alle precedenti forniture russe a basso costo, che sono intrappolati dalle loro stesse decisioni e che denigrano la Russia in ogni occasione. E con i profitti da «dividere» con l’Ucraina? La Russia non accetterà mai una proposta così unilaterale.

Il ministro degli Esteri Lavrov ha dichiarato all’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite che non ci sarà alcun cessate il fuoco in nessuna forma. Ciò significa che eventuali negoziati dovrebbero svolgersi sotto il fuoco nemico, e Putin ha suggerito che, anche in tal caso, «ci penserebbe due volte» prima di avviare qualsiasi trattativa (sotto il fuoco nemico o meno).

Il portavoce di Putin, Dmitry Peskov, ha confermato proprio la scorsa settimana che «soluzioni e accordi frammentari» impedirebbero il raggiungimento di una soluzione globale; nemmeno un «congelamento» del conflitto sarebbe d’aiuto —

«[L’Ucraina] è una questione estremamente complessa e la soluzione deve essere globale… Abbiamo bisogno di una soluzione per le generazioni future — una soluzione garantita e protetta da eventuali battute d’arresto».

Sembra che gli europei non abbiano compreso che una cessazione delle ostilità in stile coreano (come sostenuto dal generale Kellogg) lungo un fronte in cui due eserciti si fronteggiano sia la ricetta per non giungere a nessuna soluzione. Sono trascorsi 73 anni da quando la guerra di Corea è stata congelata dall’armistizio. Nulla è cambiato.

Il ripetuto ricorso a questo mantra di un cessate il fuoco lungo la linea di contatto, anziché «prima la soluzione, poi il cessate il fuoco», grida ai russi che l’Occidente vuole tenere l’Ucraina in serbo per il momento in cui sarà necessario creare una piattaforma da cui esercitare (nuovamente) pressione sulla Russia in futuro.

Il difetto fatale di questa iniziativa è la sua sordità culturale. Per Witkoff e Kushner può anche trattarsi «di ciò che conta davvero: il denaro» — ma non è così per la Russia.

Se la coppia Witkoff-Europa ricordasse la storia russa, capirebbe perché, per la Russia, la sicurezza, la sicurezza, la sicurezza viene prima di tutto.

Walter Munchau ha messo in guardia proprio questa settimana che «la guerra in Ucraina rischia di intensificarsi» —

«Non dovremmo farci illusioni riguardo a una guerra con la Russia. Non siamo assolutamente in grado di vincere. Quali mercati obbligazionari saranno i primi a crollare? Chi esaurirà per primo i missili intercettori? … Sotto ogni [aspetto] — militare, energetico, finanziario — l’Europa è in svantaggio. E non è tutto. Esiste uno scenario relativamente plausibile in cui l’Ucraina e l’Iran si fondano in un’unica guerra nell’Eurasia occidentale — e diventino il conflitto per procura definitivo tra Stati Uniti e Cina».

Se, invece di dare la priorità alla continua «truffa degli stakeholder», con il suo meccanismo volto a garantire «che l’opportunità occidentale di trarre benefici finanziari continui», la coppia Witkoff-Europa scegliesse piuttosto di affrontare gli aspetti fondamentali del conflitto — la questione più profonda di un’architettura di sicurezza eurasiatica; la definizione di dove si trovi esattamente, dal punto di vista fisico, la frontiera che separa gli interessi di sicurezza della NATO da quelli sino-russi — potrebbe trovare un pubblico più ricettivo nel suo prossimo viaggio a Mosca.

Purtroppo, circoscrivere l’estensione della NATO non è possibile — allo stato attuale delle cose.

Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too.

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Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.

If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.

Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.

Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.

Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.

But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.

Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.

The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.

Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.

Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.

The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.

Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.

On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.

Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?

As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.

What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.

In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.

When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.

The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.

Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.

One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.

The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.

For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.

By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.

Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.

There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.

So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.

Washington is offering Moscow sanctions relief, commercial opportunities and a possible return to European energy markets. Yet the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine extend far beyond economic interests, raising questions about whether Vladimir Putin has any intention of accepting a settlement that preserves Ukraine as an independent European state.

The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.

The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.

The economic bargain taking shape

According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.

Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.

The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.

American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.

There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.

The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.

As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.

Why Putin’s objectives are not primarily economic

The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.

Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.

In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.

These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.

Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.

Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.

An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.

Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.

The advantages of negotiations without compromise

This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?

One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.

Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.

They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.

For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.

None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.

Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.

The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.

Europe cannot be treated as an economic bargaining chip

The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.

The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.

The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.

Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.

Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.

A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.

This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.

The unresolved question

Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.

Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.

Those objectives may prove incompatible.

A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.

The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.

Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.

Dans ce sixième numéro de Moreau Décrypte, Xavier Moreau analyse la grande désillusion qui s’empare d’une partie des Ukrainiens. À Kiev, beaucoup observent avec inquiétude l’évolution de la position américaine, marquée par une priorité croissante accordée aux négociations et à un rééquilibrage des relations avec les grandes puissances, tandis que des discussions diplomatiques impliquant Washington, Moscou et d’autres acteurs internationaux

Publié à l’origine par divergencepolitique.fr

Austria has ordered four Russian diplomats to leave the country after security authorities identified activities incompatible with their diplomatic status, in a further deterioration of relations between Vienna and Moscow.

The Austrian foreign ministry announced the expulsions on Friday, 23 October. Three of the officials were accredited to the Russian embassy in Vienna, while the fourth served at Russia’s mission to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), where the diplomat worked on military security and arms control. All four have been declared persona non grata.

The decision follows findings by Austria’s security authorities, according to the details of the foreign ministry announcement. Officials have not publicly disclosed the activities involved or brought criminal charges in connection with the announcement. Moscow has indicated that it will retaliate, although the nature of its response has not yet been specified.

Vienna’s diplomatic position

The expulsions are particularly significant because Vienna hosts numerous international organisations and remains one of Europe’s principal diplomatic centres. In addition to the OSCE, the city accommodates United Nations offices and organisations dealing with nuclear policy, international development and arms control.

That concentration of diplomatic missions gives Austria a distinctive position in European security affairs. Foreign delegations enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity, while the Austrian authorities retain the power to withdraw recognition from representatives whose conduct they consider unacceptable.

Austria’s constitutional commitment to military neutrality has not prevented successive governments from supporting European Union sanctions against Russia or condemning Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Neutrality limits participation in military alliances; it does not require Vienna to remain politically neutral over the conduct of a war.

Russian missions to international organisations also have a particular role. The OSCE brings together European, North American and Central Asian states, including Russia and Ukraine, and provides a forum for discussions on military transparency and conflict prevention. Its proceedings have become more contentious since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Repeated expulsions

Friday’s decision brings the reported number of Russian diplomats expelled by Austria since 2020 to 18. In May 2026, Vienna expelled three Russian diplomats amid security concerns involving antenna installations on Russian diplomatic buildings. Those concerns added to wider scrutiny of possible intelligence-gathering activity in the Austrian capital.

Diplomatic expulsions are a familiar response when governments suspect espionage but do not pursue ordinary criminal proceedings. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state can declare a diplomat persona non grata without publicly explaining the underlying evidence. The sending state must then recall the official or terminate their functions.

The mechanism is politically consequential but is not in itself a criminal judgment. A declaration of persona non grata establishes that the host government will no longer accept the diplomat’s accreditation; it does not establish guilt in a court of law.

Moscow has regularly responded to expulsions of its diplomatic personnel from European countries with reciprocal measures. Such retaliation can reduce the number of diplomats available for routine consular work and political dialogue, even when wider bilateral relations remain formally intact.

European security implications

The new Austrian action comes as European countries face continuing questions about Russian intelligence networks, attempts to gather military information and suspected interference activities. The circumstances of individual cases vary, and intelligence allegations cannot automatically be treated as proven simply because diplomats have been expelled.

The latest episode nonetheless illustrates how Russia’s war against Ukraine has affected the functioning of diplomacy in European capitals. Vienna must balance its international hosting responsibilities and established channels of communication with the security obligations arising from suspected abuses of diplomatic status.

The decision also comes against the background of wider European efforts to strengthen protection against strategic vulnerabilities and an expanding debate about hybrid threats to critical infrastructure.

For now, Austria has confirmed the expulsions but has not published an account of the conduct attributed to the four officials. The next diplomatic development will be Russia’s response and whether it affects Austrian representatives in Moscow.