A major exhibition opening at the Royal Museum of Fine Arts Antwerp brings together works by the twentieth-century sculptor Ossip Zadkine, including figures from a composition separated almost a century ago. The exhibition also examines Belgium’s largely overlooked contribution to the artist’s international career.

A group of sculptures separated for 98 years has been reunited in Antwerp as part of a major exhibition exploring the career of Ossip Zadkine, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century European sculpture.

The exhibition, Ossip Zadkine and Belgium, opens on 31st October at the Royal Museum of Fine Arts Antwerp (KMSKA) and runs until 18 April 2027.

Its centrepiece is The Friends of Job, a wooden sculptural composition created in 1913 and inspired by the biblical story of Job.

One of the figures, Elihu, was sold separately in 1928. The exhibition brings it back together with the remaining figures for the first time in almost a century.

The reunion is part of a broader exhibition containing 130 works, including sculptures, drawings, paintings and archival material, assembled from collections in Belgium, France and elsewhere.

Beyond the rediscovery of an early composition, the museum is seeking to reassess Zadkine’s artistic development and the contribution of Belgian collectors, galleries and fellow artists to his international reputation.

The Belgian Origins of an International Career

Zadkine was born in 1888 in Vitebsk, then part of the Russian Empire and now in Belarus.

He developed an early interest in sculpture and subsequently spent time in Britain, where he learned woodcarving techniques from his uncle.

He later moved to Paris, becoming associated with the artistic circles that transformed European painting and sculpture during the early twentieth century.

Among his contemporaries were Amedeo Modigliani, Pablo Picasso and Marc Chagall.

Although Paris became the principal centre of his artistic career, Belgium played an important role in establishing his reputation.

In 1920, Zadkine held an exhibition in Antwerp at the invitation of the Brussels-based Galerie Sélection.

His work attracted attention from Belgian collectors and critics, providing opportunities that helped him develop his distinctive approach to sculpture.

He subsequently exhibited alongside Flemish Expressionists, including Constant Permeke, Gustave De Smet and Frits Van den Berghe.

His first major retrospective took place in Brussels in 1933, at the Palais des Beaux-Arts, now known as BOZAR.

Reflecting on his early career, Zadkine acknowledged the importance of this support, writing: “Les Belges étaient mes premiers amateurs” — the Belgians were his first admirers.

The exhibition examines how this network of collectors, gallery owners and artists influenced his development and helped establish connections between Belgian artistic circles and the wider European avant-garde.

Sculpture Between Cubism and Expressionism

Zadkine’s work developed through several artistic movements, incorporating elements of Cubism while retaining an emphasis on human expression and emotion.

His sculptures frequently combine angular forms with figures that appear fragmented, elongated or dramatically distorted.

Working in wood, stone and other materials, he explored the relationship between the physical structure of sculpture and the emotional experience of its subject.

His early preference for direct carving, in which an artist works directly into the material rather than reproducing a preliminary model, remained an important part of his technique.

The composition The Friends of Job belongs to this formative period.

Its reunion provides an opportunity to consider how Zadkine approached the human figure before developing the more expressive sculptural language associated with his mature work.

The exhibition also presents works by contemporaries including Chagall, Modigliani and Jacques Lipchitz, placing Zadkine within the international artistic environment in which he worked.

The Role of Valentine Prax

An important part of the exhibition concerns Zadkine’s wife, the painter Valentine Prax, whom he married in 1920.

Prax was an artist in her own right and played a significant role in managing the financial and organisational aspects of their careers.

Her work was also exhibited in Belgium, and the Antwerp exhibition includes examples of her artistic production alongside that of her husband.

During the Second World War, Zadkine, who was Jewish, left occupied Europe for the United States.

Prax remained in France, helping protect his works during the conflict.

The exhibition examines their artistic relationship and the contribution of Prax to the preservation and development of Zadkine’s career.

It also places their experience within the wider history of European artists whose lives and work were disrupted by war and exile.

A Lasting Connection with Antwerp

Zadkine’s relationship with Belgium continued after the Second World War.

An Antwerp shipowner connected with the Compagnie Maritime Belge helped transport his works back to Europe from New York.

The sculptor subsequently participated in Antwerp’s first Middelheim sculpture biennial.

He also contributed to discussions about establishing a permanent outdoor sculpture collection in the city.

Together with British sculptor Henry Moore, Zadkine became associated with the development of what would become the Middelheim Museum.

His work consequently forms part of Antwerp’s broader history as a centre for modern and contemporary sculpture.

The KMSKA itself holds nine works by Zadkine, including The Misery of Job, which the artist donated to the museum.

Reconstructing a European Artistic Network

The exhibition has been organised in collaboration with the Musée Zadkine in Paris.

Of the 130 works assembled, 20 come from the KMSKA’s collection, 50 from the Paris museum and another 60 from other museums and private collections.

The accompanying archival material provides evidence of the relationships that connected artists, collectors and galleries across national borders.

For the museum, the exhibition represents an opportunity to reconstruct a chapter of European art history that has received comparatively limited attention.

Zadkine’s international reputation is closely associated with Paris, but his early success depended in significant part on support from Antwerp and Brussels.

The reunion of The Friends of Job gives this historical reassessment a particular focus.

Almost a century after its component figures were separated, the composition can once again be considered as a group, while the wider exhibition places its creator within the artistic networks that shaped modern European sculpture.

Ossip Zadkine and Belgium runs at the Royal Museum of Fine Arts Antwerp from 31st October 2026 until 18th April 2027. See KMSKA exhibition details.

Main Image: Emmy Andriesse for Anefo – http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:1663055

France is preparing for another weekend of mass demonstrations as youth-led protests spread across Europe. Behind the unrest lies a broader dispute over economic priorities, public spending and the political influence of younger generations.

France and Germany face major demonstrations on Saturday, 31 October, as a wave of youth-led protests across Europe raises questions about the relationship between younger voters and political establishments struggling to reconcile economic pressures with competing spending priorities.

French authorities have mobilised approximately 70,000 police officers and gendarmes for a third consecutive weekend of protests over living costs, education and public services. In Germany, organisers expect more than 160,000 people to participate in demonstrations across 34 cities.

Although the movements have emerged under different national circumstances, their grievances reveal common concerns: declining purchasing power, deteriorating public infrastructure, limited political representation and uncertainty about future economic prospects.

France prepares for further unrest

The French demonstrations began with dissatisfaction among secondary-school pupils before developing into a wider protest movement involving trade unions, yellow vest activists and other organisations.

As EU Today reported during the initial wave of student demonstrations, complaints about teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating educational facilities rapidly developed into a national confrontation.

According to official figures, approximately 550,000 people participated in demonstrations on 17 October, followed by 410,000 a week later. Union estimates were higher.

The demonstrations on 17 October were accompanied by widespread disorder, including attacks on commercial premises and public property. Subsequent protests were largely peaceful, although numerous arrests continued.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez has warned that the latest demonstrations present a particularly high risk of disturbances, especially during the evening.

The security measures announced for the Halloween weekend include restrictions on demonstrations in central Paris and increased policing around areas affected by earlier violence.

Student organisations and trade unions have challenged the restrictions, arguing that they interfere with freedom of assembly. French authorities maintain that the measures are necessary to prevent further attacks and looting.

The political significance is heightened by France’s approaching presidential election in 2027. President Emmanuel Macron’s administration must manage the immediate security situation while addressing dissatisfaction extending beyond individual government policies.

Germany’s younger generation enters the debate

Germany’s demonstrations have a somewhat different character.

The campaign group Gen Z regelt, broadly translated as Generation Z Takes Charge, has organised protests in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt and other cities, demanding improved education, affordable living conditions, better healthcare and stronger climate policies.

The movement also opposes the expansion of compulsory military service.

According to details of the nationwide mobilisation, organisers expect more than 160,000 participants, although these figures represent expressions of interest rather than confirmed attendance.

Germany’s debate over military service has particular significance in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and Europe’s efforts to strengthen its defence capabilities.

As EU Today previously examined, Germany’s military-service framework has already generated controversy over the obligations of military-age men, including rules governing prolonged travel abroad.

For younger Germans, the possibility of further compulsory military obligations raises questions about individual freedoms, generational responsibility and the allocation of public resources.

Organisers argue that governments are willing to increase military expenditure while schools, universities and social infrastructure face financial constraints.

However, opposition to conscription should not automatically be interpreted as opposition to European defence or assistance to Ukraine. The demonstrators’ objectives encompass several policy areas, and the movement is not politically uniform.

Security concerns and political mobilisation

German authorities have approached the demonstrations cautiously.

The Hessian Interior Ministry’s assessment warned that violent extremist groups might attempt to exploit gatherings in Frankfurt and elsewhere.

At the same time, Stuttgart’s municipal authorities stated that they had no concrete evidence suggesting that the local demonstration would descend into violence comparable to the disorder witnessed in France.

The distinction matters. Organisers have explicitly rejected violence, while authorities remain responsible for protecting participants, businesses and public infrastructure.

The question of who is organising the movement has nevertheless attracted scrutiny. Germany’s national student representatives have distanced themselves from the initiative, while acknowledging the legitimacy of the concerns being expressed.

A wider European phenomenon

The demonstrations form part of a broader pattern involving younger Europeans.

As EU Today’s recent analysis of Generation Z protests examined, mobilisation in France, Belgium, Italy and Serbia has brought together concerns about housing, education, employment and political accountability.

These movements do not constitute a single coordinated European organisation. Their objectives, political affiliations and methods differ considerably.

Nevertheless, their emergence suggests that similar economic and social pressures are generating comparable political responses.

European governments are simultaneously confronting difficult decisions over defence expenditure, ageing populations, public finances and energy security.

In France, demands for higher public spending come against the background of substantial government debt and pressure to reduce the budget deficit.

In Germany, the argument is increasingly connected to the allocation of resources between social priorities and the expansion of military capabilities.

These tensions do not necessarily represent incompatible objectives. Defence, education and economic stability all form part of Europe’s long-term security.

The political difficulty lies in demonstrating how competing priorities can be financed without placing a disproportionate burden on particular generations.

For European institutions, the immediate significance of the protests is therefore not simply their scale.

It is whether the demands of younger voters begin to influence national budgets, military-service policies and electoral programmes as governments prepare for a period of sustained strategic and economic pressure.

A confrontation over the leadership of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal has brought President Karol Nawrocki and Prime Minister Donald Tusk into direct conflict, exposing unresolved questions about judicial independence and the limits of presidential authority.

Poland’s constitutional dispute escalated on Friday, 30 October, after the reported suspension of the country’s Constitutional Tribunal president prompted demonstrations in Warsaw and forced President Karol Nawrocki to abandon an official journey to Senegal.

The confrontation concerns the leadership and legitimacy of an institution that has been at the centre of Poland’s political disputes for more than a decade.

Bogdan Święczkowski, the tribunal’s president and a former senior official in the previous Law and Justice (PiS) administration, was suspended from his duties, along with deputy president Bartłomiej Sochański.

The decision was announced by Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, a judge elected under the current parliamentary majority, who said she had assumed responsibility for the tribunal’s leadership.

However, the suspension was immediately challenged by Święczkowski’s supporters, who disputed both the legality of the decision and Korwin-Piotrowska’s authority.

The conflicting claims over control of the Constitutional Tribunal have created an unusual institutional situation in which rival groups dispute who is legally entitled to exercise authority over the court.

President intervenes as protests erupt

President Nawrocki, who was elected with the backing of PiS, ordered his aircraft to return to Poland while travelling to Senegal.

Explaining his decision on social media, he said: “At a moment like this, the President must be in Poland.”

Hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the tribunal in Warsaw, where police were deployed following reports of disorder.

According to accounts of the police operation outside the court, three people were detained after protesters breached a perimeter fence and objects were thrown at officers.

Nawrocki subsequently arrived at the court, where tensions continued into the early hours of Saturday.

Opposition politicians accused Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government of attempting to seize control of the judiciary through unconstitutional means.

The tribunal’s disputed leadership also denounced the suspension as an attempted coup, maintaining that Święczkowski and Sochański remained legally entitled to hold their positions.

These are allegations made by the president’s political allies and the contested tribunal leadership, rather than established legal findings.

Tusk argues reforms are necessary

Tusk has defended his government’s actions as part of a wider effort to restore judicial independence following eight years of PiS government between 2015 and 2023.

“Restoring the rule of law is our duty,” Tusk wrote on social media, acknowledging that the process was difficult and required decisive measures.

His government argues that the tribunal’s existing leadership has obstructed judges elected by the current parliamentary majority from assuming their responsibilities.

Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek has also sought the removal of legal immunity from Święczkowski and Sochański over allegations that they prevented judges from performing their duties.

However, the legality of the latest suspension is disputed even among legal experts critical of the previous PiS government’s judicial reforms.

Constitutional law professor Marcin Matczak questioned whether the relevant legislation provided a valid legal basis for removing Święczkowski from his duties.

The disagreement illustrates a central difficulty facing Tusk’s administration: reversing contested institutional arrangements without creating new questions about the legality of its own methods.

A decade-long dispute over the judiciary

The origins of the confrontation date to 2015, when disagreements over judicial appointments developed into a wider struggle over the Constitutional Tribunal.

During its years in government, PiS introduced reforms that attracted criticism from European institutions and international legal bodies.

Critics argued that the changes undermined judicial independence and allowed political influence over appointments and disciplinary procedures.

Following Tusk’s return to office in 2023, his governing coalition promised to reverse the disputed reforms.

Progress has nevertheless been complicated by presidents associated with the opposition, who have used their constitutional powers to block or delay legislation and judicial appointments.

As EU Today previously examined in its analysis of Poland’s constitutional confrontation, Nawrocki has also proposed preparing a new constitution by 2030, potentially reshaping the relationship between the presidency, parliament and government.

The current confrontation represents an escalation of that wider institutional dispute.

Why Brussels is watching

Poland’s judicial arrangements have significant implications beyond its national political system.

The European Union depends on independent national courts to apply EU legislation consistently and protect rights established under European law.

In its 2026 assessment of the Polish justice system, the European Commission recognised further steps towards reform but maintained concerns about the Constitutional Tribunal and other aspects of judicial independence.

The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has also addressed the powers of the Polish president regarding judicial appointments.

In an opinion adopted in October, the Commission concluded that the president should receive the oaths of judges elected by parliament without delay and could not use the process to review parliamentary appointments.

The opinion also addressed procedures that could be followed when the president refuses to participate in the oath-taking process.

Although the Venice Commission’s opinions are advisory rather than binding judgments, they provide an important international legal reference point.

The latest dispute raises two related questions: whether Poland can restore a constitutionally legitimate judicial system and whether the methods used to achieve that objective satisfy the relevant legal requirements.

Political consequences

The confrontation comes ahead of Poland’s parliamentary election expected in 2027.

For Tusk’s coalition, resolving the constitutional dispute is central to a programme presented to voters as a restoration of democratic institutions.

For PiS and President Nawrocki, the latest developments provide an opportunity to challenge the government’s methods and mobilise opposition supporters.

Poland’s divisions have also extended into criminal proceedings against former senior officials, including the dispute over efforts to extradite former justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro.

Although those proceedings are legally distinct from the Constitutional Tribunal dispute, both form part of the wider confrontation over the legacy of the previous government.

The immediate question is who will exercise effective authority over the tribunal and whether the rival parties can establish an accepted legal framework for resolving the dispute.

With competing claims to constitutional legitimacy and another national election approaching, Poland faces the prospect of a prolonged institutional conflict whose outcome will affect both domestic politics and the application of European legal standards.

Washington has authorised a major sale of air defence interceptors to Ukraine, financed largely through European and Canadian contributions. However, the expected production timetable raises questions about whether the agreement can address Kyiv’s immediate security requirements.

The United States has approved a proposed $2.1 billion sale of 500 Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles to Ukraine, providing a significant new commitment to the country’s air defence capabilities at a time when Russian missile attacks are placing increasing pressure on its remaining ammunition stocks.

The decision, announced by the US State Department on Friday, 30 October, follows repeated Ukrainian requests for additional interceptors capable of defending cities and critical infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles.

However, the agreement contains a substantial limitation.

According to information provided by two people briefed on the American decision, the missiles have yet to be manufactured and are not expected to be delivered until the early 2030s.

This creates a considerable gap between the authorisation of additional military equipment and the availability of the weapons Ukraine requires to defend itself during the coming winter.

European governments to finance the purchase

The proposed sale involves 500 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors, known as PAC-3 MSE.

Lockheed Martin will serve as the principal contractor.

According to the official US approval of the proposed sale, financing will come from Canada, Germany and Norway through the American JUMPSTART programme, together with Ukrainian national funds supported by the European Union’s Ukraine Support Loan.

No American government funding is involved in the purchase.

The arrangement illustrates the increasingly important financial role played by European governments in sustaining Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

Rather than relying on direct American military assistance, participating countries are financing US-produced equipment.

Washington nevertheless retains a central position because the United States controls export authorisation and remains the principal manufacturing source for the interceptors concerned.

The State Department’s approval represents an important step towards the purchase, although the proposed sale remains subject to congressional review and subsequent contractual arrangements.

It does not establish that the missiles have been delivered or that an accelerated production schedule has been agreed.

Ukraine’s immediate shortage

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly warned that Ukraine requires additional Patriot ammunition to counter Russian missile attacks.

Earlier this week, he said Kyiv had been waiting for almost a month for Washington to approve critical supplies.

As EU Today reported following Russian strikes on Kyiv’s infrastructure, the Ukrainian president specifically criticised delays in authorising deliveries of missiles for Patriot and NASAMS air defence systems.

The shortage has become particularly pressing as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and urban areas ahead of winter.

Patriot systems are especially important because of their ability to engage ballistic missiles travelling at high speeds.

Ukraine operates several types of air defence equipment, including European-made systems, but not every system can provide equivalent protection against every category of missile.

For Kyiv, the shortage therefore cannot be addressed simply by replacing advanced interceptors with less sophisticated alternatives.

The timing of deliveries is consequently as important as the number of missiles authorised.

The manufacturing problem

The Patriot agreement also illustrates the limitations of Western defence-industrial production.

The United States and its allies have increased expenditure on advanced air defence systems, but demand continues to exceed available manufacturing capacity.

In January 2026, Lockheed Martin announced a seven-year programme to expand PAC-3 MSE production from approximately 600 to 2,000 interceptors annually.

The company reported delivering a record 620 missiles in 2025.

The expansion requires additional production facilities, equipment, trained personnel and manufacturing capacity across a complex supplier network.

Although the long-term targets represent a substantial increase, they do not automatically make additional interceptors available in the short term.

Existing orders from the United States and other customers must also be considered.

American and allied inventories are under pressure from military commitments in Europe and the Middle East, further complicating decisions about reallocating available stocks.

Could Washington accelerate deliveries?

Ukrainian officials are reportedly exploring whether the Pentagon could transfer interceptors from existing American inventories while using newly manufactured missiles to replenish those stocks later.

Such an arrangement could significantly reduce waiting times.

However, it would require Washington to assess the consequences for its own operational reserves and commitments to other allies.

Another possibility would involve transfers from countries already operating Patriot systems.

European NATO members, including Germany and Poland, have invested in Patriot capabilities, while several others are expanding their air defence programmes.

Yet national inventories are not unlimited, and governments must balance assistance to Ukraine against their own defence requirements.

As EU Today previously examined following attacks on the Ukrainian capital, the shortage is not simply a question of money. Production capacity, delivery schedules and American authorisation have become central elements of Ukraine’s ability to sustain its air defences.

European alternatives, including the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system and its Aster interceptors, may contribute to Ukraine’s wider air defence network.

They do not, however, eliminate the immediate problem of limited availability of advanced interceptors across Western arsenals.

Implications for European security

The proposed $2.1 billion agreement demonstrates that Washington remains prepared to authorise substantial defence sales to Ukraine, even as political differences between the Trump administration and Kyiv continue.

It also illustrates a structural dependency facing Europe.

European governments are providing financing, but the delivery of some of Ukraine’s most important defensive weapons remains dependent on American authorisation, production schedules and competing US military priorities.

The European Union faces an additional policy dilemma over how its financial assistance should support domestic defence manufacturing while permitting urgent purchases from non-European suppliers.

As EU Today reported on France’s proposed restrictions on arms procurement exemptions, Paris has sought tighter time limits on arrangements allowing Ukraine to purchase equipment that European manufacturers cannot supply quickly enough.

Patriot interceptors are among the capabilities affected by this discussion.

The argument is significant because industrial expansion in Europe may reduce technological dependence over time, but it cannot provide immediate replacements for weapons currently manufactured primarily in the United States.

Meanwhile, Poland’s newly announced Patriot missile maintenance facility demonstrates another aspect of the European response.

The planned facility will support maintenance, refurbishment and technical servicing of PAC-3 interceptors, strengthening Europe’s ability to sustain existing stocks.

However, maintenance capacity is not equivalent to manufacturing additional missiles.

European NATO members are simultaneously attempting to rebuild inventories, establish new capabilities and prepare for possible future security contingencies.

Their requirements compete for manufacturing capacity within an international market already facing substantial demand.

For Ukraine, the immediate concern remains whether sufficient interceptors can be made available before further Russian attacks damage energy facilities and civilian infrastructure.

The American approval provides a framework for future deliveries. Whether it produces an immediate improvement in Ukraine’s defensive position will depend on decisions concerning the transfer of existing stocks, production priorities and delivery schedules that have yet to be finalised.

The European Union and Canada have agreed to develop a closer political, economic and strategic relationship that could eventually establish a new form of association short of EU membership. The initiative reflects a changing international environment in which both partners are seeking greater economic security and strategic independence.

The European Union and Canada have launched an ambitious new partnership that could fundamentally alter their relationship, raising the possibility of Canada acquiring a unique status within the EU’s wider political and economic structures.

At their summit in Montreal on 29–30th October, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa announced an Alliance for the Future, covering trade, defence, energy, critical raw materials and technological cooperation.

The agreement goes considerably further than conventional diplomatic coordination. Both sides intend to examine how Canada could become more closely associated with the European Union without formally joining it.

According to the joint summit statement, the partners aim to define the concept of this closer association by their next summit in 2027.

The proposal comes against a background of growing uncertainty surrounding international trade, economic dependencies and the future direction of American foreign policy.

For the EU, the initiative offers an opportunity to strengthen relationships with countries that share many of its economic and security interests. For Canada, it provides a means of diversifying international partnerships while maintaining its established relationship with the United States.

A New Form of European Association

One of the summit’s most significant outcomes concerns the possibility of establishing a relationship that extends beyond existing free trade and strategic partnership agreements.

Carney’s government has described the ambition in terms of Canada potentially becoming the EU’s first associate member.

However, the terminology remains politically and legally unresolved. The expression does not currently represent a formal EU membership category, and the summit’s joint declaration avoids defining Canada as an associate member.

Instead, the leaders committed themselves to developing an increasingly close association, explicitly excluding full membership.

This distinction matters. The EU treaties reserve accession for European states, while agreements with external partners can provide varying degrees of economic integration, political consultation and participation in European programmes.

The Canadian proposal could therefore become an experiment in how Brussels develops strategic relationships with major democratic partners beyond Europe.

Whether such an arrangement would eventually require new institutional mechanisms, additional agreements or changes to existing rules remains uncertain.

Economic Security Takes Centre Stage

The economic dimension of the agreement is particularly substantial.

Canada and the EU have concluded substantive negotiations on a digital trade agreement designed to complement the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, known as CETA.

The new arrangement is intended to improve legal predictability for cross-border digital services, facilitate data flows and reduce barriers affecting businesses operating in both markets.

The partners also announced progress towards an agreement facilitating European Investment Bank investment in Canadian critical raw materials.

These resources are increasingly important to European industries producing batteries, advanced electronics, renewable energy equipment and defence technologies.

Canada possesses substantial mineral resources, while European manufacturers are attempting to reduce exposure to concentrated international supply chains.

Closer integration could offer Canadian producers additional customers and European companies more diversified sources of strategic materials.

Energy cooperation is another priority. The summit declaration includes a commitment to study the feasibility of increasing Canadian liquefied natural gas supplies to Europe while maintaining the partners’ longer-term climate objectives.

The initiative comes as European governments confront renewed energy-price pressures and the vulnerability of international supply routes.

Defence, Technology and Ukraine

Security cooperation forms another important component of the relationship.

Canada already participates in several European defence initiatives and has secured access to the EU’s Security Action for Europe programme, which supports joint defence procurement.

The Montreal summit reinforced commitments to closer cooperation in defence production, maritime security, cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure.

Both sides also reaffirmed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, pledging continued assistance and further pressure on Russia.

Their cooperation is intended to extend into emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, satellite communications and advanced research infrastructure.

Canada’s participation in European high-performance computing initiatives and discussions concerning Galileo and IRIS² illustrate the growing overlap between civilian technology and strategic security.

These arrangements could allow European and Canadian organisations to share research capabilities while reducing dependence on a limited number of external technology providers.

A Test for Europe’s International Partnerships

The political significance of the Montreal initiative extends beyond bilateral relations.

The EU has traditionally approached neighbouring countries through enlargement, association agreements or sector-specific partnerships. Canada’s proposed status introduces the possibility of a more integrated relationship with a geographically distant partner.

There are, nevertheless, practical limits to what has been agreed.

Much of the agenda remains at the negotiating or feasibility stage. CETA itself has not completed ratification in every EU member state, illustrating the difficulties that can accompany ambitious international agreements.

The outcome will depend on whether both sides can translate the summit’s commitments into arrangements that deliver measurable economic and security benefits.

By setting 2027 as the target for defining their closer association, Canada and the EU have established a timetable for a potentially significant development in European external relations.

The central question is whether this arrangement remains a distinctive bilateral partnership or becomes a model for the EU’s relationships with other strategically important countries.

Trump threatens EU with tariffs over Canada ‘associate membership’ proposal

The eurozone economy grew faster than expected by some observers in the third quarter of 2026, despite rising energy costs and geopolitical uncertainty. However, renewed inflation and uneven performance among major member states are complicating the European Central Bank’s efforts to sustain economic growth.

Europe’s economy has demonstrated continued resilience in the face of rising energy prices, but new figures suggest that the recovery remains vulnerable to external shocks and persistent inflationary pressures.

According to preliminary data published by Eurostat on 30th October, gross domestic product increased by 0.4 per cent across the eurozone during the third quarter of 2026 compared with the preceding three months.

The broader European Union economy expanded by 0.5 per cent over the same period.

On an annual basis, GDP increased by 1.3 per cent in the eurozone and 1.5 per cent across the EU.

Although these figures indicate continued economic expansion, they also reveal a moderation in growth. During the second quarter, eurozone output had increased by 0.6 per cent, while the EU economy grew by 0.7 per cent.

The latest results provide some reassurance that European businesses and consumers have continued to support economic activity despite heightened uncertainty surrounding energy supplies, international trade and borrowing costs.

However, the figures reflect economic activity during the preceding quarter and cannot fully capture the consequences of the most recent increases in energy prices.

An Uneven European Recovery

The figures reveal considerable differences between individual member states.

Spain continued to outperform several larger eurozone economies, recording quarterly growth of 0.6 per cent.

Germany, Europe’s largest economy, expanded by 0.2 per cent, maintaining positive growth but at a comparatively modest pace.

France contracted by 0.1 per cent, while Italy recorded no quarterly growth.

The Netherlands also expanded by 0.6 per cent, while Belgium registered an increase of 0.3 per cent.

Ireland recorded particularly strong growth of 5.5 per cent, although its national accounts are heavily influenced by multinational corporate activity. Eurostat has also cautioned that the Irish estimate is experimental and subject to revision.

These differences underline the difficulties of treating the eurozone as a single economic entity.

Countries with relatively strong domestic demand, investment and services activity may be better positioned to withstand external pressures than economies more dependent on energy-intensive manufacturing or weaker industrial investment.

Germany’s economic performance remains especially important because of its manufacturing sector and its close integration with supply chains across Central and Eastern Europe.

The latest figures suggest that Europe’s recovery is continuing, but without consistent momentum across its largest economies.

Inflation Returns as a Major Concern

Growth figures alone do not determine the economic outlook.

The European Central Bank is increasingly concerned that renewed energy-price increases could produce another period of elevated inflation.

According to Eurostat’s September inflation figures, consumer prices across the eurozone increased by 3.8 per cent over the preceding 12 months, compared with 3.2 per cent in August.

Energy inflation accelerated sharply, reflecting pressures associated with the continuing conflict in the Middle East and disruption affecting international energy markets.

Higher fuel and electricity costs can spread through the wider economy by increasing transport, manufacturing and distribution expenses.

Businesses facing these additional costs must decide whether to absorb them through reduced profit margins or pass them on to customers.

The consequences are particularly significant for sectors such as chemicals, steel, fertilisers and transport, where energy represents a substantial proportion of operating costs.

For households, rising energy bills reduce the income available for other purchases, potentially weakening consumer spending.

The combination creates a difficult economic environment in which inflation can increase even as growth slows.

ECB Holds Interest Rates

At its meeting on 29th October, the European Central Bank decided to leave its three key interest rates unchanged.

The deposit facility rate remains at 2.50 per cent.

In its monetary policy statement, the ECB warned that rising energy prices present risks in both directions: higher inflation and weaker economic growth.

President Christine Lagarde indicated that the full effects of the energy shock were still developing.

The challenge for policymakers is that higher interest rates can restrain domestic demand and inflation but cannot directly increase international energy supplies.

Conversely, reducing borrowing costs could support investment and consumption while potentially intensifying price pressures.

The ECB has therefore maintained a meeting-by-meeting approach, avoiding commitments to a predetermined interest-rate path.

Its decisions will depend on incoming inflation data, wage developments and evidence of whether higher energy costs are spreading through the economy.

Defence Spending and Investment Offer Support

Despite these pressures, the European economy continues to benefit from several sources of investment.

According to the ECB, government expenditure on infrastructure and defence is supporting economic activity, alongside corporate investment in artificial intelligence and digital technologies.

The expansion of European defence production could create additional demand across manufacturing, engineering and advanced technology sectors.

However, increased public expenditure also raises questions about fiscal sustainability, particularly in countries already carrying substantial public debt.

European policymakers must consequently balance investment requirements against budgetary constraints.

Structural reforms intended to strengthen the single market, improve access to private capital and reduce regulatory fragmentation could also influence longer-term growth prospects.

The latest GDP figures demonstrate that Europe has so far avoided a broad economic contraction.

They do not, however, establish that the recovery is secure.

Much will depend on the duration of the energy shock, the response of businesses and consumers, and whether inflation begins to moderate without requiring further monetary tightening.

For European governments, the immediate challenge is preserving economic growth while reducing exposure to the energy vulnerabilities that continue to influence the continent’s economic outlook.