From Calif. Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, decided today by Judge Richard Tallman, joined by Judges Richard Paez and Mark Bennett:

California Senate Bill (SB) 399 prohibits an employer from subjecting, or threatening to subject, an employee to adverse action if the employee chooses not to attend an employer-sponsored meeting or receive communications from the employer, "the purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion about religious or political matters."

The court concluded that the law restricts speech and not just employers' disciplining employees:

It is true that SB 399 facially forbids only the act of "subject[ing], or threaten[ing] to subject, an employee" to discipline for declining to attend certain meetings. But the law only applies to employers who engage in expressive activity at those meetings: namely, "communicat[ing their] opinion. It does not, for example, prohibit taking adverse action against employees who decline to attend a meeting, the sole purpose of which was for employees to fill out their annual tax paperwork. It prohibits adverse action only when the meeting's purpose was for the employer to engage in expressive activity. Thus, the First Amendment applies.

Our conclusion accords with the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Honeyfund.com, Inc. v. Governor (11th Cir. 2024). In Honeyfund.com, employers challenged Florida's Individual Freedom Act [part of the Florida Stop W.O.K.E. Act -EV], which forbade subjecting "any individual, as a condition of employment," to "training, instruction, or any other required activity" endorsing certain ideas [related to race, sex, or national origin -EV]. As California does here, Florida defended the law as "a ban on conduct because only the meetings are being restricted," not the underlying speech.

Our sister circuit rejected Florida's conduct-not-speech defense because the only way to know if the law had been violated was to examine the message conveyed at the meeting. Because "the conduct regulated depend[ed] on—and [could not] be separated from—the ideas communicated," Florida's law was "functionally a regulation of speech" implicating the First Amendment.

So too here. If an employer disciplines an employee for failing to attend an employer-sponsored meeting, the only way to know if SB 399 was violated is to "examine the content of the message that is conveyed" at the meeting. We must ask: did the employer express an opinion on political or religious matters?

So "the disfavored 'conduct'"—subjecting absentee employees to disciplinary action—"cannot be identified apart from the disfavored speech"—the employer's opinion on political or religious matters. Further, that California's law (unlike Florida's law) is viewpoint-neutral does not make it content-neutral. Because employers are forbidden from taking adverse action only if they communicate certain messages at the underlying meeting, the law inevitably singles out employers based on their expressive activity….

The court then concluded the law was content-based ("because it applies only when the employer has discussed certain topics: politics and religion") and speaker-based (limited to speech by employers), and was therefore unconstitutional unless it was narrowly to a compelling interest. And it held that the law likely couldn't be justified by an interest in protecting a "captive audience":

In tension here are "the First Amendment rights of speakers" and "the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling … auditors." The State may protect the unwilling auditor's privacy "by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content." As discussed above, that is not what California did here: SB 399 singles out political and religious speech for regulation. Thus, California, "acting as censor, undert[ook] selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others." The Supreme Court has said that "[s]uch selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling … auditor to avoid exposure." In such circumstances, California's ability to limit "discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is … dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."

California fails to identify a single case where a content-based restriction has been upheld because employees were deemed a captive audience or had their substantial privacy interests invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Instead, the State points to cases upholding speech limitations on public transit, at healthcare facilities, and on school premises, which referred to commuters, patients, and students as captive audiences. California contends that employees are equally captive because they are economically dependent on their employer and risk losing their job, with its pay and benefits, should they refuse to listen to their employer's speech. Thus, California argues that employees need as much protection from unwanted speech at work as commuters on public transit, patients at healthcare facilities, and students at public schools.

California's argument goes too far. Both the Supreme Court and our Court have referred to "captive audiences" only when the government acts as a proprietor or in the context of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Neither court has relied on a "captive audience" theory to identify a compelling interest sufficient to uphold content-based restrictions on nongovernmental speech in a nongovernmental setting. Nor, as far as we can tell, have any of our sister circuits, with the Eleventh Circuit directly rejecting such a theory. Honeyfund.com. A brief review of the key cases on which California relies demonstrates the point.

The first is Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974), in which the City of Shaker Heights sold advertising space on its public transit vehicles but refused to accept paid political advertising…. A four-Justice plurality … conclud[ed] that the city, operating "in a proprietary capacity," had decided to limit the kinds of advertisements displayed based on several prudential factors. One of those factors was "the risk of imposing upon a captive audience"—commuters. To the plurality, the commuters' "captivity" was merely a prudential consideration in the city's decision to not allow certain advertising on its property.

In his solo concurrence in the judgment, Justice Douglas also described commuters as a "captive audience." That was relevant to his analysis because he believed that the commuters' right "to be free from forced intrusion on their privacy preclude[d] the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." To Justice Douglas, the commuters' "captivity" limited the city's ability to turn its transit vehicles into a First Amendment forum.

The Supreme Court has since characterized Lehman as recognizing the government's ability to "bar from its facilities certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental purpose for which the property has been dedicated." Our precedents consider an audience's "captivity" in the same manner as Lehman: as a prudential factor for a government, acting as proprietor, to consider when deciding what speech to allow in a nonpublic forum.

The Supreme Court has also considered an audience's degree of captivity when deciding if content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditionally public forums are reasonable. The two examples California cites involved such restrictions imposed on public ways near healthcare facilities, in which patients are "held 'captive' by medical circumstance."

In short, these cases reveal that an audience's degree of "captivity" is relevant when the government, acting as a proprietor, excludes certain kinds of speech from nonpublic forums or when evaluating the reasonableness of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the government acting as a regulator. No federal appellate court, including the Supreme Court, has relied on a "captive audience" theory to identify a compelling interest sufficient to support a content-based restriction on nongovernmental speech in a nongovernmental forum.

Considering the dearth of support for California's position and that the "captive audience" theory has been applied to support content-based speech restrictions only in nonpublic government forums, we conclude that the industry groups are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, … we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes. Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.

The logic of the decision would also apply to similar laws in Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the Virgin Islands, many of which were enacted within the last several years. (Of course, the Ninth Circuit decision binding precedent is only binding in, of these states, Oregon and Washington; in others it is only potentially persuasive precedent.)

I expect the decision to be quite controversial, and there will probably be an en banc rehearing petition. Note, though, that the panel consisted of two Clinton-appointed Senior Judges and a Trump-appointed judge; this makes it hard to predict how the en banc court (currently split 16-13 between Democrat and Republican appointees) would vote.

Lonnie D. Giamela (Fisher & Phillips LLP) and Todd A. Lyon (Fisher & Phillips LLP) represent plaintiffs.

The post Law Banning Employer Requirements That Employees Listen to Employer's Religious or Political Speech Likely Violates Employer's First Amendment Rights appeared first on Reason Magazine.

 

A recent New York Times article presents evidence that Alaska Democrats sought to confuse voters in that state's 2026 Senate election by introducing a second candidate with a name very similar to that of the Republican incumbent, thereby potentially siphoning off some of the latter's voters. The incumbent senator is named Dan S. Sullivan, while the other candidate is Dan J. Sullivan. As the Times reports, some of the facts here are disputable, and it is not entirely clear whether Democratic candidate Mary Peltola knew about this effort or approved of it. But it seems likely that at least some of her staffers and other Democratic operatives were involved.

Before going further, I should emphasize that this effort is worthy of condemnation. Trying to confuse voters into voting for the "wrong" candidate in this way is not how democratic political participation should work. And the fact that other politicians (including Republicans) engage in various electoral "dirty tricks" doesn't justify this one.

Elsewhere, I have explained why these kinds of actions are not illegal, and why the Trump administration's lawsuit seeking to block certification of the Alaska Senate result deserves to fail. I stand by that conclusion. Legal scholar Rick Hasen (a leading election law expert) has a helpful recent post explaining why the New York Times revelations do not change anything from a legal point of view. But the fact that this scheme is legal doesn't make it right.

That said, it is important to keep this issue in proper perspective, and especially to recognize that many other types of lies and efforts to exploit voter ignorance are much worse. Confusion caused by candidates with similar names is relatively rare, and it is difficult to find examples where it affected more than a small fraction of voters. I am not aware of even one case where it was decisive to the outcome of an election. But I welcome correction on that latter point.

The Alaska case is unlikely to be an exception to the above generalization. In the first round of the ranked-choice voting election (which narrows down the candidates to the top 4), only 2.5% of voters picked Dan J. Sullivan. Peltola led the incumbent senator by a much larger margin than that (8.1 points). Even if every single person who voted for Dan J. did so because of confusion (which is improbable), that's unlikely to change the result.

Moreover, the Alaska ranked-choice voting system reduces the risk of error. Some of those who vote for the "wrong" Dan Sullivan might rank the "right" one second. After the former gets eliminated, those votes get transferred to the latter. On top of that, as Michael Dorf points out, the Alaska ballot explicit indicates that Dan S. Sullivan is the "incumbent." That further reduces any potential confusion. The widespread publicity this issue has gotten over the last few weeks further reduces the risk of error. Many voters have probably now heard about the two Dan Sullivans and will be on guard against the problem.

It is still theoretically possible that confusion between the two Sullivans will end up having a decisive impact on the election. Some people who voted for Dan J. might not rank the other Sullivan second, or might misunderstand how the RCV system works. And some voters might (understandably) not be very careful about how they mark their ballots, thereby making a mistake despite the various safeguards against it. Still, it seems highly unlikely that such errors will have a decisive impact on the outcome.

Overall, this kind of a thing is relative molehill of a problem. Elections where it makes a decisive difference are likely to be extremely rare, at worst. By contrast, candidate lying about policy issues and exploitation of voter ignorance about them is a veritable mountain. I summarized some of the relevant evidence in an earlier post about the Alaska controversy:

Donald Trump is a particularly egregious example, going all the way back to his first campaign in 2016, and more recently with his lies about the 2020 election and other issues. But more conventional politicians also often resort to lies and deception, even if not to the same degree.  President Obama, for example, famously  lied when he claimed that, under the Affordable Care Act, "if you like your health care plan, you can keep it." That deception won the 2013 Politifact Lie of the Year award. But it still helped Obama get reelected in 2012. I am not sure exploiting voter confusion about names is any worse than exploiting their ignorance about policy issues like crime, immigration, and health care….

Ultimately, both exploitation of voter confusion about names and other deceptions used in campaigns seek to exploit widespread voter ignorance. Because of the combination of "rational ignorance" (lack of incentive to seek out political information) and "rational irrationality" (lack of incentive to engage in unbiased evaluation),  most voters know little about government and public policy, and often do a poor job of evaluating the information they do know. This makes them vulnerable to deception and manipulation, and incentivizes politicians to lie and otherwise distort the truth.

I would add that lies and deceptions about policy issues affect vastly more voters and have vastly bigger impacts on electoral outcomes than confusion about candidates' names. To take just a few recent examples, Trump in 2016 and 2024 and Obama in 2012 probably could not have won without the former. If, in 2024, key swing voters had realized that Trump's policy agenda of tariffs and mass deportations was likely to raise prices (as it predictably went on to do) rather than lower them (as he promised to do), he likely would have lost. Polls showed that prices were the biggest issue in the election for key swing voters. Trump also might well have lost if GOP base voters realized he was lying about the 2020 election, among other issues. In 2012, Obama might have lost if swing voters realized that he was lying when said that, under his signature policy initiative (the Affordable Care Act), "if you like your health care plan, you can keep it."

Effective lies and deceptions about policy issues (often exploiting preexisting voter ignorance and bias, but also deliberately seeking to create more of it) are ubiquitous. And they very often affect electoral outcomes. Even when they don't change the outcome between the candidates who run, they often have an impact on the policies those candidates adopt in the first place. As described more fully in my book Democracy and Political Ignorance, political parties and their strategists know most voters are ignorant, and often deliberately select policy agendas based on the likelihood of successfully exploiting that ignorance. The result is that even the lesser of the evils on offer in a given election (or the less egregious liars) are often still very bad.

From a moral point of view, I don't see any reason to believe lying about policy issues and exploiting voter ignorance about them is any worse than trying to trick voters into selecting the "wrong" candidate out of confusion. In practical terms, the former happens much more often than the latter, and has a far bigger effect).

Cornell law Prof. Michael Dorf recognizes that lies about policy issues are bad, but suggests that efforts to create confusion about candidate names are worse, because the latter are harder to combat with "counter-speech." I think the truth is the exact opposite. People can and do use counter-speech to oppose lies and deceptions about policy issues. But "rationally ignorant" voters will often ignore the counter-speech (not wanting to take the time and effort to study it) or reject evidence that goes against their preexisting biases. Many policy issues require considerable time and effort to understand well.

By contrast, it's much easier to find out there are two candidates with similar names in the election, and to take precautions against accidentally voting for the "wrong" one. Counter-speech to that effect need not be very complicated at all, or take a long time to understand.  In the Alaska case, for example, you just need to remember to vote for Dan S. rather than Dan J. or just know to vote for the one marked "incumbent." And figuring this out does not require going against any partisan or ideological biases.

As I have emphasized in previous writings about voter ignorance, I do not believe we can or should fight it by trying to punish politicians for their lies, or by censoring "misinformation." There is, in fact, no easy solution to the problem. But I assess a range of  options in my 2023 article on "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Solutions to the Problem of Political Ignorance, and in Democracy and Political Ignorance. I believe the best approach is to make fewer decisions at the ballot box and more by "voting with your feet," where incentives to seek out information and evaluate it wisely are much better.  In the works linked above, I also argue that we should give consideration to simply paying voters to increase their knowledge levels (e.g. by establishing a "Voter Achievement Test" and offering rewards to high scorers). But I  recognize that any effective approach will take time, and there may be no one fix that is sufficient by itself.

The beginning of wisdom here is to recognize we have a wide-ranging problem of voter ignorance, and to prioritize the most significant types of ignorance and exploitation thereof. On that scale, ignorance about policy issues should rank high, while voter confusion about candidates' names is a very minor problem, by comparison.

UPDATE: I have made minor additions to this post.

The post Creating Voter Confusion About Candidates' Names is Bad - But Exploiting Voter Ignorance About Policy Issues is a Much Bigger Problem appeared first on Reason Magazine.

On this week's episode of Freed Up, Robby "Lestat" Soave and Christian "Lizard" Britschgi sport their Halloween costumes while reviewing Nathan Fielder's buzzy new documentary, You Can See Everything. During their discussion, they analyze the psyche of Elizabeth Holmes as well as the differences between documentaries and biographical dramas, and Christian gets an opportunity to defend his written critique of the film. Next, the boys shift gears and unpack reports that Mary Peltola's Senate campaign in Alaska helped recruit a second "Dan Sullivan" to confuse voters who meant to support the incumbent, Sen. Dan Sullivan (R–Alaska).

0:00—Halloween costumes

4:58—Robby and Christian review You Can See Everything

9:05—The ethical dilemmas in You Can See Everything

16:00—Elizabeth Holmes is still a liar

30:00—The Dropout vs. You Can See Everything

42:24—Mary Peltola's dirty tactics come to light.

54:06—Freed Up live for the 2026 midterm elections

If you enjoy Freed Up, come watch Robby debate at our upcoming Reason Versus event in Washington, D.C. Tickets are available here.

The post <em>You Can See Everything</em>, Halloween Costumes, Mary Peltola appeared first on Reason Magazine.

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© Illustration: Fatima Ruiz

I appreciate that many people are skeptical about judges. Indeed, it's good that people take with a grain of salt the statements of government officials, including judges. Judges are human, and humans make mistakes and have prejudices and blind spots.

At the same time, judges are generally quite well-trained lawyers, and know a good deal about what they're writing about. Conventional wisdom holds that federal judges generally are particularly well-qualified (of course, with exceptions, as is true for all institutions). Federal judges also generally employ quite well-qualified law clerks, who do much of the  research and initial opinion drafting.

This means that, for all the risk of error and ideological bias, judges generally (though not always) know what they're talking about in their legal analysis. They tend to particularly know more than non-lawyers, but also often more than lawyers who aren't specialists in the particular field. You might assume that some judge is "woke" or "Trumpy" or what have you, but there's a pretty good chance that the judge's legal analysis is still correct.

This post was prompted by a comment I saw on the Eric Coomer (of Dominion Voting) Loses Libel Lawsuit over The Deep Rig post, though this is just one example of a broader trend. The comment quotes an excerpt from the post's excerpt of the judge's opinion:

In short, if the law did not require "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements, it is likely that Byrne's motion for summary judgment would have been denied, and a jury would have had the opportunity to weigh in on this matter. However, under the law as it currently stands, Coomer's evidence is insufficient to meet these standards and summary judgment for Byrne is therefore required….

The comment then says, "Trumpy judge who apparently didn't bother to read Sullivan, which states" (emphasis added by commenter),

The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

And the comment continues, "Seems like this is ripe for appeal. This Trumpy judge seems to think the current precedent requires that the defendant 'subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements,' when Sullivan has a looser standard."

The trouble with the commenter's analysis is that Sullivan was of course not the last word on the subject—as the judge knew. Indeed, if one searches for "subjective" in the judge's opinion, one sees a longish passage citing authority supporting the judge's analysis:

Actual malice requires proof that the defendant published the challenged statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false. See id. [Coomer v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 552 P.3d 562, 581 (Colo. App. 2024)]; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The test for actual malice is a subjective one. Thus, the issue is not whether "a reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have investigated before publishing," but rather whether the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication, or was highly aware of its probable falsity[.]" Coomer, 552 P.3d at 591; Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. The Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103. 1105-10 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 703 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e ask whether the defendant, instead of acting in good faith, actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or was highly aware that the account was probably false."); Dershowitz v. Cable News Network, Inc., 153 F.4th 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2025) ("[A]ll that matters are the speakers' subjective beliefs about the truth of their own statements.").

St. Amant, cited by the court, indeed states,

[The precedents] are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) expressly quotes this passage as the Court having "equated reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity." The judge in the Coomer / Deep Rig case, whether you view him as "Trumpy" or not, knew the law here, and the commenter (who had elsewhere said he wasn't a lawyer) didn't seem to.

So, again, definitely view judges' work skeptically, and feel free to criticize it. But don't assume that just because you know one precedent in the field you know the law better than the judge. Don't assume that just because you think the judge has some ideological bias, that ideological bias has led the judge into legal error. And if you have some skepticism about the judge's analysis, check the sources that the judge cites in the full opinion; my posts usually just excerpt the opinion, and often don't include citations, but they generally link to the full opinion so readers can consult it directly.

The post Even "Trumpy Judges" and "Woke Judges" Might Know More Law Than You Do appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The midterm elections are just days away, and while anything can happen, the broad consensus among pollsters suggests a bad night for Republicans.

Hoping to shore up a victory for his party, President Donald Trump seized upon an idea: bribe the voters.

"If the Republicans win the House of Representatives and the United States Senate, both of them," Trump pledged in September, "I will issue a dividend to every adult citizen in the United States of America for $5,000."

According to Vice President J.D. Vance, this "dividend"—which would cost more than $1.3 trillion—would come from the "extraordinary amount of revenue" generated by Trump's tariffs. Of course, that math doesn't work: According to the Penn Wharton Budget Model, the U.S. took in just under $300 billion in tariff revenue between January 2025 and July 2026, not counting the amount it has had to refund after the Supreme Court found they were illegally imposed.

At that rate, it would take years of tariffs just to pay for Trump's dividend. Adding insult to injury, of course, is the fact that tariffs are paid by Americans, meaning we would be taxing ourselves to pay for our own disbursement.

But in the campaign season's closing days, Trump has made a number of other threats and offers, contingent on his party's success—a completely risible use of government power.

In September, three Ohio Republicans—Rep. Mike Turner and Sens. Bernie Moreno and Jon Husted—petitioned the president to build a planned Space Force training academy in their state.

"Every other state wants it," Trump said this month at an Ohio campaign rally. "If we win the midterms, Ohio will be very, very strongly considered."

Some of his pledges have been much more explicitly transactional.

On October 17, the Department of Defense—which Trump calls by its original name, the Department of War—announced a conditional $80 billion loan to pharmaceutical manufacturer Antheia. That same day, at a campaign rally in Kentucky, Trump made a pledge to the state's voters.

"If the Republicans win, the Department of War will be investing $100 million in the pharmaceutical company Antheia to revitalize a gigantic drug manufacturing facility in Winchester, Kentucky," he said. But he prefaced it by telling Rep. Andy Barr, the Republican running for the state's open Senate seat, "you have to win, Andy. Otherwise, forget it."

Days later in both Kansas and Iowa, Trump brought up E15, a gasoline blend that contains up to 15 percent ethanol derived from corn. It has advantages and disadvantages as an alternative to traditional gasoline, but it's a boon for corn-growing states.

"Normally, E15 is not allowed during the summer because warmer temperatures increase fuel evaporation and thus the formulation of ground ozone ('smog')," writes Benjamin Zycher of the American Enterprise Institute.

The government can waive that restriction to address disruptions in the fuel supply, which it did in March amid gas price shocks related to Trump's war in Iran. The House passed a bill in May to make the waiver permanent and allow E15 to be sold year-round, which Trump backed in June; the Senate version of the Farm Bill includes a year-round E15 amendment, but Democrats have held up its passage.

"With Roger Marshall in the Senate," Trump told Kansans last week, "we will make year-round E15 permanent. But if [Democratic candidate] Adam Hamilton is in, I'm not doing it."

He then made the same pledge in Iowa, where Rep. Ashley Hinson is the Republican Senate nominee. "With Ashley in the Senate, we will make it year-round E15," Trump said. "We'll make it permanent."

Of course, it's nothing new for politicians to make big promises in exchange for your votes. Typically, they're all hollow to at least some degree.

And Trump's pledges do reflect some version of reality: Keeping the Senate in Republican hands will make it easier for him to do certain things. But some of his others have been downright indefensible, less like typical political bribery than outright extortion.

At a rally in North Carolina last month, he tied hurricane disaster aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to Senate candidate Michael Whatley's election.

"We spent more than $2 billion [in] FEMA funding," he told attendees. "You're waiting for some additional money…and I'm gonna get that to you, Michael. Now if Michael loses, I'm not sending it." He added right after, "I'm only kidding, you're gonna get it."

Other times, he didn't take it back: Trump appeared at a campaign rally in Georgia this week, stumping for Rep. Mike Collins to unseat Sen. Jon Ossoff, and part of his sales pitch was that if Ossoff wins, he may just ignore the state.

"President has a lot of power," he said, and there's "a big difference when he likes the people representing a state. Collins could call me anytime he wants." But if Ossoff wins, he added, he won't take the call, and he even narrated a hypothetical conversation to make his point: "'Tell him I'm not in.' 'But he needs money for Georgia.' 'I don't give a damn what he wants!'"

Also this week, Trump railed about the Senate race in Alaska, where Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan faces not only former Rep. Mary Peltola but a retired teacher also named Dan Sullivan. The New York Times reported this week that the Peltola campaign actively recruited the second Sullivan to run explicitly as a spoiler, to siphon votes away from the senator.

"I have delivered for Alaska at Historic Levels," Trump wrote on Truth Social. "The Democrats are trying to steal this important Republican Seat and, if that happens, everything we've done for Alaska will come to an immediate hault [sic]."

It's one thing to say the federal government shouldn't provide aid to states—and since taking office, the administration has cut or paused such disbursements by $177 billion. Last week, the FEMA administrator indicated that going forward, states should expect to shoulder more of their own disaster aid.

But this goes much further, with the president explicitly conditioning aid on whether or not the state's voters have displeased him.

Perhaps, as in North Carolina, Trump was simply joking; the White House did not respond to Reason's request for clarification.

But there's certainly precedent to suggest he was serious.

"Last September, the Department of Energy (DOE) recommended cancellation of 624 grants for clean energy projects that had been approved by the Biden administration," Reason's Jacob Sullum wrote in July. The government then "winnowed it down to 284 grants, all but one of which had been awarded to projects in states that were represented by Democrats in the U.S. Senate and had voted for Kamala Harris in the 2024 presidential election."

In March, Politico reported that Trump had approved 89 percent of disaster aid requests from states with a Republican governor and two Republican senators but only 23 percent of requests from states with Democrats in those offices.

According to the Idle Rambling Substack, the trend continues: Trump has rejected nearly half of aid requests from Democrat-led states in this term while only rejecting 18 percent from Republican-led states.

But perhaps worst of all, he threatened not to pay out damages to people who suffered harm.

Between 1953 and 1987, the water at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina was contaminated by leaks of fuel and dry cleaning chemicals. The government estimates that as many as 1 million people, both service members and their families, were exposed to toxic chemicals. The Department of Veterans Affairs officially recognizes eight diseases stemming from exposure, including multiple cancers and Parkinson's disease.

In 2022, Congress passed the Camp Lejeune Justice Act, which waived any federal government claims of immunity and allowed veterans to sue over exposure to tainted water. As of September 2026, the Department of Justice says it has paid out more than $879 million, out of more than $1.1 billion in settlement offers.

"We're also fighting for our great veterans, and taking care of those veterans who brought claims related to water contamination at Camp Lejeune," Trump told North Carolina rallygoers last week. "And if we win the House and the Senate, I am directing the Department of Justice to settle all remaining legitimate claims as soon as possible." But "if we don't win, there's no money. If we do win, you're getting it."

It should be clear by now that Trump values personal loyalty over all else. To that end, there is nothing he finds more disreputable than failing to do what he says.

In the closing days of this campaign season, he is making that more explicit than ever, tying his party's success in a state to whether the state is entitled to equal treatment under the law.

Trump was right that presidents have "a lot of power." He's also a living example of why they shouldn't.

The post Trump's Latest Attempt To Salvage the Midterms: Bribe and Extort the Voters appeared first on Reason Magazine.

In a July 16 letter to California Secretary of State Shirley Weber, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said a "preliminary review" suggested there "may be as many as 190,832 non-citizens registered to vote" in her state. Weber was skeptical—for good reason, it turned out. Three months later, the Trump administration reduced that estimate by nearly 90 percent, saying about 20,000 "likely noncitizens" had received California vote-by-mail ballots.

The Justice Department gave Weber and Dean Logan, Los Angeles County's top election official, 48 hours to determine whether any of the people on the government's list were in fact citizens. Otherwise, it said, Weber and Logan should segregate those ballots and refrain from processing them until citizenship could be verified. After Weber and Logan declined to comply with the Justice Department's demands, it asked a federal judge for a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring them to do so—a request that he rejected in a scathing opinion on Wednesday.

"Never before in American history has the federal government, on the eve of an election, sought to coerce a state and local government to abandon their own Constitutional elections procedures and bend to the will of the Executive Branch," writes U.S. District Judge David O. Carter, a Bill Clinton appointee. "This request violates longstanding constitutional principles mandating that states have control over their elections. If Plaintiff's last-minute request for relief were granted, either party could create chaos for their own political purposes to disrupt the election process. Over 20,000 registered Californians would potentially lose the right that generations of Americans have fought to preserve."

The Justice Department delivered its list of "likely noncitizens" to Logan three weeks before Election Day. At that point, Los Angeles County already had sent ballots to 5.9 million voters and processed 331,000 of them. Logan said he was "legally prohibited" from doing what the Justice Department wanted because it had failed to explain the methodology used to compile the list, raising the possibility that citizens would be denied their voting rights.

There was ample reason for that concern. On July 17, DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin averred that "as many as" 15,903 noncitizens were registered to vote in Nevada. The following month, when the DHS submitted a list of allegedly illegal voters to Nevada election officials, the number had fallen to 185—99 percent lower than Mullin's original figure. It turned out that every one of those 185 voters was a U.S. citizen.

"DHS has identified over 250,000 potential non-citizens illegally registered to vote" in California, New Jersey, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, Mullin said in July. He was echoing President Donald Trump, who for years has grossly exaggerated the extent of illegal voting by noncitizens, often in service of his own vanity.

Trump has repeatedly claimed, for example, that he would have won the popular vote in 2016 but for "the millions of people who voted illegally," and in January 2024 he warned that noncitizen voters "could very well affect the next election." In a speech the night before Mullin's announcement, Trump asserted that the DHS had "identified approximately 278,000 non-citizens who are registered to vote in federal elections."

Judging from Nevada's experience, the actual number may be closer to zero. It is hard to say, because the methods used by the DHS remain hazy.

In the California case, Carter says, the DHS "purchased a voter file that appeared to reflect 'the actual voter rolls in California, that as of August 2025, may be used for the 2026 federal election.'" It "then 'enhance[d]' the voter data through a 'reliable third-party data analytics'" and used records maintained by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to find "an internal USCIS immigration number" that "may" correspond to each registered voter. "The matches are scored," Carter notes, "because 'the resulting data may be incomplete, outdated, or mismatched.'"

The DHS "then compared the potential identity matches to Department of State and Social Security Administration data to screen out U.S. citizens," Carter adds. "In the next step, a confidence level was assigned (where a high score supported a 'strong identity link') and a manual review was conducted for each match to 'determine which registered voters'" were "likely to be aliens." Then came "a 'quality review' to identify issues such as 'duplicate entries' and 'incomplete records,'" followed by "an 'enrichment process' that utilized 'additional unique identifiers' to 'improv[e]' the matching process."

The government did not initially specify the source of the "reliable third-party data analytics." But it later revealed that "the third-party platform it relied on was
Lexis Nexis," Carter notes. "It remains unknown how Lexis Nexis performed its analysis, such as how it 'linked names to Social Security numbers not available on the California public voter file.' Plaintiff likewise did not explain what its 'enrichment process' entailed or how it occurred. Plaintiff also provided 'no error rates' or 'validation against a reliable benchmark' that would enable a determination of the accuracy of its findings. Omissions of this critical information prevent an evaluation of Plaintiff's procedure, including how Plaintiff reduced its initial claim of nearly 200,000 alleged noncitizens to 20,000 individuals."

Potential sources of error include conflating people with similar or identical names and outdated records that do not reflect recent naturalization. Because it is unclear how the DHS tried to address such problems, it is not surprising that Weber and Logan did not want to rely on the Trump administration's list, especially given its pattern of dramatically reducing the putative number of illegally registered voters.

"It is well-documented that matching voter registration records with data from other
administrative databases 'presents numerous challenges,'" Carter writes. And given the potential for error, he says, "Plaintiff's allegations are not credible." He adds that the TRO sought by the Justice Department "would likely lead to voter disenfranchisement" and "would create a significant administrative burden for Defendants, leading to chaos and upending the election."

In any event, Carter says, the Trump administration does not have legal standing to seek such an order. The government's main argument was that California officials, by refusing to segregate ballots from people on its list, were interfering with its enforcement of 18 USC 611, which makes it a misdemeanor for "any alien to vote" in a federal election.

"Defendants do not 'interfere' with the United States' ability to enforce Section 611 by
administering an ongoing election in accordance with established State and Federal law, rather than assuming new obligations pursuant to a federal criminal law they are not responsible for enforcing," Carter writes. It is well established that state officials have no obligation to enforce federal law, he notes, and that they cannot be "commandeered" to do so.

Nor does the federal government need such assistance to enforce Section 611. "The very same day the United States filed its TRO [application] in this Court, the Department of Justice brought charges against 28 individuals" in California under that law, Carter notes. It is not clear how many of those defendants, who represent 0.0001 percent of California's 23 million registered voters, actually cast ballots. But "if fraudulent voting occurs," Carter says, "the United States should uphold the law and bring additional Section 611 indictments against those non-citizens it believes actually voted illegally in the current—or a prior—election."

The Constitution gives states the primary responsibility for conducting elections, subject to explicit limits imposed by Congress. But the Justice Department's actions in this case "are indicative of a broad, ongoing pattern of attempted election interference by federal officials," Carter writes. The department "has filed at least thirty-one lawsuits in federal district courts across the country seeking complete voter rolls from the States. Out of the twenty-six decided cases, the DOJ has prevailed in precisely zero."

In addition to "its failed attempt to seek State voter rolls," Carter notes, "the United States has also requested that States act based on the Executive's own lists." But "sister district courts across the country have cast doubt" on the reliability of those lists for the same reasons that Carter cites in this case.

On October 23, the Justice Department "sent letters to every county in California requiring them to set aside the votes of alleged non-citizens," Carter notes. "The letters stated that election officials 'risk significant federal scrutiny' if they failed to comply with the Government's demands. The government reiterated its threat in open court yesterday, stating that State and County election officials who do not comply with their letter risk federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2, which criminalizes aiding and abetting the commission of a criminal offense. The court reiterates what it said yesterday: these threats must stop."

The post Trump's Claims About Noncitizen Voting Are 'Not Credible,' a Federal Judge Says in a Scathing Decision appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour recently told Reason's Nick Gillespie there's a "big group" of lawmakers in both parties who are "actually" in favor of prediction market platforms. Utah Attorney General Derek Brown is not one of them. 

On Wednesday, Brown filed criminal charges in state court against Kalshi, Mansour, and fellow co-founder and chief operating officer Luana Lopes Lara. Mansour, Lopes Lara, and Kalshi are charged with one count of general gambling promotion, a class A misdemeanor; one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second-degree felony; and 12 counts of online gambling promotion, a third-degree felony.

The feud between Kalshi and Utah has been brewing for quite some time. In August, U.S. District Court Judge Robert J. Shelby found that federal law did not preempt Utah from enforcing its anti-gambling laws against Kalshi, meaning the platform could not legally operate in the Beehive State. Last week, Utah filed a civil suit against the prediction platform alleging it had continued to engage in a "brazen pattern of unlawful conduct." The criminal case comes a day after the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed its lawsuit to block Utah from enforcing its anti-gambling laws against Kalshi. 

Even though it's been illegal to use Kalshi in Utah since August, Special Agent Scott Eggerman of the Attorney General's Office was able to "create an undercover Kalshi account, using an undercover name and an undercover Visa Debit Card," according to Wednesday's complaint. 

All of Eggerman's personal user information identified him as a Utah resident with a local phone number and bank account through a "Utah-based banking establishment." Over two weeks, Eggerman spent $114.87 on a dozen wagers spread across the NFL, MLB, a local college football game, and a Major League Soccer match involving Utah-based Real Salt Lake. In one instance, he lost $20 on a wager that the Troy Trojans football team would upset the Utah State Aggies. 

Utah argues Eggerman should never have been able to set up an account, let alone place any wagers on the platform. When Kalshi challenged Shelby's ruling, it asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit for an injunction while the appeal proceeded. However, in September, the 10th Circuit denied Kalshi's request for an injunction pending appeal, meaning Shelby's order remained in effect while the court considered the case.

"A federal court has already ruled that Utah's gambling laws apply to Kalshi," Brown told Deseret News. "Kalshi kept taking bets from Utahns anyway. That is illegal, and we're putting a stop to it."

Utah joins Arizona as the only two states to pursue criminal charges against Kalshi. However, the prediction platform has more than 20 lawsuits and cease and desist actions pending across the country, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. The issue might soon come before the Supreme Court. Earlier this month, the NFL, 39 states, and Washington, D.C., filed amicus briefs, arguing that conflicting decisions in the 6th and 9th Circuit Courts of Appeals left them unsure whether the states or the CFTC has regulatory authority over prediction markets. 

Kalshi is a supporter of Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes Reason. In a statement to the Deseret News, a Kalshi spokesperson called the criminal charges a "crazy overreach" and said Brown was "playing politics." With Shelby's ruling still in effect, so long as Utah considers Kalshi a gambling platform, its continued operation violates state law. Still, the criminal charges are an attempt to strong-arm Kalshi into acquiescing to his demands instead of letting the pending court case play out. 

Utah acknowledges that there's been a "rapid increase in volume on the Kalshi platform" from users in the Beehive State. Yet its attorney general seems intent on restricting adults in the state from spending their money as they see fit.

The post Utah Files Criminal Charges Against Kalshi Co-Founders appeared first on Reason Magazine.

For more than half a century, federal officials have classified drugs into legal categories that determine who can manufacture, prescribe, or study them, and who goes to prison for possessing or selling them. Those classifications carry enormous consequences. They also reflect decades of political pressure, moralization, myth, and stigma.

Rep. Steve Cohen (D–Tenn.) proposes to change that. His Public Health and Research Reforms in Controlled Substances Act of 2026 would substantially overhaul federal drug scheduling, shift key decisions from law enforcement to health officials, ease research restrictions, deschedule marijuana, and reduce mandatory prison penalties.

While the proposal preserves too much of the drug prohibition infrastructure, it represents a major step toward a more rational, evidence-based, and humane drug policy.

The Controlled Substances Act currently combines judgments about a drug's potential for abuse with judgments about its medical usefulness. Congress vested scheduling authority in the attorney general, who generally exercises it through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) evaluates the scientific and medical evidence, but the DEA makes the ultimate legal determination of whether a drug has a "currently accepted medical use" for scheduling purposes, as the Justice Department explained in a 2024 legal opinion. Schedule I, the most restrictive category, includes substances deemed to have a high potential for abuse and no currently accepted medical use. These restrictions impede research, while officials cite insufficient evidence of medical usefulness to justify continued restrictions.

Cohen's bill would transfer authority to assess medical usefulness and drug-related risks—and to make scheduling decisions—from law enforcement to HHS, where those judgments more rationally belong. Under the new system, controlled substances would receive two classifications: a Roman numeral, I through IV, reflecting risks associated with misuse, substance use disorder, and threats to public health; and a letter, A through E, reflecting therapeutic value.

A substance could therefore be classified as high risk while still recognized for substantial medical benefits. That reflects an everyday reality of medical practice. Fentanyl, for example, can cause fatal respiratory depression and remains an indispensable anesthetic and analgesic. A drug's dangers do not erase its benefits.

The bill would also replace the vague "potential for abuse" standard for adding substances to the schedules with a standard based on the potential to develop a substance use disorder, expressly excluding isolated or occasional nontherapeutic use. Taking a substance for pleasure would no longer, by itself, satisfy that threshold.

Among the proposal's most consequential provisions is a requirement that officials consider whether scheduling a substance would itself threaten public health, including by encouraging people to substitute other drugs. They must also consider whether people use a substance to help control problematic use of another scheduled drug, as well as the harms associated with that other drug.

That would force federal officials to confront consequences that drug warriors routinely ignore. Banning a substance does not eliminate demand. Consumers may turn to underground suppliers, face uncertain potency and contamination, or switch to more dangerous products. Making a particular drug harder to obtain can leave its users worse off.

These requirements could be critical in disputes over kratom and its alkaloids, such as 7-hydroxymitragynine (7-OH), which some consumers report using for pain or to reduce their use of other opioids. Such reports should be part of an honest assessment of what consumers stand to lose when the government closes a legal supply channel.

An expert committee would evaluate each substance and publish its evidence and reasoning, making scheduling decisions more transparent and easier to challenge.

HHS would also assume from the DEA responsibility for registering researchers who study controlled substances. Qualifying researchers would gain an expedited registration pathway, with faster decisions for eligible small preclinical pilot studies. Federal officials currently demand evidence that these drugs have medical benefits while imposing restrictions that make it harder for researchers to obtain the drugs and conduct the studies needed to generate that evidence.

Cohen would require officials to reconsider existing classifications, setting a two-year deadline for 32 named substances and an eight-year deadline for most others. If officials miss those deadlines, statutory fallback classifications would apply.

The bill would also repeal the legal obligation of the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the "drug czar," to oppose specified legalization efforts—a remarkable requirement for an office supposedly focused on evaluating drug policy.

Marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols (THCs) would come off the controlled substance schedules altogether. The bill expressly makes that change retroactive, extending it to past offenses, pending cases, convictions, and juvenile adjudications.

Its sentencing reforms also merit praise. The proposal would remove the quantity-based trafficking provisions that impose five- and 10-year mandatory minimums and eliminate specified mandatory penalties when death or serious injury results. The bill would also limit certain repeat-offender sentencing enhancements to prior convictions that meet the narrower definition of a "serious drug felony." Among other requirements, the person must have served more than a year in prison and been released within 15 years of the new offense. Eligible prisoners could receive reduced sentences, and the Bureau of Prisons would be required to identify them, notify them, and file motions on their behalf.

These changes could spare people years of imprisonment. They deserve support even from those of us who would go much further.

The shortcomings remain significant.

First, the bill preserves criminal penalties for peaceful conduct involving drugs that remain controlled. It leaves the general federal simple-possession statute intact, including mandatory minimum jail terms for repeat offenses. Congress would continue to authorize imprisonment for possessing a substance without government permission.

Second, transferring power to HHS offers no guarantee against political interference. The secretary would appoint the expert committee in consultation with the drug czar. Its required membership emphasizes addiction medicine, toxicology, and substance-use services, without expressly reserving seats for pain patients, ordinary consumers, or civil liberties advocates.

The bill would allow emergency scheduling to bypass the new expert committee's review. It would also retain features of the current system: Temporary restrictions could last two years, with a possible one-year extension, and the statute would expressly exclude those orders from judicial review.

The bill would also transfer production quotas to HHS rather than abolish them. As I have argued before, presuming to know how much of each opioid more than 320 million Americans will need in the coming year exemplifies what economist Friedrich Hayek called the "fatal conceit." These quotas have contributed to shortages of injectable opioids in hospitals, jeopardizing care for surgical patients and those on ventilators. Transferring that power to a health agency does not solve the underlying knowledge problem. Congress should abolish the quotas.

The proposal substantially increases many maximum fines even as it reduces mandatory prison penalties. For an individual convicted of Schedule I or II trafficking without a qualifying prior conviction, the fine ceiling would rise from $1 million to $10 million. Congress should question this punitive expansion.

Finally, marijuana descheduling would leave Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority intact. The bill expressly preserves the agency's powers under federal food and drug law, allowing it to regulate cannabis products that qualify as drugs, foods, or other products within its jurisdiction. It provides no explicit protection for a recreational cannabis market from FDA restrictions.

Those weaknesses warrant amendments. Scientific evidence can help people understand risks, but it cannot, by itself, justify depriving competent adults of the freedom to decide which risks they will accept. Autonomous adults should remain free to make informed choices about what they put into their bodies.

Cohen, who is retiring from Congress at the end of his term, is unlikely to see this sweeping reform pass during the brief post-election lame duck session. But his proposal can serve as a benchmark for reforming the Controlled Substances Act in the next Congress. Providing his successors with a framework that places greater weight on scientific evidence, recognizes the harms of prohibition, and reduces unjust punishment would leave Cohen with a substantial drug policy reform legacy.

The post Rep. Steve Cohen Thinks the DEA Shouldn't Be Practicing Medicine appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will let pharmacies produce and sell treatments involving six peptides that aren't specifically approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The move is meant to provide a "controlled alternative" to buying peptides from possibly sketchy foreign pharmacies, HHS said.

Under the new HHS policy, the agency will not "take enforcement action against a State-licensed pharmacy, Federal facility, or licensed physician compounding a drug product" using one of six named "peptide bulk drug substance[s]."

This is a major win for peptide proponents, compounding pharmacies, and health freedom—and hints that HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. may be feeling frustration with the slow pace of things at the FDA.

The six peptides in question—BPC-157, Epitalon, KPV, MOTS-c, Semax, and TB-500—were the subject of a summer meeting of the FDA's Pharmacy Compounding Advisory Committee (PCAC).

Up for debate was whether these six "bulk drug substances" and another, Emideltide, should be put on the FDA's Section 503A Bulks List. That list governs which substances licensed physicians and specialty pharmacies can compound into drug products without them being a component of an already FDA-approved drug or having "an applicable United States Pharmacopeia (USP) or National Formulary (NF) monograph."

In July, the panel voted to put six of the seven peptide-related substances under consideration (all except Emideltide) on the bulks list. But the panel's vote is not binding.

It's ultimately up to FDA authorities to decide whether they accept the advisory committee's recommendations. So far, no decision has been released.

But yesterday, HHS unveiled an "Enforcement Discretion Policy Regarding 503A Compounding Using Certain Peptide Bulk Drug Substances." And it effectively puts the committee's recommendations into practice by proxy.

Kennedy can't ensure FDA approval, of course. But he can—and will—stop HHS from taking action against physicians or pharmacies that compound and distribute these substances under his prescribed rules.

In an explainer about the new policy, HHS notes that "compounded drugs are not FDA-approved, which means FDA does not review their safety, effectiveness, or quality before they are marketed." Nonetheless, "compounded drugs can serve an important medical need for certain patients" and "there is significant interest in the use of these peptides in compounding," it says.

Opponents of allowing more peptide-based treatments to be compounded by licensed U.S. pharmacies often focus on the fact that these products don't have FDA approval and may not have the extensive experimental backing required of FDA-approved treatments.

But people are already taking BPC-157, MOTS-c, and other peptides anyway, buying them from companies selling them under "for research use only" labels or obtaining them from foreign distributors. Peptides can even be found on discount everything-marketplaces like the China-based AliExpress.

Allowing licensed physicians and pharmacies in the U.S. to compound these substances without fear of being punished gives people access to safer options than they might otherwise have.

Pharmacies compounding peptide-based products under the rules set forth by federal law still have to be licensed in the states where they operate and follow certain rules, including a requirement that active ingredients used for compounding must be "accompanied by valid certificates of analysis" and "be compounded based on the receipt of a valid patient-specific prescription." Per the new HHS policy, they must also follow several other rules regarding the packaging and labeling of these peptides.

"The Secretary of HHS has determined that this limited enforcement-discretion policy will discourage the continued, widespread use of certain research-use-only peptides supplied by foreign manufacturers that pose a safety risk to US patients," notes the HHS explainer. "By allowing limited compounding of the substances addressed in this guidance under appropriate safeguards, the policy provides patients with a more controlled alternative."

It's an astoundingly reality-based policy for government health officials, who often act as if matters like this come down to a binary between perfect health and safety on one hand and certain danger on the other.

Rather than relegating peptides to gray or black markets until they (may be) pronounced all clear by the FDA, RFK Jr.'s HHS has chosen to balance safety with "patient choice and freedom," as the HHS states.

The post RFK Jr. Institutes Backdoor Approval of 6 Peptides appeared first on Reason Magazine.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a liaison at the military's Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with access to advanced surveillance technology, leaked files show.​​ The files also reveal ICE liaisons at Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) with access to the same tech, and an ICE contractor associated with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Middle East.

On Wednesday, a hacker group calling itself the Department of Peace released a massive collection of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel files, including ICE and other domestic security agencies. "They have our information, so it's only fair that we have theirs," the hackers wrote in a note attached to the database, which was posted online to Distributed Denial of Secrets, a platform for data leaks.

DHS told The Washington Post that it was "aware of a potential breach" and "working to address the situation swiftly and effectively." A website hosting a searchable version of the leak, ICEpick, was taken down after the DHS sent a letter demanding that the domain name host "stop serving the personal contact and location data of individuals who did not consent."

The files include an ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) unit chief who appears to oversee the agency's military liaisons. His subordinates include a "Combatant Command Program Manager" at SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida; an "HSI Liaison to USAFRICOM" in Stuttgart, Germany; and a "Senior Liaison to U.S. Southern Command" in Doral, Florida.

All of the officials named in the files are listed as users of "Penlink," "Falcon," and "RavenGo." The contractor PenLink offers officials the ability to track individual cell phone users or collect data on everyone in a certain location, according to documents obtained by 404media. FALCON, created by the contractor Palantir, allows officials to combine records from governmental and commercial databases, The Guardian reports. The DHS eventually phased out FALCON in favor of an in-house system, RAVEN.

The unit chief is additionally listed in a group called "LCR_Users." The acronym may refer to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence at Liberty Crossing, McLean, Virginia. Two employees are listed in the DHS files with "ODNI" in their title and "LCR - Liberty Crossing" as their location. The first Trump administration reportedly looked into merging ICE into the federal intelligence community, but never officially did so.

The files also include an HSI contractor listed as "CENTCOM analyst" at the National Targeting Center in Sterling, Virginia. Unlike the other liaisons, this contractor does not have access to ICE's own surveillance software. The National Targeting Center is a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) unit that surveils international travel and selects passengers for questioning. CENTCOM oversees all U.S. military forces in the Middle East.

Although it has been mentioned in public, ICE's relationship with the military is shrouded in mystery. Of course, the best-documented relationship is with SOUTHCOM, responsible for U.S. forces in Latin America. Official press releases also mentioned HSI's participation in an AFRICOM maritime security training exercise in 2021. The connections to SOCOM and CENTCOM have not been publicly reported.

ICE did not respond to Reason's request for comment.

The DHS has an in-house intelligence office that is separate from HSI and publicly cooperates with the U.S. military, as well as the rest of the intelligence community. But HSI's "global footprint" and ability to straddle the line between law enforcement and foreign policy "make it uniquely capable of disrupting and dismantling the sophisticated groups and networks that we now face," HSI Executive Assistant Director Katrina W. Berger testified to Congress in 2024.

HSI is supposed to handle serious organized crimes involving the border rather than day-to-day deportations. However, the Trump administration has turned the directorate into an all-purpose domestic spying and enforcement arm. HSI is now running a massive surveillance operation against left-wing protesters, WIRED recently revealed.

Agents have reportedly been pulled away from investigating human trafficking and drug cartels to deal with immigration enforcement. HSI was involved in arresting former CNN journalist Don Lemon for showing up at an anti-ICE protest at a church, and led the raid against Rep. Ilhan Omar (D–Minn.) reportedly aimed at showing that her U.S. citizenship is invalid.

Last month, ICE announced upcoming contracts for a $100 million, fast-tracked expansion of its domestic surveillance capabilities, with contractors asked "to identify and assess relationships among individuals, organizations, locations, events, activities, data points, and other entities." Former military intelligence analyst Michael Wriston called the intensified ICE surveillance a case of "imperial boomerang" in an interview with The American Prospect. "These are the kinds of things that happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, for years. Now that methodology is being brought into the ICE space."

The post Leaked Files Reveal ICE Liaisons to U.S. Military Commands With Access to Surveillance Tech appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Preindustrial marriage was not the fairy tale that many people imagine. Some assume that in the villages of yore, life was simpler, love and marriage came easily, and most of our ancestors lived happily ever after in contented, wedded bliss. In reality, limited partner choices, widely tolerated domestic abuse, and frequent early deaths meant marriage was fraught with challenges. In short, marriage wasn't always happily ever after.

People in the past faced few options when it came to marriage. The number of potential partners in one's tiny village was low—the few available choices might all be one's cousins, increasing the risk of birth defects in any resulting children.

Peasants typically married within their own villages, which were so insular that local dialects often proved unintelligible to people living just a few miles away. Travel was rarer, and communities were more secluded than a modern person can easily envision. As William Manchester evocatively put it in his book A World Lit Only by Fire, "Each hamlet was inbred, isolated, unaware of the world beyond the most familiar local landmark: a creek, or mill, or tall tree scarred by lightning." People typically gathered and socialized at a much smaller scale than the modern mind can fathom: The largest crowd recorded in 17th century England, the army that fought at Marston Moor, would easily fit five times over in a modern sports stadium. By the 18th century, little had changed, and the majority of villagers married people living within 10 miles of themselves.

The tiny pool of possible marriage partners often produced matches that might raise eyebrows today, such as blood relatives and couples with large age gaps. As Kirstin Olsen wrote in the book Daily Life in 18th-Century England, "A husband 10 or 15 years older than his bride would arouse little comment," for such relationships were common.

Given the highly limited pool of marriage partner choices, perhaps it is unsurprising that many people seemingly settled for spouses ill-suited to them. Olsen wrote that "much of the satirical literature of the 18th century…lampooned marriage as a hell or prison sentence for one or both partners. The most typical attitude toward marriage evinced in 18th century literature and visual art is a sly, collegial misery." The poem "Wedlock" by the Englishwoman Mehetabel Wesley Wright (1697–1750), herself pressured into a loveless marriage with a plumber, paints a typical picture:

Thou source of discord, pain and care,

Thou sure forerunner of despair,

Thou scorpion with a double face,

Thou lawful plague of human race,

Thou bane of freedom, ease and mirth,

Thou serpent which the angels fly,

Thou monster whom the beasts defy,

Whom wily Jesuits sneer at too;

And Satan (let him have his due)

Was never so confirmed a dunce

To risk damnation more than once.

That wretch, if such a wretch there be,

Who hopes for happiness from thee,

May search successfully as well

For truth in whores and ease in hell.

The Flemish poet and nun Anna Bijns (1493–1575) similarly advised other women to avoid marriage in her poem "Happy the Woman Without a Man." She wrote that a newlywed wife becomes "sorry and sad within a single year" as her husband gets drunk, beats her, cheats on her, and "consider[s] her a slave, that's all."

Men were also often unhappy in marriage. In 1682, an anonymous writer urged men to avoid the institution:

Husband! Thou Dull unpittied Miscreant

Wedded to Noise, to Misery, and Want;

…

Marry'd! O Hell and Furies! Name it not,

…

Begot in Hell to Prosecute Mankind.

'Tis the Destroyer of Our Peace and Health,

Mispender of our precious Time and Wealth;

The Enemy to Wit, Valour, Mirth, all

That we can Virtuous, Good, or Pleasant call.

By Day 'tis nothing but an endless Noise;

By Night the Eccho of Forgotten Joys:

Ye Gods! that Man by his own Slavish Law,

Should on himself such Inconvenience draw

…

And if thou'rt still Unmarry'd, thou art safe.

with whores thou can'st but venture, what is lost

May be Redeem'd again with Care and Cost;

But a Damn'd Wife, Inevitable Fate,

Destroys, Soul, Body, Credit, and Estates.

Disdain for one's wife was common, and many men were dissatisfied with their wives' appearance, lack of faithfulness, drinking habits, and temperaments. Emily Cockayne points out that "a curious little work of 1672 illustrated a misogynistic fantasy. It described a Dutch invention to help all unhappy husbands: a windmill to reform bad wives." The illustration depicts ugly, frowning women entering the mill, led by their husbands, and beautiful, smiling women exiting the contraption. An accompanying description claims that the mill can transform "all sorts of women, as the old, decreped, wrinkled, blear-ey'd, long-nosed, blind, lame, scolds, jealous, angry, poor, drunkerds, whores, sluts; or all others whatsoever. They shall come out of [the] mill, young, active, pleasant, handsome, wise, loving, vertuous and rich."

Widespread antipathy toward one's spouse also found expression in distasteful jokes, such as the following from The Spirit of English Wit:

To "a gentleman in the country, whose wife had the misfortune to hang herself on an apple-tree, a neighbour came in, and begged he would give him a cyon [scion] of that tree, that he might graft it upon one in his own orchard; 'for who knows,' said he, 'but it may bear the same fruit?'"

Not Your Grandparents' 'Traditional' Marriage

Those who imagine that the people of the past unfailingly adhered to stricter standards of sexual restraint and chastity might be alarmed at the frequency of shotgun marriages: A third of all brides were already pregnant at their weddings. Moreover, in England, one historian has suggested that in the 17th century, only about half of those regarded as married were actually married according to canon law (i.e., the ecclesiastical legal system). Many couples forwent a formal wedding and simply moved in together; they were treated as married under common law.

Although shotgun and informal marriages were frequent, marriages often ended in a less-than-ideal manner as well, typically with the untimely death of the husband or wife. Life in 17th century Europe was so fraught with disease, war, and accidents that most marriages ended with a spouse's early death, making remarriage and blended families far more common in the preindustrial past than today, despite what many might assume. Indeed, because life expectancy was low, couples who married in their mid- to late 20s typically had fewer than 20 years together before death ended their union. There often was no lengthy mourning period between a spouse's death and remarriage. In England, up to one-third of widows remarried, and half of them did so within a year of their husbands' passing.

The devastation wrought by the death of a spouse was worsened by sexist inheritance laws. Widows were often dependent on the sons who inherited their husbands' property for support.

Even during wedding celebrations, death was never far from our ancestors' minds. The rate of death in childbirth for medieval women was astronomical. Manchester writes: "On her wedding day, traditionally, [a bride's] mother gave her a piece of fine cloth which could be made into a frock. Six or seven years later it would become her shroud."

Still, people eked out what joy they could get from wedding celebrations. Among ordinary people, weddings were rude and raucous affairs. Olsen explains, "The guests kissed the bride, played practical jokes, sang obscene songs, and ate." When the couple withdrew to their dwelling after the ceremony, they were offered little privacy, as "outside the revelers sang dirty songs and shouted insinuations about what was going on in the bedroom." In Scotland, in a tradition called "the blackening," revelers pelted the bride and groom with rotting food, manure, and mud in preparation for the hardships of marriage.

Weddings were also occasions for alcohol abuse and physical altercations, as historian A. Lynn Martin notes in a research paper:

The anonymous author of In the Christen State of Matrimony (1543) complained that, "when they come to the preaching they are half drunk, some all together….When they come home from the church, then begins excess of eating and drinking and as much is wasted in one day as were sufficient for the two newly married folks half a year to live upon."…The amount of drink consumed was in truth gargantuan…so much wine was consumed by so many people at a wedding at Parma in 1247 that a relatively few banished men were able to seize control of the town.

The situation was no better in France. In the Auvergne region, weddings often ended with evening bouts of violence, after many hours of drunken rowdiness led to fistfights.

Physical fights were far from the only disturbing part of preindustrial weddings. The bride, and the groom for that matter, might both be children. As Manchester writes: "Females could marry…when they reached their twelfth birthday. The age for males was fourteen. Even before she had reached her teens, a girl knew that unless she married before she was twenty-one, society would consider her useless, fit only for the nunnery, or, in England, the spinning wheel (a 'spinster')." Even in the 18th century, in England, legally the groom might be as young as 14 and the bride merely 12 years old, though thankfully that was rare in practice. Early marriages did occur, however. In 1623, a London parish clerk wrote disapprovingly of the wedding of a 17-year-old boy working as a thread maker to the 14-year-old daughter of a porter, calling them a "couple of young Fooles."

People born in ordinary households at least usually had some say in whom they married and when, whereas children in elite families were frequently betrothed from preposterously young ages. Patricians typically arranged betrothals for their children soon after age 7, and in some cases as early as 3.

Following these prepubescent betrothals, marriages could take place soon after the bride reached the age of puberty. Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122–1204) married Louis VII of France when she was 15 and he was 17. Lucrezia Borgia (1480–1519), a prominent Italian noblewoman, was married off to her first husband when she was just 13. The groom was 27. As another example, England's King John (1166–1216), the monarch who issued the Magna Carta, married Isabella of Angoulême when she was 12 years old. He was 33. In 1533, Charles V negotiated a marriage contract for his 11-year-old niece, Christina of Denmark, and a man four times her age, granting the groom the right to consummate the union immediately.

Our ancestors were not always faithful to their spouses, but the lower classes may have had a slightly cleaner record than the nobles in that regard. Among the nobility, adultery was nearly universal. In fact, Manchester claims: "Those wives in the noblesse d'épée who remained faithful to their husbands were mocked by the others. To abstain from…adultery was almost a breach of etiquette, like failing to curtsy before royalty."

Abuse, Divorce, Murder, and Wives for Sale

Formal divorce was beyond the means of most ordinary people, so marriages typically dissolved when one spouse died or through abandonment. In 18th century England, only the wealthy could afford the means to secure private acts of Parliament to obtain a divorce, a process that was both complex and extremely costly, requiring both substantial money and influence. A rather shocking (to modern sensibilities) form of divorce known as wife selling sometimes occurred among those who could not afford a formal dissolution of marriage; the Ipswich Journal records such a sale occurring in 1789:

Oct. 29, Samuel Balls sold his wife to Abraham Rade in the parish of Blythburgh in his county for 1 [shilling]. A halter was put around her neck and she was resigned up to this Abraham Rade.

Charles V was a symbol of numerous problems with preindustrial marriage: His deformed jaw was the result of consanguineous marriages in his family, and he also once negotiated a marriage contract between his 11-year-old niece and a man four times her age, granting the right to consummate the union immediately. Portrait of Emperor Charles V, c. 1514.

Such bizarre episodes offer insight into the somewhat quizzical attitude that ordinary people held toward the official marriage code, with local customs and practices varying wildly. Despite the rarity of formal legal divorce among ordinary people, marriage did not usually last long given the high rate of premature death, and it was common for someone to marry several times after being repeatedly widowed.

Many unhappy marriages turned downright abusive. Olsen says, "Domestic violence was tolerated by the courts so long as it was limited to 'moderate physical correction,' and a man could even commit his wife to an insane asylum against her will." Domestic violence was celebrated in works of popular culture such as the upbeat wife beater's anthem, "The Cooper of Fife," a traditional Scottish folk song that inspired a country dance and similar English and American folk ballads. The contrast between the lyrics, which tell a tale of domestic violence, and the song's cheerful tune is jarring to a modern listener. An abused woman's best hope was often not legal recourse, but the possibility that a male relative, neighbor, or sympathetic passerby might notice her plight and take action on her behalf. Olsen wrote: "Neighbors [sometimes] intervened when men beat their wives, shaming the abusers with public processions and chants, or simply stopping a beating, as a saddler did in 1703, telling the abusive husband, 'you shall not beat your wife.'"

Oddly enough, roving nocturnal gangs of bored, drunken young men were perhaps an abused wife's most likely defenders. Some such "youth groups," A. Roger Ekirch relates, "contributed to social control, disciplining adulterers, abusive husbands, and cuckolds for violating common morality. Often occurring at night, charivaris in France, mattinata in Italy, and 'skimmington rides' in England subjected errant neighbors to 'rough music,' mockery, and on occasion, physical abuse."

Women, for their part, were also known to engage in criminal cruelty toward their husbands, such as by lethally poisoning them. Sometimes, these murders were committed in retaliation for domestic abuse. "Aqua Tofana," which one writer called the "bottled revenge of the 17th century wife," was a poison discovered in 17th century Sicily, notoriously sold through much of Italy by women to other women seeking to discreetly end their husbands' lives. Hundreds of victims (mainly men murdered by their wives) are estimated to have perished from the colorless, odorless poison, the precise ingredients of which are today unknown. Women were also occasionally known to attack their husbands at night while the latter slept, according to Ekirch:

An abused housewife in York warned her loutish spouse that she could kill him in bed at night if she wanted. In Germany, Margaretha Craft of Hallbach slew her second husband in bed with an axe "shortly after their union," later covering with manure his severed remains in the cellar. In 1737, a Connecticut husband—perchance while snoring—received from his wife a shovel of hot embers in his gaping mouth.

Interestingly, in England and Scotland, women who killed their husbands were charged not with murder but with petty treason, for defying the "government" of their husbands.

Not all abuse amounted to murder. A church court record from 1598 in Scotland describes a woman named Margaret Schort confessing to throwing a shovel at her husband, splashing ale in his face, cursing at him, and scratching him, for which her public punishment was recommended.

Although women certainly engaged in abuse of men as well, sexist laws frequently enabled men's abuse of women. Should a woman earn money, her husband could appear at any moment and claim her earnings, which the law recognized as his property. For example, in 18th century Britain, a wife could not enter into a contract, draft a will without her husband's consent, or determine her children's education or apprenticeships. In a separation, she lost custody automatically.

With so many difficulties accompanying marriage in the premodern age, it may seem a wonder that anyone married at all. Many people didn't. Contrary to popular belief, in much of Europe, marriage was less common in the past than in modern times. A large number of people never married. Married people were only about a third of the population, compared with about 50 percent in Western Europe today. In northwestern Europe, being married was not common for most adults until well into the 17th century.

But remaining single in the preindustrial world brought its own challenges, as Olsen notes: "The life of a spinster could be a difficult one, with extended family using unattached female relatives as temporary live-in housekeepers when a wife died." In other words, marriage was often the only way that women could avoid the fate of becoming unpaid live-in housekeepers to relatives. Economic necessity thus motivated many marriages. Marrying for love only began to emerge as an ideal in the 18th century and became more and more accepted during the 19th century.

This article is adapted from The Grim Old Days by permission of the Cato Institute.

The post Wives for Sale, Poisoned Husbands, and 12-Year-Old Brides: The Grim Reality of Preindustrial Marriage appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Next week's election is a pivotal one for Colorado, as voters will decide a pair of ballot questions that could secure the state's low-tax, small-government reputation—or shatter it.

Confusingly, there is a slim possibility that they decide to do both. More on that in a moment.

The two competing ballot measures could hardly be more different. The first, Proposition 136, would cap individual and corporate income taxes at 4.4 percent—the state's current flat rate.

The other, Amendment 87, would rewrite the state's constitution to allow for a progressive income tax. It would also set new rates, ranging from 7.4 percent on income over $500,000 to 8.4 percent on income over $1 million. And it would offer a modest tax cut to the lower end of the income spectrum: Individuals earning less than $100,000 would pay 4.2 percent, while those earning less than $25,000 would pay 3.7 percent.

Even with those offsets, Amendment 87 would be a massive tax increase. Both advocates and opponents agree that it would generate about $2–3 billion in additional annual revenue for the state government.

For now, the higher tax rates created by Amendment 87 would only apply to incomes over $500,000. Unsurprisingly, supporters of the measure are framing this as an opportunity to make the wealthy "pay their fair share."

There are two reasons why that argument is a bit deceiving.

As Jared Walczak, a senior fellow at the Tax Foundation, points out, "the new rates would be statutory, while the authorization for a graduated-rate tax would be enshrined in the constitution, permitting the legislature to adjust rates later." Lawmakers would not have to get permission from the voters to make those changes, so Coloradans would be trading away their flat income tax for a new model where income taxes could be hiked by the legislature at any time.

Second, the new rates are not indexed to inflation. As a result, "a household making $450,000 a year in today's dollars would be moved into a higher tax bracket within eight years if their earnings increased by 3% annually," reports The Colorado Sun, which crunched the numbers. Such "bracket creep" would also push more workers over the $100,000 threshold, nullifying the small tax cut for workers making less than that.

Politically, the progressive income tax proposal is dividing Democrats. The Colorado Democratic Party has endorsed Amendment 87 (along with many of its usual allies, like the AFL-CIO and the state's largest teachers union).

But Democratic Gov. Jared Polis has called the proposal "a huge blank check to politicians" that will "cripple our economy and reduce jobs."

In comments to a Denver TV station, Polis also highlighted how higher taxes in Colorado would make the state less competitive with its neighbors. "Utah has a very similar tax rate to what we have. If ours is double, we can't compete for businesses," Polis told Denver7. "It's game over. We will not be able to attract new employers to Colorado if the voters adopt this."

It's not just Utah. If the amendment passes, Colorado would have a significantly higher top income tax rate than any of its neighbors. (The current highest in that group is New Mexico, with its top rate of 5.9 percent.)

Under Colorado law, constitutional amendments typically need 55 percent approval to pass. However, Amendment 87 requires only a simple majority* because it technically repeals provisions in the constitution, rather than adding new ones. Similarly, Proposition 136—the one that would cap the income tax rate at 4.4 percent—requires just a simple majority.

It is possible, though unlikely, that both could pass. That would create a conflict, since the state's income tax can't be capped at 4.4 percent and also hiked to more than 7 percent on incomes over $500,000.

If that happens, the ballot question with the larger share of support would win, per state law. "In short, that means Amendment 87 would need to both win majority support from voters and surpass Proposition 136 in total votes to go into effect," explains the Denver Post, which has encouraged residents to vote against both ballot measures.

Accordingly, Proposition 136 must win majority support from the voters and surpass Amendment 87 (which needs 55 percent to pass, don't forget) to be implemented.

It is all a bit confusing, but the outcomes are worth watching. Colorado has long been a bit of an outlier among "blue" states for its relatively low taxes and booming population. It's now up to the voters to decide if that remains true.

*CORRECTION: This article incorrectly described how Amendment 87 could be passed into law. 

The post Jared Polis Warns Colorado's Progressive Tax Ballot Measure Could 'Cripple' the Economy appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Election law expert and UCLA Prof. Rick Hasen (Election Law Blog) has a post about this; an excerpt:

Today's New York Times story, if true, strikes me as a political bombshell: despite public denials of a connection, people associated with Democratic U.S. Senate candidate in Alaska Mary Peltola and Democratic Party officials recruited the second "Dan Sullivan" to run against the incumbent Republican U.S. Senator from Alaska, Dan S. Sullivan. The hope would be to siphon votes away from Sullivan. (As a political play, I'm skeptical that this would work, given Alaska's ranked choice voting approach would allow ranking both Dan Sullivans as 1 and 2, thereby not helping Peltola.)

But what, if any, are the legal implications of the story (if true)?

To begin with, I don't think it has any bearing at all on the current litigation in which the U.S. Department of Justice seeks to delay certification of the race if Dan S. Sullivan narrowly loses on grounds of purported voter confusion. The lawsuit is not going anywhere for any number of reasons, but even assuming DOJ's theory that it can sue to block certification, it is irrelevant as to why voters might face confusion over the two Dan Sullivans. (This has not stopped DOJ from now supporting DSCC intervention so that it can get discovery over a potential "conspiracy"). [Disclosure: I will soon be filing a motion to file an amicus brief on my own behalf supporting the State of Alaska in this case.]

Second, if there is any evidence that anyone lied under oath about the cooperation between Democrats and Dan J. Sullivan, that could be grounds for a perjury prosecution. So far I'm not aware of any such allegation in the case.

Third, this leaves the question whether this could be prosecuted as some kind of conspiracy against voters.

To begin with, it is regular practice for people to support candidates for bad motives: Republicans boosting Greens and Democrats boosting Libertarians. It turns out that Elon Musk alone may have bankrolled left-leaning Cornel West's quest to get on the 2024 presidential eiection ballot. The effort in Alaska is just an extreme version of that. From the Times's story: "Ballot-stacking tactics are common in politics and generally considered legal — and have been employed by both parties in Alaska. But this operation, which has not been reported before, reveals the lengths to which Democrats went to seek advantage in a Senate race that could determine control of the chamber." …

This is a case about someone running for office with impure motives who is lucky enough to have a name that could confuse some voters. The solution to this problem is counterspeech (as in: "Don't vote for J.! Vote for the real Senator Daniel S. Sullivan".)

I don't see how the government could criminalize his running for office for having impure motives. And if it could do so, then it could be a crime every time that the Republican Party backs a Green Party candidate, or Democrats support a MAGA candidate in a primary in the hopes that the candidate would be weaker against a Democrat in the general election. This stuff happens all the time….

Read the whole post for more.

The post The Law and Democrats Allegedly Recruiting Second "Dan Sullivan" to Run in Alaska Senate Race appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) was the author of acclaimed works about subjects including the education of children, political philosophy, and human liberty. She is perhaps best remembered for her great pioneering book, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), a key text in the rise and development of both feminism and liberal theory.

What is perhaps less remembered today is the fact that her landmark case for women's rights owed an important intellectual debt to the work of the political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), who argued that the proper role of government was to protect humanity's preexisting natural rights.

Locke is sometimes mislabeled as a conservative by certain modern academics and pundits. But his ideas were deemed to be quite radical in their own day. And for the teenaged Mary Wollstonecraft, that Lockean radicalism was as welcome as the first taste of food after a grueling starvation.

The year was 1775 and Wollstonecraft was 15 years old. She was a brilliant and independent-minded young woman, increasingly outraged by the vile behavior of her drunk, domineering father. He abused Wollstonecraft's mother and maintained a strict, sexist hierarchy at home, favoring her brother while she was made to suffer.

It was at this low point in her life when Wollstonecraft first read Locke. Certain passages from his greatest work, The Second Treatise of Government (1689), caught hold of her mind and never really let go. A properly constituted social order "gives the husband no more power over [his wife's] life than she has over his," Locke wrote. "The power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife has, in many cases, a liberty to separate from him, where natural right or their contract allows it, whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in."

In her superb book, Romantic Outlaws: The Extraordinary Lives of Mary Wollstonecraft and Her Daughter Mary Shelley (2015), the historian Charlotte Gordon memorably described the far-reaching effect that Locke's ideas had on the teenaged Wollstonecraft:

She had always felt that her father had no right to tyrannize her family and that the preferential treatment he and her mother bestowed on [brother] Ned was unjust. Now, after reading Locke, she had an ethical foundation for her feelings. Not only was it her right to shape her own future; it was everyone's right. In fact, Locke's social contract made protest seem the only rational response to injustice; it was humanity's obligation to overthrow tyranny.

One of the reasons why Locke is sometimes mislabeled as a conservative today is because of his writings in favor of property rights, an issue that we now associate with conservative and libertarian thinkers. But it is worth remembering that Locke's whole case for property rights began with the idea that "every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself."

Is it any wonder that Locke's radical case for self-ownership would appeal to a young woman like Wollstonecraft, who longed to break free from the sexist laws and cultural strictures that held her back? Nobody was going to convince her that she did not have a right to her own body.

We might say something similar about the great abolitionist Frederick Douglass (1818–1895), who also drank deep from the principles of Lockean liberalism. "You are a man and so am I," Douglass wrote in his famous open letter to his former enslaver. "In leaving you, I took nothing but what belonged to me, and in no way lessened your means for obtaining an honest living. Your faculties remained yours, and mine became useful to their rightful owner." That is about as clear and effective a restatement of Lockean self-ownership principles as you are going to find.

Locke's influence on the American Revolution, particularly on Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence, is well-known. That Locke also had a key influence on both the women's rights and abolitionist movements is perhaps worthy of further remark.

The post When Mary Wollstonecraft Read John Locke appeared first on Reason Magazine.

No matter what happens in Tuesday's elections, support for wealth taxes keeps growing. Its justification is based on the idea that the very rich owe all of us something, and taxing their fortunes is collecting on that debt. We're told their success fuels inequality and that it's selfish of them to keep so much, especially if they don't proclaim that they want to do more for society.

Former International Monetary Fund chief economist Olivier Blanchard of France recently gave this narrative a clear voice. Writing on X, he wondered why California's wealthiest are spending so heavily to defeat Proposition 40, the supposed one-time 5 percent tax on the net worth of billionaires. Blanchard added that billionaires "typically have not indicated that they are building their wealth to eventually make the world a better place."

The entire notion misunderstands how fortunes are made. In a market economy, people don't build great wealth first and redeem it later through good works. They build it by making the world better first.

When I buy an $800 smartphone, it's because I value the phone more than whatever else I would have bought with the money. The seller values my $800 more than they do the phone. We both walk away richer by our own measure. Neither owes the other anything more.

Repeat this exchange a few hundred million times, and vast fortunes take shape for the people who create amazing technology so abundantly and affordably that we take it for granted. More importantly, though, people hand over every cent of it voluntarily.

As my colleague Arnold Kling aptly explained over the weekend, "Profits are earned within a positive-sum game for society. Profits induce firms to serve consumers and to innovate." The drive for wealth taxes relies on "the opposite point of view. It regards profits as something that businesses take from the rest of us, as if we can take innovation and efficiency for granted. [It] acts as if we are in a zero-sum environment in which one person's gain is necessarily another person's loss."

And, yes, the gains are divided more fairly than people think. Nobel laureate and Yale University economist William Nordhaus estimated that innovators in the U.S. business sector personally captured, on average, a mere 2.2 percent of the social surplus they created between 1948 and 2001. The other 97.8 percent went to everyone else in the form of lower prices, higher wages, better products and goods, and services that didn't previously exist.

In short, the world has already been compensated, many times over.

Those urging billionaires to acquiesce also err by blithely assuming that the state that grabs the money will use it well enough to "make the world a better place." The burden of proof is on them. California's government already spends roughly $350 billion a year. What will the extra few billion accomplish that the rest hasn't?

"Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys," as journalist and satirist P.J. O'Rourke used to say. Maybe California's billionaires aren't eager to fund a Merced-to-Bakersfield rail line that the state prices around $35 billion and its inspector general puts closer to $48 billion. Perhaps they're hesitant to backfill pension funds like the California Public Employees' Retirement System, whose staff concedes is unlikely to hit an assumed 6.8 percent return without leaning on private equity.

Prop 40's revenue is earmarked for health care, but money is fungible. In the end, California has one budget. Every earmarked dollar frees another for something else. Some billionaires might simply have concluded that their philanthropy does more good elsewhere, or that their dollars are more beneficial when invested in private enterprises.

The tax also doubles down on California's worst habit: spend, spend, spend, and then tax, tax, tax. The money is never enough to cover all the spending. A one-time levy spent over five years doesn't fix that. It funds new commitments with temporary money. Some will want to make the tax permanent, which its intellectual architects clearly prefer and may have made possible. And yet that still won't be enough.

That's the commitment problem that Blanchard admits California can't solve. Billionaires are wise to distrust the "one-time" promise.

What worries me most is the moral framework. When a society convinces itself that the people making life better and less costly are the problem, we eventually stop getting those people.

Contrary to Blanchard's naive belief, billionaires aren't lacking in public spirit. Even if we ignore their often massive charitable giving, we can't forget that the market already collected their contribution and handed a large share of it to the rest of us. We should stop demanding they apologize for the other two cents.

COPYRIGHT 2026 CREATORS.COM

The post Billionaires Have Already Paid Us Back. So Why Does California Want More? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents slashed the tires of a couple who were recording the agents in an incident near Portland, Oregon, earlier this month. The agents then drove away without arresting or talking to the couple, video footage shows.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which released the footage today, says it is yet another example of ICE agents retaliating against people for protected First Amendment activity. In an administrative complaint on behalf of the anonymous couple, the ACLU and the ACLU of Oregon are demanding an investigation and answers from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about why agents tailed, boxed in, and "vandalized" the vehicle of a U.S. citizen.

The stunning video does not resemble any sort of normal law enforcement:

"What happened to us is not unique, and that is what is so terrifying," A.P. and M.P., the unnamed husband and wife, said in a statement provided by the ACLU. "We observe and record public ICE activity in order to shine a light on their abusive behavior and to create a record of what our government is up to. Because of that, they are terrorizing us and anyone else who dares to exercise their First Amendment right to hold our government accountable. We hope that sharing our story will bring attention to their reckless and unconstitutional attacks on our communities."

According to the ACLU complaint, the unnamed married couple was driving in Hillsboro, Oregon, on the morning of October 7 when they spotted an ICE SUV. The couple followed the SUV to a supermarket parking lot, where there were also two other ICE vehicles. The couple lowered their windows and began yelling "This is ICE! This is ICE!" as well as blowing whistles and honking the car's horn.

One ICE agent grabbed a shopping cart and began approaching the couple's car. The complaint states that the couple heard the agent say something to the effect of, "Let's block them in with the cart." As the couple began driving away, several ICE agents began chasing after them on foot. 

The three ICE vehicles chased the couple after they left the parking lot, "driving aggressively and nearly colliding into" their car, according to the complaint. Additional video shows the ICE vehicles swerving aggressively in front of the couple's car and later unsuccessfully attempting to box in their car. "None of the ICE vehicles had their flashing lights or sirens on during this entire sequence of events," the complaint states.

The couple cut through an empty parking lot, and the chase continued down several more streets before the ICE vehicles turned on their emergency lights and sirens. According to the complaint, the couple continued driving for roughly a minute, fearing to pull over on an empty road with no bystanders. 

Video shows that when they stopped at a traffic light, a masked ICE agent exited his vehicle, walked up to the couple's car, stabbed one of its rear tires with a knife, and then walked back to his car. The couple's car moved slowly forward and into a turn lane before stopping again. Then the same agent got back out of his vehicle and stabbed the tire a second time before returning to his vehicle without attempting to speak to the couple.

"All three ICE vehicles turned off their flashing lights and sirens and drove off," the ACLU complaint states.

The complaint notes that the couple "experienced retaliatory action similar to that experienced by many other individuals across the country engaged in these same First Amendment protected activities."

"In particular, individuals around the country have reported being similarly tailed, boxed in, and threatened with or subjected to violence after observing, gathering information about, and recording ICE agents performing their duties in public," the complaint states.

Last October, ICE agents in the Portland area busted out the car windows of a U.S. citizen who had been filming them, dragged her out of her vehicle, and detained her for roughly seven hours before releasing her without charges.

The ACLU of Tennessee filed a class-action lawsuit in May against a federal law enforcement task force in Memphis for harassing legal observers. Memphis residents allege in declarations that they have been violently arrested, surveilled at their houses, pulled over under false pretenses, and jailed for trying to film the task force. In September, the ACLU of Tennessee published videos showing federal agents arresting the lead plaintiff in its lawsuit while he was attempting to film task force operations.

DHS and immigration officers have repeatedly accused videographers and legal observers of obstruction of justice and "doxxing," but civil liberties advocates say the DHS is flat wrong about the law: Every federal appeals court that has considered the issue—nine so far—has firmly upheld the right to record law enforcement in public.

The Supreme Court has also unequivocally upheld the First Amendment right to criticize or oppose police activity, whether verbally or through other expressive activity.

"The right to record publicly visible law enforcement activity is fundamental to our democracy," Scarlet Kim, senior staff attorney with the ACLU's Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, said in a press release. "Like many people across the country, our clients have been observing and recording ICE activity in their community. These videos have proven critical to exposing ICE's abuses. If we cannot see and document what our own government is doing on our streets, we cannot hold it accountable for running roughshod over our rights."

The ACLU complaint to the DHS Office of Inspector General and two other DHS oversight offices demands that the agents involved in the incident be identified, investigated, and disciplined. The ACLU is also requesting a "comprehensive investigation of a disturbing pattern of ICE agents retaliating against individuals who observe, gather information about, and record ICE activity."

The DHS did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The post Video Shows ICE Agents Slashing Portland Couple's Car Tire Then Driving Off appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Assume the following: A person unlawfully entered the United States 20 years ago and has since started a business and raised U.S.-citizen children, has no criminal record, and has never been found to be dangerous. Should federal immigration law treat that person the same way it treats someone who was just apprehended at the border? Should the law treat that person as if Congress had specifically made them subject to mandatory detention for criminal or terrorism-related conduct?

Under the Trump administration, the answer is yes. President Donald Trump's current policy treats noncitizens who entered without lawful admission as subject to mandatory detention without bond throughout removal proceedings, even if they have lived in the United States for decades and have no criminal record⁠. The executive branch adopted that position in new Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidance issued in July 2025⁠, reversing its prior interpretation of the same detention law.

The U.S. Supreme Court will now decide whether Congress actually required the result Trump is seeking. On October 1, the justices agreed to hear the case of Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha⁠. Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha, a Brazilian national, entered the United States without inspection around 2005. He later applied for asylum, received work authorization, and eventually bought a home. He operates a small construction business and lives with his wife and two U.S.-citizen children. He has no criminal record. But immigration officers still arrested him while he was driving to work in Massachusetts in September 2025.

After Cunha challenged his detention, a federal court ordered a bond hearing and an immigration judge found that he posed neither a danger nor a flight risk and therefore released him on bond while his case proceeded. The Trump administration then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit and lost. Now the Supreme Court will have the final word⁠.

The Supreme Court is not deciding whether Cunha may ultimately remain in the country. Instead, it is deciding the narrower question of whether the Immigration and Nationality Act mandates detention pending removal proceedings for someone like Cunha who is present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted⁠.

The legal dispute turns on two phrases in one section of this federal immigration law. According to Section 1225, a noncitizen present in the United States who has not been legally admitted is considered an "applicant for admission." But when Congress imposed mandatory detention later in that same section, it used additional language, applying it to an applicant for admission who is "seeking admission."

That distinction may sound technical and trivial, but its consequences are enormous. If every statutory "applicant for admission" is automatically still "seeking admission," then the government can treat someone who crossed the border 20 years ago the same as someone arriving today and keep them in jail without the possibility of bond. If the two phrases mean two different things, however, then Cunha and others like him are generally eligible for a bond hearing under Section 1226, which permits both detention and release on bond or conditional parole⁠.

The Trump administration argues that if Congress has deemed someone an applicant for admission, that person must necessarily still be seeking the admission for which they are considered an applicant. But the administration's argument asks the Court to stretch federal law beyond its reasonable limits. Congress expressly deemed certain people "applicants for admission." It did not separately deem them to be "seeking admission."

This case, in short, is about textualism. And as the late Justice Antonin Scalia and his co-author Bryan Garner argue in their book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, one of the key principles of textualism is that "a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning." When Congress uses different words in closely related provisions, in other words, courts should hesitate before assuming that the different words mean the exact same thing.

In ordinary English, it is certainly difficult to describe a man driving from home to work after living in the United States for over two decades as presently "seeking admission." He is not seeking to enter the U.S.; he already entered decades earlier. The 2nd Circuit's unanimous opinion—written by Judge Joseph Bianco, a Trump appointee—reached this conclusion, holding that "seeking admission" describes ongoing activity rather than merely a retained statutory status⁠.

Meanwhile, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld the administration's position in a similar case, Judge Dana Douglas, an appointee of former President Joe Biden, invoked the same Scalia-Garner textualist principles in dissent. 

The legal dispute, therefore, does not follow neat partisan lines. Judges from different ideological backgrounds have both concluded that the administration's reading goes beyond the words that Congress wrote.

The broader statutory structure also supports that conclusion. Congress has long required mandatory detention in Section 1226 for specified criminal and terrorism-related grounds⁠. And the Laken Riley Act of 2025 expanded those mandatory-detention categories⁠. But if nearly everyone who ever illegally entered the country is already subject to mandatory detention, as the administration asserts, then all of those carefully drawn separate categories for mandatory detention suddenly become superfluous and pointless for noncitizens who illegally entered the country, an objection that Douglas raised in dissent⁠.

History also clarifies the point. For nearly 30 years, across five presidential administrations (including Trump's first), the government generally treated people like Cunha as potentially eligible for bond. Trump only reversed course in July 2025. The 2nd Circuit thus accurately described the earlier interpretation as a well-established executive branch practice⁠.

Of course, past executive practice cannot override clear statutory language. But if Congress really did mandate a sweeping detention regime in 1996⁠, it is striking that every presidential administration since then has operated under a totally different understanding⁠.

None of this gives Cunha lawful immigration status. Nor does it guarantee his release or prevent the government from deporting him. Rather, it allows an immigration judge to ask a basic question: Is keeping this particular person in jail actually necessary while his case proceeds?

The administration may believe mandatory detention makes immigration enforcement faster or more effective. And Congress is free to adopt that policy if it chooses to do so. But Congress does have to choose it first.

Protecting the constitutional separation of powers is one of textualism's most important functions. Textualism is often described as a conservative method of statutory interpretation. But its deeper value is constitutional. It forces both courts and presidents to follow the law Congress actually passed. Sometimes that produces harsher results. Sometimes it produces more humane ones. But either way, it restrains the executive and judicial branches from exceeding their proper spheres.

Whether mandatory detention would accelerate Trump's deportation program is a question of policy. Whether it is just is a question of ethics. Whether Congress authorized it is a question of law.

In Cunha, the best textualist reading is that Congress preserved the possibility of bond and left room for an immigration judge to determine whether detention is necessary. That textualism, liberty, and compassion point to the same result is not the reason to reach it. In this case, however, it is a welcome coincidence.

The post Trump's Mandatory Immigration Detention Policy Fails the Textualist Test appeared first on Reason Magazine.

When Abdul El-Sayed ran for governor of Michigan in 2018, progressive media hailed him as the next Barack Obama. El-Sayed did not appreciate the comparison. "I get compared to Obama because my name is funny, and I'm brown, and my politics are about inspiring us to believe in each other again," he told Vox at the time.

In El-Sayed's telling, Obama was a "fairly centrist, middle-of-the-road" Democrat. He did not intend that as a compliment. El-Sayed believed the administration's policies were not nearly progressive enough—indeed, he believed Obama had betrayed the agenda he ran on. The far-reaching financial, environmental, and labor regulations that Obama pushed through were not nearly enough for El-Sayed.

El-Sayed ultimately fell short in the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primary. Eight years later, he's a much savvier political operative; now running for the U.S. Senate, he has welcomed Obama's support this time. Yet El-Sayed's commitment to a left-wing agenda has hardly diminished. If he defeats his opponent, former Rep. Mike Rogers (R–Mich.), he will be one of the most far-left politicians to win a statewide election in recent memory—and in a purple-ish swing state that President Donald Trump won twice.

Like his friend and mentor Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.), El-Sayed is not a member of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA); unlike Sanders, El-Sayed maintains that he is a capitalist rather than a socialist. Yet his political project has much in common with the DSA, and he has given every indication that he will align himself with DSA-affiliated members of Congress—veterans such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D–N.Y.) and likely newcomers such as Darializa Avila Chevalier and Claire Valdez, both of New York, who rode similar waves of populist resentment to victory over establishment Democrats.

El-Sayed's left-wing bona fides were evident during his debate with Rogers on October 8. The Democrat proposed giving the federal government vast new powers: up to 50 percent control over AI companies, a socialized health insurance program along the lines of Medicare for All, and price controls on the domestic oil industry. Asked what he would do to bring down the national debt and pay for all the new spending he wants, he had a simple, three-word answer: "Tax. Billionaire. Wealth."

El-Sayed's support for higher taxes exempts one important constituency: seniors. Like many Democrats—and Republicans such as Rep. Nancy Mace (R–S.C.)—El-Sayed wants to exempt retirees from property tax increases, a policy that critics have branded "total boomer luxury communism" because it forces younger, less wealthy Americans to shoulder ever more of the social burden. The new wave of leftist Democrats think that higher taxes on the 1 percent, combined with cuts to the military budget, would be sufficient to pay down the debt while vastly expanding the social safety net.

In fact, El-Sayed has proposed tying Pentagon spending to education, such that an increase in money for the military would necessitate more funding toward schools. Don't expect this to work the other way around: Under El-Sayed's plan, a decrease in Pentagon spending would not force the government to stop throwing so much money at failing schools.

Ann Arbor and Onward

El-Sayed was born on Halloween in 1984. He grew up in Bloomfield Hills, an affluent, predominantly white suburb north of Detroit. His parents divorced when he was young, and El-Sayed lived with his Egyptian father and white stepmother. In high school, he was captain of the football, wrestling, and lacrosse teams. He continued to play on a club lacrosse team at the University of Michigan, which he attended from 2003 to 2007. (We overlapped briefly, though I never met him: I attended Michigan from 2006 to 2010.)

That meant going to Ann Arbor, a progressive college town with a long history of radical activism. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the prototypical '60s New Left student activist group, was founded in Ann Arbor in 1960; its first president, Alan Haber, still lives there. The White Panther Party, a sort of hippie counterpart to the Black Panthers, was based in Ann Arbor for a while; in the 1970s, the socialist Human Rights Party won multiple seats on city council. Liberalism, as well as radicalism, has thrived in Ann Arbor: The same year the SDS was born, future President John F. Kennedy came to the town to propose the international volunteer organization that eventually emerged as the Peace Corps. In the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries, the student-run Michigan Daily naturally endorsed the inspirational liberal candidate, Obama, over the establishment favorite, Hillary Clinton.

Over the course of the next decade—as left-wing enthusiasm for the Obama project faded and was replaced by bitter disappointment—El-Sayed enrolled in Oxford University and then Columbia University, pursuing a career in public health. (He never completed a residency, which has led to some scrutiny, even from friendly media figures, regarding his decision to describe himself as a physician.) In 2015, the mayor of Detroit appointed him the city's executive health officer. He resigned that position in 2017 to run for governor. That pattern repeated itself a few years later: He was appointed health director of Wayne County, which includes Detroit, in 2022, and resigned in 2025 to run for Senate.

Unlike in 2018, El-Sayed's hard-left politics and contempt for the Democratic establishment were now well-calibrated to prevail in the primaries. He defeated a more moderate candidate, Rep. Haley Stevens (D–Mich.), in part due to her support for Israel—an issue that El-Sayed frequently discusses. The same phenomenon has played out all over the country, with establishment Democratic figures paying a huge price when perceived as indifferent to voter outrage over Israel.

What works in the Democratic primaries does not always do as well in the general election. But while El-Sayed's politics are well to the left of the state he seeks to represent, the president's unpopularity may be enough to push him over the finish line. El-Sayed is narrowly ahead of Rogers in the latest polling. The Republican has finally resorted to breaking with the president on key policy issues—he has said that he wishes to end some of Trump's tariffs, conceding that "Canada is not our enemy"—but it may be too little too late.

Moreover, El-Sayed's left-wing foreign policy positions, which are not necessarily antithetical to libertarian views, count for more in Michigan than in other places. The state has a significant Arab-American population that politicians have ignored at their peril. In 2024, dissatisfaction with President Joe Biden's failure to curtail Israel's war on Gaza prompted many Arabs in Michigan to cast ballots for Green Party candidate Jill Stein, or even Trump, over Democratic nominee Kamala Harris. Republicans have sought to portray El-Sayed as insufficiently supportive of Israel, but that doesn't always play well in Michigan—particularly at a time when dissatisfaction with Trump's blunders in the Middle East is strong among Democrats, independents, and even many Republicans.

El-Sayed does have a possible Achilles heel on foreign policy: His association with the far-left Twitch streamer Hasan Piker. To many outside observers, the candidate's courting of Piker reads as a huge unforced error. Not only did El-Sayed seek the approval of an internet personality best known for praising authoritarian governments and evincing sympathy for terrorist groups, but he brought Piker to Michigan, put him in front of a camera, and made him a de facto representative of the campaign. For everyone except the toxically online, Piker is a bizarre and marginal shock jock, a man who says things like "America deserved 9/11." Piker is what happens when you pay too much attention to podcasts. He is also a reminder that while the insurgent left often claims to speak for ordinary, blue-collar working people, its agenda tends to be most popular with the affluent and elite-educated. In El-Sayed's showdown with Stevens, polls had her up 22 points with noncollege voters and 46 points with black voters. (Stevens herself is white.)

Yet El-Sayed prevailed, and he dealt with the Piker issue by shunting him to the sidelines. When asked about Piker, El-Sayed dutifully recites that a Twitch streamer from California has nothing to do with a Senate race in Michigan. (The obvious retort is Well, you brought him here.) He has also adopted right-coded language to explain why he should not be held responsible for Piker's inflammatory comments, telling Politico that he was over "this whole gotcha game, platform policing, cancel culture."

The GOP, meanwhile, may have gone overboard in the other direction. Rogers, a traditional Republican more in the George W. Bush mold than the Trump mold, is not exactly a right-wing firebrand, yet he could not stop himself from suggesting that El-Sayed has some sort of connection to Islamic terrorists. Just as Democrats should genuinely worry that linking up with people like Piker will cost them Jewish votes, Republicans should think more about whether reflexively calling Muslims terrorists is a bad strategy to win in Michigan.

After all, the form of radicalism that El-Sayed typifies is not really Islamic. It's not even foreign. It's the radicalism of left-wing economics, of making the federal government larger and more robust. He wants to prohibit corporations from buying houses and to punish companies like Airbnb over "housing dislocation." He wants to raise the capital gains tax, the inheritance tax, and the top marginal tax rates. He wants to give the Federal Trade Commission expansive new powers. He thinks higher education should be free for everyone. If he makes it to the Senate, El-Sayed will be a reliable vote for the Sanders agenda, including moratoriums on new data center construction, a much stronger Environmental Protection Agency, and, of course, Medicare for All. Indeed, one of El-Sayed's most frequent criticisms of Obama over the years has been that the Affordable Care Act did not go nearly far enough, and that it may have even been counterproductive to the mission of building a socialist health system.

Obama appeared alongside El-Sayed in Detroit on October 24. The candidate was savvy enough not to bring up his thoughts about Obamacare.

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This Week on Free Media

I explain why it would be wrong to nationalize Elon Musk's companies.

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Worth Watching

I finally watched You Can See Everything, Nathan Fielder's quasi-documentary about Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes. It was made with considerable technical skill, and there's plenty to like about it—but ultimately I landed in the same camp as Reason's Christian Britschgi. We will discuss the film on this week's episode of Freed Up; look for that later today on the Free Media YouTube page.

The post Abdul El-Sayed Is a Socialist in All but Name appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The plot thickens: Last night, Alaska Gov. Mike Dunleavy, a Republican, said he would launch an investigation into Democratic Senate candidate Mary Peltola. This is because of late-breaking allegations that Peltola's staffers tried to recruit candidates to run in the Senate race that could confuse voters into not voting for her opponent.

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Scenes from New York: A Brooklyn woman, Halima Salman, was apparently training with ISIS. Salman, an American citizen, was brought to Syria by her father when she was a teenager and somehow developed close ties to the terrorist group. "Salman, who faces up to 10 years in prison at sentencing, is believed to be the first woman accused of being an ISIS member to stand trial in federal court," reports The New York Times. (There are a lot of jokes I could make here, most of which would not be so tasteful, so I'll let our esteemed commenters handle it.)

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QUICK HITS

• "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu entered Tuesday's Israeli election with a governing majority and is now on course to exit with something less," reports the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal. "That's one way to understand the result, but it was also widely anticipated. The surprising news is the opposition's failure to come out ahead of Mr. Netanyahu. He may not have won, but the opposition lost.…At present count Mr. Netanyahu's Likud party is in first place, projected to win 26 or 27 seats in Israel's 120-seat Knesset. That's down from 32 in the current Knesset but up from the 19 or 21 in pre-election polls. The opposition Yashar party of former military chief Gadi Eisenkot lags at 21 seats."
• "Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh on Wednesday left the central bank on track to raise interest rates again this year, even as he stuck to his refusal to offer any explicit guidance on the future path of policy," reports Bloomberg. "Operating within his self-imposed communication boundaries, Warsh used his assessment of a strong economy and warnings over persistent inflation to signal the Fed's job is not yet done. The message reinforced expectations that officials will raise borrowing costs in December—after holding them steady Wednesday—with the potential for another increase in early 2027."
• Allie Beth Stuckey is politically burnt out, says Bloomberg.
• The differences between sex realism and gender realism, and what sex-realist feminists are actually fighting for.

The post Antics in Alaska appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A fascinating chart from Yedioth Aharanot newspaper shows the voting breakdown of the Jewish electorate in the Israeli election.

 

 

 

 

People the pollsters deem to be in the bottom 10% in socio-economic status voted 96.7% for Netanyahu's Likud and parties aligned with it. Those in the top 10% voted 80.9% for opposition parties.

What makes this particularly interesting is that the election turned almost entirely on issues that are not economic in the ordinary sense, such as conscripting Haredi Jews, which factions would best resist outside pressure for a Palestinian state, who is best-positioned to finish the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, and who is to blame for 10/7. Many voters expressed concern to pollsters about the cost of living, but none of the major parties talked much about it.

So to a large and often unappreciated (at least outside Israel) extent, Israeli politics is culture-war politics. Netanyahu and his allies represent voters who are more religiously traditional, less-educated, live on "the periphery," poorer, and, importantly, of recent North African or Middle Eastern descent--Israelis who were treated as outsiders by the Ashkenazi socialists who ran the country until Menahem Begin broke their stranglehold on elections in 1977. Netanyahu's opponents rely on voters who are disproportionately Ashkenazi, better-educated, wealthier, live in Tel Aviv or Haifa, and more secular-minded.

Another interesting aspect of this is that while the religious/secular divide comes up in politicking all the time, Israeli politics mostly avoid explicit ethnic or wealth-based appeals. The de facto leader of the opposition, Gadi Eisenkot, is the son of Moroccan immigrants. Moroccans are a huge part of Netanyahu's base, but Eisenkot's potential to be the first Moroccan (and first non-Ashkenazi) prime minister barely played a role in the campaign, and he did not try to give it one.

I will leave it to those more expert than I on Israeli politics to analyze this further, but it sure seems like a big factor in the election was a visceral fear among groups that feel historically marginalized in Israel that victory by the anti-Netanyahu faction would amount to a loss in status.

The post Israeli Jews Vote by Economic Status, Even Though Elections Turn on Other Issues appeared first on Reason Magazine.