Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.

The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.

American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.

The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.

The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.

The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.

The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.

The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation

Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.

He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.

His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.

Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.

The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.

If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.

Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.

One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.

There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.

But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.

Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.

Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.

The Problem with Reassuring Moscow

The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.

The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.

Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.

European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.

German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.

These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.

The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.

There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.

Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.

A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.

For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.

Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.

That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.

Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience

The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.

It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.

NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.

They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.

Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.

Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.

The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.

What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.

The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.

Our analysis exposes the heavy humanitarian and economic toll of the military siege suffocating Palestinians in Hebron.

Some influencers in MAGA world are at one another’s throats over the arrest and possible deportation of one of the movement’s loudest anti-immigration cheerleaders.

Samuel Sey, a Christian blogger and Ghanaian immigrant, has gained popularity for his vocal defenses of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents waging Donald Trump’s racist anti-immigrant crackdown. But as I explained in this week’s Tuesday Tech Drop, he was arrested last week after reportedly overstaying his visa.

The Department of Homeland Security told The Christian Post that Sey is “an illegal alien from Ghana” who has accepted “voluntary departure” from the country.

The MAGA movement, it seems, is torn over the ordeal.

On one hand, a Black immigrant who overstayed his visa would seem like a prime target for a movement like MAGA. On the other hand, a Black immigrant willing to celebrate Trump’s brutality toward immigrants is useful to the movement for propaganda purposes — and that seems like a big reason why some conservatives are expressing sympathy for him.

Christian nationalist influencer Joel Webbon faced some backlash over a prayer in which he thanked God for Sey’s arrest and for “shutting his mouth from spewing out more lies and slander against your servants.” Webbon, who also prayed for Sey’s deportation, is someone known for promoting bigotry and arguing that the U.S. could use even more racism.

Webbon’s remarks drew criticism from various conservative commentators and influencers who apparently have a soft spot for Sey despite MAGA’s mass deportation push. But that’s clearly not a universal stance among conservatives — even Sey’s podcast co-host, who has praised Trump’s immigration policy as “loving,” said his views were “unchanged” after Sey’s arrest.

So much for the Trump administration’s claims of only targeting the “worst of the worst” immigrants. And while some conservatives are bristling over that fact, others are still sticking to the script.

The post Pro-ICE influencer’s possible deportation sparks infighting in MAGA world appeared first on MS NOW.

The stench of eugenics continues to waft through Donald Trump’s administration.

A new report from The Bulwark sounds the alarm on disturbing remarks made by Ellis Boyle, a North Carolina-based U.S. attorney, during a discussion about crime with conservative influencer Cassie Clark. The outlet reported on Boyle’s comments about removing people with “bad” gene pools from society:

“What I’ve observed is, you know — it occurs to me, and this is not a new thought; I heard someone else say it. And I started looking — and if you look, you see it: 5% of the population cause 90% of the crime.”

And Boyle kept going:

“I think there’s a big component — if you took out [the] 5% of the population that’s bad and removed them from society, so they don’t create mayhem and create, you know, babies with the gene pool of more bad, then I think, in two, maybe three generations, think of how great this population would be. But that’s something that takes willpower.”

In response to the backlash against Boyle, Clark attempted to defend him from criticism, writing on X: “Removing the people who keep hurting everybody else from free society is called incarceration. … What it is not is eugenics.”

Yet Boyle advocated for removing people from society to limit their supposedly bad “gene pool” — which is absolutely a key tenet of eugenics.

Boyle’s office didn’t immediately respond to MS NOW’s request for comment.

Trump’s bigoted and baseless remarks about some immigrants having “bad genes” that make them prone to criminality have echoed textbook eugenicists by suggesting that America’s woes could be addressed by altering the nation’s genetic makeup.

The president and Elon Musk, the Republican Party’s biggest donor, have made a habit of trafficking in this kind of racist pseudoscience — and so have others in their orbit.

Late last year, I wrote about about people with ties to Musk and a bunch of other Silicon Valley tech bros appearing in the Epstein files, with emails showing that they discussed eugenics. Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., another prominent voice of racist pseudoscience, has been accused by critics of using the nation’s top health agency to support eugenics ideology as well. Dr. Demetre Daskalakis, a top infectious disease expert, said in his resignation letter from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that eugenics “plays prominently in the rhetoric being generated” at Kennedy’s agency.

Members of the MAGA movement routinely take umbrage at people making historically accurate comparisons between them and groups like the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Aside from the movement’s numerous Nazi scandals, ceasing to promote eugenics would certainly make those comparisons seem less apt.

The post U.S. attorney’s eugenics comments spotlight extremism within the DOJ appeared first on MS NOW.

The Trump campaign’s 2024 ad “Kamala Harris is for they/them” was devastatingly effective, and top Trump strategists credit it with winning over persuadable voters they badly needed. After that, it seemed safe to assume the attack would lose some of its punch. Democrats would have learned how to answer it.

So the estimated $58 million that state Attorney General Ken Paxton, the Republican Senate nominee in Texas, and his allies have spent on ads about the issue this cycle looked like a desperate “fighting the last war” move. Paxton is an unpopular candidate without a strong economy to cushion him, and his Democratic opponent, state Rep. James Talarico, has been ahead in nearly every public poll since July.

That turned out to be only half right.

We spent last week in Texas for the latest installment of MS NOW’s “The Voter Files,” talking with Hispanic voters in Harris County who backed Donald Trump in 2024, Democrats from the Houston suburbs, right-leaning voters from the Fort Worth suburbs and Trump voters in Hood County.

Among the right-leaning voters who are wavering, the issue has not lost any of its power. It probably isn’t enough to get Paxton over the finish line. But the barrage, which has included dirty tricks — like a fake transgender “resource guide” mailed to school-age kids — is working on the Republican base. It’s getting angry voters to the polls for Paxton, and it’s keeping conservatives who can’t stomach him from crossing over to Talarico.

The ads still work for many Republicans

Ashley, a Republican mother of four in the Fort Worth suburbs, is one of the angry ones. Both campaigns have denied sending the mailer.

“I honestly don’t care who sent it. I just don’t want the info in my house,” she said.

She would never consider voting for Talarico, who went to seminary and talks openly about his faith.

“Just because you went to seminary doesn’t mean you have Christian values,” she said. “If you’re supporting LGBTQ in any form or fashion in that regard, that’s not Christian.”

Susan is the other kind. She lives in the Fort Worth suburbs, has kids in high school and college, and almost always votes Republican. In the primary, she voted for Sen. John Cornyn, whom Paxton beat. She ought to be persuadable.

She feels about Paxton’s character the way she felt about Trump in 2016, when she voted third party. Trump’s first term won her over, and she voted for him in both 2020 and 2024.

“I would probably just not vote or vote libertarian as a protest,” she said. “I just cannot bring myself to vote for Paxton, and yet I know Talarico is in favor of this.”

“This” is what she sees as Talarico’s overly permissive approach to transgender issues involving minors. In 2021, during a hearing on a bill limiting students to school sports teams that match their sex assigned at birth, he argued that “there are six really common biological sexes.” He recanted last month on Fox News. But the ads have made sure those old remarks are everywhere, and Susan takes them as his real worldview.

She’s sympathetic to what she thinks is a misguided attempt at Christian compassion. But the transgender debate roiled her kids’ high school, so it’s personal, and it matters more to her than the issues where she’s closer to Democrats. She’s against the war with Iran, and she’s frustrated with how Trump has handled Immigration and Customs Enforcement, corruption and the economy.

There were eight right-leaning voters in our Fort Worth-area group. Six had voted for Cornyn in the primary, and several received mailers addressed to their children. Seven said where the candidates stand on transgender policy for kids would factor into how they vote.

A vulnerability for Democrats among Hispanic Trump voters

The issue also hits a nerve with the conservative Hispanic voters we met in Harris County. They voted for Trump in 2024, and they’re unhappy with the economy and with an immigration crackdown they consider overkill. That gives Democrats an opening on policy. Where Democrats keep losing them is on culture and shared values, and nothing matters more there than transgender rights.

“There’s certain things that are just a no-go for me, and it’s non-negotiable,” said Angelika, a mother of six. Cultural issues keep her “more towards the Republican side, because I believe Jesus should be in school,” Angelika explained. On transgender rights, she added, “I don’t want anyone teaching my kids about that kind of stuff.”

“You can’t have a kid, you know, deciding if you’re going to be a boy or girl at the age of seven, eight, or nine,” said Guillermo, who still leans toward Talarico.

Some of them didn’t buy Talarico’s walk back, which they found insincere and political.

“If you are going to say something, stand by it,” Caroline said. “On the other hand, Ken Paxton too, with all the scandals and the corruption, it’s kind of picking the lesser of two evils for me.”

Not everyone had closed the door. Adrian, a married homeowner from northern Houston, said he was open to Talarico if the Democrat would clarify where he stands.

“Talk more about religion, more about transgender,” he said. “If he focuses more on that and the cost of living, I would consider him.”

Why an undervote may not be enough

Four focus groups can’t tell you how a statewide race will go. But what we heard suggests the ads may get Paxton an undervote: conservatives who dislike him turning out but leaving the Senate race blank. Others, like Susan, may cast a protest vote for the libertarian. Neither group is crossing over to Talarico. But that isn’t enough for Paxton if Talarico keeps winning independents by double digits, as he has in recent polls, and Democratic voters stay this turbocharged.

The anti-transgender ads could turn out to be Republicans’ Maginot Line. After World War I, France spent a fortune on fortifications built for the last war, and in 1940, the Germans went around them. Republicans have spent an estimated $183 million nationwide on their own wall of ads. It may not hold back voter anger over the cost of living, corruption and Trump’s immigration crackdown, or the usual midterm backlash against the party in power. The fight has already moved somewhere else. Millions squandered, and more people are angry.

“I feel like it’s the Republicans that are constantly talking about this stuff, and I’m like, ‘Okay, but that doesn’t make my brisket cheaper,’” said one participant, an independent from Fort Bend County who generally votes Democratic.

The post Anti-trans ads are holding Texas Republicans in line. They may not win Ken Paxton the race. appeared first on MS NOW.

This is the Oct. 29, 2026, edition of “The Tea, Spilled by Morning Joe” newsletter. Subscribe here to get it delivered straight to your inbox Monday through Friday.

“These are not serious people. They don’t have solutions to actual problems, so they’d rather have the media and you talking about the Cheesecake Factory. That’s the game they’ve been playing for the last two years.”

— Former President Barack Obama, criticizing the Trump administration at a rally outside Atlanta yesterday

Modern political history offers few closing arguments as out of touch, self-defeating, or downright bizarre as the one President Donald Trump has made on the behalf of his fellow Republicans ahead of next week’s midterm elections.

As I write in my latest piece for The Atlantic:

Trump’s primary rationale for why voters should support the GOP, as best I can tell, is that the affordability crisis is a “hoax,” Bill Maher is a “loser,” and Sen. Jon Husted of Ohio has a nice physique.

That easy-to-mock message has been accompanied by a staggering number of missteps. Just for starters, he’s belittled the impact of his stalled war with Iran, sided with Russia as it continues to pummel Ukrainian cities, defended an attack ad from the GOP candidate for Ohio governor that repulsed other top Republicans, downplayed high energy prices while boasting that U.S. oil and gas companies are “making a freaking fortune,” embraced AI as the nation turns against it, obsessed over White House construction projects, and spent a lot of time talking about handsome men, Husted being just one.

I took a look at some of Trump’s recent rallies, and very few of the arguments he makes are actually helpful — or even relevant — to Republican candidates.

He’s broken key promises to drive down costs, deport only “the worst of the worst,” and stay out of foreign wars.

He’s on the wrong side of many of the day’s top issues.

And he now lives, even some Republicans privately think, in a gilded bubble, palling around with billionaires, oblivious to — and, even worse, uncaring about — the problems facing so many voters.

His approval rating has slipped to the low 30s, and he’s become so politically toxic that some Republicans in tight races don’t want him anywhere near their state or congressional district, fearing his rallies will do more harm than good.

Yet the president plans to spend much of his time on the campaign trail in the coming days, largely in deep red states now suddenly in play.

Read more in The Atlantic.

CHARTS OF THE DAY

Source: Gallup poll of 1,200 U.S. adults, conducted Oct. 1-19, 2026. Margin of error: ±4 percentage points

A CONVERSATION WITH ANNE APPLEBAUM

A new investigation in The Atlantic documents the suffering of civilians in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Ukraine — and warns of a Kremlin propaganda spectacle as American journalists prepare to visit under a humanitarian ceasefire credited to Melania Trump.

Anne Applebaum, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and staff writer at The Atlantic, joined “Morning Joe” today to discuss the upcoming media visit, the Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine, and her recent reporting from Venezuela.

JS: Your colleague Zarina Zabrisky has written about the horrors of Russian occupation in Oleshky. What happens to Ukrainians living under Russian control?

AA: When the Russians go into a piece of Ukraine and take it over, they murder the leaders. They arrest people who have Ukrainian flags or symbols. They set up concentration camps — they call them filtration camps — to interrogate people and sometimes torture them. They remove the Ukrainian language and change the school curriculums.

And they shoot dogs. Why? Because the dogs make noise and might attack soldiers, and the Russians want control. And of course, they also kidnap children.

JS: Ukraine has repeatedly sought a humanitarian ceasefire. Why is Russia agreeing now, just days before the midterms?

AA: Oleshky is a town that’s been deprived of food and outside medical supplies since December, so people have been starving. The Russians have finally agreed to a ceasefire, and they’ve credited Melania Trump. It seems to have been negotiated by her PR guy who did her documentary. They’re allowing in some reporters from Newsmax, and maybe Fox News.

JS: And what do you expect those American journalists will see?

AA: The belief is that there’s going to be a kind of propaganda show where people say, “Oh, we’ve always been well treated by the Russians.” These are all Ukrainians, and the concern is that they’ll be taken to Russia rather than allowed to cross the river to Kherson, which is under Ukrainian control.

It’s a real test of the integrity of those journalists. Will they help cover up what’s happened in places like Oleshky, or will they tell the real story?

WG: Can Ukraine survive with President Trump effectively throwing his lot in with Putin?

AA: This war is over when the Russians decide to stop fighting. What the Trump administration has done for the last year and a half is give the Russians the feeling that it’s worth continuing. In other words, the Kushner and Witkoff negotiations have prolonged the war. Having said that, the Ukrainian front line is holding. They are not about to collapse, and there’s no indication that they will stop fighting.

JS: And what about the pressure on Ukraine to give up territory?

AA: This is not a real estate deal. It’s not like, “Oh, we’ll give you this block for that block, and you can build your building.” When you give up territory, it means giving up people to this totalitarian regime. If surrender means the Russians come in, kill your leaders, kidnap your children, and destroy your culture, why would you stop fighting?

JL: You recently traveled to Venezuela. How does what you saw compare with the Trump administration’s account?

AA: What we’ve created is a coalition of two kleptocracies. You have the Trump administration doing very opaque oil deals with what was the Maduro regime. Now Venezuela is run by Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s former vice president.

But opposition leader María Corina Machado has just returned, and the scenes of joy show Venezuelans’ desire for democracy. They want to make their own decisions and have their oil benefit them.

Katty Kay: And what has changed in daily life for ordinary Venezuelans since Maduro’s departure?

AA: Not much. There’s still very high inflation. I went to a market in Caracas where the prices were written on a whiteboard because they have to be changed every day. People talk about the difficulties of paying for education for their kids. Everybody still thinks about emigration. The feeling is that they’re trapped and waiting for a change.

This conversation has been condensed and edited for brevity and clarity.

The post In the closing days, few of Trump’s arguments are actually helpful — or even relevant — to Republican candidates appeared first on MS NOW.

The Horn of Africa is where strategic maritime corridors, fragile states, and regional ambitions converge - and it is emerging as a new front in Middle Eastern geopolitical competition.

Israel’s 26 December 2025 recognition of Somaliland’s independence added new dimensions to these tensions, intersecting with Turkey’s expanding military, economic, and diplomatic footprint in Somalia and broader partnerships across the Horn of Africa.

From Turkey’s perspective, Israel’s Somaliland move and its broader regional engagement challenge Ankara’s strategic interests. Tel Aviv, for its part, views Somaliland as a potential gateway to projecting influence near Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and along one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

Somaliland’s longstanding quest for international recognition risks becoming further entangled in the rivalries of Middle Eastern powers, transforming a local sovereignty dispute into a wider contest over the future of Red Sea security.

As Turkey and Israel deepen their engagement, and other external actors pursue their own agendas, the Horn of Africa might end up an increasingly crowded arena of geopolitical competition. The implications for regional stability could be serious.

Israel's Somaliland gambit and the rivalry with Turkey

Situated alongside busy maritime routes, the Horn of Africa links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, occupying a position of much geostrategic importance.

Egypt, Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) increasingly view the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the surrounding territories as a single security environment. Instability in one part of this interconnected region can disrupt commercial shipping, threaten energy security, and intensify rivalries among states far beyond its shores.

Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland’s independence and to invest in deeper ties with the self-declared breakaway republic is very much about securing a strong position in a territory situated in close proximity to Yemen.

This land can provide Tel Aviv with the means to closely monitor Houthi activity, improve intelligence collection, and strengthen surveillance of maritime routes that have become increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

“Israel’s interest in the Horn of Africa is not new but has sped up amid regional shake-up in the aftermath of [7 October 2023],” Dr Burcu Ozcelik, Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security at the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told The New Arab.

“Israel sees Somaliland mainly through a defence cooperation lens, and as a possible staging ground for future offensive military activity against the Houthis. The strategic value of access near Yemen for Israel spans intelligence, surveillance, and potentially military operations,” she added.

Ankara and Tel Aviv’s rivalry and maritime security interests are “mutually reinforcing” motivations, argued Cameron Hudson, an independent analyst with expertise on African peace, security, and governance, who previously worked on Africa at the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and the US National Security Council.

“They are two sides of the same coin and cannot be disaggregated,” he told The New Arab.

However, Omar S. Mahmood, a Senior Analyst for Somalia and the Horn of Africa at International Crisis Group, offers a more qualified interpretation. He suggests that the immediate motivation for Tel Aviv is mostly related to security, while competition with Ankara is a secondary consequence, not necessarily the driving force.

“I don’t think Israel’s relationship with Somaliland is driven by a broader rivalry with Turkey per se. But there are local ramifications as Somaliland itself is seeking external allies as it is uncomfortable with growing Turkish military support to Somalia, viewing it as a potential future threat,” explained Mahmood in an interview with The New Arab.

“So, in this sense the middle powers can get drawn into supporting opposite sides in local rivalries, even if that was not the primary factor driving their engagement in the first place,” he added.

Turkey's foothold in Somalia

Turkey’s presence in Somalia is a product of many years of sustained investment and political commitment.

In 2011, Somalia faced a devastating famine which claimed approximately 250,000 lives (half of them children) amid an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. At that time, Mogadishu did not have many reliable partners around the world.

That was when Ankara’s engagement with the country gained momentum, beginning with humanitarian assistance and reconstruction before developing into a much wider relationship across multiple domains, from investment to military training and security cooperation to state-building.

Central to Turkey’s military partnership with Somalia has been its TURKSOM facility in Mogadishu. This training establishment has been at the heart of Turkish efforts to help build up the Somali government’s ability to fight al-Shabaab.

Ankara and Mogadishu signed a 10-year defence agreement in 2024, extending their cooperation into naval development and the protection of Somalia's coastline, alongside growing Turkish interests in maritime security and offshore oil and gas exploration, underscoring Turkey’s stakes in Somalia achieving greater stability.

Bilateral ties also strengthened when Somalia sought international support following Ethiopia's agreement with Somaliland concerning access to the sea in exchange for recognition - a deal which infuriated officials in Mogadishu.

Ankara subsequently helped mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia, illustrating how Turkey’s influence has gone beyond military and economic cooperation and entailed effective regional diplomacy.

In late 2025, Turkey joined many other countries around the world in strongly denouncing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Ankara feared that recognition of the breakaway republic gravely threatened Somalia’s territorial dignity.

Turkey also has concerns about the potential creation of openings for external actors to establish a presence for themselves in territories situated near maritime routes where Ankara has vested interests.

Rather than reacting with an immediate escalation of its military presence, Ankara seems to find its most effective response to be based on reinforcing its relationships and institutions that serve to underpin Turkish influence in Somalia. This measured approach appears to be aimed at protecting the investments which Turkey has made in the country without setting Ankara up for any overt confrontation with the Israelis in Somalia.

However, Ankara’s efforts to preserve its position in Somalia could have unintended consequences. Somaliland may interpret deeper Turkish-Somali security cooperation as a threat to its political ambitions, prompting Hargeisa to seek stronger external backing and, in the process, potentially deepening regional tensions.

The Emirati factor

No analysis of Turkish-Israeli competition in the Horn of Africa is complete without taking stock of the UAE’s role. Abu Dhabi’s support for Somaliland, even if short of formal recognition, places the UAE broadly on the same side of this sovereign dispute as Tel Aviv.

The UAE has vast strategic and commercial interests across the Red Sea, giving Abu Dhabi high stakes in the Horn of Africa’s evolving security order, while its normalised relationship with Israel continues to be an important feature of the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape more than six years after the Abraham Accords’ signing.

On the other side, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and other regional actors have expressed support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, a position that connects their interests in the Horn of Africa to their wider security cooperation in the Middle East.

Hudson sees the UAE and Israel as a “powerful and mutually reinforcing duo in the Red Sea” which are both willing to challenge established power structures and intervene in disputes in the Horn of Africa to further their national interests at the region’s expense.

“They are happy to pick winners and losers, unsettle established power dynamics, and actively intervene in regional politics and conflicts in ways that benefit them even if that means unsettling regional dynamics,” he told The New Arab.

Hudson contrasts this with “Turkish or Saudi efforts to stabilise and reinforce established power dynamics as a way of limiting destabilising outside influences.”

Clearly, Abu Dhabi’s role is important not only due to Emirati ambitions but also because external backing can make local leaders less willing to compromise by reducing the perceived costs associated with confrontation.

The local stakes of a wider geopolitical contest

Despite the growing involvement of Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa, and the risks of this region becoming more of an arena for external competition, it is necessary to note that Somalia and Somaliland are not passive actors victimised by a giant game of geopolitical chess.

Both have agency and are actively seeking non-African partners to strengthen their positions and advance their political objectives.

For the government in Mogadishu, Turkey's military, economic, and diplomatic support is critical to strengthening state institutions, improving security, and protecting Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Meanwhile, Somaliland has long sought international recognition and has strong incentives to cultivate relationships with countries such as Israel and the UAE, which might advance that goal or at least provide greater protection against perceived threats.

In this sense, “you have a layer of local rivalries that now intersect with regional rivalries, creating a potentially dangerous situation,” explained Mahmood, who emphasised that this permits “Horn of Africa actors to take on more maximalist, aggressive and less compromising positions, knowing that [they] have…external support to fall back on.”

Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, Israel, and maritime targets have done much to help explain why regional powers see the Horn of Africa as increasingly important to their foreign policy calculations.

As Houthi-Saudi hostilities escalate, Riyadh is focused on growing stronger security partnerships with regional actors, while governments in the Horn of Africa are likely to view closer cooperation with the Kingdom as a way to secure higher levels of assistance and bolster their own military capabilities. Meanwhile, the conflict in Sudan adds new layers of complication as it draws regional actors into overlapping security and political calculations.

Yet a greater military presence does not necessarily translate into greater stability. While competing powers expand their security footholds with the aim of countering one another, mistrust can deepen, territorial disputes can intensify, and local actors will probably pursue greater support from external powers.

Therefore, the Horn of Africa is increasingly likely to become exposed to conflicts in and around the Red Sea even if not directly involved in their initial escalation. Within this context, heightened insecurity means that further militarisation of the Red Sea risks undermining, rather than enhancing, security.

An evolving security arrangement around the Red Sea

On 7 August, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement - a trilateral alliance which is defensive in nature and aimed at containing the chaotic instability unleashed by the war centred on Iran.

This security configuration has potentially significant implications for the balance of power around the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. It was hardly surprising that the leadership in Mogadishu hailed the pact in the immediate aftermath of its announcement, especially given Somalia’s close ties with the three signatories and shared threat perceptions of Israeli aggression.

For Somalia, the pact’s significance extends beyond its endorsement and raises important questions about regional realignments and Ankara’s position in the Horn of Africa within the wider context of an emerging security architecture.

Escalating Houthi-Saudi hostilities prompt a broader recalibration of regional security alignments, bringing Turkey and Pakistan closer to Saudi Arabia through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. For Ankara, this partnership offers an opportunity to connect its longstanding presence in Somalia with a wider strategic role in Gulf and Red Sea security.

Dr Ozcelik told The New Arab that the hostilities have “crossed red lines that were deemed unthinkable not long ago,” setting in motion a realignment among Riyadh’s allies. Ankara’s growing institutional engagement with the Kingdom therefore extends beyond diplomatic rhetoric, highlighting a more formal commitment to regional defence and security cooperation.

There are implications of this emerging Turkish-Saudi alignment for the rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv. As Dr Ozcelik stressed, Ankara is “institutionalising its partnership with Saudi Arabia beyond rhetoric and through defence commitments, minilateralism, and regional diplomacy.”

This closer Turkish-Saudi relationship will not escape Israeli strategists’ attention, particularly as Ankara expands its regional security role while Riyadh remains firm in its support for Palestinian statehood.

In Dr Ozcelik’s assessment, these parallel developments risk “fuelling a greater gulf between Israel and Turkey,” further complicating an already tense relationship that has significantly deteriorated since 7 October 2023.

While commentators sometimes toss Somalia around as a possible Mecca Joint Defence Agreement candidate, Hudson considers formal Somalia membership in the pact unlikely in the near term. He noted that Somalia remains a recipient of security assistance rather than a country capable of contributing meaningfully to a mutual defence arrangement.

“Given the high level of instability still emanating from Somalia, external countries would be foolish at this point to enter into a mutual security agreement with them now. Somalia can’t provide for its own security, let alone contribute to the security of others,” Hudson told The New Arab.

Similarly, Mahmood does not expect Somalia to formally join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. But he does think Mogadishu is likely to deepen security relations with the pact’s three signatories, noting that this is a development already underway. “Somalia prefers to align with this bloc of countries and sees them as a future source of support as it continues to build up its military capabilities,” he observed.

The risks of an expanding geopolitical contest

The internationalisation of the Horn of Africa’s political disputes and security crises entered a new chapter after Israel became the first UN member-state to officially recognise Somaliland ten months ago.

What started as a dispute over Somaliland’s recognition and Somalia’s territorial integrity has transformed into a larger contest over maritime security, military access, and regional influence.

A dangerous risk is an exacerbating security dilemma in which competing alliances deepen mistrust, undermine compromise, and expose the Horn of Africa to conflicts originating elsewhere.

Preventing further escalation will require Middle Eastern powers and their regional partners to exercise restraint while recognising that lasting stability depends on addressing the disputes that drive Somalia and Somaliland to seek competing external allies.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Like many voters, Addison Smith went to her local polling place to cast a ballot in the upcoming midterm elections.

Unlike most, she had to fly four hours to get there.

A student at Berklee College of Music in Boston, Smith was eager to vote in the competitive Senate race between Democrat James Talarico and Republican Ken Paxton and worried she wouldn’t be able to get a mail ballot in time. So her dad offered to pay for a plane ticket to Houston.

“Kinda chic to fly home to vote in the midterms,” she wrote on TikTok, above the caption “They need me.”

“I just made a little quick TikTok about it because I was like, everyone should go vote, and I think that’s important, especially in states where the registration deadline hasn’t passed or early voting is still open,” Smith told MS NOW.

College students sometimes travel long distances to vote because they live away from home and move frequently, which can complicate voting by mail. In 2024, a University of Miami student flew from Florida to North Carolina to vote. In 2020, two American University students rented a Volkswagen Golf and drove 30 hours from Washington, D.C., to Texas after their mail ballots didn’t arrive. A Johns Hopkins medical student spent $600 on a last-minute flight from Baltimore to Florida to vote.

But those were presidential elections. Midterms typically draw fewer voters, and the president isn’t on the ballot. Still, Democrats appear more motivated this year. A Pew Research Center survey found that supporters of Democratic House candidates were 17 percentage points more likely than Republican supporters to say they were extremely motivated to vote.

Texas is a particular draw this year, with a competitive Senate race and a closely watched governor’s race.

Ella Alvarez, a 19-year-old University of Oklahoma student, drove 4 1/2 hours from campus to her home in Abilene, Texas, to vote last week. A first-time voter, Alvarez described coming home as a no-brainer. She’d been waiting for her chance to vote.

“I’m really soaking it all in, and I’m able to understand on my own for once, like what this really means now, and how lucky are we to have such amazing candidates right now?”Alvarez said. “I can’t imagine why I wouldn’t want to go home and vote for them, and it was too important to me to mail-in.”

Alvarez voted for Democrats “all across” the ballot, including Talarico for Senate and Gina Hinojosa for governor.

“Young Texans aren’t the future of this party, we are the present of this party,” said Kendall Scudder, chairman of the Texas Democratic Party, said in a statement to MS NOW. “Young people understand this isn’t just about one election, it’s about building a Texas Democratic Party ready to win power for the next 30 years and beyond.”

For some young voters, the motivation is opposition to President Donald Trump. In the fall Harvard Youth Poll, 63% of young people who said they would definitely vote described their congressional vote as opposition to Trump and his policies. The poll also found a 16-point gap between young Democrats and Republicans who said they would definitely vote: 50% of young Democrats, compared with 34% of young Republicans.

Jahnavi Rao, who leads the youth voter registration group New Voters, which has run more than 1,300 voter registration drives in high schools around the country, said that social media has played a role in boosting this engagement.

“The last year has been incredibly destabilizing for the country as a whole and globally,” she said. “Young people are more aware of that than anybody due to it being constantly in our faces through social media.”

Still, enthusiasm is only one measure of an election. In 2016, Sen. Bernie Sanders drew 27,000 people to a Manhattan rally before losing the New York primary to Hillary Clinton by 16 points. And in 2022, the final Economist/YouGov poll found Republicans were more likely than Democrats to say they were more enthusiastic than usual about voting — 59% to 48% — but Democrats held the Senate, and the much-hyped “red wave” never materialized.

TikToks like Smith’s suggest that some voters feel intensely about this election — and are eager to turn that feeling into action. But only Tuesday will reveal how many less enthusiastic voters turn out anyway.

This is a preview of MS NOW’s Project 47 Newsletter. As President Trump continues implementing his ambitious agenda, get expert analysis on the administration’s latest actions and how others are pushing back sent straight to your inbox every Tuesday. Sign up now.

The post This college student flew nearly 1,600 miles home to vote in the midterms appeared first on MS NOW.

The Pentagon estimates the Iran war has cost more than $47 billion, but the figure excludes damage to US bases and may significantly undercount the conflict’s true cost.

Israeli Attacks Kill Four Palestinians in Gaza ■ Hebron lockdown continues ■ Israeli racism apparent in Netanyahu's response to election turnout ■ More

Artificial intelligence is one of the economic sectors where the EU and China could be allies rather than foes; both are racing to close the gap with the United States. But until now, the EU has viewed China as a competitor and threat on AI and digital technology. 

The two economies “have huge cooperation potential in new energy, AI, services trade, the digital economy and green low-carbon fields”, China’s ministry of commerce said in a statement following the second round of China-EU trade talks in Beijing earlier this month. 

Those two days of talks between EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Chinese commerce secretary Wang Wentao were widely viewed as a successful first step forward by EU leaders at last week’s summit in Brussels.  

In particular, China has agreed to reduce exports of electric vehicles and guarantees continued access to rare earths without new export controls. It also commits EU and Chinese officials to at least six more months of negotiations on a raft of trade disputes. 

A visit to a robotics factory was part of the itinerary for a delegation from the European Parliament’s international trade committee who will make a three day visit to China from 27 October. 

Committee chairman Bernd Lange told reporters that Unitree Robotics, a Chinese robotics company that uses its own humanoid robots—powered by embodied AI —to help manufacture and assemble more robots would be “at the heart of Chinese industry in the future.” 

China is the world leader in the robotics market, with Lange’s Germany its main European rival. 

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Over the past week, the public has learned of three efforts by the Department of Justice to charge perceived enemies of President Donald Trump with federal crimes. One of those efforts, an attempt to indict former White House aide turned Jan. 6 committee star witness Cassidy Hutchinson, failed on Tuesday after a Washington, D.C., grand jury did not have the votes to return what’s known as a “true bill.”

The other two have resulted in the opening of criminal cases: one against former FBI Director James Comey, the third such effort against him in just over a year, and the other against two former FBI employees alleged to have lied to a congressional committee about what they knew about Hunter Biden’s laptop.

And with the midterm elections literally days away, despite this seeming escalation in prosecutions, the Justice Department has maintained that political considerations had nothing to do with the timing or existence of these criminal matters.

As a DOJ spokesperson told The New York Times, “The standard is purpose, not proximity to Election Day. Department policy does not require the department to stop ongoing work during an election season.”

Yet even assuming that Justice Department prosecutors are acting in good faith, that description of DOJ policy is incomplete.

A memo issued in 2024 by then-Attorney General Merrick Garland mandated that prosecutors not time “criminal charges or any other action in any matter or case for the purpose of affecting any election.” The memo went on to say, “Such a purpose, or the appearance of such a purpose, is inconsistent with the Department’s mission and with the Principles of Federal Prosecution” (emphasis added).

The Justice Department did not immediately respond to MS NOW’s request to confirm whether the memo was still in effect. MS NOW is unaware of any evidence that it has been rescinded.

Moreover, the Justice Manual — sometimes called the bible of federal prosecution by current and former DOJ personnel — provides that any issue or even “the perception of an issue” concerning an investigative or prosecutorial action during an election season demands consultation with the Public Integrity Section, the deputy attorney general and/or the attorney general themselves. In other words, Trump political appointees, up to and including Attorney General Todd Blanche, are the final arbiters of whether a prosecutor’s purpose is legitimate.

Given that, some or all of them must have signed off on these recent prosecutorial developments. But the mistakes made by DOJ lawyers in each of these cases suggest both a rush to the courthouse and a desire to stretch the law, criminal procedural rules or both in ways that might fail or have already faltered.

Take the most recent criminal charges against Comey, unsealed earlier this week. Those charges center on the purported disclosure of allegedly classified information by an FBI employee to a New York Times reporter who published an article hours later. According to the DOJ, Comey intentionally caused that disclosure on Oct. 5, 2016, knowing the information was classified.

But the case against Comey, filed 10 years later to the date, was not initiated through an indictment, which requires a vote of at least 12 grand jurors in a federal court. The Justice Department charged Comey via an information, which does not require grand jury involvement and therefore typically can be filed much more quickly than an indictment.

Because the statute of limitations for each of the charges against Comey is 10 years, the DOJ seems to have assumed it could charge Comey by information within that window and then later obtain an indictment, which (barring a defendant’s waiver) is necessary to prosecute felonies.

But now the department is instead defending Comey’s near-immediate motion to dismiss. And his legal team’s argument has nothing to do with the substance of the charges or claims of selective or vindictive prosecution, which it supported with extensive documentation in the two prior cases against Comey.

Instead, Comey’s attorneys argue that the plain language of the statute of limitations pertains only to indictments, not informations or criminal complaints, the third way federal criminal cases can begin. A Washington, D.C., federal judge will hold a hearing on that motion Friday.

The case against former FBI analyst Nikki Floris and former agent Bradley Benavides seems to show signs of a similar rush to the courthouse. That case was instigated on Oct. 20 through a criminal complaint, which typically contains a written statement of “the essential facts” of the offense charged, usually submitted by a federal law enforcement agent under oath and then approved and signed by a federal magistrate judge.

But within days — and literally in the middle of the night before a preliminary hearing — the Justice Department filed what it characterized as a “superseding” criminal complaint. The new complaint lacked a signature from either the agent, swearing to its veracity, or the judge himself. It also was filed under the name of a different FBI agent, without any explanation.

The magistrate judge, Zia Faruqui, was furious, asking the DOJ lawyer whether he was aware of any prior federal case in which a magistrate judge had allowed a superseding criminal complaint without a judge’s sign-off. The lawyer acknowledged that he was not — and ultimately, the judge refused to sign the new complaint, telling the prosecutors, “I am concerned about what your view of the law is.”

The hearing was further derailed when Bryan Witt, the agent who replaced the original affiant, took the witness stand to defend the government’s finding of probable cause to charge Floris and Benavides.

On questioning by Floris’ lawyer, Witt testified that the day after Trump complained during a national address that some FBI intelligence officials had downplayed a report that China had tried to interfere in the 2020 election in order to defeat him, FBI Director Kash Patel directed the U.S. attorney’s office in Kansas City, Missouri, to investigate some of those same officials, including Floris. Witt further testified that the letter arrived “right in the middle of a major public corruption case,” that the new investigation was “a huge distraction” and that he had concerns from the outset that “this would be viewed as political.”

He also admitted that he never interviewed Floris, though he said it would have been “incredibly useful” and normally would have been something agents did, and that the initial complaint contained factual inaccuracies. As of Wednesday afternoon, Faruqui was still weighing whether prosecutors had probable cause to charge Floris and Benavides.

In light of the challenges the DOJ has encountered in that case, one may wonder if it would have been more effective to slow down and present an indictment to a grand jury. Yet the department’s failed attempt to secure an indictment against Hutchinson — its third potential own goal in recent days in D.C. federal court — might explain why it didn’t.

Because grand jury proceedings are secret, it is unclear why the grand jury did not indict Hutchinson. But according to public reporting, including from MS NOW, lawyers from the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division proposed charging her with false statements to Congress, crimes not usually within that unit’s ambit.

The Justice Department’s inability to indict her comes after an unusual number of similar losses in other cases in Washington that have involved known targets of Trump’s ire, including an attempt to indict six members of Congress who, through a video, encouraged military service members to refuse to follow unlawful orders.

And with days to go before the midterm elections and with a president who is openly taking credit for the DOJ’s litigation strategy, it could be that no matter what charging instrument the department chooses, it is working too fast — and with too conspicuous a veneer of partisanship — to succeed.

The post DOJ says recent charges against Trump foes aren’t rushed or improper. But it keeps hitting roadblocks. appeared first on MS NOW.

U.S. economic growth increased in the third quarter, as the surge in artificial intelligence investment continued and consumers kept spending despite persistent inflation. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent from July through September, preliminary data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) showed Thursday. The BEA will…

U.S. economic growth increased in the third quarter, as the surge in artificial intelligence investment continued and consumers kept spending despite persistent inflation. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent from July through September, preliminary data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) showed Thursday. The BEA will…

Damascus - The Israeli military shot dead a developmentally disabled Syrian man last Thursday, triggering a wave of protests across the country against Israel’s continued occupation of parts of Daraa, Quneitra, and the Golan Heights.

The families of individuals detained and illegally transferred to Israel gathered outside the UN headquarters in Damascus on Friday to protest the killing of Muath Al-Baaer. Hundreds also came out to protest in Idlib, Homs, Hasakah, and Quneitra.

Anger is growing in Syria as Israel deepens its occupation in the south. Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since it captured it from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, unilaterally annexing the territory in 1981.

However, following the fall of Assad’s regime in 2024, Israel extended its occupation zone, deploying forces into the neighbouring Quneitra and Daraa regions. It is here that many young men have been disappearing following the Israeli military’s many night raids.

Yet, these disappearances did not begin with the fall of the regime.

In 2024, eight months before now-President Ahmed Al-Sharaa stormed into Damascus, Saddam Hassan Ahmed, 16, was arrested by Israeli forces in Quneitra. He still languishes in an Israeli prison, alongside 38 other Syrian men.

On Friday, his father, Abu Saddam, gathered with other families of the kidnapped in the shade of an apartment complex directly facing the UN headquarters. They were waiting for the protest to start, as their permit was only valid from 2pm.

Abu Saddam is the informal spokesman for the families of the kidnapped, but he insists that the decision to protest was collective.

“We came here to stand together in support of one another, as well as our sons, to stand alongside them until they are released,” he told The New Arab.

“We call on UN forces to pressure the occupying state,” he declared. “We want them to use their influence to secure the release of those detained in Israeli prisons.”

At the permitted time, a small crowd of several dozen gathered and waved the Syrian flag, chanting revolutionary slogans of unity and solidarity. 

Overlooking the protest, people came out on their balconies in the upmarket apartment blocks to observe. One woman, holding a placard with her son's face on it, pointed up to them. “Why haven’t they come down to join us?” she shouted. “This is their country too.”

Whilst the turnout was relatively modest in Damascus, large crowds gathered in several other cities to protest the continued Israeli occupation.

“Protests were recorded in eight different governorates of Syria, indicating that the Israeli activities have become a national issue,” Muaz Al-Abdullah, a Middle East Research Manager at ACLED, a conflict tracking organisation, told The New Arab.

“[This is] one of the few causes that unites Syrians across different regions,” he added. “The killing of Muath Al-Baeer was the spark, not the cause.”

An entrenched occupation

Israel's occupation of southern Syria happens in the shadows; on the ground it is uncommon to even catch a glimpse of Israeli soldiers. Yet this shadow of fear looms large over the families of Quneitra.

The Israeli military has established a number of outposts on many of the region's strategic hilltops, from which they terrorise local residents. “Things are becoming more difficult,” says Abu Saddam.

“Their rhetoric has become more heated, and the attacks are increasing, especially as the elections approach.”

According to Al-Abdullah, their presence “is increasingly affecting how civilians use their land and move between villages”.

Under the rubric of creating a security zone, the Israeli military is damaging agricultural lands, confiscating livestock, and destroying woodland and homes near its bases. It has also continued developing Sufa 53 - a fortified military road and network of fortified positions - on the border between Quneitra and the occupied Golan Heights.

Analysts agree that, whilst the occupation of southern Syria is shaped by its own specificities, there are clear resemblances justified on a doctrine of security used to explain the ongoing occupations in southern Lebanon and the West Bank.

Israel also frequently establishes flying checkpoints and launches night raids to illegally detain the area’s young men - many of whom are taken into Israel and have yet to return.

For Mohanad Al-Rish, a Research Manager at COAR Global, a political consultancy firm, this practice raises “serious concerns” as a violation of the Geneva Convention, in which “the forcible transfer of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power is prohibited”.

The Convention requires that those accused of offences be detained within the occupied territory.

Beyond the legal implications, he recognises the “significant consequences” for civilians living in the region, who are faced with a daily sense of insecurity and declining confidence in the Syrian government’s ability to protect them.

The government's position

“I don’t believe the Syrian government has many effective options,” says Al-Rish. Syria’s fragile security environment and weak state capacity mean that any “direct confrontation would carry considerable risk,” he argues.

Israel has made clear its willingness to strike at the heart of the government. During the massacres in Suweida targeting Syria’s Druze minority in 2025, Israel bombed the Syrian Ministry of Defence building and the grounds of the Presidential Palace.

In August, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, standing atop occupied Mount Hermon, sent a “message” to Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa stating, “When you wake up in your palace in Damascus, look up at Mt Hermon, and you will see the Israeli military.”

Due to this, Damascus continues to communicate that it does not seek military escalation and is committed to the diplomatic track, which appears to have stalled. The last known meeting in August between the head of Mossad, Roman Gofman, and Syrian Foreign Minister, Assad Al-Shaibani, seemed to offer little tangible progress.

According to Al-Abdullah, ACLED recorded 24 Israeli incursions the week of the talks, compared to 15 the week before, signalling that Tel Aviv didn’t seek to reduce tensions following the meeting.

With Syria limited to continuing to apply diplomatic pressure through international mediators, Al-Rish believes that the “political environment surrounding these negotiations is changing, [meaning] maintaining the same approach becomes increasingly difficult, particularly in the face of growing domestic frustration.”

He acknowledges that given Syria’s weak security infrastructure, the accumulation of grievance could “become increasingly difficult to contain.”

Growing anger

Although Abu Saddam and the families of the missing made clear that their anger is not directed at the government nor the UN, this recent wave of protests reflects growing frustration about the current settlement in southern Syria.

Although Damascus is clear in its intention to avoid conflict with Israel, one danger is that grievances “could be exploited by third parties, particularly Iran-backed networks,” argues Al-Rish. If people feel disillusioned with the government, they may seek retribution elsewhere.

It would seem that armed groups are active in southern Syria. The Syrian authorities have foiled several plots, most recently on 29 September, when they arrested three men in Deraa province alleging that they were establishing rocket platforms intended to “destabilise the region.” 

There is a danger that Damascus may fail to foil a plot, and thus open the door to fierce Israeli retaliation and further potential escalation.

According to Al-Abdullah, “[this] has already happened.” ACLED has recorded four armed clashes between armed groups in Syria and the Israeli military since the fall of the regime. “Each time, the Israeli response was severe,” he adds.

For now, there seems little that Damascus can do other than harden its condemnation of Israeli violations, but for the families of the missing this offers little salvation. All they want is for their sons to come home.

Cian Ward is a journalist based in Damascus, covering conflict, migration, and humanitarian issues

Follow him on X: @CP__Ward

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

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