Serbs voted “Students Win” without knowing what their program offers, it doesn’t even matter, “anyone is better than Vučić.”

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What to make of the present Serbian moment? Post-Milošević politics is closing a two-and-a-half-decade cycle, standing on the threshold of a new era whose dynamics mirror the old. But history does not repeat; it rhymes. Eerily familiar patterns, driven by traits of the collective Serbian psyche, are re-emerging, even as external and internal material conditions chart a divergent course.

Color Revolutions are quite simple on a level identical to basic marketing. Why does the average person opt to pay a considerable premium for Nikes over some generic basketball shoe? There is top-down vertical advertising at the first level, but this is later surpassed by horizontal peer to peer viralization which leverages on social acceptance. Here this is a simple combination of Edward Bernays’ 1923 work, Crystalizing Public Opinion, his 1928 work, Propaganda, combined with Gustav Le Bon’s 1895 work The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Then of course there are Saul Alinsky, Gene Sharp, and Sharp’s student and Otpor! leader, Srđa Popović. But since the Arab Spring series of Color Revolutions, social media starting with Twitter became a critical factor.

There resides a great strength in social media, the TikTok generation, which also characterized by and large the foreign NGO-backed “Student” movement itself. The “Student list” came to power without clearly communicating to its own voters what exactly they would do on economic, territorial, and foreign policy matters if elected. On October 26th, they were placating Serbian nationalists and Eurosceptics on Russian television to absolve them of fears which in reality they are justified in having. We saw this also with Magyar in Hungary, so this part of the play’s script was not only already rehearsed, but had seen its opening night in the Hunnic lands to the north. But the “Student List” color revolutionaries did not wait long, on October 27^th, Ilija Srdanović, lead candidate of the Student List told the U.S. funded Radio Free Europe that the new government will continue EU integration and the EU-mediated dialogue with Pristina, we presume, towards Kosovo recognition.

Screenshot from RFE/RL Interview with Srdanovic

What Serbs before the election were told by the “Student List” was “Trust me, bro”, a gamble that a “majority” of people in the small Balkan country were apparently willing to take. We will not even discuss the improbability of over 600,000 new voters rising from graves or crawling out of strollers to vote, as Vučić is not challenging the results, even though the “Student List” Color Revolutionaries expected him to.

That fact alone relates to a broader economic and military crisis which looms overhead, and will be the subject of further analysis which will better explain why Vučić is in the optimal position politically as an opposition leader over the course of the coming years. But on that note, our prior analysis of the EU/NATO drive to war with Russia in 2029/2030 is all but certain; see Still a failure: The City of London backs EU’s €90 billion Ukraine war-chest.

The vaguemaxxing approach perfected at Occupy Wall Street sixteen years ago allowed the anti-Vučić opposition to present as a Rorschach blot of sorts; appearing as anti-EU/NATO nationalists to the nationalists and appear as pro-EU liberal to the liberals. Though, to wit, most sophisticated-enough liberals understood the strategy: to fool the “under-educated, Orthodox, working class, country-bumpkin nationalists”. This is part of the problem of the Serbian professional managerial class “intelligentsia” as Archibald Reiss understood over a century ago, and as we will discuss later on in this piece.

To understand the present moment requires grasping the years of betrayal that followed the post–Cold War era’s first color revolution, which unfolded in Belgrade twenty-six years ago. We outline those fifteen years before the rise of the Serbian Progressive Party for two important reasons; first to set the record straight on the actual condition of the “selling out” of Serbia as those new to the Serbia story are prone to believe the “Student list” ADHD propaganda that Vučić did these things, and second, perhaps more importantly, as a funhouse mirror forecast of sorts, given that we are nearing the start of a new rhyming historical cycle (back towards chaos and betrayals). However, the broader global context has changed. NATO is in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. Serbia is threatened on all sides, and is obviously both the lowest hanging fruit and the “punching bag” for the EU/NATO: what they cannot inflict upon Russia, they will inflict upon Serbia, which they regard as “little Russia”.

October 5^th – The “Bulldozer Revolution” – Color Revolutionaries storm the Parliament building and overthrow Milošević

Recall back in October, 2000; after winning the election, DOS (Demokratska opozicija Srbije), whose representative at the time was Vojislav Koštunica, the ruling party Socialists hastily betrayed and extradited their man, former president Slobodan Milošević, to an ad hoc tribunal established by bodies that had no jurisdiction over it. Immediately before the election, the sentiment of the people and the opposition movement “Otpor” was that anyone was better than Slobodan Milošević; they promised prosperity, peace and stability, a state without corruption or the mafia, and the people believed it. Following the election results, celebrations lasted for days with the slogan “He’s finished” and with hope for a better tomorrow. Their “better tomorrow” never came.

Serbia was in an abyss from 2000 all the way to 2012, around 1200 state-owned companies were sold for chump change, largely to foreign interests. These had been not only a mark of sovereignty, but also provided fair and reliable wages that working families relied upon. Because of the leaders of the DOS, Serbia was economically destroyed in the years that followed. When it was believed things couldn’t get worse, they proved Serbs wrong. Serbia was ruled by a party whose members were not in agreement regarding politics and the path they wanted to take, for all that united them was the rancid combination of Western backing and opposition to Milošević, (and this is the same contradiction we find with the “Student government” today).

This was evidenced again in 2003 with the extradition of the president of the opposition Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj, to the Hague Tribunal, where he remained until 2014 and was never convicted, and released and returned to Serbia in 2016 as the result of back-channel work done under Vučić in coordination with the Radical Party (an effort which this author participated). Later in that same year of 2003, just a month after Šešelj’s extradition, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was likely assassinated by members of the Serbian security establishment who feared that Đinđić would continue to extradite more Serbian patriots, which further weakened an already shaken state. Following this and the failed presidential elections, the disagreements between the leaders of DOS reached a culmination and the party split into two fronts, DS and DSS. During 2003 and 2004 Serbia had no president but rather a string of acting presidents: first Nataša Mićić (Civic Alliance of Serbia), who held that duty for three months, then Dragan Maršićanin (DSS) held the role for a month, then Predrag Marković (G17plus) performed the function for three months, after which Boris Tadić, of the Democratic Party (DS), was elected president in July 2004.

To make themselves more acceptable to EU membership, Serbian laws were changed and a new Constitution was adopted in 2006, during the term of President Tadić. In that constitution, Kosovo and Metohija were placed in the preamble of the constitution supposedly to emphasize the significance of the fact that Kosovo and Metohija is part of Serbia, forgetting to emphasize that the preamble of a constitution is not necessarily a binding part. Immediately before the adoption of the 2006 Constitution, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was dissolved, leaving Serbia landlocked. This was the culmination of a Western-instructed independence referendum, made possible when Serbian authorities previously signed the Belgrade Agreement to restructure relations between Serbia and Montenegro, where there we saw the renaming of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Union State of Serbia and Montenegro before its eventual split. A questionable constitution was adopted. At that moment, Serbia had no real army, the “Democratic” authorities made sure of this during that period, which in turn laid the perfect groundwork for the ethnic Albanian declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia in February 2008. Serbia had no army to defend it, the people took to the streets and protested, but since preserving Serbian sovereignty was not on the list of Western/NGO requirements of Serbia, nothing came of it. Nota bene: this is what happens when protests are without mass institutional support (foreign or domestic); the elites weather them and people’s spontaneous protests fizzle out and demoralization sets in. Sustained protests for years requires massive organization and high levels of funding and coordination.

After this, Serbia under Tadić signs the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. In 2008 Serbia experiences an economic crash during the global crisis engineered by Wall Street and the City of London (which as an aside led to the next round of Color Revolutions in the form of the Arab Spring within two years), the loss of jobs, and a spike in the euro exchange rate. After that, the then- Democratic Party (DS) authorities under President Tadić extradited more Serbian heroes to the Hague Tribunal: Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadžić in 2008, followed Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in 2011, in exchange for which Serbia received candidate status for EU membership.

Archibald Reiss, the Swiss criminologist and Serbophile was so moved by the Serbian spirit, unity, and sacrifice during the First World War that he made Serbia his home, but in equal measure found himself outraged and indeed demoralized by the levels of corruption, opportunism, and classism among the elites both during and after the war. His insights into the Serbian mentality tell us a lot about what we have just seen, or rather, why things played out the way they did. Reiss meticulously dissected the tragic rift between the noble, heroic ordinary people and a self-serving, corrupt intellectual and political elite. Reiss would have viewed the foreign-backed NGO color revolution that ousted Vučić as little more than another manifestation of the Serbian elite’s moral decay, naivety, and subservience to external powers, and also their sense of entitlement lording over the Serbian masses, in Ottoman style, but worse for it requires manipulating and playing upon Serbian patriotism, sense of duty, and their deep rooted commitment to both personal and collective freedom. Reiss would sharply lament how the populace, endowed with immense bravery yet often prone to political short-sightedness and easily gas-lit by grand rhetoric, allowed themselves to become pawns in a geopolitical game orchestrated by foreign money and nefarious interests. He would fiercely criticize the urban “intelligentsia” and opportunistic political actors for their uncritical envy and imitation of foreign masters (what today we would call a product of autochauvinism combined with foreign soft power acculturation), pointing out that in exchanging one ostensibly “corrupt autocrat” for leaders beholden to external NGOs, Serbia merely traded internal political clientelism for foreign subservience. To Reiss, actual national sovereignty and social justice could never be gifted by foreign-funded apparatuses; rather, by relying on foreign interventions instead of conducting a deep, self-reliant moral regeneration from within, Serbians had once again fallen victim to their tragic flaw: letting the “king of money” and corrupt elites dictate their destiny while losing sight of their own authentic identity.

Čujte Srbi: čuvajte se sebe – by Rodolphe Archibald Reiss

Reiss observed that the Serbian political elite and the self-proclaimed intelligentsia flipped wildly between a sense of superiority over their own populace and deep-seated envy of wealthier, more advanced foreign nations. Their idea of modernizing Serbia was not to build on authentic national virtues, but to copy external models superficially (today, the EU or the ‘Nordic model’) while harboring a hidden disdain for the common Serbian peasant (Vučić voters, derided as Sendvučić, voting in exchange for sandwiches). Modernization, in that sense, was a vanity project rather than a matter of national survival.

Magyar offers congratulations to the Student List

So now here in late October 2026 we hear “He’s finished” on the streets. Once again, Serbs have bought the lie. Once again a state without corruption, without a mafia was promised. Serbs voted “Students Win” without knowing what their program offers, it doesn’t even matter, “anyone is better than Vučić.” The paradox is that now the state will be led by the very people who ruined it in the period from 2000 to 2012 and to finish everything they couldn’t back then. We can forecast the return of the Hungarian separatist movement in Vojvodina, which flourished in the early 2000s with the support of the Provincial Government headed by Bojan Pajtić in the period from 2004 to 2009, who is now on the Students Win parliamentary list. Without Orbán in Hungary, and specifically with Magyar there in charge, we can all but guarantee it. But as we have said, war is on the horizon. Where the Russian army situates by 2028 will determine much. Where the U.S. will situate after presidential elections in November of that same year will determine the rest.

Follow Joaquin Flores on Telegram @NewResistance or on X/Twitter @XoaquinFlores

Youth-led demonstrations across Europe are bringing together concerns about housing, education, employment and political accountability. Although the movements differ considerably between countries, their emergence reflects growing dissatisfaction among younger Europeans over economic prospects and their influence on political decisions.

A series of demonstrations involving young people across Europe has developed into a wider political phenomenon, as students and younger workers challenge governments over living costs, public services and their expectations for the future.

Protests have taken place in France, Belgium, Italy, Albania and several other countries, while a student-led movement in Serbia has achieved a particularly consequential political outcome.

In Serbia, nearly two years of demonstrations culminated in a parliamentary election victory for a student-backed political movement, ending the electoral dominance of President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party.

The outcome, reported by Reuters on 29 October, has given the movement a prospective parliamentary majority, although final certification of the election results remains outstanding.

Elsewhere, protesters have secured fewer immediate political concessions.

Nevertheless, their campaigns share a recurring concern: that conventional channels of political representation have failed to address problems affecting younger generations.

Economic Pressures Behind the Demonstrations

The grievances vary between countries, but housing affordability, insecure employment, education funding and living costs feature prominently.

A European Parliament youth survey published in February 2025 found that 40 per cent of respondents aged 16 to 30 considered rising prices and the cost of living a priority for the EU.

Almost one-third identified economic conditions and job creation as a principal concern, while education also ranked prominently.

More recent figures illustrate the financial pressures confronting younger Europeans.

According to Eurostat data published in June 2026, 24.2 per cent of EU residents aged 15 to 29 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025.

That compares with 20.9 per cent for the population as a whole.

These figures do not establish that economic hardship is the cause of every protest. They do, however, provide context for the dissatisfaction expressed by participants.

Belgium’s Students Demand Better Education

In Brussels, demonstrations have focused partly on the condition of schools and the availability of educational resources.

Students have criticised deteriorating facilities, shortages of teachers and government decisions affecting education funding.

Nineteen-year-old student Maya Gourdel told Reuters that peaceful attempts to draw attention to these concerns had attracted little response from political leaders.

Her account reflects a wider frustration among demonstrators who believe that public attention has increased only after protests became more disruptive.

Belgium’s education system is organised primarily at community level, meaning decisions concerning funding, staffing and school infrastructure are divided among different authorities.

The demands of protesters consequently involve both national political debates and decisions taken by regional and community institutions.

France and Italy Face Wider Social Unrest

In France, demonstrations concerning the cost of living and public services have involved students alongside trade unions and other organisations.

Recent protests have also been accompanied by violence, including attacks on commercial premises and confrontations with police.

The involvement of younger demonstrators does not mean that every participant supports violent tactics.

Rather, the events illustrate how movements with economic and political grievances can encompass groups with different objectives and methods.

Italy has experienced similar tensions, particularly in Milan, where demonstrations against rising living costs have followed earlier episodes of unrest.

The Italian government has faced pressure over household expenditure, wages and the affordability of essential services.

These disputes have developed against a background of high energy prices and concerns about the broader economic outlook.

Albania’s Frustration With Political Institutions

In Albania, student-led protests have challenged Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government over alleged corruption, limited employment opportunities and education standards.

Demonstrations that began in Tirana have spread to other cities.

On 29 October, opposition lawmakers disrupted proceedings in parliament following weeks of protests and confrontations between demonstrators and police.

The government has offered measures intended to address economic concerns while condemning violence associated with the demonstrations.

For many younger Albanians, employment prospects are closely connected to the possibility of emigrating.

The perception that professional opportunities depend on political connections or personal networks has become another source of dissatisfaction.

However, the Albanian movement cannot be treated as identical to protests in EU member states, given the country’s different economic conditions and political institutions.

Serbia Shows the Political Potential of Student Movements

Serbia provides the most substantial example of youth-led protest translating into electoral change.

The movement emerged after the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people and prompted allegations of corruption and negligence.

Students organised prolonged demonstrations demanding accountability and institutional reform.

Their campaign subsequently developed into an electoral challenge to the governing Serbian Progressive Party.

Preliminary results from the October 2026 parliamentary election indicate that the student-backed list has secured a majority of seats.

However, electoral certification and the formation of a new government remain incomplete.

The movement now faces a different challenge: converting protest demands into administrative decisions, legislation and economic policy.

Its success will be judged not only by the election result but also by its ability to govern.

A Generational Shift, But Not a Single Movement

It would be misleading to describe Europe’s demonstrations as a unified political campaign.

Participants have different objectives, national circumstances and ideological positions.

Some demand increased public expenditure, while others concentrate on corruption, political accountability or employment opportunities.

What connects them is a recurring concern about whether established institutions respond adequately to younger citizens.

The political consequences will depend on whether demonstrations produce lasting organisations, influence elections or secure changes in government policy.

Serbia suggests that student mobilisation can translate into substantial political change.

For governments elsewhere in Europe, the question is whether the grievances driving these movements can be addressed through existing political institutions before dissatisfaction generates further unrest.

On October 25, an election list formed after two years of student-led protests in Serbia toppled Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The announcement was met with street celebrations that continued throughout the night, recognizing the outcome as a chance to break with 12 years of the former president’s anti-people policies. 

Election turnout surged to almost 70% of registered voters. The Student List secured roughly 53% of the vote and the SNS came in second with close to 39%. The two options are set to be the only forces in parliament except for minority representatives.

“These results have shown that a genuinely homegrown – even if heterogeneous – movement can articulate social discontent with SNS rule, provided it makes a decisive break with the baggage of the pro-Western opposition,” the Party of the Radical Left (PRL) wrote in a reaction on Monday.

The Students List ran on a platform titled “Serbia or the Mafia,” consisting of anti-corruption promises and plans to tackle the political establishment’s capture of the media sector. It also included a call for more transparency in public procurement and recruitment in the public sector. The platform promised to limit import monopolies, lower drug prices, and make healthcare more accessible.

From the Novi Sad canopy collapse to the ballots

Sunday’s results were made possible by months of demonstrations and public assemblies triggered by the canopy collapse in Novi Sad in November 2024. Sixteen people died in the event. In the aftermath, students across the country threw their energy into a campaign demanding accountability for the tragedy. 

From the beginning, protesters insisted the Novi Sad disaster was a consequence of the SNS’s way of doing politics, marked by widespread corruption, nepotism, and disregard for the public interest. During his tenure as prime minister and president, Vučić attempted to cast himself as a supporter of multilateralism and a political figure critical of the West, yet his actions exposed this as a more rhetorical than anything else.

These actions included supporting extractive deals with British-Australian mining company Rio Tinto – which the European Union included on its strategic projects list despite risks posed to communities in Jadar and mass mobilizations against the project – as well as the launch of a drone factory in cooperation with Israeli arms producer Elbit Systems. In fact, despite the former SNS leader’s efforts to present him as neutral, Serbia’s involvement in arms trade to Israel has been such to warrant notes of particular concern by UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese.

Locally, Vučić’s rule was marked by violent crackdowns on activists and campaigns, from the most recent student campaigns to Palestine solidarity. There was no substantial reaction to these reports from other European countries or the EU.

On the other hand, while very heterogeneous in character, the student movement aligned itself clearly against the Gaza genocide. Some local groups made solidarity with Palestine a central issue in their mobilizations. They also mobilized against projects associated to US interests, including the redevelopment of the former General Staff complex – a Belgrade landmark damaged in the 1999 NATO bombardment of the city – into a luxury hotel by Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of US President Donald Trump. This project was also brokered while the SNS was in power.

Progressives within Student List face difficult task ahead

The student campaign grew in significance through decentralized plenums and consultations across the country. This approach was not abandoned even during the formation of election lists – leading to a roster of new candidates, previously largely unknown to the public. University staff and other education workers who had supported the mobilization from the early days figured prominently on this list.

The success of the Student List represents an extraordinary achievement, especially considering the movement faced obstructions at every turn. These included police violence and institutional intimidation over the past two years, as well as schedule provisions that jeopardized voting rights in the diaspora. 

“The progressive elements within the Student List and the movement now face a difficult task: to resist the forces of the establishment within their own ranks,” the PRL emphasized after the election.

Earlier on, the party and other progressive voices expressed “critical support” for the Student List, recognizing the elements of social justice incorporated in its platform – but also noting aspects belonging to a technocratic vision of governance. 

Read more: Albania’s protests show no signs of backing down

“When it comes to the published program, the measures set out in the ‘Serbia or the Mafia‘ plan are not enough to eradicate the structural injustice that has taken root in Serbia over thirty years of privatization, ‘structural adjustment’ to the Euro-Atlantic regime, and the weakening of public institutions – and their systematic incapacitation from carrying out their mandated functions and protecting the public interest against the arbitrary power of capital,” the PRL stated in September.

Despite such reservations, the hope embedded in the movement surrounding the Student List is clear. The PRL observed: “Beyond the mass politicization of students and the raising of awareness on many key social issues – and despite pressure from ‘opposition’ politicians who would rather keep all these topics quiet […] we consider the following to be progressive developments: the construction of a directly democratic movement that antagonizes both the government and the parliamentary opposition in practice […] open communication and cooperation with trade unions, which gave rise to the first mass protest-based May Day commemoration in many years […] and cooperation with informal labor and professional collectives, which gave rise to a new organization – the Social Front.”

For 14 years, Serbia’s government kept the country close to Moscow. Now, the opposition “Student List” has won the country’s snap parliamentary election, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine is ready to deepen its cooperation with Serbia, welcoming the result as “a new page” in a post on X.

The win could end the 14-year rule of President Aleksandar Vučić’s political force and weaken Moscow’s position in the Balkans. Serbia has remained an important Kremlin partner in Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Belgrade never joined the EU's sanctions against Moscow.

“A new page”

In his post, written in Ukrainian, Zelenskyy said that "changes have taken place in Serbia, the victory of the Student List, and this is clearly a new page in the history of the country and its people."

“We wish Serbia success, real development, and warm relations with the European community,” he wrote.

He said Ukraine was grateful to Serbia “for the respect shown to our people and our state, our independence,” and added: “We are ready to keep increasing our cooperation, and may all the good hopes of the people of Serbia come true.”

But the winners rule out sanctions on Russia

Vučić had earlier predicted that a new government could impose restrictions on Moscow by March or April, according to Novosti. The Student List says otherwise: it has no plans to align with the EU or to sanction Russia over the war in Ukraine, according to Reuters.

Its candidates frame Serbia’s reliance on Russian gas, with Gazprom as the largest supplier at around 2.2 billion cubic meters a year at below-market prices, as an acute economic dependency rather than a geopolitical alignment.

The movement’s top candidates have also said a future government would end all arms exports to war zones, including sales to Western intermediaries who pass weapons to Ukraine. Around €800 million worth of Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine through that route since 2022.

Sono contrari alle sanzioni alla Russia, non riconoscono il Kosovo, non sono così certi della strada verso l’Ue. La pensa così una parte dell’elettorato serbo che ieri ha consegnato il Paese alla Lista degli Studenti, rompendo il monopolio durato 14 anni di Aleksandar Vucic. Di contro, molte analisi stanno oggi riconducendo il cambio di potere in Serbia a una svolta pro Bruxelles, ma gli interrogativi in questa fase sono forse più delle certezze, dal momento che del programma dei nuovi amministratori poco si sa. Formiche.net ne ha parlato con il deputato di FdI Emanuele Loperfido, membro della delegazione italiana presso l’Assemblea Parlamentare dell’Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa e inviato dell’Osce proprio a Belgrado per seguire il processo elettorale. “Come Europa, dovremo essere bravi a metterci nelle condizioni di far risultare più attraente la sponda europea per la Serbia”.

Perché Vucic ha perso le elezioni?

Fisiologicamente, dopo 14 anni, anche il miglior premier sul mercato può stancare il proprio elettorato che sceglie di metterlo da parte. Di fronte ha avuto un movimento politico studentesco che è cresciuto, avendo sempre Vucic come obiettivo: e quindi, di fronte a un mondo che è cambiato rapidamente, anche loro hanno voluto cambiare, invertendo un trend di un establishment che si era consolidato in Serbia. Il sentimento tipico giovanile di volontà di cambiamento è esacerbato probabilmente da un sistema che era diventato un po’ oppressivo. Inoltre Vucic deve aver perso anche il polso del Paese e qualche suo collaboratore non è stato in grado di interpretare l’intensità della volontà del cambiamento.

Da osservatore Osce cosa ha visto durante le elezioni? Il rischio brogli e aggressioni ritiene che complichi la strada del Paese verso l’Ue?

I Balcani non possono mai essere analizzati in modo manicheo, da una parte o dall’altra: piuttosto occorre valutare le tante sfaccettature per comprendere il quadro generale. Sicuramente c’era da parte del movimento studentesco un allarme circa il fatto che potessero verificarsi brogli, per cui c’è stato un presidio molto capillare nei seggi. Noi abbiamo visto durante le operazioni di voto tanti rappresentanti di lista. Una presenza quasi asfissiante ai seggi, che racconta un dato abbastanza emblematico di queste elezioni: ovvero in tutti i seggi sono arrivati gli esponenti del movimento studentesco con in mano la loro penna perché venivano ipotizzati vari brogli tramite l’utilizzo da parte del regime di penne cancellabili. Quindi erano tutti premuniti, andando al seggio con la loro penna, scattando anche una foto alla scheda. Però poi la volontà popolare è stata così forte per cui, già pochi minuti dopo la chiusura dei seggi, quando stava avanzando l’ipotesi di scontri in piazza, Vucic ha riconosciuto la sconfitta e il Paese ha potuto godere del risultato elettorale che è stato netto. Inoltre il regime non ha assolutamente reagito, come qualcuno ipotizzava. Forse in realtà Vucic era molto meno sicuro di quello che pensavano nel suo staff e il monitoraggio nella parte pre elettorale ha esemplificato un dato che è apparso chiaro a tutti noi presenti: ovvero che la Lista degli studenti è un movimento che ha saputo interpretare la volontà di cambiamento, ma senza avere un programma politico ancora ben chiaro.

Quali sono le idee della Lista degli studenti? Sono realizzabili e in linea con le politiche Ue?

Il programma consiste in 1900 pagine che non avevano pubblicato in toto, perché ancora erano in fase di comprensione: ovvero si ragionava su quali potevano essere gli elementi caratterizzanti un movimento politico che raccoglie di tutto. Senza dubbio sono stati abili nell’intercettare il dissenso verso Vucic, ma poi alla conta dei fatti tra i loro elettori ci sono serbi contrari alle sanzioni alla Russia, serbi che non riconoscono il Kosovo, serbi non sono così certi della strada verso l’Ue, serbi che non hanno chiara la dimensione della pace giusta in Ucraina. Inoltre nei confronti dell’Europa non si sono alleati con un partito europeista che comunque si era presentato alle elezioni, perché al loro interno hanno un’anima ancora dubbiosa rispetto al percorso europeo. Quindi si tratta di un movimento che oggi verrà chiamato a stabilire quali sono le priorità dal punto di vista della politica internazionale. Fino a ieri i loro elementi distintivi erano soprattutto la volontà di trasparenza, la lotta alla corruzione e il ricambio anche generazionale dell’establishment.

E adesso?

Ora verrà una fase molto difficile: quindi per chi in Italia ha fatto una lettura molto semplice, dicendo che ha vinto l’Europa, in realtà stando fisicamente lì in quelle ore per le elezioni credo occorrerà più tempo per capire dove andranno davvero.

Hanno vinto studenti, manifestanti, neofiti della politica: esiste il rischio di passare da un leader autoritario ad una fase di caos e populismo?

Può essere un’ipotesi, perché i leader al momento riconosciuti sono essi stessi senza esperienza politica. Sono sicuramente validi accademici, validi, professori, validi professionisti, ma senza esperienza politica. La loro organizzazione è fatta di comitati che, come ci hanno tenuto a ribadire più volte, sono comitati orizzontali e non verticali, per cui si decide sulla base dell’esito di piattaforme internet e magari vengono prese decisioni che sono anche diverse e non compatibili l’una con l’altra. Un de javu di ciò che abbiamo già visto in Italia. Noi possiamo essere sicuramente contenti dell’esito del risultato elettorale dal punto di vista della democrazia, che ha dimostrato come nonostante quello che veniva dagli studenti indicato come “regime” c’è stata una altissima affluenza. Quindi da questo punto di vista si può dire che la democrazia serba è matura e funziona: passi in avanti che, come Europa, noi dobbiamo essere contenti che si siano verificati. Adesso vediamo se sceglieranno la sponda europea oppure se magari si faranno affascinare ancora dalla Russia.

In che senso?

Beh, non avendo accessi al mare, la Serbia è ancora costretta a prendere l’energia da Mosca.

Vede il rischio che con la nuova classe dirigente la Serbia rischi essenzialmente di fare un salto nel buio?

Premetto che ultimamente forse era più Putin che aveva bisogno di Vucic e non il contrario, a causa il gioco russo a scacchi nella strategia internazionale. Putin ha bisogno di far vedere che ha un piede nei Balcani. Di contro Vucic con la sua esperienza politica e con un’autorevolezza che deriva dai 14 anni al potere, ha giocato sapientemente su due fronti, facendo l’occhiolino una volta al’Europa, una volta la Russia. Ora con questa nuova classe dirigente le problematiche legate all’energia rimangono intatte e la Russia è la via più facile per una fornitura energetica che continua ad essere a poco prezzo. Come Europa, dovremo essere bravi a metterci nelle condizioni di far risultare più attraente la sponda europea per la Serbia, quindi fare in modo che ci possano essere forniture alternative a buon prezzo. E quindi evitare che i serbi cadano nella provocazione per cui stare con la Russia vuol dire avere energia a poco prezzo e stare con noi significherebbe energia ad alto prezzo. Un’ultima annotazione: il Partito democratico italiano continua a gioire per le vittorie all’estero. Dopo l’Ungheria ora la Serbia, pur non essendo assolutamente famiglie politiche a loro ascrivibili.

Vucic on Sunday blamed his defeat on foreign interference.

Serbia has achieved something that appeared improbable only months ago. Aleksandar Vučić, who dominated the country’s political institutions for more than a decade, has acknowledged electoral defeat. A movement born from student demonstrations against corruption is now preparing to take power. Yet the most consequential struggle may only be beginning.

The parliamentary election of 25 October represents more than the rejection of an increasingly centralised political leadership. It raises a fundamental question about the Serbian state: whether the institutions shaped by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can function independently of the political organisation that controlled them.

According to preliminary figures released by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List secured 52.54 per cent of the vote against 39.29 per cent for Vučić’s United Serbia coalition, with 8,077 of 8,392 polling stations counted. Projections give the students approximately 140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, enough to govern without coalition partners.

Vučić had resigned from the presidency in September, hoping to return to power as prime minister. Instead, the election deprived him of the parliamentary majority necessary to complete that manoeuvre. His concession has substantially reduced the immediate prospect of a disputed transfer of power, although the election results still require formal certification.

But losing an election and losing control of a political system are not necessarily the same thing.

The political inheritance of the 1990s

Vučić’s political career provides important context for understanding the significance of his defeat.

He entered politics through the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, and served as information minister in Slobodan Milošević’s government from 1998. During that period, Serbian authorities employed restrictive media legislation against independent newspapers and broadcasters, imposing substantial financial penalties and limiting critical reporting.

After Milošević’s removal in 2000, Vučić remained politically active. His subsequent association with the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in 2008 following a split within the Radical Party, allowed him to reposition himself as a politician promising economic modernisation and European integration.

This transformation proved remarkably successful.

The SNS came to power in 2012, and Vučić subsequently served as prime minister and president. Serbia attracted foreign investment, undertook major infrastructure projects and maintained its formal ambition of joining the European Union. At the same time, political authority became increasingly concentrated around Vučić and his associates.

The distinction between Serbia under Milošević and Serbia under Vučić should not be overlooked. The former governed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and pursued policies that brought international isolation. The latter operated through electoral institutions, international economic partnerships and a declared European orientation.

Nevertheless, Vučić’s political career illustrates a continuity in personnel and political methods that Serbia’s post-2000 democratic transition never entirely resolved.

The OSCE’s assessment of Serbia’s 2023 parliamentary elections documented advantages enjoyed by the governing party, political pressure on public employees, media bias and the misuse of state resources. These findings demonstrated how electoral competition could continue while the conditions under which parties competed became increasingly unequal.

The Student List has now broken that pattern at the ballot box. Whether it can prevent its reconstruction remains uncertain.

Why the students succeeded

The immediate origins of the political upheaval lie in the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people.

The disaster became a symbol of wider concerns about public procurement, construction oversight and political accountability. Demonstrations demanding responsibility subsequently developed into a nationwide movement challenging the government’s legitimacy.

As EU Today previously examined, the protests exposed a deeper conflict between Serbian society and institutions widely perceived by demonstrators as serving political interests rather than the public.

Unlike established opposition parties, the student movement did not depend on a familiar political leader or traditional party machinery. It mobilised university communities, academics, professionals and citizens who had previously remained outside organised political activity.

Its central demand was institutional accountability rather than a comprehensive ideological programme.

That distinction was crucial. By concentrating on corruption, democratic standards and the functioning of the state, the movement attracted voters with differing views on nationalism, foreign policy and European integration.

However, the same diversity that helped it win the election could complicate governing. Its candidates must now agree on economic priorities, ministerial appointments, foreign relations and the extent of institutional reform.

A protest movement can unite around opposition to a political leader. A government must reach agreement on decisions that inevitably divide its supporters.

Russia’s influence will not disappear with Vučić

One of the most important consequences of the election concerns Serbia’s relationship with Moscow.

Throughout his presidency, Vučić cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining productive relations with Brussels, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously.

Serbia continued its EU accession negotiations and benefited substantially from European investment and trade. Yet Belgrade consistently refused to join the principal European sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The contradiction was particularly striking because Serbia’s economic relationship with the EU vastly outweighs its trade with Russia.

The European Commission’s assessment found that the EU accounted for 58.3 per cent of Serbia’s total trade in 2024. European markets, investment and regulatory structures have therefore become fundamental to the Serbian economy.

Vučić nevertheless preserved close political links with Moscow, benefiting domestically from nationalist sentiment and Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.

He also attempted to demonstrate that relations with Russia did not preclude cooperation with Ukraine.

In June 2025, Vučić travelled to Odesa for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Serbia provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but declined to sign the summit’s joint declaration. Its continuing refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow remained the most substantial distinction between Serbian policy and the EU position.

Yet a Student List government would not necessarily reverse that policy.

In September, the movement explicitly declared its opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia, referring to Serbia’s historical experience with international restrictive measures.

Vučić nevertheless predicted during his concession speech that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Moscow by March or April. He also attributed his defeat to interference by European governments and what he called the American “deep state”, supposedly opposed to President Donald Trump.

His prediction about sanctions was therefore inconsistent with the movement’s publicly stated position.

This exposes an important misconception about Serbia’s political transformation. Opposition to Vučić does not automatically translate into support for every element of EU foreign policy. Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, Kosovo and national sovereignty extend beyond the electorate traditionally associated with the SNS.

The new government may pursue closer integration with European institutions while retaining positions that Brussels considers incompatible with membership.

The economic structures behind political influence

The challenge extends beyond diplomatic relationships.

Russia’s presence in Serbia includes strategic energy interests, notably its controlling shareholding in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which operates the country’s principal oil refinery.

American sanctions against the Russian-owned company have complicated its operations, while negotiations over the proposed acquisition of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL Group illustrate how energy security, foreign ownership and international sanctions have become interconnected.

For an incoming administration, reducing such dependencies will require commercial negotiations, regulatory oversight and alternative energy supplies. Political declarations cannot achieve these objectives on their own.

Equally important will be the examination of public contracts and relationships between political officeholders and businesses that benefited from government decisions.

The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report identified persistent corruption concerns, insufficient transparency in major infrastructure procurement and weaknesses in institutional accountability.

Any investigation into alleged wrongdoing under Vučić must be independent, evidence-based and subject to judicial scrutiny. Allegations of corruption do not themselves establish criminal responsibility.

A government elected to restore the rule of law would undermine its own mandate if it replaced politically selective justice with prosecutions directed by a new political majority.

The central objective must be to ensure that prosecutors, courts and oversight bodies can investigate former as well as current officials without political interference.

Brussels faces a test of its own

For the European Union, the election provides an opportunity to reconsider its approach towards Belgrade.

For years, European institutions confronted a government that professed commitment to EU membership while resisting reforms considered essential to the accession process.

In July 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that Serbia’s negotiations should advance only when measurable improvements are achieved in the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Parliament also called for alignment with EU sanctions against Russia.

The Student List’s victory may improve the prospects for domestic institutional reform, but the disagreement over sanctions remains unresolved. Brussels cannot assume that a new Serbian government will satisfy every accession requirement simply because it defeated Vučić.

Nor should it overlook the political significance of the result.

The movement’s strongest mandate concerns the restoration of public accountability. Supporting independent institutions, transparent procurement and genuinely competitive elections would address both Serbian public demands and longstanding EU concerns.

There is also the unresolved question of Kosovo. A change of government in Belgrade does not remove the political and constitutional difficulties surrounding relations with Pristina. The new leadership will inherit negotiations that have repeatedly stalled under previous administrations.

The EU will therefore need to distinguish between areas where rapid progress is possible and disputes that require more sustained diplomacy.

The difference between victory and democratic transition

Serbia has removed one of the central figures of its post-Yugoslav political order from government. It has not yet demonstrated that the system surrounding him can be dismantled through constitutional means.

The immediate tasks are substantial: forming an effective cabinet, protecting the independence of prosecutors, scrutinising public expenditure, reforming media regulation and ensuring that state institutions no longer operate as extensions of the governing party.

A separate presidential election must also follow Vučić’s September resignation, adding another important stage to the transition.

The greatest danger is not simply that the former governing party could eventually return to office. Electoral competition must allow that possibility in any democracy.

The more consequential danger is that the political methods associated with Vučić’s administration could survive under different leadership.

Serbia’s experience after Milošević demonstrated that removing a dominant political figure does not necessarily eliminate the structures, interests and habits of government accumulated during his rule.

The student movement has now been given an opportunity to confront that unfinished transition.

Its success will ultimately be measured not by the political fate of Aleksandar Vučić, but by whether Serbia develops institutions capable of investigating misconduct, restricting the arbitrary use of power and operating independently of whichever party wins the next election.

That would represent a more fundamental transformation than the defeat of any single political leader.

A student movement that emerged after a deadly railway disaster has turned nearly two years of protests into an electoral victory.

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Serbia’s student-led opposition has secured a decisive parliamentary victory over Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling party, according to preliminary results, ending 14 years of political dominance by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and opening a new chapter in the country’s politics.

RELATED: Serbia’s Vucic Concedes Victory to Opposition Students Party

Vučić acknowledged the defeat on Sunday, saying initial projections indicated that the Student List would win between 135 and 140 seats, compared with about 105 for his party. The result follows nearly two years of student-led demonstrations against corruption and what protesters describe as growing authoritarianism.

The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a non-governmental organization, projected that the Student List would win 139 seats after 56% of ballots had been counted, against 104 for the SNS. Unofficial estimates from polling institute Ipsos put the student movement at 140 seats and Vučić’s party at 103, down 26 seats from the 2023 parliamentary election, when it secured an absolute majority.

The setback was compounded by the failure of the Socialist Party, a longtime ally of Vučić, to clear the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation. The party previously held 18 seats. Preliminary estimates also gave three seats to Serbia’s Hungarian minority party and two to the Albanian minority list.

Turnout approached 70%, the highest since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 and close to the record set in the 2000 parliamentary election.

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The student movement grew out of protests that began in 2024, after 16 people died when a canopy collapsed at a railway station in Novi Sad. The disaster prompted mass demonstrations across Serbia, with protesters demanding accountability over the collapse and the construction work carried out by a Chinese company following a tendering process criticized for its lack of transparency.

Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, turning the demonstrations into a broader challenge to corruption and the concentration of political power. The student movement emerged as a nationwide opposition force and sustained pressure on Vučić’s government for nearly two years.

Vučić, who had led the country for 14 years, resigned as head of state in September to run for prime minister.

Celebrations and tensions in Belgrade

The preliminary results sparked celebrations across Belgrade, where thousands gathered to dance, chant slogans and set off flares and fireworks. Crowds shouted “Victory” and “Vučić is leaving” as people embraced and wept with joy.

Slavija Square, a focal point of the mass protests against the government, filled with supporters of the student movement. At Pioneers Park, between parliament and the presidential palace, hundreds of people tore down the fence surrounding the grounds and entered the public space.

The park had been closed to the public for months and periodically occupied by groups of masked Vučić supporters, who were accused of being used as a force to confront government opponents.

The celebrations underscored the scale of the political shift after more than a decade of SNS rule. Vučić had weathered previous opposition challenges, but the student movement turned sustained street protests into an electoral campaign that defeated his party.

A decentralized political movement

The Student List has presented itself as an alternative to Vučić’s centralized model of leadership. It operates through a horizontal structure and has avoided putting forward a single public face, arguing that political decisions should be made from the bottom up rather than imposed from above.

Its slate of 250 candidates includes university professors, actors and farmers, many of them little known to the wider public.

Radomir Sajcic, a University of Belgrade professor representing the movement, celebrated the result at its headquarters. “Dear Serbia, tonight the voice of the people can be heard,” he declared. “Tonight we celebrate victory; tomorrow we will build the future.”

Sajcic also described the outcome as “a victory of courage over fear, a victory of hope over indifference, a victory of faith that Serbia can and must be different.”

The movement’s platform calls for restoring the separation of powers and the autonomy of the prosecutor general’s office, as well as increasing investment in health care and education. It also pledges to tackle corruption and individual privileges to boost public revenue, while promoting technological modernization across the economy, including agriculture.

Serbia’s score in Transparency International’s corruption index has deteriorated during Vučić’s tenure. The European Union has also raised concerns about the country’s declining adherence to the rule of law.

European support and foreign policy questions

European institutions have welcomed the student movement’s victory, describing it as an opportunity to advance democratic reforms, strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.

European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen congratulated the students and offered support for reforms and greater press freedom. Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset highlighted Vučić’s acceptance of the results and his commitment to a peaceful democratic transition.

Today, the people of Serbia turned out in record numbers to shape their country’s future.

Congratulations to the Student List on its victory in the parliamentary elections.

We stand ready to support reforms on the rule of law, media freedom, the fight against corruption and…

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) October 25, 2026

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić and Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar also congratulated the winners and expressed their willingness to cooperate with them.

The election could also affect Serbia’s relations with the European Union and Russia. Under Vučić, the country has pursued EU membership while maintaining close ties with the Kremlin. Serbia has been an official candidate for EU accession since 2012.

Before the vote, EU foreign policy spokesperson Christian Wigand said the bloc would monitor the election closely and stressed the need for a free, fair and transparent process.

The Student List has offered fewer details about its international priorities than about its domestic reform agenda. Available indications suggest it may maintain Serbia’s EU candidacy while continuing to oppose sanctions against Russia, although the movement has yet to clearly outline its foreign policy plans.

The student movement’s victory marks a major political turning point for Serbia after 14 years of Vučić’s dominance. Its ability to convert demands for accountability and institutional reform into a parliamentary majority has reshaped the country’s political landscape, but the incoming government’s approach to domestic reform and foreign relations remains uncertain.

Gli studenti hanno vinto le elezioni politiche anticipate in Serbia. E in tutto il Paese, in diretta Tv, è esplosa la festa nelle strade. Secondo i risultati ancora provvisori ma che difficilmente possono cambiare in modo sostanziale, gli studenti hanno ottenuto il 52% dei voti, che conferirebbero 138 dei 250 seggi del Parlamento nazionale contro il 39% ottenuto dalla lista Serbia Unita dell’ex presidente Aleksandar Vučić, che avrebbe così 104 seggi.

“È chiaro che abbiamo perso queste elezioni“, ha dichiarato Vucic ai suoi sostenitori presso la sede del suo partito nella capitale, riconoscendo già in serata la vittoria del movimento studentesco.”È la lista degli studenti a essersi aggiudicata la vittoria. Otterrà tra i 135 e i 140 seggi, noi circa 105”, ha affermato.

Clacson che suonano, folla in festa e abbracci: l’annuncio della sconfitta alle elezioni legislative anticipate – dato dal nazionalista Aleksandar Vucic dopo 14 anni di dominio sulla vita politica serba – ha scatenato un’esplosione di gioia per le strade di Belgrado. “Mai più avremo un tiranno in questo Paese”, ha dichiarato Ilija Srdanovic, rappresentante della lista degli studenti, rivolgendosi ai sostenitori che agitavano palloncini colorati. Gruppi di giovani vestiti di nero hanno lasciato il centro città tra i fischi degli elettori dell’opposizione, mentre la polizia in tenuta antisommossa presidiava la commissione elettorale, la sede della presidenza e un parco dove si erano radunati i sostenitori del governo. Per tutta la giornata, la Serbia è rimasta col fiato sospeso. Già alle 7 del mattino, all’apertura dei seggi, si erano formate delle code, preannunciando un’affluenza alle urne superiore a quella delle precedenti tornate elettorali.

Mirjana Nikolic – candidata nella lista degli studenti e rettrice dell’Università di Arti Drammatiche – ha voluto rendere omaggio a “tutti questi giovani, senza i quali nulla sarebbe stato possibile”. Questa vittoria è il culmine di quasi due anni di manifestazioni, scatenate dal crollo – avvenuto nel 2024 – di una pensilina presso la stazione ferroviaria di Novi Sad, la seconda città di questo Paese balcanico. Sedici persone persero la vita e, secondo i manifestanti, l’incidente fu una conseguenza della corruzione endemica. All’inizio di settembre, Vucic ha infine indetto le elezioni, dimettendosi dal suo secondo mandato come capo dello Stato per guidare la campagna elettorale del proprio schieramento. Il movimento studentesco si è organizzato in una forza politica eterogenea. La sua lista unitaria, priva di un leader di spicco, ha presentato una selezione di candidati provenienti dalla società civile, accomunati dall’unico obiettivo di sconfiggere il Partito Progressista Serbo (SNS) di Aleksandar Vucic.

L'articolo Elezioni in Serbia, vincono gli studenti: finisce l’era Vucic dopo 14 anni. “Non avremo mai più un dittatore”. Belgrado in festa proviene da Affaritaliani.it.

Pro-Israel populist leader has dominated politics in Balkan country since he became president in 2014, but faced allegations of corruption and creeping authoritarianism

“It is clear that we have lost these elections,” Aleksandar Vucic said in a surprisingly early speech congratulating his opponents.

© Armin Durgut/Associated Press

High turnout and gathering tensions marked the highly contested parliamentary election that was a showdown between Vucic and university students.

High turnout and gathering tensions marked the highly contested parliamentary election that was a showdown between Vucic and university students.

It was a seismic political shift in the Balkan country where Vucic, who had been endorsed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and who denounced the student movement as a foreign-led attempt to unseat him, led with virtually absolute power for 14 years.

EU closely watching vote in the potential member state, where right-wing populist leader is neck and neck with movement sparked by deadly train crash that led to graft allegations

Domenica la Serbia andrà al voto anticipato: può finire l’era targata Vucic (e quindi le preoccupazioni europee sul feeling con Mosca e Pechino) oppure la piazza degli studenti può influire sul nuovo corso, prendendo il potere. Ma attenzione alle infiltrazioni in entrambi gli schieramenti, dal momento che i collettivi studenteschi non sono immuni da episodi di guerra ibrida, sulla falsariga dei maranza: convocati e indottrinati sui social. Quasi sei milioni e mezzo gli elettori chiamati alle urne in ottomila seggi, compresi quelli per gli elettori residenti in Kosovo e in Bosnia Erzegovina, tutt’altro

Al voto

Il presidente uscente, Aleksandar Vucic, guida la lista Serbia unita, seguita dalla lista del Partito socialista serbo (Sps) di Ivica Dacic e da quella studentesca Gli studenti vincono. Gli ultimi sondaggi condotti dall’agenzia Ipsos danno Vucic al 47,4% dei consensi, contro il 40 della Lista studentesca, prevedendo con un’affluenza del 64,7%.

La Lista Studentesca nasce dopo l’incidente di Novi Sad, che ha innescato un movimento di protesta contro il regime di Vucic, accusandolo di corruzione. Ieri decine di persone hanno affollato l’ultimo comizio nel Palazzetto dello Sport a chiusura di una campagna elettorale che essenzialmente è bipolare. L’ex presidente si dipinge come l’uomo della continuità, che è il passaggio maggiormente contestato dagli studenti, pront invece a chiedere totale discontinuità.

A sfidare Vucic ci sarà il professore di medicina Ilija Srdanovic che dal novembre 2024, data dell’incidente ferroviario in cui persero la vita 16 persone, ha impostato un certo tipo di impegno politico. Da quel giorno ha costruito un movimento che si è trasformato in partito. È stato anche accusato di far parte di un disegno esterno per destabilizzare il Paese e sostituire Vucic, ma sul punto si è registrata la presa di distanza dell’ex presidente del Montenegro Milo Djukanovic che ha escluso tale scenario e ha contrastato con veemenza le voci di una suo appoggio alla Lista studentesca.

La geopolitica, oltre le liste

Ma non c’è solo l’urna elettorale in quanto tale al centro della disputa di domenica, bensì anche l’aspetto geopolitico: il Paese balcanico è in bilico tra l’ingresso in Ue da un lato e le pressioni di Cina e Russia dall’altro, passando per le sanzioni americane che, ad esempio, hanno spinto la Serbia a cercare un nuovo proprietario per la sua compagnia petrolifera controllata da Gazprom. Nell’ultimo periodo Belgrado ha stretto ancora maggiori relazioni con Pechino. Il partenariato tra Vucic e Xi è considerato “di ferro”, caratterizzato da legami politici, economici e militari che, in concomitanza con l’ascesa di Vucic, si sono ulteriormente cementati. Durante l’incontro dello scorso maggio, i due leader hanno deciso di promuovere congiuntamente quattro iniziative globali, otre ad aver concluso una serie di accordi di cooperazione pluriennale.

Anche la russa Rosatom potrebbe fare i conti con l’ostracismo serbo e sganciarsi dal paese balcanico, dal momento che il suo progetto di costruire una centrale nucleare su larga scala sarebbe in contrasto con il processo di adesione all’Ue. Nel paese intanto montano le preoccupazioni di tipo occupazionale, dopo che la fabbrica tessile turca Kaizen di Smederevo ha avviato la liquidazione, con il rischio che 350 lavoratori restino a casa. Un altro elemento che potrebbe influire sugli umori elettorali, accentuando il voto di protesta.

Serbia is approaching a decisive parliamentary election on Sunday, 25th October, with former President Aleksandar Vučić facing an unprecedented challenge from a student-led political movement that emerged from nationwide anti-corruption protests.

The election comes amid growing allegations of political intimidation, surveillance and restrictions on independent journalism. International observers have expressed concern about the conditions under which the campaign is taking place, while opinion polls suggest that the opposition Student List could challenge Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

Vučić, who resigned from the presidency to seek the prime minister’s office, has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade. His attempt to retain power through a different constitutional position comes at a time when Serbia’s relationship with the European Union has deteriorated over judicial independence, media freedom and its continuing ties with Russia.

Student protests become an electoral challenge

The opposition movement developed following the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people.

The disaster triggered demonstrations demanding accountability for alleged corruption, failures in public procurement and inadequate construction oversight. What began as a student protest subsequently developed into a nationwide political movement.

As EU Today previously reported, the demonstrations exposed mounting dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of public institutions and corruption allegations.

The Student List, formally registered for Sunday’s election, has brought together academics, professionals and activists who argue that Serbia requires fundamental changes to public administration and political accountability.

Unlike conventional opposition parties, the movement has developed without a single dominant political leader. Its organisers have sought to mobilise voters who previously abstained from elections, including younger citizens dissatisfied with the established political parties.

The movement is fielding 250 candidates and has emerged as the principal electoral challenger to the SNS.

Allegations of intimidation and surveillance

The closing stages of the campaign have been overshadowed by allegations involving Serbian police, intelligence services and political supporters.

A Reuters investigation published on 22nd October documented accounts from activists and journalists describing intimidation, physical attacks and alleged misuse of surveillance technology.

The investigation cited the SHARE Foundation, a Serbian digital rights organisation, which reported that at least 14 individuals had been targeted with advanced spyware.

Independent cybersecurity researchers have also examined alleged attempts to compromise the devices of political activists and opposition figures.

Serbian authorities have denied accusations of systematic political repression and rejected allegations that state agencies conducted unlawful surveillance.

Concerns about media freedom have nevertheless intensified. Reporters Without Borders ranked Serbia 104th among 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting a deterioration in the environment for independent journalism.

The ruling party maintains that it remains committed to democratic institutions and Serbia’s European integration.

European observers scrutinise the vote

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has deployed an election observation mission to monitor campaigning, electoral administration and voting procedures.

Its mission includes 14 core experts and 30 long-term observers, with additional short-term observers requested for election day.

A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is also observing the election alongside representatives of the European Parliament and other international institutions.

Earlier this month, the Council of Europe’s pre-electoral delegation described the campaign environment as highly polarised and called for electoral rights to be respected.

The findings of international observers will become particularly important if the result is close or either side disputes the count.

Preliminary assessments are expected on 26th October.

Consequences for Serbia’s European ambitions

The election could influence Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union, which have made limited progress despite Belgrade’s formal commitment to membership.

Brussels has repeatedly raised concerns about judicial independence, the treatment of journalists, corruption and Serbia’s alignment with European foreign policy.

As EU Today examined in July, the failure to advance accession negotiations reflects disagreements extending beyond individual judicial reforms.

Serbia has maintained close economic and political relationships with Russia and China while continuing to seek access to European markets and investment.

A victory for the Student List could create an opportunity to reconsider the country’s approach to EU integration, although its candidates would still face the difficulties of governing a politically divided country.

A victory for Vučić would preserve much of Serbia’s existing political leadership, but the scale of the opposition challenge suggests that domestic pressure for institutional reform would continue.

Much will depend on turnout, the distribution of parliamentary seats and whether the results are accepted as legitimate.

For Brussels, Sunday’s election will be an immediate test of its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and its ability to reconcile strategic interests with the democratic requirements attached to EU membership.