Russia attacked Kyiv with ballistic missiles late on 29 October, killing a man and injuring a 35-year-old woman, Kyiv city prosecutors said. The strikes damaged eight apartment blocks in Dniprovskyi district, a gas station, a restaurant, a dental clinic, warehouses, and cars. A warehouse building caught fire in Darnytskyi district, the city administration reported.

Overnight, Russia fired Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles, four Kh-59/69 guided missiles, and 113 drones, 83 of them jet-powered, Ukraine's Air Force said. The attack mainly targeted Kyiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Air defenses downed three missiles and 96 drones, but strikes hit 17 locations.

Russia is waging its war on Ukraine's cities around the clock as winter approaches, striking homes, transport, and the power grid that keeps them running. On 29 October, including the late attack on Kyiv, Russian strikes killed at least 27 civilians and injured more than 140 across six regions, by EP's tally of regional authorities' reports. It was one of the deadliest days of the autumn. Most died in daylight, on a train platform in Dnipro, in an apartment block in Kremenchuk, in central Chernihiv, and under guided bombs in Izium.

Dnipro and Kyiv's right bank lose power

A Russian strike on Dnipro left more than 350,000 customers in the city and nearby towns without power, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast's administration said shortly after midnight. Water pumping stations switched to backup power. By morning, engineers had restored electricity to most customers in the oblast, but more than 200,000 were still without power.

In Kyiv, equipment damaged in earlier strikes failed on the right bank, forcing emergency outages, the city administration said. Russia attacked an industrial plant in Poltava Oblast's Kremenchuk district overnight and again in the morning, with no casualties reported, the regional administration said.

In the morning, a Russian drone hit a shopping center in Kharkiv's Kyivskyi district, injuring four women, Kharkiv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniehubov said. In Chernihiv Oblast, Russian drones destroyed the house of culture in Mena late on 29 October, and in the morning a drone hit a house in Bobrovytsia and injured a woman, the regional administration said. In Chernihiv itself, 37 people sought medical help after the 29 October strike on the city center that killed two 15-year-old girls, Yana and Mariia.

Two oblasts in mourning as the Dnipro toll rises to 15

A 40-year-old man wounded in the 29 October jet drone strike on Dnipro's railway station died in hospital, raising the toll to 15, the regional administration said. Eleven people remain in hospital. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast declared 30 October a day of mourning.

Poltava Oblast also mourns three people killed when a Russian drone hit an apartment block in Kremenchuk on 29 October. Another 32 were injured, six of them children, the regional administration said.

In Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, Russian guided bombs hit a five-story building on 29 October, killing four people and injuring 14, police reported. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russian attacks killed two people in Bilenke and injured 23 across the region, 13 of them when Russia sent seven FPV drones at vehicles and public transport in Zaporizhzhia city, police said. EP reported the city faced a record number of such attacks.

A Russian FPV drone struck a social bus operated by the Proliska Humanitarian Mission in the frontline village of Bilenke, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, while it was carrying 23 passengers and a driver. The mission’s head, Yevhen Kaplin, reported the attack on Facebook on 29 October. In a comment to Ukrainska Pravda, he later gave slightly different details: 20 passengers and around 14:50.

Earlier that day, Russian attacks on Bilenke killed a 49-year-old man and wounded three other men, acting Zaporizhzhia Oblast head Mykhailo Semikin said. The village of Bilenke is likely to face the most difficult conditions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast this winter, then-head of the oblast Ivan Fedorov said in an interview with Ukrinform on 15 August. Russian forces use the village as a testing ground because the front line runs roughly across the river, he said.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, this marks the 121st attack on the mission’s staff and volunteers while they were providing aid, as well as on its vehicles, offices, and warehouse infrastructure, Kaplin said.

The drone was reportedly lying in wait

The attack killed a female passenger born in 1952. The bus driver sustained serious injuries and was evacuated to a medical facility, Kaplin said. Another passenger, a man born in 1947, sustained multiple shrapnel wounds, while another woman suffered injuries from flying glass. The remaining passengers suffered acoustic barotrauma. Most of the people on board were elderly.

According to preliminary information, this was a drone that was lying in wait, Kaplin said. The attack took place at around 14:30 in the center of the village, on a section of road protected by an anti-drone net.

The bus was clearly marked with the humanitarian mission’s logo on the hood and roof, as well as the words “social bus,” Kaplin said.

National Police special units and military personnel evacuated the wounded, accompanied by aerial cover teams, due to the threat of further drone attacks.

It was the only transport serving the village, Kaplin said

Commercial transport operators no longer serve the village of Bilenke, but more than 1,600 people still live there.

As a result, residents had no way to reach the Oblast center to access essential services, or to buy food and medicine, Kaplin said. They also could not collect their pensions or winter aid payments from the state and humanitarian organizations.

The Proliska team launched the social bus at the request of regional and local authorities.

Russians attack public transport in Zaporizhzhia with drones

Russian drones also hit civilian transport in the Oblast capital several times on 29 October. The city came under a record number of FPV drone attacks that day, Semikin said, adding that Russia had changed its tactics and modified its drones.

• In the morning, a Russian FPV drone struck a municipal bus in the city, Semikin said on 29 October. He first said the strike injured a woman and a man, then said four people were injured.
• Russia launched two strikes on Zaporizhzhia, Semikin reported the same day. Two men, aged 66 and 41, were injured. The strikes damaged 15 vehicles, a warehouse building, a power line, and a nearby apartment block. A fire broke out at the site, he added.
• Later, a Russian drone struck a minibus in central Zaporizhzhia, Semikin reported. According to preliminary information, one person was injured.
• A Russian FPV drone struck a municipal trolleybus in Zaporizhzhia again, Semikin said. He initially reported one woman injured, then said the number rose to three. They included a 56-year-old woman in serious condition and two other women, aged 71 and 66, who sustained minor shrapnel wounds to their legs, he said.

Novaya Gazeta, founded after fall of the Soviet Union, was branded a 'foreign agent' after becoming one of the last Russian news outlets to report critically on invasion of Ukraine

Après plus de 30 ans d'existence, Novaïa Gazeta, l'un des derniers bastions de la presse indépendante en Russie, annonce sa fermeture. Farouchement opposé à la guerre en Ukraine et régulièrement ciblé par le Kremlin,...

Alors qu'une trêve humanitaire permet l'évacuation de près de plusieurs centaines de civils à Olechky, Kiev dénonce une vaste opération de propagande orchestrée par Moscou. Une médiation sous haute tension, marquée...

More than 200,000 people remain without power in Ukraine's central Dnipropetrovsk region following Russian attacks, authorities have said, a day after a deadly Russian drone strike on a train station there.

That was almost three times as much as what businesses producing and refining oil in the United States made in the same period in 2025.

© The New York Times

I experienced war’s subterranean future as drones dominate the skies. I didn’t like it.

© Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

Novaya Gazeta, the venerable investigative Russian newspaper whose reporting staff included the slain Anna Politkovskaya and at least five others who were killed or died under suspicious circumstances, announced it was shutting down.

"Everyone who wishes to leave Oleshky will be given the opportunity to leave safely. At the same time, those who have decided to stay can stay and will receive all the necessary humanitarian support," Ukraine's Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said.

Euroclear is facing "multiple proceedings in Russian courts," including a case launched by the Russian Central Bank that seeks to challenge the immobilization of its assets.

Il 24 ottobre, l’Ucraina ha annunciato che i suoi sistemi Starlink e Starshield erano di nuovo pienamente operativi dopo oltre una settimana di restrizioni. Nello specifico, il Ministero della Difesa ucraino ha rilevato che la connessione è tornata stabilmente a velocità superiori a 400 km/h, a fronte dei 160 km/h a cui era precipitata giorni prima.
La limitazione, hanno spiegato diversi funzionari ucraini, aveva compromesso la capacità ucraina di intercettare i droni russi in fase di attacco, costringendo le forze armate di Kiev ad annullare alcune operazioni già pianificate.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Tuttavia, a brevissima distanza dal ripristino della piena operatività dei sistemi Starlink a disposizione di Kiev, Elon Musk, amministratore delegato di Space-X, ha accusato l’esercito ucraino di aver violato i termini di servizio.

In un post sul suo profilo X, il magnate di origini sudafricane ha affermato che: «l’uso di Starlink, un servizio commerciale civile, per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone non è mai stato consentito, né dovrebbe esserlo. Starshield è un sistema diverso ed è controllato dal governo degli Stati Uniti. Ciò che decidono di fare spetta a loro».

L’esercito ucraino «ha violato i termini di servizio di Starlink e lo ha utilizzato per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone. Quella falla è stata chiusa la settimana scorsa».

Starlink «rimane cruciale per la difesa dell’Ucraina, poiché è l’unico sistema che non può essere disturbato o distrutto, almeno per ora. Se Starlink venisse spento, il fronte ucraino collasserebbe immediatamente. Questa non è una minaccia, è semplicemente un dato di fatto.

Il sistema si è rivelato cruciale per «impedire alla Russia di sopraffare l’Ucraina nei primi giorni della guerra, poiché tutti gli altri mezzi di comunicazione erano stati distrutti o disturbati dalla Russia».

Space-X «ha fatto molto di più per difendere l’Ucraina di qualsiasi altra azienda privata sulla Terra. Detto questo, non provo che disprezzo assoluto per i guerrafondai che fanno la morale e spingono per un massacro senza fine, senza offrire alcuna soluzione realistica al conflitto. Che possano bruciare all’inferno. Fine della storia».

Starlink è un sistema internet satellitare gestito da Space-X, mentre Starshield è una versione che si avvale della tecnologia Starlink per scopi militari gestita dal governo degli Stati Uniti.

Questa integrazione rende quantomeno ambigua la posizione di Starlink, mettendo in seria discussione la natura privata della casa madre Space-X.

Quella del connubio pubblico-privato negli Stati Uniti è una storia vecchissima, ma che trova negli anni Cinquanta uno dei suoi momenti decisivi.

All’epoca, in piena Guerra Fredda, lo spauracchio sovietico, agitato con cieca ossessività specialmente in seguito allo shock generato dal lancio dello Sputnik (1957) e all’entrata in servizio del bombardiere strategico Tupolev-95, si rivelò determinante a costruire un robusto consenso politico attorno alla decisione dell’amministrazione Eisenhower di destinare una quota crescente di risorse al rafforzamento della marina e al potenziamento dei settori di ricerca e sviluppo.

L’onere di gestire le risorse e coordinare gli sforzi in questo senso ricadde sulla Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), un organismo facente capo al Pentagono fondato, al pari della National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa), nel 1958 in conformità all’esigenza di colmare il divario tecnico-scientifico con l’Unione Sovietica.

Mentre il governo moltiplicava le misure di stimolo alle imprese (assegnazione di commesse pubbliche agli atenei, concessione di agevolazioni fiscali, ecc.), la Darpa elaborava una rete di ricerca e condivisione a maglie strettissime, in grado di interconnettere decine di università, start-up e laboratori di ricerca e portare gli Stati Uniti all’avanguardia nel campo cruciale della scienza. Il lancio dei programmi Gemini e Apollo, lo sviluppo dei missili balistici a medio e lungo raggio, la realizzazione dei sottomarini e delle portaerei a propulsione nucleare si devono al contributo determinante apportato dalla Darpa.

Nel 1982, il Congresso approvò il programma di sostegno alle start-up Small Business Innovation Research (Sbir), affidandone la gestione alla Small Business Administration, predisponendo parallelamente la trasformazione della Darpa nel fondamentale canale di collegamento tra imprese e dipartimenti universitari, in grado di assolvere ai compiti di mediazione tecnologica e imprenditoriale necessari alla commercializzazione delle innovazioni che venivano realizzate nei settori di punta (informatica, telecomunicazioni, biotecnologia, semiconduttori, ecc.) dalle società hi-tech a cui il complesso militar-industriale aveva subappaltato parte delle mansioni legate ai comparti di ricerca e sviluppo, nell’ambito della celeberrima Strategic Defense Initiative (Sdi).

Il progetto, concepito dall’amministrazione Reagan e annunciato urbi et orbi nel marzo 1983, puntava alla creazione di un sistema di difesa aerea multistratificato basato su intercettori spaziali in grado di colpire i missili balistici nemici prima che colpissero il suolo statunitense, “superando” così il principio della mutua distruzione assicurata su cui si era imperniata la Guerra Fredda fino a quel momento.

La Sdi, recita un documento del dipartimento di Stato, «si basava su tecnologie avveniristiche, inclusi sistemi laser spaziali non ancora realizzati», il cui sviluppo assorbì enormi risorse pubbliche in larga parte ridistribuite a beneficio delle aziende private sotto il coordinamento della Darpa.

Una volta convertite all’uso civile, le nuove tecnologie ad elevata intensità di capitale messe a punto contestualmente alla Sdi assunsero rapidamente un grado di pervasività – inteso come capacità di trovare applicazione in un numero sbalorditivo di campi sconvolgendone il funzionamento e i rendimenti – tale da scompaginare il vecchio sistema di produzione fordista ad elevata intensità di manodopera riducendo drasticamente la presenza umana sia nella manifattura che nel settore di servizi.

«Non si tralasciò occasione – osserva Giuseppe Guarino – che si prestasse per la stimolazione e la promozione della Information Technology per finalità militari. Ognuna delle sue fasi essenziali, con successiva trasformazione e utilizzazione dei prodotti a fini commerciali, è stata in pratica resa possibile dal sostegno del Dipartimento della Difesa, dalla Nasa e degli altri dipartimenti militari, compresa la Cia […]. Il merito dell’intervento pubblico non è di aver assorbito l’intera produzione della Information Technology, ma di aver contribuito in maniera determinante con i propri acquisti iniziali a far scendere i prezzi a livelli che avrebbero consentito la diffusione civile e commerciale delle innovazioni, nonché con quelli successivi che hanno favorito l’utilizzazione delle nuove tecnologie nell’organizzazione pubblica, anche civile, e la diffusione delle stesse» (1).

La progressiva affermazione del nuovo modello in tutti i comparti dell’economia ha accelerato il processo di “terziarizzazione” dell’economia statunitense, e palesato il ruolo cruciale giocato dallo Stato rispetto al finanziamento dello sviluppo tecnologico realizzato da aziende private.

Negli anni ’90, sotto la direzione del direttore George Tenet, la Cia iniziò a finanziare generosamente le piccole aziende intente a sviluppare tecnologie applicabili a fini di intelligence aggirando le lungaggini che caratterizzano la mastodontica macchina burocratica statunitense. A questo scopo, la Casa Bianca e il Congresso approvarono la creazione di In-Q-Tel, oscura società di venture capital senza scopo di lucro incaricata di finanziare la messa a punto di tecnologie d’avanguardia per conto – o quasi – della Cia. Come riporta il «Wall Street Journal»:  «i vertici In-Q-Tel considerano l’azienda come indipendente, nonostante i legami molto stretti con la Cia e il fatto che quasi tutte le decisioni di investimento sono gestite dall’agenzia di spionaggio […].La presenza di intricati legami è endemica nel venture capital, in cui la conoscenza intima del settore è essenziale per il successo. Le altre società, tuttavia, giocano con il proprio denaro, o quello di privati».

In-Q-Tel «utilizza denaro pubblico, soggetto a severe norme sul conflitto di interessi e, secondo fonti vicine, si tratta di almeno 120 milioni di dollari all’anno. A volte impegna questo capitale secondo modalità che, anche se non intenzionalmente, avvantaggiano gli stessi amministratori dell’azienda in virtù di altre cariche nel settore hi-tech».

Quasi sempre, le scelte di In-Q-Tel «attraggono altri finanziamenti. Ogni dollaro investito in una piccola impresa in genere è accompagnato da 15 dollari provenienti da altre fonti. Questo aumenta le probabilità di successo del piccolo business in questione e rende le sue stock option più preziose».

Nel 2000, In-Q-Tel ha investito somme piuttosto rilevanti in alcune imprese che producevano satelliti e che si occupavano di raccogliere, classificare e analizzare dati sensibili. In breve tempo, la società ha accumulato quote azionarie di maggioranza di decine compagnie hi-tech, così da dettarne gli indirizzi e allinearle alle esigenze di Washington. Opportunamente orientata dai fondi di In-Q-Tel, una compagnia specializzata nell’elaborazione di soluzioni chimiche adatte alla fabbricazione di tappeti sviluppò in breve tempo una specie di sonda in grado di rilevare la presenza di veleni ed altre sostanze chimiche letali in ambienti chiusi, poi sistematicamente impiegata nei teatri di guerra afghano e iracheno.

Parallelamente, In-Q-Tel investì in un’azienda operante nel settore delle antenne satellitari, ricavando sistemi di localizzazione portatili di cui le truppe e le forze speciali Usa si sono servite per segnalare la propria posizione ai centri di comando.

Più recentemente, i capitali di In-Q-Tel hanno finanziato aziende cruciali come Anduril e, soprattutto, Palantir, saldamente integrata nelle macchine militari statunitense, israeliana e ucraina oltre che nella pubblica amministrazione britannica e in molti altri comparti critici.

L’altissimo livello di “collaborazione pubblico-privato” raggiunto negli Stati Uniti grazie a entità come In-Q-Tel è emblematizzato dal cosiddetto “scandalo Datagate”, scoperchiato nel 2013 grazie alle rivelazioni dello “spifferatore” Edward Snowden. In qualità di tecnico impiegato per una società appaltatrice della National Security Agency, Snowden ha documentato con dovizia di particolari l’esistenza di una rete di sorveglianza capillare e massiccia sui miliardi di comunicazioni sia interne che esterne agli Stati Uniti gestita dalla Nsa stessa attraverso Prism. Vale a dire un sistema in grado di assicurare all’intelligence nazionale la possibilità di accedere in maniera diretta ai server di cui si servivano le aziende operanti nel settore dell’alta tecnologia per ottenere qualsiasi tipo di informazione (messaggi, fotografie, e-mail, ecc.).

Entrato in vigore nel 2007 e beneficiando nel corso degli anni della collaborazione di colossi del calibro di Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, Skype, AoL, YouTube e Apple, Prism ha posto la Nsc e anche il Gchq britannico nelle condizioni di acquisire i metadati in transito attraverso i cavi in fibra ottica collegati ai server centrali di Yahoo e Google.

Space-X non ha beneficiato dei fondi di In-Q-Tel, ma del subappalto sistematico ad opera di agenzie statali come la Nasa o dello stesso Pentagono, che come contropartita gode di libero e completo accesso alla tecnologia  Starlink. Al punto da garantirlo a Paesi alleati come l’Ucraina.

La decisione di ridurre prima e ripristinare poi il servizio Starlink a Kiev non fa quindi capo a Elon Musk, ma sui vertici del potere pubblico statunitense a cui Space-X – così come le altre grandi aziende hi-tech statunitensi – rispondono più o meno indirettamente.

NOTE

1) Guarino, Giuseppe, I soldi della guerra. Gli Stati Uniti: spesa militare, innovazione, economia globale, Mondadori, Milano 2003, pp. 67-80.

Connu pour son rôle de Jaime Lannister dans "Game of Thrones", l'acteur danois Nikolaj Coster-Waldau a vécu une nuit sous tension à Kiev. En déplacement en Ukraine comme ambassadeur de bonne volonté de l'ONU, le...

Beyond strikes on Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russia launched ballistic missiles, four guided aerial missiles, and 113 Shahed-type drones, including 83 jet-powered drones, against Ukraine overnight on Oct. 30, according to Ukraine's Air Force.

"In developing drones and counter-drone systems, Europe has one significant advantage: our partnership with Ukraine," said European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis.

The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.

The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.

American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.

The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.

The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.

The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.

The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.

The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation

Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.

He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.

His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.

Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.

The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.

If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.

Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.

One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.

There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.

But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.

Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.

Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.

The Problem with Reassuring Moscow

The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.

The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.

Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.

European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.

German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.

These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.

The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.

There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.

Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.

A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.

For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.

Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.

That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.

Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience

The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.

It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.

NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.

They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.

Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.

Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.

The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.

What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.

The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.

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Outside the Ukrainian educational and cultural center in a quiet Pennsylvania suburb of Jenkintown, on the outskirts of Philadelphia, a banner expressed unqualified gratitude: “Thank you USA for supporting Ukraine.”

Inside, however, the sentiment was altogether different. Irene Skulsky, a retired teacher in her late 70s, voiced indignation at Donald Trump’s sudden turn against her ancestral homeland, which she believed had come close to killing her son, Darko, and a desire to punish his fellow Republicans at next week’s midterm elections.

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© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images

© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images

© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images