The first criminal trial arising from the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has opened in Hamburg, confronting German judges with allegations against a former Ukrainian military officer and a dispute over whether Russian energy infrastructure constituted a legitimate wartime target.
Serhii Kuznietsov, 50, is accused of organising an operation that destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strands in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. German prosecutors have charged him with offences involving explosives, damage to infrastructure and participation in a war crime.
At the opening hearing on 14 October, Kuznietsov’s lawyers sought to have the proceedings dismissed, challenging both the evidence against their client and the prosecution’s classification of the pipelines as protected civilian infrastructure.
According to the account of the opening proceedings, the defence argued that the installations served Russia’s strategic interests and had been used to exert economic and political pressure on European countries.
Kuznietsov denies involvement in the explosions. His lawyers maintain that the prosecution has not established that he participated in, let alone directed, the operation.
The explosions occurred on 26 September 2022, approximately seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Underwater detonations near the Danish island of Bornholm ruptured sections of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, releasing large quantities of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.
German investigators allege that a group of Ukrainians used a rented sailing yacht, the Andromeda, to transport divers, explosives and equipment to the pipelines.
According to the prosecution, the operation involved military-grade explosive devices and was organised with the knowledge or direction of Ukrainian state authorities.
These allegations remain to be tested in court. Ukrainian officials have denied state involvement, and no German judicial finding has established responsibility on the part of Kyiv’s political or military leadership.
The defendant was arrested in Italy in August 2025 and subsequently extradited to Germany following lengthy legal proceedings.
As EU Today reported following the Italian Supreme Court’s ruling, Kuznietsov’s defence had challenged the legality of his transfer and questioned the evidence underpinning the German investigation.
His appearance in Hamburg now moves the case from extradition disputes to direct examination of the prosecution’s allegations.
The central legal controversy concerns whether the Nord Stream infrastructure was entitled to protection as a civilian installation during an international armed conflict.
Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are generally protected against attack unless their nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage.
Kuznietsov’s defence argues that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests by generating energy revenue and providing Moscow with leverage over European governments.
Defence lawyer Nicola Canestrini has described the pipelines as an instrument of Russian economic coercion rather than infrastructure serving an exclusively civilian purpose.
German prosecutors reject the proposition that those circumstances automatically justified their destruction. They maintain that the operation involved attacks against civilian infrastructure and therefore constituted a war crime.
The legal assessment is more complicated than determining who owned the pipelines.
Financial benefits to a belligerent state do not necessarily make every commercial installation a military objective. Equally, civilian ownership or use does not automatically exclude infrastructure from becoming a military target if the conditions established under the laws of armed conflict are satisfied.
The operational circumstances in September 2022 could become important. Nord Stream 1 had already ceased delivering gas, while Nord Stream 2 had never received German certification to begin commercial operations.
The court will therefore have to consider both the pipelines’ strategic significance and their actual contribution to Russia’s military operations at the time of the explosions.
Kuznietsov’s lawyers have also argued that his military status restricts his ability to discuss information that could be covered by Ukrainian state secrecy obligations.
According to the opening-day court reporting, the defence contends that these restrictions undermine his ability to challenge the prosecution’s case.
The proceedings also raise questions concerning the legality of his extradition from Italy and the precise offences for which his transfer was authorised.
These are separate from the underlying question of responsibility for the explosions. A procedural objection could affect the conduct of the trial without resolving the factual allegations.
The case has implications for relations between Germany and Ukraine, although criminal responsibility must be determined independently of diplomatic considerations.
Germany remains a major supplier of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. At the same time, German prosecutors are pursuing allegations that Ukrainian personnel damaged infrastructure in which German companies had invested heavily.
The pipelines themselves remain politically contentious. As EU Today previously examined, the owner of Nord Stream 2 has separately challenged the EU’s plans to eliminate Russian gas imports, demonstrating that the commercial and legal consequences of Europe’s former energy relationship with Moscow remain unresolved.
The Hamburg trial will not determine the legality of Russia’s invasion, nor will it establish Ukrainian government responsibility merely because a former officer stands accused.
It will examine the evidence against Kuznietsov and the circumstances in which the destruction of infrastructure connected to an aggressor state can constitute a criminal offence.
Further hearings are scheduled, with the evidentiary proceedings expected to begin on 27 October. The outcome will depend on whether prosecutors can establish the defendant’s alleged role and overcome the legal challenges raised by his defence.
O preconizado corte de 50% na retenção de IRS em novembro, fará com que um salário de 1.000 euros fique sujeito a 34 euros de IRS para o conjunto do vencimento e subsídio de natal, em vez de 70 euros, segundo veicula o Notícias ao Minuto com base na publicação de hoje em Diário da República (DR).
O montante final a reter em novembro para refletir a descida intercalar do IRS em 2026, por despacho do Governo publicado hoje em DR, estabelece que, nesse mês, as entidades pagadoras de salários e pensões, em vez de cobrarem a percentagem habitual de IRS, só retêm metade desse valor.
Como o corte se aplica quer ao vencimento mensal quer ao subsídio de natal, que é sujeito a retenção de forma separada, a quantia de IRS a entregar ao Estado em novembro relativamente ao conjunto das duas remunerações – salário e subsídio – será semelhante àquela que em condições normais se aplicaria apenas ao salário mensal. As diferenças decorrem de arredondamentos a que as regras da retenção obedecem.
Saliente-se que o NM divulga os cálculos realizados pela Lusa os quais permitem visualizar esses efeitos em diferentes níveis de rendimento, como poderá observar adiante.
No caso de um trabalhador solteiro sem filhos que ganhe 1.000 euros brutos por mês, a retenção na fonte atual é de 35 euros.
Em novembro, com o corte de 50%, a retenção sobre o salário baixa para 17 euros – não para 17,50 euros, uma vez que o Código do IRS prevê que “a importância apurada mediante aplicação das taxas de retenção é arredondada para a unidade de euros inferior”.
Como o subsídio de natal é idêntico ao vencimento mensal, a retenção a fazer de forma autónoma sobre essa componente remuneratória também será de 17 euros.
Dessa forma, o valor global a reter de IRS nesse mês será de 34 euros. Sem o ajustamento agora fixado pelo Governo, seriam retidos 70 euros, 35 relativos ao salário e outros 35 ao subsídio.
A simulação é igual para um trabalhador casado com alguém que também aufere rendimentos.
Ou seja, num vencimento de 1.200 euros brutos por mês, a retenção mensal, atualmente nos 96 euros, baixa em novembro para 48 euros. Sobre o subsídio, a retenção será igualmente de 48 euros, colocando o total do IRS a entregar nos 96 euros.
Num vencimento bruto de 1.500 euros, a retenção passa de 168 euros para 84 euros, aplicando-se um valor idêntico ao subsídio.
Já para um rendimento mensal bruto de 2.000 euros, a retenção reduz-se dos atuais 301 euros para 150 euros, a que se soma uma cobrança igual sobre o subsídio de natal.
Para um trabalhador que recebe 3.000 euros brutos mensais, a entrega de IRS de novembro, em vez de 663 euros, recua para 331 euros, aos quais acrescem outros 331 euros sobre o subsídio de natal.
E num salário bruto de 5.000 euros por mês, a retenção mensal baixa de 1.452 euros para 726 euros, cobrando-se o mesmo sobre o subsídio.
Os cálculos são semelhantes para trabalhadores solteiros com filhos, com a diferença de que o valor de IRS a entregar é menor consoante o número de dependentes.
Numa pensão de 1.000 euros brutos mensais, de um reformado casado com alguém que também aufere rendimentos, o IRS a reter em novembro sobre a pensão será de 10 euros, em vez dos 20 habituais, sendo o pensionista chamado ainda a entregar 10 euros relativos à retenção do subsídio de natal.
Um pensionista com uma reforma de 1.500 euros, em vez de entregar 151 euros, fará uma retenção de IRS em novembro de 75 euros, a que acrescem 75 euros sobre o subsídio de natal.
Numa pensão de 1.800 euros, o valor a reter em novembro, em vez de 223 euros, será de 111 euros, acrescendo outros 111 sobre o subsídio de natal.
Um pensionista que receba 3.000 euros brutos, e que atualmente retém 678 euros por mês, irá entregar 339 euros em novembro, mais 339 sobre o subsídio de natal.
É de referir que tanto os salários como as pensões até aos 920 euros não fazem retenção na fonte, porque se encontram isentos de IRS por via do mínimo de existência, que exclui de tributação os rendimentos mais baixos.
A redução da cobrança de IRS em 50% só se aplica em novembro, para refletir nesse mês a descida das taxas gerais do 1.º ao 6.º escalão de rendimento.
Em dezembro, voltam a aplicar-se as taxas normais fixadas desde o início do ano, ou seja, sem a redução de 50%.
The Council measures announced on 12 October target 826 companies and 743 executives. Unlike earlier sanctions targeting political figures, the latest listings reach deeper into the industrial supply chains needed to manufacture missiles, drones, aircraft and ammunition.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said more than half the new listings concerned ballistic missile production. The Council identified electronics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, radar specialists, navigation equipment firms and producers of explosives.
These businesses occupy positions in production networks that enable Russia to sustain the manufacture of weapons despite restrictions on its access to Western technologies. The Council announcement estimates their combined annual turnover at at least €20 billion and employment at more than 250,000.
The move follows intensive Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy installations. European governments increasingly seek to undermine Moscow’s operational capacity by identifying businesses that procure or manufacture components for its armed forces.
Listed firms face asset freezes, while EU businesses and citizens cannot make funds or economic resources available to them. The named executives also face travel restrictions. Suppliers and financial institutions will need to check commercial transactions for links to sanctioned entities.
The actual impact on Russian output remains uncertain. Businesses with few assets in Europe may experience limited immediate disruption. Moscow has developed alternative procurement channels through third countries, some involving intermediaries that acquire electronics or equipment originally manufactured elsewhere.
Sanctions effectiveness therefore depends on customs intelligence, financial due diligence, international cooperation and the willingness of commercial partners to stop dealing with listed companies. Targeting managers individually is also intended to raise the personal costs of directing Russia’s military production.
Precision navigation systems, sophisticated electronics and specialised manufacturing technology remain difficult to substitute rapidly. Nevertheless, listing a supplier cannot by itself prevent components from moving through indirect trading routes.
The sanctions coincide with renewed discussion of a possible halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. Brussels is signalling that negotiations about the war’s conduct need not entail relief from restrictions on Russia’s defence economy.
Whether the measures reduce missile production will depend on changes in procurement and output over the coming months. Their immediate significance is the EU’s decision to extend restrictions beyond the most visible weapons producers into the broader industrial networks sustaining Russia’s war.
Elle est souvent présentée, voire encensée, dans de nombreux médias occidentaux comme le « lieu de la fête au Proche-Orient » (1), ce qui attesterait sa « résilience », terme en vogue qui horripile de nombreux Libanais de la capitale, sinon du pays tout entier. L'exception beyrouthine tiendrait, selon la géographe Marie Bonte, dans son « offre festive mais aussi dans la capacité des habitants à faire la fête, quelle que soit la conjoncture ». Après avoir retracé l'émergence de la vie nocturne au « temps des cabarets » (1920-1960) et son adaptation durant la guerre civile (1975-1990), elle montre comment, à partir des années 2000, « des bars et les boîtes de nuit se concentrent dans des îlots denses de monde, de bruit et de lumière, donnant à la ville des allures d'archipel ». Ces îlots sont traversés par des dynamiques politiques où se mêlent concurrence économique, reconstitution de hiérarchies entre les professions, formes de distinction sociale diverses selon les lieux fréquentés ou encore « appropriation d'une mémoire politique de gauche » via les choix musicaux et un usage des lieux dépassant le cadre de la fête. Certes, il peut s'agir aussi d'une échappatoire face à l'incertitude du lendemain.
C'est ce mélange qui innerve le roman graphique, plus exactement le récit autobiographique imagé Rue de Phénicie, de Lamia Ziadé (2), après Ô nuit, ô mes yeux (2015), Ma très grande mélancolie arabe (2017) et Mon port de Beyrouth (2021), tous parus chez POL. L'autrice vit depuis longtemps à Paris, où elle poursuit son interrogation et sa célébration d'une identité singulière, et de sa ville natale, avec une liberté stimulante, une fantaisie fantastique — au long d'une déambulation nocturne à travers Beyrouth ainsi qu'à travers sa propre histoire, inextricablement liée à son « obsession, l'histoire moderne du Liban et du Proche-Orient ». Durant ses longs séjours à Beyrouth consacrés à l'écriture et à des expositions après une « vie de noctambule délurée » à Paris, la fête lui apparaît comme une forme de résistance dans une ville qui ne veut pas s'éteindre, au propre comme au figuré. À la fermeture du Paradise, le dernier bar ouvert de la nuit, elle se lance à la recherche d'une boîte fantasmée — la Boîte de Pandore —, ce qui lui sert de prétexte pour déambuler dans l'histoire politique du pays et de la région à travers des lieux hautement symboliques, comme le Musée national, ou des cimetières. Mais Lamia Ziadé n'est pas dupe de la dimension illusoire de sa quête.
Deux autres déclinaisons ajoutent leurs variations à cette évocation obsédante. Dans le deuxième volume de la bande dessinée Le Génie de Beyrouth (3), qui revient sur le siège en 1982 de Beyrouth-Ouest — fief de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et de ses soutiens libanais — par l'armée israélienne, les rues sont plongées dans l'obscurité et, pour le journaliste qui écrit à la lueur de la bougie, la ville semble « coincée dans son dernier carré, (…) obligée de faire face », elle ne peut plus se réfugier dans la nuit. Mais elle a des ressources insoupçonnées.
Quant à la narratrice du premier roman, proche de l'autobiographie, de la Franco-Libanaise Manal Salamé, si elle déclare préférer la ville de jour (4), car, « le jour, elle ne sait pas mentir », elle ne se refuse pas à parcourir la nuit et ses faux-semblants, ceux que, de retour au Liban après dix-sept ans d'absence, elle retrouve lors d'une longue soirée alcoolisée. À Beyrouth, on n'éteint pas les lumières.
(1) Marie Bonte, Nuits de Beyrouth. Géographie de la fête dans une ville post-conflit, ENS Éditions, Lyon, 2023.
(2) Lamia Ziadé, Rue de Phénicie, POL, Paris, 2025, 392 pages, 34 euros.
(3) Sélim Nassib et Léna Merhej, Le Génie de Beyrouth. La fille tombée du ciel (tome 2), Dargaud, Paris, 2026, 112 pages, 23 euros.
(4) Manal Salamé, Habibi Beyrouth, Éditions La Tribu, Paris, 2026, 309 pages, 21 euros.
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