Sally Rooney’s books have been pulled from sale in Britain because of her support for Palestine Action after she pledged to use royalties from her work to fund the proscribed terror group.
The post Sally Rooney’s Books Pulled From Shelves Over Palestine Action Support appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Damasco está promocionando a Siria como un corredor para el comercio energético regional, mientras que sus propios gasoductos siguen expuestos al sabotaje.
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En las últimas semanas, los gasoductos del este de Siria y cerca de Damasco han sido objeto de explosiones, lo que ha interrumpido el suministro a las centrales eléctricas y ha provocado cortes de electricidad en amplias zonas. Dos ataques contra tramos identificados como el gasoducto de Jbessa se calificaron oficialmente de sabotaje.
Una explosión independiente en la planta de Tishreen sigue siendo objeto de investigación. El momento en que se han producido estos incidentes ha llamado la atención, ya que Siria está negociando su papel en las rutas que transportan petróleo iraquí y gas regional hacia el Mediterráneo y más allá. Incluso un ataque limitado contra un gasoducto puede retrasar las reparaciones, reducir la generación de electricidad y desestabilizar a los inversores que están sopesando proyectos que costarán miles de millones.
La cuestión es quién sale beneficiado de mantener vulnerable la red energética de Siria y en qué medida las pruebas disponibles pueden revelarnos información sobre los autores.
El gasoducto de Jbessa y la explosión de Tishreen
El primer incidente confirmado tuvo lugar el 18 de agosto, cuando una explosión interrumpió el bombeo a través del gasoducto de exportación desde la planta de gas de Jbessa, situada en la zona rural de Hasaka, al noreste de Siria. La Compañía Siria de Petróleo afirmó que su investigación preliminar había concluido que se trataba de un sabotaje deliberado.
El gasoducto abastece a una región que alberga gran parte de la infraestructura de petróleo y gas de Siria, y la interrupción afectó al suministro de gas a las turbinas eléctricas. Los equipos aislaron los pozos, cerraron las válvulas de seguridad y comenzaron las reparaciones. No se registraron heridos. Ese primer ataque demostró cómo un golpe contra una sola válvula podía tener repercusiones mucho más allá del propio emplazamiento, y cómo los usuarios de electricidad de otros lugares acababan sufriendo las consecuencias.
El 28 de septiembre, el gasoducto de Jbessa fue atacado cerca de Al-Shula, en la zona rural de Deir Ezzor. Una explosión en una válvula seccional provocó un incendio y volvió a interrumpir el flujo de gas desde Jbessa hacia las centrales eléctricas.
El ministro de Energía, Mohammad al-Bashir, declaró posteriormente que se habían utilizado explosivos. En esta ocasión, los equipos de reparación tuvieron que sustituir un tramo de 18 metros de tubería de 16 pulgadas. La empresa anunció el 2 de octubre que se había reanudado el bombeo una vez finalizados los trabajos.
Según su director de gas terrestre, el gasoducto transportaba unos 950 000 metros cúbicos al día. Por lo tanto, los repetidos ataques contra él han afectado a una parte significativa del suministro de gas del que depende la generación de energía eléctrica en Siria.
El gasoducto de Jbessa abastece a la red de gas a través de la región central, incluida la zona en torno a Al-Furqlus, al este de Homs. Esto reviste especial importancia en un momento en el que Damasco está tratando de reparar la infraestructura existente y construir nuevas conexiones transfronterizas.
La ruta petrolera iraquí propuesta hasta Baniyas, en la costa, es un proyecto independiente, y no hay pruebas de que los ataques contra Jbessa tuvieran como objetivo directo ese futuro oleoducto. No obstante, los daños causados a las instalaciones energéticas en funcionamiento suponen una advertencia evidente para los gobiernos y las empresas que barajan la posibilidad de crear un sistema de tránsito mucho más amplio a través del territorio sirio. Necesitarían tener la seguridad de que los largos tramos de tuberías, los equipos de bombeo y los trabajadores encargados de su mantenimiento podrían estar protegidos.
El 30 de septiembre se produjeron otros dos incidentes violentos. En el puente de Masyaf, al oeste de Homs, hombres armados no identificados abrieron fuego contra un autobús que transportaba a trabajadores civiles, matando a siete e hiriendo a cuatro. Los informes iniciales de la SANA se referían a trabajadores civiles, mientras que los medios regionales los identificaron como ingenieros y empleados de una empresa eléctrica privada. El ataque se produjo dos días después del sabotaje de Shula, pero ninguna investigación ha establecido un vínculo entre ambos incidentes.
Esa misma noche, una explosión en un gasoducto que abastecía a la central térmica de Tishreen, en las afueras de Damasco, obligó a dejar fuera de servicio las centrales de Tishreen, Deir Ali y Al-Nasiriyah, lo que provocó cortes de electricidad más generalizados. Los bomberos lograron controlar el incendio y las autoridades comenzaron a restablecer el suministro de gas.
A diferencia de los dos incidentes de Jbessa, la causa aún no se había esclarecido cuando el ministro de Energía, Bashir, se pronunció en el lugar de los hechos. Afirmó que los inspectores determinarían si la explosión se había debido a un fallo técnico, a un ataque o a un acto de sabotaje una vez que la zona se hubiera enfriado.
¿Quién se beneficia de una Siria debilitada?
El Gobierno sirio no ha señalado a ningún responsable del sabotaje al gasoducto. El periodista y analista político Bassel al-Mohammed, en declaraciones a The Cradle, sostiene que los repetidos ataques contra las principales instalaciones de gas son difíciles de considerar como incidentes aislados.
Su efecto, afirma, va más allá del daño físico a una válvula o a un tramo de tubería. Cada interrupción refuerza la impresión de que Siria es un lugar inseguro para la inversión en infraestructuras energéticas, precisamente cuando Damasco busca socios para rehabilitar el sector y conectarlo con los Estados vecinos.
Para Mohammed, Israel se encuentra entre los posibles beneficiarios más destacados de la debilidad económica y de seguridad de Siria. Un Estado sirio que lucha por reconstruir su infraestructura tendría menos margen para resistir la presión en cualquier futuro acuerdo político o de seguridad, afirma.
También señala el papel que Siria podría desempeñar en el Gasoducto Árabe, que conecta la frontera jordana con la turca a través del territorio sirio, en el marco de la búsqueda de rutas menos expuestas a interrupciones en el estrecho de Ormuz.
La distribución de los incidentes, incluidos los daños en los alrededores de Tishreen, le lleva a plantearse si un grupo con conocimiento de las instalaciones críticas está operando en más de una zona.
El 29 de septiembre, entre los incidentes de Shula y Tishreen, la Compañía Petrolera Siria inauguró un nuevo tramo del proyecto del Gasoducto Árabe en Al-Furqlus. Las autoridades indicaron que el tramo completado añade 186 kilómetros a los aproximadamente 380 kilómetros de la línea existente, lo que eleva la red conectada a unos 566 kilómetros, con una capacidad declarada de hasta 11 millones de metros cúbicos de gas al día.
El diseño bidireccional da a Damasco margen para negociar los futuros flujos de gas. Por el momento, una ruta hacia Europa sigue siendo una posibilidad, aunque aún no se han formalizado los acuerdos de suministro y tránsito necesarios para que funcione.
Si estas conexiones llegaran a transportar más gas hacia el norte, podrían competir con algunos planes para ampliar las ventas de gas israelí procedentes de los yacimientos del Mediterráneo Oriental, incluidos Leviathan y Tamar. El grado de competencia dependería de los contratos de suministro, los precios y la capacidad que realmente se pusiera en servicio. No puede darse por sentado solo por la existencia de un gasoducto.
Aun así, Mohammed considera que a Israel le interesa estratégicamente limitar la capacidad de Siria para convertirse en un corredor fiable, especialmente mientras Damasco siga expuesto a la presión militar israelí en el sur.
Rutas energéticas y cálculos israelíes
La rivalidad en torno a Siria también se inscribe en una contienda más amplia por las rutas de transporte de petróleo y gas desde Irak y el Golfo. Los planes turcos de exportación a través de Ceyhan y las esperanzas sirias de reabrir una salida al Mediterráneo ofrecerían a los productores alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz.
Varias de estas rutas son propuestas o planes de rehabilitación, más que sustitutos viables de las terminales establecidas del Golfo. Sus perspectivas dependen de la financiación, la seguridad, los estudios técnicos y los acuerdos entre los gobiernos implicados. Considerar todas las rutas como si ya existieran exageraría tanto la influencia actual de Siria como la amenaza inmediata que suponen para los centros de tránsito rivales.
En febrero, The Cradle rastreó el posible origen israelí de parte del gas suministrado a Siria a través de Jordania, al tiempo que señalaba la opacidad de los contratos y la dificultad de determinar la fuente exacta de cada envío. Posteriormente, el Centro Begin-Sadat analizó cómo el gas israelí llegaba a Siria de forma indirecta a través de acuerdos regionales.
Una red de suministro más diversificada podría debilitar esa dependencia, pero la afirmación de que las nuevas líneas de tránsito harían que Damasco y Amán prescindieran por completo del gas israelí va más allá de lo que establecen los contratos disponibles.
Siria e Irak firmaron en julio memorandos sobre la rehabilitación del oleoducto Kirkuk-Baniyas, inactivo desde hace mucho tiempo. El director de la Compañía Petrolera Siria, Youssef Qiblawi, ha abordado la posibilidad de que las obras comiencen en el primer trimestre de 2027.
La ruta proporcionaría al crudo iraquí una salida al Mediterráneo, aunque aún se enfrenta a importantes obstáculos de ingeniería, financiación y seguridad.
Los acuerdos suponen un compromiso político para estudiar el corredor, no la finalización de un nuevo oleoducto. Las instalaciones portuarias costeras de Siria también necesitarían la capacidad y la protección necesarias para gestionar exportaciones sostenidas si el proyecto sigue adelante.
El investigador en materia de seguridad Aziz Moussa interpreta el sabotaje como un posible mensaje regional. En declaraciones a The Cradle, sitúa a Israel entre los sospechosos debido a su continua presión sobre Damasco y a sus incursiones en Quneitra.
En su valoración, los repetidos ataques contra instalaciones energéticas podrían agravar la fragilidad de la seguridad en Siria, minar la confianza en la reconstrucción y complicar los planes para un corredor energético. También sugiere que el primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, podría tener motivos políticos para aumentar la presión.
Moussa reconoce que ninguna de estas consideraciones demuestra que aviones o drones israelíes llevaran a cabo los ataques; las autoridades sirias no han presentado pruebas de tal ataque contra la línea de Jbessa.
Moussa señala una dificultad con respecto a esa teoría. Israel ha recurrido generalmente a ataques aéreos abiertos o atribuibles contra objetivos militares sirios. Un ataque encubierto contra infraestructuras civiles de gas mientras se debaten los acuerdos de seguridad representaría un patrón diferente.
Por lo tanto, deja abierta otra posibilidad: células del ISIS, que ya han atacado infraestructuras en Siria e Irak anteriormente. Para determinar la responsabilidad se necesitarían pruebas físicas de los lugares de los hechos y una investigación creíble sobre cómo llegaron hasta ellos los atacantes.
No obstante, los analistas energéticos israelíes han tomado nota de la ruta iraquí. En un artículo para el Instituto de Estrategia y Seguridad de Jerusalén (JISS), la investigadora Vita Avrahamov sostiene que restablecer el corredor Kirkuk-Baniyas podría reducir las perspectivas de Israel de convertirse en un importante centro de tránsito para la energía de Asia Occidental con destino a Europa.
Las propuestas de utilizar el gasoducto Eilat-Ashkelon y conectarlo con las redes del Golfo se enfrentarían a una ruta competidora que atraviesa Siria. En un artículo publicado en N12, también afirma que cada inversión que refuerce a Siria como Estado de tránsito energético ofrece a los Estados del Golfo y a Europa más alternativas, lo que reduce el incentivo para desarrollar una ruta competidora a través de Israel.
Su análisis considera que para Israel resulta ventajoso que los exportadores de petróleo dispongan de alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz y que se reduzca la influencia iraní. Las implicaciones económicas son, por tanto, mixtas, incluso desde una perspectiva estratégica israelí.
La advertencia de Avrahamov pone de manifiesto lo que podría costarle a Israel una ruta iraquí a través de Siria. Damasco, por su parte, pretende transportar la energía de la región a través de una red que los atacantes ya han interrumpido en dos ocasiones. Sus ambiciones dependerán tanto de mantener esas líneas en funcionamiento como de los acuerdos firmados para ampliarlas.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
Mali’s armed forces have recaptured the northern city of Kidal following a large-scale military offensive conducted alongside Russia’s Africa Corps. It is a major development in the government’s efforts to restore state control over territory held by armed groups.
The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) announced that their troops consolidated their operational deployment in Kidal on October 7, 2026, under Operation Dougoukoloko, following several days of airstrikes and coordinated air and ground operations against the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an armed group affiliated with al-Qaeda.
In a statement, the military said the operation had weakened the armed groups’ fighting capacity and disrupted their logistical networks.
“As part of the large-scale offensive conducted in the Eastern theater, under Operation DOUGOUKOLOKO, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) consolidated their operational deployment in the city of KIDAL on Wednesday, October 7, 2026,” the statement said.
The military added that the offensive followed an intense air campaign and several air-ground operations that had “neutralized several elements belonging to the FLA-JNIM terrorist coalition” and inflicted significant damage on their logistical capabilities.
According to the statement, the operation was conducted by Malian forces and their partners, referring to Russia’s Africa Corps, which has supported Mali’s military authorities in security operations.
The military said the offensive aimed to strengthen security for communities in northern Mali, ensure the free movement of people and goods, reinforce border security, and disrupt the criminal economic activities of armed groups.
“Through this operational dynamic, the FAMa continue their sovereign mission of securing the national territory and protecting civilian populations and their property against abuses by Armed Terrorist Groups,” the statement added.
Kidal, long a stronghold of Tuareg separatism, has been at the center of the conflict in northern Mali since 2012. The Malian army first retook the city on November 14, 2023, after more than a decade with almost no state presence there.
That control ended in April 2026. On that day the FLA and JNIM launched near-simultaneous assaults on several cities, including the capital, Bamako, as well as Kati, Mopti, Gao and Kidal. The attacks targeted military installations and strategic sites. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was among those killed. Malian troops and Africa Corps forces subsequently withdrew from Kidal.
For the transitional government led by General Assimi Goïta, which has made territorial sovereignty its central promise, the recapture is a major symbolic victory.
The recapture comes as Mali continues to pursue a security strategy centered on strengthening its armed forces and working with external partners, particularly Russia, following the deterioration of its relations with several Western governments and the expulsion of French forces.
For the Malian government, securing Kidal is more than a military objective but also a question of national sovereignty. Control of the city would strengthen the state’s position in the north.
In its statement, the military said the operation was intended to provide lasting security for the population, protect civilian property, and restrict the activities of armed groups operating in the region.
The recapture of Kidal does not by itself resolve Mali’s broader security crisis. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) broadly continues to face security threats and destabilization campaigns from adversaries in its fight to assert sovereignty.
Al-Manar | October 11, 2026
Yemeni Armed Forces reiterated on Sunday a warning to airlines, aviation personnel, airport workers, and travelers against using Saudi airports and airspace, declaring them potential targets and a theater of military operations, with the exception of airports in Mecca and Medina.
In a statement, Spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Saree urged all concerned parties to take the warning seriously, holding Saudi Arabia responsible for any attempts to intercept Yemeni operations.
The Yemeni Armed Forces reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing the strategy previously announced as “an airport for an airport, a blockade for a blockade, and escalation for escalation,” vowing to continue until their objectives are achieved.
Earlier on Saturday, Member of Yemen’s Ansarullah Politburo Mohammad Al-Bakhiti warned that Saudi regime plots to target holy sites in Mecca and Medina and to blame Yemen for attacks.
In exclusive remarks to Al-Manar on Friday, Al-Bakhiti revealed that Riyadh had supplied Saudi-backed mercenaries in Yemen with missiles and drones to carry out attacks and blame them on Yemeni Armed Forces.
A BBC Arabic reporter who wrongly described terrorists killed in Gaza as "journalists" has a history of glorifying the murder of Jewish people.
The post BBC Reporter’s History of Glorifying Murder of Jews appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
The man charged with murdering Ann Widdecombe and targeting Nigel Farage, Joshua Kerry, had "an extreme Left-wing mindset" and hostility to Reform, a court has heard.
The post Man Charged With Murdering Ann Widdecombe and Targeting Nigel Farage Was Motivated by Extreme Left-Wing Mindset and Hostility to Reform, Court Hears appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
China is increasingly trying to diversify its connections to the region as Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan create new security and strategic problems for Beijing. The opening of a road through the Wakhan Corridor is an important step in that effort. Afghanistan has formally inaugurated a 121-kilometer road through the corridor, running from Broghil to the […]
The post Afghan road to China tests Pakistan’s power and leverage appeared first on Asia Times.
Press TV – October 7, 2026
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei says the United States and the Israeli regime have a history of manufacturing false-flag incidents only to clean up their messes around the world.
In a Wednesday post on his X account, the Iranian official said such scenarios would not save them from the quagmire of the aggression against Iran.
Baghaei said telling lies about Iran and accusing it of having a role in security incidents would fail to justify the US-Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic.
“In a world where the American and international public is weary of an unlawful war of aggression against Iran, and where the aggressors have no honest way to justify a war of choice, even a raft made of lies can look like salvation to those who are drowning,” he said in the post.
The post also included a video elucidating previous US and Israeli false-flag operations, including massive US media campaigns denoting the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which led to the invasion of the country in 2003, and Israel’s involvement in a case in Egypt in 1954, known as the Lavon Affair.
“False flags are an old craft: manufacture the incident, assign the blame, and harvest the consequences,” said Baghaei.
The post came after officials in the US and allied countries suggested that Iran may have had a role in recent security incidents, including on a Flydubai flight from the United Arab Emirates to the Israeli-occupied territories and in a suspected plot against an American base in Britain.
Iran has roundly rejected the accusations, calling them a pretext for launching renewed aggression against the country, months after the US and the Israeli regime were forced to end a previous offensive under a ceasefire reached in mid-April.
A video is making the rounds in French social media showing a group of French youngsters profaning a church while chanting a rap song that glorifies the Islamic terrorists Mohamed Merah and Salah Abdeslam.
The post French Youngsters Chant Rap-Hymn to Islamic Terrorists While Profaning Church appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
The Green Party member behind the "Zionism is racism” motion is close friends with an al-Qaeda terrorist who plotted to bomb passengers landing at Heathrow from Israel.
The post Green Behind Zionism Vote is “Good Friend” of Al-Qaeda Terrorist appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
introduction by Gospa News Editorial Staff
Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026
As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.
This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).
This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.
He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…
A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.
In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.
Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.
In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:
No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.
Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.
“NATO’s LIES ON MEDITERRANEAN WARS FOR GAS”. Exclusive Interview to Former Interpol EU Officer
US Researchers: “Investors may have had Prior Knowledge of Hamas Attack on Israel”
Declassified Guantanamo Court Filing Suggests some 9/11 Hijackers were CIA Agents
By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | September 5, 2026
Before the killings that helped bring down Ukraine’s president in February 2014, American diplomats were discussing who should enter its government. In a leaked telephone call, senior State Department official Victoria Nuland told US ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt, “I think Yats is the guy,” referring to opposition leader Arseniy Yatseniuk. Washington had clear preferences and was working to advance them. Later that month, Yatseniuk became prime minister.
Ivan Katchanovski’s The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine examines the violence that preceded that transfer of power. Drawing on television footage, witness testimony, forensic examinations and Ukrainian court proceedings, he argues that elements of the opposition shot protesters and police in a false-flag operation. His case centres on evidence of protesters being shot from opposition-controlled locations, including Hotel Ukraina, overlooking the killing ground.
The protests began in November 2013, when President Viktor Yanukovych suspended plans to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Demonstrators gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square, known as the Maidan. Police violence, restrictive legislation and escalating clashes deepened the confrontation. On 20 February, scores were killed or injured. An agreement signed the following day failed to preserve Yanukovych’s presidency; he fled Kyiv, and parliament voted to remove him.
During the shootings, BBC correspondent Gabriel Gatehouse reported seeing what looked like a protester firing from a window of Hotel Ukraina. Katchanovski connects the BBC footage with ICTV recordings and an investigative finding that the room was occupied by a parliamentary deputy from the far-right Svoboda party. His account also cites a Maidan participant’s testimony that protesters had told him the gunman was “our sniper.”
Orwellian blackout & denial of false-flag Maidan massacre evidence:
· BBC & ICTV videos of sniper(s) in Hotel Ukraina room of far-right Svoboda deputy shooting Maidan protesters & BBC journalists
· Maidan activists, BBC journalist & verdict identifying them as Maidan sniper(s)
·… pic.twitter.com/aRQozPzS8d— Ivan Katchanovski (@I_Katchanovski) October 4, 2026
VIDEO: BBC and ICTV footage that Katchanovski identifies as showing shooting from a Hotel Ukraina room occupied by a Svoboda deputy, directed towards protesters and the BBC crew. (Source: Ivan Katchanovski on X.)
Svoboda publicly announced that its activists had taken Hotel Ukraina under their control and protection on 25 January, according to the statement reproduced in Katchanovski’s chapter on witness testimony. He also cites a Maidan Self-Defence commander who described guarding the entrance and checking bags before, during and after the massacre. Other recordings and accounts place armed opposition groups inside.
Wounded protesters described shots coming from the hotel and other Maidan-controlled locations. Katchanovski compares those accounts with wound directions, ballistic findings and synchronised footage. In his reconstruction, protesters advancing towards the police were also being shot from elevated positions to their sides or behind them, in buildings controlled by their own movement.
Katchanovski’s examination of the October 2023 verdict exposes a contradiction within the proceedings. Passages he reproduces place particular fatal shootings in the direction of Hotel Ukraina, outside police-controlled territory. Yet the prosecution’s case against Berkut, Ukraine’s riot police, proceeded alongside evidence that, according to his analysis, pointed towards opposition-controlled positions. He identifies missing exhibits, altered bullet fragments and reversals of earlier forensic examinations, arguing that the investigation obscured the responsibility of opposition-linked shooters.
Self-described Georgian participants alleged that they received weapons and orders to shoot both police and protesters to disrupt a political settlement. Their accounts implicated opposition figures, including Serhii Pashynsky, a Ukrainian member of parliament from the Fatherland party and a Maidan opposition politician. Katchanovski compares details from those accounts with footage, shooting locations, and other testimony, though he acknowledges his study cannot verify allegations against named individuals.
The authorities emerging from the upheaval quickly sought new intelligence ties. A New York Times investigation traces the partnership to 24 February 2014, when Ukraine’s new security-service chief contacted the CIA and Britain’s MI6. It subsequently expanded into extensive cooperation, including 12 CIA-supported secret locations along Ukraine’s border with Russia, constructed over the eight years preceding the newspaper’s 2024 report.
At home, parliament’s attempt to repeal the regional-language law triggered widespread criticism. As language scholar Dominique Arel explains, acting president Oleksandr Turchynov blocked the repeal, leaving the law in force. The vote nevertheless intensified controversy over the new authorities’ approach to language rights.
The massacre helped determine who would govern Ukraine. Katchanovski concludes that elements of the opposition engineered the killings to turn public outrage against Yanukovych and seize power. His case brings together hotel footage, victims’ accounts, forensic material and evidence he identifies as investigative manipulation. The book challenges both the attribution of the shootings and the political account built upon them.
BOOK: Read Ivan Katchanovski’s The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine, the open-access investigation examined in this article. The book brings together video analysis, witness testimony, forensic material and Ukrainian court proceedings to present the author’s case for a false-flag massacre. (Source: Ivan Katchanovski, The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine | Palgrave Macmillan, 2024)
I have watched Pakistan-Afghanistan relations long enough to distrust easy headlines, and last week’s news produced a few of them. At the Center-2026 (Tsentr-2026) war games in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, Taliban officers stood among the foreign observers. Reports say it was the first time Moscow had invited a Taliban military delegation since the movement returned […]
The post Russia courts the Taliban without dropping Pakistan appeared first on Asia Times.
Ann Widdecombe's alleged murderer, Joshua Kerry, has been charged with preparing acts of terrorism against Nigel Farage after "intensive" police investigation.
The post Widdecombe Murder Suspect Charged With Terror Plot Against Farage appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
RT | October 2, 2026
Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.
A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.
On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”
In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.
The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”
Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”
The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.
Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.
By Craig Murray | October 2, 2026
Rather than abandoning the plainly nuts Fairford narrative, Burnham and his government are doubling down on the claim it is an Iranian terror plot.
It remains quite possible the men were indeed fuel thieves, simply stealing fuel from farms. They appear to have been equipped for fuel theft and all they were carrying was petrol. It is worth a footnote that there is a very real history of US military personnel, and indeed British personnel, selling military fuel from bases. Stolen red diesel meant for HMS Bulwark fuelled fairground rides throughout England, which I think is rather lovely. But if the Fairford Five were fuel thieves, farms are more probable as the target.
We should pause here to acknowledge that USAF Fairford is falsely designated RAF Fairford, itself a propaganda lie, just like “RAF Lakenheath” or “RAF Mildenhall”. The UK is full of US military bases, on which US law applies. (My birth certificate gives my father’s occupation as “Clerk USAF”. He was employed at Mildenhall at the time).
It is a classic example of state propaganda that the petrol discovered in the Fairford vans was described by counter terror police as a potential accelerant for a bomb.
Well yes, petrol is that. It has however, rather more obvious uses too. The same technique was used at the height of the War on Terror propaganda in the Great Easter Bomb Plot, that never was. Police rounded up and arrested many young Muslims across the Manchester region, which was front-page news. They were all later released without charge.
But at the time of arrest the police announced they had found a potential bomb-making ingredient in a kitchen.
Well, they had. It was a bag of sugar. Sugar is indeed a potential bomb-making ingredient. Yet most of us have a bag in the kitchen. At least it did not take the police ten days to find the bag of sugar in the kitchen, unlike when they searched Charlie Rowley’s flat for a vial of novichok, and it took them ten days to “find” a bottle of perfume sitting on the kitchen counter.
For Fairford, on balance I think a false flag gone wrong is a little more likely than just fuel thieves. We know the men had no bombs and no guns, which makes the terrorist narrative rather hard for the government to sustain. But if they were patsies set up in a false flag, there would be plenty of things already on the base that go bang which could have been used to create the “terrorist incident” around them.
Two key points make me think this was a false flag. Firstly the lady farmer who called 999 was adamant there were more men that the five arrested and bailed. The others would have been the spycops – agents provocateurs – who would have been quietly spirited away from the scene. That also fits with the released information that it was one of the men who phoned in a warning about the “attack”.
It looks to me like a false flag spectacular had been planned, with US involvement as claimed by Trump and possibly Israeli knowledge as claimed by Netanyahu. This operation by the security services was viewed as over the pay grade of local police (who might be inconveniently honest) who were not in the picture. It all went horribly wrong for the government when an alert local farmer called the local police, and when a participant also called it in. That could have been one of the recruited “terrorists” who got cold feet, or one of the agents panicked they had lost contact with their line of command.
The use of recruited patsies to carry out false flags is now better understood. I have been writing about it since before the Newburgh bomb plot which was a particularly egregious example. In the United States there has been more awareness of and reaction to agent provocateur incited plots than in the UK.
For anyone sceptical, here is a summary of Newburgh:
In May 2009 the FBI arrested four poor men from Newburgh, New York, and announced it had foiled a plot to bomb two synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military planes at Stewart Air National Guard base. The plot, the targets, the inert bombs and the disabled Stinger missile were all supplied by the Bureau. The recruiter was Shahed Hussain, a Pakistani fraudster who had become an informant to avoid deportation after a driving-licence scam. Paid nearly $100,000, he spent more than a year fishing at a Newburgh mosque, posing as a wealthy Jaish-e-Mohammed agent, before latching onto James Cromitie, a Walmart stocker and petty drug dealer.
Hussain offered heavenly reward and as much as $250,000. Cromitie brought in three others: Onta Williams, David Williams and Laguerre Payen. Hussain drove them across a state line to inspect the fake weapons, which federalised the charges and carried a 25-year minimum. They were convicted in 2010.
The sentencing judge, Colleen McMahon, said she believed beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime except that the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition. In 2023 she ordered the release of three of them, calling it an FBI-orchestrated conspiracy and writing that the real lead conspirator was the United States. She freed Cromitie in 2024 on the same basis, describing him as a small-time grifter with no history of violence and Hussain as a villain who had lured him with promises of both heavenly and earthly rewards.
The Golders Green ambulances arson was a classic of this false flag genre. Four young Muslims were recruited, in this case online rather than in person, by someone they never saw who was almost certainly a Mossad agent. They were offered money to attack the ambulances, which they did. The attack is then blamed on Iran through a claim on a Telegram channel on behalf of an “Iranian organisation”, Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, which is a Mossad fabrication.
HAYI first became known to the world through simultaneous press releases on 16 March by five Israeli government outlets in Israel, US and UK (including BICOM) and an article by the Israeli front “Foundation for Defending Democracy”. The FDD’s Nick Stewart travels with Kushner and Witkoff as part of the US negotiating team on the Middle East.
There are numerous reasons for doubting the real existence of HAYI. None of its material is in Farsi. All of its “attacks” have been minor arson attacks on pointless targets that hurt nobody. The grammar, calligraphy and imagery of its materials are all wrong.
The UK state itself has now debunked some of the Mossad HAYI narrative. On 29 April, when Essa Suleiman stabbed three men, the entire media blocked out the first Muslim victim and claimed an antisemitic terrorist attack on the two in Golders Green. The HAYI Mossad run “Iranian” Telegram channel immediately put out a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. But yesterday police and prosecution were forced to drop the claim it was a terrorist attack at all. The stabbing of the Muslim is charged as attempted murder, though still ignored by the media. So “HAYI” claimed responsibility for a non-existent terrorist incident.
A false flag can be, but is not necessarily, the state planting a bomb and then blaming someone else. It can be more complex – the state recruiting people to plant bombs. Those people may believe they are genuinely part of an ideological campaign, or may just be doing it for money.
The opaque Starmer rent-boy arson plot, in which Ukrainian male models burnt property associated with Keir Starmer, remains unclear, largely because any discussion of what lay behind the attacks was banned by the judge in the trial. But the media, with government encouragement, continually relays the story that the arsonists were recruited online by a man known as “El Money”. An interesting twist here is that the media constantly refer to him as Russian-speaking. But the evidence in court is that he spoke both Russian and Ukrainian.
Almost all adult Ukrainians can speak Russian. The number of Russians who speak Ukrainian is very small. Yet El Money is now routinely portrayed as Russian.
Which brings us to the whole question of Russian “hybrid attacks”, where we are asked to believe the narrative of the security services of states whose leaders are openly promoting war with Russia, about desultory and mysterious attacks. The rather sorry Leipzig drone is a good example. We have a more recent claim of Russian arson from Estonia, a state which has instituted massive discrimination against the 29% of its population who speak Russian.
Not only has Estonia closed Russian schools, libraries, theatres, churches, cinemas and university courses, it even refuses passports to people born and bred in Estonia, whose parents were born and bred in Estonia, if they cannot speak Estonian. That is totally contrary to numerous UN, Council of Europe and OSCE instruments on protection of minority linguistic rights.
It is one thing to insist on language qualification for citizenship for new immigrants. Many countries do. It is quite another thing to deny citizenship to a native linguistic minority. Estonia was part of Russia from 1721 to 1919 and of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1991. It has Russian speakers.
So I decline to believe the Estonian government on Russian “hybrid attacks”.
Which brings us to the amazing “FlyDubai” hijacking and the heroic plumber who knew how to rescue a plane from a death dive because he watched Air Crash Investigation.
There are real problems with this narrative. One is that the plane is said to have dived approximately 15,000 feet in about 30 seconds. This is said to be confirmed by independent flight trackers.
The force was so enormous that the rudder ripped off the plane.
Picture a dive of 500 feet – that is more than a 40 storey building – per second. Picture that. 500 feet in a second. Imagine yourself falling that fast. The forces would be enormous inside the cabin. Anybody not strapped in would be lifted right out of their seats and probably hit the ceiling. Many would be injured. Any unfastened object, including major ones like food trollies, would be hurled about with great force. Baggage lockers would come unlocked as the weight of the bags inside was hurled up. Remember this dive ripped the rudder off. It would be impossible for anyone not strapped into their chair to keep their footing or seat.
Chilling footage of the Flydubai FZ1073 commercial plane making a rapid descent during the on-board struggle between the hijacking pilot and co-pilot/passengers. pic.twitter.com/PsSSPwhThr
— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) September 30, 2026
We have a great many videos from on board the plane but nothing like this is shown. No video shows this kind of extreme situation, and the cabin at the end of the flight is remarkably undisturbed.
Before #FZ1073 changed its squawk to 7700, we observed extreme fluctuations in the transmitted altitude data, with calculated vertical speeds ranging from approximately -30,000 to +10,000 ft/min.
For context, vertical speeds during normal operations rarely exceed ±4,000 ft/min.… pic.twitter.com/Zgyn0iQ33a
— Flightradar24 (@flightradar24) September 30, 2026
There is also a problem with that flight-tracking data. As pointed out by this commercial pilot on CNN, a plane can’t easily slow down in mid-air. He is disbelieving of how quickly the flight trackers show the plane returning to normal speed. He is also deeply sceptical of the ability to control the plane after the rudder came off due to loss of hydraulic fluid, and of the chances of the airframe staying together. Now compare that to the lack of cabin tumult.
I have seen it argued that if you entered the dive very gently and carefully without sudden change of pitch, and exited it similarly smoothly, then you would avoid extreme G-forces and the cabin might be relatively undisturbed. Even if so, it is hard to imagine the kind of smooth transition into the dive in the circumstances we are told were occurring in the cockpit, with the co-pilot deliberately putting the plane in a death dive while fighting with the pilot.
The smooth transition out of the dive in the official story was achieved by a plumber who knew what to do from watching Air Crash Investigation. I don’t think I need to comment on that.
We will never find out the truth about FlyDubai. The plane diverted to Saudi Arabia. The copilot who is being painted as an Islamic extremist will be isolated there and tortured by the Saudis. Netanyahu has already said Israel will join the interrogation. Do not believe any confession or evidence from the co-pilot.
The plane was a Boeing, so the USA will join the initial investigation alongside UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel. A more potent coalition of Zionist evil does not exist. We will certainly have faked flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder evidence coming from that shower.
I do feel something has snapped in people’s willingness to believe official narratives. The Skripal narrative was even more crazy than any of these, but most people still trusted government. Thankfully that faith has been seriously shaken.
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