The U.S. Supreme Court's 2026–2027 term just got a whole lot boozier. On Monday, the justices agreed to hear arguments later this year or next in the case of Department of Justice v. McNutt. At issue is whether the 1868 federal ban on distilling liquor at home is unconstitutional because it exceeds the lawful regulatory power of the federal government. If any modern Supreme Court case ever deserved its own drinking game, this one is it.
In April, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit found the federal ban on home distilling to be unconstitutional because Congress lacked the proper authority to issue such a ban in the first place. It was not a legitimate exercise of the congressional authority "To Lay and collect Taxes," the appellate court reasoned, because "the purpose of a tax is to raise revenue for the government;" yet this law "amount[s] to an anti-revenue provision" that only "prevents distilled spirits from coming into existence." And if it does not exist, of course, the government cannot tax it.
The 5th Circuit also denied that the federal ban on home distilling could be saved by the government's appeal to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which says that Congress has the authority "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
But the federal ban on home distilling cannot be "necessary" to the execution of the enumerated taxing power, the 5th Circuit argued, because the provisions of federal law at issue "tax nothing, and are distinct from the regulation of distilling alcoholic products that is permitted by federal tax law."
Nor did the 5th Circuit find the ban to be "proper." "By purporting to ban activity without a plain connection to the exercise of Congress's taxation power," it held, "Congress has essentially—and 'improperly'—invaded the reserved police and regulatory power of the states."
The Trump administration lost this case at the 5th Circuit and has now successfully urged the justices to hear its appeal. In its petition seeking review, the Trump administration faulted the 5th Circuit for its overeagerness to "second-guess" the "legislative judgment" of Congress. Instead, the Trump administration argued, the federal judiciary owes a great deal more deference to the federal government's regulatory priorities in a case like this. "A law is necessary and proper if it is 'convenient' or 'useful' for carrying an enumerated power into effect, and 'plainly adapted' to that legitimate end," the Justice Department's brief argued. "That is the case here."
This case may lead to an interesting divide among the Supreme Court's more conservative members. In United States v. Comstock (2010), a 7–2 Supreme Court embraced the Necessary and Proper Clause as sufficient constitutional grounding for the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which had empowered federal officials to order the indefinite civil commitment of "sexually dangerous" individuals who had already finished serving their prison sentences. Chief Justice John Roberts joined the majority opinion in that case, while Justice Samuel Alito voted in concurrence. In other words, they both endorsed a broad view of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. By contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, voted in dissent. The Comstock ruling, Thomas protested, "comes perilously close to transforming the Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police power that 'we always have rejected.'"
Are we about to see a similar Alito-Thomas split over the proper reach of federal power in this case? And what about Justices Neil Gorsuch, Amy Coney Barrett, and Brett Kavanaugh? Will one or more of them play the Scalia part and similarly reject the Trump administration's broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause?
Stay tuned.
The post Trump Administration Urges SCOTUS To Uphold Federal Ban on Distilling Liquor at Home appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Successful tech companies are being punished—for being successful.
Last week, Britain's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) proposed designating Microsoft as having strategic market status, which would give the government regulator enormous powers to regulate Microsoft and impose specific conduct requirements on product design. A consultation process has begun, with a decision on whether Microsoft will be given strategic market status expected in February 2027.
If the CMA decides to designate Microsoft as having strategic market status, it could intervene in product bundling (how Microsoft packages Teams, Word, Excel, and Copilot together), interoperability (whether Microsoft should make it easier for competing software and AI developers to integrate with its products), cloud licensing (whether Microsoft's licensing arrangements disadvantage rival cloud providers), and customer switching (whether businesses face unreasonable barriers to leaving Microsoft's ecosystem) in the United Kingdom.
Bizarrely, the CMA's fundamental gripe with Microsoft is that it has made its software so interconnected, convenient, and commercially attractive to buy together that competitors struggle to persuade businesses to use anything else. For example, the CMA says that Microsoft offers customers "technology that is useful, secure, easy to deploy and manage, and available at an attractive overall price." According to its own customer research, Microsoft is seen as "relatively good value for money," and its bundles are "seen as more cost-effective than buying and managing separate licences." Because commercial bundling "makes customers less likely to adopt products from alternative providers," the CMA thinks it must intervene.
Microsoft is not the first tech giant to feel the CMA's wrath for creating products people like. In 2025, the CMA decided Google had strategic market status in general search and search advertising, giving the regulator the power to impose legally binding requirements on how the company operates. Since then, the CMA has ordered Google to use government-mandated standards for ranking organic search results, provide competitors with tools to access users' search data, and give publishers greater control over how their content is used in AI-powered search. (These requirements were imposed without finding that Google had violated competition law.)
"Products working well together at an attractive price used to be called a selling point," but is now "attracting intervention pushed by an overzealous regulator," Matthew Lesh, public policy fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs, a London-based free market think tank, tells Reason. Lesh is the co-author of Digital Overload, a 2023 report that warns against giving the CMA "extensive, discretionary powers" amounting to the regulator "telling some of the most successful and popular platforms on the planet how to run their businesses."
Lesh argues that including Copilot, Microsoft's AI chatbot, in the designation is "particularly outrageous." Last year, when Google was designated as having strategic market status, the CMA excluded Gemini because the "AI assistant sector is relatively small, nascent, and highly dynamic." Lesh argues that, with Google, the CMA acknowledged "uncertainty about the market's development," but now "proposes sweeping Microsoft's workplace AI into a designation requiring an assessment looking at least five years ahead."
"Five years ago, ChatGPT didn't exist. Anyone confident about who will lead workplace AI in 2031 should be running a hedge fund, not a regulator," he tells Reason.
While European countries have taken a far more interventionist approach to technology, the United States has, at least comparatively, celebrated competition and innovation. But American lawmakers are increasingly flirting with importing similar restrictions on Big Tech.
In June, Sens. Chuck Grassley (R–Iowa) and Amy Klobuchar (D–Minn.) reintroduced the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, which would allow federal and state antitrust enforcers to challenge certain practices by dominant online platforms, including favoring their own products and disadvantaging competitors. Jack Nicastro described the bill in Reason as an "atrocious importation of European-style competition policy," arguing that it would undermine innovation and choice. The following month, Sen. Mark Warner (D–Va.) introduced the AI AGENT Act, which would impose new requirements on major online platforms to accommodate competing AI agents.
These proposals are intended to address similar concerns to those of the CMA in Britain. The idea is that established companies outperforming their competitors is somehow evidence of "market failure," undermining the very innovations that made them successful.
Technological progress has always been driven by entrepreneurs and the companies they've built competing to win over consumers. Britain seems to have forgotten this. If the United States wants to remain a world leader in tech, it should avoid the British approach like the plague.
The post Britain Wants To Punish Microsoft for Being Too Successful appeared first on Reason Magazine.
At a protest against a bill to legalize Waymo in Washington, D.C., earlier in October, the main tagline was: "Robotaxis don't vote; we vote." Little is known about the group behind it, raising questions about who's fueling the pushback against robotaxis in America's major cities.
People First Transportation Alliance (PFTA), the organization in question, describes itself as a "statewide coalition of labor unions" dedicated to putting "people over untested technology." The PFTA states it's a "coalition of community organizations, safe-streets advocates, and faith leaders." However, as The Washington Post reported on Monday, the group appears to have overstated its affiliation with four of the 13 individuals and organizations listed as its founding members.
"Several groups and individuals said statements made about them on the Transportation Alliance website were inaccurate," the Post reported, adding that PFTA "appears to be newly formed, with a minimal social media presence. Its website domain was created in late April, according to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers." The group created its social media accounts in May, but it has no posts and no followers.
Apart from its recent interest in the nation's capital, the PFTA lists New York and Philadelphia as its priorities, two cities led by lawmakers who publicly oppose Waymo's presence. Yet for a relatively unknown, recently created organization, the PFTA has found success in its campaign to shut autonomous vehicles like Waymo out of America's Northeast.
In February, the New York Post reported that Gov. Kathy Hochul (D–N.Y.) withdrew her own proposal—which would have allowed commercial robotaxi services such as Waymo to operate in smaller cities in upstate New York—after a PFTA-led coalition prompted enough backlash to kill support for the measure. A Hochul spokesperson told the Post that it was "clear that the support was not there to advance this proposal."
The PFTA told the Post that the organization would urge the state to "pass legislation requiring a human driver behind the wheel in every vehicle and a comprehensive study leading to a plan to address the impact driverless cars would have on New York State."
The group's resolution comes despite customer support for autonomous vehicles: A 2025 study on Waymo, Uber, and Lyft by Obi—a company that aggregates real-time rideshare prices—found that 70 percent of riders who've used Waymo preferred it over Lyft or Uber and 42.7 percent of all respondents were willing to pay Waymo's premium price (up to $10 more) to use the service.
Despite consumer support, autonomous vehicles can't count on a fair shake from lawmakers in some of the country's largest cities. In New York City, Waymo's permit to operate a pilot program on public streets expired in March. Mayor Zohran Mamdani has so far been noncommittal on renewing the company's permit. At a press conference that same month, he said his administration would be prioritizing workers such as the city's taxi drivers who "for far too long, have been sold a dream of being able to work their way to the middle class, only to have the rug pulled out from under them."
Despite the mystery surrounding the PFTA, its D.C. protest drew enough public support to elicit a statement from a person who will likely be the city's next mayor, current D.C. Councilmember Janeese Lewis George. In a post on X, Lewis George said D.C. was "facing a jobs crisis" that would be exacerbated by "rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles." She urged the D.C. Council—which is currently considering a punitive proposal to legalize commercial autonomous vehicles—to "get this right and not rush Waymo legislation this year."
It's unclear how much longer Lewis George wants the District's residents to wait before autonomous vehicles are available for use. D.C.'s approach to legalizing commercial robotaxis hardly seems rushed.
Waymo began testing its vehicles in the city nearly two and a half years ago, in spring 2024. The company's co-CEO Tekedra N. Mawakana said its fleet has driven "more than 300,000 miles in Washington, D.C."Meanwhile, the District Department of Transportation (DDOT) has been conducting studies and organizing working groups on autonomous vehicles for nearly a decade. Still, the agency has been unable to draft a regulatory framework that would eventually enable commercial robotaxi use in the nation's capital. In March, UrbanTurf reported that DDOT would be conducting a long-awaited study on autonomous vehicles—originally due in 2022—and "expects to propose recommendations on AV deployment later this year."
Opponents of autonomous vehicles, such as Lewis George and the PFTA, often cite job loss as a reason not to legalize the tech. Still, with only 200 full-time ride-share drivers in a city of roughly 400,000 workers, as Lewis George has reportedly stated, the situation is a far cry from a crisis.
As for PFTA's public safety claims, Waymo's independently reviewed data show that, compared with an average human driver over the same distance, its vehicles caused 95 percent fewer serious-injury-or-worse crashes and 93 percent fewer pedestrian crashes with serious injuries.
PFTA claims it represents the people most directly affected by transportation policy. The little publicly available information suggests the group is more focused on protecting its members' position in the ride-share market than enhancing the experience of riders, who are increasingly opting for robotaxis when given the opportunity.
The post A Months-Old Anti-Robotaxi Group Is Steering Transportation Policy From Albany to D.C. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
The attack began overnight on 11–12th October, when intruders gained access to remotely managed refrigeration equipment and altered operating settings, causing refrigerators and freezers to overheat.
Stores belonging to several major supermarket chains were affected, including Intermarché, Netto, Coopérative U, Carrefour and Monoprix. Some were forced to discard substantial quantities of fresh and frozen food.
French Finance Minister Roland Lescure confirmed that approximately 700 of the country’s 10,000 supermarkets had been affected, although the severity of the disruption varied between locations.
The Paris prosecutor’s office has opened an investigation into the attack, including the damage caused by destroyed merchandise and reported fires.
The incident has drawn attention to industrial control systems that are routinely connected to the internet but may receive less cybersecurity protection than corporate networks and customer databases.
Investigators have established that refrigeration equipment was targeted through vulnerabilities associated with remote monitoring and control systems.
The French cybersecurity authorities identified compromises involving products supplied by Danish manufacturer Danfoss and American company Copeland.
Some of the affected systems used older equipment that no longer received regular security updates.
According to information released by the companies and cybersecurity specialists, certain industrial controllers had been accessible through public internet connections, creating opportunities for unauthorised access.
Hackers reportedly manipulated defrost cycles and increased temperature settings, preventing equipment from maintaining the cold conditions required to preserve food.
The attack affected approximately 300 Intermarché and Netto stores, while Coopérative U reported disruption at around 80 outlets.
Several retailers managed to contain the damage, but others lost substantial quantities of stock.
The consequences extended beyond malfunctioning equipment. Businesses faced the cost of replacing spoiled food, repairing refrigeration systems and restoring normal operations.
The precise financial damage is still being assessed, although estimates from the retail sector indicate that losses across France could amount to tens of millions of euros.
The incident illustrates the security problems created by the growing use of internet-connected industrial equipment.
Modern refrigeration installations allow contractors and maintenance specialists to monitor temperatures, adjust settings and diagnose faults remotely.
These arrangements can reduce operating costs and improve efficiency, but they also create additional access points that attackers may exploit.
Cybersecurity specialists have identified vulnerabilities in commercial refrigeration platforms manufactured by Danfoss and Copeland.
The manufacturers subsequently addressed identified flaws, although older or unsupported equipment remained a concern.
A critical problem for businesses is that industrial machinery often remains operational for many years after its original software has become obsolete.
Replacing entire refrigeration installations can involve substantial expense and operational disruption, encouraging operators to retain equipment that may no longer meet contemporary cybersecurity standards.
The risks are particularly difficult to manage when responsibility for maintenance, software updates and network security is divided between retailers, equipment suppliers and external contractors.
The attack has renewed scrutiny of France’s implementation of the European Union’s NIS2 Directive, which is intended to strengthen cybersecurity across sectors providing important economic and public services.
The directive establishes common requirements covering risk management, incident reporting, organisational responsibility and protection against cyber threats.
Its scope extends beyond traditional critical infrastructure such as energy, telecommunications and transport to include certain businesses involved in food production, processing and distribution.
EU member states were required to incorporate the directive into national legislation by 17 October 2024.
France was among the countries that received a formal warning from the European Commission in May 2025 over incomplete implementation.
French cybersecurity specialists have since warned that delays have complicated efforts to establish consistent obligations for organisations operating industrial and commercial systems.
However, NIS2 does not automatically cover every supermarket. Its application depends on the nature and size of an organisation and the provisions of national implementing legislation.
The incident therefore raises questions not only about the pace of legislative implementation but also about the practical protection of equipment already in use.
The disruption demonstrates how a cyberattack can cause physical damage without directly targeting a conventional industrial facility.
Unlike breaches intended to steal customer information, the French incident interfered with machinery responsible for preserving essential products.
The distinction is important for European policymakers, who increasingly face threats to infrastructure that combines digital controls with physical operations.
The European Union’s cybersecurity agency ENISA has organised cross-border exercises to test how authorities and companies would respond to disruption affecting essential services.
The attack itself has been established, but responsibility for it has not been publicly attributed.
French authorities have said there is no immediate threat to national food supplies. Nevertheless, the destruction of merchandise and interruption of ordinary retail operations have demonstrated the potential economic consequences of weaknesses in relatively commonplace equipment.
The continuing investigation must establish how access was obtained, which systems were compromised and whether the vulnerabilities were known to operators before the attack.
For Brussels and national regulators, the case provides a practical test of whether European cybersecurity legislation can translate into effective protection for the connected equipment on which ordinary commercial activities increasingly depend.
The European Commission (EC) flagged concerns KKR may have provided incorrect or misleading information during its investigation into a deal for Telecom Italia’s (TIM) fixed network assets led by the company in 2024.
In a Statement of Objections document, the regulator cited concerns about responses submitted by the investment company on wholesale access agreements.
The EC explained following a probe into the issue sparked by complaints from operators it holds the preliminary view KKR “at least negligently, submitted incorrect and/or misleading information on the terms of its existing long-term agreements”.
Its accusation centres on a claim terms in existing contracts would continue to apply post-acquisition, since they could only be changed in agreement with third-party operators.
This policy being in place, it believed, would ensure “KKR will not be able to deteriorate the conditions for wholesale access or terminate such access”, the regulator added.
EC asserted information on this issue was key in its assessment of the proposed deal at the time.
However, following the buyout the regulator received complaints from third-party operators claiming the wholesale provider, FiberCop, had increased the price.
EC EVP for clean, just and competitive transition Teresa Ribera said: “Effective merger control depends on companies providing the commission with correct information.”
She continued: “KKR appears to have provided incorrect or misleading information about whether it would keep its existing long-term access agreements under the same terms unless mutually agreed otherwise with the third-party operators. Our evidence suggests that, after the merger, KKR may have raised prices for existing wholesale broadband customers, in some cases significantly.”
A KKR spokesperson told Mobile World Live it “strongly disagrees with the European Commission’s preliminary assessment. We stand by the accuracy of the information provided during the commission’s 2024 review”.
“We will vigorously challenge these preliminary allegations in our response to the Statement of Objections, while continuing to engage constructively with the commission. The Statement of Objections is not a final finding of infringement, and the commission’s existing clearance of the transaction remains valid.”
The post KKR faces accusation of misleading EC over TIM deal appeared first on Mobile World Live.
With little more than two weeks to go until the midterm elections, it seems increasingly possible that the Democrats, already a big favorite to win control of the House of Representatives, will also take charge of the planet's most elite nursing home, the United States Senate, where the median age is 64 years old. RealClearPolitics' poll aggregator has moved control of "the world's greatest deliberative body" (as its members are grandiosely wont to call it) to "toss up," status and prediction markets are now breaking big toward a blue wave. As of this writing, Kalshi has its Senate odds at 63 percent for the Dems vs. 37 percent for the GOP; Polymarket is at 62 percent vs. 39 percent.
As gratifying as it might be to see unprincipled Trump enablers reduced to minority status after signing off on economy-wrecking tariffs, inhumane immigration detentions, and wars of choice, there's at least one good reason to dread a Democratic majority too: Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the Massachusetts progressive who is spending the run-up to the midterms freaking out over possible consolidation in the condiments business and accusing private equity firms of gutting such shopping-mall favorites as Claire's and Toys R Us. There's every reason to believe that a Senate run by Warren and other economic interventionists will waste time, money, and resources trying to prevent a world in which, per the X wag Iowahawkblog, "a panopticon conglomerate owns two brands of hot sauce."
On October 13, Warren posted this dire warning to X:
Hellmann's mayo
McCormick spices
Cholula hot sauce
Frank's RedHotWhat do these products have in common? One company could soon control them all.
I have concerns that McCormick and Unilever's $45 billion merger could increase YOUR grocery prices.
— Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren) October 13, 2026
It's hard to think of a more competitive and varied market than the one for hot sauces, which is expected to more than double over the next decade. The barriers to entry are generally low, as are the key ingredients, and new entrants can easily market and sell online, avoiding the costs of buying shelf space in conventional supermarkets. Yet Warren is urging regulators at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to halt mergers of both product makers like McCormick and Unilever and grocery stores like Kroger and Giant Eagle.
The latter complaint is particularly picayune. Kroger is one of the country's largest supermarket chains, operating around 2,800 stores under its own name as well as Harris Teeter, Ralph's, and others. Giant Eagle operates about 170 stores. This merger is no more the stuff of nightmares than a single company producing both Cholula and Frank's RedHot. If Warren gains more clout from being in the majority, expect her to butt in more and more on such mergers.
Making it harder for businesses to adapt is not a recipe for making goods and services more affordable. But Warren is keen to blame economic creative destruction not on "new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates" (as Joseph Schumpeter would have it), but on pure greed. In a TikTok released earlier this month, she shows a poster board with corporate logos from once-thriving companies that she says have been "gutted" by "private equity" firms.
"Here's your local mall," she piously intones. "Now, private equity wants you to believe that Red Lobster went bankrupt because of their endless shrimp….They want you to believe that Claire's went bankrupt because teens stopped shopping at the mall." In Warren's telling, private equity firms magically take over thriving businesses and then strip them bare. The typical pattern is that private equity enters the picture after a business is failing.
Virtually all accounts of the decline of, for example, Red Lobster, note that the chain had been spiraling for several reasons before the private equity firm Golden Gate Capital got involved in 2014. As this CNN article notes, the chain, which started in 1968, had seen drops in sales as customer desires changed. Management compounded the difficulties with a series of bad decisions, including continuing various all-you-can-eat menu specials, before coming out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy last year.
Similarly, it's true that some teens still go to malls and get their ears pierced at Claire's. But anyone who has spent time in retail America over the past few decades knows that malls are no longer the destination that they once were. As CapitalOne Shopping Research documents, "in 1986, there were 25,000 malls, large and small, nationwide." By 2023, that number had shrunk to just 1,200. While some malls are coming back, most are not, and for reasons that have nothing to do with private equity. Online retails plays a role (though a smaller one than usually imagined, with e-commerce accounting for less than 20 percent of all retail sales). But mostly, it's that people today tend to want a different sort of retail environment. Anchor stores—think Macy's and J.C. Penney—are shadows of themselves, and younger people have less unstructured time in which to prowl food courts and arcades.
For politicians like Elizabeth Warren, though, there can be no financial gains or losses that aren't the result of shadowy, conspiratorial forces. If her party takes control of the Senate, her words will carry more weight. But it will be American consumers that ultimately shoulder the burden of an even-more-regulated economy. The market for hot sauces will almost certainly stay spicy, but many other parts will surely suffer.
The post Be Prepared for Elizabeth Warren's Reign of Economic Error appeared first on Reason Magazine.
US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder has criticised plans under consideration in Brussels that would reserve parts of the radio spectrum for European operators, potentially restricting services provided by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and its Starlink satellite network.
According to details of Washington’s objections, the American administration believes the proposed arrangements would discriminate against US companies and undermine competition. Puzder has warned that European businesses could face substantial consequences if the restrictions proceed.
The disagreement comes as Brussels pursues a broader strategy intended to strengthen Europe’s technological independence in satellite communications, cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Washington has increasingly challenged European regulations that it considers detrimental to American technology companies.
At the centre of the disagreement is the allocation of radio frequencies used by satellite communications systems. Access to suitable spectrum is essential for providing reliable services, particularly as operators deploy increasingly large constellations in low Earth orbit.
SpaceX has established a substantial commercial and technological advantage through Starlink, which operates thousands of satellites and provides broadband services to residential, commercial and government customers across numerous countries.
European operators argue that the expansion of American satellite networks could make it difficult for European competitors to secure sufficient spectrum and develop commercially viable services.
Washington takes a different position, warning that preferential treatment for European operators could restrict competition rather than strengthen it.
The precise legal form of the proposed EU restrictions, and whether they will proceed, remain unsettled. No final European prohibition on American satellite services has been announced.
Nevertheless, the dispute raises a question for Brussels: whether measures intended to protect European industrial capacity can be introduced without exposing European exporters and investors to American retaliation.
The European Commission is investing heavily in IRIS², its secure satellite communications programme, which is intended to provide independent communications capabilities for governments, defence organisations and commercial customers.
Under arrangements confirmed in August, the programme’s principal constellation is planned to comprise 348 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, with initial launches scheduled for 2029.
The system is designed to reduce Europe’s reliance on communications infrastructure controlled by companies or governments outside the EU, particularly during military emergencies, cyber incidents and interruptions to terrestrial networks.
The Commission’s technical programme envisages communications services supporting border management, crisis response, defence and other sensitive government activities.
However, IRIS² is not yet operational, and European commercial operators face significant competition from SpaceX.
Eutelsat, which operates the OneWeb satellite network, is among the European companies positioned to benefit from increased demand for alternatives to Starlink.
Its shares rose sharply on 14 October following reports of restrictions affecting Ukrainian access to certain Starlink services. The market reaction reflected renewed interest in European-controlled satellite communications.
OneWeb cannot simply replace Starlink across all applications. Differences in network architecture, terminal equipment and available capacity complicate any rapid transition.
The dispute is particularly sensitive because Starlink has become an important part of Ukraine’s communications infrastructure during Russia’s invasion.
Ukrainian forces have relied on satellite connectivity for communications in areas where conventional telecommunications infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.
The strategic consequences of relying on a commercial provider became more prominent following reports that access to certain Starlink capabilities had been restricted.
For European governments, the episode has reinforced concerns about whether defence communications should depend on technology controlled by a company subject to political and commercial pressures outside Europe.
Yet restricting American participation before European alternatives are fully available could produce its own operational difficulties.
The Commission must therefore distinguish between developing independent European capabilities and limiting access to services that governments, businesses and military organisations currently require.
The satellite dispute follows disagreements over European regulation of American digital companies, including competition enforcement and restrictions on online platforms.
As EU Today reported in May, the European Commission had already proposed reserving much of the future mobile satellite spectrum for European operators.
Washington’s opposition introduces a different dimension because spectrum allocation affects market access directly.
The American administration is also linking the dispute to broader commercial relations, raising the possibility that measures affecting satellite companies could produce consequences for unrelated European industries.
Brussels has not announced a final decision on the disputed spectrum arrangements, while the United States has not specified which retaliatory measures it would impose.
The immediate issue is therefore regulatory rather than an enacted trade restriction. Whether it develops into a wider confrontation will depend on the Commission’s final proposals and Washington’s willingness to pursue its warning through commercial measures.
The Australian government has introduced its digital duty of care legislation to parliament today. The bill includes an “off switch” to allow social media users to opt out of recommender algorithms. If passed, Australians could choose to switch off their algorithmic recommendation and consume a news feed populated by the accounts they subscribe to. It’s […]
The post China previews a world where the algorithm is switched off appeared first on Asia Times.
On a recent episode of the Bulwark podcast, journalist Ron Brownstein described the election as a contest between “the wave versus the wall.” The wave being voter anger and President Donald Trump’s plummeting popularity. The wall being structural impediments to voters’ voices, such as gerrymanders and the Republican Party’s stark spending advantage. Now we know […]
The post Don’t let Musk and the billionaires buy America’s elections appeared first on Asia Times.
The European Commission has proposed delaying key methane emissions requirements for imported oil, gas and coal by one year, acknowledging that the present energy crisis could make the original timetable difficult to enforce without threatening Europe’s fuel supplies.
The legislative proposal presented on 14th October would postpone obligations requiring importers to demonstrate that their overseas suppliers meet monitoring, reporting and verification standards equivalent to those imposed on European producers.
The requirements were scheduled to take effect on 1st January 2027. Under the revised arrangements, compliance would begin in 2028, with the first annual demonstrations to national authorities due by 31st May 2029.
The decision follows months of pressure from European governments, American energy companies and importers concerned that the regulation could complicate contracts and restrict access to alternative supplies during a period of exceptional international disruption.
The Commission’s explanatory memorandum places the decision directly within the consequences of the Middle East conflict, which has disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz since February.
According to the Commission, approximately 20 per cent of global liquefied natural gas supplies and 25 per cent of seaborne oil trade have been affected. Alternative producers have only partially compensated for the interruption, leaving European buyers competing for increasingly expensive supplies.
Brussels acknowledges that the disruption is likely to continue affecting energy markets after the immediate crisis subsides, partly because damaged infrastructure will require time to repair and restart.
Under these circumstances, importers have warned that they may be unable to obtain sufficient fuel meeting the original compliance requirements by January.
The Commission’s formal amendment to Regulation 2024/1787 responds to these concerns by extending deadlines rather than cancelling the legislation.
The development follows wider discussions about Europe’s energy costs. As EU Today reported during the Brussels summit, high energy prices have become a central concern for governments attempting to protect European industrial competitiveness.
The United States has been particularly concerned about the effect of the methane rules on transatlantic energy trade.
American producers have become increasingly important suppliers of liquefied natural gas to Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 accelerated the diversification of European energy imports.
According to the reporting on the Commission’s decision, American companies, including ExxonMobil, have raised objections to the requirements, while Washington has pressed Brussels to provide additional flexibility.
French President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed concern about the legal risks facing importers attempting to demonstrate compliance across complicated international supply chains.
The problem involves obtaining reliable emissions measurements from production facilities that may be located thousands of miles from Europe and operate under different regulatory systems.
European importers must then establish whether the information satisfies EU standards, even when the companies operating those facilities are not themselves subject to European jurisdiction.
For suppliers with several production sites, transport arrangements and intermediary contracts, collecting consistent and independently verified information can be a substantial undertaking.
The Commission insists that the postponement does not represent an abandonment of its methane reduction objectives.
The original EU methane regulation entered into force in August 2024. It introduced requirements covering methane measurement, leak detection, reporting and restrictions on routine venting and flaring.
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, and emissions from oil and gas operations can arise through equipment leaks, deliberate releases and incomplete combustion.
The International Energy Agency estimates that more than 350 billion cubic metres of gas were lost globally through flaring, venting and leakage in 2024. Reducing those losses could increase the quantity of gas available for commercial use.
The Commission is therefore attempting to preserve its environmental objectives while allowing additional time for verification systems and national enforcement arrangements to become operational.
The proposal also postpones methane-intensity reporting obligations for EU producers and importers from August 2028 to August 2029. Requirements to demonstrate compliance with maximum methane-intensity values would move from August 2030 to August 2031.
Existing obligations to provide information about overseas emissions, in force since May 2025, would remain unaffected.
The proposed changes require approval from the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure.
That process could expose differences between governments seeking greater flexibility and lawmakers concerned about weakening the timetable for reducing fossil-fuel emissions.
Industry representatives have sought longer extensions, while environmental organisations argue that delaying methane reductions will not resolve the structural causes of Europe’s energy problems.
Brussels is also confronting the consequences of its decision to phase out Russian gas imports. As EU Today’s examination of the Nord Stream 2 legal challenge explained, the Union’s efforts to eliminate dependence on Moscow have already generated disputes over energy security and European regulatory authority.
The Commission now faces two competing requirements: maintaining a common environmental standard for imported fossil fuels while ensuring that suppliers remain willing and able to serve the European market.
Whether the proposed one-year extension proves sufficient will depend on the recovery of international energy supplies and the ability of producers, importers and national authorities to establish reliable verification arrangements before the revised deadlines.
The European Union’s General Court has rejected a legal challenge to the European Commission’s classification of adult entertainment platform Stripchat under the Digital Services Act, strengthening Brussels’ authority to determine which online services must comply with the legislation’s most demanding obligations.
In its judgment delivered on 14th October, the Luxembourg-based court dismissed the action brought by Technius Ltd, the company operating Stripchat, against its designation as a very large online platform.
The dispute centred on how the Commission calculated the platform’s average monthly active users in the European Union, which determines whether additional regulatory obligations apply.
Under the Digital Services Act, platforms exceeding 45 million monthly active recipients in the EU are subject to enhanced supervision, including requirements concerning systemic risks, transparency, content moderation and independent auditing.
The judgment addresses a fundamental question for European digital regulation: whether companies can exclude particular categories of website visits when calculating the number of people using their services.
In February 2023, Technius reported that Stripchat had approximately 31.8 million average monthly active recipients in the EU, placing it below the threshold for very large online platforms.
The company relied on information provided by Similarweb, a commercial service measuring website traffic and user behaviour.
However, the Commission questioned the methodology used to reach that figure. Technius had discounted certain visits on the grounds that users entered the website but departed without engaging with its content.
Such visits are commonly described as bounced visits and frequently appear in commercial website analytics.
The Commission concluded that the company’s deductions had significantly underestimated its audience because the original Similarweb calculation of unique visitors already incorporated a filtering process excluding many bounced visits.
On that basis, Brussels calculated that Stripchat had more than 62 million monthly unique visitors in the EU, well above the statutory threshold.
The Commission consequently designated the platform as a very large online service on 20th December 2023. Technius challenged the decision, arguing that the figures were unreliable and that the absence of a prescribed calculation methodology undermined legal certainty.
The EU General Court rejected both arguments.
According to the court’s official explanation, the Commission had adequately explained its calculation and was entitled to rely on the data available when the designation decision was adopted.
The judges found that Technius had effectively applied deductions to figures from which relevant traffic had already been filtered, producing an artificially reduced estimate of active recipients.
The judgment also addressed a potentially significant complication.
After the Commission adopted its decision, Similarweb revised its methodology. Using the corrected method, Stripchat’s estimated monthly active audience for the relevant period was approximately 37.3 million.
That figure was below the threshold for classification as a very large online platform. Nevertheless, the court held that the subsequent correction did not invalidate the original designation.
The judges determined that the Commission’s decision had to be assessed according to the facts, applicable law and permissible evidence available when the decision was taken.
The ruling therefore does not establish that Stripchat currently exceeds 45 million monthly users. It confirms that the later recalculation was insufficient to annul the Commission’s December 2023 decision.
The consequences extend beyond one adult entertainment website.
The Digital Services Act covers online intermediaries operating in the European market, including social networks, marketplaces, hosting services and other platforms.
Its obligations increase according to the size and nature of a company’s operations. Very large online platforms must assess systemic risks associated with their services, introduce appropriate mitigation measures and submit to independent audits.
The Commission is responsible for supervising their additional obligations and can impose substantial financial penalties for established infringements.
The distinction between the two categories can therefore have considerable financial and operational consequences.
Companies falling below the 45 million threshold remain subject to relevant DSA obligations but do not face the same additional requirements imposed on the largest platforms.
The General Court’s ruling confirms that companies cannot escape designation by applying an unreliable interpretation of website traffic data.
At the same time, the Commission’s published supervisory framework allows a designation to be revoked when a platform remains below the threshold for a full year.
The judgment comes as the Commission faces multiple legal challenges to its enforcement of Europe’s digital legislation.
As EU Today previously reported, Washington has sought to intervene in proceedings concerning the Commission’s €120 million Digital Services Act fine against X, introducing an additional diplomatic dimension to European regulatory disputes.
The Commission is also pursuing separate investigations into whether major platforms comply with obligations concerning the protection of minors, advertising transparency and the management of illegal content.
In another case examined by EU Today, Brussels reached preliminary findings concerning TikTok’s default privacy settings for children, illustrating the practical consequences of the stricter duties imposed on very large online platforms.
The Stripchat judgment concerns designation rather than a finding that the company breached any substantive safety obligation. Its immediate consequence is to preserve the Commission’s original classification decision.
Technius may still appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union on points of law within two months and ten days of notification of the judgment.
For European regulators, the decision provides judicial support for using established commercial analytics when assessing the reach of online platforms, provided that the methodology is adequately explained and the underlying evidence is reliable.
For technology companies, it confirms that the legal assessment of user numbers extends beyond the figures they choose to report to Brussels. The Commission can scrutinise those calculations and reject methods that fail to provide a reliable estimate of an online service’s European audience.
European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.
The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.
The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.
The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.
Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.
The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.
These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.
The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.
As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.
The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.
The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.
Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.
These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.
The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.
Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.
Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.
Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.
The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.
The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.
The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.
In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.
The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.
The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.
The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.
These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.
The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.
European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.
The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.
Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.
The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.
Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.
Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.
Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.
The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.
The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.
Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.
The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.
Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.
Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.
The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.
Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.
The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.
The European Commission is continuing discussions with Google over the company’s response to €890 million in penalties imposed under the Digital Markets Act, as Brussels examines whether changes to its search engine and app-store practices are sufficient to address infringements of European competition rules.
Commission spokesman Thomas Regnier confirmed on Wednesday, 14 October, that officials remained in dialogue with the American technology company. The Commission is assessing the measures Google has introduced, taking account of feedback from businesses affected by its services before reaching a conclusion on compliance.
The review follows two decisions adopted on 23 July, when the European Commission found Google in breach of the Digital Markets Act. A €460 million fine concerned preferential treatment for Google’s own services in search results, while a separate €430 million penalty addressed restrictions preventing app developers from freely directing customers towards alternative purchasing channels.
The first infringement concerns Google’s treatment of competing online services offering hotel reservations, shopping comparisons, transport information and sports results.
Regulators concluded that Google had placed its own services in more prominent positions, sometimes providing them with enhanced visual features and search functions unavailable to competing businesses.
The Digital Markets Act prohibits designated gatekeepers from giving their own products preferential treatment when ranking services that compete with those offered by other companies.
Google has already modified its European search results in response to the Commission’s decision. The changes include revised presentations of commercial information and greater prominence for independent comparison services.
As EU Today reported following the introduction of the revised search format, Google has argued that the measures could make searches less convenient and increase dependence on intermediary websites.
The company maintains that direct information previously available through its search engine may become harder for consumers to obtain.
For competitors, however, the question is whether Google’s adjustments provide genuine commercial opportunities or merely alter the appearance of search results without changing the underlying distribution of traffic.
The second case concerns the Google Play application marketplace, where developers have historically depended on Google’s infrastructure to distribute software and sell subscriptions.
Under the DMA, developers must be able to inform customers about alternative offers and direct them towards purchasing arrangements outside the platform, including their own websites.
The Commission found that Google’s restrictions and fees had limited that freedom.
Although the company may charge for certain services associated with acquiring customers, the Commission concluded that the level and duration of its steering-related charges exceeded what the legislation permits.
Google has since adjusted its external-offers arrangements. European officials are examining whether those changes provide developers with a commercially workable alternative to transactions processed through Google Play.
The issue has consequences for subscription services, digital publishers and software companies seeking to maintain direct relationships with their customers.
A formal ability to direct consumers elsewhere is of limited benefit if the financial conditions make such transactions uneconomic.
The Digital Markets Act was designed to address market practices that conventional competition investigations often took years to resolve.
Rather than requiring regulators to establish a new infringement through lengthy proceedings in every instance, the legislation imposes specific obligations on companies designated as gatekeepers.
The Commission’s DMA enforcement framework allows regulators to examine whether those obligations are being followed and to impose financial penalties when they are breached.
Google’s July fines represented an important enforcement decision. The current review concerns the company’s subsequent conduct and the practical effects of its compliance measures.
The continuation of discussions does not itself establish a fresh infringement. Further penalties would require an additional regulatory determination.
Google also faces broader obligations concerning the sharing of search data with competing providers, an issue addressed in a separate Commission decision issued in July.
These obligations concern access to anonymised information about searches, rankings and user interactions that competing search engines may need to improve their own services.
Taken together, the measures represent a substantial intervention in how Google’s European business operates.
The proceedings have acquired a political dimension because most of the largest companies affected by the DMA are American.
President Donald Trump has criticised European penalties against US technology companies and threatened trade measures in response to what his administration regards as discriminatory regulation.
Brussels maintains that the legislation applies according to market position and commercial conduct, regardless of nationality.
European regulators must nevertheless enforce their decisions in an environment where competition policy has become entangled with wider trade relations between the United States and the European Union.
Google’s financial exposure extends beyond the €890 million imposed in July. Continued non-compliance could lead to further regulatory proceedings, while changes to the company’s services may also affect advertising revenue and its relationships with commercial partners.
The immediate assessment will concentrate on whether competing search services receive fair treatment and whether application developers can direct customers towards alternative transactions without unjustified restrictions.
The Commission has not announced a date for its final assessment. Its decision will help establish how far Europe’s digital competition legislation can change the conduct of companies whose platforms occupy central positions in online commerce.
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