Norway has put into force a new round of sanctions against Russia that hits banks, listed oil refineries, ports, airports, and suppliers of Russia’s military industry, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry announced. The rules mirror the EU’s 21st sanctions package, which Brussels adopted in July.

The EU’s 22nd package, adopted on 12 October, is principally a list of names, while the 21st brought significant new measures, lawyers noted. Among them are new tools against the shadow fleet, the tankers with murky ownership that Russia uses to move oil around sanctions. That fleet also sails along Norway’s coast, and a new Norwegian Coastal Administration report found that it poses a growing threat to security and the environment there.

Banks, refineries, and Sheremetyevo

Norway is not an EU member, but it has joined every EU sanctions package against Russia, with a few exceptions and national adjustments. Oslo backed this one politically on 11 August, and the rules took effect on 21 October. Part of the package was already in force. It placed travel restrictions and asset freezes on 48 people and asset freezes on 168 entities, and it listed 41 shadow fleet vessels on 14 August.

Norway’s transaction ban now covers 33 more Russian credit and financial institutions. A separate ban covers 22 more abroad, including in India, Mongolia, Nigeria, and the UAE.

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Another transaction ban reaches listed refineries in Russia and third countries that process Russian oil or help dodge sanctions. A Georgian refinery joins that list on 25 January 2027. The same ban adds two Russian ports and four Russian airports, including Moscow’s Sheremetyevo.

Drone gear and the shadow fleet

Export curbs on dual-use goods now cover 51 new entities that back Russia’s military industry. Some are in China, including Hong Kong, and others are in India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the UAE. The banned-exports list adds nickel and beryllium powder, along with drone gear such as jamming and interception systems, launchers, and servo motors.

Oslo can now also list ships that service sanctioned shadow fleet tankers or swap cargo with them at sea. Elsewhere in Europe, France’s navy and UK forces have boarded sanctioned shadow fleet tankers this year.

Beijing denounces the use of judicial measures to pressure Havana.

On Wednesday, China opposed the “abuse of judicial means” to pressure Cuba and urged the United States to “immediately end the blockade” against the island following the issuance of an arrest warrant in Florida for former Cuban President Raul Castro.

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Russia Condemns U.S. Arrest Warrant for Raul Castro

At a regular news conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said that the former president “is a highly prestigious and respected Cuban revolutionary leader who enjoys enormous authority internationally.”

Mao stressed that Beijing has always opposed the “abuse of judicial means” to pressure Cuba, while expressing the Asian country’s “firm” support for the island in defending its national sovereignty.

The spokeswoman also urged the United States to “immediately end the blockade” against Cuba and “stop violating the Cuban people’s right to exist and develop.”

Judicial Proceedings Revived Nearly Three Decades After 1996 Incident

China’s position comes after Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier announced on Monday that he had obtained a state arrest warrant for Castro, 95, who has been retired from public life since 2021.

U.S. authorities are seeking to prosecute him on charges of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, linking him to the chain of command that authorized the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft belonging to the terrorist organization “Brothers to the Rescue,” an incident in which four Florida residents were killed.

The state-level legal action comes in addition to the indictment filed by the U.S. federal justice system last May. The reopening of the case nearly three decades later coincides with a period of intensified sanctions, political pressure and legal blockades directed by U.S. President Donald Trump against Havana.

Official Rejection From Havana

The announcement by U.S. prosecutors prompted an immediate and forceful response from the island’s top political leadership.

Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel called the judicial decision a “pathetic Miami circus” intended to appease the most extremist factions.

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez described the measure as “another futile maneuver by anti-Cuban politicians in South Florida,” aimed at manufacturing pretexts to deepen the economic stranglehold on the Cuban population.

teleSUR/ JF

Sources: EFE – teleSUR

The conversations of small groups break the night’s calm in Wudaoying, one of the most popular hutong (alleyways) in Beijing’s old quarter. At the door of a concert hall, Shao, 27, and Qin, 28, chat with beers in their hands. “They treat me like a little girl and on top of that I have to smile so as not to cause trouble,” Shao complains. She takes a drag from her cigarette and nods toward a co‑worker standing a few meters away. “I’m sick of so much mansplaining,” Qin replies, referring to the condescending explanations by men who assume women know less.

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Dallo “Shanghai Spirit” alla Dichiarazione di Bishkek, questa organizzazione, che pone la sicurezza al primo posto, privilegia il pragmatismo rispetto all’ideologia.

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La sicurezza prima di tutto

Il recente vertice dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO), tenutosi a Bishkek, ha segnato il venticinquesimo anniversario della nascita di quella che, nel panorama delle istituzioni internazionali, rappresenta un caso di studio particolarmente interessante. Nata dalle ceneri delle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi e trasformata in organizzazione a tutti gli effetti nel 2001, la SCO ha attraversato un quarto di secolo consolidando un’architettura istituzionale che oggi funziona in modo efficace: riunioni annuali del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato, incontri regolari a livello interministeriale, e una cooperazione quotidiana che si sviluppa su binari sempre più articolati.

Tuttavia, l’anniversario offre l’occasione per una riflessione che va oltre la mera celebrazione. La domanda che emerge con forza è: quale ruolo giocano i valori all’interno della SCO? E come si rapporta questa dimensione valoriale con quella, apparentemente più pragmatica, della sicurezza e della cooperazione funzionale? L’analisi dei documenti fondativi e delle dichiarazioni successive rivela una traiettoria complessa, che merita di essere esaminata in profondità.

Fin dalle sue origini, la SCO ha posto la cooperazione in materia di sicurezza come una delle sue priorità principali. Questa scelta non è casuale: la preistoria dell’organizzazione affonda le radici nelle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi, sia sulle questioni di confine che sugli aspetti più ampi della sicurezza reciproca. Il “Shanghai Five”, gruppo informale che precedeva la nascita ufficiale dell’SCO, aveva proprio nella gestione delle questioni di sicurezza e nella costruzione di fiducia tra i membri il suo collante principale.

Questa specializzazione originaria ha avuto conseguenze durature. Anche quando, nel corso degli anni, l’SCO ha ampliato il proprio raggio d’azione a settori sempre più diversificati, la sicurezza è rimasta il fulcro attorno al quale si è sviluppata l’intera architettura organizzativa. In un certo senso, come nota acutamente l’analisi, l’SCO può ancora essere definita un’organizzazione internazionale specializzata, focalizzata su una singola priorità principale, nonostante la sua evoluzione verso forme di cooperazione più comprensivo.

Il confronto con i BRICS, struttura di cooperazione genuinamente omnicomprensiva che opera in un’ampia gamma di campi, risulta particolarmente illuminante. Mentre i BRICS hanno sviluppato nel tempo una piattaforma valoriale sempre più articolata, con dichiarazioni che dedicano ampio spazio a questioni di valori comuni e condivisi, l’SCO ha mantenuto un approccio più marcatamente operativo e meno declamatorio sul piano assiologico.

La Carta dell’SCO: principi senza valori

Un dato particolarmente significativo emerge dall’analisi del documento fondativo dell’SCO. La Carta, firmata il 7 giugno 2002 ed entrata in vigore il 19 settembre 2003, non menziona affatto il termine “valori”. Al suo posto, troviamo un articolo dedicato, l’articolo 2, intitolato significativamente “Principi”. È su questi principi che l’SCO basa la propria attività.

Questi principi includono: rispetto reciproco per la sovranità, l’indipendenza, l’integrità territoriale e l’inviolabilità dei confini statali; non aggressione; non interferenza negli affari interni; non uso della forza nelle relazioni internazionali; uguaglianza di tutti gli Stati membri; risoluzione pacifica delle controversie tra Stati membri; non targeting dell’SCO contro altri Stati. Un principio particolarmente rivelatore è quello dell’attuazione graduale delle azioni congiunte in aree di interesse comune.

Quest’ultimo principio, quello della “phased implementation”, spiega molto del funzionamento dell’SCO e delle aspettative, talvolta eccessive, che si generano attorno alla sua attività. La delusione che talvolta accompagna il giudizio sull’organizzazione — quel “nulla accade oltre i vertici” che circola in certi ambienti — trova proprio in questo principio la sua spiegazione. Non si tratta di un difetto, ma di una scelta deliberata e costitutiva: procedere per gradi, consolidare i risultati raggiunti, evitare passi falsi.

L’assenza del termine “valori” dalla Carta dell’SCO è perfettamente spiegabile e non diminuisce affatto il livello di fiducia reciproca tra gli Stati membri. Vale la pena ricordare che, anche nel caso dei BRICS, il termine “valori” non fu una caratteristica immediata delle dichiarazioni finali, affermandosi stabilmente solo a partire dalla metà degli anni 2010. Prima di allora, il termine utilizzato per caratterizzare la coesione interna dei BRICS era, tra gli altri, proprio “principi”, esattamente come per l’SCO.

Il contesto storico e l’evoluzione del lessico valoriale

Nel 2002, il termine “valori” non era ancora politicamente di moda come lo è oggi, ed era usato piuttosto raramente nei documenti dei principali Paesi del mondo non occidentale. In quel periodo, in questi Paesi — Russia inclusa — la parola “valori” era più spesso postulata nel lessico politico in senso negativo, come “valori imposti dall’Occidente”, e quindi come qualcosa che richiedeva resistenza.

La consapevolezza che questo è un gioco che si può giocare in due, e che per rafforzare efficacemente la solidarietà tra i Paesi non occidentali era necessario formulare una propria piattaforma di valori condivisi, arrivò molto più tardi. E il lavoro per garantire che i valori non occidentali siano percepiti come comprensibili, attraenti e allo stesso tempo non banali — non semplicemente nello stile “siamo per tutte le cose buone e contro tutte le cose cattive” — continua ancora oggi, con successi alterni.

Questo ritardo nell’elaborazione di una piattaforma valoriale esplicita non significa però che l’SCO sia priva di una dimensione assiologica. Al contrario, essa esiste, ma si esprime attraverso categorie diverse da quelle del lessico valoriale occidentale: i “principi” e, soprattutto, lo “spirito”.

Un dato cronologicamente significativo emerge dall’analisi comparata dei documenti dell’SCO e dei BRICS: rispetto a un termine particolare — e alla sua rilevanza sostanziale — l’SCO ha notevolmente anticipato i BRICS. Si tratta del termine “spirito”.

Nelle dichiarazioni dei vertici annuali dei BRICS, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” e i suoi elementi costitutivi apparvero per la prima volta durante la presidenza cinese del 2017. Lo “spirito” scomparve poi dai documenti dei BRICS per diversi anni. Il termine ritornò nel 2022, ancora una volta durante la presidenza cinese. Ma successivamente, in tutte le dichiarazioni dei vertici BRICS del 2023-25, i cui progetti iniziali furono preparati da altri Paesi, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” fu costantemente presente.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, il termine “spirito” apparve nella primissima dichiarazione successiva al vertice di Shanghai del 15 giugno 2001, quando lo “Shanghai Five”, precedentemente esistente come raggruppamento informale, fu trasformato in un’organizzazione internazionale a tutti gli effetti. In questa dichiarazione, lo “spirito di Shanghai” fu menzionato come punto separato, caratterizzato da fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso.

È evidente che il termine “spirito” affonda le sue radici, innanzitutto, nella tradizione politica cinese contemporanea, poiché in ogni caso è apparso per la prima volta in documenti di anni in cui i vertici si tenevano in Cina. Questa è, in un certo senso, una peculiarità cinese. Detto questo, il termine “spirito”, anche se non immediatamente, si è poi stabilmente affermato nelle dichiarazioni dei BRICS; e nel caso dell’SCO, un anno dopo, nel 2002, quando il vertice si tenne non in Cina ma a San Pietroburgo, il termine “spirito” entrò nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Nella Carta, tuttavia, l’epiteto “Shanghai” scomparve in relazione allo spirito; lì si fa riferimento semplicemente allo “spirito di fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso”.

L’approccio civilizzazione e la sua evoluzione

Di particolare rilevanza per l’ideologia politica odierna è l’approccio civilizzazionale riflesso nella Dichiarazione di Shanghai del 2001. Essa notava specificamente il “rispetto reciproco e la fiducia reciproca tra Stati appartenenti a civiltà diverse e portatori di tradizioni culturali differenti”. Un anno dopo, tuttavia, la menzione delle civiltà scomparve dal preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Questo movimento di apparizione e scomparsa del lessico civilizzazionale è significativo. Da un lato, riflette la sensibilità cinese per le questioni di identità culturale e di diversità; dall’altro, mostra la cautela degli altri membri nell’adottare un linguaggio che potesse essere percepito come troppo marcatamente ideologico o potenzialmente divisivo.

Se esaminiamo il preambolo dell’attuale Dichiarazione di Bishkek del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato dell’SCO del 1° settembre 2026, troviamo che essa enfatizza il “fermo impegno verso gli obiettivi e i principi sanciti nella Carta dell’SCO, nonché verso il ulteriore rafforzamento del buon vicinato, dell’amicizia e dell’efficace cooperazione multilaterale”. Inoltre, questa dichiarazione impiega ancora una volta proprio il termine “spirito di Shanghai”, che è incarnato nei principi esposti nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

È chiaro che, poiché gli elementi costitutivi di questo spirito dell’SCO sono fissati nel testo legale della Carta, le loro formulazioni rimangono incrollabili anche a venticinque anni di distanza. Qui sta la differenza tra lo spirito dell’SCO e lo spirito dei BRICS, dove, di anno in anno, vari elementi di questo spirito vengono aggiunti o rimossi dai Paesi che esercitano la presidenza, a seconda delle loro particolarità nazionali. E la definizione dello spirito dei BRICS risulta, ogni anno, almeno leggermente diversa.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, è significativo che l’epiteto “Shanghai” sia ritornato — un epiteto che, a differenza dello spirito stesso, non è legalmente fissato. Questo ritorno segnala una volontà politica di rivendicare l’eredità originaria dell’organizzazione, in un momento in cui la competizione tra potenze per la definizione dei valori globali si fa sempre più intensa.

Quanto pesa questo anniversario

Se rileggiamo passo passo le dichiarazioni dei vertici dell’SCO rivela variazioni significative nel trattamento della dimensione valoriale. L’attenzione particolare dedicata nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek all’impegno dell’SCO verso lo spirito di Shanghai e i principi dell’SCO non è particolarmente tipica delle altre dichiarazioni dei vertici degli ultimi anni.

Per esempio, nelle dichiarazioni successive ai vertici “non anniversari”, il preambolo è praticamente assente, e la descrizione della situazione internazionale e delle sfide alla sicurezza inizia fin dall’inizio. Nelle dichiarazioni emesse ad Astana nel 2024, a Delhi nel 2023 e a Mosca nel 2020, né lo “spirito di Shanghai” né semplicemente lo “spirito” sono menzionati (sebbene la dichiarazione di Mosca contenga il termine “spazio SCO”). Nelle dichiarazioni emesse a Tianjin nel 2025 (naturalmente), a Samarcanda nel 2022 e a Bishkek nel 2019, c’è una menzione dello “spirito di Shanghai”, ma essa è collocata non all’inizio del testo ma in profondità nella prima sezione.

È chiaro che il carattere specifico dell’attuale dichiarazione è spiegato dalla sua natura anniversaria; la dichiarazione emessa a Dushanbe per il precedente anniversario — il ventesimo, nel 2021 — fu composta esattamente allo stesso modo, con un lungo preambolo che menziona lo spirito di Shanghai e l’impegno verso i principi. Questo è altamente significativo: gli anniversari offrono l’occasione per un’affermazione più esplicita dell’identità valoriale dell’organizzazione, mentre nei vertici ordinari prevale un approccio più pragmatico e orientato alle questioni contingenti.

Il contributo indiano e la prospettiva dei “4 M”

In questo quadro, assume particolare interesse la prospettiva indiana sull’SCO. Le iniziative dell’India nell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai si sono concentrate su questioni economiche, riflettendo il desiderio di costruire cooperazione economica con gli Stati dell’Asia Centrale al fine di migliorare il proprio posizionamento regionale e rafforzare il multilateralismo.

Secondo Anil Trigunayat, l’SCO può senza dubbio contribuire alla collaborazione regionale aderendo al principio delle “4 M”: i membri devono abbracciare il Rispetto Reciproco (Mutual Respect), l’Interesse Reciproco (Mutual Interest), la Sensibilità Reciproca (Mutual Sensitivity) e il Beneficio Reciproco (Mutual Benefit) affinché il gruppo possa emergere più forte e più rilevante.

Questa formulazione è significativa perché mostra come, dal punto di vista indiano, la dimensione valoriale dell’SCO non risieda tanto in una piattaforma ideologica esplicita, quanto in un insieme di principi operativi che guidano la cooperazione quotidiana. L’India, con la sua tradizione di non allineamento e la sua sensibilità per la sovranità nazionale, si trova naturalmente a proprio agio in un’organizzazione che privilegia i principi sui valori, e che evita di imporre una visione ideologica comune.

 Verso un prospero futuro

L’analisi della dimensione valoriale dell’SCO a venticinque anni dalla sua fondazione rivela un quadro complesso e sfumato. Da un lato, l’organizzazione non ha mai sviluppato una piattaforma valoriale esplicita paragonabile a quella dei BRICS o di altre strutture di cooperazione. Dall’altro, essa possiede una solida base di principi, sanciti nella Carta, e uno “spirito” che, pur non essendo definito in termini valoriali, costituisce un potente collante identitario.

Questa configurazione non è un caso, ma riflette la storia e la natura dell’organizzazione. Nata come strumento di costruzione di fiducia in materia di sicurezza, l’SCO ha privilegiato la concretezza dei principi operativi rispetto all’astrattezza delle dichiarazioni valoriali. La sua specializzazione funzionale, il suo carattere istituzionalizzato, e il principio della attuazione graduale hanno contribuito a mantenere l’organizzazione ancorata a una dimensione pragmatica, evitando le derive ideologiche che talvolta caratterizzano altri consessi internazionali.

Tuttavia, il ritorno dello “spirito di Shanghai” nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek, in occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario, segnala una crescente consapevolezza dell’importanza della dimensione identitaria e valoriale. In un’era di competizione globale sempre più intensa, in cui la definizione dei valori e dei principi che devono guidare l’ordine internazionale è essa stessa oggetto di contesa, l’SCO si trova a dover bilanciare la sua tradizionale prudenza con la necessità di affermare con maggiore chiarezza la propria identità.

L’analisi terminologica dei testi, e delle piattaforme valoriali che essi riflettono, non è che un tassello del quadro molto più ampio della cooperazione pratica tra i Paesi dell’SCO realizzata in questi venticinque anni. Ma è un tassello significativo, perché rivela come un’organizzazione nata per la sicurezza sia progressivamente divenuta anche un laboratorio di elaborazione di un linguaggio comune, di principi condivisi e di uno spirito collettivo. E in un mondo in cui la battaglia per la definizione dei valori globali è destinata a intensificarsi, questo laboratorio potrebbe rivelarsi più importante di quanto non appaia a prima vista.

La sfida per l’SCO, nei prossimi venticinque anni, sarà quella di preservare la propria specificità — la concretezza dei principi, la gradualità dell’azione, la centralità della sicurezza — senza rinunciare a elaborare una visione del mondo che, senza essere ideologica, sia capace di attrarre e di unire. Un compito non facile, ma che l’organizzazione ha dimostrato, in questi primi venticinque anni, di poter affrontare con successo.

Al Mayadeen | October 20, 2026

Tehran no longer views Pakistani and Qatari mediation as yielding tangible results, Iranian sources told Al Mayadeen on Tuesday, as a Russian initiative coordinated with China proposes joint management of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran.

Iranian sources told Al Mayadeen that Tehran has come to view Pakistani and Qatari mediation as ineffective in delivering tangible results, citing Islamabad and Doha’s limited ability to influence the US position. This has prompted Iran to explore alternative channels for mediation.

In this context, Iranian international affairs expert Mehdi Khan Alizadeh told Al Mayadeen that a new Russian diplomatic move could pave the way for Moscow to assume a more substantive mediating role, amid coordination between Russia and the United States. He pointed to a Russian initiative developed in cooperation with China that proposes joint management of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz with Iran.

Alizadeh explained that the initiative concerns the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran addressed these issues, while Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is expected to visit Moscow again, reflecting continued efforts surrounding the Russian proposal.

Regarding Tehran’s immediate priorities, Alizadeh stressed that ending the war takes precedence over the nuclear issue. He said this position follows a decision by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic, Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, adding that Iran’s current focus is on securing a ceasefire, while the nuclear file is not presently among its priorities.

These developments coincide with US President Donald Trump’s remarks about “providing a framework for Russia to communicate with Iran,” potentially intersecting with Moscow’s diplomatic efforts.

Lavrov visits Tehran for first time since start of war

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Tehran on Monday for his first visit since the start of the war on Iran, as Moscow seeks to play a mediating role.

Lavrov said Moscow’s efforts “aim to prevent the return of a full-scale war.”

Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Lavrov that the establishment of US military bases in regional countries has offered, and will continue to offer, no benefit to the region beyond increasing tensions and undermining security.

During his meeting with Lavrov, Pezeshkian said US interference and divisive policies had led to the emergence of disputes across the region.

He stressed that there are no fundamental disagreements between Iran and regional countries, affirming Tehran’s readiness to address existing challenges through dialogue and mutual understanding.

Pezeshkian also said Iran shares common ground with countries across the region and has consistently sought to develop relations with them on the basis of brotherly engagement and mutual cooperation.

Araghchi, Lavrov reject military action, call for stability in Gulf

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for his part, said during a joint press conference with Lavrov that Tehran and Moscow agree that military action is not the solution. He added that relations between the two countries contribute to strengthening regional stability.

Araghchi said he had hosted Lavrov in Tehran for “important discussions” covering several issues spanning Europe and West Asia, including Lebanon, Palestine, Ukraine, and Yemen.

The talks also focused on expanding economic and nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Araghchi underscored that ties between Iran and Russia have never been closer or more collaborative than they are today.

By Tings Chak

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

On Oct. 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup.

The first round gave Flávio 47.03 percent of valid votes against Lula’s 45.16 percent, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat.

The runoff takes place as President Donald Trump seeks to restore U.S. domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and China’s President Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science and technology.

The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programmes, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health and industrial cooperation.

Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labour, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organisations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanisation, bioinputs and digital technologies for family farming.

These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratoryand IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models.

In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organisations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside.

Massive exports of soybeans, meat and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing.

While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology and agrarian reform.

Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

Return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its December 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure.

Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbours and parts of Africa.

Its roughly 23 percent share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and U.S. military superiority.

Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of U.S. technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to U.S. trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur.

These proposals converge with a wider U.S. campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process.

Meanwhile, Washington’s January bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS & the Struggle for Independent Foreign Policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures.

At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform.

The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, Vice President João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to U.S. sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship.

The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favourable today, but political direction remains decisive.

Former President Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks and major media.

These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organisations, material interests and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the Election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation.

In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing and relations between China and Mercosur.

In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labour rights, public services, agrarian reform and the defence of democratic space.

Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realising those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains.

This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed U.S. imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organised popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Original article: consortiumnews.com

Beijing has proposed banning exports of the technology used to make next-generation solar cells, a move that could complicate United States technology guru Elon Musk’s plan to expand into space solar power. The ban, which covers production technology for perovskite and tandem solar cell modules, is part of a proposal by China’s Ministry of Commerce […]

The post China next-gen solar tech curb to impact SpaceX AI computing plan appeared first on Asia Times.

For years, the idea of speaking forthrightly to China would evoke an admonition from the US State Department and most of the American policymaking class: “We can’t do that. They won’t like it.” They’d often add, “China has red lines, don’t you know?” There are things you are told you just can’t say – questioning […]

The post Talking with China, say what you’re told you can’t say appeared first on Asia Times.

Russia wants America and China to decide Ukraine’s future without Kyiv. Europe must challenge this dangerous return to diplomacy of the strong for the strong

Does Vladimir Putin know exactly how to play Donald Trump? The history of chummy phone calls, high-profile meetings and attempts to bring Russia in from the cold certainly suggests that Moscow’s thuggish ruler has a hold on this American president. If Mr Trump agrees to negotiate Ukraine’s future with Mr Putin and China’s Xi Jinping without Ukraine at the table, he will have handed the Russian leader a victory before talks begin. The message will be that strongmen are ruling the world and determining the fate of weaker nations.

Ukraine has the right to determine its future. That right cannot be waved away by a self-serving Russian proposal, however much it indulges Mr Trump’s belief that world affairs should be settled by powerful men. The scales are falling from European eyes. Trumpian America is raising doubts about whether it will help deter aggression or even honour its Nato commitments. If Washington now rewards Moscow and pressures Ukraine to accept a raw deal, it would be a betrayal. European governments would wonder where America might be in the future when their own security is threatened.

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The European Parliament is preparing to vote on amendments to the as Brussels seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of minerals essential for defence equipment, electric vehicles, advanced electronics and industrial production.

The proposals, scheduled for debate in Strasbourg on Monday, 19 October, and a vote on Tuesday, would strengthen coordination over strategic supplies and revise the responsibilities of European companies that depend on vulnerable international supply chains.

At the centre of the discussions is a proposal to establish a European Critical Raw Materials Centre, which would coordinate purchasing arrangements, assess supply risks and support the development of strategic reserves.

The initiative comes amid increasing concern over China’s dominant position in the processing and supply of several materials regarded as indispensable to European industry.

Parliament considers stronger European coordination

According to the European Parliament’s October plenary briefing, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre would operate as an EU body responsible for several functions currently distributed between European institutions and national authorities.

These would include identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains, conducting risk assessments, coordinating contingency stocks and supporting joint purchasing arrangements.

The objective is to give European governments and manufacturers greater capacity to respond to interruptions in supplies of minerals and processed materials that cannot easily be replaced.

The legislative report has been prepared by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Dutch Social Democrat MEP Mohammed Chahim serving as rapporteur.

The committee examined amendments to the existing legislation during 2026, with its revised report submitted for plenary consideration on 9th October.

Tuesday’s vote is intended to establish Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council. It would not, by itself, constitute final adoption of the amended regulation.

China’s position creates supply risks

The European Union depends heavily on imported critical raw materials, particularly those required for batteries, permanent magnets, semiconductors and specialist industrial equipment.

China occupies a particularly important position in the refining and processing of rare earth elements, graphite and several other materials used in high-technology manufacturing.

The concentration of production creates vulnerabilities because disruption at a single stage of processing can affect manufacturers operating across multiple European countries.

According to the Council of the European Union’s assessment of strategic mineral supplies, China is the principal supplier to the EU for numerous materials, including gallium, germanium, magnesium and rare earth elements.

These substances are used in applications extending well beyond electric vehicles.

Permanent magnets are required for certain electric motors, wind turbines and defence systems, while other critical materials are used in radar, satellites, aircraft components and advanced electronic equipment.

Restrictions affecting their availability can therefore have consequences for European industrial output, defence procurement and the development of new technology.

The question for EU policymakers is not simply whether minerals can be obtained, but whether Europe has sufficient alternative sources and processing capacity to withstand restrictions imposed by a dominant supplier.

Existing targets remain difficult to achieve

The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force in May 2024 and established benchmarks intended to strengthen European production and diversify imports by 2030.

Under the existing framework, the EU aims to develop extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10 per cent of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials, where geological reserves allow.

The corresponding benchmarks are 40 per cent for processing and 25 per cent for recycling.

The legislation also seeks to prevent any single non-EU country from supplying more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of a particular strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage.

These are policy benchmarks rather than binding production quotas imposed on individual companies.

Their achievement depends on the development of mines, processing facilities and recycling operations, as well as the ability to attract investment.

New extraction projects frequently require lengthy environmental assessments, infrastructure development and extensive capital investment. Processing operations face additional challenges involving energy costs, technical expertise and commercial competitiveness.

Consequently, reducing import dependence involves more than identifying mineral deposits within European territory.

Greater obligations for manufacturers

The proposed amendments also address the responsibilities of major European companies using strategic raw materials.

Under provisions examined by the parliamentary committee, the European Commission would take a greater role in identifying large manufacturers whose operations depend on strategically important supplies.

These companies could face requirements to assess vulnerabilities in their supply chains, including the geographical location of extraction and processing operations and the ownership of relevant facilities.

The arrangements would be particularly significant for businesses producing batteries, aircraft, drones, satellites, advanced chips and other products considered strategically important.

Where significant risks are identified, companies could be expected to consider measures including diversification, improved material efficiency or maintaining stocks.

The proposals also seek to strengthen recycling and the recovery of valuable materials from existing products, reducing the quantity of newly extracted resources required by European industry.

Recycling alone cannot remove the need for imports, particularly where demand for new technologies is increasing, but it can provide an additional source of supply.

Supply security becomes an industrial priority

The legislation forms part of a wider effort to link European industrial policy with economic security.

Brussels has been seeking additional raw materials partnerships with third countries, while manufacturers remain concerned about the commercial cost of building alternative supply chains.

Recent EU discussions concerning cooperation with Vietnam illustrate the emphasis being placed on securing alternative access to minerals such as tungsten and rare earth elements.

However, diversifying supplies does not necessarily mean transferring extraction and processing to Europe. Partnerships with reliable external producers may remain essential, particularly for materials unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Union.

The proposed European centre would therefore have to balance internal production, international purchasing, strategic stocks and commercial demand.

The immediate legislative issue is whether the revised framework gives European institutions sufficient powers to coordinate these activities without placing disproportionate administrative obligations on businesses.

Tuesday’s parliamentary vote will determine the negotiating position MEPs take into discussions with EU governments over how those responsibilities should be distributed.

By Peter VAN BUREN

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Critics of Trump’s diplomatic staffing don’t address why it’s important to have a top man on the ground in the Zoom era.

During my more than two decades at the State Department as a diplomat, my well-meaning mother often asked what I’d have to do to make ambassador. The answer was simple: Dad would have to die young, and Mom would then have to donate the whole estate to the winner of the next presidential election. Then I’d get appointed ambassador to a small, unimportant country. For so many reasons, I am glad Dad lived to a ripe old age, and that Mom looks forward to taking care of the Humane Society in her will instead. I would have made a terrible ambassador.

Since 1960, 72 percent of America’s ambassadors to desirable posts in Western Europe and the Caribbean have been political appointees like the recently departed Kimberly Guilfoyle, as I might have been if the plan with Mom had worked out. Their primary and often only qualification is spending big on the guy who won the presidency. Career diplomats on the other hand are often promoted as ambassador into politically less important hardship posts, no donation required. All must be confirmed by the Senate. The United States is unusual among developed democracies in the scale of political ambassadorial appointments. Unlike the U.S., most developed democracies, including Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, reserve ambassadorships almost entirely for career diplomats.

So while the debate over political ambassadors versus career diplomats has gone on for more than a century, in 2026 the more interesting question may be whether we need ambassadors in every capital at all. What useful and productive thing was Guilfoyle doing in Greece anyway?

It is important to have a good person in the role; he acts as the personal representative of his country’s leader, in America’s case, answerable to the Oval Office. He receives confidential instructions from the White House before taking up his job abroad, and for many political ambassadors, can often pick up the phone and call the president and cabinet officials directly. I was in the room as a subject matter expert when ambassador Howard Baker simply picked up the phone and dialed Vice President Dick Cheney at his ranch in Wyoming and untied a significant bureaucratic knot that was burdening our relationship with Japan. This demonstrates something well-connected political ambassadors can uniquely do. On the other hand, communication inside an embassy can be problematic for political appointees; many Foreign Service Officers (FSO) see them as outsiders come to mess up their way of doing things and slow-walk ambassadorial initiatives because they are sure they know better. Political appointees, especially those taking leave from large businesses to serve, also tend to spend a lot of their time back in the U.S., creating friction with the staff.

In the American system, because most career ambassadors owe their own bottom-line allegiance (and pension) to the State Department, communication is often not that close and friendly with the Executive under most circumstances. A White House unsure of whether the State Department is even on its side will be unlikely to be reassured by a career ambassador in place, not to mention State’s long-standing institutional resistance to too many political appointees in general. Careerists usually do have strong host-country knowledge and maybe language skills. Some, however, can get too deep into the weeds on administrative, visa, or personnel matters a political appointee usually leaves to subordinates, and some use their new-found authority to settle old scores or pursue personal projects adjacent to core foreign policy.

The ambassadorial title remains the profession’s highest achievement. It would be surprising if ambitious FSOs did not aspire to it. But just being the most qualified for anything inside State is rarely enough. That leaves plenty of careerist yes-men around looking to get into an ambassador’s chair.

The struggle over who is better at the job, political appointees or careerists, will never conclusively end. It has been a factor of American diplomacy for decades, under all flavors of administrations. The mainstream media negatively focus on some of Trump’s ambassadorial choices, but to anyone familiar with diplomacy it is nothing more than another round in a century-old political argument.

The new question, unique to the second Trump administration, is whether or not the president should appoint anyone at all, career or political, to a particular ambassadorial job. Trump currently has 92 ambassadorial seats empty, with either the candidate stuck in the Senatorial confirmation process or the chair simply left vacant by Trump’s choice. The same number of empty offices at comparable points of their presidencies was only 54 under Biden, and 55 under the first Trump administration. A lot of the empties are in smaller countries of lesser political importance, but a few larger embassies stand out, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Some have pending nominees, some do not. Senate intransigence aside, this seems to be by choice. The real question is, however, how much it matters.

Any American embassy without an ambassador is led by a charge, someone temporarily in the ambassadorial role, typically the embassy’s deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is usually a State Department career FSO, typically the most experienced and senior one at post, and often has done multiple tours in the country in subordinate roles. This seems like the kind of person State would want in charge, yet the American Foreign Service Association and most rank-and-file FSOs curiously complain about not having enough career officers in leadership roles. One wonders whether for some critics the temporary nature of the title itself has become too much the issue.

Things are complicated by the fact that until something goes wrong, most ambassadors work without real oversight. One of the criticisms in Dennis Jett’s excellent book American Ambassadors is the lack of standards and definitions of success for an ambassador. They report to the president after all, who is usually too busy to pay much attention to things on a day-to-day basis in Lesotho, no matter who the ambassador is. Underlings in the embassy by culture and negative experience tend to be sparse in their suggestions upward, and State has little of the military’s tradition of after-action summaries, tough lessons-learned reports, and sincere historical evaluation of mistakes. Ambassadors tend to choose their own path. Some try to be local celebrities, scoring photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and hosting VIPs. Others focus near-exclusively on American business promotion abroad, while others remember their own days in the bureaucracy and dive deep into political or economic reporting. This all further complicates what is and is not a “good” ambassador. So do we really need them?

Some Democrats think so. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, accused the administration of retreating from the world stage by leaving ambassadorial postings vacant. “China has ambassadors in nearly every country it has diplomatic relationships with, advancing its interests at the expense of America’s,” she said in a statement. Yet she and others rarely provide specific examples of what America’s ambassadors are doing or might be doing. Critics rarely identify policy outcomes that required a Senate-confirmed ambassador rather than a competent charge. That is the problem in these discussions, an unwavering belief that diplomatic presence is inherently valuable, even when its measurable effects are difficult to identify, and that if we’re not careful China will do it better. Remember of course the exact argument was made during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, leading the U.S. to open embassies in countries with little global importance, only to close them when priorities changed.

Ambassadors are increasingly curiosities left over from the 19th century, a past when Washington, DC, needed trusted representatives empowered to make decisions a world away. Embassies as they exist today were created for a world without Zoom, encrypted messaging, presidential and cabinet travel, celebrity special envoys, global media reporting, and easy direct leader-to-leader calls. It raises the question in 2026 that few people are willing to ask: If 92 embassies can function for months without ambassadors, how indispensable were those ambassadors in the first place?

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

Successive Australian governments have reacted with alarm at China’s influence-building activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. They have passed foreign interference laws, tightened foreign investment regulations, and regulated university collaborations with institutions overseas. They have executed a Pacific Step-Up and a plan for greater trade and investment with Southeast Asia. And they have tightened […]

The post What Australia could learn from SE Asia about managing China appeared first on Asia Times.

Indonesia has spent a decade trying to turn its mineral wealth into something more valuable than raw commodity exports. The strategy is ambitious: restrict raw nickel exports, attract investment, build processing capacity and move downstream into electric-vehicle (EV) batteries that will power the next generation of transport and energy storage. China is central to the […]

The post Owner or owned? Indonesia’s Chinese battery chain dilemma appeared first on Asia Times.

Non disponendo delle condizioni materiali necessarie per sfidare la supremazia industriale cinese, l’Unione Europea continua a trasformare le proprie difficoltà economiche in una giustificazione per una nuova escalation delle ostilità.

Segue nostro Telegram.

I leader europei sembrano aver individuato una nuova missione strategica: ricostruire la capacità industriale del continente riducendo al contempo la sua dipendenza dalla Cina. L’iniziativa è stata recentemente avanzata congiuntamente da Francia e Germania e viene presentata come una risposta alla crescente presenza della Cina sul mercato europeo. Il problema è che i leader responsabili di questo progetto continuano a ignorare una questione fondamentale: nessuna reindustrializzazione su larga scala può avere successo senza un approvvigionamento energetico stabile, abbondante e a prezzi accessibili.

L’Europa dispone di eccellenti università, di una forza lavoro qualificata, di centri tecnologici all’avanguardia e di una tradizione industriale che le conferisce ancora notevoli vantaggi. Tuttavia, queste risorse non possono funzionare in modo isolato. Gli impianti chimici, le acciaierie, gli stabilimenti metallurgici e numerose altre industrie dipendono da un approvvigionamento energetico continuo e competitivo. Il capitale, le conoscenze scientifiche e i lavoratori specializzati non possono compensare all’infinito i costi di produzione elevati. È proprio su questo punto che la strategia dell’Europa contraddice i propri stessi obiettivi.

Per decenni, l’integrazione economica tra l’Europa occidentale e la Russia ha fornito condizioni favorevoli allo sviluppo di importanti settori industriali. Le forniture di gas naturale russo, in particolare, hanno contribuito a sostenere attività ad alto consumo energetico. Questo rapporto ha soddisfatto gli interessi economici concreti di entrambe le parti: Mosca disponeva di un importante mercato per le proprie esportazioni, mentre le economie europee ottenevano una risorsa essenziale per la loro competitività.

L’introduzione delle sanzioni nel 2022 ha profondamente alterato questa situazione. Le misure coercitive illegali hanno reciso un partenariato di lunga data tra Russia ed Europa, lasciando la parte occidentale del continente economicamente indebolita e dipendente da approvvigionamenti energetici esterni più costosi e meno sicuri. L’Europa, che già prima di allora stava subendo una graduale deindustrializzazione, è successivamente precipitata in una crisi energetica, con conseguenze che vanno dall’aumento delle bollette energetiche ai fallimenti aziendali causati dall’incapacità di mantenere una produzione competitiva.

Sarebbe ragionevole aspettarsi che una strategia di ripresa industriale iniziasse affrontando queste vulnerabilità. Invece, i leader europei stanno tentando di costruire una nuova base produttiva senza risolvere adeguatamente il problema energetico. I responsabili della politica economica europea sembrano ritenere che sussidi, incentivi fiscali e programmi di investimento siano sufficienti a ripristinare la competitività. Tali strumenti possono contribuire allo sviluppo industriale, ma la loro efficacia rimarrà limitata fintantoché persisteranno gli svantaggi strutturali nei costi energetici.

È in questo contesto che la Cina sta assumendo una posizione sempre più di rilievo nella «lista delle preoccupazioni» di Bruxelles. La capacità della Cina di produrre su vasta scala, rifornire catene industriali complesse e offrire attrezzature a prezzi competitivi rappresenta una sfida per un’Europa che cerca di recuperare la propria autonomia produttiva. Anziché riconoscere la portata del declino accumulato e sviluppare una strategia coerente per invertire la tendenza, alcuni settori della leadership europea preferiscono ricorrere a barriere commerciali, indagini punitive e meccanismi di contenimento economico.

Tale approccio rivela una comprensione piuttosto superficiale della concorrenza industriale. Limitare le importazioni cinesi non comporta automaticamente la creazione di stabilimenti europei, né riduce i costi dell’elettricità, né garantisce l’approvvigionamento di gas agli impianti industriali. Al contrario, le aziende che dipendono da attrezzature, componenti e materie prime cinesi potrebbero trovarsi a dover sostenere spese più elevate proprio nel momento in cui hanno bisogno di investire per recuperare la propria posizione sui mercati internazionali.

La questione russa rende questa situazione ancora più delicata. Il ripristino della cooperazione energetica con Mosca costituirebbe il primo passo di qualsiasi serio piano di ripresa industriale. Grazie alle forniture energetiche russe e ad ampie partnership commerciali con la Cina, l’Europa potrebbe ritrovare una nuova strada verso lo sviluppo, proprio come stanno ora iniziando a fare i paesi africani e asiatici attraverso le loro partnership con la Russia e la Cina.

Bruxelles, Parigi e Berlino, tuttavia, si stanno muovendo nella direzione opposta. Gli strateghi europei sembrano determinati a confrontarsi contemporaneamente con due delle maggiori potenze industriali ed energetiche del mondo, senza dimostrare di possedere le risorse necessarie per sostenere tale ambizione. In primo luogo, hanno compromesso un rapporto energetico fondamentale con la Russia. Ora rischiano di trasformare la Cina in un avversario commerciale permanente.

In definitiva, ciò che i falchi europei perseguono non è lo sviluppo dell’Europa, bensì la strumentalizzazione di questioni quali l’industria e il commercio per portare avanti la propria agenda autodistruttiva. In base a questa strategia, i cittadini europei – già privati dell’energia russa e potenzialmente destinati a un accesso ridotto ai prodotti cinesi nel prossimo futuro – saranno ancora una volta i primi a subirne le conseguenze.