Stefan Wermuth/REUTERS
A Western company developing drone technology for NATO militaries says that working in Ukraine is the best way to ensure its gear meets the alliance's needs for a future fight.
ORQA, a Croatian company that makes drones and drone technology, including controllers, receivers, goggles, video equipment, and flight simulators, already supplies parts and systems to two dozen NATO allies. But it wants to draw on Ukraine's battlefield experience to improve its products.
Working in Ukraine "creates an opportunity to really channel this sort of operational expertise to shape these products. And then these products can be made to a standard that NATO demands," CEO Srđan Kovačević told Business Insider.
ORQA produces components used by Ukrainian defense tech company General Cherry and is partnering with the firm to jointly make drone systems and spread Ukraine's drone expertise.
The war in Ukraine is the most intense drone war ever fought, and getting feedback from the battlefield provides critical insight into what soldiers need most.
John Keeble/Getty Images
"If I'm being blunt, there are only a few parts of the world where you can actively shoot down these unmanned aerial threats in a real-world environment," Kovačević told Business Insider.
That same drive has prompted Western defense companies, ranging from small start-ups to major primes, to set up manufacturing facilities, repair hubs, and offices in Ukraine, seeking battlefield feedback to improve their technology faster.
ORQA is also seeking to better understand how Ukraine's defense industry scales, moves quickly, and works in wartime.
Ukrainian defense firms are producing drones and other weapons at a much faster rate than many of their Western counterparts.
Kovačević said that "the West has a tremendous amount to learn from Ukraine," saying that the "operational excellence that Ukrainian defense forces have developed is unparalleled in the Western world."
He said that while the West "has a very deep technology expertise," it lacks "this lived experience of taking that technology and applying it to the operational reality of the 21st-century warfare."
"Now," he said, "it's time to merge the two and emerge better off on both sides of this partnership."
General Cherry is one of Ukraine's biggest drone companies and has announced partnerships with other Western defense tech companies.
Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images
ORQA and General Cherry intend to manufacture in both countries, supplying NATO and its allies with Ukrainian-developed counter-drone technology while expanding domestic production of drone components in Ukraine.
Kovačević said Ukrainian companies like General Cherry have "immensely valuable lived experience of building and scaling under fire," something that is often "neglected by Western companies," but they can learn.
The significant "volumes that Ukrainian drone companies are able to produce really dwarf anything that's happening in the West right now," he added.
Western leaders are encouraging industrial collaboration, and NATO has launched programs to bring Ukrainian and allied defense companies together.
ORQA isn't alone in looking to Ukraine's extensive battlefield experience to develop better weapons for NATO. Latvia-based Origin Robotics, for example, makes BLAZE interceptor drones purchased by several NATO militaries and BEAK, a drone-launched precision-guided weapon used by Ukrainian forces.
Its CEO, Agris Kipurs, previously told Business Insider that the company takes lessons from its work in Ukraine, "but we adapt those weapons systems specifically to be used in a NATO country. And NATO countries and the armies of NATO countries are our customers. That is the user we build for."
Kovačević said Ukrainian technology can't simply be transplanted into NATO militaries. Ukraine has had to develop weapons at breakneck speed and make do with what's available.
NATO, however, has time to take operational knowledge, contextualize it for alliance forces, and build these products to the necessary standards using Western technology, he said.
Kovačević said the goal of these industrial partnerships is to supply NATO without undermining Ukraine's ability to meet its own wartime needs.
ORQA also aims to boost Ukraine's domestic production of drone components and reduce its reliance on foreign suppliers.
Ukraine is "relying heavily on non-Ukrainian and non-European supply chains," Kovačević said, adding that reducing that dependence is strategically important. ORQA says it manufactures key components in-house and avoids Chinese-made parts to strengthen its supply chain.
Ukraine's Cabinet has opened the construction of underground arms production space to private investors, Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi announced on 22 October, saying the rule applies from that day. A second decision eases imports for partner-funded weapons production.
Koretskyi said the change would add more of the space arms makers need, especially as Russian strikes intensify. On 9 December 2025, the Defense Ministry reported that more than UAH 1.5 billion (about $36 million) in budget support had let war-damaged defense firms restore operations. At the time, the ministry planned to relocate or duplicate the most critical plants, and underground complexes were under construction. The new model puts no additional burden on the state budget, Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Hvozdiar said. The bill still lands somewhere, though. Defense firms will buy, lease, or take the space for use, and companies working on state contracts are among those eligible. If they pay developers out of state-contract revenue, part of the cost could come back to the budget.
The changes to Cabinet resolution No. 1494 give private investors a simplified route to construction and permits, the ministry said. Developers can build protected facilities with their own or raised funds. Deadlines, terms of use, and the handover are set in a contract between investor and defense firm. The mechanism covers new sites as well as moving or expanding existing production. If a firm gets only part of a facility, that part must be at least 25% of the facility's total area and fit for production.
Developers must sign deals with, among others, residents of Defence City, Ukraine's special legal regime for arms makers, holders of state defense contracts, and firms the ministry designates as critical.
Components for weapons production that international partners pay for will enter Ukraine free of import duty and VAT, Koretskyi said. He added that customs inspection and clearance would be simplified and sharply shortened through a "single window."
JAVIER TORRES/AFP via Getty Images
"Man's best friend deserves man's best tech."
That's what Palmer Luckey said about his new startup, Warhound. The Anduril cofounder, along with Colossal Biosciences cofounder Ben Lamm, raised $200 million in seed funding for the startup that aims to genetically engineer high-performance military dogs.
Warhound said in a Thursday press release that it wants to rebuild the US's supply of working dogs for military forces, law enforcement, and emergency first-response teams.
It added that most of the military dogs currently working in the US are acquired from Europe, and many are eventually deemed unfit for service.
Colossal Biosciences is a biotechnology company that uses gene-editing tools to protect endangered species and revive extinct ones. It will help produce healthier dogs suited to demanding missions, with Lamm telling TechCrunch that this involves enhancing the dogs' speed, agility, and ability to sniff out bombs.
Anduril's contribution to Warhound is the external hardware to keep the dogs and their handlers safe, such as eye and ear protection.
Warhound's $200 million seed round was backed by several VC firms, including In-Q-Tel, Sequoia Capital, ARK Invest, and Franklin Templeton.
Shaun Maguire, a partner at Sequoia Capital, said in the release, "Palmer, Ben and the Warhound team are exceptional. Sequoia is proud to back them."
Warhound will be led by CEO David Spirk, a senior counselor at Palantir and a veteran of the US Marine Corps. He was also a former data officer for the Department of War.
The startup, based in Texas, has made commitments to animal welfare, saying in the release that it's certified by the American Humane Society, the US's first national animal welfare organization.
It said that improving the health and training success of the dogs will limit the number who enter unnecessary intensive training and enable safer missions.
Screenshot via Telegram/Serhii Sternenko
Russia's next big bet in the air war will likely move past jet-powered Shaheds to a deep arsenal of new cruise missiles, two of Ukraine's most prominent drone experts warned on Thursday.
Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov and Serhii Sternenko wrote separately on their Telegram channels about the Filin, an 11-foot Russian winged cruise missile that Ukraine's military intelligence service recently unveiled.
These cheap weapons possess superior capabilities that would easily overshadow the threat posed by the Shahed, according to the pair, both former drone advisors to Ukraine's defense ministry.
"The mass use of this type of aerial attack weapon is what awaits us very soon," wrote Sternenko, who runs a major foundation that crowdfunds for Ukraine's military, in a Telegram post.
"Then we will remember the jet Shaheds only as a small problem compared to this," he added.
Beskrestnov, a drone analyst, said he had "long predicted that our adversary is betting on cheap cruise missiles for the future, not on jet Shaheds."
He wrote on his Telegram channel that the Filin can fly faster, maneuver better, and carry a heavier payload than Russia's current turbojet drones,
"They do not need drone ports, many of them can be launched from helicopters and UAVs. And most importantly, they can be produced from Russian components," Beskrestnov added.
On Wednesday, Ukraine's military intelligence agency, GUR, released extensive details on the Filin, which it said Russia had begun deploying at the end of summer 2026.
The Filin, it said, is the "continuation of the trend of the Russian military-industrial complex to develop inexpensive air attack weapons with jet propulsion and ground launch."
The ground-launched missile can carry a 100kg warhead, and Russia has said that it can fly at speeds of almost 500 mph at a range of 745 miles. By comparison, the Kremlin's most advanced jet-powered drone deployed so far, the Geran-5, is known to fly at a maximum speed of 370 mph.
The Filin can also fly at "ultra-low altitudes" and as high as 3.7 miles, GUR said.
Similar to Russia's Shahed drones, the Filin features a carbon and fiberglass fuselage, with some of its parts produced via 3D printing, the intelligence service added.
And as with turbojet Shaheds, GUR also said that the Filin is filled with foreign electronics in its flight controller, inertial navigation system, equipment control unit, and counter-jamming hardware.
The agency listed 35 components from the US, including transistors and converters; 22 from China; and 13 more from Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the Netherlands.
Notably, GUR said the Filin's engine is Russian-made, compared to the Chinese engines used on many of Moscow's turbojet drones. The same engine has been found on other recently unveiled Russian missiles, such as the air-launched Kover and Monochrome.
Much of Russia's ability to reduce the cost of its new cruise missiles is owed to its use of commercial engines and components. Another high-profile Russian missile that also uses civilian tech is the Banderol, which emerged in the spring of 2025 and has been straining Ukraine's air defense networks in the last few months.
The Banderol flies more slowly and has a shorter range than the Filin, but it still reaches a max speed of 435 mph, making it much harder for Ukraine to intercept with drones. Its estimated price is $150,000 per unit — about a sixteenth the cost of a traditional Kh-101 cruise missile — so it's easier to mass-produce.
The frequent use of weapons like the Banderol over the summer has led to fears that Russia will lean into its tactic, often nicknamed "missile spam," to keep pushing Ukrainian air defenses.
"What is the Air Force command doing now to build up countermeasures in advance?" Sternenko wrote on Wednesday about the missile threat.
From Knife Rights, Inc. v. Blanche, decided yesterday by Fifth Circuit Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, joined by Judges Don Willett and Cory Wilson:
This case presents a Second Amendment challenge to the Federal Switchblade Act (FSA)'s restrictions on switchblade knives. {Section 2 of the FSA, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1242, … place[s] a fine of up to "$2,000 or imprison[ment] not more than five years, or both" for anyone who "knowingly introduces, or manufactures for introduction, into interstate commerce, or transports or distributes in interstate commerce, any switchblade knife."}
Applying the framework articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, we hold that the FSA is unconstitutional. We determine that switchblade knives qualify as "Arms" and are covered by the "plain text" of the Second Amendment. Because the regulation implicates the amendment, the government bears the burden of establishing that the FSA comports with well-established principles of the Second Amendment and its regulatory tradition. The government fails to meet its burden. Specifically, the FSA's restrictions on the introduction, manufacture, transportation, and distribution of switchblades fail step two's "how" analysis….
Amongst other definitions, Heller highlighted that the founding era understood the term to mean "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another." Switchblade knives have surely been used for "defence" and to "strike another."
Knives have been used for defense throughout human history, including the American founding. During the colonial period, "[e]veryone had a knife," and "as long as a man was required to defend his life," a "knife was a constant necessity." In the 1700s and during the American Revolution, knives were used for scavenging, hunting, and defense, and "[b]elt and pocket knives" accompanied frontiersmen "in the developing eastern settlements and on the western frontiers." Well into the 1800s, "men of all walks of life" were "accustomed to wear a knife as a necessary part of their garb."
Switchblade knives are no exception. "Springblade knives" (precursors to the modern switchblade) "have been made for hundreds of years because there has always been a need for a pocketknife that can be opened easily when the hands are wet, cold, or covered with gloves." In the 1700s, such knives were a part of certain types of flint-lock pistols: "[i]f the pistol mis-fired (which frequently happened) the person would touch the release button and the blade would open up, and be available for use." After the Civil War, patents for switchblade knives proliferated, and the large-scale production of "switchblades in the United States began in the 1880s, shortly" thereafter. Then, "[o]ver a 50 year period from the mid 1890s to the mid 1940s there had been approximately 20 different companies who had manufactured switchblade knives in this country." In short, some forms of switchblades have been commonly used for defense for hundreds of years. They are "arms."
Accordingly, the government's not-in-common-use argument fails. In addition to the wealth of history indicating the founding-era uses of switchblades for defense, the record indicates that there are "millions" of automatically opening knives in the United States now. The record further reflects that switchblade knives are lawfully used for "every day utility use, hunting, fishing, recreation, and camping and hiking." Despite the FSA, there are still lawful sales of switchblade knives in the United States. Consequently, switchblade knives are "arms" "in common use" both then and now….
We proceed to step two [of the Bruen analysis]. Here, we assess whether § 1242 is consistent with the principles that flow from the Second Amendment's history and tradition….
The government makes its stand primarily by citing a host of nineteenth-century cases in support of its argument that there existed a well-established tradition of regulating "inherently concealable weapons." The concealable nature of these weapons, the argument goes, makes them "particularly dangerous." The government connects this with the clear congressional history that suggests that Congress enacted the FSA because it believed that switchblades posed a unique danger and therefore needed to be restricted. This line of argument is focused on answering the "why" portion of the step two inquiry.
However, we do not reach the question of whether the government meets its burden as to the "why" analysis because it fails the "how" analysis. As mentioned, the Supreme Court has informed us that "[e]ven when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason," it may not be "compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding." So, even if we grant the government's argument that there is a well-established tradition of regulating "inherently concealable weapons," this only addresses the "why" inquiry.
The government cites no historical analogue that regulates the manufacture, transportation, or distribution of "inherently concealable weapons," much less switchblade knives. Rather, its analogues suggest that there is a tradition of regulating the manner of carrying concealable weapons….
The government's best attempt at meeting its burden is through a single citation to a treatise-length law review article. See Gov't Br. at 16–17 (citing David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The History of Bans on Types of Arms Before 1900, 50 J. Legis. 223 (2024)). It cites the article to show how "statutes regulated concealable weapons in a variety of different ways, including banning carry or concealed carry, prohibiting their possession in specific locations, subjecting their sale or possession to taxes, or restricting the sale to minors." The referenced section of the article catalogs nearly two hundred pre-1900 statutes regulating daggers, dirks, and sword canes.
Of the nearly two-hundred statutes, only two regulate bladed weapons in an analogous manner as § 1242. See 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 192 (proscribing the "sell[ing], barter[ing] or exchang[ing]" of "any dirk or bowie knife, or sword or spear in a cane"); 1837 Ga. Laws 90, 90–91 (making unlawful "for any merchant, or vend[o]r of wares or merchandize in this State, or any other person or persons whatsoever, to sell, or offer to sell … Bowie, or any other kinds of knives, manufactured and sold for the purpose of wearing, or carrying the same as arms of offence or defense, pistols, dirks, sword canes, spears, &c"). Two laws out of nearly two hundred bring us into outlier territory….
John William Dillon (Dillon Law Group, A.P.C.), Richard Brent Cooper (Cooper & Scully, P.C.), and Daniel Schmutter (Hartman & Winnicki, P.C.) represent plaintiffs.
The post Switchblade Ban Violates Second Amendment, Fifth Circuit Holds appeared first on Reason Magazine.
© Geert Vanden Wijngaert/Associated Press
As of October, Russia has up to 700 ballistic and several thousand cruise missiles in reserve, and its 2026 state order for Geran-type drones and decoys such as the Gerbera exceeded 100,000 units, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) told NV in figures the outlet published on 20 October. The missile stocks are roughly the same as HUR reported to NV in July, the outlet found.
Ukraine enters the heating season facing what it says is a Russian plan to hit 60 infrastructure sites this winter. HUR’s figures suggest Russia has the weapons for it, even after its fall mass strikes. In June, HUR said Russia could fire up to 100 ballistic missiles a month while keeping its stocks steady. Its drone output, meanwhile, is shifting to jets that are harder to shoot down.
Russia can make more than 200 missiles a month, 110 of them ballistic, HUR said. About 115 of its ballistic missiles are Iskander-Ms, with production of up to 65 a month. A modernized Iskander with a projected range of 550 to 700 km is in development.
At the same time, Russia holds up to 400 S-300PM and S-400 air defense missiles adapted to strike ground targets, and makes about 40 a month. Meanwhile, Kinzhal production has been temporarily paused over poor accuracy, and the capacity has gone to conventional ballistic missiles.
Russia plans to make more than 80 Kh-101 cruise missiles a month and is exceeding that, though defects in releasing them from aircraft have sent some batches back to the factories.
Russia has more than 450 Kalibrs and makes about 29 a month. Because Ukrainian air defense downs them effectively, Russia sends most new ones to its strategic reserve and to equip its fleets, HUR said. It also holds more than 600 Oniks anti-ship missiles, upgraded for ground strikes, and more than 120 Zircons.
Russia holds a reserve of about 6,200 Gerans and makes about 10,000 drones a month. Its main production hub is the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan.
Since summer, Russia has shifted toward turbojet drones. “The reason is the saturation of Ukraine’s Air Force with mobile fire groups that shoot down low-speed targets en masse,” HUR said. Russia now assembles about 4,000 jet drones a month, mostly Geran-4s and Geran-5s, which fly at 400 to 500 km/h. It also makes about 2,000 cheaper propeller-driven Geran-2s, which HUR said are used to wear down air defense and locate air defense positions.
In a direct confrontation with Russia, European NATO states would likely be even more vulnerable than Ukraine to swarms of Russia’s new jet-powered strike weapons, Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) argued in a 20 October op-ed for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He calls them low-cost cruise missiles. Just three days earlier, Romania met what it believes were two of them over the Black Sea.
Romanian F-16 fighter jets shot down two jet-powered Geran-family drones over Romania’s territorial waters on 17 October, the Defense Ministry said. Interim Defense Minister Radu Miruță said they flew at about 450 km/h and were likely Geran-4s, the first of that type Romania had downed.
Russia began using the Geran-4 in May in response to effective Ukrainian interceptor drones, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said, adding that it reaches up to 500 km/h. By June, those interceptors were downing about half of slower Shahed-type drones, defense adviser Serhii Beskrestnov estimated.
Hoffmann traces the shift to the Geran-3, a model Ukraine recovered intact in 2025. In his account, a Chinese JT80 turbojet roughly doubled its speed, from 185 to 350 km/h. However, he puts newer models, including the Geran-4, at 600 km/h or more, above HUR’s figure for that model.
By his estimate, each costs $150,000–$250,000, against about $50,000 for a long-range drone. Still, from Russia’s perspective, he wrote, that buys a significantly higher chance of getting through.
Hoffmann argues defenses must match the threat’s speed, for example with jet-powered interceptor drones. Ukraine already fields some. On 4 October, President Zelenskyy said its Bars interceptors had shown the highest percentage among Ukrainian interceptors, about 30% of targets, according to Militarnyi. One unit destroyed five aerial targets with five Bars interceptors, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara later told journalists. He also called aviation one of the most effective tools against jet drones.
Hoffmann’s concern is scale. Jet engines are in short supply, he wrote, because too few European and US suppliers can meet demand. Ukraine’s Defense Industry Council flagged a shortage of such engines for its drones in April. In his view, gun systems and higher-end missile defenses are too scarce or too costly to fill the gap.
Key developments on Oct. 21:
From today's decision by Judge John Sinatra (W.D.N.Y.) in Heeter v. James:
New York enacted a first-of-its-kind law prohibiting law-abiding residents-who are not engaged or employed in an eligible profession-from purchasing body armor for self-defense. New York enacted this legislation "to further strengthen gun laws." New York's body armor legislation, however, violates the Second Amendment….
In D.C. v. Heller (2008), the Court made it clear what the term "Arms" meant when the Second Amendment was ratified. In explaining that "[t]he 18th-century meaning" of the term "Arms" is "no different from the meaning today[,]" the Court quoted multiple dictionaries from the Seventeenth Century. Specifically, "[t]he 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined 'arms' as '[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.' 1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary defined 'arms' as 'any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.' 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary; see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989).'' As a result, this Court is bound by Heller's textual analysis, which demonstrates that the word "arms" included armor at the Nation's founding (as it does today)….
The State submits that, during the Founding Era, armor "had become rare or even entirely obsolete in everyday American English" and "the protective leather gear of th[e] pre-Kevlar era was notoriously ineffective against bullets, meaning civilians did not typically wear such body protection either." This argument runs headlong into the definitions adopted by Heller, nevertheless indicating that the term "arms"—as it was defined in the Founding Era—included defensive body armor that (according to the State) was supposedly rarely utilized in 1791.
Body armor may be used more today than Defendants' understanding of its use in 1791. But it strains credulity to say that an arm that was rarely used during the Founding Era—yet still protected by the Second Amendment per Heller—is no longer protected despite being much more common among Americans today.
Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with Heller's clear statement that the Second Amendment "extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." While body armor may not have been in common use at the founding—although the commonly understood definition of "arms" included body armor—neither were other arms commonly used for self-defense, such as resolvers, semiautomatic pistols, and stun guns. See Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016) (Alito, J., concurring). The defensive body armor available today is "no more exempt from the Second Amendment's protections, simply because [it was] unknown to the First Congress, than electronic communications are exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment." …
Even if the definitions put forth by the Supreme Court in Heller are dicta, this Court has an "obligation to accord great deference to Supreme Court dicta," absent a change in the legal landscape. Defendants have not suggested—nor can they—that a change in the legal landscape exists that would require this Court to ignore how Heller defined the term "arms." …
Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated that body armor is an "arm" protected by the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the State to justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of arms regulation. The State fails to do so….
The State argues that there exists a "centuries-long historical tradition" demonstrating that, "when body armor has been in use, it has been subject to government regulation." Yet, the State is unable to identify a single regulation on body armor post-ratification…. The State contends that its body armor ban is consistent with "English monarchs and parliaments" who "regularly issued laws forbidding or restricting the wearing of armor …." Not only is this analogy irrelevant to the regulation of arms in the United States, but it also ignores the historical reason the right to keep and bear arms is "understood to be an individual right protecting against public and private violence." Accordingly, the Court interprets the English history put forth by the State in light of these principles and articulates that it is not "sufficiently probative" to defend New York's body armor ban….
The State points to the Statute of Northampton for support for its position that there is a long-standing tradition of restricting who can purchase body armor. The law prohibited anyone to "go, nor ride armed by night, nor by day, in fairs markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armor to the King and their bodies to prison, at the king's pleasure." Notwithstanding the ink that continues to be spilled over this law, the Supreme Court has stated that "the Statute of Northampton—at least as it was understood during the Middle Ages—has little bearing on the Second Amendment adopted in 1791." N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022)….
The State's analogy to the Statute of Northampton is an attempt to justify its body armor ban by speculating that individuals only wear body armor to terrify the public. Yet, this ignores the reality put forth by Plaintiffs, that the public is more likely to reach for body armor to protect themselves from terrifying circumstances. In Rahimi, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment." Here, however, the State is suggesting that a merely broad-based suspicion over the population at large is sufficient to justify a universal ban on the sale and purchase of a specific type of arm. And to the extent that the State analogizes this to prohibiting criminals from purchasing body armor, other statutes already criminalize the use of body armor while committing violent crimes. The State's categorical prohibition of a specific type of arm to law-abiding citizens at large, is untethered from any historical tradition-including the Statute of Northampton….
Nicolas J. Rotsko (Fluet) represents plaintiffs.
The post Body Armor Ban Struck Down by N.Y. Federal Court appeared first on Reason Magazine.
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